07 - Interstate Conflicts in South Asia

Inter/Intrastate Conflicts in South Asia

Large sections of the people of South Asia had to suffer the worst havoc of history, caused by the tsunami, due to the absence of a proper warning system since human security has never topped the agenda of the policy makers in a region embroiled with conflicts. South Asia, has, so far, failed to resolve inter/intrastate disputes that threaten its peace and impede the prospects of regional cooperation. There are perennial disputes that continue to fuel hostility which, in turn, give birth to ancillary conflicts that further complicate the prospects of conflict management and prohibit progress on the economic agenda envisaged by South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The past, and the current, mutually exclusive approaches to either dominate the region, ignoring the concerns of immediate small neighbours, or look beyond it to counterbalance the immediate 'hegemon' did not help forge understanding in the region, nor will they in the future.

The governments and the parties to the conflict are under tremendous domestic and international pressure to find amicable solutions to their conflicts, especially in a changing regional, ecological and global environment. The states of South Asia need to jointly face the challenges, such as low river-water discharges, natural disasters, such as by the recent tsunami, and global trade disparities, in order to prevent the birth of a new inward-looking era in which each state fends for itself in the face of problems that can essentially be handled collectively in a dynamic regional setting. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water disputes since regional riparian statutes are obligatory under RRR statute model respecting Helsinki Convention that envisages 8K upstream and downstream rights. All reconciliation processes and negotiations have to be even-handed, attuned to the priorities of the parties to the conflict, balanced, productive and mutually beneficial, and need to be framed and phased in a manner that the interlocutors continue to benefit from the process and are able to move forward.

The slow pace of negotiations between India and Pakistan, suspension of the negotiation process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), failure to initiate reconciliation with the Maoists in Nepal and inability of New Delhi and Dhaka in putting together a comprehensive negotiation framework to iron out their differences is causing despair among the people who have suffered too long due to these conflicts. However, it is a matter of satisfaction that the governments and the parties to the conflict increasingly realise the futility of conflict and have seen so much of it that they should find little reason in not taking the course of peacefully negotiated settlement of the disputes.

Quite encouragingly, the composite dialogue process between India and Pakistan has entered its second round and both the governments have reiterated not to let the reconciliation process get derailed. Being nuclear powers, India and Pakistan must respect the desire for peace of their peoples and not let them down by slipping back into their frozen rigid positions. The respective nationalist ideologies of enmity need to be replaced with a paradigm of peace and harmony that views bilateralism as mutually reinforcing and equally rewarding. This would require approaching the outstanding

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issues with flexibility of approach and innovation, especially with regard to Jammu & Kashmir. The lesser differences should be quickly resolved to create an environment favourable to a process that may essentially result in the resolution of the main issue. The joint statements of January 6 and September 24, 2004, ask for stopping cross-border infiltration, and repression by respective states, exploring all possible options on Kashmir to find a solution to the satisfaction of the parties to the conflict -- above all the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir. They, simultaneously, call for normalisation of relations, taking confidence-building measures and expanding areas of possible cooperation.

Indo-Bangladesh relations are passing through yet another uneasy phase of tension. It seems that New Delhi's complaints of Dhaka's alleged 'help' to militants from India's north-east and Bangladesh's concern over India's 'refusal' to correct the trade imbalance and differences over the river-linking project by New Delhi have strained their relations. While India should do more to remove tariff barriers on exports from Bangladesh and take Dhaka into confidence over the river-linking project, both the countries must take each other's security concerns more seriously and prevent cross-border hostilities.

The political conflict in Sri Lanka, that has assumed an ethnic form due to the marginalisation and exclusion of ethnic minorities, cannot be resolved with a mindset of an already defined majoritarian state. Nor can a distinct Tamil political identity in the north-eastern region be recognised, without ensuring equality to other ethnic and religious minorities, territorial integrity of the state and stopping human rights violation from all sides and guaranteeing the rights of minorities. In the interim, the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 needs to be strengthened and the urgent needs of the people of the war zone, including the minorities, necessitate the establishment of an interim administrative structure without further delay. The current havoc caused by the tsunami demands joint efforts by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.

Given a very serious crisis in Nepal, it is time to review the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Letters exchanged in 1950 and 1965 and the constitution of the country. There is a need to effectively regulate Nepal-India border to stop cross-border activities that are detrimental to peace and security of the two countries. However, the Maoist conflict cannot be solved militarily and, therefore, calls for a negotiated settlement that can happen only if the parliamentary forces reach a consensus to bring the constitutional process back on the rail and the Maoists are brought on board to settle the conflict on a democratic basis. There is an urgent need to stop violence and violations of human rights by the security forces and the Maoists.

It is a matter of serious concern that the pretext of inter/intrastate conflicts or 'war against terrorism' is being used to clip civil liberties, introduce draconian laws and suppress democratic aspirations of the people. While appreciating the voices of sanity for peaceful resolution of conflicts from the civil societies and the media, it is disappointing that certain sections of establishments, media and societies are still embedded to the so-called 'national consensus' that are one-sided and exclusionary. This is the time for South Asia to focus on its real issues of poverty, development and human security to save the people from the bloody waves of tsunami and get rid of inter/intrastate conflicts.


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In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

Khaled Ahmed, Consulting Editor of Daily Times, Pakistan, takes a historical and

empirical view of unresolved disputes among the states of South Asia and says

that while perennial disputes continue to keep the gulf, ancillary issues have also

become 'core issues' and difficult to resolve. Focusing on India's relations with all

its neighbours, he narrates multiple differences between New Delhi and all other

countries that prohibit India's smaller neighbours to embrace the regional big

brother.

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shaukat Aziz, comes out very emphatically in

favour of making South Asia an economically vibrant region with a pledge to

make regional cooperation a dynamic enterprise. Mindful of Pakistan’s strategic

position between South, East and Western Asia, Mr. Aziz assures of a very

contributory role and that, he underlines, is possible if India and Pakistan join

hands to do it together by thinking ‘out of the box’.

Salman Khurshid, senior leader of the Congress Party and former Indian

diplomat, develops a context that makes no sense of the conflict between India

and Pakistan. Challenging Pakistan's case over Jammu & Kashmir, while

questioning the genesis of Pakistan's creation on the basis of religion - the

hallmark of a contestable secular position - he, however, suggests a solution to

the conflict on the lines of the Good Friday Agreement in the broader context of

South Asian union.

Moeed Yusuf, Consultant at Sustainable Development Policy Institute,

Islamabad, provides a broader perspective on nuclear stabilisation in South Asia,

while evaluating dangers inherent to nuclearisation of the subcontinent. Setting

parameters that ensure nuclear safety in an otherwise volatile region, the author

sets out necessary measures to ensure nuclear stability while discarding notions

of prevention or pre-emption and calling to keep nuclear threshold at a

manageable level.

South Asia’s Unresolved Disputes

Indo-Pak Conflict and Possibilities of Peace

Nuclear Stabilisation in South Asia

South Asian Economic Powerhouse


iv

Najmuddin Shaikh, former foreign secretary of Pakistan, analyses the factors that

have brought India and Pakistan on the path of negotiated settlement of disputes.

Taking a detached position, but obviously from Pakistan’s perspective, he argues

not to re-invent the whole wheel in favour of every issue but to agree on what had

been agreed earlier or what is possible and suitable to both sides in the longer

term. The author’s do’s and dont’s are worth consideration by the interlocutors.

I. P. Khosla, former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, in his

remarkable study of Indo-Bangladesh relations unveils the political dynamics of a

bumpy relationship that suffers the ups and downs of political and divisive pulls.

While he blames the political leadership of the countries for the difficult relations,

he, despite sympathetically entertaining Bangladesh's concerns, makes a rational

case on different issues that in the end may not be of satisfaction to the

Bangladeshis.

Krishna V. Rajan, former Indian Ambassador to Nepal, traces the five decades of

an uneasy relationship between India and Nepal from, of course, New Delhi's

perspective. He shows how India feels uneasy over Nepal's tendency to pursue

equidistance or forge relations with other countries, especially China, and the way

the Himalayan kingdom feels insecure due to India's attitude, despite striving to

benefit from New Delhi's support. He concludes by saying that the 1950 Treaty is

outdated and unfair to Nepal and needs to be reviewed, even as both agree to

counter the Maoist challenge together.

Ahmer Bilal Soofi, a prominent lawyer from Pakistan, places the disputes

between India and Pakistan over Siachen, Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage in legal

and technical perspectives. Suggesting that these issues be resolved on legal and

technical bases, he cautions against mishandling of these issues by those who are

not experts in the field and calls for political backing to legalistic solutions.

Bharat Bhushan, Editor of Telegraph, surveys the troublesome path of not

resolving issues, such as Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen, between India and

Pakistan and focuses on the shifting interpretations and methodologies experts

and bureaucracies from the two sides use to defer their resolution. Although

mainly representing the Indian standpoint, the author rightly observes that the

resolution of these ancillary issues has got caught up in the heat of the perennial

dispute over Kashmir and favours finding middle-of-the-road solutions.

Bangladesh-India Relations

Nepal-India Relations

Legal Purview: Wullar Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek

Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies

Indo-Pak Relations: Present and Future

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Dr Saman Kelegama, Executive Director of the Institute of Policy Studies, Sri

Lanka and Ratnakar Adhikari, Executive Director of SAWTEE, Kathmandu,

review the debate on regionalism and make a comparative evaluation of the for

and against schools of regionalism in the context of multilateral liberalisation.

Supportive of regional trade arrangements and open regionalism, both Kelegama

and Adhikari argue in favour of SAFTA while concluding that it needs to be

repositioned in a pan-Asian context as a building-block for an Asian Economic

Community.

Syed Shahid Husain, former Secretary in the Ministry of Water and Power,

Pakistan, critically evaluates the ambitious river linking plan being envisaged by

India that arouses serious apprehensions in Bangladesh, the lower riparian

country. Besides politically and technically questioning the project, the author

warns against the negative impact of the project over ecological equilibrium.

Dr Bishnu Raj Upreti, Director of Friends for Peace, Kathmandu, analyses the

‘people’s war’ started by the CPN-M (Maoist) Party in Nepal. Tracing the

structural and ideological causes behind the Maoist insurgency and the three-way

conflict between the Maoists, the palace and the parliamentary parties, the author

identifies catalysts which have fueled the conflict in the Himalayan kingdom. The

author concludes on the note that the Maoist conflict is not the reason behind the

failure of democracy in Nepal, rather a reaction to it; and calls on all parties to

the conflict to settle their differences through purposeful dialogue.

Achin Vanaik, a prominent Indian political commentator, contrasts the

assumptions propounded by the bomb lobby with subsequent shift in their

position to show the absurdity of the stability argument woven around nuclear

deterrence. Questioning the very notions and assumptions, he argues complete

disarmament while proposing some basic measures to make the threat from

nuclear weapons less menacing.

Regionalism Debate: Re-positioning SAFTA

India’s River Linking Plans

Nepal: A Tragedy of Triple Betrayal

South Asia's Unresolved DisputesKhaled Ahmed

tates located in South Asia have taken longer than expected in overcoming their

mutual suspicion and relating to one another as a bloc. Interstate hostility has Slingered in the region, while in Southeast Asia the states of the Association of South

East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have overcome far more complex hurdles to successfully

activate a regional trading bloc. On the other hand, South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not taken off because of bilateral impediments.

Politicians are often heard saying that regional disputes should be resolved first.

Outside observers and a growing community of intellectuals in South Asia

recommend that regional disputes should be isolated to pave the way for a regionally

active SAARC. The negative jurisprudence of old and simmering disputes has shaped

national politics in the region; and its inhabitants are too deeply indoctrinated in it to

allow their governments to move to a new paradigm of relations. The recent official 1dialogue between India and Pakistan has aroused familiar misgivings . Democracy

may indeed be a complicating factor in the most important triangle of the region:

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh.

Physical imperatives of the region place India at the centre of the problem. It

abuts on almost all the South Asian states while these states are separated from one

another by natural features or Indian territory. India has a complex and troubled

relationship with Pakistan, giving rise to the development of country-specific

nationalisms on both sides. It began with the single territorial dispute of Kashmir in

1948, but after half a century and three wars, more disputes have emerged in a

cumulative negative process. The pattern constantly anticipates further proliferation

of disputes in the future rather than their isolation in favour of resolution. So far the

tendency to gestate and produce new disputes has been more prominent than the

effort to settle them. Because India is the upper riparian state, bilateral tensions are

beginning to focus more urgently on water than on territory. The current movement

towards normalisation of relations between the two states is underpinned by efforts to

resolve the bilateral disputes. The process highlights the tension between the instinct

to settle the disputes in accordance with the nationalist interpretation placed on their

evolution, on the one hand, and the international persuasion to bring about a new

cooperative mode of state behaviour, on the other.

India's relations with Bangladesh tend to fluctuate while the bilateral

disputes remain un-tackled. As the upper riparian state, India is increasingly seen in

Bangladesh as the enemy that wants to squeeze its traditional water resources.

Hundreds of border enclaves left over from the 1947 boundary demarcation have not

been streamlined and continue to give bilateral trouble. Bangladesh has problems

Absurdity of Nuclear Deterrence


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with India in the Bay of Bengal, much exacerbated by a disputed silt island in the Bay.

This dispute, impacting on maritime delineations of territorial waters and economic

zones, is remarkably similar to the Sir Creek dispute India has with Pakistan.

Bangladesh's nationalism has become bifurcated between the traditional 'painful

birth' syndrome, which makes it anti-Pakistan; and the constitutional Islamisation of 2the state, which makes it anti-India . A two-party system, which should normally

stabilise the electoral system in a democracy, actually weakens the state because of the

violently polarised Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalisms espoused by the Awami

League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). After a much disputed

effort made in the 1990s by upper-riparian India to resolve the river water disputes

with Bangladesh, the new millennium has seen new tensions rather than cooperation

between the two neighbours.

Sri Lanka has feared India because of its 'minority complex' vis-à-vis the 65

million Tamils that live in the Indian state of India. It began by seeking settled

maritime boundaries with India in the Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar, then put its

diplomatic pressure behind the creation of a UN-backed Zone of Peace in the Indian

Ocean as an instrument of national security. Sri Lanka tried to avoid linkages within

the region as a means of achieving security. It was lukewarm about its membership of

SAARC and sought extra-regional relations with the ASEAN states. Yet out of all the

states in the region, Sri Lanka has behaved more like a state of the future. It has

rationalised its relations with 'hegemonic' India and moved more successfully in the

direction of bilateral free trade with it than states have within the SAARC framework.

It looked at the 1987 Indian military intervention with suspicion but then saw the

withdrawal of the Indian troops from its territory in 1989. In the eyes of many Sri

Lankans, after having failed to negotiate an independent position for itself, Sri Lanka

implicitly acknowledged India's predominance before signing the 1987 agreement that

brought the Indian troops to Sri Lanka.

Together with Sri Lanka, Nepal has a history of interacting with India before

1947 as an independent state. It has accepted the suzerainty of the 'Indian empire' in

the past, which it continues to do subliminally today in a bilateral framework that it

seeks also to challenge. Economically dominated and much weakened by cross-border

movement of populations, it has sought to balance its relations with India by reaching

out to China, which India has looked at with suspicion. Nepal views its 1950 security

treaty with India with dissatisfaction and would like to renegotiate it. India's own

unspoken security doctrine hinges on its strategy of preventing its neighbours from

communicating with extra-regional powers. To secure this objective it has signed

treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, binding the neighbours to 'consult' India

as a first resort to counter external security threats rather than allow non-regional

'protectors' to intervene. Some critics have called it the 'India Doctrine' serving as a

legal prop to India's hegemony in South Asia.

India is the status quo power in South Asia in most discussions relating to the

resolution of disputes in the region. India's perception of security compels it to

perceive extra-regional threats through the instrumentality of the states situated on


8

its periphery. During the Cold War, when its security perceptions were formed, it

acted to prevent the peripheral states from joining up with the wrong ideological

camp at the global level. If seen transgressing, it used its status quo advantage as a

punitive tool to bring them to heel. As it increasingly perceived threat from China and

Pakistan, it used the punitive tool effectively to encourage a certain pattern of

behaviour among the peripheral states. From this mode of behaviour emerged more

disputes between it and the neighbouring states while the old ones were not resolved

as a matter of security policy. However, India's attitude began to change in the 1990s

when the Cold War came to an end and India's over-all Nehruvian orientation began

to decline. It saw rapid economic growth and was forced to look at the peripheral

states more as entities that may assist in the rapid expansion of its economy rather

than as rivals. More and more intellectuals in India are trying to persuade the

strategic elite in New Delhi to move in the direction of resolution of disputes with the

peripheral states in order to attain the global status India deserves as a nuclear and

economic power.

There could be unspoken doctrines behind policies that resulted in the non-

resolution of disputes. As the upper riparian state, India threatened the lower-riparian

Pakistan (East and West Pakistan till 1971) with economic damage through control of

waters. As time passed, lesser disputes served as disincentives to the pursuit of the

large disputes. One can say that in the Indo-Pak equation, smaller disputes were

linked by India to the politics of preventing Pakistan from asserting its rights on the

Kashmir dispute. The proliferation of disputes after 1947 seems to flow from a policy

of actual creation of smaller disputes. Today, Kashmir has come to be labelled as a

'core' dispute by Pakistan in order to prevent it from being enumerated as one of the

'non-core' issues. The 'non-core' disputes have become linked to conditions placed by

India on Pakistan's conduct. For instance, disputes can be discussed meaningfully if

Pakistan stops its 'cross-border' infiltration of terrorists. In this formulation, the

existence of 'non-core' issues can lessen the compulsion of discussing Kashmir as the

irreducible quid pro quo for Pakistan's stopping its 'cross-border terrorism'. Today as

India and Pakistan once again engage in a 'composite' dialogue, the two sides actually

betray their real positions by insisting on two different approaches. Pakistan wants

the 'core issue' discussed on priority; India wants it to be a 'basket' among other non-

core 'baskets'.

The peripheral states (Bangladesh added after 1971) have sought to persuade

India to resolve the bilateral disputes through a variety of policies. In all cases, the

various strategies of compelling India to come to the negotiating table in a meaningful

way have failed. This has, in turn, resulted in the weakening of the peripheral states, 3mostly accompanied by instability and internal division . Pakistan took the most

dangerous course. It embraced the doctrine of low intensity warfare after 1989 and

sought to bring India under pressure as the stronger status quo power through

deniable privatised jihad. After a decade of inflicting considerable damage on India,

this jihad has subsided amid global condemnation. Pakistan, not able to see the

connection of Kashmir jihad with global terrorism, is now a state threatened by the

forces it once unleashed while in possession of nuclear weapons. If Bangladesh


9 10

thought that India's policy over the Ganges waters emanated from its conflict with

Pakistan and that the Farakka Dam dispute would be resolved amicably after the

creation of Bangladesh under a pro-India government, it was gravely mistaken.

India's unwillingness to discuss the dam with Bangladesh before commissioning it has

created a great schism in Bangladesh, represented by two violently opposed political

parties. The instability of Bangladesh has pushed hundreds of thousands of

Bangladeshis into India illegally. The non-resolution of disputes between India and its

neighbours appears to be creating a domain of disorder in India's periphery. In the

long run this disorder will hinder India's progression towards the status of the big

power it wants to be at the global level.

I. India, Pakistan and KashmirThe India-Pakistan rivalry is mostly understood in the context of the challenge

Pakistan has posed to India on the issue of Kashmir. India annexed Kashmir after the

ruler of Kashmir acceded to India in 1947. This is contested by Pakistan and by some 4scholars in the West . The first war over Kashmir ended in 1948 after India went to

the UN Security Council. The Security Council recommended plebiscite in Kashmir

which could not be held because of the changed position of India. There were other 5‘solutions' floating around too but none was accepted seriously . In 1971, Pakistan

experienced civil war in East Pakistan. India responded to the uprising there and

intervened. Pakistan army was defeated by India and Pakistan was dismembered. One

of the reasons behind the uprising was West Pakistan's security doctrine that posited

defence of East Pakistan through enhanced military capacity in West Pakistan. In

1972 the two countries signed the Simla Agreement, binding themselves to a

resolution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral talks. The issue went into cold

storage after 1972, only to re-emerge in 1989 after an uprising in Kashmir which was

caused by India's misrule in the state of Jammu & Kashmir.

Pakistan decided to start a low intensity conflict in Kashmir based on the

experience gained from the deniable war in Afghanistan it had pursued in the 1980s

together with the United States against the Soviet Union. General Zia-ul-Haq, who

died in 1988, had transformed Pakistan under his strategy of Islamisation.

Unwittingly, he undermined Pakistan's Kashmir cause by introducing laws in Pakistan

that reduced the citizenship of all non-Muslims. It is moot whether he could have

done so in the midst of an uprising in Kashmir with chances of it falling to Pakistan

along with its 3 million non-Muslims. In the eyes of the international community it

was no longer acceptable to give to Pakistan the whole or a part of Kashmir inhabited

by non-Muslims. The world, therefore, started thinking more in terms of compelling

India to award more genuine autonomy to the unhappy Kashmiris in return for a tacit 6conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an international border . India stood firm

against all international pressure and hunkered down to confronting the unofficial

Pakistani jihad in Kashmir under an all-parties consensus of 1993. What followed has

been described as a reign of atrocities over the Muslim Kashmiri civilians. By the end

of the decade India became an offender of human rights in Kashmir and Pakistan was

identified as a patron of terrorism in the name of jihad.

By the end of the 1990s, Kashmir jihad was increasingly seen by the world as

terrorism or cross-border terrorism, as labelled by India. Pakistan-based militias

began to be declared terrorists by the United States as it began to bear the brunt of Al

Qaeda attacks in different parts of the world. India increased its military drive against

the uprising, its troops committing human rights violations that the world noticed but

could do nothing about. The Indian point of view, barring a few knowledgeable

personalities, remained supportive of the Indian military action. On the Pakistani

side, the popular view remained supportive of the proxy war and no criticism of the

jihadi militias could be made public without the fear of being physically attacked.

Inside Kashmir, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) represented the popular

rebellion against India. Most of the parties comprising the APHC demanded 'Azadi' or

an independent Kashmir instead of a plebiscite that would make it possible for

Pakistan to annex Kashmir. APHC was also internally divided, which seemed to

replicate the Pakistani experience with the jihadi militias in Afghanistan against the

Soviet Union. In 1998 the Kashmir dispute attained an extra dimension when India

and Pakistan tested their nuclear devices and became overt nuclear powers. By the

time Pakistan embarked on the Kargil Operation in 1999, the low-intensity conflict in

Kashmir was yielding mostly negative results for Pakistan in terms of international

support. The Kargil Operation, ostensibly meant to 'highlight' the Kashmir cause,

collapsed to make Pakistan realise that it had become too isolated internationally for

the policy of 'highlighting' to work.

Kargil was another incident that woke the world to the possibility of a major

war in South Asia. In 1987, the Indian exercise ‘Brasstacks’ triggered fears in Pakistan

of an Indian invasion; in 1990 India's military exercise ‘Mahajan’ in Rajasthan is said 7to have brought the two 'recessed' nuclear powers to the brink of a nuclear conflict .

By 1999, the world believed that the theory of nuclear deterrence was not understood

in South Asia the same way as had been in the West and that India and Pakistan could

actually go at each other with nuclear bombs. Kargil caused the elected government in

Pakistan to collapse; it strengthened the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya

Janata Party (BJP) under an upsurge of nationalism in the country. The architect of

Kargil, General (now President) Pervez Musharraf went to a summit with the then

Prime Minister Vajpayee at Agra in July 2001, but failed to get a 'flexible' response

from him. The chastening of Islamabad at Kargil was not in equal measure with the

moral boost the operation had yielded to New Delhi. The next trauma to Pakistan was

not late in coming. On 11 September 2001, Pakistan suffered a blow to its over-all

independence of policy when the United States challenged it to join the global drive

against terrorism and ban all the jihadi militias operating in Kashmir. To compound

Pakistan's problems with the world, the jihadi militias would not go away. Jaish-e-

Muhammad struck in December 2001 in New Delhi, this time in the very heart of

India's democracy -- the parliament building. India moved its forces to the border 8where they remained for over a year.

The world doesn't care for Pakistan's stand any more, that is, it thinks that

the position on plebiscite is passé and now the two states must sit down and evolve a

new solution encompassing the rights of the Kashmiris within or without India. (The


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influential view outside is for a solution within India.) The world is also conscious of 9India's ability to withstand all kinds of pressures for the alteration of the status quo .

It is more or less reconciled to the Line of Control (LoC) as a permanent frontier. But

it wants to use the freezing of the LoC as a lure for India to give genuine autonomy to

the Kashmiris. However, to keep the Pakistanis within the loop, a variety of new

solutions involving Jammu & Kashmir with soft borders between the two occupied

territories have been offered, only to be rebuffed -- mostly by India, while Pakistan

plays its cards close to the chest, benefiting from India's quick rejectionism as a status

quo power.

In 2000, Farooq Kathwari, head of a New York-based Kashmir Study Group,

floated his paper Kashmir: a way forward. The report contained five proposals for

the creation of one or two new states which would together constitute a 'sovereign

entity but one without international personality'. An Indian journalist cited the

Kathwari paper as saying: 'The new entity would have its own secular, democratic

constitution as well as its own citizenship, flag and legislature, which would legislate

on all matters other than defence and foreign affairs... India and Pakistan would be

responsible for the defence of the Kashmir entity, which would itself maintain police

and gendarme forces for internal law and order purposes. India and Pakistan would

be expected to work out financial arrangements for the Kashmir entity, which include 10a currency of its own' . The Kashmir Study Group came under attack in India. It had

been drawing upon the various Kashmir-related proposals made by independent

Indian and Pakistani personalities. While Pakistan has been insisting on 'third party

mediation' (read the U.S.) in Indo-Pak talks, it is common knowledge in Pakistan that

the U.S. think-tanks favour a solution based on the conversion of the Line of Control

(LoC) into an international border and a special status in Indo-Pak talks for the

Kashmiri leaders. Indian diplomat and journalist Kuldip Nayar has been discussing

the Trieste Model which he claims was personally supported by former Pakistan

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1993, Indian journalist Khushwant Singh stated

that India should give serious consideration to allowing the Vale (excluding Ladakh

and Jammu) 'to become an autonomous entity whose existence is guaranteed jointly 11by its neighbours -- India and Pakistan' . In the 1960s, Indian statesman Jayaprakash

Narayan and Indian President Rajagopalachari favoured the aspirations of the

Kashmiris which could then be described as 'autonomy short of independence'.

Alastair Lamb studied these various proposals and thought they all pointed to the

solution of the Kashmir problem on the 'Andorra' model. His 'Andorra Approach'

refers to the French-Spanish 'co-principality' in the Pyrenees which achieved limited 12independence through a constitution in 1993 . Finland has been keen that Pakistan

and India study the League of Nations case of Aland Islands between it and Norway

and draw lessons from it. The case of South Tyrol between Italy and Austria has also

been held up as a model if India and Pakistan decide to resolve the dispute by 13becoming flexible in their approach . Senior Congress leader Mr Salman Khurshid,

speaking at the SAFMA Conference on 'Interstate Conflicts in South Asia' in New

Delhi on 10 October, 2004, referred to the relevance of the 'Irish Formula' to the

Kashmir issue. He thought that India and Pakistan could benefit from the Good


12

14Friday Agreement of 1998 while discussing the dispute . Earlier in September 2004,

head of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Ms. Shireen Mazari had also

favoured the Irish Formula.

II. Siachen, Wullar, Sir Creek‘Lesser' disputes have cropped up between India and Pakistan while the two countries

were being persuaded by the international community to resolve the big issue of

Kashmir. The dispute over Siachen surfaced in 1984 when the two faced each other

over the glacier approximately 150 miles northwest of Srinagar. Technically a part of

Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen is located in a territory not clearly defined by the Simla

Agreement. The Line of Control (LoC) established by the Agreement relied on the

1949 UN-mediated Ceasefire Line which was demarcated up to NJ9842 on the map.

Beyond this point the document mentioned only the glaciers in general because of

their inaccessibility. Both sides claimed that the other had provoked it into high-

altitude deployment. India claimed that it wanted to secure the glacier because it

formed a kind of gateway to Ladakh which was a part of the Indian-administered 15Kashmir. It is accepted on all hands that India had made the first move on Siachen .

The officers who had planned the operation tended to relate it to Chinese occupation

of Aksai Chin, leading to the India-China war of 1962. Their position was that New

Delhi had not allowed reconnaissance of the high mountains in the 1950s, thus

making it possible for the Chinese to build the secret Xinjiang-Tibet road. Pakistan

mobilised claiming that the Indian move to Siachen would interdict Pakistan's

communication with its Northern Areas.

The Indian and Pakistani pickets on the Siachen glacier have fired upon each

other for the last 20 years. Siachen seems to have become a permanent dispute

because of (rather than in spite of) the Simla Agreement provision that all disputes

would be resolved through bilateral discussion for which there is no enduring

mechanism. The Agreement has thus become a kind of useful docket in which to

regularly insert new disputes. The irony is that the Siachen dispute was first created

by violating the Simla Agreement; then Simla Agreement was used as a peg to make it

permanent. In 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Zia-ul-Haq agreed to

solve the dispute through talks, then in 1987 Siachen saw one of its worst incidents of

fighting on the glacier. In 1989, foreign secretaries from both sides came close to

clinching an accord on calling the troops back to pre-1984 positions, but India

backtracked, saying the accord had not been conclusive. Some Indian experts say that 16the Siachen issue is now as permanent as the Kashmir dispute . Outside observers

think that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi backtracked on Siachen because electorally a

climb-down from the Siachen would have been seen by the Indian masses as a

confession of defeat at the hands of Pakistan. By 1993, six foreign secretary-level talks

had taken place without any result while much vitriol was expended on both sides on

partisan presentations of the issue.

While the world categorises the war on Siachen as one of the most absurd

undertakings of the 20th century it also looks at Siachen as a crisis 'successfully

managed' by New Delhi and Pakistan. This is the minimalist view allowing the two


13 14

countries to be seen as reasonably competent to isolate their disputes and not let them

escalate into bigger crises. Since they are accompanied by flights of nationalist

imagination on both sides, the truth may be that the accumulation of the secondary

disputes is developing national psyches against any final resolution. A number of

issues have come to surface in consequence of India's status of an upper riparian

state. Here too India has been inclined to using the status to compel Pakistan to 17modify its conduct on the Kashmir dispute . Another issue which falls in the category

of 'successfully managed' crises is the Wullar Barrage-Tulbul Navigation Project. The

dispute arose in 1985 after India started work on a barrage on the Jhelum River at the

mouth of the Wullar Lake near Srinagar. India claimed that the dam was meant to

regulate navigation on the river in certain months of low flow. Pakistan accused India

of violating the 1960 Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Predictably the two could not

resolve the issue through negotiations under the Simla Agreement in the decades that

followed. The escalation represented by Wullar is the transformation of an otherwise

well-performing Indus Treaty into a disputed one. While avoiding the option of

arbitration under the Treaty, the two sides have peculiarly conflicting views on the

status of the Wullar Barrage dispute after suspension of work on the barrage. India

thinks that the dispute has been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides while 18Pakistan thinks that the dispute is pending .

An official Pakistani website posits the dispute(s) like this: 'Over the years

India has tried to start projects on the western rivers in Indian-Occupied Kashmir that

violate the provisions of the Treaty. Some of the important projects among these are:

a) The Baglihar Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab. b) The Wullar barrage Project

on River Jhelum. c) The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project on River Kishanganga

(River Neelum). d) The Dul-Hasti Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab. e) The

Sawalkot Dam on River Chenab. Apart from above-mentioned controversial projects,

India has recently started avoiding holding of special meetings of the Pakistan India

Commission (PIC) and conducting tours. During the last year (2002) no general tour

of inspection could be carried out due to Indian reluctance. Similarly, India refused to

entertain Pakistan's request of carrying out a special inspection tour of the Baglihar

hydroelectric project on river Chenab and also refused to hold a special meeting of the 19PIC on the same issue. These are all blatant violations of the Indus Water Treaty' . It

appears that, instead of 'managing' the crises, the two countries are busy creating new

disputes.

The Pakistani view of the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab is

summarised as follows: The 450-MW Baglihar power-project, which India is building

on the Chenab River in Indian-administered Kashmir, is at present a major water

issue between the two countries. Under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), India is

entitled to use the three Western rivers, allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, for

purposes such as generation of hydroelectric power. The present controversy arose as

a result of the provision of submerged gated spillways in the Baglihar project-design

that Pakistan says violates the IWT. The design would increase the dam's water-

storage capacity. Pakistani experts say the project, on completion, would deprive

Pakistan of about 7000 cusecs of water per day, in addition to completely disrupting

supplies for an uninterrupted period of 26 days during the critical December-

February period. India claims to have made changes in the design taking into

consideration Pakistan's objections, but Pakistan remains unsatisfied. Following the

failure of talks on the issue during the special meeting of the Indus Commission in

February 2003 (which was held after much dilly-dallying by India), Pakistan asked for

the appointment of a neutral expert in accordance with article IX of the IWT. India 20has not responded positively so far to Pakistan's demand' . However, bilateral talks

on Baglihar have been publicised as friendly and promising without an indication of a

breakthrough in 2004.

In August 2004, an Indo-Pak discussion of the Sir Creek dispute has also not

yielded anything positive. The two sides decided to stick to their conflicting positions

on Sir Creek, a 60-mile estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch forming the

southern border (Gujrat-Sindh) between the two countries. In 1968, an arbitration

tribunal had decided that India was right in claiming that the Rann belonged entirely

to it. The two countries had fought a war in the Rann in 1965, disputing the boundary

north of Sir Creek. The tribunal did not go into the matter of where the frontier was in

the Creek but that, in itself, became a dispute later on. By 1992, the two countries had

talked about Sir Creek six times without a result. Where was the line separating India

and Pakistan on the waters of the creek? International law would incline to the Indian

view that the line should pass in the middle of the stream. Pakistan contends on the

basis of earlier agreements that it should pass on the eastern shore of the creek, thus

practically giving the creek to Pakistan. Since India had relied on an earlier map

giving the boundary on the eastern bank it was supposed to have yielded the point.

The truth, however, is that the determination of the boundary will also decide the

beginning of the maritime boundaries of India and Pakistan. If India gets the line to

fall in the middle of the stream on the principle of thalweg, then Pakistan tends to get

less of the territorial waters zone and economic zone in the Indian Ocean. Both

countries already routinely arrest each other's fishermen on the maritime boundary 21drawn notionally from Sir Creek . Sir Creek is similar to the Delta Island dispute

between India and Bangladesh as in that case too the drawing of the maritime

boundary is an underlying issue.

