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European Journal of Political Theory
10(1) 7191
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885110386006
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E JPTArticle
Human dignity inhistorical perspective:The contemporary
andtraditional paradigms
Oliver SensenTulane University, USA
Abstract
Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become
increasingly prominent in
the political discourse on human rights. In United Nations
documents, for instance,
human dignity is currently presented as the justification for
human rights. In this paper
I shall argue that the contemporary way in which human dignity
is thought to ground
human rights is very different from the way human dignity has
been understood tradi-
tionally. My aim is to contrast the contemporary paradigm of
dignity to a different one
that has been prominent historically from Cicero onwards. My
conclusion is that if one
wants to use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannot
refer to the history of
philosophy for support of this conception, and if one wants to
use this history in
support, one would have to employ a different conception of
dignity that uses a different
pattern of thought.
Keywords
absolute value, dignitas, human dignity, human rights, Kant,
Stoic
Introduction
Over the last 60 years the idea of human dignity has become
increasingly prominentin the political discourse on human rights.
To take one important example, humandignity is currently said to be
the justication for human rights in United Nationsdocuments. In
this paper I shall argue that the way in which human dignity is
oftenthought to ground human rights as it is implied by UN
documents and contem-porary sources is very dierent from the way
human dignity has been understoodtraditionally. In the following I
shall rst characterize the inuential contemporaryview of human
dignity, using the UN documents as an illustration. I shall
then
Corresponding author:
Oliver Sensen, Department of Philosophy, 105 Newcomb Hall,
Tulane University, 6823 St. Charles Avenue,
New Orleans, USA
Email: [email protected]
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introduce a dierent paradigm of dignity that has been prominent
historically.I shall refer to the views of Cicero, Leo the Great,
Pico della Mirandola andKant as examples of this paradigm. Finally,
I shall spell out the contrast betweenwhat I call the contemporary
and the traditional patterns of thought.1 My aim inthis paper is
therefore to distinguish dierent patterns of thought, and
illustratetheir importance in historical context.
The contemporary paradigm of dignity
In contemporary usage, dignity when it is thought to be more
than a mere con-vention is often referred to as an inherent value
of human beings.2 Human dignityis seen as a term with strong moral
implications; in particular, it is often said thatone should
respect other people because of their dignity.3 In justifying why
oneshould respect others, the good (the inherent value of the
individual) is seen as priorto the right (the principle that
demands respect for others), and the rights of thoseaected are seen
as being prior to the duty of the agent. Accordingly, Josef
Seifertexpresses the contemporary view as follows:
When we speak of the dignity of human life, we mean an objective
and intrinsic value.
We speak of a value and intrinsic goodness greater than, and
dierent from, a modest
aesthetic value of an ornament or the intellectual value of a
chess player . . .which do
not directly impose moral imperatives on us. Instead, when we
speak of human dig-
nity, we speak of morally relevant value, one which evidently
imposes on us a moral
call and an obligation to respect it.4
That is, human beings possess the objective and inherent value
property called dig-nity, and because of this they can make rights
claims on others. Not many propo-nents of human dignity reect on
the ontological status of this value. However,scholars who do, such
as Seifert, consider the value to be a non-relational
property,5
that is, a property that does not change according to the
dierent circumstances orrelations in which a human being nds
himself. The distinguishing feature of thisproperty is a moral
importance: each human being has an intrinsic and
objectivepreciousness.6 Dignity is said to be a value that is
incommensurably higher7 thanother values (e.g. things one values
for pleasure or use). This view of dignity as anontologically
distinct value property is a stark form of value realism, such as
onemight nd in G. E. Moore andMax Scheler.8 The way one can detect
such a value isoften said to be by intuition as direct recognition.
For instance, Seifert writes: Aslife, and human life, this value
called dignity is an ultimate and irreducible phe-nomenon which
cannot be dened properly speaking but can only be unfolded
andbrought to evidence.9 Seiferts view that the inherent value
property cannot bedened is based on his interpretation of G. E.
Moores intuitionism.10 Not everyproponent of the contemporary
paradigm of dignity holds an intuitionist epistemol-ogy, however.
For instance, a number of contemporary Kantians provide
argumentsfor an absolute value of human beings.11 For now it is
only important to note the
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main structure or pattern of thought characteristic of the
contemporary conceptionof dignity. Today dignity is widely
conceived of as an inherent value property on thebasis of which one
can claim rights from others: one has rights because of
onesintrinsic and objective preciousness. In justifying human
rights, the good (dignity) isprior to a principle stating what is
right; and human rights as entitlements whichare justied by the
good are prior to the duties of the agent.
The character and importance of this contemporary conception of
dignity can beillustrated by the usage of dignity in United Nations
documents. In UN docu-ments human dignity is currently said to be
the justication for human rights.However, there is one important
limitation to using the UN documents as anexample that has to be
noted at the beginning. In documents like these keyterms are
deliberately kept vague, since one can only secure an agreement
amongso many dierent parties at the price of a certain ambiguity.12
If one were to specifythe meaning and grounding force of human
dignity, it might be at odds with someparties deeply entrenched
opinions and beliefs. In this case the whole project mightfail.
Accordingly, there is no explicit attempt to clarify or justify
human dignity inthese documents. However, the language that is used
is perfectly in line with thecontemporary paradigm, and can to this
extent be used as an illustration: The twoUN Covenants state that
human rights derive from an inherent dignity of thehuman person,
and the UN Charter links dignity and worth.
In 1947, in the wake of the Second World War and only two years
after thefounding Charter of the United Nations, the decision was
made to draft anInternational Bill of Rights. This Bill was
intended to serve as the basis of free-dom, justice and world
peace, and it was to consist of three parts: a
non-bindingdeclaration of a general nature, a convention of more
limited scope and a docu-ment of methods of implementation.13 Human
dignity plays an important role inall of these UN documents: the
founding Charter of 1945, the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights
of 1948 and the two Covenants on Rights, draftedin 1966.14 In all
of these documents human dignity is central to justifying
humanrights, or is explicitly said to be the basis for them.
As scholars point out,15 the role of dignity as the basis for
human rights is notunambiguous in the 1945 Charter and 1948
Declaration, as dignity and rightsare listed in them side by side.
However, the view of dignity as the ground of rightsis made
explicit in the Covenants of 1966.
The Introduction to the founding Charter of the UN (1945)
reads:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to rearm
faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small . . . and for these
aims . . . have resolved
to combine our eorts to accomplish these aims.16
In this document human rights and dignity are listed together,
but neither of themis said to depend on the other; dignity is more
closely associated with the worth ofthe human person.
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Similarly, the rst sentence of the Preamble of the UN Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights (1948) places rights and dignity side by
side:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the
world . . . now therefore the General Assembly proclaims this
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . .17
So, in both the 1945 and 1948 documents, human dignity is
presentedhand in hand with rights, implying an important connection
between them,but dignity is not yet made the explicit basis for
rights. However, in the 1948Declaration dignity is already
strengthened in its importance, as it is now namedbefore
rights.
It is also noteworthy that the framers of the 1948 Declaration
had more con-dence about the existence of human dignity.18 Whereas
the parties to the 1945Charter express their faith in dignity, the
members to the Declaration present dig-nity as an inherent fact or
property that can be recognized. As I have indicated,this way of
conceiving of dignity suggests that human beings are equipped
withdignity as a distinct (value19) property, in virtue of which
one is justied in demand-ing ones rights from others. The
Declaration, though, does not give an account ofwhat this inherent
(value) property is, nor of how one is able to know or recog-nize
it.
The two Covenants on rights adopted in 1966, the International
Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights, give human dignity
an even more important role. Their pre-ambles explicitly state that
dignity is the basis for human rights. Both Covenantsbegin their
preamble with these words (my emphasis):
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed
in the Charter of the
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and
peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity
of the human person . . . ,
Agree upon the following articles: . . .20
Accordingly, in both Covenants human dignity is presented as the
main foundation of
rights: rights derive from inherent dignity. The Covenants are
more important than
the 1948 Declaration insofar as the Declaration is a non-binding
statement of intent,21
while the Covenants put some requirements on their parties even
if they include no
sanctions.22
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To sum up, UN documents help to show that human dignity is of
prime impor-tance for discussion of human rights. Since the UN
Covenants human dignity ispresented as the justication for human
rights. Human dignity is associated withworth and said to be
inherent. Although in these documents dignity is neitherdened any
further nor justied, the UN documents can serve as an illustration
ofthe contemporary paradigm of human dignity and its prominence. In
the followingsection, I shall characterize the traditional paradigm
of dignity. In Section 3 I shallthen bring out the dierences
between the traditional and the contemporary para-digms of human
dignity.
The traditional paradigm of human dignity
There is a historically prominent way of thinking about human
dignity that isdistinct from the contemporary paradigm. Because of
its prominence I shall callit the traditional paradigm of human
dignity. It can be argued that this traditionalparadigm was
dominant throughout the history of philosophy, and that
thecontemporary paradigm virtually did not exist before the 20th
century.23 My ambi-tion here is not to present a full history of
ideas, but to bring out clearly thestructure of a prominent
alternative conception of dignity.24 I shall then illustratethe
traditional paradigm in reference to the views on human dignity of
Cicero, Leothe Great, Pico della Mirandola, and Immanuel Kant four
prominent thinkersspanning classical antiquity, the Christian
middle ages, the Renaissance and themodern age. In doing so, the
primary aim is not to provide a detailed or novelreading of the
thinkers in question, but to bring to light the broad
similaritiesin their views of human dignity, and to formulate the
traditional paradigmmore clearly.
To begin with a brief overview: human dignity, in the
traditional conception, isin the rst place the answer to the
theoretical question of the place of human beingsin the universe.
According to this paradigm, human beings are distinguished fromthe
rest of nature in virtue of certain capacities they have,
particularly reason andfreedom. The term dignity is used to express
this special position or elevation.Only in a further step does
human dignity gain moral relevance: through the intro-duction of a
further moral premise, one is said to have a duty to realize fully
onesinitial dignity.25 This second stage I shall therefore call
realized dignity, and therst stage initial dignity. The traditional
paradigm then uses a twofold conceptionof dignity.
The traditional paradigm of human dignity is related to an older
aristocraticusage of dignity. The aristocratic usage is familiar
from common parlance if, forinstance, one speaks of a dignitary or
a baroness who carries herself with dignity.The aristocratic usage
of dignity can be seen in the ancient Roman dignitas,26
according to which dignity is an elevated position or rank. In
ancient Romedignitas was a concept of political life: it expressed
the elevated position of theruling class. In the aristocratic usage
dignity is not ascribed to all human beingsbut is a term of
distinction; it was an aristocratic conception in that it applied
only
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to a few, for instance to a consul or senator. The elevated
position could be gained,lost or regained. It could be gained
through the political oce, which itself could begained through
merit, birth or wealth. In virtue of this rank one had certain
powersand privileges, but one also had duties to behave
appropriately to ones rank.
The Roman dignitas is a complicated notion that has further
connotations thanrank, e.g. excellence, worthiness and esteem.27
However, the additional connota-tions are not essential to
dignitas. One can have the high oce without beingexcellent, worthy,
or esteemed. In the late Roman Empire there was the
Notitiadignitatum, a list ranking the highest oces in the empire.28
To have dignity in thissense neither presupposes excellence, nor
high esteem. One simply has to have theoce, which was given out by
the emperor. The essential component is that dignityexpresses a
relation, an elevated standing of something over something
else.
What this paradigm therefore brings out and this will be crucial
for under-standing the contrast between the contemporary and the
traditional patterns ofthought is that one does not have to
understand dignity as a non-relationalvalue property human beings
possess. Rather dignity can merely refer to rank oran elevated
position. To say that something is elevated over something else
there-fore does not necessarily refer to a moral order, or an order
in value. In the lateRoman empire one could have dignity without
being worthy (morally or otherwise)of the oce. The sense in which
something is elevated over something else willtherefore have to be
specied with each usage of dignity.
Cicero
It was Cicero who used the aristocratic Roman term dignitas to
express the idea ofhuman beings elevated place in the universe. He
thereby universalized dignitas toapply to all human beings: All
human beings have a rank or elevated position innature. His thought
therefore provides a clear and important example of the
tra-ditional conception of dignity, as one can see by considering
his discussion of thesuperiority or dignity of human beings over
animals in book 1 of De ociis.29 Inparagraphs 105 to 107 he says
that animals are governed only by instinct and theirsensual
pleasure, while human beings have reason. Because of this
superiority itwould be unworthy of humans to live a life of
pleasure:
But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep
before our eyes how far
superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have
no thought except for
sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to
seek; but mans mind is
nurtured by study and meditation. (1. 105)30
Cicero concludes the paragraph by saying that human beings are
ashamed if theyare caught in living out their pleasure. He
continues:
From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the
dignity of man and
that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; . . .And if we
will only bear in mind the
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superiority and dignity (excellentia et dignitas) of our nature,
we shall realize how
wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury
and voluptuousness,
and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity,
and sobriety. (1. 106)
Since one would be ashamed if one were caught indulging in
pleasure, Ciceroargues, living a life of pleasure is unworthy of
the elevated position humanbeings occupy. Ones superiority and
elevated position demand a life in whichones lower desires are
governed in accordance with reason. According toCicero, all human
beings are endowed with reason:
We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two
characters, as it were:
one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being
all alike endowed with
reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute.