The above 'lesser' disputes between India and Pakistan have often been

consigned to a domain of discussion devoted to confidence building measures

(CBMs). Despite the fact that these disputes have become perennial, a number of

publications have listed them as possible CBMs serving to soften the two sides before

they approach the 'core issue' of Kashmir. The idea tacitly yields the position that the

lesser issues are not real and may have been created to strengthen bilateral positions

on the issue of Kashmir: that somehow India and Pakistan have dug a moat of

obstacles to safeguard the castle of the main dispute. It has been presumed that since

these obstacles are not really substantive, they can be removed to improve the

atmospherics between the two rival states. In this thinking, Kashmir indeed is tacitly

viewed as the core issue. Pakistan too designates Kashmir as the core issue and looks

at these lesser issues as distractions that can be sorted out easily once Kashmir is

resolved. On the other hand, India does not recognise the designation of a 'core issue';


15

it does not want to discuss Kashmir on any priority. At the internal political level

Kashmir is actually non-negotiable. This puts a different complexion on the 'non-core'

issues discussed above. The two sides are not actually agreed on the status of the

issues other than Kashmir. Are they peripheral to the Kashmir dispute? Can they be

treated as CBMs? Their importance and seriousness lie in the fact that they threaten

to become 'core issues' if India and Pakistan do not make up their minds about the

post-nuclear status quo in the region.

III. Bangladesh-India DisputesBangladesh is geographically surrounded by India, except for a stretch of 283 km

border with Myanmar (Burma). Its relations with India were hostile when it was a

part of Pakistan. India's policy was punitive in response to Pakistan's pursuit of a

change in the territorial status quo in the region. The 1965 war was fought to a

stalemate in West Pakistan but it exposed East Pakistan to new fears of security.

Inter-wing political contradictions created an opposition in East Pakistan that was

pro-India. Internal strife separated Pakistan's Eastern wing in 1971, after what looked

like a pro-India revolution seeking national liberation. Many observers expected

Bangladesh-India relations to improve as partners in South Asia. It was thought that

the disputes relating to territory and waters that bedevilled India's relations with

Pakistan would be resolved in short order. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Today,

instead of clearing the backlog of bilateral troubles, the two countries have entered a

phase of bitterness unseen before. The old Farakka Dam issue that simmered between 22India and Pakistan was resolved in the 1990s, but not completely . Other issues have

snowballed meanwhile to heighten mutual hatred at the popular level.

River Ganges flows through China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. It receives

80 per cent of its rainfall during the June-September monsoon period till the volume

of water at Farakka becomes 2.5 million cubic feet. In 1951 India first thought of

building a dam at Farakka -- 18 miles upstream from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)

designed to divert the Ganges' flow during the dry season into Baghirathi-Hoogli

River to flush out the silt at the port of Calcutta. Concern for the future of East

Pakistan's agriculture was aroused by the planned barrage. As time passed the

Farakka Dam became a dispute between India and Pakistan -- second in bitterness

only to the Kashmir dispute. The Dam was commissioned after the independence of

Bangladesh. It was expected that, given the cordial relations between India and the

newly created state, the Farakka Dam issue would be dealt with amicably, but it was 23not . India did not consult with Dhaka before operationalising the barrage. In the

years that have followed, Bangladesh has suffered adverse effect on its agriculture,

fishery, navigation and forestry due to the reduced flow in the dry season when it

most needs the Ganges water. (Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers sustain 86

per cent of the total land area in Bangladesh.) Anti-India sentiment was fuelled by the

dispute over the Farakka Dam. In contrast, when India, as the upper riparian state,

interfered with rivers flowing into Pakistan the dispute was resolved through the

Indus Water Treaty in 1960. India and Bangladesh have failed since 1974 to agree on a

strategy of water flows during the dry season. When Bangladesh proposed several

storage dams on the tributaries of the Ganges up river in Nepal, India objected to it.


16

Instead it proposed a diversion from Brahmaputra through a large canal to augment

the Ganges waters. This was not acceptable to Bangladesh, which feared ecological

damage from the canal. India and Bangladesh signed a 30-year agreement on water

sharing from Farakka in December 1996. The agreement has not satisfied the

opposition parties in Bangladesh. One fear that drives the anti-India feeling in

Bangladesh comes from any future measures that India might take to divert the 54 24rivers that flow into Bangladesh from its territory .

The issue of demarcating territorial waters between the countries has

resulted in serious differences. Both lay claim to a new-born island in the estuary of

Haribhanga River on the border of the two countries has simmered since the 1970s.

This island, known as South Talpatty to Bangladesh, and New Moore/Purbasha to

India, first appeared on a satellite picture in 1975. Both immediately laid claims to it.

Bangladesh proposed that a joint Indo-Bangladesh team go to the spot to determine

the flow of channels of the river in accordance with international law. India instead

sent out troops and stationed its naval force on the island in 1981. However, India

withdrew its forces after protest from Dhaka and agreed to negotiations. There was

tension over the issue in 1998 after the Indian Border Security Force (BSF)

established a base on the island and the Indian navy started visiting the island

regularly. In 2001, the quarrel over the island was compounded when border

skirmishes occurred in Meghalaya state of India and the Sylhet district in Bangladesh.

Dhaka accused India of holding territory in the area illegally since 1971. An operation

by the Bangladesh troops against the Indian army resulted in the death of 16 Indian

and three Bangladeshi soldiers. An estimated 10,000 people on Bangladesh side and

1,000 people on Indian side were forced to flee from the disputed area as a result of

the on-going tension. This brought to the fore the much tortured question of the

unresolved 'enclaves' that exist along the border. The border drawn between India and

Pakistan by Sir Cyril Radcliffe resulted in India's control over 112 enclaves and

Bangladesh's control over 32 enclaves based on the religious identities of the

inhabitants of those areas. To avoid trouble the two countries signed an agreement in

1972 to resolve the enclaves issue, but India did not ratify it. Bangladesh immediately

ratified the treaty and returned the disputed Berubari to India, while India gave

Bangladesh the permission to use the Tin Bigha corridor, a gateway to Bangladeshi 25enclaves inside India, in 1992 .

Bangladesh has refugee problems with both Burma and India. In the first

case, it is Burmese Muslims (Arakanese) who flee into Bangladesh; in the second case,

it is the Bangladeshis fleeing into India mostly for economic reasons. Bangladesh also

has 260,000 'Pakistanis' who have not been expatriated to Pakistan. India has become

sensitive to the stream of migration from Bangladesh; and because of it the bilateral

equation dips dangerously when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Khaleda Zia is in

power. In January 2003, the former Deputy Prime Minister of India, L. K. Advani,

announced the deportation of some three million 'illegal' Bangladeshis from India.

The government of West Bengal state contested the criterion on which the

Bangladeshis were designated as illegal but New Delhi remained adamant and finally

deported some 213 Bengali-speaking people from West Bengal. Bangladesh disagreed


17 18

with the principle on which India sought to resolve the 'illegal Bangladeshis' issue.

This issue took India-Bangladesh relations to their lowest point in 2003. According to

Bangladeshi sources, that year India is alleged to have made 60 attempts to push

thousands of people into Bangladesh from various points on the border.

Indo-Bangladesh trade has been another bilateral irritant. Bangladesh has to

accept India as its biggest trade partner because of geographic proximity but has a

trade deficit of a billion dollars it doesn't like at all. It imported goods worth US$

1,022 million in 2001-02 and exported to it goods worth only US$ 50.28 million. In

the last ten years the trade deficit has grown three times over because of the economic

disparity and India's comparative economic advantage. Borders being porous and

rendered vulnerable by enclaves lead to massive smuggling that undermines

Bangladeshi economy. The unhappiness over the unequal trade relationship spills

over into the entire area of economic cooperation. Political bitterness has fostered the

habit in Bangladesh of subjecting the issue of economic adjustment with India to

electoral pressures. The question of exporting Bangladeshi gas to an energy-starved

India could become a counter in the Bangladeshi leverage on India to resolve some of

the outstanding disputes, but it was politicised between the anti-India BNP and

supposedly pro-India Awami League. One of the issues highlighted in the 2001

elections was Dhaka's agreement to exporting gas to India. Awami League's Hasina

Wajid was warned that if she agreed she would lose the elections. However, the

popular sentiment was so intensely anti-Indian that she lost the elections anyway and 26the gas project was shelved . On the other hand, India has alleged that BNP allows

Pakistan to pursue its hostile anti-Indian agenda from the soil of Bangladesh.

Exchanges have been bitter over statements made in India that the Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) has been operating out of Bangladesh. There is a counter-allegation

that under the Awami League government India extends its influence in Bangladesh

through Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). A free trade treaty between India and

Bangladesh is under discussion but, given the state of bilateral relations, it is expected

to take a long time in materialising.

IV. Indo-Sri Lanka RelationsSri Lanka and Nepal fall in the category of states with which India has an 'asymmetric'

relationship. The unresolved issues basically relate to this permanent factor. India's

neighbours began in 1947 to think of national security as a part of their relations with

India. The threats were perceived as being external, mostly tied to unsettled disputes

with India. Over the years, the direction of threat has become internal rather than

external. Like Bangladesh and Pakistan, Sri Lanka too has started positing national

security as related to internal threat. As they stand today, the Sri Lanka-India

relations could be described as South Asian model for the future. Sri Lanka began by

maximising its security against India. Its perception of India was dominated by its

concern to secure its territorial integrity. Top priority was given by Colombo to the

resolution of the disputes over Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Strait. Up to the 1980s Sri

Lanka sought to neutralise India by getting the UN to declare the Indian Ocean as a

Zone of Peace. It feared Indian intervention on behalf of the Tamil community in the

north of the country as they represented the 65 million strong Indian state of Tamil

Nadu. So strong was the Sri Lankan fear of being absorbed by the Big Brother in the

north that it sought in the beginning to turn away from the subcontinent and establish

relations with the states of Southeast Asia within ASEAN. It was lukewarm towards 27SAARC and its regional framework .

If the past is a bitter memory it should fade away in the coming economic era.

India's policy towards Sri Lanka was directed at preventing it from looking outwards

from the subcontinent and thus attracting external interests into the region. 'Broadly

speaking, two major considerations underlay India's Sri Lanka policy when Indira

Gandhi was prime minister. First, there were geo-strategic concerns, and a desire to

insulate Sri Lanka from external forces that would have a destabilising effect on

India's security and strategic environment. The second consideration was to prevent

geographical proximity and ethnic affinities from leading to a resurgence of

secessionist demands in Tamil Nadu. While proclaiming India's commitment to the

unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped Tamils wrest concessions from an unwilling

Sinhalese-dominated government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a two-28pronged but contradictory strategy -- mediatory and militant-supportive' . It was

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who in 1985 decided to stop all training and assistance

to Sri Lankan Tamil groups to ensure the success of the mediatory efforts he had

initiated. However, some sources in India maintain that the LTTE received massive

assistance when Rajiv Gandhi was in power. It received more arms than all the other

militant groups put together; the quality of the arms the organisation received was 29also higher than that of what the other organisations received . This assistance

continued till July 1987. In 1987 an Indo-Sri Lanka treaty made it possible for the two

countries to start a new relationship. India initiated a new perception of the Tamil

problem in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka looked at India as a balancing factor against its

own Sinhala nationalism of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). New Delhi withheld

its support to the Tamil Tigers to give Colombo the breathing space to confront the

JVP violence. Under the treaty an Indian 'peace-keeping' force entered Sri Lanka but

failed to achieve its objectives. India was not able by this policy to make the Sri

Lankan government reach an equitable solution to the problem of separatism. The Sri

Lankan nationalists campaigned to paint the Indian intervention as a violation of Sri

Lanka's sovereignty while on the LTTE's side India was unable to persuade the Tamil

leaders to accommodate the Sri Lankan point of view.

The two countries moved forward to a free trade treaty in 1998 -- the only

bilateral one in the region -- which is said to be operating satisfactorily. Under the

agreement, India will eliminate tariffs on 1,000 Sri Lankan products over a period of

three years and Sri Lanka will do away with tariffs on 900 Indian products within

eight years. The list of products whose tariffs will be eliminated or reduced and the

'negative list' of products will be negotiated as the bilateral trade (now at a billion

dollars) takes off. A Sri Lankan economist, however, takes a cautious view of the

agreement: 'There is a fear among the smaller countries that the main beneficiary

from tariff liberalisation would be the larger countries. Irrespective of the theoretical

viewpoint, the perception of smaller countries needs to be recognised, and it was this

realisation that led to the “Gujral Doctrine” to be introduced by India in 1997/98.


19

However, there is some dilution of the doctrine in recent years and, giving vent to this,

an editorial of the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) stated: ‘It is for India to

ensure that smaller members of the region have a growing stake in regionalism. This 30responsibility India has not taken seriously’. (EPW, January 10-16, 2004: 119)

The 'unresolved dispute' of Tamil separatism has forced the two states to

become aware of their limitations. India has come to realise that there is a limit to

how far it can go to offer assurances to Colombo at the risk of alienating the state of

Tamil Nadu; and Colombo has realised that the people of Sri Lanka simply cannot

suppress their fear of India because it contains the state of Tamil Nadu where people

are generally in sympathy with the LTTE. The Indo-Sri Lanka model of cooperation

emerges from this mutual realisation. It is also based on the tacit acceptance by Sri

Lanka of India's regional vision. The two Muslim states of the region -- Pakistan and

Bangladesh -- are strongly resisting this regional vision, but their rebellion is fast

giving way to the realisation that they are both weak from within and that their

security needs to be strengthened against internal threats. This phenomenon of

internal threat is in line with the Sri Lankan experience.

V. Indo-Nepal RelationsRelations between India and Nepal are close yet fraught with difficulties stemming

from geography, economics, the problems inherent in big power-small neighbour

relations, and common ethnic and linguistic identities that overlap the two countries'

borders. In 1950 New Delhi and Kathmandu initiated their relationship with the

Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accompanying letters that defined security

relations between the two countries, and an agreement governing both bilateral trade

and trade transiting Indian soil. The 1950 Treaty and letters stated that 'neither

government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor'

and obligated both sides 'to inform each other of any serious friction or

misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the

friendly relations subsisting between the two governments'. These accords cemented a

'special relationship' between India and Nepal that granted Nepal preferential

economic treatment and provided Nepalese in India the same economic and

educational opportunities as Indian citizens.

In the 1950s, Nepal welcomed close relations with India, but as the number

of Nepalese living and working in India increased and the involvement of India in

Nepal's economy deepened in the 1960s and after, so too did Nepalese discomfort

with the special relationship. Tensions came to a head in the mid-1970s, when Nepal

pressed for substantial amendments in its favour in the trade and transit treaty and

openly criticised India's 1975 annexation of Sikkim as an Indian state. In 1975, when

King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev proposed that Nepal be recognised

internationally as a zone of peace, he received support from China and Pakistan. In

New Delhi's view, if the king's proposal did not contradict the 1950 Treaty and was

merely an extension of non-alignment, it was unnecessary; if it was a repudiation of

the special relationship, it represented a possible threat to India's security and could

not be endorsed. In 1984 Nepal repeated the proposal, but there was no reaction from


20

India. Nepal continually promoted the proposal in international forums, with Chinese

support; by 1990 it had won the support of 112 countries.

In 1978 India agreed to separate trade and transit treaties, satisfying a long-

term Nepalese demand. In 1988, when the two treaties were up for renewal, Nepal's

refusal to accommodate India's wishes on the transit treaty caused India to call for a

single trade and transit treaty. Thereafter, Nepal took a hard-line position that led to a

serious crisis in India-Nepal relations. After two extensions, the two treaties expired

on 23 March 1989, resulting in a virtual Indian economic blockade of Nepal that

lasted until late April 1990. Although economic issues were a major factor in the two

countries' confrontation, Indian dissatisfaction with Nepal's 1988 acquisition of

Chinese weaponry played an important role. New Delhi perceived the arms purchase

as an indication of Kathmandu's intent to build a military relationship with Beijing, in

violation of the 1950 Treaty and letters exchanged in 1959 and 1965, which included

Nepal in India's security zone and precluded arms purchases without India's approval.

India linked security with economic relations and insisted on reviewing India-Nepal

relations as a whole. Nepal had to back down after worsening economic conditions led

to a change in Nepal's political system, in which the king was forced to institute a

parliamentary democracy. The new government sought quick restoration of amicable

relations with India. Nepal too has followed the pattern of the other peripheral states

challenging the subcontinental status quo against Indian interests.

The special security relationship between New Delhi and Kathmandu was re-

established during the June 1990 New Delhi meeting of Nepal's Prime Minister

Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh. During the

December 1991 visit to India by Nepalese Prime Minister Girijad Prasad Koirala, the

two countries signed new, separate trade and transit treaties and other economic

agreements designed to accord Nepal additional economic benefits. Indo-Nepal

relations appeared to be undergoing still more reassessment when Nepal's Prime

Minister Manmohan Adhikari visited New Delhi in April 1995 and insisted on a major

review of the 1950 peace and friendship treaty. In the face of benign statements by his

Indian hosts relating to the treaty, Adhikari sought greater economic independence

for his landlocked nation while simultaneously striving to improve ties with China. In

India, most men of opinion are agreed that an asymmetry of relations between the

two countries is inevitable. The leaders in India stressed India's special relationship

with Nepal. In 1990, Indian external affairs minister I. K. Gujral stated that the size

and levels of economic growth of Nepal and India were such that reciprocity in the

strict sense of the word was neither feasible nor possible in their relationship, that was

the reason why he had often said that the relation between the two countries was

bound to be asymmetrical and the only point was how to make that asymmetry more

beneficial to both sides (The Rising Nepal, 1 June 1990). A Nepali scholar emphasised

that India's unwillingness to accept Nepal's equidistance approach in its relations with

its immediate neighbours -- India and China -- was expressed by the then Indian

Ambassador to Nepal, S. K. Sinha who, addressing a function organised by the Rotary

Club of Biratnagar, stated that it was not practical for Nepal that it would maintain

relations based upon equidistance with which India had special relations in all fields.


21 22

Nepal could not have relations with China, which were similar to those with India. He

had made similar other remarks in other places as well. Indian scholars and

academicians like Bhabani Sen Gupta also openly emphasised India's special relations 31with Nepal (Spotlight March 32, 1991).

Dr Bishnu Hari describes India-Nepal relationship as 'constraint zones' that 32need to be addressed to improve bilateral ties . The first 'constraint' relates to what he

calls the 'regular problematic paradigm' of inundation, particularly due to Laxmanpur

Barrage affecting the Banke districts of Nepal. After discussions, India agreed to

manage the sluice gates of the Bund but rejected the demand that it avoid inundating

Lumbini, the famous birthplace of Lord Buddha. In fact there were 17 places where

inundation occurred from projects located inside India, 300 metres from the Nepali

border. What Dr Hari describes as a 'tragedy zone' are the agreements signed between

India and Nepal on irrigation. They are a 'tragedy' because they are widely rejected by

the Nepali population. One example is the Tanakpur Agreement signed by Prime

Minister Koirala in 1991, which has had to be replaced by another by the name of

Mahakali Agreement which too has not been implemented. Nepal is busy on six major

irrigation projects on rivers that mostly flow towards the Ganges Basin in India,

becoming a part of the great 'River-linking Project' which upsets Bangladesh a great

deal. It was thought that after BJP, the controversial project would be laid aside, but 33on 6 October, 2004, the president of India reportedly revived it . There are also

problems related to the 1781 km long border that Nepal has with India. A large part of

the no-man's land on the border has been encroached upon by projects inside India.

Yet, there is hope if India and Nepal finally recognise the need they have of each

other. Nepal contributes 71 per cent of the Ganges dry season flows and 41 per cent of

the total annual flows.

Recently Indian writer Raja Mohan clarified the following aspects of the

Indo-Nepal relationship: 'India's current Nepal policy has three components. First is

military assistance to Kathmandu in enhancing the capabilities of the Royal Nepal

Army to counter the violence of the Maoists. India sees the rise of Maoists as a threat

not merely to Nepal but also itself. India has a unique relationship with Nepal and is

obliged under a 1950 treaty to offer protection to the state in Kathmandu. For New

Delhi, Nepal's war against Maoists was intimately linked to its campaign against the

terror of the left wing extremist groups within India. Second, New Delhi called for a

restoration of the balance between Constitutional monarchy and multi-party

democracy to strengthen the ability of the Nepali state to deal with the grave crisis.

Third, New Delhi impressed upon Kathmandu that there can be no military victory

against the Maoists and a political dialogue is necessary to address the genuine

grievances of the people that the movement has articulated. As the Maoists gain

ground, this three-fold policy of India has come under stress…India's own ardour for

military intervention in its neighbourhood has cooled considerably since its last

disastrous experience in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. India has also traditionally been

opposed to letting the United Nations have a say in managing the regional conflicts

within its neighbourhood. As the crisis in Nepal unfolds, India will have to choose

between many unpleasant and probably ineffective options. But the first step in New

34Delhi must be to devote urgent political attention to potential state failure in Nepal'.

(Khaled Ahmed is Consulting Editor of Daily Times, Pakistan)

End Notes1 Inayatullah, 'India's new gameplan', The News (14 September, 2004). 'In Pakistan, much

fear India is simply stinging them along, and has no intention of ever seriously discussing

Kashmir. To them, the list of 72 "confidence-building measures" India has proposed is a list

of 72 excuses to change the subject. The fact of the matter is that India had already queered

the pitch against Musharraf. Not only Natwar Singh but Manmohan Singh himself had

upped the ante, putting Pakistan in the dock only days before Kasuri set foot in New Delhi.

Add to this the utterings of Pranab Mukherjee, India's defence minister on the Line of

Control.' 2. Jeremy Seabrook, Freedom unfinished: Fundamentalism and Popular Resistance in

Bangladesh Today, (Zed Books, 2000). The author thinks that the state is swaying between

those who favour the Bengali nationalism and those who propagate Bangladeshi

nationalism, the two poles being represented by Sheikh Hasina's Awami League (AL) and

Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The BNP leans on a third phenomenon,

the fundamentalists and Jamaat Islami. Over this confusion presides the sinister

subcontinental politics of India and Pakistan, India supporting Awami League and

Pakistan supporting BNP and the fundamentalists. The author favours Proshika, an old

NGO advocating a plural Bangladesh, but seeing both AL and BNP as totally corrupt parties

that agree on everything exploitative of the masses but not on each other's existence. BNP

ruled Bangladesh from 1991 to 1996; AL ruled from 1996 to 2000. BNP enforced crippling

strikes against the AL government 60 times; AL enforced strikes against the BNP 140

times.3. Abdullah Malik, Ahmad Salim and Fauzia Javed, Masood Khaddar Posh (Sang-e-Meel,

2004). The book examines the memoir of General Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (1965)

for his confession that the Indus Water Treaty 1960 was an unequal treaty that he had to

conclude with upper riparian India or face water embargo by India possibly leading to war

in which Pakistan would be defeated because of India's superior arms. Ayub admits to

using coercion and threat to beat down domestic opposition to the 1960 Treaty. Today in

2004, Sindh refuses to accept the Treaty, which it associates with the perfidy of the upper

riparian province Punjab.4. Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition (OUP, 1998) comes to the conclusion that the

instrument of accession was not signed on the date claimed by the Indian government to

legitimise its sending of troops into Kashmir. American scholar Stanley Wolpert relates the

accession story in his 1996 book, Nehru: A tryst with Destiny, basing it on the lack of

concordance between versions of the accession. Wolpert writes that Menon returned from

Srinagar on 26 October 'with no Instrument of Accession' to report on the perilous

condition in Kashmir to the Defence Committee. Only after Mountbatten had allowed the

airlift of Indian troops on 27 October, did Menon and Mahajan set out for Jammu 'to get

the Instrument of Accession'. The Maharaja signed the Instrument after the Indian troops

had assumed control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir's summer capital, Srinagar. If

Wolpert's version is accepted then the 'conspiracy' of legalising the airlift becomes

acceptable. Lamb thinks that it is possible that 'certainly Menon, perhaps Mountbatten,

perhaps Nehru and perhaps Patel' were involved in this conspiracy. Lamb also claims that

the document of accession does not exist.5. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990 (OUP, 1991) rates Owen Dixon

very highly as an investigator and regards his reports to the UN Security Council as most


23

elegantly framed and insightful. After a number of attempts, Dixon failed to convince India

to accept new modalities of demilitarisation of the State before holding the plebiscite. He

also suggested holding regional plebiscites which would have divided Jammu & Kashmir

between India and Pakistan. Josef Korbel, commenting on Dixon's effort in his book

Danger in Kashmir (OUP reprint 2002), noted that Dixon 'appeared sceptical of the ability

of the United Nations to force upon India any just solution'.6. Mansur Ijaz, 'Kashmir: Defining the Road to Peace', Washington Post, (22 September,

2004): 'One bold step: adjusting the Line of Control. Kashmir's final solution lies in

territorial adjustments that reflect India's desire for geographical unity while respecting

Pakistan's yearning to reunite with disputed Kashmir's people. Therefore, modifications of

the Line of Control that give Pakistan even a sliver of the coveted Kashmir valley by moving

it a few miles east in the southern part near Srinagar, while moving it westward in the

northern part at Siachen, where only glaciers hold fort, would give Pakistan's army generals

enough cover to claim victory to their partisan domestic audience while allowing India its

right to geographical unity. Accentuating such territorial adjustments by making the border

more porous so Kashmiris within the princely state can be reunited and demilitarisation

can occur would heal the scars of five decades of conflict'. (Mansoor Ijaz, chairman of

Crescent Investment Management in New York City, jointly authored the blueprint for a

cease-fire of hostilities in Kashmir in 2000.)7. P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen Philip Cohen, Perception Politics and Policy in

South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, (Routledge/Curzon, 2003). The authors have

examined the Mahajan exercise after their earlier analysis of Brasstacks.8. Daily Times, Lahore, 11 March, 2004: 'Senator Lt General (r) Javed Ashraf Qazi said on

Friday that banned outfit Jaish Muhammad was involved in the attempts on General

Pervez Musharraf's life. “We must not be afraid of admitting that Jaish was involved in the

deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, Daniel Pearl's

murder and attempts on President Musharraf's life,” said Senator Qazi, who is also former

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) director general.' 9. George Perkovich, vice president of studies at the Carnegie Endowment and MIT, who

wrote the seminal book on India's nuclear programme India's Nuclear Bomb: the Impact

on Global Proliferation (OUP, 1999), has meditated on the theme in his article 'Is India a

Major Power?', The Washington Quarterly, (Winter, 2003-04). He quotes the great pro-

bomb political scientist Kenneth Waltz of the realist school to establish the baseline of his

discussion: 'a useful colloquial definition of power is the extent that one affects others more

than they affect oneself'. He then elaborates the definition further by saying: 'A state's

power can thus be understood as a combination of its capacity to influence others to behave

as it wants them to and, conversely, to resist the unwelcome influence of others'. He thinks

that India has achieved the second quality but not the first: it has attained the ability to

fend off external coercive pressure but cannot compel others to do its bidding. However,

one has to watch India's growing ability to exercise compellance in its periphery.10. Praveen Swami, The Hindu (1 April, 2000).11. Telegraph (23 November, 1993)12. Unfinished Partition (OUP, 1997)13. Shireen M. Mazari, 'Conflict resolution Models and Pakistan', The News, (15 September,

2004), rejected all the models except the Good Friday model of Ireland: 'The Good Friday

Agreement (Northern Ireland), which resolved the problem of Northern Ireland, has a

direct relevance to the case of Kashmir because it is premised on two interrelated

principles. One, it recognises "the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a

majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to

continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland" (that is

going with the Republic of Ireland). There is also a provision for a periodic holding (every

seven years) of a referendum in case the people of Northern Ireland appear to change their


24

minds. Two, that de-weaponisation will follow the implementation of the settlement.

Through this agreement the government of Ireland Act of 1920 was repealed. The

principles underlying this settlement are extremely relevant to Kashmir and need to be the

basis of any substantive solution relating to this dispute. In fact, out of all the conflict

resolution models, this is the only one that is premised on the right of self-determination

and not on territorial control. As such it is a good starting point for concrete moves forward

in resolving the Kashmir dispute. The time has come for India to stop seeking refuge

behind empty rhetoric and other evasive measures intended to prevent any serious

discourse on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. There is too much at stake for the

people of South Asia'.14. Hindustan Times, (New Delhi: 11 October, 2004): ‘Congress leader Salman Khurshid on

Sunday suggested that India should study the Irish peace agreement so that it can try to

replicate it to resolve the Kashmir issue, arguing that the "all or nothing" approach by

either side was impractical. Former foreign minister and BJP leader Yashwant Sinha

supported this suggestion. Addressing the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA)

Conference on inter-state conflicts in the region, Khurshid, while enumerating several

contemporary models of successful reconciliation, suggested that "the most rewarding

exercise would be to examine the IRA peace agreement". Elaborating on the Irish model,

Khurshid expressed the view that the softening of borders, as in the case of Ireland, could

make nationalist concerns less dominant, and the feeling that the Kashmir issue was a fight

for territory irrelevant. ‘The Irish model has not been studied...For India-Pakistan, the

particular aspect of boundaries becoming progressively irrelevant is most interesting," he

said. Khurshid sniffed a possible solution in the gradual erosion and consequent

irrelevance of territorial boundaries. He also drew on the example of the European Union

(EU). "The growth of the EU as a supra-national identity with the attendant practical

conveniences, the common market, easy travel across frontiers, etc. had a psychological

impact that made ethnic/nationalist concerns less dominant. The traditional sense of

nationalism and territorial sovereignty can be "tempered with a sense of participation in a

greater enterprise’, Khurshid said.’15. P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen Philip Cohen, Perception, Politics and Policy in

South Asia (Routledge/Curzon, 2003): 'Ambassador Robert Wirsing notes that ample

evidence points to the Indian armed forces as being the first to establish permanent posts

on the glacier and that they had prepared themselves long and well for the task'. p.5416. Lt Gen V. R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict without End (Viking India, 2000) thinks that the

Siachen conflict will go on forever and he links it to 'Pakistan's cross-border terrorism'.

General Raghavan was India's Director General Military Operations (DGMO) till 1992, and

was Commanding General in the Siachen and Kargil sectors of Jammu & Kashmir and was

involved in negotiations with Pakistan over Siachen. Professor Stephen Cohen in his

foreword to Raghavan's book says an Indian soldier dies every fifth day and quotes

Auchinlek as saying that neither India nor Pakistan had produced the kind of leadership

that could have prevented the worst consequences of Partition.17. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: the Realist Foundations of

Strategy (MacMillan, 2002) refers to one article written by ex-Indian High Commissioner

to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy ('Price for Supporting Terrorism' in Hindustan Times, 23

December, 2001) and another by Indian ex-ambassador to Italy K. P. Fabian ('Water from

India Terrorism from Pakistan' in The Indian Express, 23 January 2002) proposing that

India renege on the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan and divert its waters as a

punitive measure.18. Kashmiri journalist and activist Ved Bhasin in September 2004 told the writer that the

Wullar project had been affected more realistically by the ecological degradation of Wullar

Lake which no longer gave India the volume of water needed for the barrage.


25 26

19. An official website in Pakistan describes the Baglihar Dam issue from the Pakistani

perspective (http://www.infopak.gov.pk/public/Indus-Water-Treaty.htm)20. Ijaz Hussain, 'Baglihar must be depoliticised', Daily Times, (Lahore: 11 June, 2003).21. Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak (eds.), Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and

Reconciliation between India and Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996). A. G.

Noorani's legal consideration of the Sir Creek dispute remains standard authority and is

frequently rephrased by other books. He faults the positions of both sides on various points

indicating a wilful queering of the pitch for each other in the process of creating more 'non-

core' issues.22. A. G. Noorani, Frontline (10-23 May, 2003), reviewing India Bangladesh Documents by

Avatar Singh Bhasin: 'That shows an unfortunate streak in Gujral and puts a question mark

on the Gujral Doctrine. The Treaty with Bangladesh on the sharing of the waters of the

Ganga, signed on December 12, 1996 owed little to him. It was accomplished thanks only to

the decisive intervention of West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu. Even so, it is less

favourable to Bangladesh than the Agreement of 1977, which, unlike the Treaty, contained

a binding minimum guarantee clause in favour of Bangladesh. He publicly complained on

January 1, 1997: "We saw from the figures that some people are talking things which are

not correct." Jyoti Basu was given incorrect statistics by New Delhi'. 23. Iftekheruzzaman, 'Bangladesh a Weak State and Power', in Asian Security Practice

(Stanford University Press, 1998). The author discusses Bangladesh's security problems

vis-à-vis India. p.32724. Lailufar Yasmin, 'India-Bangladesh Tussles', South Asian Journal (July-Sept 2004): 'This

mega project of river linking and water diversion has its roots in a nineteenth century's

proposal to build links for the purpose of promoting inland navigation for better

transportation. Though the proposal did not materialise during that time, it was later

revived twice in the 1970s in different forms, keeping the basic idea of river linking intact.

However, the Indian Central Water Commission (CWC), in its feasibility survey, rejected

these two plans as well. The Indian Ministry of Water Resources later established the

National Water Development Agency (NWDA) that undertook studies on the optimum

utilisation of peninsular and Himalayan rivers. The proposal contained a plan of linking the

water flows almost all over India through connecting the Himalayan and Peninsular

components by creating a total of 31 links among 36 rivers of the country. It will involve

digging 600 canals, which could flood 3000 square miles of land, displacing 3 million

people from their ancestral land. This project started gaining importance in the public

domain after the Supreme Court of India passed an order on 31 October, 2002, to complete

the river linking project within 12 years.'25. Lailufar Yasmin, 'Bangladesh-India Tussles', South Asian Journal, (July-September,

2004).26. Jeremy Seabrook, 'Bangladesh: Enigma of Nationhood', South Asian Journal (July-

September, 2004): 'The US is bringing pressure upon Bangladesh to export its (modest)

reserves of natural gas to India, via the intermediary of Unocal, an energy company of

which Hamid Karzai, and the ubiquitous Zalmay Khalilzad (involved at one time in

negotiations between the US government and the Taliban for a pipeline through

Afghanistan, subsequently representative to the Iraqi Opposition) were former advisors. It

is rumoured that Sheikh Hasina was warned before the elections of 2001 that if she did not

agree to the deal with Unocal, she would lose. She did. But Khaleda, as the embodiment of

Bangladeshi nationalism, can scarcely bring herself to sign away a resource which

Bangladesh will need for its own development. The elections of October 2001 were bitterly

fought; not only on the issue of further liberalisation, including the export of gas, but more

significantly on the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, the criminalisation

of politics and the politicising of crime.'

27. Nira Wickramasinghe, 'Sri Lanka: the Many Faces of Security', in Asian Security Practice

(Stanford University Press, 1998). The main features of Sri Lanka's perception of India are

drawn from this essay. p.36728. V. Suryanarayan in 'Chronicle of a Failed Policy', reviewing J. N. Dixit's book Assignment

Colombo, in Frontline (21 March-3 April, 1998).29. Ibid. The author challenges Dixit's claim that Rajiv Gandhi actually switched off aid to

LTTE.30. Dr Saman Kelegama, 'Safta: A Critique', South Asian Journal, (April-June, 2004).31. Dr Ram Gopal Dahal, 'Special Relations or Equi-Distance Concept', The Daily Telegraph,

(Kathmandu, 6 March, 2002.32. ‘Review of Nepal-India Relations: Time for New Thrust for New Vision’, read at SAFMA

Regional Conference: Interstate Conflicts in South Asia, The Ashok Hotel, New Delhi,

India: October 9-10, 2004.33. 'President prod for river link', The Telegraph, (7 October, 2004),: 'President A.P.J. Abdul

Kalam today asked the Centre to send him updates on the previous NDA regime's

ambitious river-linking project and has prodded the UPA government into reviving the

grandiose scheme to transfer water from surplus regions to deficit areas. The NDA's

constitution of a task force on the river-linking project at former Prime Minister Atal

Behari Vajpayee's behest had threatened to widen inter-state political chasms and

provoked a public debate involving hydrologists, politicians and environmentalists. Union

water resources minister Priya Ranjan Das Munshi today briefed Kalam. His briefing

followed the President's query to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the progress of the

project. Das Munshi is understood to have presented the steps being taken by his ministry

to link the perennial snow-fed rivers of the north with seasonal rivers in the Deccan

plateau.'34. Reproduced in Daily Times (Lahore: 28 August, 2004).