From this all morality
and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational
method of ascertaining
our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to
individuals in particular.
(1. 107)
This is a clear example of the traditional pattern of thought.
Human beings are saidto be elevated over animals in virtue of
having reason. Because one is elevated overanimals, one should not
behave like animals, but live a life of reason. Cicerosderivation
of duty from the fact that one possesses reason is implicitly based
upon ateleological premise: nature has given one reason, and one
should act according tonature. Therefore, the superiority or
elevation of human beings over animals is atrst only a factual
description: human beings possess the capacity for reason,
whileanimals do not (cf. 1. 13). It is only by adding a further
premise that this fact yieldsan obligation (even if Cicero did not
introduce them as two separate premises, theyare logically
distinguishable). It is because nature gave one the end of
self-controland restraint that one should act this way: nature has
endowed us with the role ofsteadfastness, restraint, self-control,
and modesty (1. 98).31 As to the reason whyone should behave in
accordance with nature, Cicero claims that it would be point-less
to go against it:
It is pointless to go to war with nature and to aim at something
which we cannot
achieve. This is a truth which lends greater clarity to the
nature of the tting; for
nothing is tting if it ies in the face of Minerva, as the saying
goes, in other words if
nature confronts and conicts with it. (1. 110)
Nature, then, circumscribes the lives open to human beings, and
it pointsthem toward the life that is tting for them. That life is
one that accords withthe dignity or elevation of human nature: the
tting is what is consistent withmans excellence in the respect in
which his nature diers from all other livingcreatures (1. 96).
To sum up, Cicero gives a clear example of the traditional
paradigm of dignity,according to which human beings are special in
nature in virtue of possessing
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a certain capacity, namely reason. Being elevated, or having
dignity, in this waywas said to yield a duty to behave in a way
that is worthy of this dignity. ForCicero, human beings have this
duty because nature endowed them with reason,and it would be
pointless to go against nature. The duty to use ones reason
appro-priately is justied with a teleological premise.
Leo the Great
Among Christian thinkers, an important example of the
traditional twofold con-ception of dignity is found in the sermons
of Pope Leo I (or St Leo the Great,reigned 44061). His sermons are
thought to contain the earliest known usages ofthe Latin dignitas
by a Christian thinker.32 In one famous passage, he says:
Realize(agnosce), o Christian, your dignity. Once made a partaker
in the divine nature,do not return to your former baseness by a
life unworthy [of that dignity].33 Thispassage is still used today,
as it is the opening sentence of the section on moralquestions in
the Catholic Catechism.34 Leo also expresses the view that one is
madea partaker in the divine nature by saying that one is created
in Gods image:Wake up then, o friend, and acknowledge the dignity
of your nature. Recallthat you have been made according to the
image of God. 35
For Leo, then, human beings have dignity, which is to say that
they are elevatedover the rest of nature in being created in the
image of God.36 The respect in whichhuman beings are an image of
God is that they have a soul, which is what elevatesthem above
animals, and over the body more generally: let the soul, which
prop-erly is constituted as ruler of the body under the direction
of God, retain the dignityof its mastery.37 And this dignity, Leo
says, consists in the souls capacity togovern itself independently
of bodily desires by the use of reason that is, in notbeing
determined by bodily desires:
If . . . the desires of the body are stronger, the soul will
shamefully lose dignity proper
to it, and it will be calamitous for it to be a slave to what it
ought to govern. But if the
mind, submissive to its Ruler and to heavenly gifts, tramples on
the lures of earthly
indulgence and does not allow sin to reign in its own body,
reason will hold a well-
ordered leadership.38
So, while Leo explicitly conceives of dignity in reference to
God, he would agreewith Ciceros view that human beings are elevated
over the rest of nature in virtueof reason and the capacity to rule
bodily desires.39 Leo goes on to say that oneought to imitate
God:
If we reect upon the beginning of our creation with faith and
wisdom, dearly
beloved, we shall come to the realization that human beings have
been formed accord-
ing to the image of God precisely with a view that they might
imitate their Designer.
Our race has this dignity of nature, so long as the gure of
divine goodness continues
to be reected in us as in a kind of mirror.40
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A human being lives up to the dignity of his nature as long as
he remains animage of God.
To sum up, Leo provides another example of the traditional
twofold conceptionof dignity.41 According to this conception, to
repeat, human beings are distin-guished in nature in virtue of
having certain capacities that animals and non-rational nature
lack, specically reason and freedom from the determination ofbodily
desires. Because human beings are distinguished in possessing these
capac-ities, it is said that they should make a proper use of them,
and thus realize theirinitial dignity. Leos views are similar to
Ciceros in this respect, but in Leosthought a providential God
takes the place of a teleological nature.42 Leo expressesthis duty
by emphasizing that God commands human beings to imitate
divineworks: justly does God demand from them the imitation of
himself, for hehas made them in his image and likeness .43
Pico della Mirandola
Human dignity emerged as a topic of particular prominence among
Renaissancethinkers it even appears in the titles of several famous
books from the period.44
This prominence is often seen as a reaction to a work called De
Miseria HumaneConditionis by Cardinal Lothario dei Conti (or
Segni), later Pope Innocent III, thatemphasized the misery of
man.45
In the following I shall focus on the most salient of the
writers treating dignity inthis period, Pico della Mirandola
(146394),46 whose thought provides anotherexample of the
traditional paradigm of dignity. In his Discourse on the Dignity
ofMan (1486) Pico considers the place of man within the universal
order or thechain of being47 that stretches from God to the lowest
animals, and he concludesthat the initial dignity of man consists
in having no xed place in that chain.Rather, the dignity of human
beings lies in their capacity to choose their ownplace in that
chain. At the beginning of his Discourse Pico relates a story of
creationin which he has God address Adam as follows:
Constrained by no limits, you may determine it for yourself,
according to your own
free will, in whose hand we have placed you. . . . It will be in
your power to degenerate
into the lower forms of life, which are brutish; you shall have
the power, according to
your souls judgement, to be reborn into the higher orders, which
are divine.48
On Picos view, human beings are special because they were given
freedom andreason: human beings have the freedom to live like
brutes, but their souls alsopossess reason, through which they are
able to grow toward the divine. What liftshuman beings up above the
rest of nature is that they can choose their fate them-selves: even
human beings who live like animals are unlike mere animals free
tochoose a dierent course. In this passage the other elements of
the traditionalconception of dignity are briey touched upon. Being
placed in this special posi-tion is suggested to yield a duty to
oneself to realize fully ones initial dignity.