27

South Asian Economic Powerhouse Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shaukat Aziz

he world's economic centre of gravity is fast shifting to Asia. Our continent is

seeing important processes of regional and sub-regional economic cooperation. TNorth East and South East Asia are forging cooperation in trade, investment and

technology. China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN are major success stories in terms

of economic and technological advancement. These countries have been able to

benefit from the processes of globalisation and have positioned themselves to

optimise gains.

The resource rich regions of Central and West Asia are also embarked on

important cooperative ventures indicated by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Pakistan is situated in South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf regions

simultaneously. Our strategic location makes it possible for us to play a critical role in

advancing cooperation in these regions and we are determined to contribute to their

peace, stability and prosperity. We look at Pakistan as an anchor of stability at the

crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf region.

We are forging close cooperative links with all these regions. We want to

build positive links with the process of globalisation and believe that regional

cooperation is a necessary ingredient in maximising dividends in an increasingly

inter-dependent world.

Pakistan has worked towards the creation of South Asia Free Trade Area

(SAFTA) and major progress was made at the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad. We

have also started consultations to enter into preferential tariff and even free trade

arrangements with several important economies of the Asia Pacific region. Pakistan

will host the Ministerial Meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Islamabad in

April, 2005. A major theme at the Islamabad ACD meeting is Economic Cooperation

in Asia. As Chairman of SAARC, Pakistan has made efforts towards the realisation of

its goals. Enormous challenges confront South Asia. It has the largest number of poor

in the world; FDIs are at a low level, but a vast unrealised potential exists.

South Asia, home to one-sixth of humanity, cannot remain indefinitely mired

in poverty and affliction. We have resources, talent, skills and industrious peoples. We

have a great capital -- our human resource. It is second to none. We have the ability to

turn South Asia into an economic powerhouse of the world.

Central to SAARC's functioning is the Pakistan-India equation. The recent


28

improvement in atmospherics between India and Pakistan helped propel the process

of regional cooperation in South Asia. Under SAARC we are coming together in trade

with SAFTA, a very attractive arrangement for all of us. We are also working towards

Customs cooperation; setting up an Arbitration Council; working instrument on

Avoidance of Double Taxation; and on promotion and protection of Investments.

SAARCFINANCE enables the heads of our Central Banks to develop closer

understanding and cooperation. There is also the overarching objective of poverty

alleviation as well as mechanisms for technical cooperation. Social Charter sets the

regional markers for lifting the quality of life in the region. In SAARC we should share

best practices and create mutual dependencies and linkages. All this would create

South Asian dynamics for growth and development.

On the India-Pakistan bilateral plane there is a lot that can be done. To begin

with the Gas Pipeline Project could be a huge and successful CBM. We envisage this as

a stand-alone project of great significance, where India and Pakistan and gas suppliers

can benefit. We believe that both Pakistan and India can gain a lot by cooperating in

the field of energy. We can offer India an energy corridor, if it so wants. We could

promote tourism and trade and many other areas of cooperation.

Bilaterally, India has a huge advantage in terms of balance of trade. It is

important to identify reasons that make it difficult for Pakistan to get access to the

Indian market. We hope the study group set up in Islamabad in November last year

would assist us to do so. We hope that the Economic Experts Committee would be

able to deal with these issues effectively. It is important to create a level playing field

and facilitate private sector interaction.

Investments and joint ventures could take-off in a big way if we are able to

create an enabling political environment of peace, stability, trust and confidence. We

should work towards attaining these objectives and I don't think they are difficult to

achieve.

I discern distinct warmth in sentiments in Pakistan and India to engage

constructively. Constructive engagement requires vision, sagacity and sense of

purpose. There is a huge area of convergence. Divergences can be minimised. The

parameters of engagement as far as Pakistan is concerned are simple and

straightforward. Let me share them with you: We must cultivate good neighbourly

relations. We must respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and base our

relations on sovereign equality. We should respect the principles of non-intervention

and non-interference. We must endeavor to win each other's trust and confidence.

Respect for these basic principles of inter-state conduct is the safe and sure

foundation on which Pakistan-India relations will thrive and prosper. Pakistan looks

forward with confidence to engaging India on the whole range of issues. Pakistan and

India must lead South Asia to new horizons of economic development. Our basic

economic indicators are impressive. India's growth rate has been very healthy. We

expect ours to grow.


29 30

The macro-economic indicators for Pakistan are all positive. The investment

climate is attractive; the Stock Exchange is buoyant and interest rates are down. The

exports and foreign exchange reserves are healthy. Fiscal deficit is contained at 3.3

per cent of GDP. Per capita income has risen to US$ 650 and is destined to go higher.

This year the GDP was 6 per cent. We have undertaken across the board reforms in

our financial and banking sectors and many foreign banks are operating in the private

sector. Pakistan is now out of the IMF-PRGF and in fact returned -- with thanks -- two

tranches offered by the IMF recently. Pakistan is accessing global capital market. Last

year Pakistan floated its first Euro bond. And Pakistan's rating has improved since to

B plus.

Our privatisation program has progressed well. Major banks have been

privatised. The telecom sector is being de-regulated. Mobile telephony has seen a

quantum jump. A new paradigm has been introduced to encourage the private sector

to leverage the opportunities for commercial and economic activity. The government's

role is now only confined to that of a policymaker. We have left the entire business

activity with the private sector.

The government is also paying greater attention to the social sector.

Education is high priority as is agriculture. Major infrastructure projects are taking

shape in the form of electricity generating powerhouses, ports, and road and rail

networks.

Pakistan is well positioned geographically to emerge as a commercial hub for

landlocked Central Asia and beyond. Our experience in Afghanistan has been very

encouraging. Our trade with Afghanistan has reached US$ 1 billion mark and is

growing. Our banks have opened branches in Afghanistan recently. This has further

generated economic and commercial activity between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Karakoram highway links us overland across the Himalayas to China.

Our seaports are equidistant from Europe and the Far East. We are, therefore, paying

special attention to becoming an important trans-shipment point for flow of goods

and resources especially energy. The port of Gwadar has created history. From the

beginning to the end it would be completed within three years.

We are conscious of our geo-strategic and geo-economic significance. We are

equally conscious of our credentials as a progressive, moderate Islamic state, which

can be a model to other countries. We are committed to pursuing the policy of

enlightened moderation at home and abroad, a policy discussed and introduced to the

world, and particularly the Muslim world by the President of Pakistan, Mr. Pervez

Musharraf. We believe that at this critical juncture of contemporary history, it is

important to debunk the theory about clash of civilisations. I have no disagreement

with Huntington but I disagree with his concept of clash of civilisations.

Pakistan, today, is engaged simultaneously at home and abroad on defending

basic human values and to avert conflicts and crises. Our role in countering terrorism

is well acknowledged and appreciated. We are committed to promoting peace in our

adjoining regions. A vision of peaceful cooperation must imbue our efforts to leverage

the full potential of South Asia for progress and development.

As Chairman of SAARC, Pakistan has been pro-active in promoting regional

cooperation. There is a clear recognition all around that SAARC's success is a function

of Pakistan-India relations. When Pakistan-India relations seem to be on the mend,

SAARC moves up. Whenever Pakistan-India relations get cool, SAARC becomes

inactive.

Both regional and bilateral processes are mutually reinforcing. On the

bilateral track, the CBMs and Composite Dialogue process with India have been

sustained and should be made more substantive and purposeful. Pakistan is prepared

to make its earnest contribution to the success of these endeavors. We need to move

from tactical to strategic discussions. This is a process that has already started.

Pakistan-India relations are not ordained to remain adversarial perpetually.

A sense of confidence in our common destiny coupled with the courage to take bold

decisions to turn the corner is required. It is time for a strategic re-think. It is time to

move away from rigid mindset. We must be realistic and pragmatic. The time has

come to bridge the trust deficit. Both sides must move away from conditioned reflexes

to open new avenues and cover fresh ground in our bilateral relations.

We must learn from history and experience of other nations in managing our

region and our relations. We need to seek just and durable solutions of all outstanding

issues including Jammu and Kashmir. It is time to accommodate in full the

aspirations of the Kashmiri people. This is an imperative of justice, history and

democracy. My visit to New Delhi last November has been useful. The dialogue we

have had with Indian leadership has been very constructive. I have conveyed to the

Indian leadership that Pakistan sincerely desires peace. We want good neighbourly

relations based on sovereign equality. We have the courage to take bold decisions to

move the relations forward. We must think 'out of the box'. By adhering to old

mindsets the present opportunities could easily be lost.

If India takes a step forward, Pakistan will respond by two. We will

demonstrate flexibility, if India chooses to show the same. In short, we are sincere and

serious and expect this to be reciprocated. Let us both prove the pundits of gloom and

doom wrong. A new beginning, a new dawn awaits the peoples of South Asia. Let's

work together for a promising tomorrow.


31

Indo-Pak Conflict and Possibilities of PeaceSalman Khurshid

he history of our attempts to resolve the Indo-Pak conflict can, at best, be

summed up as a combination of wishful thinking, self-righteousness, hypocrisy Tand acute myopia, on both sides. Unfortunately, Pakistan has added another

ingredient of coercion through overt or covert acts of violence and disruption. Now

the cycle has come full circle, once again, from confrontation to conciliation. We must

all hope that the progression will be positive, but it is yet too early to base that hope

on firm factors. However, in order to make tangible progress we need to be clear

about what it is that we are trying to address and whether the cause of the conflict is

something India and Pakistan can agree about. In a sense we should be speaking

about the shape and size of the table (as in Vietnam peace talks), then proceed to talk

about talks, then talk (perhaps for a long time, with expected and unexpected

fluctuation in temperature), and finally arrive at a solution that can be sold to the

people of the two countries and the people of Jammu & Kashmir, some will promptly

add.

What are political conflicts about, particularly between two countries? They

are usually about economic matters , ‘papi pet’ as they say. If someone else has an

economic asset -- mines, petroleum, or productive land, and you have less and need or

want more, there is a good case for conflict. It may appear to be a blind urge to

dominate for the sake of domination, but we should not be misled by appearances.

The protagonists might talk of ideology, but we should not be credulous and believe

that. Ultimately, it is really a matter of trying to get the largest piece of the cake. All

wars have been fought for that. The world wars were no exception. In civil wars and

secessionist movements the ingredient mix might vary and ideological battle may

seem a little more sincere, but the basic cause of conflict is seldom different.

Applied to the Indo-Pak conflict that thesis holds good, but only up to a

point. However, it will be argued here that the original cause of Indo-Pak conflict may

have been lost sight of over the five decades since Partition and, therefore, the thesis

may have become redundant in this case. Let us examine the various descriptions of

the Indo-Pak conflict:

1. It is the unfinished agenda of 1947 or an incomplete or imperfect Partition of

India.2. It is incomplete and imperfect because Jammu & Kashmir, as a Muslim majority

part of India, must be transferred to Pakistan.3. There is an inherent ideological conflict between the people of India and

Pakistan, and Jammu & Kashmir is only one way of getting at each other.4. There is a clash of civilisation between Islam and Hinduism, represented in South


32

Asia by India and Pakistan.5. It is nothing to do with Pakistan and a matter of concern only of people of Jammu

and Kashmir who aspire to an independent existence based on Kashmiriyat.6. Pakistan has got involved on the basis of ‘my enemy's enemy is my friend’. An

independent country of Jammu & Kashmir as a Muslim majority state would be a

good ally of Pakistan.7. It is a territorial dispute and merely needs appropriate adjudication for making

boundary adjustments between the two countries.8. It is a definitional issue for India, and attempt by Pakistan to change the

definition and idea of India.9. It is for Pakistan a cause of revenge for India's role in breaking up East Pakistan.10. Jammu & Kashmir was strategically required by Pakistan as a U.S. ally against

the USSR and China, and later as a friend of China against India.

Even if one or more of these propositions were true at a given time in the past

they are certainly not true anymore. So, more likely than not, both sides have

forgotten what the conflict is all about. But somehow in the absence of a convenient or

visible exit the conflict continues with fluctuating intensity. External developments

and events, as well as internal expectations and circumstances, continue to influence

the mood of the parties to the conflict. Kashmir's separatists take offence at our

referring to the conflict as two-sided, but it makes little sense even from their point of

view to call it a three-sided dispute. It would be better to see it as two separate

conflicts -- first, between India and Pakistan; and second, between nationalists and

separatists (using those terms entirely for convenience).

The most powerful argument from Pakistan's point of view is obviously their

claim of being an Islamic State. But of course that might not have been enough

because there are other Islamic states in the neighbourhood, or to say the least, states

with Muslim majority populations. The Central Asian countries are the latest to join

the club although in terms of governmental institutions they aspire to be secular. But

Pakistan could have argued that the issue was not about any Islamic country, but of

the Islamic country carved out of British India and that the carving out was

incomplete. But who made the ground rules anyway? There was no referendum

amongst Muslims of undivided India whether they wanted partition, and whether

they would want it if they had known that it would involve having to move from where

they lived traditionally. Was the Partition about people or was it actually about

property? Actually it was about a mix of the two and the mix was not always the same

everywhere.

Most importantly, a large number of Muslims chose to stay on, forming 10

per cent of the remnant population after Partition. It may not be a large percentage of

India's total population, but it is the second largest Muslim population in the world.

For Pakistan, to continue the conflict with India is also to battle with the very people it

professes to represent -- Muslims of the subcontinent. This has been poignantly

underscored several times -- by martyrs like Brig. Usman, Havildar Abdul Hameed,

Lt. Haniffuddin; by cricket stars like Nawab Pataudi, Saleem Durrani, Abbas Ali Baig.

Azharuddin, Mohd. Kaif and Irfan Pathan; hockey players like Aslam Sher Khan, and


33 34

Zafar Iqbal; scientists like President Kalam etc. It is a long story with an impressive

list of distinguished Indians. So how will Pakistan pick and choose? Why only wish to

represent Kashmiri Muslims? What about the Hindu and Buddhist populations of

Jammu and Ladakh, respectively? Why not Uttar Pradesh or Assam, both states with

large Muslim populations?

The most powerful argument available to India is the definitional argument.

India defined itself to include all religions, unlike Pakistan that defined itself to

exclude non-Muslims. Conceding Jammu & Kashmir to Pakistan on grounds of

religion would amount to our willingness to redefine ourselves. This is the reason why

India cannot accept even friendly mediation to resolve the dispute. Mediation could

be possible for purely territorial disputes. Of course we may not even need mediation

if the Indo-China peace process model can be used on the Pakistan front as well,

provided of course it can be restricted to territorial adjustment.

Some people believe that every conflict has a particular context. Major

conflicts, including the one that led to the two world wars and the awful tragedy of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, may have ended because victory and defeat was then

possible, although at great cost. The conflict between U.S. and the USSR during the

Cold War may have ended because victory or defeat, even if theoretically possible, had

become meaningless because of the size of their nuclear arsenals. But more than that,

the entire context changed as well with the break up of the Soviet Union. If the change

of context and its contribution to the resolution of long standing conflicts is

something to go by, for Pakistan the context has changed several times over

Bangladesh; the failure of insurgency in Punjab; India's slow but steady

rapprochement with China; the breakup of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War;

the several wars that we fought without any real gain to either side; holding of two

successive and successful elections in Jammu & Kashmir; Kargil and finally 9/11

should have changed it.

The last three years have been interesting tight rope walk years for the

Pakistani establishment. This involves a curious dilemma: There is great reward in

pursuing an anti-fundamentalist agenda and yet without fundamentalism there is no

case for Jammu & Kashmir. The picture is not very clear because the 'West' and 'East'

flanks of Pakistan have separate considerations and motivation. There is no direct

quid pro quo for Pakistan on the Western flank, although there might be something in

it for U.S. support to the government. But the Eastern flank is quite different. There

must be an incumbent expectation of U.S. delivery on the Jammu and Kashmir front.

Strategy that fits with that would be to reduce the profile of cross border terrorism but

continue to utilise the period for stocking up for the contingency of failure. For India,

therefore, the good news about the end of terrorism may come with peacetime

pressures.

For India too the context has changed several times, usually in tandem with

the change for Pakistan, though not quite as dramatically. The last time we thought it

might have changed so dramatically so as to end the problem itself was in the

aftermath of 9/11. But that did not materialise, as it could not have, given the

complexity of the problem. In a sense the worst is over, but the problem remains.

From Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January, 2004 to Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh in September, 2004, we appear to be breaking new grounds.

President Musharraf too seems more confident of being able to break new ground, or

at least to give up old ground. Yet it is too early to bet on conspicuous movement

forward. In medical jargon we are beginning to talk about the dreaded disease as well

as beginning to treat its symptoms seriously. In the past we merely disagreed on the

nature of the disease and ignored the symptoms repeatedly.

The search for a solution has acquired a new meaningful context and urgency

because of the convergence of changing contexts for both countries. But distressingly,

despite the BJP's stated commitment to peace in the 6th January 2004 joint

statement about a composite dialogue on ‘all issues including Jammu and Kashmir’,

their response to the September 24th, 2004 Manmohan Singh-Musharraf Joint

Statement was curiously negative. Their objections may well be the usual party

political damage control unrelated to real positions on bilateral issues. But they do

indicate a naivetté on the Jammu & Kashmir matter. Whether we say it or not, we

know it and so does the world that it is Jammu & Kashmir that has soured relations

between India and Pakistan. We all would, of course, be very happy if Pakistan just

forgot about Jammu and Kashmir and cut off the oxygen to the terrorist outfits that

continue to cause casualties in Jammu & Kashmir. Some people actually believe this is

what the talks are about with Pakistan. In other words it is not about 'what', it is only

about 'when' and 'how'. But what is there in it for Pakistan? They would certainly want

to know why did they had to fight so long and so disastrously, if this is all that could

be achieved?

Similarly, for Pakistan it would be misplaced optimism to assume that the

changed context in the world and U.S. policy planners' perception of Pakistan --

having acquired fresh strategic significance in the global war against terrorism --

would inevitably lead to a ‘territory for terrorism’ swap on the lines of ‘land for peace’

in Palestine. Yet India too has to watch out for a unique dilemma so long as terrorist

activity continues, whether we say it in joint statements or we don't, no Indian

government can talk peace or show any concession; but if terrorism stops there will be

an expectation on the Pakistan side of a ‘peace dividend’. Something like that

happened in the aftermath of 9/11 when the U.S. sought a partnership with both

Pakistan and India in the war against terrorism and disappointed India. And to top it,

circumstances made Pakistan more critical to that war.

So where does all this take us? There is too much at stake for India to allow

our relations with Pakistan to keep us from seizing the opportunities. Pakistan, after

57 years of traumatic existence, cannot afford not to find a national objective and an

aspiration other than a myth from the past. For both sides to cling on to a hope,

indeed a shortsighted expectation of an ‘all or nothing’ solution is detrimental to their

own interests. If President Musharraf has to rein in and persuade his own

fundamentalists, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too has to carry the separatists in


35

Jammu & Kashmir and at least silence the saffron fringe. Neither of them has an easy

task. Nor do our two countries.

Common people do usually prefer peace over violence provided the latter is

not given the colours of romance (ideology). But the romance fades quickly as violence

draws closer to home. Ironically peace efforts have the greatest chance of success

when one side figures out that it has lost on when a stalemate of continuing violence

begins to tire the common folk. In the India-Pakistan relationship, the former is now

virtually impossible and the latter is only beginning to happen. But it seems that the

world is in a hurry and in no mood to wait. That can be an advantage for both of us

but we both need some understanding and a lot of courage.

It seems that India has toyed with some ideas for solution that depart from

the formally stated position. Similarly, Pakistan has lately suggested a methodology

that in turn is indicative of their preference. The past practice of suspecting everything

said by the other side and, therefore, saying 'no' will take its own time to fade away.

There are several contemporary models of successful reconciliation and

transformations, leading from hostility to peace -- South Africa, Berlin, Vietnam,

Palestine, etc. One can pick out interesting pointers from each one of those. However,

the most rewarding exercise would be to examine the IRA peace agreement. There are

obviously many layers and dimensions to the resolution of that long and bloody

conflict but for India and Pakistan the particular aspect of boundaries becoming

progressively irrelevant is most interesting. The growth of EU as a supra-national

identity with the attendant practical conveniences, the common market, easy travel

across frontiers etc., had a psychological impact that made the ethnic/nationalist

concerns less dominant. The opportunity that came with the union in a sense blunted

the complaints of past injustice. It thus became possible to talk about and embrace a

solution, if the traditional or artificial sense of nationalism and territorial sovereignty

can be tempered with a sense of participation in a greater enterprise. Since all the

imagined or real reasons of the conflict have largely disappeared, it remains for us to

overcome established mind-sets. If Pakistan can play India in cricket and hockey as

equals, talk to India as a nuclear country to another, why cannot we sit as equals in

the pursuit of peace? If Pakistani leadership shows statesmanship in working towards

a futuristic concept that binds Pakistan, rather than a genetically flawed concept of a

state for Muslims of the subcontinent and Indian leadership can achieve statesman-

like rapprochement with our estranged compatriots in Jammu & Kashmir, we can

come to the table with the ability to secure sustainable peace. The mention of the gas

pipeline in the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh Joint Statement may be the beginning of

a model of coexistence or cooperation that has eluded us for half a century.

(Salman Khurshid is a former Indian diplomat and currently the President of the

Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee)


36

Nuclear Stabilisation in South AsiaMoeed Yusuf

he May, 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan and India led to a fundamental change in

the Indo-Pak relationship. The nuclear explosions ended more than a decade long Tperiod of covert nuclearisation during which the two sides had exercised 'existential

deterrence'. Overt nuclearisation established a new nuclear equation raising hopes

that it would bring stability to the conflict prone region. Whether events on ground in

the past five years have actually led to stable deterrence, is an ongoing debate. One

thing that is obvious is that the euphoria of nuclear optimists has been dented by

recurring crises and the seeming indifference of both sides to flirt with each others'

nuclear threshold.

This paper analyses the existing level of stability in the South Asian nuclear

regime and suggest ways in which nuclear stability may be enhanced. The paper

begins by providing a brief history of conflicts and crises between Pakistan and India.

Following that, nuclear stability is defined to establish benchmarks against which the

stability of the current regime is to be assessed. The benchmarks are then applied to

evaluate the level of existing stability, differentiating stability during peace time and

periods of high tensions. Finally, ways to stabilise the South Asian nuclear regime are

highlighted.

I. Indo-Pak's Troubled PastThe hostile relationship between Pakistan and India needs no reiteration. The two

adversaries have been involved in several crises and at least three full-fledged

conventional wars in the past. The first active conflict was initiated in Kashmir just a 1year after they gained independence . In 1965, the two clashed again on the Western

Front (West Pakistan), and in 1971 yet another conventional war led to the separation 2of East Pakistan, leaving a permanent scar on Indo-Pak relations . Although there

remain numerous contentious issues between Pakistan and India, undeniably at the

core of their hostility lies the dispute over Kashmir. The bottom line is that Pakistanis

and Indians perceive Kashmir to have been responsible for their troubled

relationship. Before we move on to the task of defining stability, it is important to

highlight the essentials of Indo-Pak crises in which the aspect of nuclear deterrence

featured in one way or another. Four crises fit this criterion; two took place in the

period of covert nuclearisation and two after the nuclear capabilities had become

overt.

The first such crisis took place in 1986-87. It developed when India

conducted an extensive military exercise, the 'Brasstacks', 20 miles from the Pakistani 3border . The ultimate aim of the exercise that involved quarter of a million Indian


37 38

troops has been widely debated. Opinions vary greatly, some labeling it as an attempt

to put pressure on Pakistan to cease support to Sikh infiltrators in Eastern Punjab,

while others suggesting that India had planned a full-fledged war to split Pakistani 4territory . In any case, given the sheer magnitude and apparent hostile nature of the

exercise, Pakistan mobilised its forces leading to an eyeball-to-eyeball deployment.

For the first time during any Indo-Pak crisis, covert nuclear threats emanated from

Islamabad. Dr. A. Q. Khan, the 'father of Pakistan's bomb' professed Pakistan's

nuclear capability in an interview with an Indian journalist stating, 'nobody can undo

Pakistan….We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our 5existence is threatened.' The statement was carried in all leading newspapers, thus

achieving the aim of communicating the existence of the capability.

Next, in 1990, following an upsurge in violence in Indian-administered

Kashmir and subsequent Indian allegations of Pakistani support to the insurgents,

tensions between Pakistan and India heightened. A crisis developed as Pakistan

conducted 'Zarb-e-Momin', a major military exercise that India responded to by its 6own 'precautionary' reinforcements . Both forces were put on high alert and the crisis

seemed to be escalating towards an active conflict. Here again, nuclear overtones were

present, and there is a wider consensus that the nuclear deterrent featured to keep the

crisis from escalating. Some reports even suggest that Pakistan had placed its delivery

aircraft on full alert and technicians in its main nuclear facility had been ordered to 7assemble nuclear weapons in preparation of a launch . While later studies have

discounted such reports, they all seem to agree that some nuclear preparations were 8underway from the Pakistani side . What exact role the deterrent played in Indian

calculations is hard to determine.

The third crisis, which escalated to a limited conflict, took place a year after

both counties had declared their nuclear capabilities. In the spring of 1999, about

2000 infiltrators from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control and captured Indian 9army's posts in the Kargil-Drass area of Kashmir . This led to Indian retaliation.

However, the conflict remained limited as the Indian military was under strict orders 10not to carry the retaliation across the Line of Control . American involvement made

11way for the eventual withdrawal of Pakistani troops . There is no doubt that the

nuclear deterrent featured prominently in calculations on both sides during the crisis. 12Nuclear threats were exchanged openly . One report even suggests that India had

maintained its nuclear forces at a high state of readiness in preparation for 13retaliation . The Kargil crisis is of consequence for any analysis of nuclear stability in

the region. It demonstrated the existence of the 'stability-instability paradox' in a

nuclear South Asia, i.e. it made limited conflict (instability at lower levels of conflict) 14more likely while inducing stability at the higher end of the spectrum .

The latest crisis erupted after a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in

December 2001 and subsequent allegations of Pakistan's involvement led to a massive 15troop mobilisation from the Indian side . With the killing of families of Indian

military personnel in Kaluchak in May 2002, escalation to a conventional war seemed 16inevitable . The crisis caused Pakistani counter-mobilisation, leading to the largest

military deployment in South Asian history. Nearly a million troops were deployed at 17the international border . As in the 1999 crisis, both countries exchanged several

18nuclear threats that were to be employed in case of escalation . The nuclear equation

remained at the forefront and deterrence optimists believe that in the end existence of 19stable nuclear deterrence forced the two sides to withdraw their forces .

There are a few lessons from these four nuclear-related crises which have a

bearing on any discussion of strategic stability in South Asia. First, is the fact that,

despite the initial euphoria after the 1998 tests, the existence of nuclear weapons has

not eliminated crises or conflicts altogether. Second, although crisis situations have

developed, in the end all crises under the nuclear umbrella have either not escalated

to conflicts (1986-87, 1990, 2001-02), or in the case of Kargil, have remained

extremely limited in nature. Third, the reason for successful escalation control in

these crises varies from crisis to crisis and cannot be attributed to successful

deterrence in all cases. As mentioned, in the first two crises even the fact that the

nuclear deterrent featured in official calculations is debated. One common element

which assisted in escalation control in each crisis, however, was the crucial role played 20by the U.S . Finally, these crises, especially the ones that took place during the overt

nuclearisation phase bring us to the sombre realisation that crises carry with them the

threat of escalation to a full-scale conventional war, which in turn raises tremendously

the risk of a nuclear exchange. In other words, moving along the escalation ladder to

the highest end of the spectrum is a realistic possibility in South Asia.

II. Concept of StabilityThe Oxford English dictionary defines stability as 'permanence of arrangement, power

21of resisting change of structure' and 'immunity from destruction or essential change'.

Within the military context then, this implies maintaining a situation where no

development disrupts the existing equilibrium in a way that it results in active

conflict. For a conflict implies an essential change and a lack of power of

resisting change of structure. In the nuclear context, stability points to the

concept of nuclear deterrence, or the ability to deter an adversary from taking an

offensive for fear of punishment.

There is voluminous literature that deals with the concept of nuclear

deterrence. Experts have attempted to determine the necessary prerequisites for

establishing deterrence stability between two adversaries. Broadly, there are three 22prerequisites according to the rationalist deterrence theory :

(i) Both countries should have a deliverable first strike capability and an ability to

sustain an adversary's first strike and conduct a successful retaliatory strike.

This refers to the concept of survivability of ones nuclear arsenal. The idea is to

ensure that a retaliatory strike capability remains intact under any circumstances.

While the emphasis rightly remains on developing a first and retaliatory strike

capability, it must also be pointed out that establishing nuclear deterrence is a

game of perceptions as much as it is of possessing the capability itself. The

deterrent effect remains incomplete until and unless the credibility of this


39

capability and the resolve to implement it is communicated to the adversary. As

Bernard Brodie wrote during the Cold War, 'deterrence depends on the subjective 23feeling compounded of respect and fear….'. Therefore, while analysing the

stability regime, the perceptions in the minds of the involved parties must also be

judged in addition to the survivability of the force itself.(ii) Neither of the two sides should consider a preventive or pre-emptive strike as a

viable option and should not undertake any action to this effect. Prevention

reflects an attempt at decimating an adversary's nuclear facilities before they are

fully developed. Pre-emption, on the other hand, refers to an attempt to

neutralise an existing capability, before the enemy can launch a strike. If either of

these two were exercised, whether successfully or otherwise, the deterrent effect

of one's arsenal would of course have failed.(iii) Arsenals of both countries should be secure against accidental or unauthorised

use, or accidents involving nuclear weapons. This subsumes both the concept of

safety and security of the nuclear arsenal. By safety, one implies that nuclear

weapons function only as and when intended. Security refers to establishing

adequate controls over the nuclear arsenal and sensitive material to guard against

accidents. To ensure that nuclear weapons are not employed unless intended by

the legitimate authorities and are well protected is a prerequisite to maintaining

strategic stability.

In this context, the above benchmarks for strategic stability would be used to evaluate

the existence or lack thereof, of strategic stability between Pakistan and India.

Specifically, we look to answer the following questions:

(i) Are the nuclear arsenals of Pakistan and India survivable?(ii) Is the credibility and resolve to employ the nuclear option communicated to the

adversary?(iii) What is the likelihood of either of the two sides contemplating pre-emption of the

other's nuclear forces?(iv) To what extent are South Asian nuclear arsenals safe? In other words, is there a

likelihood of unauthorised or inadvertent use?(v) To what extent are South Asian nuclear arsenals secure against accidents

involving nuclear material?

Since answers to some of these questions are likely to vary significantly during peace

time - as compared to crisis situations, their bearing on stability of the nuclear regime

will be highlighted in both conditions. In the following section each of the above listed

aspect of deterrence is dealt with individually.

III. Applying the Concept of Stability to South Asia(i) Survivability of Indo-Pak nuclear weapons

As mentioned, survivability implies that a nuclear force is functional and is

capable of withstanding an initial strike and launching a retaliatory strike. Nuclear

optimists point out that the mere existence of a second strike capability is enough to 24deter an adversary from contemplating a first strike . In the South Asian case,

survivability seems to be more or less guaranteed. Both Pakistan and India

demonstrated their nuclear capabilities through the 1998 nuclear tests. Although the


40

size of Pakistan and India's nuclear arsenal is miniscule compared to that of the Cold

War adversaries, it is sufficient to ensure that a first strike could be absorbed while

retaining the retaliatory capability.

Estimates for nuclear weapon equivalents (NWEs) in terms of fissile material 25for India range from 60 to 110, depending on which estimate one goes by . For

26Pakistan the range runs from 30 to 90 NWEs. Furthermore, both countries continue

to aggressively upgrade their nuclear delivery systems. Both have aircraft capable of

delivering nuclear weapons, the F-16 and Mirage-5 in case of Pakistan, and the SU-30, 27Mirage-2000, and MiG-27 in case of India. In addition, both have well developed

ground-based missile delivery systems that can be launched from mobile launchers, 28virtually ensuring an operational delivery capability . The provision of adequate

dispersal of missile batteries combined with an adequate number of nuclear warheads

ensures that a launching capability would remain intact, even if the adversary

managed to conduct a first strike.

(ii) Credibility and resolve to employ the nuclear option Communicating credibility and resolve to employ nuclear weapons is referred

to as nuclear signalling. For deterrence to function, a capability to inflict nuclear

damage must be perceived as real by the enemy. Otherwise it is unlikely to have any

significant impact on its calculations. Nuclear signalling can be undertaken in various

forms. Three major ways to communicate nuclear signals can be highlighted.

First, resolve to employ nuclear weapons could be communicated tacitly -- by

actual demonstration of a capability or through an official policy pronouncement. A

demonstration could entail testing of nuclear weapons as Pakistan did in response to

India's tests in 1998. Another way to show seriousness is by testing nuclear capable

missiles. Both Pakistan and India have done so regularly since 1998. Furthermore,

credibility of the nuclear deterrent could also be demonstrated by deploying

operational nuclear forces and communicating such a move to the adversary. Finally,

resolve could be signalled through official policy pronouncements. For example,

Pakistan's rejection of a 'no-first use policy' demonstrates its resolve to employ

strategic forces were it threatened in any conflict.

While demonstration of a capability does signal resolve, it can also have quite

the opposite impact -- that of diluting deterrence by leading to inadvertent escalation.

There is only a thin line between communicating resolve and creating fear of an

imminent danger in the adversary's mind by pursuing overly aggressive signalling. As

Bernard Brodie has put it, 'it is possible to make him (the adversary) fear us too much,

especially if what we make him fear is our over-readiness to react, whether or not he 29translates it into clear evidence of our aggressive intent.' If a perception of imminent

danger develops in the adversary's camp, it could transform a period of calm into a

crisis situation. On the other hand, if such a perception develops in the midst of an

ongoing crisis, it could cause the crisis to move rapidly along the escalation ladder.

For Pakistan and India, credibility of an operational nuclear force and the

resolve to employ it is well established. In fact, their active signalling during past


41 42

30crises reflects their desire to show resolve to respond even if conflicts remain limited.

Pakistan and India have conducted missile tests even in times of crisis in the past.

During the 2001-02 standoff, India tested its Agni ballistic missile followed by a quick 31response from Pakistan with three tests of its Ghauri, Ghaznavi, and Abdali missiles.

In the Indo-Pak context, what is more worrying is the overly aggressive

signalling. Although the 2001-02 missile tests were pre-notified, concerns were raised

in the media labelling the tests as provocative and irresponsible. As for signalling by

deploying nuclear forces, such a risk does not exist in peace time. Neither Pakistan

nor India have their nuclear forces deployed and are not likely to do so in the near

future. In a crisis situation, however, any hint of either side initiating even limited

deployment could cause a reciprocal reaction bringing the two forces to a high level of

readiness and underscoring all dangers associated with such a development.

Second, nuclear signalling could be undertaken through direct

communication between two adversaries. This would entail official contact between

the two governments during which a nuclear threat, or an absence of it, is

communicated. The advantage of such signalling is that a message is unambiguous

and allows ones intentions to be clearly revealed to the adversary. More than their

utility in communicating resolve, official communication channels are extremely

useful when convincing the adversary of the reverse -- lack of any intention to use

nuclear forces. For example, if certain tacit or indirect signals have been

misunderstood, or if false intelligence or rumours in the press have led one to believe

that employment of nuclear weapons by the adversary is being contemplated, an

official contact could help clarify the absence of any such threat.

While official Indo-Pak communication channels have remained open during

peace time, their actual utility is during periods of crises. Here, history paints a dismal

picture. Lack of official communication can arguably be blamed for initiation and the

limited escalation of recent Indo-Pak crises. Out of the four nuclear relevant crises, it

was only during the 1986-87 crisis that official contact was utilised to diffuse 32tensions. In the last three crises, official communication was non-existent with the

result that both parties relied on indirect communication, sending unintended and

confusing signals and adding to the risk of escalation.

One alternate to direct communication that both Pakistan and India have

successfully employed in crises is conducting such communication through an

intermediary. The intermediary has been the U.S. The U.S.' role was present in 33diffusing all four nuclear relevant crises. In the 1999 crisis, Washington's

involvement was so proactive that many believe it to be the single most important

factor in diffusing tensions. However, depending on the U.S. to mediate in every crisis

is dangerous for two reasons. For one, the U.S. could find comfort in the fact that it

has been successful in bringing an end to all past crises and might decide to leave

Pakistan and India to their own crisis prevention mechanisms till the next crisis 34erupts. Paradoxically, Pakistan and India, believing that they could tap the U.S. in

35times of crises, might be more willing to undertake risky behaviour. Were the U.S. to

fail in its mediating efforts in any future crisis, the risk of escalation would increase

tremendously. In short, banking on the U.S. as the sole means of transmitting official

signals is no alternate to direct communication.

The third way to transmit nuclear signals is through indirect means. An

example of this would be making press statements addressed to a general audience

but meant to send a message to the adversary. This sort of signalling is extremely

risky and ends up sending unclear and confusing signals. The actual signal

transmitted solely depends on the perception of the recipient. The danger of

misperception is much greater in times of crises than in peace time, as in a heightened

state of tensions an adversary's calculation is bound to be conservative.

Due to the lack of direct communication during crises, Pakistan and India

have had to rely on indirect signalling, which has frequently led to misunderstandings.

In fact, allegations of sending provocative and threatening signals followed by official

clarifications by the initial message transmitter are a common occurrence in Indo-Pak 36crises. This was witnessed on numerous occasions during the 2001-02 stand-off.

Furthermore, since indirect communication is also the principal way to satisfy

domestic political interests and since pacifying hard line elements has always been an

important political concern for governments on both sides, most indirect signalling

tends to be provocative in nature. During the 2001-02 crisis this was clearly the case.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf stated: 'even an inch (of Indian incursion) will

unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy……inflicting unbearable damage to the 37enemy'. Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, an ex-Army General, in response to war rhetoric

emanating from New Delhi at the time categorically stated: '…what is the damned

nuclear option for. If Indians will destroy most of us, we too will annihilate parts of 38the adversary.' The Indian Defense Minister was quick to counter Pakistani

signalling with India's own. In a press conference he stated: '….if the deterrent is not

adequate and Pakistan uses the bomb, we will suffer a little but there will be no

Pakistan left later.….Pakistan should know its strengths and vulnerability and stop 39making these stupid statements. As the resolve to match provocative signalling from

the adversary seems to have paid off to Pakistan and India in past crises, it would 40probably incentivise a repeat of such behaviour in the future as well. This pattern

would virtually ensure instability in future crises.

To sum up, signalling credibility and resolve of employing nuclear weapons is

well established for Pakistan and India. The concern in this case seems to be the

opposite -- predominance of overly aggressive and provocative signalling. The

problem is compounded by the lack of direct communication channels to clarify any

misinterpreted signals. The issue becomes much more serious in times of heightened

tensions as previous Indo-Pak crises have shown. To ensure that signals are not

misinterpreted and do not lead to escalation in crisis situations, direct communication

channels must remain open regardless of the state bilateral relations are in.

(iii) Pre-emption of the other's nuclear forcesThe second condition of nuclear deterrence necessitates absence of a


43

preventive or pre-emptive strike. While no attempt at either pre-emption or

prevention has been executed in South Asia, they have been contemplated previously.

In 1984-85, India planned to conduct a preventive strike against Pakistan's main 41nuclear facility at Kahuta. As for pre-emption, Pakistani intelligence claims to have

received credible reports of an Indian plan to attack Kahuta immediately after India 42conducted its nuclear tests. However, these reports have never been confirmed.

While such actions might have been possible in the past, the current status of

Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals makes any thought of pre-emption a virtual

impossibility. Given the sheer size of India makes Pakistani pre-emption impossible.

However, some fears of the reverse -- India pre-empting Pakistani nuclear forces --

have been raised citing prior knowledge of each other's nuclear facilities, the short

missile flight times, and a lack of early warning capabilities as elements that make 43pre-emption attractive. However, it must be realised that pre-emption of nuclear

forces can never be carried out unless one is guaranteed of eliminating the retaliatory

capacity of the opponent in its entirety. Proliferation optimists believe that the mere

repercussions of an unsuccessful attempt ought to lay any qualms about pre-emption 44to rest.

With displaced mobile delivery systems and a reasonable number of

warheads, there is no way India could guarantee success in such a mission. This is

especially true since Pakistani nuclear forces remain unmated. Having the warheads

stored separately from their delivery systems makes the task of pre-emption even

more difficult. Theoretically, were the forces mated and deployed, pre-emption would

be more viable. However, in such a scenario the short time required for Pakistan to

launch retaliation would deter any such plans. Finally, it must be pointed out that

despite the agreement under which both sides exchange coordinates of their nuclear

facilities, the information shared is only partial and cannot be banked upon to choose 45the targets to strike when attempting pre-emption.

One word of caution. Although the above stands true for both peace time and

crisis situations, in a crisis a conventional attack targeting Pakistani aircraft and

missile batteries could be perceived as an attempt at pre-emption. Chances of such a

development are realistic, given that India's new war doctrine 'Cold Start' hints at 46targeted punitive strikes inside Pakistani territory. Here, the lack of early warning

systems would be a major handicap and faulty intelligence could rush Pakistan into

preparing for a necessary response to the perceived pre-emption. However, Pakistan's

nuclear force structure is large enough for it not to worry about the 'use 'em or lose

'em' dilemma even if an attack has been initiated. It could afford to order dispersal of

its forces to safe locations and weigh its options before responding.

(iv) Safety of South Asian nuclear arsenals The risk of unauthorised or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia

has concerned all experts. An unauthorised or inadvertent launch is believed to be one

of the most likely reasons behind a nuclear exchange. While command and control

redundancy is essential at all times, a lack of it becomes much more dangerous during


44

crises and conflicts. This is especially so for South Asia as forces remain un-deployed

in peace time and much of the following applies only when forces are deployed in the

field.

Although both Pakistan and India claim to be cognizant of the need for a

robust command and control system, most inferential analysis points out that 47developing such a system is likely to pose significant challenges to the two sides.

However, no empirical evidence is available on this count, as specific command and 48control procedures for both countries remain classified. Pessimism on the South

Asian command and control protocol flows as follows:

With visible emphasis from both sides on developing mobile delivery

systems, it seems certain that they have opted for wide dispersal of their strategic 49forces in order to make them more survivable. This is especially true for Pakistan as

India's overwhelming conventional superiority and Pakistan's consequent insistence

on its ‘first use policy’ necessitates wider dispersal. Theoretically, India, having

conventional superiority and a ‘no first use policy’ can afford assertive, centralised

control as reflected by its ex-Army chief General Sundarji, '…very strong centralised

negative controls can be exercised, if you are looking at nuclear weapons purely as a

deterrent…….if you see it purely as deterrence, there is no harm done if it is totally 50centralised, tightly held, because the response time is no longer central.' However, as

mentioned above, development of mobile missiles such as the Agni suggest that even

India plans to disperse its forces.

With dispersal comes what Peter Feaver calls the 'always/never dilemma'. It

reflects the condition where 'leaders want a high assurance that weapons will always

work when directed and similar assurance the weapons will never be used in the 51absence of authorised directions.' While nuclear forces will be dispersed to ensure

survivability, it will also mean running the risk of a loss of control of the weapon

systems. This problem is especially acute in the case of South Asia. Pakistan and India

lack adequate communication infrastructures and in times of conflict, disruption of

communication networks is extremely likely. In order to satisfy the 'always' part of the

dilemma, decision makers are likely to pre-delegate authority to senior field 52commanders . Pre-delegation inherently increases the risk of unauthorised use. For

instance, if a field commander can see that a loss for his forces is imminent, he could 53order to launch a nuclear strike in desperation . This might even take place if

communication systems are intact and the leadership has not ordered a strike.

Fears of unauthorised use are exacerbated due to the fact that Pakistan and

India do not posses sophisticated coding and authentication systems required to

enhance negative controls to strengthen the never aspect of the always-never

dilemma. Reportedly, neither country possesses systems such as Permissive Action 54Links (PALs). Similarly, since advanced circuitry techniques are also believed to be

absent, risk of an accidental launch of ready-to-launch forces also remains.

Related to unauthorised use and inadvertence is the possibility of a

miscalculation. The absence of advanced early warning capabilities, coupled with


45 46

extremely short flight times for delivery systems, heighten the risk of a miscalculation.

In a quantitative analysis conducted by M.V. Ramana et al., they determined the

response times that India's Green Pine Radar system would provide its decision

makers with. Authors concluded that to travel between Sargodha and New Delhi a 55ballistic missile would take 5 minutes. For the Green Pine Radar to detect an

incoming missile and for it to be confirmed would take 110 seconds, leaving only 190 56seconds for decision makers to react. Given that it is impossible to make any

informed decision in such a time-frame, decision makers would be left with no choice

but to either retaliate immediately or absorb a strike. With Pakistan lacking even a

capability equivalent to the Green Pine, its decision would be based on even less

credible information. Furthermore, early warning radars are inherently faulty and 57have a high error probability. Therefore, the chances of a false alarm leading to a

miscalculation cannot be discounted either. Such a possibility is not farfetched as false 58alarms were regularly detected by U.S. and Soviet radars during the Cold War. To

overcome the minimal response time, some experts worry that in due course, Pakistan

and India might choose to adopt a fully deployed Launch on Warning (LOW) 59posture. However, technical and financial constraints will guard against such a

60development in the near term. At least in peace time, nuclear forces are likely to

remain unmated with delivery systems.

The above poses a grave threat to the stability of the South Asian nuclear

regime. In any conflict that escalates to a full-fledged war, both sides are almost

certain to prefer reinforcing the always while neglecting the never aspect of the

always-never dilemma.

(v) Are South Asian nuclear arsenals secure against accidents?Accidents involving nuclear material are another worry for South Asian

nuclear experts. South Asia has witnessed nuclear accidents in the past. Just last year

India's Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP) had a nuclear accident described as 61'the worst accident in radiation exposure in the history of India.' Similar incidents

during the Cold War also took place despite the elaborate and technically 62sophisticated systems set up to avoid such incidents.

The principal danger of a nuclear accident remains on one's own territory.

However, an accidental detonation could also have adverse implications for strategic

stability. Here a scenario is outlined which several nuclear experts believe is realistic 63within the South Asian context. This situation would involve an accidental nuclear

detonation during a limited or full-fledged conventional conflict. The reason could be

a transportation or handling incident, sabotage, or even a conventional strike from the

adversary on a target, which it believed was not a nuclear storage facility. In such a

scenario, it would be difficult to determine the cause of the detonation and the

affected side would be forced to make a hasty decision. Experts believe that in all

likelihood the detonation would be taken as intentional rather than due to an 64accident, especially if the incident generated a mushroom cloud. In such

circumstances escalation control would become extremely difficult.

IV. Evaluating Strategic StabilityAn analysis of stability of the strategic deterrence in South Asia presents a mixed

picture. One glaring fact that comes out from this exercise is that crises, even those

that do not escalate, induce instability into the strategic equation. An absence of direct

communication channels and resorting to provocative indirect or tacit signalling could

heighten tensions during crises. Even tacit signalling such as deployment of strategic

forces could provoke escalation in crisis situations. Similarly, while pre-emption is not

realistic, fog of war could lead one to mistake conventional strikes for an attempt at

pre-emption and thus to a subsequent preparation for retaliation. While command

and control is likely to be a problem for South Asia at any time, forces are deployed on

widely dispersed operational posts. Realistically in the near future, such a scenario

would only be realised in times when crisis escalation is imminent, or if a conflict has

already been initiated. In a conflict, the likelihood of unauthorised use or a

miscalculation remains high as well.

What this prognosis highlights is that as the South Asian nuclear regime

stands today, it is fairly stable in times of peace but extremely unstable in crisis

situations. Clearly, the key to strategic stability is crisis prevention. Unfortunately, as

discussed earlier, previous conduct of both countries provides little reason for

optimism in this regard. The probability of crises erupting in a nuclear South Asia

remains extremely high. In fact, experts believe that since victory in a major war is no 65longer possible, the two sides now try to exhibit their strength during crises . This is

likely to become the norm in the future, which is worrisome since crises inherently

bring with them the risk of escalation.

During the two crises experienced in the overt nuclearisation phase, both

sides pursued nuclear brinkmanship with seeming disregard for each others' nuclear

threshold. Pakistan's connection to the Kashmir insurgency remained intact after the 66nuclear tests, as the Kargil crisis exhibited. If this connection persists in the future,

crisis prevention will be impossible. India, on the other hand, still continues to toy 67with the extremely dangerous notion of limited war under the nuclear umbrella ,

which led the two sides to the 2001-02 military standoff. The concept of limited war is

also enshrined in India's new war fighting doctrine, 'Cold Start'. The thrust of this

Pakistan-specific offensive plan is to conduct hard strikes, presumably inside 68Pakistani territory . Were India to employ this plan, a fresh crisis would surely engulf

South Asia. Moreover, while India calculates that such an action would remain below

Pakistan's nuclear threshold, predicting the adversary's response in war is impossible.

Flirting with an adversary's nuclear threshold, especially when nuclear red lines are

undefined, is extremely dangerous.

India's growing conventional disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan is also a matter of

concern. India already commands a 2.22:1 superiority in terms of strength of the 69Army and 3.22:1 superiority in terms of strength of the Air Force . Moreover, India

continues to induct state of the art technology in its arsenal, which has a bearing on

strategic stability. For one, systems such as the Arrow-2 ballistic missile defence that

India is trying to acquire could lead it to pursue aggressive military policies with


47

70relative comfort . More importantly, as Indian conventional disparity vis-à-vis

Pakistan increases, Pakistan's nuclear threshold would continue to be lowered. In

such a scenario, even targeted strikes that result in limited crisis escalation could end

up tampering with Pakistan's red lines.

Unlike the period when Pakistan and India fought conventional wars in a

non-nuclear environment, any crisis now carries with it the inherent risk of escalation

to the nuclear level. What is more, the advent of nuclear weapons seems to have

exacerbated the chances of a crisis erupting between the two sides. Therefore, there

remains an urgent need to address the issue of crisis prevention and introduce specific

measures that would enhance the stability of the nuclear regime.

V. Stabilisation of the Nuclear RegimeBefore forwarding specific recommendations to enhance stability of South Asia's

nuclear regime, three generic points need to be made. First, that any risk reduction or

confidence building measure (CBM) is inherently based on trust. To generate trust, a

broader confidence building process (involving non-military as well as military CBMs)

is required. Second, in the absence of a trustworthy environment, specific stability

enhancing measures must be legally binding. A non-binding agreement is unlikely to

deliver. Finally, any agreements that do not carry with them assurances of continued

implementation during crises end up being ineffective. The biggest shortcoming of

past Indo-Pak CBMs has been that they have tended to become inoperative during

crises.

Pakistan and India have several military CBMs in place. These include the

communication hotline between Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs),

agreement of non-attack on nuclear facilities and installations, agreement on prior 71notification of military exercises, agreement on air space violations, etc . A host of

new official proposals have surfaced during the course of the ongoing composite

dialogue process. Examples of these are extending the DGMOs hotline to the foreign

secretaries, agreement on pre-notification of the technical parameters of missile flight 72tests, and agreement on observing a moratorium on nuclear tests . A voluminous

body of proposals has also been contributed by experts in the field.

Certain measures are suggested below. An attempt is also made to point out

complexities in some of the previously suggested measures. (i) Negotiation on the Kashmir Issue

Whether or not Kashmir is acknowledged as a core issue by India, the fact is

that it lies at the heart of hostilities between the two neighbours. Developing trust

between Pakistan and India is a virtual impossibility till this issue remains in the

forefront. Moreover, it will continue to precipitate future conflicts and to undermine

the potential of specific stability enhancing measures. Although other stability

enhancing measures ought not be held hostage to a resolution of Kashmir, since such

a prospect seems nowhere on the horizon, continuous efforts to resolve this issue are

an imperative. The key is to continue talks on this issue with a genuine intent to move

towards resolution. Discontinuing a dialogue on Kashmir by itself could disrupt the


48

current peace initiative. In all likelihood, absence of the broader confidence building

process would automatically reduce the chances of success of specific measures.

(ii) Crisis prevention mechanismAs mentioned, the focus of any specific measures to enhance strategic stability in

South Asia ought to be on crisis prevention. What is proposed here is just a way to

ensure that diplomacy is put to the task of diffusing tensions before an actual crisis

erupts.

Pakistan and India could consider entering into a binding bilateral agreement

under which they make it necessary for prime ministers of both sides to establish

contact if a crisis seems to be developing. They should be mandated to hold at least

three telephonic conversations over a period of one week in an attempt to diffuse an

imminent crisis. A clause in the agreement could necessitate such interaction before

either side could order conventional force deployments. Such an arrangement would

guard against two pitfalls. First, it will ensure that official communication channels

remain open at the highest level. Second, Indo-Pak crises tend to erupt and escalate

suddenly. A provision for three telephonic conversations spread over a week would

give time to both sides for informed decision making. At the very least, these

interactions would ensure that troop deployment plans are put on hold until all

avenues for rapprochement are exhausted. For example, if India planned to mobilise

in response to a terrorist attack on its territory, Pakistan could provide proof of its

innocence or agree to specific measures to rectify the situation within a set time-

frame.

The utility of such a mechanism would be tremendously enhanced if the two

sides agreed to involve a neutral mediator in their conversations through a conference

call. The mediator could be an individual of international repute or a representative of

the U.N. or from a third country. Although, the two sides might be averse to such

direct outside involvement, the fact is that both inevitably end up depending on 73outside forces to subdue their crises in any case . A more direct role for a mediator

would perhaps be able to help in crisis prevention rather than escalation control. To

expand the initiative, the two sides could allow designated officials from each side

plus the mediator (or his appointed team) to observe troop movements on ground.

While tele-diplomacy is continuing, these observers could confirm the absence of

wartime deployment.

It must be ensured that telephonic conversations are only restricted to discussion

about crisis prevention. They should not be used as a means to transmit nuclear

signals, lest they generate further mistrust. Involvement of a neutral mediator could

help ensure this as well.

(iii) The signalling conundrumThe issue of nuclear signalling creates a conundrum. Absence of official

communication channels during crises leaves tacit and indirect communication as the

only options for nuclear signalling. However, both induce strategic instability in times

of crises. On the other hand, signalling resolve remains a necessary aspect of


49 50

deterrence. By the same token, removing misperceptions by signalling is also

imperative for stability. The only way out of this conundrum is to ensure that official

communication channels remain open during crises. These channels could be the

hotline between DGMOs or the one proposed for foreign secretaries. A binding

agreement stating that these channels would remain open during crises has been

floated but needs to be formalised. The prime ministers’ telephonic interaction cannot

substitute for this direct communication, which will need to occur on a frequent basis.

Although both Pakistan and India are likely to transmit some signals through indirect

and tacit channels regardless of the availability of direct channels, misperception

could be sufficiently reduced by concurrently maintaining contact through the official

route.

(iv) Non-deployment agreementFrom the analysis of strategic stability, it is clear that nuclear force

deployment on semi-operational or operational status increases the risk of a nuclear

holocaust. In fact, much of the current peace time stability should also be attributed to

a non-deployed posture. While operational deployments during peace time are not

likely any time soon, what is needed is a binding agreement on non-deployment

during times of crises or conflict. Pakistan has previously offered to formalise an 74agreement guaranteeing ‘non-deployed deterrence’ with India. However, the latter

75rejected it. Pakistan still maintains that it will not initiate deployment. Given that

India has a ‘no first use’ policy, it could afford to maintain non-deployed forces. The

two sides should work towards formalising such an agreement.

To verify implementation of the agreement in the absence of sophisticated

intelligence gathering capabilities would be problematic. The most obvious alternate

to satellite based intelligence would be limited verification conducted by a designated

joint team of military personnel. Lack of trust necessitates that inspectors of the

inspecting country be allowed to pick sites at random. Otherwise the process will lack

credibility. Furthermore, if avenues for satellite-based intelligence open up for

Pakistan and India, verification would become simple and the true stabilising

potential of the agreement would be realised.

(v) Agreement not to attempt pre-emptionWhat is envisaged here is a binding agreement between the two sides not to

attempt pre-emption of the other's nuclear forces, both in peace time and crises. It has

already been argued that the likelihood of pre-emption is almost non-existent.

However, formally agreeing to this would guard against the possibility of punitive

strikes being misinterpreted as pre-emptive ones during periods of high tension.

Notionally, the agreement could be implemented by negotiating the maximum

number of nuclear delivery systems (aircrafts on ground and missile batteries) that

can be successfully hit in a conventional strike without qualifying as an attempt at

pre-emption. The maximum number should be low to ensure that majority of delivery

systems remain functional. Any offensive that strikes more than the agreed number of

delivery systems would be perceived as pre-emption.

The agreement would have several benefits. First, it will act as a strong

deterrent for the attacker against targeting more than the agreed number of delivery

systems. The very rationale for the agreement implies that if the limit were exceeded,

the defender's 'red lines' would have been tampered with. Possibility of nuclear

retaliation is thus implicit. Furthermore, limiting the number of strikes means that

the defender would not have to face the 'use em or lose em' dilemma. In other words,

the nuclear threshold of the defender would be raised. A recommendation for an

agreement not to strike airfields in conflicts has been floated previously for much the 76same reason. This agreement would be more comprehensive, as it would cover

missile delivery systems as well.

The proposal does not necessitate sharing of information regarding positions

of delivery systems. The attacker would base its calculations on its own intelligence.

Although not all strikes will be 'successful' (the agreement will be based on successful

strikes not attempted strikes), the attacker would have no way of confirming the

outcome of each intended strike on delivery systems. Given the consequences of

crossing the agreed upon limit, in all likelihood the attacker will choose to play safe

and base its calculations on number targeted, and not number hit. This ought to

reduce the defender's losses further, thus leaving more delivery systems functional

and consequently keeping the nuclear threshold from lowering.

One potential problem could be a lack of verification on the part of the

defender if it claims that the agreed limit has been crossed. However, this need not be

stipulated as the defender would have no incentive to launch a nuclear strike before it

is convinced that pre-emption is being attempted. The underlying goal of this

agreement would be to deter the aggressor from targeting a significant number of

delivery systems and consequently lowering the nuclear threshold.

(vi) Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs)Proposals for setting up NRRCs on the Cold War model are present. Although

technically, NRRCs could be of help in both crisis prevention as well as escalation

control, the often-suggested benefits of NRRCs in the Pakistan-India context are

exaggerated. While they may be of much use during peace time, their utility is likely to

remain limited during periods of crisis.

Most information NCCRs would transmit will not be verifiable. Given the

mistrust between the two sides, information from an adversary's NCCRs is likely to be

discounted during periods of high tension. This is so since NCCRs could be used to

provide misinformation during crises.

On the other hand, in peace time NCCRs could be useful for maintaining an

instantaneous channel for communication between technical experts on both sides. It

could assist in developing a common vocabulary regarding doctrines and nuclear red 77lines for experts. Furthermore, it could also serve as a Centre to assist in

implementing existing CBMs (for example, by pre-notifying missile tests), clear

misperceptions developed due to faulty intelligence, and notify about nuclear 78accidents, which could be perceived otherwise . To begin with, NCCRs could act as a

confidence building measure. Continuous exchange of accurate information during


51

peace time could gradually build trust which might be kept intact during crises as

well. However, this is a long-term prospect.

(vii) Cooperative Ariel ObservationAnother proposed risk reduction measure in South Asia is Cooperative Ariel

Observation (CAO). It is essentially a verification mechanism, which theoretically

could help in crisis prevention as well as escalation control. However, operationally

CAO would be of limited use. The underlying principle behind CAO is that by aerial 79monitoring both sides could access reliable information about each other directly .

However, given that it is not realistic to conduct observation missions on an

adversary's entire territory, such missions would not be able to provide current, up-to-

date information. Especially in times of crises, force deployments could well be

underway in areas not being monitored. Furthermore, if the frequency of observation

missions is too low, deployments could be initiated and completed within the time

interval between two successive missions. On the other hand, an extremely high

frequency of missions covering a large portion of ones territory would raise concerns

of rendering the entire force structure naked. Neither side is likely to accept that.

What CAO can be most effective in is to monitor arms control or non-deployment

agreements in specific areas, which does not apply to the Indo-Pak context at 80present . In terms of enhancing strategic stability in South Asia, CAO has limited

near-term utility. It would have to start with largely symbolic missions and gradually

move towards gaining real time information, if trust is generated.

(viii) Adequate command and controlBoth countries need to ensure that a fail-safe command and control system is

operational. A clear chain of command on paper does not necessarily mean that it will

hold during conflicts. Safeguards must be built to ensure that the chain of command is

fully respected under all conditions. Furthermore, even when conflict necessitates

dispersal, pre-delegation should be avoided. A necessary prerequisite for this is

hardened communication facilities, which are currently lacking in South Asia.

Personnel reliability measures should also be pursued to make potential

decision makers in the field comprehend with the level of responsibility entrusted in

them. Psychological training to retain informed decision-making skills under stress of 81war could also help . To ensure safeguards against inadvertence, warheads should be

removed from their cores and at the very least nuclear and non-nuclear explosives 82must be separated . Even when forces are deployed, warheads should not be mated

83with delivery systems .

These are precautionary measures that Pakistan and India should undertake

immediately, if they are not already in place. However, to provide greater assurance of

the 'safety' of nuclear forces, advanced technology is required. The U.S. could be a

potential source of such cooperation. Technological cooperation could include sharing 84portal command equipment, access doors, PALs, sophisticated vaults, and the like.

Realistically, such cooperation is not likely any time soon since the U.S. is curbed by

its export controls and even Pakistan and India might not be willing to share sensitive

information with the U.S. However, the U.S. could assist on other counts. It could


52

share its Cold War experiences regarding problems with command and control and

safety of the arsenal. Perhaps, its Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) 85could be expanded to include South Asia. This ought to assist in enhancing the safety

and security of South Asia's nuclear arsenal.

Lack of trust between Pakistan and India is likely to restrict the benefit any

stability enhancing measure could have. One must be cautioned against expecting the

potential of such measures to be realised in its entirety. For the time being, most

stability enhancing measures will merely end up being confidence builders. As an

atmosphere of trust is generated, impact of such measures on strategic stability could

increase. Till then it would be sensible to focus on targeted agreements that aim at

preventing crises and enhancing stability. Progress even on these is likely to be

sluggish. The key, however, is not to allow the process to stall.

VI. ConclusionThe nuclear regime in South Asia exhibits stability during periods of calm. However,

in crisis situations the nuclear equation becomes highly unstable. This raises serious

concerns as Indo-Pak relations have been prone to crises and overt nuclearisation

seems to have increased the propensity of the two sides to be involved in crises. Both

tend to believe that room for limited escalation below the nuclear threshold is present.

Pakistan's past connection with the Kashmiri insurgency, and the Indian limited war

doctrine combined with its growing conventional disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan is

worrisome in this regard.

Any measures designed to enhance strategic stability must be part of a

broader confidence building process which seeks resolution of outstanding disputes

and looks to create an overall environment of trust. The thrust of stability enhancing

measures should be on crisis prevention, with escalation control as the second best

option. The key is to ensure that all agreements are legally binding and are guaranteed

to work during periods of heightened tensions. Diplomacy at the highest level must be

given a fair chance to diffuse imminent crises. By the same token, official

communication channels must remain open regardless of the situation on ground. A

non-deployment agreement and an agreement not to attempt pre-emption would also

enhance stability. Other previously suggested measures such as NRRCs and CAO,

while promising, are only likely to realise their potential in the long run. Pakistan and

India must also take unilateral measures to enhance safety and security of their

nuclear arsenals. Realistically, until an atmosphere of trust develops, progress on

stability enhancing measures is likely to be sluggish. However, perseverance is the

only way forward!

(Moeed Yusuf is a consultant on Economic Policy at SDPI, Islamabad and also a

regular columnist for The Friday Times and Daily Times, Pakistan. Mr. Yusuf can be

contacted at [email protected])


53 54

End Notes1. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia

(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998) p.67.2. Hagerty, pp.69-70. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India,

and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,

1990) pp.221-234. 3. For an account of the Brasstacks crisis, see Hagerty pp.96-99. 4. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'Conflict, Crisis and Nuclear Stability in South Asia,' paper presented

at a workshop on New Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia, Univeristy of

Bardford, July 2004, <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sassu/publications/Cheema.pdf>,

p.4. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear

Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000) pp.322-23. 5. ‘Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia,’ ACDIS

Research Report, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995, p.30. Quoted in

Cheema. p.5. 6. P.R. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South Asia, The Henry L.

Stimson Center, August 2003. p.16. 7. Seymour H. Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge,’ The New Yorker (March 29, 1993), p.65. Quoted

in Chari, ‘Nuclear Crisis,’ p.17. 8. For an analysis of the nuclear dimension in the 1990 crisis, see Stephen P. Cohen, P.R.

Chari and Parvaiz Iqbal Cheema, ‘The Compound Crisis of 1990: Perception, Politics and

Insecurity,’ ACDIS Research Report, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000.9. Hilary Synnott, ‘The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests’, Adelphi

Paper 332, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1990) p.35. 10. Chari, ‘Nuclear Crisis,’ p.19.11. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington to secure an agreement with

U.S. President William Clinton. Troop withdrawal took place shortly afterwards. ‘U.S.-

Pakistan Deal Calls for Withdrawal of Kashmir Fighters,’ CNN, July 5, 1999,

<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/05/kashmir.01/>.12. According to one estimate 13 nuclear threats were conveyed within a period of 35 days

during the Kargil crisis. See Timothy Hoyt, ‘Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension’ in a

forthcoming book on Kargil, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Quoted in

Cheema. p.9.13. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace. p.9.14. The concept of ‘stability-instability paradox’ was originally formulated by Glenn Snyder.

See Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’ in Paul Seabury (ed.),

The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), pp.194-201. For a discussion of the

concept in the Indo-Pak context see, Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (eds.), The Stability-

Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, The Henry L.

Stimson Center, June 2001.15. ‘Indian Parliament Attack Kills 12,’ BBC News, December 13, 2001,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1707865.stm>. 16. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, ‘Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control,’

Occasional Paper, The Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2004,

<http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pubs.cfm?ID=105>, p.4.17. ‘Pakistan Moves Troops to Border, ’ CNN , May 31, 2002,

<http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/31/kashmir.attack/>.18. For a detailed analysis of nuclear signaling during the 2001-02 crisis, see Chaudhury,

‘Nuclear Doctrine.’19. Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia,’ The Nonproliferation

Review (Spring 2003) p.66.20. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, p.25.

21. The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, Vol. XVI, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),

pp.429-430.22. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New

York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), p.51.23. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1959), p.397. Quoted in Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Managing South Asia's Nuclear Rivalry: New

Policy Challenges for the United States,’ paper presented at an international conference on

Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia, Institute for Regional Studies,

Islamabad, Pakistan, June 7-9,2004, p.4.24. This is the crux of the argument extended by proliferation optimist, Kenneth Waltz. Sagan

and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp.26-30. 25. These estimates are taken from two quantitative analyses that attempt to approximate

Indian and Pakistan NWEs. One has been conducted by David Albright and the other by

Rodney Jones. See ‘India and Pakistan Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inventory,

end of 1998, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/stocks1099.html>. Also

see, Rodney W. Jones, ‘Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Posture in South Asia: An Overview,’

Final Report, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,

Policy Architects International, October 1, 2001, pp.8-10.26. Ibid.27. Lavoy, pp.8-9.28. Ibid.29. Brodie, p.397. Quoted in Lavoy, p.4.30. Lavoy, p.12.31. Chaudhury, pp.4-6. 32. Official Pakistani and Indian delegations met during the crisis to negotiate withdrawal of

troops. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, p.15.33. See Chari, Nuclear Crisis, pp. 15-20, 25. Also see, Uttara Sahasrabuddhe, ‘The US and

Evolving India-Pakistan Relations’ paper presented at an international conference on

Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia, Institute for Regional Studies,

Islamabad, Pakistan, June 7-9, 2004, pp.5, 7-8.34. Khan, p.64.35. Ibid. 36. Chaudhury cites examples of official statements being made and then retracted throughout

his paper. Chaudhury, ‘Nuclear Doctrine.’ 37. ‘Musharraf Rallies Pakistan Troops,’ BBC News, May 29, 2002,

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2015198.stm>.38. Chaudhury, p.5.39. Pak N-Blackmail No Worry: Fernandes,’ The Hindu, January 8, 2003,

<http://www.google.com.pk/search?q=cache:VB8pxb9bveQJ:www.meadev.nic.in/news/cl

ippings/20030108/hin3.htm+Pakistan+should+know+its+strengths+and+vulnerability+a

nd+stop+making+these+stupid+statements&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>.40. Lavoy, p.14.41. Chari, Nuclear Crisis, pp.13-14. 42. See Moeed Yusuf, ‘Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: Need for a New Direction?’ Master's diss.,

Boston University, November 15, 2003, p.6.43. Some of these elements have been listed by Chari in Nuclear Crisis, p.24. 44. This has been argued by Kenneth Waltz and other proliferation optimists. 45. Officially, the agreement shares coordinates of all nuclear facilities. However, since there is

no verification mechanism in the agreement, concealing some information is almost a

given. Both sides have regularly questioned the completeness of the other's list. See ‘India-

Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement,’ available at<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/indpak.pdf>.