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Realizing that dignity or falling short of it is presented as
being equivalent tomoving upward or downward in the chain of
being:
The Father infused in man, at birth, every sort of seed and
sprouts of every kind of
life. These seeds will grow and bear their fruit in each man who
will cultivate them. If
he cultivates his vegetable seeds, he will become a plant. If he
cultivates his sensitive
seeds, he will become brutish. If he cultivates his rational
seeds, he will become
a heavenly animal. If he cultivates his intellectual seeds, he
will be an angel and
a son of God.49
Accordingly, it is through the cultivation of reason and
intellect that human beingsrealize their dignity. Picos claim, in
short, is that human beings are free to choosetheir path in life,
and that this is what lifts human beings up above the rest
ofnature, or gives them a dignity. Yet this freedom entails the
chance to rise high orfall low. That is, human beings are superior
to animals in the capacities they pos-sess, though not necessarily
in how they choose to exercise those capacities. Thereason why one
should choose to live according to ones superior capacities
isexplained by Pico as follows:
It is in order for us to understand that, because we were born
with the option to be
what we want to be, we must take most care of this; lest people
say of us that, being
held in honor, we did not realize that we reduced ourselves to
brutes and mindless
beasts of burden. Let us rather remember the saying of Asaph the
prophet: You are
all gods and sons of the most high, unless abusing the most
indulgent liberality of the
Father, we turn from benecial to harmful the free choice he
bestowed on us. Let a
holy ambition pervade our soul, so that, not satised with
mediocre things, we strive
for the loftiest and apply ourselves with all our strength to
pursue them.50
That is, striving for the highest is what God intended one to
do, what is to onesadvantage and what is the ambitious or excellent
thing to do. Picos talk of higherand lower can therefore be
explained against the background of the chain ofbeing. He does not
refer to a value property as used by the
contemporaryparadigm.51
To sum up, the conceptions of human dignity found in Cicero, Leo
and Pico allshare the same basic structure. On the traditional
paradigm dignity has two levels.First, all human beings are said to
be elevated over the rest of nature in virtue ofpossessing a
capacity for freedom or reason (initial dignity). Second, morality
istied to a duty to realize fully ones initial dignity.
Kant
Immanuel Kant is perhaps the most famous modern philosopher to
talk abouthuman dignity. My claim that Kant too adheres to the
traditional paradigm ofdignity will be somewhat controversial. Kant
is often read as adhering to what
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I have called the contemporary paradigm. Many scholars allege
that for Kant dig-nity is an absolute inner value all human beings
possess, and that this value is thereason why one should respect
others.52 Accordingly, people often refer to Kant asan inspiration
for the contemporary conception of dignity.53 In the following
myaim is not to prove that Kant does not hold the contemporary
paradigm.54 My aimis merely to point out that Kants writings
display the key features of the traditionalpattern of thought about
human dignity.
In Kants view human beings have the prerogative over the rest of
nature inpossessing free will.55 This freedom is inseparably tied
up with the moral law (G, 4:4467), which appears to human beings as
the Categorical Imperative (G, 4:41213). For Kant the Categorical
Imperative is the supreme principle of morality(G, 4: 392). It
commands one to universalize ones maxims (G, 4: 421.), andthereby
to respect others (G, 4: 4378).56 One fully realizes what the
CategoricalImperative demands, if one follows its dictates not from
any ulterior motive, butsimply because it is right (G, 4: 390). In
this way, freedom and the CategoricalImperative yield normative
requirements:
[T]his dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural
beings [of being able to
regard himself as also giving universal laws] brings with it
that he must always take
his maxims from the point of view of himself, and likewise every
other rational being.
(G, 4: 438)
Kant uses dignity to refer to an elevated position or a
prerogative. Repeatedly,Kant species dignity as elevated status or
sublimity (Erhabenheit),57 by which hemeans the highest elevation
of something over something else. Dignity expresses arelation: that
something is higher in a certain respect. Kant does use the
aristocraticconception of dignity, for instance, when he talks
about the dignity of a regentand of a minister.58 However, more
prominently, he uses the twofold traditionalparadigm of human
dignity. Kant calls freedom the initial dignity,59 and
distin-guishes it from morality as the fully realized dignity: The
dignity of human naturelies only in its freedom . . .But the
dignity of one human being (worthiness) rests onthe use of his
freedom.60 This is a similar pattern to the one I have noted in
Cicero,Leo and Pico. Human beings are said to be elevated over the
rest of nature in virtueof a certain capacity, freedom or reason.
But only if one makes a proper use ofones freedom (or reason), does
one fully realize ones initial dignity:
. . . duties towards himself. These do not consist . . . in
seeking to satisfy his cravings
and inclinations . . .But they consist in his being conscious
that man possesses a certain
dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that
it is his duty so to act
as not to violate in his own person this dignity of
mankind.61
Like Cicero and the long tradition before him, Kant talks about
dignity mainly inrelation to duties towards self. In virtue of the
Categorical Imperative, one has aduty towards oneself not to
violate the prerogative one has over other creatures.
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The emphasis on oneself is also present in the main section of
the Groundwork inwhich Kant talks about dignity (cf. G, 4: 4346).
Kant asks why a morally goodbeing abides by the Categorical
Imperative (in the Formula of Autonomy).His answer is that such a
person does so not for any ulterior motive, but fromthe idea of the
dignity of someone who is morally good:
Reason . . . does so not for the sake of any other practical
motive or any future advan-
tage but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who
obeys no law other than
that which he himself at the same time gives. (G, 4: 434)
A morally good being abides by the imperative for the sake of
morality. Kant goeson to specify dignity as elevation (in other
words, raised above), and says that it ismorality that is innitely
raised above all price: Hence morality, and humanityinsofar as it
is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity (G, 4:
435).Moral worth is raised above all relative worth, humanity is
raised above the rest ofnature in virtue of being free and capable
of morality: the dignity of humanityconsists just in this capacity
to give universal law, though with the condition of alsobeing
itself subject to this very lawgiving (G, 4: 440).
Even when Kant seems to talk about a requirement to respect the
dignity ofothers, he connects dignity to duties towards the self.
In the Doctrine of VirtueKantsays that [t]he respect that I have
for others or that another can require fromme . . . is therefore
recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings(6: 462).