46. See Shaukat Qadir, ‘India's 'Cold Start' Strategy',’ Daily Times, May 8, 2004,

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_8-5-2004_pg3_3>. 47. Proliferation pessimists believe that lack of resources and sophisticated technology is likely


55

to keep a robust command and control from emerging. Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel

Wolven, ‘Command and Control Challenges in South Asia,’ The Nonproliferation Review

(Spring-Summer, 1999) p.29.48. Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India,’ Strategic Analysis,

Vol. XXIII, No.10 (January 2000) p.1718. 49. Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen and India's Agni ballistic missile systems are mobile. In

addition to road mobility, both countries have also attempted to make their missiles rail-

mobile. This is largely in order to overcome the poor road infrastructure in South Asia. For

a detailed account of both country's missile systems, see L. J. Ryabikhin, ‘Missile

Developments in South Asia: An Outsider's View,’ paper presented in an international

seminar on Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia, Islamabad Policy

Research Institute and Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad, April 20-21, 2004.50. Bowen and Wolven, p.26.51. Peter Feaver, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,’ International Security

17 (Winter 1992-93) p.163.52. Bowen and Wolven, p.27.53. Khan, pp.67-68.54. Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, ‘Going Nuclear: The Weaponization Option’ in Samina

Ahmed and David Cortright (eds.), Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear

Options (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), pp.94-95.55. M. V. Ramana, R. Rajaraman, and Zia Mian, ‘Nuclear Early Warning in South Asia:

Problems and Issues,’ Economic and Political Weekly, January 17, 2004, p.4. 56. Ibid., pp.5-6. 57. Ibid.58. B r u c e K e n n e d y , ‘ N u c l e a r C l o s e C a l l s , ’ C N N I n t e r a c t i v e ,

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/12/spotlight/>.59. For a detailed discussion on LOW and its potential repercussions for Pakistan and India,

see M. V. Ramana, ‘Risks of a LOW Doctrine,’ Economic and Political Weekly, March 1,

2003. 60. In terms of cost, deployment is by far the most expensive component of maintaining a

nuclear force. In the case of the U.S., deployment costs were 55 percent of the overall

expenditure on maintaining U.S.' nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. Ejaz Haider,

‘Managing Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: In Search of a Model’ in M. V. Ramana and C.

Rammanohar Reddy (eds.), India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics (Hyderabad:

Orient Longman, 2003) p.142.61. Danger of Nuclear Accidents in S. Asia,’ editorial in Daily Times, July 22, 2003,

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-7-2003_pg3_1>.62. R. Rajaraman, M. V. Ramana, and Zia Mian, ‘Possession and Deployment of Nuclear

Weapons in South Asia,’ Economic and Political Weekly, June 22, 2002.63. This scenario was discussed at the “Escalation Control Workshop” organised by the Henry

L. Stimson Center on November 14-18, 2002 in Surrey. It brought together experts on

South Asia who seemed to form a consensus that such a scenario was realistic. See, Michael

Krepon and Ziad Haider, ‘Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia,’ Report 50, The Henry

L. Stimson Center, pp.4-6.64. Ibid., p.5.65. Ibid., p.13.66. Khan, p.64.67. Ibid.68. See Qadir, ‘India's 'Cold Start'.’ Also see Shaukat Qadir, ‘Cold Start: The Nuclear Side,’

Daily Times, May 16, 2004, <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_16-

5-2004_pg3_4> 69. Zawar Haider Abidi, Threat Reduction in South Asia, The Henry L. Stimson Center,

November 2003, <http://www.stimson.org//southasia/pdf/zawarabidi.pdf>, pp.2-3.70. For example, India could conduct punitive strikes on militant camps or Pakistani missile


56

batteries believing that the impact of Pakistani retaliation could be minimized by the

missile defense shield. See Moeed Yusuf, ‘Arrow-2 in the Indian Quiver,’ The Friday Times,

September 17-23, 2004.71. For a discussion on Indo-Pak CBMs, see P. R. Chari, ‘Conventional CBMs and Arms

Control,’ paper presented in the international seminar on Arms Race and Nuclear

Developments in South Asia, Islamabad Policy Research Institute and Hanns Seidel

Foundation, Islamabad, April 20-21, 2004.72. ‘India and Pakistan will Maintain Ban on N-tests,’ Daily Times, June 21, 2004,

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_21-6-2004_pg1_1>. Ejaz Haider,

‘First-use and Nuclear Risk-reduction,’ Daily Times, June 22, 2004,

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_22-6-2004_pg3_5>.73. As mentioned, the U.S. has played a proactive role in bringing Indo-Pak crises to an end.

On all occasions the U.S. brought pressure to bear on both sides.74. Khan, p.71.75. Jaya Tiwari, ‘Nuclear Confidence Building Measures in South Asia,’ Reaching Critical Will,

<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/mon3/tiwari.html> (accessed on

September 25, 2004). 76. This was one of the recommendations of the Henry L. Stimson Center's ‘Escalation Control

Workshop.’ Krepon and Haider, p.7.77. This was also recommended at the ‘Escalation Control Workshop’. Ibid., p.6.78. For a detailed analysis of roles NRRCs could play, see Colonel Rafi uz Zaman Khan,

‘Pakistan and India: Can NRRCs Help Strengthen Peace?’ Occasional Paper 49, The Henry

L. Stimson Center, December 2002.79. John H. Hawes and Teresita C. Schaffer, ‘Risk Reduction in South Asia: A Role for

Cooperative Aerial Observation?’ The Henry L. Stimson Center,

<http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/saaerial.pdf > (accessed on September 20, 2004),

p.77.80. Were a non-deployment agreement inked, CAO could be utilised to monitor it. However,

again, it would only be able to monitor specific areas.81. Khan, p.72. 82. Ibid.83. Ibid.84. Ibid., pp.72-73.85. The U.S. has mainly helped Russia and former Soviet Republics through this program. For

details of how this could be applied to the Indo-Pak context, see Rose Gottemoeller with

Rebecca Longsworth, ‘Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle:

India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation,’ Working Paper 29, Global Policy

Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002.


57 58

Indo-Pak Relations: Present and FutureNajmuddin A. Shaikh

his paper was originally designed to focus on the possibility of a future conflict

between Pakistan and India in the larger setting of the prospects of interstate Tconflicts in South Asia. It is, of course, true that in any consideration of Indo-Pakistan

relations and their future direction, analysts and observers -- guided by the troubled

relationship of the past -- have invariably to contend with the fact that, whatever the

discerned positive developments, the possibility of a deterioration of relations and the

outbreak of armed conflict cannot be ruled out. It is also true that, since the early

1980s, security officials in both India and Pakistan were forced by perceived ground

realities to include in their strategic calculus the existence of nuclear weapons in the

arsenal of the other side.

The nuclear dimension of any future conflict was, of course, underlined by

the demonstration of this capability by both India and Pakistan in quick succession in

May 1998. It is my contention, however, that the acquisition and subsequent public

demonstration of nuclear capability provided a spur to efforts towards peace and to

ruling out military conflict as a means of resolving Indo-Pak disputes.

The Lahore Summit and other positive developments in Indo-Pak relations

should be viewed in this context. Some analysts have argued that, following the public

demonstration of nuclear capability, leaders in both countries were anxious to take

steps that would assuage the concerns of the international community, and secure

lifting of the sanctions that had been imposed on both countries. According to these

analysts, this consideration played a major part in bringing about the Lahore Summit.

But this author would like to believe that, very largely, it was a direct consequence of

the realisation that any future Indo-Pak conflict was fraught with such danger that it

behoved visionary or even pragmatic leaders on both sides to intensify negotiations to

arrive at a peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes. This is why the Agra Summit

took place, despite the bitter after-taste of the Kargil episode. This is also why the

door to future negotiations was kept ajar despite the ostensible failure of that summit.

Similarly there are many analysts who, in writing about the Kargil conflict or

in dissecting the causes and consequences of the mobilisation of forces of December

2001 -- in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament, tended to argue that

the above situations were defused by the active intervention of the international

community. There is no doubt that the loudly expressed concerns of the international

community and the diplomatic efforts of the international community had a great deal

to do with the dampening of the prospects of war but the ultimate decision to avoid

war came because leaders on both sides were responsible enough to recognise that in

the new strategic environment nuclear blackmail would not work; a limited war was

not a viable proposition and, most importantly, all-out war was not an option.

In the light of what many of us remember of the grim days in 2002, of the

stridency of statements from both sides, of the apprehensions of the international

community which led to the departure from both countries of sorely needed foreign

experts and the learned commentaries of regional and international analysts, this may

appear to be an overly optimistic assessment but justified, nonetheless. I will deal

later with developments that may call this assessment, into question in the future but

for the moment this is the thesis on which the rest of this presentation will rest.

Looking at the question of Pakistan's alleged sense of insecurity and the

relationship this bears to its perception of the unresolved issues -- primarily Kashmir

-- that have bedevilled its relations with India, one comes to a few conclusions. There

is no doubt that for the first 50 years of its existence Pakistan's foreign policy had one

objective: ensuring its security and territorial integrity against the perceived threat

from a much larger India.

With military conflict being ruled out, what are the impelling forces or

incentives that can drive the two sides, or hinder such efforts, to arrive at a peaceful

resolution of their disputes, particularly the dispute over Kashmir, to which Pakistan

attaches the greatest importance and which, for India, represents the greatest

challenge in terms of its democratic domestic polity and its international standing?

There are many.

For the older generation in both countries the mass migration and bloodshed

that followed independence is a painful memory. It will never fade entirely but for

many this is offset by a recollection of what the two (Pakistan and India) had in

common. This was underlined when President Musharraf, addressing a press

conference at the UN before his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said,

'After all, he (Manmohan Singh) was born in Pakistan and I was born in India. So

there is a good ground for this understanding'. Because of the strained relationship of

the past, few in the younger generation know their counterparts on the other side.

Curiosity, more than any other emotion, seems to characterise the attitude of the new

generation of the two countries towards each other. Surprisingly, the stream of

government and other vested interest sponsored propaganda on both sides over the

last 57 years has not created among them (the youth) a hatred of their counterparts.

Communal discord and evidence of intolerance in either country revives the pain of

the past for the older generation and may drive the younger generation towards

hatred, but currently it seems that there is a desire to establish the sort of relationship

which would enable them to get to know each better and to prosper together.

Economic planners and businessmen in both countries are becoming acutely

aware of the drag on economic development that the tension in the region has caused.

Leaders have acknowledged and repeatedly paid lip service to the notion that the

common enemy both countries have to fight is the scourge of poverty. This


59

identification first appeared in Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter of invitation to

President Musharraf for the Agra Summit and was endorsed in Musharraf's reply.

Now it appears that there is a readiness to go beyond mere lip service. In the press

conference referred to above, President Musharraf said, 'We are like two elephants in

South Asia, trampling the grass in our fight…. Look where it has taken us. South Asia

is one of the poorest regions and our economy refuses to take off because of our

preoccupation with this dispute'.

At another time and in another ambience, President Musharraf would have

spoken proudly of the fact that Pakistan achieved 6.4 per cent growth in 2003-04 and 1that in 2004-05 growth was expected at 6.6 per cent, despite the water shortage and

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would have riposted with the fact that in the first

quarter of 04-05 India's growth rate was 7.2 per cent and would be about 6.6 per cent

for the year.

The fact of the matter is that without the constraints and the expenditure the

tensions between the two engender, the growth rate of each could top or at least come

close to 10 per cent annually. The proposed pipeline from Iran to supply gas to India

provides a simple illustration. By one estimate, transit fees from the pipeline would

add US$ 500 million or close to 1 per cent to Pakistan's GDP while, in the case of

India, the lower costs of gas and its transportation costs would give India an equal

percentage boost in its much larger GDP. This, of course, is without taking account of

the added economic activity and employment opportunities the pipeline would

generate in the areas through which it would pass.

Even more importantly there is a realisation that the concept of global

interdependence has one of its best illustrations in South Asia. If Pakistan is to realise

the benefits of its geo-strategic location and act as a bridge between Central Asia and

South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia and the Middle East and South Asia, it

can only happen when it is prepared to grant transit facilities to its neighbour. If India

is to secure economic access to the energy it will so desperately need as its economy

takes off and if it is to trade profitably with Central Asia and the Middle East by the

cheaper overland route, it needs to use this transit facility. If a genuinely viable Asian

highway and other communication networks linking the highly populated and

economically significant areas of Asia and the Middle East are to be constructed India

and Pakistan must cooperate. If the other South Asian countries are to benefit from

the economic activity; that will be generated by the US$ 750 billion plan visualised for

the development of the western regions of China, India and Pakistan must cooperate.

If SAARC is ever to rival ASEAN as a regional organisation or provide

incentives for ECO and ASEAN to seek cooperation with South Asia through the

SAARC mechanism, the present political barriers to the development of SAARC must

be done away with and methodologies must be designed to ensure that all SAARC

members benefit, in more or less equal measure, from this organisation. If there is to

be genuine free trade in the region, it must be ensured that such trade promotes a

division of labour that will enable all members to benefit equally.


60

All this can only happen if Pakistan and India work together. This, in turn,

can only happen if they resolve their political disputes or make visible progress

towards their resolution.

There are the usual clichés used in making suggestions on how these

problems could be resolved or visible progress could be made towards resolution:

lDon't cut your nose to spite your face.lDon't try to beggar your neighbour.lDon't block proposals that ease human suffering. lDon't try and use temporary solutions for humanitarian problems to promote

political objectives.lDon't believe that democracy and repression can long remain compatible.lLook upon the Composite dialogue process as a kitchen range on which all

burners are in use. All the dishes must be ready for the banquet. They may cook at

different rates but there cannot be, if the Chefs are to be complimented on a

magnificent repast, too long an interval between the serving of the appetizer and

the dessert. In fact all preparatory steps may need to be taken to prepare the

dessert before the cooking of the entrée starts.

While the above mentioned are clichés, they are also statements of the

obvious, particularly as applied to Indo-Pak relations. To include in the list:

lThe resolution of each of the issues that the two sides needed to discuss could

yield a win-win result if the two sides agreed to so interpret it.lEven where such interpretation became difficult the long term benefit would far

outweigh the cost of the short-term concession.lThe benefits of rapprochement would flow not only to the two countries and the

region but would also affect a sea change internationally.

So how can this be done? What are the mechanisms that can be devised

which would allow matters to be advanced without providing opportunities to the

nay-sayers in both countries to sabotage the process? The moment seems propitious.

At no time in recent years have the statements of leaders from the two sides been so

positive. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke of his meeting with President

Musharraf as an 'essay in mutual comprehension' and called it 'a historic day'. The

Joint Statement which President Musharraf read out and which he termed an

agreement, stated: 'They also addressed the issue of Jammu & Kashmir and agreed

that possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue should be

explored in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner'. It also said that, 'They [the two

principals] agreed that confidence-building measures [CBMs] of all categories under

discussion between the two governments should be implemented keeping in mind 2practical possibilities'.

It appears to be an open secret that the groundwork for this meeting had

been done in meetings between Mr. Dixit, the Indian National Security Adviser and 3Mr. Tariq Aziz, the Secretary of the National Security Council in Pakistan . It also

seems to be an accepted conjecture that, even while working from a draft already


61 62

prepared by the two advisers, the two principals made their own contribution to the

final wording. This is important since it signifies a personal commitment on the part

of the two leaders to the content and to its implementation.

It would be reasonable to presume from the manner in which the statement

is worded that the two leaders have agreed that the possible options for a negotiated

settlement on Kashmir will not be negotiated in the fora set up for the 'composite

dialogue' but will be entrusted to the two advisers. Many in this day of open

diplomacy may find this difficult to swallow. But when 'options' are being considered

and when these options will entail the abandonment of long-held positions it is best

that these discussions be held outside the glare of media attention that invariably

focuses on the meetings planned for the 'composite dialogue'. Sensitive issues demand

secret diplomacy and in Indo-Pak relations this subject is easily the most important

and the most sensitive.

The Pakistani president has said that he is not insisting on a time frame for

the solution of the problems but he is insistent that this is not a process that should be

entirely open-ended. If an early solution is to be found then there is all the more

reason that it be found and agreed upon in private negotiations before being

presented to the people of the two countries and above all to the Kashmiri people for

their approval. Such secret diplomacy must of course include consultations with the

Kashmiri people. Their leaders are, for the most part, pragmatic. They will not

necessarily stick out for the unattainable.

Assuming that the Joint Statement heralds the beginning of a serious and

sincere effort in secret negotiations to settle the Kashmir issue, where does one

anticipate the other elements of the 'composite dialogue' going in the more public

series of meetings that have been planned? An American observer of the South Asian

scene has said, 'India and Pakistan are both masters of the defensive game and could 4go on for years in talks characterised by more activity than movement' . Pakistanis

and Indians are not alone in having mastered the diplomatic technique of many

meetings and no progress. The Americans spent many months arguing with the

Vietnamese during their prolonged negotiations on the size and shape of the table at

which the negotiations would be conducted. It is a useful tool when the governing

principle is 'talk talk, fight fight' and to let the situation on the battlefield determine

what is said in the negotiations. It would be a pity, however, if this cynical observation

were to be borne out in the Indo-Pak context where the purpose is to put behind the

prospect of conflict and to give durability to the peaceful situation that prevails on the

ground.

It is perhaps presumptuous to propose that the axioms and analogies

suggested earlier -- dismissed as clichés -- could be used to ensure some results. In

Siachen, if both sides agree not to cut their nose to spite their face (we will continue to

pay Rs. 500 for every Chappati (bread) the Jawan eats while stationed in Siachen so

long as the Pakistanis have to pay Rs.100 for every Chappati fed to their Jawans

stationed in the same frosty wastes), the agreement reached in 1989 can be signed

and implemented quickly. One can only hope that when Defence Minister Mr.

Mukherjee, in announcing the resumption of the talks between the military officials of

both sides, referred to the history of past negotiations this was the direction in which

he was pointing.

Similarly, the settlement of the Sir Creek boundary along the lines indicated

in all the maps accepted by both sides would enable both countries to demarcate not

only the land border but also the maritime boundary in an area in which there are

rumoured to be substantial undersea gas and oil deposits. Whether one side gets less

and another more should be seen as less important than the fact that both would

benefit.

The same applies to Tulbul; if it is indeed no more than a navigational project

and does not involve any obstruction to the full flow of water downstream or if the

obstruction is of minor nature, an agreement should be reached. If there is a

substantial difference, it should, as provided in the Indus Water Treaty be referred to

international arbitration. The same position should hold with regard to Baglihar.

Such Kashmir-related matters as the Indian allegation of cross-LoC

infiltration would probably form part of the secret diplomacy but other humanitarian

measures such as the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service will form part of public

diplomacy. It does seem rather difficult to accept that the use of domicile certificates

rather than passports for travel on this service will, in any way, erode India's position. 5After all, this document is issued by officials of the government in Srinagar . On the

other hand, travel on Indian and Pakistani passports would, undoubtedly, be used to

establish Pakistan's acceptance of the LoC as an international border. The

humanitarian problem -- the problem of divided families needs to be resolved first,

without seeking a political advantage.

The Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is another example of what can be

called short-sighted diplomacy. India has reason, given the past record of distrust, to

feel concerned about the security of supplies from a pipeline that flows through

Pakistan. A solution to this problem can be found, either through some form of

international guarantees or through an arrangement for storage capacity to meet

requirements during a temporary stoppage. The focus of the public debate in India is,

however, shifting. It is being argued that India can, in any case, meet its needs by

importing LPG for which it has entered into deals with Iran and possibly Qatar. An

effort is being made to suggest that the pipeline -- if it is to be built -- will be a huge

favour by India and that Pakistan should reciprocate by allowing India transit

facilities to Afghanistan and Iran by the overland route. The truth of the matter is that

Pakistan will benefit from the royalties paid for the transit of the pipeline. It will also

benefit from the ancillary economic activity that will be generated along the path the

pipeline follows. The major beneficiary will, however, be India. The transportation

cost of piped gas is about 30 per cent of the cost incurred on importing LPG and the

distribution of LPG is far more expensive than that of piped gas. No advances in gas

liquefaction technology can, in the foreseeable future, change this economic reality.


63

With its burgeoning energy needs, India needs piped gas not only from Iran

but also perhaps from the two other pipeline projects that have been mooted -- the

Qatar and the Turkmen. For all three suppliers, for various reasons, the overland

South Asian market is far more attractive than any other. India, with Pakistan's

cooperation, is in a favourable negotiating position. The Turkmen pipeline has the

added advantage that as and when it is completed it will give Afghanistan sorely

needed revenues through royalty payments and added security because of the special

force that would be created to guard the pipeline.

While limitations of space make it impossible to deal with all the other issues

that form part of the cluster for the composite dialogue, it is important to touch upon

security. It seems that agreement will be reached on a formal pact providing for

advance notification of missile launches. This will be a good start even though it will

only formalise what is already being done in practice. It is hoped that the two will also

reach an agreement on the non-deployment of short-range missiles in the border

areas. Since both countries have tested medium range missiles the effect of this

agreement will be more symbolic than real but it will be an important political signal

and an indicator of the intent of both sides to minimise the chances of an accidental or

inadvertent incident triggering the wrong sort of alarms in the other country.

These measures, as also the creation of better communication facilities

between the strategic forces of the two countries, are important but even more

important if we are genuinely seeking to jointly wage a war against poverty. We have

to find ways to reduce our conventional defence expenditure and to ensure that our

nuclear deterrent is maintained at the minimum level.

A sense of security has been engendered in Pakistan by the acquisition of a

minimum nuclear deterrent. Were the value of the deterrent to be called into question

by the Indian acquisition of ABM weapon systems, Pakistan would have no choice but

to expend its limited resources on further strengthening its deterrent. As the example

of the Soviet Union and the United States has shown, once the two countries step on

top of this slippery slope there will be no stopping. The U.S. and the Soviet Union

spent US$ 5.5 trillion on building and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. More

importantly they built powerful lobbies within their respective countries. As a result,

the United States is budgeting for research on new nuclear weapons. It has wasted

more than US$ 70 billion on the quest for a missile defence system, which the United

States needs as much as it needs a hole in the head. All it has to show for it is the so-

called deployment of a system that, according to experts, cannot possibly tackle the

nonexistent threat that it is deployed against.

So do we want to step on to this path? Or should we be sagacious enough to

agree on a restraint regime in both the conventional and nuclear field that addresses

the differing security concerns of the two countries but without exaggerating the

threat? The answer is obvious. Pakistan has proposed a restraint regime. Clearly it is

of greater benefit to Pakistan, which has a much smaller resource base. But no one

should doubt that it is of benefit also to India. If we are not playing 'beggar thy

neighbour' the Pakistan proposal deserves serious consideration and substantive


64

discussion.

This paper began with from the premise that war is no longer an option. It is

hoped that, given sincerity and a genuine recognition of the interests of the teeming

masses of South Asia, the assumption will hold true. It may sound overly optimistic

but the present leadership will take steps, with the full support of the people of both

countries, to resolve existing problems and to realise in full the advantages that a

cooperative relationship between the two countries can bring.

(Najmuddin A. Shaikh is former foreign secretary of Pakistan)

Author’s Note: This paper is based largely on a presentation made by the author at the SAFMA

conference on ‘Interstate Conflicts in South Asia’ in New Delhi (8th-10th October 2004).

End Notes1. The government has set a GDP growth target of 6.6 per cent for 2004-05 against 6.4 per

cent of the last financial year. ( Dawn, ‘Shaukat wants eight per cent GDP growth rate

achieved: Directive to Finance Ministry’, 4 July, 2004 )2. The Hindu, ‘India, Pakistan to explore possible options on Kashmir issue’, 25 September,

20043. The Hindu, ‘Dixit-Aziz meetings generate hope’, (14 September, 2004), ‘After last Friday's

meeting between the National Security Adviser, J. N. Dixit, and his Pakistan counterpart,

Tariq Aziz, in a third country, the Government hopes that the Manmohan Singh-Pervez

Musharraf interaction in New York next week will produce a clutch of workable "options"

on Kashmir. ……If Mr. Dixit and Mr. Aziz find the time and place to get together for a quiet

chat before the Manmohan-Musharraf meeting, they could possibly shortlist a number of

"options," mutually acceptable to India and Pakistan, on Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf is on

record as having said that the two sides will have to look at options other that what is

proposed by India and rejected by Pakistan as well as what is proposed by Pakistan and

rejected by India. The onus has been put on Pakistan to come up with concrete suggestions

as to these new options, ideas that Dr. Singh and Gen. Musharraf can look at in New York. 4. Terisita C. Schaffer in South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Washington, No: 75 (1st October 2004).5. Prior to 1953, travel across the then Ceasefire Line in Jammu and Kashmir was permitted

on such domicile certificates. The same domicile certificate was also at that time used for

travel across the International border between India and Pakistan. It can be argued that

since the domicile certificate is no longer valid for travel across the International border it

cannot be accepted for travel in Kashmir without undermining the Indian stance that

Kashmir is an integral part of India but that is to deny the need for creative thinking to

resolve humanitarian problems.


65 66

Bangladesh-India Relations I. P. Khosla

I. Introduction: The Basic ElementsThe basic elements in the bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh may be

outlined by examining the evolution of the foreign policies of the two countries and

the way in which each has figured in the changing foreign policy framework of the

other. In India's case, these elements are common to India's relations with some other

South Asian neighbours too, though not all. In order to illustrate this point a few

examples will be given in what follows.

The first element is the Nehruvian policy of India playing a role on the world

stage -- meaning the neighbours get less attention. This is what attracts the comment

that 'good neighbourliness as such is not an Indian foreign policy goal ... the tendency

is to take things for granted with the neighbours so that it can pursue the broader 1foreign policy goals. ' It was not until 1958, when the security threat from China

loomed on the horizon, that Nehru began to focus on South Asia. In this respect, and

of relevance to Bangladesh, former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's eyes were turned to

broader global issues like world disarmament, and wished to bestow benign or

benevolent neglect on the South Asian neighbourhood, including Bangladesh.

The second element is more closely associated with the prime ministership of

Indira Gandhi who expected the neighbours to accept the reality of the power

differential, that they will not and cannot be equals in their dealings with India and

there is, therefore, no harm in India showing its teeth from time to time, if needed. In

the matter of security interests, particularly, there are policy makers who believe that

to compromise even in a local and seemingly unimportant matter, like a minor border

incident with Nepal or Bangladesh, is to jeopardise national security. This parallels

the neighbour's image of the bully.

India is, of course, larger than any of its neighbours. Putting all the South

Asian countries together, India accounts for 75 per cent of the area, of the population

and of the GNP. In the size of armed forces the gap is not so wide, but India is still

bigger than all its smaller neighbours put together. In industry and technology the gap

is really wide; the neighbours have very little and India is among the world's leading

players. If trade is thrown open, the Indian economy seems likely to overwhelm the

region.

The large difference in size and power does lead to the view, held by the

neighbours, reinforced by others, and seemingly validated by Indira Gandhi' policy,

that India aspires to be a regional hegemon, a dominating power which will bully its

way on whichever issue. That policy was seen 'to become a hegemonic power in South

2Asia by playing a much more assertive role that she had ever done before' . A corollary

to this is that India would like to keep the region as an exclusive sphere of influence in 3its own version of the Monroe doctrine . One Bangladeshi commentator writes that

after 1971 Indian strategists evolved 'the South Asian version of the Monroe doctrine,

wherein India views the entire region as a single strategic unit and herself as the sole 4custodian of security and stability in the region. ' Another Bangladeshi puts the same

thought in somewhat different, and Marxist, terms, that the 'Indian ruling class

successfully organised hegemony over the nationalist struggle in Bangladesh'; and

'hegemony among the Indian population with respect to the nationalist struggle in

Bangladesh'; and in the third place 'organised international consent to back India's 5role', a sort of hegemony over the international sphere, making a triple hegemony . Or

put another way and more simply, after Nehru there was a 'new Indian determination 6to dominate South Asian politics' .

The third element, which first appeared with the government of Morarji

Desai in 1977, and was later developed in larger theoretical terms, can be

encapsulated in the Gujral doctrine, which has been interpreted variously from, at one

extreme, generosity confined to rhetoric, through unilateral accommodation, where

possible, in neighbours interests without demanding reciprocity to, at the other

extreme, giving away more than is reasonable. Gujral himself put it that with its

smaller South Asian neighbours 'India does not ask for reciprocity but gives and 7accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. ' This goes parallel to the view

among the neighbours that India must go the extra mile. In every issue India should

give more than it gets in order to demonstrate that it is, indeed, not a bully out to

dominate the region. This has been a consistent component of the price of friendship.

The elements in Bangladesh's foreign policy include a global view. It is a member of

the non-aligned movement, of the Commonwealth, and, more important, of the

Organization of Islamic Conference. There is also an important regional parameter:

SAARC is a Bangladesh initiative. Bilateral differences had been obstacles to South

Asian cooperation in the past, but the letter written by President Ziaur Rahman to the

other South Asian heads of state/government in 1980, and the successful examples of

regional cooperation in other parts of the world produced, after much discussion, a

Charter which could be a promise for substantial economic cooperation This would

certainly have a positive impact on solving other problems.

But India looms large. There is no dearth of commentators who have stressed

that 'India's regional supremacy has played a central role in the development of

Bangladesh's foreign relations. For each of the smaller South Asian states, India's

intentions are of great concern, but particularly to Bangladesh because it is 'almost

surrounded by India' and 'because it lacks the military strength and extra-regional 8alliances to withstand a serious challenge. ' Geography compounds the impression of

size since India seems to surround that country. It is 'India-locked', as commentators

from Bangladesh are fond of saying. Tabarak Hussain, a former Bangladesh foreign

secretary, writes: 'Bangladesh's neighbourhood is dominated by India's presence. A

sense of its pervasiveness seems to prevail. Heavy imbalance in the power equation 9between the two countries compounds the situation' .


67

One set of aspects which runs like a common thread in the practice of

international relations in South Asia is the intimacy and intricacy with which

domestic and foreign policies interact. There is a long-term sense in which this is true

for foreign policy in general. The classic writings on international relations tell us that

national power, national ideology, geography, economic strength are among a large

number of factors that influence foreign policy decisions. For India the domestic

environment has been identified, it has 'a major influence on the formulation of

foreign policy. The five essential elements in the domestic environment of India are

tradition and history, democracy, the economic factors, the pluralist nature of society 10in India, and Nehru's charismatic leadership. '

In the general field of international relations, however, the interaction with

the domestic has assumed a new form since the end of the Cold War, and particularly

in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The bipartisan nature of foreign policy has

been eroded; outcomes of elections in Europe or the U.S. are seen to be, and could

actually be, influenced by decisions taken on foreign policy. In South Asia this is true

in the more immediate sense of a perceptible tuning of daily decisions to domestic

needs, an intensity of foreign policy rhetoric directed for party political purposes

towards a domestic audience, a sense in which this is not true of the foreign policies of

South Asian countries towards other regions or countries.

There are four aspects. First, every foreign policy initiative, peace with

Pakistan, trade with Nepal, the sharing of Ganga waters with Bangladesh, can be used

for election campaigns, as was evident even in the 2004 national election in India, and

much more so in every Bangladesh election. This has continued ever since the birth of

Bangladesh. The Awami League leadership and government from 1971-75 was seen as

'pro-Indian', among diverse sections of political opinion in Bangladesh which wanted

to replace it. Indian opinion helped by agreeing to this, so that any understanding

with that government was projected as a sell-out of national interests. This had a

major consequence on the evolution of the domestic polity. Foreign policy decisions

seem to influence the outcomes of electoral processes and the consequent formation

of governments.

The 'denial of any place of honour to the Awami League in the memory of the

nationalist struggle ... became a major element of the radical political offensive against

the regime. What is distinctly noteworthy in this regard is the constitution of India as 11a hostile object in the radical political discourse' . This had a decisive influence on the

self-identity that Bangladesh assumed over the years, particularly the period of

military rule, since 'all the military regimes that have ruled Bangladesh after 1975

appear to have formulated their foreign policy ideologies in opposition to the 12possibilities opened up by the legacy of nationalism. ’

Second, as a perceptive former foreign minister of Bangladesh put it, 'domestic

politics including party rivalry and regime perception of its political interests vis-a-vis

national interests appeared to have played a significant role in impeding or facilitating 13the solution of bilateral problems between India and Bangladesh. ' Just as much as


68

bilateral issues influence voting patterns and government formation, so does

government formation influence the settlement of issues; a change in government, no

matter how much consistency or bipartisanship is proclaimed, leads to change in

policy, in India as much as in the neighbourhood. It was, for instance, a fact that 'a

change of central government in the 1989 Indian elections also eased tensions with

Bangladesh ... India's External Affairs Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, emphasised his 14government's willingness to improve relations with Bangladesh. '

Third, bilateral issues with neighbours are such that in India ministries other

than the foreign office, state governments, other authorities like the Border Security

Force and the Bangladesh Rifles (in the case of Bangladesh), are inseparably involved

in the decision making process on both sides, and the role of such ministries and

other authorities is increasing; it is no longer possible for the Foreign Office to impose

an agreement which these regard as damaging. Every neighbour shares a border with

an Indian state; the hard political reality is that in India there has been a gradual shift

of power from the centre to the states and the interests of the states as seen by their

leaders are gaining greater weight in decision making. This is particularly the case

with Bangladesh's borders, which have always been porous and often been

troublesome.

Fourth, the same is true of the neighbours, though somewhat less so. Thus

democratic decentralisation, however laudable in general terms of the spread and

consolidation of people's participation and empowerment, has the effect of localising

foreign affairs in respect of neighbours too. Issues which should be settled in the

reasoned atmosphere of conference rooms are dragged out, aired in public, cause

demonstrations, lead to heated political debate, and are consequently difficult to

settle. II. Identity and SecurityThere are two non-traditional threats that Bangladesh has perceived to its identity

and security from India. The first is political. India has the widest spectrum of

political opinion in the region and is clearly a successfully functioning democracy.

Political parties and groups among the neighbours, especially opposition parties and

dissident groups can and do find common ground with one political interest group or

another in India, in terms of paths to socio-economic development, political

emancipation, democratic pluralism and empowerment. There may be considerable

admiration among the neighbours for India as a model of political stability in a

democratic system. But their leaders, and this applies more so to Bangladesh, also

think this could become the ground for subversive attack for their dissidents usually

turn to India for support. And they always find it, if not in government circles then in

the many others that abound. Comments by Indian leaders that India stands for

'progressive democracy' or secularism in other countries, that such and such

development was a setback to democracy in a neighbouring country, as also a

perceived reluctance on India's part to engage meaningfully with non-democratic

governments in the neighbourhood, have fostered the impression that India prefers

the neighbouring countries to take a certain political path. It is but one step from here


69 70

to the conclusion that the path will be mapped out by India.

In the case of Bangladesh this has a history. Among the earliest desires of the

leaders of Muslim Bengal, as the movement for Indian independence began to gather

pace over a hundred years ago, was for separate treatment from the Hindus. The

desire was articulated by Urdu speaking, westernised, politically conservative Bengali

Muslims, supporters of British rule, who had little respect for Bengali culture or

language. And it was articulated through their support for Lord Curzon's 1905

partition of Bengal, despite antagonising the Hindus on this issue; in their demand, a

year later, for separate electorates and representation for Muslims in the elective

bodies; and the key role they played in the movement leading to the partition of India

in 1947. The formation of the All India Muslim League in December 1906 in Dhaka

was at the initiative of the Nawab Salimullah of that city, 'to protect and advance the

political rights and interests of the Mussulmans of India'. A Bengali Muslim leader, A.

K. Fazlul Haq, moved the resolution at the 1940 Lahore session of the Muslim League

demanding 'independent states' in the areas in which the Muslims were numerically

in majority, a resolution which is usually cited as the origin of the partition. The heart

of the Two-Nation Theory beat strongest in Bangladesh. For India to expect a secular

Bangladesh is to go against the trend of this entire history, and produces

corresponding resentment there.

The second threat is cultural. The cultural mosaic of India encompasses all

the cultures of South Asia: its languages and literatures and music, its religions, its

ethnic identities, its customs and traditions. There are more Muslims in India than in

a Pakistan created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia (not correct,

since there are more Muslims in Pakistan, according to the Indian

Census 2001 - Ed.), half as many Bengali speakers as in a Bangladesh created so

that the people could speak their own language the home of which is in India, many

more Hindus than in Nepal, more Buddhists than in Bhutan. If globalisation can be

defined in one version as the spread throughout the globe of a pervasive and

homogenising culture and value system, then regionalisation is what seems to

threaten India's neighbours.

As a counter to the influence of socio-politics and culture there has developed

among India's neighbours a strong proclivity to assert the separateness of their

identity. This may find recourse in the adoption of an ideology that contrasts with that

of India as when Bangladesh adopted Islam as the state religion and criticised India

for what it called an attempt to foist an alien culture that obliterates the distinct

culture of the Bengali Muslims. Or it may lead to demonstrative distancing, a refusal

to settle issues on terms which seem reasonable. Indians often bewail this.

Commentators from India continue today to bewail the passing of secularism but to 15do so is an anachronism . They are of a mind with those who call Bangladesh 'an

anachronism within an anachronism'. Such comments lead to further feelings of

insecurity in Bangladesh.

The response in Bangladesh to India's all-encompassing cultural mosaic has

been more vehemently self-assertive than that of the other neighbours. This is

because it has been pushed first one way, then the other. Pakistan thought the

promotion of the Bengali language was a plot devised by India to lure the Eastern

wing away, so it tried to impose Urdu on the former East Pakistan, which led to the

language movement and ultimately the movement for separation. Then the Awami

League government in the years 1971-75 tried to impose a secular state (and India

tried to integrate the two economies, making proposals to integrate the two transport

systems and to link the power systems into one grid, which made things worse), and

this swung the pendulum in the opposite direction. Then the military government

which followed abolished secularism in an effort to take it back, a demonstrative

assertion of separateness which India saw as unfriendly, even as the first step in

reuniting Bangladesh with Pakistan. Thus Bangladesh swung between the two poles of

secularism and Islam, Bengali and Bangladeshi; the so-called forces of 1971 and those

of 1947, pro-India and anti-India.

In fact the average Bangladeshi harmonises religion and culture, particularly

language well; politics, helped by external forces, have pulled him first one way, then

the other. It was left to democratic politics to re-establish at state level and in many of

the institutional mechanisms of government and politics, some of the harmony, a

development that is not yet complete.

Another response was that Bangladesh denied any significant role to India in

its independence, saying that instead of Bangladesh being grateful, India should be; it

was a Bangladeshi liberation war which reduced the size of, and the security threat

from, Pakistan. One refrain echoed by those who considered the matter of being

grateful was that 'New Delhi failed to appreciate the fact that while India played a

crucial role in the independence of Bangladesh, the latter also played, on its part, a

crucial role in making India the unchallenged regional power in South Asia. 16Therefore, gratefulness should have been reciprocal ...' The Indian refrain is the

opposite. 'Did they just forget that it was India which brought them independence 17when the entire Western world was against ..? How could they be so hostile?' Part of

this defence mechanism is that domestic problems have, almost invariably, been seen

(whether that is factual or not) to have some link with India. In conversation and

sometimes in the press, there is no shortage of individuals and groups who are ready

to blame India for any calamity that strikes: for riverine floods, for the cyclones that

cause periodic havoc along the coast, and for drought (in the dry season), for the

disappearance of fish from the rivers and coastal areas, for being secular and for being

fundamentalist.

Yet another response is the temptation to bring in outsiders for purposes of

balance. Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. was an early step. Later, as India-China

differences came out into the open some of the neighbours 'played the China card'.

Pakistan was the first to do this, but Nepal and then Bangladesh were not far behind.

Sri Lanka was tempted to give facilities to the U.S., and then tried to turn to ASEAN.

III. TerrorismIn the Indian view there is no doubt that terrorist groups, largely those which target

India, do get support in Bangladesh; that a number of terrorist actions from the


71

neighbourhood against Indian states have been planned and carried out by such

groups; and that the government has, to say the least, done much less than it could

have to control all this. Indeed, faced with repeated accusations on this score

Bangladesh leaders sometimes go on the offensive, thus raising the level of rhetoric.

When Bangladesh Foreign Minister Morshed Khan said to a group of journalists in

Dhaka on 7th September, 2004 that India's Northeast was Bangladesh-locked and

that Dhaka could easily end India's trade surplus by banning Indian goods, this was a

piece.

Bangladesh is less than helpful in the matter of terrorism because of the

control of the armed forces over such operations. Every government after 1975,

including post-1991 governments, has tried to ensure that the armed forces are kept

reasonably well funded and equipped. But the justification for well-equipped forces

can only be the threat from India. Military exercises in Bangladesh are traditionally

conducted against a fictitious 'Wolfland', a thinly disguised name for India. Quite

recently a retired senior military officer described India as Bangladesh's greatest

enemy, while another said the claim of Bangladesh to India's northeast was greater

than that of India; and there are serving officers who in published articles have

recommended support for insurgents fighting in the Northeast. There was a time

when this enemy image attached to India acquired political resonance, helping the

armed forces to stay in power; and that was the time a variety of operations against

India were put into the planning, some of which were initiated. As a party initiated by

the armed forces, and which is still manned by a large number of retired officers -- the

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) continued this thinking. However, Sanjit Deb

Burman and Anup Chetia, who are wanted in India, for whose extradition repeated

requests have unavailingly been made, and who are still living a comfortable life in

Bangladesh, were also there during the Awami League government. The continued

existence of training camps for insurgents who operate against Indian targets cannot

reasonably be doubted; nor can the fact that specific organisations like Harkat-ul-

Jihad-al-Islami, the Jamiatul Mujahideen and possibly even Al Qaeda, have been

operating and have bases in Bangladesh. There can also be little doubt that the

Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is particularly active there, and probably

responsible for most of the activities directed against India. The government there, of

course, has completely denied this.

In India there has been a temptation to link all this with the supposed rise of

fundamentalism as seen in the role of the Jamaat-e-Islami and others which have

been part of the democratic process like the Islamic Oikyo Jote, or in the actions of the

BNP. Ever since the BNP government came to power in 2001, Indian commentators,

especially those from West Bengal, have shackled that government with radical Islam,

anti-Indian sentiments and actions, anti-secularism, anti-democracy, and pro-China

policies. These shackles have become stronger with the years, regardless of the facts.

An early comment, which started a flood of articles of similar nature, was by a Hong

Kong based weekly, that a 'revolution is taking place in Bangladesh that threatens

trouble for the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic fundamentalism,

religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international terrorist


72

18groups...are combining to transform the nation.' Another comment is: 19'fundamentalism seems to have won the first round in Bangladesh' . This is to push

politically motivated dire warning well beyond credibility. Efforts have also been

made by Indian commentators to see Bangladesh as a 'cocoon of terror'. The

'disrupted and dysfunctional state of Bangladesh is set to become a monolith Islamic

state and a breeding ground of Islamic terror...will be incalculably disastrous for India 20and the rest of the South Asian region.'

In line with the general tendency for closer interaction between foreign policy

and domestic politics, this became a battleground between the two main Bangladeshi

political parties, as Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina used the occasion to attack

the performance of the BNP government, projecting it as government by violence and

terror, and the BNP leadership said she was conspiring with the help from foreign

countries to dislodge her government. This battle continues to occupy centre stage in

domestic politics.

Bangladesh officials and many others, however, decry such descriptions.

After a series of articles in this tenor appeared in Indian newspapers early in 2004,

the heads of 15 Chambers of Commerce and Industry from Bangladesh issued a

statement saying their business community 'is deeply concerned over the deplorable 21propaganda by a section of the India media against Bangladesh' . Others foretell that

this kind of report could be self-serving, since they could affect the attitude of policy

makers, especially aid donors and business, so promoting a siege mentality in which

the promotion of a radical form of Islam is taken to be the easiest way to safeguard

national interests. In South Asian diplomatic circles gloomy forecasts have often been

taken to be self-serving.

The fact of the matter is that there are many steps the BNP government could

have taken to promote Islam legally, and since there is a 2/3 majority in Parliament,

even the Constitution could have been amended, but no move has so far been made in

this direction and none is likely. This is only one of the objective considerations

showing there is no truth in the contention that fundamentalism is on the rise there.

IV. Sharing the Ganga WatersThe sharing of the Ganga waters is no longer -- since the 30-year Treaty was signed in

December 1996 -- as live an issue as it has been (though Bangladeshis do say that a

permanent solution is still required). But the story of the way it was handled by the

two sides before that offers an illustration of the basic elements cited above. The

central question was simple: since there was not enough water in the Ganga for both

countries, how would it be shared?

In the lower Ganga basin two things have been happening over the decades.

More and more water has been going east rather than south (towards Kolkata port)

due to the accumulation of silt in particular patterns; and the port itself has become

more and more silted, thus hindering shipping. So a scheme was devised that a

barrage be constructed at Farakka to divert 40,000 cusecs south through the Hoogli

towards the port, thus hopefully flushing it of the accumulated silt. In the driest


73 74

period about 60,000 cusecs reached Farakka, so diverting 40,000 would leave only

20,000 for Bangladesh, which it considered too little for irrigation, the control of

salinity, navigation, health, the ecological cycle and so on. Basically it wanted the

historic flows to continue, meaning no diversion. India thought about 9,000 cusecs

were enough for Bangladesh, meaning there was more than enough after diversion.

Construction having been completed, the diversion into the Hoogli of Ganga

waters at Farakka started on 21 April 1975. Three days before that India and

Bangladesh agreed on the amounts of water which India could divert in April and May

of that year, but the diversion canal was being tested and these amounts were small.

By the end of that year a new government headed by General Ziaur Rahman was in

power in Bangladesh -- a government which India mistrusted. So no agreement was

reached on how the water was to be shared in 1976 or in 1977; the diversion of water

by India continued at higher levels and what was left for Bangladesh was much less

than in the 1977 or later agreements.

Bilateral negotiations were held, but they were disjointed, since the mutual

mistrust between the military government and the government of India continued. To

summarise the later story, counting the dry seasons, after 1977 there were five years of

agreement with a minimum guarantee clause (reached when a non-Congress

government came to power in Delhi in early 1977); then two years (1983-84) -- Indira

Gandhi was now back in power -- of a Memorandum of Understanding, not

agreement, with no guarantee; then a year with nothing; then three years (1986-88 --

Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister) of an MOU again with no minimum guarantee

clause; another eight years (1989-96) with nothing; finally the thirty-year agreement

of 1996, again with no guarantee clause. The actual quantum of water sharing was not

very different in all these agreements, and even in the years without agreement India

continued to release some water for Bangladesh, though less. The point is that the

issue could have been settled, were it not for the desire of one side or the other to use

it for domestic purposes, to show goodwill or ill-will, to bring in outsiders, anything

other than the actual minimum needs of water.

Thus the absence of agreement during the 1976 and 1977 dry seasons was

used by Ziaur Rahman to consolidate his somewhat shaky position. A Bangladesh

White Paper of 1976 asserted that the withdrawal of water by India threatened the

survival of millions of people of Bangladesh; the media, with official encouragement,

referred to it as a conspiracy against the independence and sovereignty of the country;

it was taken to the UN with an official complaint to the General Assembly, and to

China during an official visit of Zia with the complaint that Bangladesh faced a real

threat to its security and sovereignty from Farakka; the leftist leader Maulana

Bhashani started a long march to Farakka with thousands of his supporters. In August

1978, Bangladesh proposed formally that Nepal be included in the studies for the

augmentation of the flows in the Ganga. The same thing happened during the long

period of eight years without agreement. Bangladesh Prime Minister Begum Khaleda

Zia raised the issue in the UN General Assembly in October 1993, saying this was an

'issue of life and death' for her country. Then there was an attempt to bring in China,

to which Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, visiting Bangladesh at the time said

in February 1994 that 'I believe this problem should be solved between Bangladesh 22and India bilaterally.' Passage of time helped. During the first three years after

Farakka was commissioned three things became clear as a result of more careful

measurement of the flows and more accurate assessment of the respective needs of

the two countries, and these became even clearer as the years passed.

First, that the real problem was confined to a month or, in the phraseology

used in later agreements, three ten-day periods from April 11-May 10 each year and

for the rest of the year there was enough for both sides. Second, that the needs of

India were evolving. The flushing of Kolkata port, for which Farakka had been built,

was effective, but it was never going to become a deep water port; indeed with the

introduction of ever larger container ships for international trade, traffic would in any

case have to be diverted no matter how effective the flushing. And upstream

requirements were increasing. So India's needs were now for the people of Uttar

Pradesh (UP) and Bihar (irrigation) and for the people of Kolkata (reduced salinity);

the hydrological compulsions of having to put 40,000 cusecs into the feeder canal for

purposes of flushing were not so strong. There would be no particular problem if the

flushing did not happen for a few weeks. Third, that the real needs of Bangladesh

were considerably smaller or at least more flexible, than had been projected. At one

extreme there was the claim that the lower riparian has a right to all the water that has

historically flowed; at the other extreme that if planned irrigation was only required,

about 3000 cusecs would be enough; then one could add the conservation of fisheries,

reduction of salinity, historical usage and so on until one reached a figure for entire

flow. In other words, both sides could compromise, given adequate goodwill.

In early 1977 Morarji Desai became the Prime Minister of India and was

determined to show that Indira Gandhi's policies, especially towards neighbours, had

been wrong. Bangladesh scaled down its requirements and agreement was reached

within eight months. The interaction of foreign and domestic policy is well illustrated

in this case. At his first meeting with Desai in April 1977, Bangladesh Foreign Minister

Shamsul Huq called without appointment, to which Desai, signaling the change,

replied that there 'should be no formality between neighbours'. Huq then said,

'Excellency, why have you stopped our rightful share of the waters of the Ganges?' 23Desai replied, 'I did not do it. That woman did' .

In general the change in government in Delhi made for a change in relations

with Bangladesh. 'The Desai era was marked by a remarkable improvement in India-

Bangladesh relations and also satisfactory progress towards resolving the irritating

bilateral problems.' And this led Bangladesh to conclude that 'by her sheer size and

scientific and technological progress, India stands out as a rising Asian power. Her 24neighbours should accept this reality in good grace' . Similarly, the final agreement of

1996 was signed when I. K. Gujral became foreign minister under a non-Congress

government. In June 1996 Sheikh Hasina Wajid became Prime Minister of

Bangladesh. So six months of negotiation were sufficient to arrive at agreement.


75

India and Bangladesh have some 54 rivers in common, and though the large

majority has not been a source of difficulty, there are those like the Teesta on which

negotiations continue without any hope of an early agreement. Meanwhile the mega-

project being thought about in India of linking the major rivers in the country has

caused unease in Bangladesh. There is no doubt that the 1996 Ganga Waters 25Agreement 'has set an example for others to emulate' . But both India and

Bangladesh need to go beyond this towards a comprehensive agreement on principles

that should prevail as the foundation for such agreements in the future.

V. Migration The migration of persons from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh into India has been

substantial. The total number of Hindus there has, since 1951 -- and according to their

census reports -- remained almost the same, meaning that the entire increase

migrated to India. This means (assuming a moderate population increase of 2.5 per

cent p.a.) that 250,000 Hindus moved each year. For the Muslims the figures are not

so clear. At the border there has been a general impression of the Border Security

Force and state police that more, or at least, as many Muslims are migrating; some

journalists and even officials (off the record) put the figure much higher - as much as

4 Muslims to every Hindu. Assuming the low figure would mean a total of half a

million migrants per year and when the then Home Minister of India, L. K. Advani,

mentioned 20 million as the total of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to be sent

back this figure would account for forty years. This is of uncertain accuracy, for a

previous home minister had referred in August 1998 to 8 million, and a West Bengal

minister said in the same year there were none in his state. There are many other

estimates, often conflicting with each other. The then Governor of Assam prepared a

report in 1998 giving figures of 5.4 million for West Bengal, 4 million for Assam, 0.8

million for Tripura, and smaller figures for Bihar, Maharashtra, Delhi and even 26Rajasthan .

India repeatedly raised the issue with the Bangladesh government, which

steadfastly denied that any such movement was taking place. The only time a

Bangladeshi leader admitted it was during Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's visit to India

in May 1992 when the two sides agreed that large scale illegal immigration was a

problem that needed to be solved. Every other leader, and Khaleda Zia herself

thereafter, has denied that any problem exists. Indeed their officials invariably replied

that conditions being so good in their country, no one, least of all patriotic

Bangladeshis, would wish to exchange those for the much worse ones in India.

It is ironical, in view of the ridiculing expressions that this usually raised

among their Indian interlocutors, that the latest human development figures indicate

that this may indeed be true to some extent. The infant mortality rate is lower in

Bangladesh (51 per thousand compared to 67); a higher percentage of infants is

vaccinated against tuberculosis and measles - and more children go to primary school

(87 per cent compared to 83 per cent in India); and of these a larger percentage

comprises girls; more people have access to clean water; maternal mortality is lower.

Even the population growth rate, a big success story, has fallen dramatically, to just


76

1.5 per cent during the last five years, lower than that of India. And as a percentage of

GNP spent on health Bangladesh has 1.6 compared to India's 0.9. Other indicators are

there: the activity and success of NGO's, the high turnout of women voters. All this

has happened in the last ten years.

Most of the migration - among both Muslims and Hindus - is for economic

reasons due to flood or drought or lack of employment opportunities, though some of

the latter, sporadically and in small numbers, is due to violence against the minorities.

More important, the perceived Islamisation of the country, the amendments to the

Constitution brought in by Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad, the increasing salience

of Islamic parties, have led the Hindus to leave. Now and again, when Islamic forces

are reported or seen to gather strength, there was a sudden large exodus, as happened

most recently after the 2001 elections there. There has also undeniably been some

exodus among both Hindus and Muslims due to tacit encouragement from India,

especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it stopped thereafter. On balance, it

seems a valid judgement that 'sustained and uninterrupted movement of population

from Bangladesh to India has been taking place for reasons other than political, 27religious and ethnic' and that one of the major driving forces could be deteriorating

economic conditions due to environmental degradation.

The issue first became politically active when the All Assam Students Union

started agitating in the mid-1970s against the Central government for what Assamese

saw as a policy of liberally allowing and even encouraging Bangladeshis to enter India

to increase the number of votes for the Congress party. Then it came to the fore when

the 1981 census results showed that in West Bengal and Assam in particular, but also

in Tripura, the overall population increase was three times the national average, and

that the growth of the Muslim population in particular was too high to be explained by

natural causes.

So India not only took up the issue with the Bangladesh government but also

decided to build a fence along the border in an effort to stop the 'infiltration'. Other

measures were planned: roads along the fence for patrolling; better intelligence; and

more effective forces along the border. Largely these measures were intended to

assuage the feeling among political parties of the opposition that nothing was being

done about this human invasion -- a response to a political problem.

As regards the fence, work on this has been desultory. Started in the mid-

1980s, about a third of the 4096 km of border has been fenced. At one time it was

thought to be a decision to be taken unilaterally by India, the then Prime Minister

Rajiv Gandhi said India should discuss it with Bangladesh, who of course opposed it

vehemently. It was later declared that India had the right to build the fence and that

Bangladesh had no locus standi in the matter. The riverine portions of the border, and

many of the migrants enter by boat, cannot be fenced at all. Since border guidelines

agreed with Bangladesh specify that no such structure will be constructed within 150

metres of the border, and the fence is that distance, a no-mans land, a wide swath of

territory, has been created where criminals and smugglers run free, immune from the


77 78

Indian authorities who do not cross the fence, immune from the Bangladesh

authorities since they are in Indian territory.

For India this cannot be a straightforward issue of sending back illegal

immigrants/infiltrators and stopping any more from coming in. Since the figures were

not unambiguous it was never known how many should or indeed could be sent back.

The Hindus could not; they were regarded as refugees rather than immigrants. Of the

Muslims many had settled in states far from the border; the population figures

showed high increases in Bihar and even further away in Delhi. Most seemed to have

documents proving that they were Indian citizens, given to them when they were

being encouraged to vote. They had been there for two or even three generations. The

policy of sending back resulted only in a few incidents in each of which some dozens

were pushed back; this only led to border incidents, and those pushed back re-entered

by another route.

The solution to this problem is also not, as India has sometimes tried, to get

Bangladesh to admit that it is happening, which they will not do, but to work out

concrete measures for cooperation between the Border Security Force and the

counter-part Bangladesh Rifles. Discussions have been held and there are some signs

that they will lead to better security along the border, but the long-term solution lies

in more jobs and better living conditions in Bangladesh.

VI. Trade and Economic RelationsAn issue which has caused resentment in Bangladesh, is its trade deficit with India.

India's exports have risen steadily so that today Bangladesh is India's sixth largest

customer, buying during the last year was US$ 1.8 billion of goods; selling less than

US$ 100 million. Then there is the illegal or informal trade across the open border,

which may account for a figure of exports and imports which is as much or higher,

and equally unbalanced. Three general considerations are relevant here. First, the

applicability of the basic elements of India's relations with her South Asian

neighbours. Bangladesh has consistently used the trade deficit for political purposes,

the usual accusation being made by either of the two main political parties that the

other has 'sold out' the economy to India, or acquiesced in India converting

Bangladesh into a 'captive market'. It is not clear how voters respond to such charges,

but election campaigns see a heightening of the level of accusations.

Second, given the diversity of India's productive capacity and the limits of that of

Bangladesh, the trade deficit will continue, perhaps in abated form, even if India were

to grant all tariff, non-tariff and para-tariff concessions asked for. 'The reason behind

this situation (the soaring trade deficit) is that the country has not developed an

efficient and dynamic manufacturing sector. Industrial activity is minimal if not 28stagnant' . At present just three products account for the bulk of Bangladesh exports:

jute, textiles and inorganic chemicals. This is reflective of the general limits of the

country's global export basket: 75 per cent of this comprises textiles and garments.Third, this issue will disappear from the purely trade point of view in few

years. The mandatory removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers under the WTO regime

by 2008 will ensure that the grant of any special concessions such as Bangladesh is

now asking will become redundant. The 12th SAARC Summit (Islamabad, January

2004) decision to launch a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2006 will achieve the

same result, perhaps even earlier. Then there are the arguments used to counter

Bangladesh's demands for restriction on free exports in certain items.

One is that Bangladesh has an almost equally large trade deficit with China,

and is not complaining. Bangladesh does not see the logic of this, since its demand is

for specific concessions from India, not that its trade with every country should be

balanced. Another is that if India is given transit facilities, the resulting transit fees,

and Indian investment in the infrastructure required would ease the trade imbalance.

On occasion India has linked trade with transit. This makes the issue even more

political for a large cross-section of leaders in Bangladesh believe and proclaim that

the grant of transit facilities would endanger independence and national sovereignty;

that this will be an Indian corridor cutting Bangladesh in two; that India will

transport arms as a result of grant of the facility leading to a military threat to

Bangladesh.

Behind this is the China angle. The closer integration of the Northeast into

the rest of India, which the transit facility would promote, is something China does

not want. This became particularly clear when in June 1987 Chinese Vice Premier

Qiao Shi said in Dhaka that China had apprehensions about the proposal; President

Ershad was in China the following month and assured his Chinese hosts that

Bangladesh would not allow India to move military hardware across Bangladesh into 29the Northeast . Here again, especially when alarm is expressed about the possibility

of India moving arms across Bangladesh, is one way to play the China card. It is true

that the relationship between India and China has changed profoundly in the period

since then; developments during the last ten years also suggest that China's attitude

towards the more intensive integration of the Northeast with the rest of India is less

than positive.

A third is the export of gas to India, which should reduce the trade deficit.

However, after some hesitation, most leaders in Bangladesh have agreed that reserves

of recoverable gas are too low and that these must be larger than 50 years domestic

consumption for such exports to be considered. Probably, facing a similar situation,

India would insist that as much value addition as possible to a domestic natural

resource should be within the country, which is what Bangladesh is now trying to do.

Finally, India argues that if Bangladesh liberalises the conditions for Indian

investment then the industrial and export base of the latter could be expanded,

enabling more exports. At present India accounts for about 7 per cent of the total

number of foreign investment projects, 70 out of 1,000. For this a congenial

atmosphere free of overt hostility and propaganda is needed.

With so many arguments circulating it is difficult to foresee that the

Bangladesh request for trade concessions will easily be accorded. There is little doubt,

however, that at little cost to itself, India could grant all the concessions asked. It has

been calculated that even if India gives totally customs free access to the exports of


79

Bangladesh the loss of revenue would be less than 1 per cent of the total. And the

result would be, given the high import intensity Bangladesh's exports, a further

increase of India's exports to that country; higher incomes there which would further 30increase the market for India's products, given the high import elasticity for imports ,

and in general a considerable boost to bilateral trade and to the goodwill that

undoubtedly exists in Bangladesh, and create a strong support base among

commercial circles there for the development of yet closer relations.

VII. Conclusion Given the present atmosphere between the two sides, one should not plan for too

ambitious a programme in the way of improved relations. Some suggestions, however,

would not be out of order, and the first is to lower the level of rhetoric, if not eliminate

it altogether. This means that Delhi and Dhaka have to ensure that central as well as

state/local leaders speak with one moderate voice on bilateral issues, avoid any sort of

encouragement to forces that the other side regards as inimical and step up

cooperation between local authorities at the border, especially the BSF and the BDR.

When one considers the recent experience with Pakistan this should not be difficult to

do; from an atmosphere just a year ago in which war was expected or at least the most

talked about likely outcome of developments, in which even to mention peace or

improved relations smacked of unreal idealism and even suggesting a cricket match

was met with derision, we have today one in which peace, the promotion of every type

of contact, open travel, the exchange of information, are being lauded. And this is

despite the fact that there is no progress whatsoever on any difficult issue. With

Bangladesh, since the issues are not so grave, this should be easier.

It is necessary for the two sides to set up a monitoring body which could

analyse the causes of deterioration in atmospherics and the level of rhetoric, and to

suggest concrete remedial steps. This could create the ground for a high level visit,

which unfortunately does not yet seem to be on the cards; indeed such a visit by itself

does much to improve the atmosphere.

Constructive cooperation needs to be carried forward. The Tatas took a

commendable initiative to invest in Bangladesh and this is moving slowly ahead, but

evidence suggests that on both sides the governments have not been helpful or

encouraging; such initiatives need to be put onto a fast track. Other things are also

moving forward: double entry visas; land route communication with Tripura; other

investment proposals, to mention a few. But the pace is slow, and it is clear that

official obstructions are the major reason. Water is an area in which India should take

the initiative to formulate joint principles which could apply to rivers other than the

Ganga.

India needs to take certain types of steps and Bangladesh needs to take some

others. If India accepts Bangladesh's request for export concessions, this would cost

little and go a long way to show that it is prepared to go the extra mile. Then there are

the land and maritime border problems, which are more difficult, but Bangladesh

needs only assurance that India is serious in expediting settlement, not a specific

deadline by which this will be done.


80

Bangladesh, on its part, must take concrete measures against the insurgent

camps that have been established in its territory. This need not be a publicised

measure, but a flat denial that any camps exist has aroused suspicions in India, which

need to be assuaged. And it has to take measures to reassure the minorities. After the

initial post-election violence the situation has, to some extent, been brought under

control, but regular measures of reassurance are still needed.

( I. P. Khosla is former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India)

End Notes1. Imtiaz Ahmed and Abdur Rob Khan, 'India's Policy Fundamentals, Neighbors and Post-

Indira Developments', BIISS Papers, No 3, (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of International

and Strategic Studies, July, 1985) p.41. 2. Harish Kapur, India's Foreign Policy, 1947-92, Shadows and Substance, (New Delhi: Sage

Publications, 1994) p.134.3. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, 'South Asia: An Indian Version of the Monroe Doctrine', in

International Herald Tribune, (12 April, 1989).4. A. K. M. Abdus Sabur, 'Bangladesh-India Relations, An Overview', in Bertram

Bastiampillai, (ed.) India and her South Asian Neighbours, (Bandaranaike Centre for

International Studies, 1992) p.1595. Imtiaz Ahmed, State and Foreign Policy: India's Role in South Asia, (New Delhi: Vikas

Publishing House, 1993) p.265.6. Harish Kapur, note 2, p.29.7. I. K. Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India, (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1998)

p.169.8. Kathryn Jacques, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, International Relations and Regional

Tensions in South Asia, (Great Britain: Macmillan, 2000) p.24.9. Tabarak Hussain, 'Domestic inputs in Foreign Policy', in S. R. Chakravarty and Virendra

Narain (eds.), Bangladesh, Global Politics (Jaipur: South Asia Studies Centre, University of

Rajasthan, 1988).10. A. Appadorai, The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy, 1947-1972, (Delhi: OUP, 1981)

p.22.11. Jayadeva Uyangoda, 'Indo-Bangladesh Relations in the 1970's: Bangladeshi Perspectives',

in Shelton U. Kodikara, (ed.) South Asian Strategic Issues, Sri Lankan Perspectives, (New

Delhi: Sage, 1990) p.77.12. Jayadeva Uyangoda, note 11, p.81.13. Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Bangladesh in International Relations, The Dilemmas of the

Weak States, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1993) p.102.14. Kathryn Jacques, note 8, p.139.15. Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh, From Mujib to Ershad, An Interpretive Study, (Karachi:

OUP, 1992) p.21616. A. K. M.Abdus Sabur, note 4, p.159.17. Sanjay Bhardwaj, 'Bangladesh Foreign Policy vis-a-vis India', in Strategic Analysis, Vol.27,

No.2, (Apr-Jun 2003) p.264.18. Bertil Lintner, 'A Cocoon of Terror', in Far Eastern Economic Review, (April 4, 2002).19. Jaideep Saikia, 'Islamic Resurgence in Bangladesh', in Aakrosh, October 2003, Vol.6,

No.21, p.36.20. Bibhuti Bhusan Nandy, 'Bangladesh Terror, II', in The Statesman, (September 8, 2004).21. See The Hindu, (September 21, 2004).22. See the Introduction by Avtar Singh Bhasin, India-Bangladesh Relations, Documents -

1971-2002, Volume I, (New Delhi: Geetika Publishers, 2003) p.liv.23. Muhammad Shamsul Huq, note 11, p.91.


81 82

24. Muhammad Shamsul Huq, note 11, pp.97 and 124.25. T.Ramakrishnan, 'Sharing Water Resources', in The Hindu, (8 October, 2004).26. For more figures see Sreeradha Datta, 'Indo-Bangladesh Relations: An Overview of

Limitations and Constraints', in Strategic Analysis, (Jul-Sep, 2002), Vol.26, No.3. p. 429.27. Sarfaraz Alam, 'Environmentally Induced Migration from Bangladesh to India', in Strategic

Analysis, Vol.27, No. 3, Jul-Sep 2003, p.423.28. Delwar Hossain, ‘Bangladesh: Impact of Globalisation and Governance’, in South Asian

Journal, (October-December 2004) p. 151.29. Avtar Singh Bhasin, Introduction to India-Bangladesh Relations, Documents - 1971-2002,

(Geetika Publishers, 2003) p.lxx.30. see Indra Nath Mukherji, ‘Indo-Bangladesh Bilateral Trade, Issues and Concerns’, in

Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol.7, Nos.3-4, Jul-Dec 2003, p.54.

Nepal-India RelationsKrishna V. Rajan

t is a truism that India and Nepal, despite their proximity and cultural affinities,

have not been able to build up a relationship of mutual trust and confidence, or Ieven partially succeeded in utilising their complementary economic potential for the

benefit of their citizens. Since 1947, when India gained its independence, regimes

have changed many times in Kathmandu, as have governments in New Delhi, little

has changed in fundamental terms as far as the relationship is concerned. Plus ca

change, plus c'est la meme chose (the more things change, the more they remain the

same) is a fair description of the story of bilateral relations so far.

Nepal is currently experiencing a major, multifaceted crisis. The

constitutional monarchy-multiparty democracy combine is beset with institutional

difficulties, and there has been a dramatic erosion of central authority in the face of

the eight-year long Maoist insurgency. The failure of governance and absence of

leadership are painfully obvious, as is the breakdown in law and order and virtual

collapse of the economy. There are serious questions about the capacity of its fragile

Westminster-style democracy to survive not only challenges from the left and right,

but popular disillusionment with the democratic experience of twelve years (1990-

2002). The institution of monarchy has also been gravely damaged, first by the royal

massacre of June 2001 and, since October, 2002, by the ill-advised and misjudged

initiatives of King Gyanendra to assume full powers and sideline political parties as

well as the Constitution. The Maoist insurgency is able to demonstrate at will through

its tactics of terror and extortion, the impotence of government machinery and its own

capacity to shut down factories and empty the roads, but it does not enjoy any real

credibility as a democratic alternative to the present arrangement even if the latter is

malfunctioning and discredited. The prospect of Nepal as a 'failing State' is a matter of

deepest concern not only for the Himalayan kingdom but also for India and, indeed,

for many other countries. In this grim crisis, India and Nepal need to introspect and

see how their relationship could measure up to the existing challenges, rather than

being held hostage to them.

Political and security considerations have usually been the driving force in

bilateral ties. Over nearly six decades, India has dealt with every kind of regime in

Nepal, tried different tactics and strategies, gone the extra mile in winning friends and

influencing leaders -- basically guided by its own security perceptions. Nepalese

sensitivities whether at the personal, political level or relating to the Nepalese psyche

have not always been fully anticipated or well-managed. Nepalese political elites, for

their part, have often exaggerated India's interest or ability to manipulate internal

competitions for power in Nepal, and tended to expect political quid pro quos for


83

cooperation even on India's legitimate security concerns. An inevitable result of such

approaches has been the corrosion and devaluation of a relationship whose natural

assets and complementarities could well have led it in a very different direction.

In the early 1950s, Nehru sought an understanding with the autocratic Rana

regime a la British India, while encouraging an end to Nepal's international isolation

and modification of its undemocratic polity. The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship,

was a robust imitation of the 1923 Treaty between British India and the Ranas -- it

could not and did not go down too well with many Nepalese, who felt that the Treaty

was unequal, non-credible and un-democratic, and who bristled openly at the

suggestion that India's security perimeter legitimately extended up to the Himalayas.