However, as he goes on it becomes clear that dignity is not the
reasonwhy one should respect them. Rather it species what one
should respect in others.Immediately after the rst quote Kant says
that, just as one should strive to fullyrealize ones own dignity,
so everyone else is under that duty towards oneself.Given that one
should respect others, one therefore should respect this
striving:
. . . just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this
would conict with his duty
of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally
necessary self-esteem of
others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to
acknowledge, in a practical
way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. (6:
462)
The reason that one should respect others (and their striving
for their own dignity)is not because they have a value property
called dignity, but because it isdemanded by the Categorical
Imperative: The duty of respect for my neighboris contained in the
maxim not to degrade any other to a mere means to my ends(6:
450).
My aim has not been to prove that Kant does not uphold the
contemporaryparadigm. He does, however, exhibit the traditional
conception of dignity. In manyways, his views are similar to
Ciceros. He does mention the Stoic conceptionapprovingly,62 and it
has been argued convincingly that Kants Groundwork wasin great part
a response to Garves edition of Ciceros De ociis.63 An
importantdierence between these two thinkers, however, is that Kant
uses the Categorical
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Imperative as a normative premise, rather than the teleological
conception ofnature Cicero employs. Apart from these (and other)
dierences, there is acommon structure to the usage of dignity that
has been prominent historicallyin such thinkers as Cicero, Leo,
Pico and Kant. In the following, I shall focus onthe similarities,
and point out three main dierences between the traditional and
thecontemporary conception of dignity.
The difference between the two conceptions
There are three main respects in which the traditional
conception of dignity I havesketched diers from the contemporary
one. In the traditional conception (1) dig-nity is not conceived of
as a non-relational value property, (2) dignity is not thebasis of
rights and (3) dignity is primarily about holding oneself to a
certainstandard.64
Dignity not a value
In the traditional conception, dignity refers to the special
position of human beingsin the universe, which is grounded in the
possession of certain capacities, not in aninherent value property.
Dignity therefore expresses a relative status rather thanan
intrinsic feature (even if the elevated status is based on an
intrinsic feature likefreedom or reason). Some thinkers hold an
underlying view that there is a hierarchywithin nature or creation.
However, the special standing of human beings withinthis hierarchy
is not based on the possession of a separate (non-relational)
valueproperty in a strong moral realist sense. Rather, it is based
on the fact that dierentkinds of beings possess dierent
capacities.65
To understand this aspect of the traditional paradigm it is
important to keep inmind its origin from the aristocratic
conception of the Roman dignitas. A Romansenator is elevated in
society by his merit, rank, wealth or esteem. While in
thearistocratic conception one human being has an elevated status
over others with-out referring to a non-relational value property
Cicero took the conception ofdignitas and he universalized it,
applying it to the status of all human beings withinnature again
without invoking a non-relational value property. In the
traditionalpattern of thought human beings are elevated over the
rest of nature in virtue ofhaving certain capacities like reason
and freedom.
Dignity does not yield rights
In the traditional conception of dignity, the prime emphasis is
on duties, not onrights. The thought is not that one can make
claims on others because one hasfreedom and reason. Instead, having
reason or freedom is said to yield the duty tomake a proper use of
ones capacities. As I have spelled out, ones duty to behave ina
proper way does not immediately follow from having the capacities
of reason orfreedom. Rather proponents of the traditional paradigm
of dignity use a further
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premise: for instance, a teleological view that one ought to use
the specic humancapacities with which nature (or God) endowed human
beings, or KantsCategorical Imperative. If the traditional paradigm
justies human rights in thesense of entitlements, then they are
grounded on the further normative premise, noton dignity
itself.
This is an important contrast to the contemporary paradigm. In
the contempo-rary pattern of thought human rights are based on an
inherent (value) property ofhuman beings. One can claim ones rights
in pointing to ones absolute value. Thetraditional paradigm, in
contrast, does not rest rights on a non-relational valueproperty of
human beings. The dierence can again be illustrated with Kant.
Kantgrounds rights on the Categorical Imperative:
But why is the doctrine of morals usually called (especially by
Cicero) a doctrine of
duties and not also a doctrine of rights, even though rights
have reference to duties?
The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral
laws, and so all
rights as well as duties proceed) only through the moral
imperative, which is a prop-
osition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting
others under obliga-
tion, that is, the concept of right, can afterwards be
explicated. (Doctrine of Right,
6: 239)
Kant places duties prior to rights. Someone can claim rights in
reminding the agentof his or her duty to follow the Categorical
Imperative. Accordingly, the innateright of each is a right to
freedom that can coexist with the freedom of everyoneelse in
accordance with a universal law.66 Ones freedom is only restricted
by theCategorical Imperative. If another human being restricts ones
freedom unlawfully,one can remind him of his duty to follow the
imperative.
In the traditional paradigm it is therefore not dignity as an
elevated position thatgrounds rights, but the further normative
premise that is used to derive any duties,e.g. to fully realize
ones initial dignity. This point is further supported by
theobservation that rights in the sense of entitlements do not gure
prominently inthinkers who use the traditional paradigm of
dignity.67 One reason might be theperfectionism that is commonly
connected with this paradigm.
Perfectionism
The third main dierence in the general structure of the
traditional and the con-temporary conception of dignity is that, in
the traditional pattern of thought, theprimary focus is not on the
dignity of others, but on the realization of ones owndignity.68
When Cicero, Leo, Pico and Kant talk about human dignity,
theyemphasize that the agent should realize his or her own initial
dignity. In talkingabout human dignity, they highlight a privilege
or capacity human beings havebeen given, and their emphasis is on
how one should use that capacity. This empha-sis stems from an
underlying perfectionism. The main concern of these four thin-kers
in questions of moral philosophy is how one should perfect oneself,
not how
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one should treat others. For Kant, of course, the requirement to
treat others alwaysas an end in itself is very important; however,
he famously argues that withoutduties towards self, there would be
no duties towards others:
For I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only
insofar as I at the same
time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of
which I regard myself as
being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own
practical reason; and in
being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one
constraining myself. (Doctrine
of Virtue, 6: 41718)
For Kant it is the Categorical Imperative that obliges one to
respect others.69
Without the duty to oneself to follow the imperative, there
would be no obligationsto others. In short, in the traditional
paradigm it is ones own realized dignity orperfection that is of
prime concern.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have argued that the traditional conception of
dignity diers fun-damentally from the contemporary one that is
currently prominent in UN docu-ments and other sources. The
implication of this claim is not that the contemporaryparadigm is
unfounded. If I am right that the contemporary pattern does not
havethe support of a long history, it does not undermine the
current view. To argue thiswould be to commit a genetic fallacy.
Just because an idea is relatively new,70 doesnot mean it is not
justied. In addition, the traditional paradigm has its own
prob-lems: neither a superiority of human beings, nor teleology,
nor the CategoricalImperative, nor duties towards self are widely
accepted. On the other hand, theremight be an independent
justication for the contemporary paradigm be it com-monly shared
intuitions, or a plausible argument for an absolute value of all
humanbeings.