India, however, persisted with its efforts with the friendly constitutional monarch

(King Tribhuvan) it had helped restore, and the democratic set-up (headed by the

Nepali Congress) which it helped to install. Neither survived for long; but the

resentment generated by the excessively visible Indian role in 'guiding' the country's

affairs while promoting India's own security interests vis-à-vis China had a lasting

impact. In the subsequent decades India switched on and off its active support for

friendly democratic forces (especially the Nepali Congress) depending on India's

leverage at the given moment and prospects of receiving minimum security-related

cooperation from the absolutist monarchs (first King Mahendra, then his son

Birendra). There were many visits and agreements; and much Indian aid which went

into building roads, hospitals, communications, irrigation and power projects, and

self defence for the Royal Nepalese Army. The result (from an Indian perspective) was

only declining levels of gratitude and increased anti-Indian sentiment at the level of

the common man in Nepal, and at the level of the government playing the China card,

cosying up to Pakistan, systematic non-observance of Nepalese commitments under

the 1950 Treaty and other agreements, the campaign to declare Nepal a Zone of Peace,

protests on Sikkim's merger with India, much brinksmanship on India's security

concerns. The nationalist Nepali perspective on all this was, of course, quite different

and has traditionally been dismissed by the Indian establishment. It is only

comparatively recently that Indian experts have, for example, started conceding that

the Nepalese sense of grievance on the poor quality of design, inefficient

implementation and bad maintenance of Indian executed projects like Kosi and

Gandak may not be unjustified; or that if King Mahendra had been handled

differently, he would have been as friendly and accommodative of Indian sensitivities

as his father; that the misunderstandings between King Birendra and Prime Minister

Rajiv Gandhi could have easily been avoided if there had been a little more

transparency.

By the end of the 1980s India was pitching in whole-heartedly with the

democratic forces while maintaining a cold and formal relationship with the king,

foreseeing a popular tide in favour of pro-India groups in any free and fair election.

Poor personal chemistry between the monarchy and first Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi, and later Rajiv Gandhi, along with other factors, created and sustained

mutual suspicions and antipathy ultimately translating into confrontational politics

during the government of Rajiv Gandhi.


84

When Rajiv Gandhi enforced a blockade against Nepal after King Birendra

imported Chinese anti-aircraft missiles in contravention of the 1950 Treaty (and also

incidentally permitted the Trade and Transit Treaty to lapse) tensions escalated. G. P.

Koirala, leader of Nepali Congress, then in the vanguard of the pro-democracy and

anti-King movement, is reported to have asked Indian Army ex-servicemen in Nepal's

Gurkha districts as to what they would do if there was a war between India and Nepal.

They are said to have insisted, 'India has given us our bread, we will never fight

against India!' On the Indian side, the Army Chief of Staff is known to have protested

to Rajiv Gandhi that the embargo must be immediately lifted, as it was causing great

hardship to the families in Nepal of serving Gurkhas in the Indian Army who were

willing to lay down their lives for India's national interests. This is mentioned simply

to underline the fact that leaders are sometimes totally out of touch with the

sentiments of the people they are supposed to be serving.

When the Panchayat system was replaced by constitutional monarchy and

multi-party democracy, after a mass agitation enjoying cross-party political support,

there were huge expectations of a new era in Indo-Nepal relations. Indeed, during the

first few years, India and Nepal seemed to be making up for the lost time. Visits

multiplied, agreements were signed and new vistas of cooperation in trade, economic

development and water resources opened up. But the bold steps taken between the

Nepali Congress Government and India in strengthening ties were to some extent

undermined by the widespread (if largely unfair) perception that India was putting all

its eggs in one 'pro-India' political basket in Nepal in order to promote its own

interests. The monarchy was a passive spectator while the opposition (leftist as well as

pro-Palace) exploited these sensitivities to create an anti-India vote-bank.

Political infighting within the Nepali Congress brought its government down

necessitating mid-term elections, and brought a minority communist (Communist

Party of Nepal-UML) government to power (1994) after an election campaign marked

by anti-Indian rhetoric. Much to the relief of India, however, the basic direction of

bilateral relations was maintained by the communists. While rejecting the concept of

a special relationship with India, and raising 'national' issues like the need for the

1950 Treaty to be updated, the Tanakpur Agreement to be renegotiated and need to

solve the Bhutanese refugee problem with greater persistence than its predecessor

government, the UML Government of Manmohan Adhikari gave sufficient indication

during its brief nine-month tenure, of its serious desire to strengthen relations with

India on a long term basis. For his part, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao brought

home to Adhikari that India would deal with Nepal as a country, irrespective of the

political or ideological complexion of the party in power or the (alleged) pro or anti-

India leanings of the prime minister of the day. With somewhat uncharacteristic

crispness, Narasimha Rao made it clear that while India did not expect reciprocity in

an arithmetical sense, there had to be reciprocity at least in spirit, and certainly in

core areas of the relationship.

The Adhikari Government fell, after just nine months in office, and was

replaced by a coalition of the Nepali Congress (NC), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party


85 86

(RPP), and Terai-based National Sadbhavana Party (NSP) under Sher Bahadur

Deuba. The following years saw political instability assume chronic dimensions. Prime

ministers and governments changed with bewildering frequency. Every possible

permutation and combination of political parties was forged through temporary

alliances in their bid for power. The result of the general elections of 1999, held

despite a threat of disruption by the Maoists, created hope for political stability since

it restored a majority Nepali Congress government under K. P. Bhattarai. But history

repeated itself; the Nepali Congress squandered away its advantage due to infighting

between the Koirala and Bhattarai camps, and the musical chair game helped replace

Bhattarai with Koirala and brought Deuba back in power. The Maoists took full

advantage of the political instability. The tragic royal massacre of June 1, 2001,

further boosted their prospects. In October 2002, the Constitution itself was derailed

when King Gyanendra dismissed the Deuba government, and took one initiative after

another, in an unsuccessful bid to find a solution to the Maoist insurgency while

consolidating the position of the monarchy at the cost of the multiparty system. In

India too, there was political uncertainty and change. Between 1996 and 2004, the

office of the prime minister has seen six changes and there have been four general

elections.

Both countries have paid a big price for this political turbulence. Yet initially

at least they succeeded in maintaining a certain stability, continuity and direction in

bilateral ties, which appeared to vindicate India's long-held conviction that multi-

party democracy was not only good for Nepal but offered the best hope for developing

bilateral cooperation on a long term basis. This was partly due to the transparency

and public awareness resulting from democratic functioning and a free press, but also

due to a consistent approach on India's part not to play favourites in dealing with

Nepalese political leaders.

A refinement of the Narasimha Rao approach of 'non-arithmetical

reciprocity' -- as a basis for Nepal-India relations -- came in Foreign Minister I. K.

Gujral's Chatham House speech of 1996; the now famous 'Gujral Doctrine' of non-

expectation of reciprocity in India's dealings with its neighbours (except Pakistan).

The 'doctrine' made a huge impact on Nepal, where it generated somewhat unrealistic

expectations. The first test it was subjected to was when the Trade Treaty came up for

renewal in December 1996. Commerce Secretary Tejendra Khanna negotiated a far-

reaching agreement under Gujral's personal instructions, providing for duty-free

access to the Indian market for all goods manufactured in Nepal, irrespective of

labour and material content. The idea was to stimulate Indian investment in export-

oriented manufacturing activity in Nepal and thus expand the basket of exportable

commodities from Nepal to India -- the only way to address Nepal's long-standing

grievance of a huge trade deficit and the huge potential for Indian investment in

Nepal, which had been largely untapped for decades. The treaty began to show results

almost immediately. Over the following five years, Nepalese exports to India increased

at the rate of 57 per cent per annum, India's at 14 per cent and a number of Indian

companies including Hindustan Lever, Dabur and Colgate invested in joint ventures

on the Nepalese side of the border for export to India and third countries. The Treaty

has not had smooth sailing in subsequent years, but the principle of enabling

manufacturing industry in Nepal to ride piggy-back on the vast Indian market for the

good of both countries has been accepted.

The 'Doctrine' came under further scrutiny when I. K. Gujral, on becoming

prime minister, visited Nepal in 1997 at the invitation of his counterpart, Prime

Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Apart from other agreements signed, Gujral

overruled objections from his bureaucrats and agreed to a long time Nepalese request

for an alternative transit route to Bangladesh (the so-called Phulbari route). In order

to address the special security concerns posed by the fact that the route passes

through the sensitive 'Chicken's Neck' area of West Bengal, it was decided to provide

Indian security escort for the Nepal-bound or Nepal-origin cargo -- perhaps the most

striking example of going the extra mile in accommodating a landlocked neighbour's

aspirations in the history of transit agreements. The fact that this exceptional gesture

was being made with a coalition government led by individuals who did not have a

particularly 'pro-India' complexion, did not go unnoticed.

The message to Nepal that India's cooperation would not be influenced by

the political orientation of the government in power in Nepal was further reinforced

by the successor government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, when the Indo-

Nepal Transit Treaty came up for renewal. By now three governments had changed in

Nepal and Koirala was heading a Congress-communist coalition. In what was

possibly a unique concession to a landlocked neighbour, the Treaty was made

automatically renewable every seven years, unless either country gave notice to the

contrary before its expiry. In other words, Nepal's access to the sea was in principle

granted in perpetuity, not something to be renegotiated and renewed every seven

years. To his credit, while other leaders in the ruling party and coalition pulled in

different directions on Nepal and relations suffered as a consequence, Prime Minister

Vajpayee himself showed the same sensitivity towards Nepal as had his predecessors

prime ministers Narasimha Rao and I. K. Gujral, and frequently overruled his

advisors in showing accommodation to Nepal's expectations. The hijacking incident of

December, 1999, and the somewhat casual and insensitive way in which even close

friends of India like K. P. Bhattarai and G. P. Koirala treated India's requests for

cooperation, came as a personal shock to Vajpayee. Subsequently, Vajpayee's personal

interest and sympathy for Nepal waned as the inter-ministerial bureaucracy in India

took a hard-line position on various issues, often negating concessions earlier

accorded to Nepal in the spirit of the Gujral doctrine.

To its credit, the political community in Nepal did make impressive efforts,

especially before the hijacking incident vitiated the atmosphere of bilateral relations,

to create cross-party consensus for constructive discussions on important bilateral

issues. The experience of the Mahakali Treaty was particularly striking. The Treaty

was first proposed to the Narasimha Rao government by the Communist Party of

Nepal-UML in April, 1995. It proposed a mega-project at Pancheshwar on the

Mahakali River, upstream of Tanakpur on which the CPN-UML, while in opposition,

had created a major controversy. The idea was to subsume Tanakpur in a larger


87

project to be jointly designed and implemented (unlike previous river projects in

Nepal which had been entirely executed by India, like the Kosi). Pancheshwar is at a

point on the Mahakali where the river forms a boundary stretch, and the proposal was

to have two stations of equal capacity on either bank, with power surplus to Nepal's

needs being exported to India at mutually agreed tariffs, and additional downstream

benefits to be paid for by India.

The CPN-UML government fell before the proposal could be discussed.

However, the successor Nepali Congress-RPP-NSP coalition led by Sher Bahadur

Deuba, with Water Resources Minister Pashupati Rana and Foreign Minister P. C.

Lohani taking the lead, picked up the threads of the same proposal, hoping that the

UML, now the main Opposition party, would find it difficult to oppose a draft initiated

during its own administration. The Treaty was finalised on the basis of a formal all-

party consensus in Nepal, and signed in New Delhi by prime ministers Sher Bahadur

Deuba and Narasimha Rao during the former's New Delhi visit in March 1996. By the

time the Treaty was placed before the Nepalese Parliament for ratification the Gujral

Government was in office in India; the Nepalese Parliament ratified the Treaty with

the requisite 2/3 majority, after a thorough and occasionally divisive national debate.

The Deuba Government fell soon thereafter; its successor was a coalition led by anti-

Mahakali dissidents in the RPP and CPN (UML), Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur

Chand and Deputy Prime Minister Bamdev Gautam. The new government opted to

honour past international commitments, and the Instruments of Ratification of the

Treaty were exchanged during Prime Minister Gujral's official visit to Kathmandu in

July 1997.

The Mahakali Treaty attracted attention in a number of countries as an

important indication of the ability of India and Nepal as multi-party democracies to

reach agreement on cooperation in water resources on the basis of equality,

transparency and equitable sharing of costs and benefits. The Nepalese Constitution

requires ratification by two thirds Parliamentary majority for any agreement affecting

the country 'extensively, seriously or in the long term'; many had thought that with

such a constitutional provision Nepal and India would never be able to reach an

understanding on cooperation in such a sensitive area as water, since ratification by

Parliament would be next to impossible, given the divisive nature of politics in the

subcontinent. Nepal has some 83,000MW of hydropower potential, half of which is

feasible for development. It presently has a demand of only 270MW. With India's

energy deficit projected to reach 20,000MW by 2010, the compelling logic of

economic complementarity is all too obvious. Also, large-scale export of hydropower

is perhaps the only way Nepal can hope to achieve speedy growth and remove poverty

within a decade. The only other resource it has is tourism, which has its limitations.

Thus, the fact that despite a hung parliament and considerable political

uncertainty, Nepal's main parties could unite to the extent of securing parliamentary

ratification for the Treaty was hailed in many quarters as an impressive

demonstration of the maturity of Nepal's democracy and the promising prospects now

available for investment in the power sector. That a Power Trade Agreement had


88

already been signed between the two countries during Deuba's visit to India,

providing in principle for private sector investment in hydropower projects in Nepal

for export to private sector consumers in India, further encouraged interest of

prospective investors world-wide.

It is unfortunate that the Treaty is being implemented at such a slow pace,

mainly because of its over-politicisation in Nepal on the one hand and

compartmentalised, overly-technical, poorly coordinated approaches to it in India, on

the other. But for all its shortcomings (no Treaty is probably perfect), it does offer a

model for India and Nepal on how to reach important understandings despite the

uncertainties of democratic politics and coalition governments. It is waiting to be

implemented the moment Nepal's polity can summon the political will, consensus and

resolve it once showed, and India the priority it once accorded and sense of

accommodation it earlier demonstrated. It is encouraging to note that meanwhile,

India and Nepal are seriously discussing a number of other projects (including Kosi

High Dam, Upper Karnali and Budhigandaki); and that at least one private sector

hydropower project for export to India (West Seti) has been finalised.

During the period between 1990-2001, when King Birendra attempted with

some success to play the role of a constitutional monarch, India's relations with the

institution of monarchy improved. The king shed his reserve vis-à-vis India, and in

various ways he sent out signals to India as well as his own people that the

misunderstandings and bitterness of the 1980s should be forgotten by both countries,

and that he was personally a strong supporter of closer India-Nepal relations. He

maintained regular contact with the Indian leadership on all matters of mutual

interest, so that to the extent possible, neither country was taken by surprise by

developments in the other; graced private and public functions regularly at India

House after more than twenty years of avoiding them; made unusual departures from

protocol in dealing with the Indian Embassy or visiting Indian dignitaries; paid

several private as well as official visits to India, including a pilgrimage to Hardwar,

Kedarnath, Badrinath, Dwarika; warmly received President Narayanan on an official

visit; and was himself invited to visit India as chief guest on Republic Day, 1999 -- the

first time a King of Nepal had been accorded this honour in 50 years.

Mutual goodwill and the momentum for strengthening cooperation appeared

to have reached unprecedented levels. Speaking in parliament in reply to a no-

confidence motion, shortly after the king's visit as chief guest on Republic Day, Prime

Minister Vajpayee defended his government's foreign policy achievements by giving

the example of Nepal: an election campaign was in progress there, he said, but there

was not a hint of anti-Indianism in the air! Indeed, unlike in previous elections, India-

related issues like the 1950 Treaty, Mahakali Treaty or Kalapani border dispute did

not figure in the campaign. Tanakpur, which had brought the Koirala government

down in 1994 and had once seemed such an intractable issue, was not mentioned even

once.

The results of the general elections in May, 1999, were widely perceived as a

vote for stability, development and apparently also for good relations with India.


89 90

Parties and individuals, professing a commitment to the politics of the far left as well

as the extreme right, were categorically rejected. India's constant reiteration of its

faith in the multiparty democracy-constitutional monarchy arrangement, despite its

recent failures, has much to do with its experience of the positive achievements in

Nepal and in the bilateral relationship, up to the time of the hijacking incident.

Old suspicions and mutual demonisation have, unfortunately, vitiated the

atmosphere once again. As in the past, India's security concerns and Nepal's inability

to satisfy them has become the central issue for India, and the ground for reviving

anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal has become fertile once more.

The Maoist insurgency has, of course, taken full advantage of this in order to

enhance its own appeal within Nepal. Until recently, India's formal position on the

insurgency was that while it would readily respond to requests for supply of arms,

equipment and training, strengthen cooperation on cross-border movement of

Maoists and extradite Maoist leaders from India, this should be treated as Nepal's

internal matter. After the visit of Prime Minister Deuba to India in September 2004,

both countries have accepted it to be a shared concern. It is expected that Indian

support to the Government of Nepal will increase. The latter has been advised at the

highest level not to encourage involvement of third parties. What seems to have

prompted the change of policy is proliferating cross-border linkages between the

Maoist groups on the two sides of the border, the revival of hostile attacks against

Indian interests in Nepal, the demonstrated ability of the Nepalese Maoists (e.g.,

through their recent blockade of Kathmandu and forced closure of dozens of

industries all over Nepal) to mock the government's writ in the land, as well as the

evolution of new policies on the part of government of India in dealing with its own

Maoists.

In India's judgement, the collapse of the constitutional forces in the face of

the Maoist threat must be averted at all costs. It is, however, clear that the

combination of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in Nepal is

saddled with too many inner contradictions and deep mutual distrust, and may not be

able, at least in the foreseeable future, to deal effectively with the crisis facing the

state. It is far from clear as to how Nepal can be helped in a bilateral framework

towards the only viable solution, which is to become an inclusive democracy. Any

inclination on the part of India to be proactive will only attract controversy and

become counterproductive. Nor is it clear how complicated issues like the Maoist

demand for a Constituent Assembly, future of constitutional monarchy, civilian

control over the Royal Nepal Army, disarming Maoist cadres, holding elections, are to

be addressed without a facilitation acceptable to all sides if and when a peace process

starts.

India and Nepal also need to move beyond the Maoist insurgency and away

from traditional concepts of military and strategic consideration. Apart from more

effective joint management of the border and improving the infrastructure, the core

issue of improvement of the quality of governance on both sides of the border will

have to be tackled with a sense of urgency. Without this, threats to India as well as

Nepal, whether from unfriendly third countries or the Maoist insurgency or the drugs-

and-arms smuggling network will continue. In this context, India will have to look at

the need to respond to the widely held feeling in Nepal that the 1950 Treaty is

outdated and unfair to Nepal and needs to be reviewed. A special relationship -- one

in which Nepal obtains economic advantages in exchange for dilution of its sovereign

space -- is less sustainable than a relationship of strategic interdependent economic

linkages. Specifically, the two countries need to build on possibilities in the water

resources and hydropower sector, and attracting investment and economic growth in

the Bihar-Uttar Pradesh-Nepal triangle if the security and economic prospects for the

entire sub-region are to be strengthened.

(K. V. Rajan is a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and served as

India's Ambassador to Nepal from 1995 to 2000. Mr. Rajan can be contacted at

[email protected])


91

Legal Purview: Wullar Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek

Ahmer Bilal Soofi

This paper can serve as a basic document for identifying the complex nature of each of

the three issues -- Wullar Barrage, Siachen and Sir Creek -- between India and

Pakistan. It is a legal summary of all the three issues along with brief descriptions of

the positions taken by both the parties.

I. Wullar BarrageWullar is a lake upstream Jhelum river on the Indian side of Jammu & Kashmir. It is

said to be the largest fresh water lake. India proposed to build a barrage on the mouth

of the lake. The intent of constructing the barrage was to provide for storage of water

and its controlled release would make the river Jhelum navigable throughout the year,

which is why the Indians also refer to it as Tulbul Navigation Lock project. Pakistan

opposed this move on the basic ground that it violates the Indus Water Treaty of 1960

between both the states.

Pakistan's position is that under the controlling Articles of the Indus Water

Treaty, namely Articles 2 and 3, the broad principle of distribution of the rivers has

been spelled out clearly. Under the said principle, the waters of the three western 1rivers, Jhelum, Chenab and Indus would be available for Pakistan , whereas the

waters of three remaining rivers (eastern rivers), namely Beas, Ravi and Sutlej would 2be available for unrestricted use of India . In the light of this broad principle,

Pakistan maintains that any attempt to block the water, or make a storage, upstream

on river Jhelum, would be in violation of the 1960 Treaty and that storage for

navigational purposes is not permissible under the Treaty of 1960. Pakistan further

argues that the purpose for which the barrage needs construction, is firstly not

permissible under the Treaty and secondly it is hardly relevant now because several

improved communication links, serving as better alternatives to river navigation have

come up in the area and, therefore, India has lost the rationale to build the barrage.

Indian position is that, notwithstanding the broad principle in the 1960

Treaty (which it also accepts), it has the technical endorsement to build a barrage on

Wullar in the light of the Article 3 para 4 of the Indus Water Treaty. The said article

broadly prohibits all attempts to store or restrict flow of water on Jhelum, but as an

exception allows construction under certain conditions and technical specifications 3which are enlisted in Annex D and E of the 1960 Treaty . Indian view is that if they do

comply with the conditionalities and technical specifications of Annex D and E to the

Treaty, then, they can legally go ahead and build the barrage. The current factual

position is that although the work at the site is stopped, India still intends to go ahead.


92

Wullar has been included in Indo-Pak talks almost 10 times, which has had

both good and bad consequences. Good to the extent that the dispute did not

deteriorate further given the attention to it and bad that it failed to be resolved since it

remained tied up with other contentious. It came very close to resolution when in 1991

a draft agreement was prepared but could not be signed. Indians blame Pakistan for

tying up the resolution with construction of the proposed 390-MW Kishanganga

Hydroelectric project. Parties have later considered using the draft agreement as a

starting point for resolution. The agreement tacitly allowed building of the barrage

with monitoring by the Indus Water Commissioners (established under the 1960

Treaty) and intends to introduce technical restrictions such as 6.2 metres of barrage

would remain ungated with crest level at EL 1574.90 meters along with other 4stipulations .

One option available to India and Pakistan is to first reach a conclusion at a

political level, whether both agree for construction of the Wullar Barrage or to

abandon the construction. This is so because 1960 Treaty would be instructive on the

purposes of storage. If there is concurrence to give up the project, then the matter

ends and no side-line technical deliberations are required.

However, if there is a political acceptance on both sides for construction of

the Wullar Barrage, then several alternatives are available to find a way forward. For

example, both the states can (a) agree to assign the issue to resolution under the

Indus Water Treaty Mechanism (b) revisit the draft agreement prepared in 1991 (c)

prepare an independent technical solution and for resolution of future disputes, link

it with the dispute resolution mechanism of 1960 Treaty.

II. Siachen IssueAfter the 1948 ceasefire between the Indian Army and Pakistani Army in Kashmir,

under the mandate of UN, the positions held by both the sides were frozen and the

line dividing these positions was referred to as the ceasefire line (CFL). The following

year, in 1949, military commanders of both the sides entered into a detailed

agreement whereby the ceasefire line was documented, delimited on the map and

demarcated on the ground. This was done under the 1949 Karachi Agreement. This

delimitation ended almost with the position of the troops and the areas further north

of the troops positions, were not delimited or demarcated.

In the 1971 war, the positions of Indian and Pakistani armies opposing each

other on the ceasefire line changed. There were some gains and losses on earlier

positions by both the sides. Again when the fire ceased, courtesy UN intervention, the

new positions emerged. Instead of withdrawal to the ceasefire line positions, the new

positions were accepted and now the line dividing the opposing troops on the ground

was referred to as the Line of Control (LoC), which exists till today. The military

commanders again delimited and demarcated the LoC and its last point on map was

NJ 9842. This point was almost 78 kilometers short of the present Siachen glacier. In

short in the 1980s, Indian Army movements were detected around Siachen area and

Pakistan mobilised its troops and since then both the armies are locked in Saichen

without a clear military victory.


93 94

India has two alternative positions on Siachen. First, it argues that Siachen is

part of Kashmir and Kashmir is part of India which is endorsed generally by the

Indian Constitution and, therefore, it has the right to station troops on Siachen. In

alternative India argues that, under the 1949 Karachi Agreement, when ‘the line

proceeds northwards towards glacier' straight upwards, Siachen falls on the Indian

side of the so-extended LoC.

In contrast, Pakistan insists that extension of line if made northwards

towards the glaciers, while keeping in view the previous course of direction of LoC,

would see distinctly Siachen falling on the Pakistani side of the so extended LoC.

Pakistan further relies on evidence of state practice whereby Pakistan is confident of

its claim of having asserted better administrative control in relation to Siachen. For

example, it relies on several atlases and expeditions who have been seeking approval

from Pakistan. Pakistan also argues that Siachen occupation is a breach of the Simla

Agreement, thus relieving Pakistan from obligations of bilateralism.

Resolution of Siachen means solving two different issues. First, the de-

militarisation of the glacier itself and second the resolution of the title of the glacier.

One concern holding back the solution of this issue is that parties apprehend that

resolution of first may not be tied up with the second. Although there are formulations

that de-militarisation is notwithstanding the issue of eventual title, nonetheless, it

does bother the concerned in both the states. Therefore, the starting point of the

negotiations should be a clear, well-declared and well-phrased verdict, mutually

accepting that de-militarisation (a) does not tantamount to waiver of claims to title of

either party and(b) a time bound mechanism to commence the process of determining

the title of the glacier. In this mechanism, there are multiple choices before the

parties. For example, they can agree on international arbitration, or agree to submit

the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In case of ICJ or arbitration, the

parties would need to agree on the terms of reference to be submitted to arbitration,

or the parties may continue with the political dialogue for a political rather than

technical solution.

A question would arise as to what should be the legal status of the Siachen

territory while demilitarisation takes place and parties await resolution of title. In my

view, it may be declared as ‘terra nullis' (territory belonging to no one), a recognised

regime under international law. The talks on Siachen must take account of the issues

raised, otherwise they would again end in a deadlock, because giving up the territory

means extinguishing executive control over the disputed terrain.

III. Sir CreekWherever a river forms a delta before falling into the sea, it develops creeks on the

coastal line. Around the area where the present border of Pakistan is supposed to

meet India in the delta area south of the Rann of Kutch, a dispute arose on the issue of

drawing a dividing line between the two countries. The demarcation becomes

significant when the line is extended seawards to divide the sea boundary between

India and Pakistan. The line then directly affects the division of sea resources --

including minerals, fish and other marine life -- between the two countries.

A country's rights on the resources of the sea are now granted by the 1982

Law of the Sea Convention. The said Convention gives additional rights to both India

and Pakistan, over sea resources up to 200 nautical miles in the water column and up

to 350 nautical miles in the land beneath the water column. It also provides principles

on the basis of which sea boundaries have to be drawn between the states adjacent to

each other with a concave coastline. In short, the land boundary's general course of

direction on the land leading up to the coast, can make a difference of hundreds of

square nautical miles of sea when stretched into the sea as a divider between the said

two states.

Pakistan and India have a concave coastline. With the new 1982 Law of the

Sea Convention adopted by both, the governments have suddenly realised the

enormous sea resources that can be lost or won on the basis of the land terminal point

where the border between India and Pakistan ends. That is why Sir Creek has become

more contentious than ever before.

There is also a comprehensive dispute relating to maps of the creek. During

the British period, the Rann of Kutch was partly administered by the Government of

Sind and partly by the Maharaja of Rann of Kutch. In 1913, the Government of

Bombay resolved the boundary dispute through a ruling, which became the basis of

the 1914 map referred to as B-40. It was around 1925-6 that some pillars were actually

erected at distances, demarcating on ground the agreed boundary between the state of

Kutch and the Sindh Government. As per this arrangement, the line was to follow a

longitude till a specific point called border post (B.P) 1179 and from there run parallel

with (longitude) to the mouth of the creek and then follow the eastern side of the

creek. The eastern edge was also called the Green Reband because of its visible

thickness on the map. Around 1937-8, the Government of India issued the map of the

said terrain by the Surveyor General, which affirmed eventually the said position of

eastern side being the border. In 1947, due to partition, the eastern edge of the creek

was deemed to have been converted as the concluding portion of the international

border between India and Pakistan.

In 1965, the well-known Rann of Kutch Arbitration took place. Interestingly

enough, India agreed to exclude the line beyond B.P. (border post) 1175 from the

subject matter of arbitration on the ground that it is not disputed. Thus the arbitrator

never adjudicated on the boundary of the present Sir Creek as both parties agreed that

no dispute existed. India also stated that the border from the mouth of Sir Creek

should run on the western side of the creek and not the eastern one. This was a major

departure from its earlier position of agreeing to the eastern side.

Pakistan opposes this and instead relies on the Resolution Maps of 1913-14

and the 1937 Map approved by the Surveyor General of India. One option for the

parties was to follow the Thalweg principle, which means drawing a line in the middle

of the deepest navigational channel.

The fundamental technical confusion is that the dialogue process has failed to

realise that Sir Creek negotiations is not part of political process alone, but it is


95

actually a clear obligation on the two states under the 1982 Law of the Sea

Convention. Whether the dialogue process is on or not, both the states have

obligations under Article 76 (in respect of Continental shelf), Article 74 (in respect of

the Exclusive Economic Zone) and Article 15 (in respect of the territorial sea) of the

1982 Law of the Sea Convention to arrive at a negotiated settlement based on

principles of International Law. India could argue that there is no dispute on

delimitation of sea boundary and that the present dispute is regarding the

international border, which was simmering much before the 1982 Law of the Sea

Convention came on line. However, even if this argument is accepted, the obligations

under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention remain unfulfilled because the sea

boundaries remain undivided.

In case both the parties fail to reach an agreement then Part XV of the 1982

Law, which provides for the formal mechanism in respect of settlement of disputes,

can be invoked. In the above context, the process of dialogue can authorise resort to

the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

IV. Delay in Peace Process Given the current sequence of meetings between Indo-Pak delegations and the toned

down statements from both the sides, it can be sensed that both the countries are

making earnest efforts to push the peace process into a result-oriented direction. But

despite good faith to resolve these issues, there may still be delays. These delays will

occur due to the inherent nature of each of these three disputes.

All these three disputes are basically technical in nature. They stem from

legal texts (Wullar from 1960 Treaty, Siachen from 1949 Karachi Agreement, Sir

Creek from interpretation of maps). When technical issues are brought into a process

of political dialogue between the traditionally hostile states, they create pressure on

negotiators. The negotiators on either side are usually not technical personnel. They

are in the form of a delegation of Pakistan's Foreign Office meeting with a similar

Indian delegation. I do not recall reading names of any lawyers, navy personnel or

President of Pakistan PM of IndiaPolitical Consensus

2–3 days’working rounds

Reservations / Delay

Foreign OfficeMinistry of

External Affairs

Experts ExpertsMore time to discusstechnical alternatives

President of Pakistan PM of IndiaPresident of Pakistan PM of IndiaPolitical ConsensusPolitical Consensus

2–3 days’working rounds

Reservations / Delay

Foreign OfficeMinistry of

External AffairsForeign OfficeForeign Office

Ministry ofExternal Affairs

Ministry ofExternal Affairs

Experts ExpertsExpertsExperts ExpertsExpertsMore time to discusstechnical alternatives

More time to discusstechnical alternatives

Management of Peace Process


96

5water experts in the negotiation teams from either side. Resultantly, the onus of

decision in talks and their consequences, have to be borne by the current team. The

present composition of members in both the delegations, would be hesitant to agree

to a political solution that runs down the technical side of the issue. Each technical or

legal element of the issue has legal consequences and the negotiators fear

inadvertently destroying the consequences that may favour their respective state.

Further, in all these three issues in particular, failure is measurable. Any critic can

later point out to a specific provision of the relevant text and argue that the

negotiating team has compromised on a favourable point.

Another problem is that if only the technical personnel get involved, they face

pressure of a different nature. As a lawyer or a water specialist, one is reasonably

familiar with the extent of genuineness in a particular issue and, in certain cases, a

negotiator may be willing to yield. But when the negotiation becomes part of a

political process of `composite dialogue', the technical negotiators are reluctant to

even accept the genuine claims of the adversary in view of the charged up political

atmosphere. The reference to `expert level talks', often implies replacing a set of

diplomats with a set of bureaucrats from the relevant ministries. These bureaucrats

may be running the affairs of the concerned ministry but they are not `experts'. Thus

one finds further delays in talks.

It is expected that both the delegations participating in the dialogue process

are equipped on the technical side of the issues and would be in a position to take

immediate decisions during the actual process of the dialogue instead of deferring the

issue for technical input. For example, it is the political component of the dialogue

process to discuss whether Wullar barrage should be build or not. If yes, then the

technical component of the dialogue process has to be initiated which would require

interpretation of the applicable treaty and technical specifications would take over.

Are the delegation mobilised enough to go through the technical exercise within a day

or two so as to conclude the agenda item? Most likely not. This would be a delaying

factor.

In view of the above, it is clear that the `management of the talks' is an

important issue particularly in respect of these three issues. The experts’ input must

be obtained first, with several alternatives. It should be done before the diplomats

from both the sides meet. The diplomats should make a political choice from the

technically approved alternatives, whereas it is often the other way around. The

diplomats or the foreign secretaries, arrive at a political decision first and later refer

the briefs downwards asking for technical and legal justifications. When the experts

try and match the political decision with the technical justification, it is the political

decision that requires re-alignment and the matter is referred back to the parties and

they end up accusing one another.

For example, a political decision for demilitarisation of Siachen is being

discussed between Mr. Tariq Aziz (from Pakistan side) and Mr Dixit (from Indian 6side) . Assume that both agree to the withdrawal of the troops recognising that it


97 98

construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.’4. Such as India shall forego a General Storage capacity of 30,000acre feet. Water level in the

barrage will be allowed to retain the full operational level of 5177.90 feet. The timing of filling

the lake shall be decided by the Indus Water Commissioners. Any other changes shall be done

with mutual consent.5. Although in separate talks between both the sides at least on two issues the specialist

participate. For example extensive technical exchange takes place under the Indus Water Treaty

mechanism. Likewise, on the Sir Creek, navy representatives from both the sides have meet

frequently. 6. As reported in daily Dawn, Pakistan, 29 and 30 September, 2004.

Siachen Issue Indian Position

Pakistan’s Position

would not prejudice legal positions of either party. When the broad agreement is

referred back to experts in both the states, they may come up with their own

independent formulations to be incorporated into the text of the agreement. These

formulations would become extremely crucial when the issue is revisited for eventual

settlement. What language should be used to describe the occupation? What

proposition to frame to signify the entire dispute? Eventually what would happen is

that despite political will, there would be disagreement on the technical language of

the agreement recording the withdrawal. Instead, it would be more productive if the

concerned interlocutors have already tasked experts to put in various alternatives of

draft language. They may then simply negotiate the existing draft texts and conclude

the talks.

Political will to resolve these disputes should not be confused with political

resolution of these issues. Will to settle all issues in a composite dialogue must mean

to undertake a meaningful and thorough process of experts input (involving various

alternatives), which must run simultaneous to the peace process and be part of it.

That would be a more dependable way towards a sustained dialogue which would

bring out specific results.

(Ahmer Bilal Soofi

has worked as Consultant to several UN bodies and has advised the Government on

several international treaties.)