My aim in this paper has not been to take sides. Rather I wanted
to bring out more clearly than has been done before the most
important features of twodierent paradigms of dignity. If I am
right, the implication of the paper is adilemma: if one wants to
use the contemporary conception of dignity, one cannotrefer to the
history of philosophy for support of this conception, and if one
wantsto use the history in support, one would have to employ a
conception of dignitythat uses a dierent pattern of thought.
Notes
For their helpful suggestions I would like to thank Jimmy
Altham, Friedo Ricken, KathrynSensen, Franz Josef Wetz, Stephen
White and two anonymous referees for this journal.1. Throughout the
article I shall use pattern of thought, paradigm and conception
interchangeably.2. Accordingly, the German dictionary Duden
describes dignity (Wurde) as a worth inher-
ent in human beings that commands respect (Achtung gebietender
Wert, der dem
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Menschen innewohnt) (my tr.), see G. Drosdowski (ed.) (1997)
Duden: Etymologie,
p. 821. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.3. Cf. e.g. Allen Wood (1998) Kant
on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature I,
Aristotelian Society Supplement 72: 189. Hardy E. Jones (1971)
Kants Principle of
Personality, p. 130. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Herbert J. Paton(1947) The Categorical Imperative, p. 171. London:
Hutchinson. David W. Ross(1954) Kants Ethical Theory, pp. 524.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. Patrick .Hutchings (1972) Kant on Absolute
Value, pp. 287, 290. Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press. . P. C. Lo (1987) Treating Persons as Ends.,
p. 165. Lanham, MD:University Press of America. Guido Lohrer (1995)
Menschliche Wurde, pp. 124, 346.Freiburg: Alber.
4. Josef Seifert (1997) What is Life?, p. 97. Amsterdam:
Rodopi.5. Cf. ibid. p. 98.6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.8. Cf. G. E. Moore (1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Max
Scheler (1913/16) Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale
Wertethik. Berne:Francke. Not all forms of value realism postulate
an ontologically distinct property.
More modest forms of realism might e.g. hold that value
statements have a truth value,or that they refer to something
independent of human beings, cf. Allan Gibbard (1999)Morality as
Consistency in Living: Korsgaards Kantian Lectures, Ethics 110:
142, n. 3.
For some disadvantages of the Moore-style realism cf. John
Mackie (1977) Ethics:Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1. New York:
Penguin. The ontological and epistemicnature of this value might
seem queer in comparison with natural objects. In addition,
one who holds this view would be powerless to argue against
relativism, and from aHumean perspective it fails to give an
account of how this value could be motivating.
9. Seifert (n. 4), p. 98.
10. Seifert (ibid.) explicitly refers to Moore on p. 95.11. The
most prominent proponents are Christine Korsgaard (1996) Creating
the Kingdom
of Ends, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen
Wood (1999) KantsEthical Thought, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Paul Guyer (2000)
Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, ch. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.12. Cf. Mary Ann Glendon (1999) Foundations of
Human Rights: The Unfinished
Business, American Journal of Jurisprudence 44: 10. Knut Ibsen
(1990) Volkerrecht,
p. 642. Munich: Beck. Franz Josef Wetz (1998) Die Wurde der
Menschen ist antastbar,pp. 756. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
13. See Matthew Craven (1995) The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, pp. 1617, 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press.14. For
further examples see James Griffin (2001) Discrepancies between the
Best
Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International Law
of Human
Rights, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 6 n. For a
brief overview ofhuman dignity in international law more generally,
see Jochen A. Frohwein (2002)Human Dignity in International Law, in
D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds) TheConcept of Human Dignity in Human
Rights Discourse, pp. 12135. The Hague:
Kluwer Law International.15. See Wetz (n. 12), p. 51; Glendon
(n. 12), p. 2.16. (1946) Charter of the United Nations, p. 2. New
York: United Nations Publications.
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17. (1949) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. New
York: United Nations
Publications.18. For an account of the history of the drafting
process see Mary Ann Glendon (2001) A
World Made New. New York: Random House. Klaus Dicke (2002) The
Founding
Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, inKretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 11120.
19. The UN Charter lists dignity and worth together (see above),
thereby associating dignityand worth or value.
20. (1967) International Covenants on Human Rights, Preamble.
New York: UnitedNations Office of Public Information.
21. Cf. Craven (n. 13), p. 7.
22. Parties of both covenants regularly write reports to the UN
about measures of imple-mentation and their progress in these
measures, and the relevant committees can thenmake recommendations.
However, it is up to the individual states whether they heed
these recommendations. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights hastwo further control mechanisms (see Ibsen (n.
12), pp. 6479). Member States of theCovenant can complain about the
progress of other members in front of the HumanRights Committee,
which can ask for clarification and ultimately seek to mediate
between the two states. However, state parties first have to
declare in general thatthey recognize the competence of the
Committee (see articles 412, 28). In 1989 24member states out of 87
which had signed the Covenant had also recognized the
Human Rights Committee (see Ibsen (n. 12), pp. 648, 641).
Additionally, in signingan Optional Protocol members to the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can furtherauthorize the
Human Rights Committee to accept complaints from individual
citizens
about their state. The Committee will then give its views on the
matter (see article 5 ofthe Optional Protocol). By 30 June 1995 83
states had signed the Optional Protocol outof 113 parties to the
Covenant (see (1996) Encyclopedia of Human Rights, pp. 16723.
Washington: Taylor & Francis). The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, andCultural Rights does not have these additional
control mechanisms. For detailed infor-mation about the Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights see Craven(n. 13). For a
thorough analysis of different aspects of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights see the essay collection edited by Louis
Henkin (1981)The International Bill of Rights. New York: Columbia
University Press.
23. See Viktor Poschl (1969) Der Begriff der Wurde im antiken
Rom und spater,
Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Philosophisch-histor-ische Klasse 3: 556. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.
Wetz (n. 12), ch. 3; and Dicke (n. 18),p. 111. One exception might
be G. W. F. Schillers (1787) Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3,
although he does not characterize dignity as value. Whitman and
Appiah even arguethat the prominence of dignity in contemporary
political documents results from what Icall the traditional
paradigm, cf. James Whitman (2003) From Fascist Honour to
European Dignity , in C. Joerges and N. Ghaleigh (eds) The
Darker Legacy ofEuropean Law, pp. 24366. Cambridge: Hart. Anthony
Appiah (2001) GroundingHuman Rights, in A. Gutman (ed.) Human
Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p. 107.Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
24. Several scholars have attempted to trace the history of the
idea of human dignity; cf. e.g.Herschel Baker (1947) The Dignity of
Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea.Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. W. Durig (1957) Dignitas, in T. Klauser
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(ed.) Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum, vol. 3, pp.
102435. Stuttgart:
Hiersemann. Poschl (n. 23). Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1980)
Menschenwurde inJ. Ritter and K. Grunder (eds) Historisches
Worterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 5, pp.11247. Basel: Schwabe &
Co. Kurt Bayertz (ed.) (1996) Sanctity of Life and Human
Dignity. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer. Maximilian Forschner
(1998) Marktpreis undWurde oder vom Adel der menschlichen Natur, in
H. Kossler (ed.) Die Wurde desMenschen, pp. 3359. Nurnberg:
Universitatsverbund Erlangen-Nurnberg e.V. Wetz(n. 12), ch. 2.
25. However, I do not mean to suggest that all of the thinkers
who follow the traditionalparadigm of dignity conceived of these as
two separate stages.
26. Cf. Helmut Wegehaupt (1932) Die Bedeutung und Anwendung von
dignitas in den
Schriften der republikanischen Zeit. Ohlau: Eschenhagen. Hans
Drexler (1944)Dignitas, in R. Klein (ed.) Das Staatsdenken der
Romer, pp. 23155. Darmstadt:Wissenschaftlicher Buchgesellschaft.
Poschl (n. 23). Hans-Georg Gadamer (1988) Die
Menschenwurde auf ihrem Weg von der Antike bis heute,
Humanistische Bildung 12:95107. For a sociological description of
Roman society cf. G. Alfoldy (1986) Dieromische Gesellschaft.
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. The archaic conception has a lot incommon
with Aristotles conception of magnanimity (cf. his Nicomachean
Ethics, bk
4, 1123b1125a). The Roman dignitas has many facets. Apart from
(1) being excellent orworthy, dignitas could also refer to (2) the
appearance of excellence, (3) standing oresteem by others, (4) a
particular rank or office, cf. P. G. W. Glare (ed.) (1996)
Oxford
Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. For an etymology of
the Latin dignitas cf.Wegehaupt (n. 26), pp. 5, 9, and Drexler (n.
26), p. 233.
27. Again, cf. the Oxford Latin Dictionary (n. 26).
28. Poschl (n. 23), p. 36.29. Scholars believe that this is the
earliest passage in which the Latin term dignitas is used
to refer to all human beings, see Poschl (n. 23), pp. 3741; Wetz
(n. 12), p. 20; and
Hubert Cancik (2002) Dignity of Man and Persona in Stoic
Anthropology: SomeRemarks on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105107, in
Kretzmer and Klein (n. 14), pp. 1940.While a similar pattern of
thought was common in Greek philosophy, there was nodirect
equivalent for the Latin dignitas in the Greek language, cf. Poschl
(n. 23),
pp. 910. For a thorough commentary on De officiis cf. Andrew
Dyck (1996)A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
30. Cicero, De Officiis, tr. W. Miller (1913). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
31. Cf. also 1. 100: If we take nature as our guide, we shall
never go astray; or 1. 103:Nature has not fashioned us to behave as
if we have been created for fun and games.Rather, we are moulded
for self-discipline and for more sober and important pursuits.
32. See Poschl (n. 23), pp. 489.33. (1996) Sermons, tr. J. P.
Freeland and A. J. Conway, 21, ch. 3, p. 79. Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press. To the following cf.
Poschl (n. 23),
pp. 4250; Durig (n. 24); and Richard Bruch (1981) Die Wurde des
Menschen in derpartistischen und scholastischen Tradition, in W.
Gruber (ed.) Wissen Glaube Politik, pp. 13954. Graz: Styria.
34. Cf. (1999) Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1691. London:
Geoffrey Chapman.
35. Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114). Cf. Sermons, 94, ch. 2 (p.
392): People shouldacknowledge their own dignity, and see
themselves as made in the image andlikeness of their Creator. The
idea that human beings are created in the image of
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God is likely meant to be a reference to the Bible; cf. Genesis
1: 26, cf. 1: 278, and
Psalms 8: 510.36. Some scholars have claimed that this is a
general feature of Christian views on dignity;
cf. Poschl (n. 23), p. 42; and Bruch (n. 33), p. 140.
37. Sermons, 42, ch. 2 (p. 180).38. Sermons, 39, ch. 2 (p.
1678).39. Cf. Poschl (n. 23), pp. 44, 46; Bruch (n. 33), p. 141.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church
(n. 34) indicates that this is still the view of the Catholic
Church today: By virtue of his
soul and his spiritual powers of intellect and will, man is
endowed with freedom, anoutstanding manifestation of the divine
image (1705, cf. 1934, 1730, 306). In addi-tion, Leo holds the view
that human beings are an image of God in being able to do
justice and be merciful, see Sermons, 95, ch. 7 (pp. 3989).40.
Sermons, 12, ch. 1 (p. 49).41. Some scholars argue that the twofold
structure is a general feature of Christian thinkers;
cf. Bruch (n. 33), pp. 1489; and Glendon (n. 12), pp. 1314.42.
However, in De Legibus 1. 24 Cicero too holds that the soul was
created by God, and
that humans have a likeness with God in being virtuous. Cf.
Poschl (n. 23), p. 42. A cleardifference is that Leo holds that the
dignity of humans was forfeited in Adams fall and
restored in Jesus death: This nature, although it had been
corrupted in Adam, hasnevertheless been re-fashioned in Christ.
Sermons, 27, ch. 6 (p. 114), cf. 25, ch. 5(pp. 1023), 72, ch. 2 (p.
316). Poschl (n. 23), p. 48 holds that this view was a general
feature among Christian thinkers.43. Sermons, 45, ch. 2 (p.
194).44. Apart from Picos discourse De Dignitate Hominis, cf. also
Bartolommeo Fazio (1450)
De Excellentia et Praestantia Hominis, and Giannozzo Manetti
(1452) De Dignitate etExcellentia Hominis.
45. Cf. e.g. Bernard Murchland (1966) Two Views of Man, p. vi.
New York: Frederick
Ungar. The prominence is probably a reaction to a similar
emphasis in the ChristianMiddle Ages more generally, cf.
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 2. 2. 9.
46. For a brief biography see Paul O. Kristeller (1964) Eight
Philosophers of the ItalianRenaissance, ch. 4. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
47. Cf. Discourse, 3.6. Pico refers to the place of man in
universi serie. Translations of Picoare taken from the joint
research project by Brown and Bologna Universities on theDiscourse
on the Dignity of Man, see: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/
Italian_Studies/pico/index.html. For the idea of the chain of
being more generally cf.Arthur Lovejoy (1961) The Great Chain of
Being: A Study of the History of an Idea.New York: Harper &
Row.
48. Discourse, 4.20 and 23.49. Ibid., 6.2830. For similar themes
in Leo cf. his Sermons, 24, ch. 2, 71, ch. 2, and 73, ch. 4.50.
Ibid., 10.4850.
51. While the claim that one should strive for a higher level of
being can be expressed interms of being better or having more
worth, this does not imply a separate valueproperty in the sense of
G. E. Moore or Max Scheler (n. 8). Ontologically, a higher
levelonly has more being, cf. Friedo Ricken (1998) Aristotelische
Interpretationen zum
Traktat De passionibus animae (Summa theologiae I II 2248) des
Thomas vonAquin, in M. Thurner (ed.) Die Einheit der Person, pp.
13740. Stuttgart:Kohlhammer. Poschl traces this view back to
Plotinus Enneads, cf. Poschl (n. 23), p. 51.
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52. Cf. e.g. Paton (n. 3), pp. 171, 189; Ross (n. 3), pp. 524;
Lohrer (n. 3), pp. 124, 3444;
and Wood (n. 3), p. 189; Wood (n. 11), p. 115; Dieter Schonecker
and Allen Wood(2003) Immanuel Kant Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten: Ein einfuhrenderKommentar, p. 142. Paderborn:
Schoningh.
53. See, for instance, Alan Gewirth (1982) Human Rights: Essays
on Justification andApplications, p. 28. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. Bayertz (n. 25); Seifert(n. 4), p. 98; Kretzmer and
Klein (n. 14).
54. I have argued for this extensively in my (2009) Kants
Conception of Human Dignity,
Kant-Studien 100, pp. 309331. (Scholars who read Kant as
adhering to the contempor-ary paradigm of human dignity often rely
on a few passages. A different picture emergesif one takes all
occurrences of dignity in Kants writings into account.)
55. Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals (G in the
following), 4: 438. Page numbers referto the Prussian Academy
edition of Kants collected works: Deutsche Akademie
derWissenschaften (formerly Koniglich Preuischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften) (ed).
(1902ff.) Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: De Gruyter.
References are to volumeno.: page no.. All translations are unless
otherwise stated by Mary Gregor fromImmanuel Kant (1999) Practical
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
56. My claim that the requirement to respect others is already
implied by the requirement to
universalize ones maxim will be controversial, but is
expressively stated by Kant himself:For, to say that in the use of
means to any end I am to limit mymaxim to the condition ofits
universal validity . . . is tantamount to saying that . . . the
rational being itself, must be
made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as ameans
but . . . always at the sametime as an end (G, 4: 4378; my
emphasis). If one universalizes ones maxim, one therebyrespects
those over whom one universalizes; cf. KantsCritique of Practical
Reason, 5: 87
8; and Julius Ebbinghaus (1998) Die Formeln des Kategorischen
Imperativs und dieAbleitung inhaltlich bestimmter Pflichten, in his
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, p. 216.Bonn: Bouvier. Roger Sullivan
(1989) Immanuel Kants Moral Theory, pp. 1935.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Onora ONeill (1989)
Constructions ofReason, ch. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press; and my (2010) pp. 102118Dignity and the Formula of Humanity,
in J. Timmermann (ed.) Kants Groundwork:A Critical Guide.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57. Cf. Oberservations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and
Sublime, 2: 212, 215, 241; G, 4:425, 440; Critique of Practical
Reason, 5: 71; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 435; Lectures onLogic, 9: 30.
Sometimes Kant expresses this as something being below someones
dig-
nity, e.g. in Critique of Pure Reason, 3: 419; Critique of
Practical Reason, 5: 327; Religionwithin the Boundaries of Mere
Reason, 6: 113; Doctrine of Virtue, 6: 327; Lectures onPedagogy, 9:
489. For a clarification of sublimity, cf. Critique of the Power of
Judgment,
5: 248.58. Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 8:
344.59. The Conflict of the Faculties, 7: 073; my tr.
60. Reflection note, 6856, 19: 181; my tr.; cf. Lectures on
Pedagogy, 9: 488. Kant hardly everbrings the two levels of dignity
together. More commonly, he merely talks about oneaspect, e.g. when
he talks about how reason, in the consciousness of its dignity,
despisesthe latter [inclinations] and can gradually become their
master (G, 4: 411), or about the
esteem one has for morality and its dignity (G, 4: 4423).61.
Lectures on Pedagogy, 9: 488, tr. A. Churton in Immanuel Kant
(1899) Kant on
Education. London: Kegan Paul.
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62. Cf. his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6: 57
note: These philosophers
[Stoics and others] derived their universal moral principle from
the dignity of humannature, from its freedom (as an independence
from the power of the inclinations), andthey could not have laid
down a better or nobler principle for foundation. They then
drew the moral laws directly from reason, the sole legislator,
commanding absolutelythrough its laws. And so was everything quite
correctly apportioned. (Tr. A. Wood andG. di Giovanni in Immanuel
Kant (1996) Religion and Rational Theology. CambridgeUniversity
Press: Cambridge.)
63. See Klaus Reich (1939) Kant and Greek Ethics II, Mind, 48:
44663.64. This way of putting the differences is my own. I have,
however, been greatly helped by
the works in the history of the idea of dignity mentioned
earlier, cf. esp. Poschl (n. 23).
65. For instance, plants are capable of nutrition and growth;
animals possess those capa-cities and also the capacity for
perception and motion, and human beings possess notonly these, but
also the capacity for reason and choice; cf. Aristotle, On the
Soul,
414a29415a13; Plotinus, Enneads, 5. 2. 12; Ricken (n. 51), pp.
13740.66. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But
It Is of No Use in
Practice, 8: 2923; cf. Doctrine of Right, 6: 230.67. Richard
Tuck has argued that the concept of a right in the sense of
entitlement origi-
nated in 12th-century property law, and that it had its
breakthrough only in the 17thcentury, cf. his (1979) Natural Rights
Theories: Their Origin and Development, pp. 9, 11.Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Cf. Jerome B. Schneewind (1998) The
Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p.
93. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Glendon (n. 12), p.
6.
68. Similarly Poschl (n. 23), pp. 556.
69. For a fuller discussion of this claim see my Dignity and the
Formula of Humanity(n. 56).
70. The earliest passage I have found in which rights are based
on dignity is in G. W. F.
Schillers Don Carlos, Act III, Scene 3 (n. 23). However,
Schiller understands dignity as anobility in nature, a conception
akin to the traditional paradigm of dignity. I have notfound a
passage in which dignity is said to be an inherent non-relational
value propertybefore the 20th century although I realize that Kant
is currently often read this way.
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