End Notes1. Article III (1) ‘Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of western rivers

which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions of para 2’. 2. Article II. ‘all the waters of Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of

India…’3. Article III (4), ‘Except as provided in Annexures D & E, India shall not store any water of, or

is a Senior Partner of a Commercial Law Firm in Lahore. Mr. Soofi

Suggested Way Forward

Experts

Ministry of External Affairs

Ministry of External Affairs

Experts

PM of India

Foreign Office

President of Pakistan Political Discussions

Discussion on

2–3 days’ working rounds

Technical Alternatives


99

Indian PositionIndian Position

Pak positionPak position

200 miles EEZ200 miles EEZ

Sir Creek

Wullar Barrage / Tulbul Navigation Project


100

Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies

Bharat Bhushan

he resolution of the disputes over Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage, the TSir Creek boundary and the Siachen conflict can help change the parameters of

India-Pakistan relations, enabling them to move forward on the more difficult issue of

Kashmir. That this is not an impossible task has been evident for quite some time. But

the two neighbours have been engaged in such one up-manship that nobody wants to

give an inch even if the consequent peace dividend is evident.

India and Pakistan have, in the past, come fairly close to agreements on the

Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage dispute and the Siachen conflict. Just as

nations deserve the political leadership they get, they also inherit their lack of vision

from one generation to the next. Besides, successive weak governments in Islamabad

and New Delhi have been forced to retreat from possible solutions lest they are seen

as compromises. Only strong and popular governments can give concessions and be

sure that they are not seen as compromising the national interest.

In a sense this article presents virtually nothing new. What it does, however,

is to put together the various aspects of three of the less intractable disputes between

the two countries and suggests not specific ways of resolving them but of surrounding

them with measures to build confidence thereby making them amenable to resolution.

I. The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage DisputeThis dispute is over the Indian proposal to construct a barrage on the Jhelum River

downstream from the Wullar Lake in Jammu & Kashmir. The project itself, in a sense,

goes back to 1912. The then government of Punjab had approached the Maharaja of

Kashmir seeking permission to construct a barrage on Wullar Lake. In 1924, the

Punjab government renewed the proposal offering Rs. 1.85 lakh as annual royalty. The

Maharaja, however, rejected the proposal as he was apprehensive that the

construction of the barrage might lead to water-logging in Sopore and Baramulla.

The current dispute, though, arises from Pakistan viewing the construction of

a barrage on the Wullar as a storage work. Islamabad refers to it as the Wullar

Barrage dispute while India, which sees the project as an attempt to make the Jhelum

navigable, calls it the Tulbul Navigation Project. The name Tulbul comes from a

village at the western tip of the town of Sopore, although when the project was started

by India in 1980 the site was shifted to Ningli, on the eastern side of Sopore which

was nearer to the Wullar.


101 102

Pakistan's contention is that a barrage at the mouth of the Wullar is a

contravention of the Indus Water Treaty. The 1960 Treaty assigned the unrestricted

use of the eastern rivers of the Indus basin (including Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) to India

and of the western rivers (including Chenab, Indus and Jhelum) to Pakistan.

It, however, permitted India the limited use of the western rivers for

domestic and agricultural use, run-of-the-river hydroelectric generation and any non-

consumptive use that did not diminish the water flow to Pakistan. The Treaty also

permitted India limited storage of water of the western rivers -- a general storage

capacity of 300,000 acre feet on the various channels of the Jhelum (excluding

Jhelum Main) and 10,000 acre feet on the Jhelum Main itself.

Controlling water for navigation is a permissible activity under the Indus

Water Treaty. The Indian position is that the Tulbul Navigation Project is neither an

act of storage nor of impounding the waters of the Jhelum, but of controlling the flow

for navigation. The project would leave the volume of water flowing to Pakistan intact.

India maintains that the project would, in fact, help regulate the water flow in the

Jhelum and would benefit power projects downstream both in the Indian side as well

as Pakistani side of Jammu & Kashmir.

The problem of navigation in the Jhelum arises in the lean season from

October to February. During this period, the flow of water in the river is 2,000 cubic

feet per second and its depth is about 2.5 feet. This cannot support navigation.

Around the year navigability requires double the flow and depth -- hence the barrage

that would make the river navigable from between Sopore and Baramula.

The work on the barrage began in 1984 but was stopped in 1987 by the Rajiv

Gandhi government after Pakistan protested. Many in India believe that stopping

construction was a mistake and that the decision was taken by Rajiv Gandhi to please

Benazir Bhutto. Since then there have been ten rounds of secretary-level talks

between India and Pakistan to settle the Tulbul/Wullar Barrage dispute bilaterally.

The last round was held in the first week of August, 2004. Although matters have not

proceeded apace since then, the basic draft agreement on the dispute had been arrived

at in October 1991.

Initially, the barrage was to be gated. After Pakistan's objections, it was

decided to un-gate it. This is reflected in the stipulations of the 1991 draft agreement.

In the agreement the two sides agreed that: (a) India would keep 6.2 meters of the

barrage un-gated with a crest level at EL 1574.90 metres; (b) India would not make

any alteration in the salient features of the project without mutual agreement between

the two countries; (c) India shall forego the general storage capacity of 30,000 acre

feet out of the provision permitted to it on the Jhelum (excluding Jhelum Main); (d)

in return for this, the water level in the barrage will be allowed to attain the full

operational level of 5177.90 feet -- the timing of the filling of the lake will be decided

by the two Indus Water Commissioners and, should they fail to reach an agreement,

the filling of the lake would be between June 21 and August 20; (e) except for the

stipulation regarding the filling of the lake, India would let all the waters entering the

Wullar Lake downstream; and (f) all differences will be settled under the provisions

of the Indus Water Treaty.

Later, in addition to the above, Pakistan demanded that India forego the

construction of the 390 MW Kishenganga hydroelectric project. Its argument was that

this project would affect Pakistan's proposed Neelum-Jhelum power project. New

Delhi did not give any such commitment. The 1991 draft was reproduced verbatim in

the non-papers handed over to Pakistan by India in 1994. During the 1998 composite

dialogue, the Pakistani delegation had apparently insisted on starting the talks afresh

but then agreed to pick up the threads from the 1991 draft.

By the time the latest round of talks took place in August 2004, the Pakistani

position seems to have hardened with Islamabad insisting that India gave up the

project. New Delhi is of the view that there are two reasons for this: One, Pakistan has

decided that no deviation from the Indus Water Treaty was acceptable to it; and two,

wherever Pakistan can prevent India from taking up a project in Jammu and Kashmir

it has decided to do so as a signal to the Kashmiris that Islamabad can exercise a veto.

II. Boundary Dispute along the Sir CreekWhenever India and Pakistan begin to normalise ties, they begin by releasing

fishermen and fishing boats seized by them for crossing over into their respective

territorial waters. These fishermen and their boats are seized along the un-

demarcated border of the Gujarat Coast.

This dispute of an un-demarcated boundary along the Arabian Sea and the

Rann of Kutch straddling Paksitan's Sindh province and the Indian state of Gujarat is

not limited only to fishermen and fishing. In August 1999, a Pakistani Atlantique

surveillance aircraft was shot down by the Indian Air Force in the Rann of Kutch. New

Delhi claimed that the Atlantique was on a spying mission and had violated India's

airspace. The ten sailors and six crew members on board the aircraft died. India

claimed that the debris fell two kilometres within its territory and Pakistan made a

contrary claim. However, as it turned out, it actually fell on both sides of the border.

The next day when the Indian Air Force tried taking a group of journalists to

the site where the debris had fallen, Pakistan apparently retaliated by firing on the

Indian helicopters ferrying the media personnel. Pakistan's claim was that its ground-

to-air missiles were aimed at the Indian fighter jets accompanying the helicopters

which were apparently in violation of their airspace. The shooting down of the

Atalntique was taken by Islamabad to the International Court of Justice. The verdict

eventually came in India's favour i.e., the court accepted that India was justified in

shooting down the intruding aircraft.

There is both an international border as well as an un-demarcated border in

the Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan. The incident of the Atalantique

surveillance aircraft being shot down took place over the clearly demarcated

international boundary -- to the north-east of the un-demarcated one. The 1965 India-

Pakistan war also began in the Rann of Kutch.


103

The Sir Creek dispute, as the name indicates, is about the un-demarcated

boundary because of the claims and counterclaims of India and Pakistan. The dispute

is about a tidal channel called Sir Creek -- a 38 km estuary in the marshes of the Rann

of Kutch. The boundary along this tidal channel between India and Pakistan has not

been delimited.

There are two issues involved in the dispute -- the delimitation of the

boundary along the creek and the demarcation of the maritime boundary from the

mouth of the creek seawards in the Arabian Sea. The dispute is complicated by

Pakistan linking its resolution with the Kashmir issue and its refusal to separate the

resolution of the land boundary along the creek from demarcation of the maritime

boundary. Without demarcating the maritime boundary, neither India nor Pakistan

can exploit the ocean resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone (up to 200 nautical

miles). As this area adjoins Bombay High where India has been exploiting sub-sea oil

and gas deposits, there is some expectation of similar reserves in the adjoining

disputed area.

Legend has it that the Sir Creek dispute began much before Indian

independence in 1908 between the ruler of Sind and the Rao of Kutch over a pile of

firewood lying on the banks of Kori Creek to the east of Sir Creek, which divided the

two principalities. The dispute was referred to the British government in Bombay

which gave its ruling in 1914 through a resolution which had a map attached to it. Up

to the 1960s, the dispute remained unresolved but was dormant. Then Pakistan began

claiming that half of Rann of Kutch along the 24th parallel belonged to it. The 1965

war that began in the Rann of Kutch followed this claim. The boundary dispute was

referred to the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal. The tribunal was

chaired by a Swedish judge, Gunnar Lagergren and comprised two others -- Ales

Bebler of Yugoslavia (Indian nominee) and Nasorallah Intezam of Iran (Pakistan's

nominee).

The two sides agreed before the tribunal that their dispute should be limited

only to the boundary to the north. There was some agreement on the boundary to the

south, which began at the head of Sir Creek and moved eastwards along the 24th

parallel. India claimed that after moving eastwards for a short distance, the boundary

turned sharply north at a right angle to meet the northern boundary of the Rann.

Pakistan, on the other hand, claimed that it went on straight eastwards along the 24th

parallel. The tribunal gave its award on February 19, 1968. It rejected Pakistan's claim

that the border between Gujarat and Sindh should run roughly along the 24th parallel

beginning at the head of Sir Creek, moving eastwards from there. This would have

involved dividing the Rann in the middle and transferring about 3,500 sq miles of

territory from India to Pakistan.

The tribunal upheld India's claim that the boundary line from the head of the

Sir Creek went a short distance eastwards, then turned northwards at a right angle

and then ran along the northern edge of the Rann (see map at the end of the article).

This northern edge had also formed the boundary between the British Indian state of

Sindh and the Kutch state before 1947. As a result of the tribunal broadly accepting


104

the Indian contention, only about 300 sq miles of territory was awarded to Pakistan.

The decision was accepted by both India and Pakistan.

This still left the boundary of the Sir Creek -- from its head in the marshy

lands of the Rann to its mouth in the Arabian Sea -- and the maritime boundary

between India and Pakistan un-demarcated. India and Pakistan had agreed not to

refer this part of the un-demarcated boundary for adjudication to the tribunal.

Because of this understanding between the parties, the tribunal had noted that it had

not taken into consideration the boundary along the Sir Creek.

The dispute has festered since then. As a result, it is not possible for India

and Pakistan to distinguish between their territorial waters (the zone up to 12 nautical

miles, where states enjoy exclusive rights and can restrict passage of foreign boats),

their contiguous zones (up to 24 nautical miles, where states can enforce custom and

fiscal laws, fisheries laws and ban acts prejudicial to the state) or their Exclusive

Economic Zones (up to 200 nautical miles extendable to 350 nautical miles for

countries with continental shelf).

Pakistan's contention is that the boundary along the Sir Creek must lie along

the eastern edge of the creek. India believes that the boundary should be along the

middle of the creek; that it should be demarcated using the 'thalweg' or the mid-

channel principle ('thal'- valley, 'weg' - way). The 'thalweg' principle lays down that

boundaries along a river or a valley must lie along the line connecting the deepest

points along a river channel or the lowest points along the valley floor. The case for a

mid-channel boundary is based on the Sir Creek being a navigable channel

throughout the year. Pakistan's contention is that the creek is not navigable and,

therefore, the mid-channel principle does not apply.

India and Pakistan both refer to the 1914 resolution of the Bombay

government about the dispute between Sindh and Kutch over the Kori Creek and the

map attached to it. The map shows a green line running along the eastern edge of Sir

Creek on the Kutch side and Pakistan claims that this was the boundary between

Sindh and Kutch. This was the map that India had relied on prior to the constitution

of the India-Paksitan Western Boundary Case Tribunal.

However, in 1958 Pakistan had itself admitted that this map was 'intended no

more than an annexure to the Bombay Government resolution'. This resolution,

according to veteran lawyer and analyst A. G. Noorani, has a reference to the Indian

government's 'sanction' on November 11, 1913, of the Kutch-Sindh compromise over

Kori Creek, which had been spelt out by the Bombay government in a letter of

September 20, 1913. The letter referred to the line on the attached map 'from the

mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek.'

The letter also quoted the Sindh Commissioner as saying, '... the Sir Creek

changes its course from time to time and the western boundary of the area, which it is

proposed to surrender to the Rao [of Kutch] should, therefore, be described as “the

centre of the navigable channel of the Sir Creek”.' This is seen as support for the


105 106

Indian contention. The Secretary to the Bombay government commented on this,

saying: 'I am to explain that the term 'navigable' is really inappropriate in the larger

sense. The creek is, of course, tidal, and it is only at certain conditions of the tide that

the channel is navigable and then only to the country craft as the point from which the

proposed boundary turns due east from the creek.' Noorani concludes, 'This is not a

rejection of the Sindh Commissioner's condition but essentially an acceptance of it.'

Today, the Sir Creek does not flow as shown in the 1914 map. It has shifted

westwards i.e., towards Pakistan. However, the head of the creek, as it existed then, is

marked by a boundary pillar, called Western Terminal -- it was from this point that

some 38 pillars marked the horizontal boundary eastwards. Pakistan neither

recognises the existence of the Western Terminal nor the pillar-based horizontal

boundary eastwards. Pakistan's contention is that the eastward boundary should be

based on the dotted line as drawn in the 1914 map. This line is below the boundary

marked by the pillars. The contentious question is: What should be recognised -- the

pillars on the ground or the line on the 1914 map? In the current climate, neither

country is willing to concede territory.

So the dispute remains where it was -- with Pakistan insisting on the left

bank of the creek and the dotted line on the 1914 map as the boundary and India

insisting on the mid-channel of the creek and the pillars to the east as the boundary.

Meanwhile, under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLS) both

countries have to bring their Maritime Zone laws in consonance with it by defining

their base-line points to define their maritime boundary and its co-ordinates have to

be deposited with the UN. Islamabad has, in an attempt to define its maritime

boundary along the eastern edge of the Sir Creek in the 1914 map up to a point on an

Indian low tide elevation. This would allow Pakistan not only to claim the Sir Creek

entirely but even the Pir Sinai Creek to its east. This would not be acceptable to India

and this claim is likely to be protested against.

India also has to deposit its baseline point co-ordinates with the UN. Once it

does so, Pakistan may also object to the manner in which India defines its baseline

point. There would be no way out but bilateral negotiations, provided for in UNCLS to

sort this out. Why is this of any significance? Although the area under dispute along

the Sir Creek is estimated to be only about six to seven square miles, it also involves as

much as 250 sq. miles of ocean and ocean floor. If the boundary was moved by, say,

one kilometre along the coastline, it could translate into the loss of a few hundreds of

square kilometres of the Exclusive Economic Zone in an area which could be rich in

oil and natural gas. The issue, therefore, not only concerns land claims but also sub-

sea resources. Both Indian and Pakistani experts believe that the Sir Creek dispute is

amenable to a solution. But their governments have been intransigent and there has

been no real progress on the ground.

There are two simple ways of increasing cooperation between India and

Pakistan in the Sir Creek area: One, by decreasing the area in dispute by settling those

parts which are easier to resolve and leaving the more intractable parts for later; two,

by leaving the boundary question aside for the time being and exploring cooperation

in the non-boundary related areas which would have a direct and fruitful bearing on

the disputed area in the long run.

To reduce the area of the dispute, India has proposed the median or the

equidistant method where the demarcation of the maritime boundary would begin

from the seaward side. This would involve taking a point 200 nautical miles from both

Indian and Pakistani coasts and moving the point forward by drawing an equidistant

line towards the coast. This series of equidistant points or equidistant line can move

up to an agreed point towards the coast -- perhaps 50 nautical miles from the coast.

This would help demarcate the boundary along the better part of the Exclusive

Economic Zone of the two countries and leaving the boundary near the coast

undefined for the time being (see map at end of article).

This proposal has not been accepted by Pakistan. If the equidistant principle

is not accepted by Pakistan, India may even be willing to take its baseline point on the

coast and the Indian baseline point and use the trinagulation method to mark the

boundary up to a certain mutually acceptable distance (say, 50 nautical miles once

again) and narrow down the differences on the maritime boundary.

The second way out, some experts have suggested, is to temporarily set aside

the boundary dispute and explore cooperative ventures in the region. The fishermen's

unions in Gujarat and Sindh have suggested licensed joint fishing with quantity

restrictions. They point out precedents for sharing border resources. The fish in Lake

Victoria breed in the territorial waters of Kenya but then go off to Ugandan waters but

this fact can be used to prevent the Kenyan fisherman from access to this resource,

they point out. India and Sri Lanka have already agreed to declare their border

fisheries a joint resource. The joint fishing licenses that the fishermen's unions of

Sindh and Gujarat in India suggest could be photo-identity cards issued by the

coastguards and the fishermen's unions jointly on either side. This would prevent

unnecessary harassment of fishermen whose unions, in fact, enjoy excellent fraternal

ties.

Some experts have also suggested that, since the marine environment of

India and Pakistan along the Sindh and Gujarat coasts are closely linked, the two

countries could conduct cooperative environmental studies and share data. These

could, for example, relate to oil spills or preservation of mangroves.

Oil spills in this region are bound to go up over time as it is estimated that by

the year 2007 nearly 50 per cent of India's oil imports would be through ports along

this coast. In 2002, when an oil tanker broke near Karachi Port, the first thing that the

Pakistani authorities did was to inform India of the oil spill and the danger it may

pose to its marine environment. Pollution caused by oil and heavy metals seeping into

the sea from ship-breaking activities have damaged marine life and also caused

environmental concern in this area. The loss of coral reefs and mangroves due to

pollution along the Gulf of Kutch has led to cyclones hitting the mainland with

undiminished fury. Experts have also suggested that India and Pakistan should jointly


107

study the threats to these mangroves and coral reefs. A mechanism for carrying out

these studies already exists under the South Asian Seas Action Plan of which both

India and Pakistan are signatories.

III. The Dispute over 'Mountain Rose'Siachen is the world's highest battlefield with gunfire being exchanged at 16,000 to

20,000 feet above sea level. Nine out of ten deaths on the Siachen are due to climate

with only one being combat-related. It is no wonder then that the Siachen dispute

between India and Pakistan is described as one of the most futile and wasteful in the

world both in material and human terms.

The defence secretaries of India and Pakistan have met eight times to discuss

the Siachen dispute in an attempt to resolve it -- their last meeting being in August

2004. Twice the two sides came close to settling the dispute but the political climate

was perhaps not right to reach a settlement. The solutions proposed include

demilitarisation of the glacier and of creating a 'Zone of Disengagement'. However,

mutual lack of trust has prevented a resolution of the dispute.

Siachen invokes strong passions in both India and Pakistan. It is the stuff of

legends. It was for the brand rub-off offered by it that former Defence Minister of

India George Fernandez visited the Glacier often on New Year's Eve or Christmas. For

most Indians Siachen, symbolises unparalleled gallantry, bravery and a commitment

to protect national interest. This was why the nation was shocked to know that last

year some army officers had fabricated video evidence of fake encounters with

Pakistani soldiers in the Siachen area to secure gallantry awards.

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf's 'Siachen consciousness' is

also very high. In September, 1987, as brigade commander of the Special Services

Group, he was responsible for leading an attack on an Indian position at Bilafond La,

one of the two main passes on the Soltoro ridge (the other being Sia La - 'La' means a

mountain pass) to the Siachen Glacier from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. His

forces had to retreat. Having also served as Pakistan's Commander of Northern Areas,

he knows the Siachen dispute intimately.

Although the boundary dispute between India and Pakistan in this region is

referred to as the Siachen dispute, the Siachen Glacier is in fact under Indian control.

There is no battle raging on the glacier itself. Indian soldiers sit on the Soltoro ridge to

the west of the Siachen Glacier (see map at end of article). Between the Pakistani

forces and the Glacier, therefore, there are high mountain peaks controlled by India.

The Siachen Glacier flows in the valley formed by the Soltoro ridge to its west

and the Eastern Karakorams. It is about 72 km long from its highest point at Indira

Col to its snout. It gets its name from the wild mountain roses that grow near its

snout. Siachen is the source of the Nubra River that meets the Shyok River,

originating from the Eastern Karakorams, at Thois. Later, it feeds into the Indus.

Militarily, the Siachen Glacier can be divided into three parts. The Northern

Glacier is the most difficult, containing the highest peaks. The Central part is where


108

the glacier is broadest -- up to 20 km wide and this is where India has its Kumar Post

from where expeditions are launched to the various Soltoro peaks. The Southern

Glacier is narrow -- only four to five km wide. Helicopters maintain the entire

Northern and Central Glacier while ponies and porters supply the Southern Glacier.

There are stretches of a fair-weather road that also services the glacier.

The Indian army has taken 105 mm field guns to the glacier to support the

peaks. They had to be knocked down for transport and reassembled. They are

deployed at the lower end of the Northern glacier and in the Southern glacier. The

Base Camp has 130 mm and the Bofors 155 mm guns. The difficulty in using field

guns on the glacier arises from shifting ice which moves by about two inches a day in

winters and 10 to 20 feet a day in summer. Registering a target and using the

calculations to shoot after even a couple of days will not guarantee a hit because of

shifting gun positions. At present three battalions of the Indian army are deployed in

the Siachen region -- one each in the northern, central and southern parts of the

glacier. At any point of time three battalions are deployed, three are in training and

three awaiting orders. The soldiers manning the observation posts on the Soltoro and

the camps have to be relieved every 30 days to three months.

The estimates of the costs of hostilities on Siachen vary. Lt. General (Retd) V.

R. Raghavan in his definitive work 'Siachen - Conflict without end' says: 'No one has

an accurate assessment, but everyone has a figure to quote and a point to make.'

Without endorsing any estimate, he quotes cost figures ranging from US $ 1.2 million

per day for both India and Pakistan; US$ 1.94 million a day for India alone; and Rs.

2.5 crore to Rs. 6.5 crore for India alone to US$ 18.5 million a day for Pakistan and

thirty times that for India. Pakistan's former foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan once

said that the cost of a roti (bread) for a Pakistani soldier posted in that region is more

than Rs. 450. George Fernandes told the Indian Parliament that Siachen costs the

exchequer Rs. three crore per day.

The Siachen dispute originated because the boundary in Jammu & Kashmir,

after the Karachi Agreement of 1949, was not fully demarcated. A ceasefire line (CFL)

on the map ended at a grid point with co-ordinates NJ-9842 on the Soltoro ridge. This

was near the northern-most point where troops were deployed when the fighting

ended in 1948. Although the CFL subsequently changed into the Line of Control

(LoC) after the Simla Agreement of 1972, its end points remained the same.

The descriptive explanation of the boundary beyond NJ-9842 -- 'thence

North to the Glaciers' -- has created confusion. India believes that this means that the

boundary would go north through the nearest watershed, the Soltoro ridge. Pakistan

draws a straight line from NJ-9842 going northeast to the Karakoram pass. The

former interpretation gives the control of the Glacier to India, the latter, to Pakistan.

In 1978, the Indian army became aware of maps showing the LoC as a

straight line extended from NJ-9842 to the Karakoram pass appearing in publications

abroad. The same year an Indian army mountaineering expedition led by Colonel N.

Kumar, brought back evidence of foreign mountaineering expeditions being launched


109 110

into the Siachen area from Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Kumar's expedition also did not go unnoticed. Both sides were convinced that

the other was trying to establish a military presence in the area. New Delhi and

Islamabad began exchanging protest notes asking the other to desist from entering its

territory. It was then that India realised that Pakistan was behind the extension of NJ-

9842 to the Karakoram pass, claiming the Siachen glacier. India objected to this

'cartographic aggression' as it meant Pakistan claiming territory up to the Karakoram

pass and preparing the ground for involving China in the India-Pakistan dispute.

The Indian Army believed that the choice before it was either to be blind to

this activity or pre-empt Pakistan. In late 1983, India had intelligence that Pakistan

was also purchasing large quantities of high altitude gear and its troops were planning

to occupy the passes leading to the Siachen Glacier. Two months before the

mountaineering season was to begin in April 1984, India airlifted two platoons of

Kumaon Regiment and placed them on the two key passes of Bilafond La and Sia La

on the Soltoro ridge. Pakistan had been effectively pre-empted. Both India and

Pakistan see geo-political compulsions in fighting for Siachen. In 1963, Pakistan ceded

4,500 sq km of Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley to the west of the Karakorams, to China

because it wanted a border with China. But India believes that the disputed territory

of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir was not Islamabad's to give away.

India, therefore, did not recognise this settlement. However, New Delhi came to know

of the Chinese activities in the area only a decade after China had built the Aksai Chin

highway passing through it. The belated Indian presence on the Soltoro ridge abutting

the Shaksgam Valley seeks to question the Sino-Pakistan 'border settlement'.

If there is no military presence on the Soltoro ridge, Indian military experts

argue, then India would be blind to any activity inimical to its interests in and around

the Soltoro ridge, in the eastern Karakorams and in what the Indian Army calls 'Sub-

sector North' abutting the eastern Karakorams but contiguous to the Shaksgam

Valley. Satellite pictures and air surveillance, they argue, provide only images but it is

physical observation which indicates an adversary's intent. Initially, the Siachen

conflict was also justified in terms of countering a threat to Ladakh from Pakistani

forces coming down the Nubra Valley via Siachen. This is now considered logistically

unviable.

That Siachen rankles in the Pakistani mind is evident from the fact that the

Kargil misadventure, some in Pakistan claim, was aimed at undoing the Indian

takeover of Siachen. One of its objectives apparently was to snatch Siachen from India

by cutting off the Srinagar-Leh highway.

India and Pakistan have held eight rounds of talks on the Siachen dispute.

They apparently came close to resolving the dispute in 1989 and then again in 1992.

These attempts were unsuccessful because of two reasons: first, Pakistan wants India

to withdraw to pre-Simla positions by vacating the Soltoro ridge but wants to retain

its own military positions claiming that they are pre-1971; and second, to keep up the

myth of engaging India on the Siachen glacier, it refuses to exchange maps marking

the present ground positions. These would show that Pakistan is nowhere near the

Siachen glacier and that its posts on the Soltoro are at much lower heights (9,000 to

15,000 feet) than India's.

Was there really a settlement in the offing in 1989? American scholar Robert

Wirsig has claimed that India made six proposals to Pakistan in 1989: cessation of

cartographic aggression by Pakistan (i.e. extending the LoC from NJ-9842 northeast

to the Karakoram pass); establishing a demilitarised zone at the Siachen glacier;

exchanging maps to show present positions on the ground; delimiting the border

beyond NJ-9842 towards the China border based on ground realities; formulating

ground rules for future military stand-off - a measure of last resort; and redeploying

Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Pakistan apparently countered this with two alternative proposals:

deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions held at the

time of the 1971 ceasefire (pre-Simla positions); and only then, the delimitation of an

extension of the LoC beyond NJ-9842.

There were differences over which should come first -- delimitation or the

redeployment of forces. Re-deployment was seen as entirely an Indian withdrawal

with Pakistan staying put. India was unwilling to accept demilitarisation to mean only

an Indian pullout.

The sixth round of Siachen talks in 1992 also raised hopes for a solution.

India claimed that there was a broad understanding on the redeployment of Indian

and Pakistani troops and on creating a 'Zone of Disengagement' on either side of the

Soltoro ridgeline -- although Pakistan was still unwilling to mark its current

deployment on a map indicating the ground reality before disengagement. Whatever

hopes that Indian officials had for a settlement even then were dashed when they

approached the political leadership. The Zone of Disengagement Plan did not find

political acceptance with Narasimha Rao's minority government.

In the seventh round of talks in November 1998, India referred only to the

Soltoro range with no mention of the Siachen glacier. The proposal for a Zone of

Disengagement was also dropped.

The 1998 proposals, instead, suggested a comprehensive ceasefire along the

Soltoro region based on a freeze of the ground positions; discussions of the modalities

of ceasefire in a definite time-frame; bilateral mechanisms for the ceasefire including

flag meetings and hotlines between divisional commanders; and authenticating the

existing position on the Soltoro range beyond NJ-9842. Pakistan rejected the

proposals. The Indian position had clearly hardened in the face of Pakistan's refusal to

recognise the ground reality.

The army has the dominant say in the Siachen dispute. The Indian army's

position is that there should be no asymmetrical redeployment of troops. There is no

glacier on the Pakistani side. To climb up the Soltoro peaks Pakistani army does not


111

have to traverse a glacier - just mountaineering is enough. If there is a pullback by the

Indian army to say, Leh or Turtuk but the Pakistanis stay in Skardu; then they can

occupy the key positions on the Soltoro ridge in ten days' time. It would take India

three to four months to do that.

Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, has apparently assured

India that, should demilitarisation take place, his army would not reoccupy the crucial

passes on the Soltoro ridge. However, after Pakistan's Kargil misadventure, his

assurances are likely to be taken with a pinch of salt in India. All the same, the two

sides have agreed to engage in a military-to-military dialogue to explore ways of

disengaging from the Siachen Glacier and this may be a movement forward.

There have also been proposals for converting the Siachen Glacier area into a

science park -- an environmental zone, jointly managed by both India and Paksitan.

However, till such time as the entire area is demilitarised without either side feeling

defeated, these proposals can only remain pipedreams.

IV. ConclusionThere are some disputes between nations that have the potential of being addressed

relatively easily but they get linked with bigger disputes and seem intractable. Yet, if

these smaller contentious issues were analytically separated from the bigger ones and

resolved, they could have a positive impact on the prospect of solving the bigger

disputes.

The Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage dispute is easily resolvable

and there even exists a draft agreement on it. If, in return for allowing the project,

Islamabad wants its pound of flesh in terms of a greater share of water from the

Indus, it can bring such a proposal to the table. Obduracy would neither be in the

interests of the people of Jammu & Kashmir nor of improving Indo-Pak relations.

Similarly, in the Sir Creek area, solutions or at least half-way houses are

possible. As a small beginning, after the foreign secretary level talks of June 2004, the

two sides have agreed to send a team to survey the boundary pillars east of head of the

Sir Creek. This may not seem like much progress but it is a small co-operative step

forward and should be viewed positively. In the case of the Siachen dispute, the

political leadership both in Pakistan and in India seems far too weak at present to sell

a complete solution to their people. The glacier, many people in India and Pakistan

believe, has no strategic significance and its militarisation is the result of competing

and irrational nationalisms. This irrationalism as well as competition needs to be

downscaled. The disengagement in the Soltoro region would be a good beginning but

this requires a decisive leadership both in India and Pakistan.

The status of Jammu & Kashmir is arguably the biggest contentious issue

between India and Pakistan. There are some who argue that unless the Kashmir issue

is addressed adequately nothing significant can be achieved between India and

Pakistan. However, unless the overall atmosphere is improved between the two

countries, a compromise on Kashmir would be difficult to sell for either Islamabad or

New Delhi.


112

The need, therefore, is to change the parameters of the problem. Once its

dimensions are changed -- for example by surrounding it with agreements on the

relatively less difficult disputes between the two countries -- then psychologically at

least Kashmir may not seem as intractable as it does now. On the other hand, if both

India and Pakistan harden their stands on even the smaller disputes, engaging on

Kashmir would become disproportionately difficult.

(Bharat Bhushan is the Editor of The Telegraph in Delhi. The views expressed in this

article are his and do not represent the views of the newspaper. Mr. Bhushan may be

contacted at [email protected])

Author’s Note: This article is largely based on a series of news reports that I wrote in the

Hindustan Times (November 9-12, 1998) and for The Telegraph (December 18, 2003 and

August 1, 2004) and a paper, 'India's Maritime Boundaries - The Case of Sir Creek, presented

at the Media and Conflict workshop organised by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights

(SAFHR) in Kathmandu, Nepal in September, 2003.

BibliographylA. G. Noorani, 'CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek, and Wullar Barrage', in

Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak Manohar (eds.), Crisis Prevention, Confidence

Building, And Reconciliation in South Asia, (New Delhi: 1996).lBharat Bhushan, 'Tulbul Navigation Project: With Political Will, Dispute Can be

easily Resolved', The Hindustan Times, (October 5, 1998).lGaurav Rajen, 'Strengthening Regional Security in South Asia: Cooperative

Monitoring in Coastal Regions', Faultlines, Volume 14, 2001.lBharat Bhushan, 'Sir Creek: Dividing Up Swamps and Seas. Issue mired in maps

and methodology', The Hindustan Times, (October 9, 1998).lBharat Bhushan, 'Fisherfolk float formula to bridge the Creek', The Telegraph,

(December 18, 2003).lRobert G Wirsing, 'The Siachen Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle it?' Indian

Defence Review, (July, 1991).lBharat Bhushan, 'High-altitude war that is most wasteful and futile', 'Peace and

tranquility' in Siachen possible,' The Hindustan Times, (October 6, 1998).

Lt. Gen. (Retd) V. R. Raghavan, Siachen Conflict Without End, (India: Viking,

2002).lPraful Bidwai, 'Siachen Impasse, Meter of Destruction Keeps Ticking,' The Times

of India, (11 November, 1998)lK. L. Biringer, 'Siachen Science Center: A Concept for Cooperation at the Top of

the World'. Occassional Paper, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National

Laboratories, USA, 1998.lNiranjan D. Gulhati, Indus Water Treaty, (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1973).


113 114

PakistanAdministeredKashmir

Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir


115

Regionalism Debate: Dr Saman Kelegama

and Ratnakar Adhikari

I. Introduction Trade liberalisation can follow various tracks -- unilateral, bilateral, regional and

multilateral. There is a growing consensus among a large segment of stakeholders that

multilateral trade liberalisation is the first best option not least because of the

reciprocity and multilateralisation of concessions (so called most-favoured nations

principle), where each country has an equal chance of gaining from trade

liberalisation initiatives of other countries. However, the progress of the WTO over

the last 10 years clearly indicates that trade liberalisation under the multilateral

regime is at best uncertain and slow.

Neoclassical economists argue that unilateral trade liberalisation is the best

option for a country; however, political economy of trade liberalisation is such that

reciprocity is a sine-qua-non in trade liberalisation initiatives in most developing

countries. Since unilateral trade liberalisation is not a practical option and

multilateral trade liberalisation is slow and uncertain, many countries have opted for

regional trade liberalisation through regional trade arrangements (RTAs). In the

existing literature, RTAs have been hotly debated and there are two schools of

thought. The first school of thought, led by Larry Summers (former Treasury

Secretary of the USA and currently President of the Harvard University) maintains

the view that RTAs are building blocs towards multilateral trade liberalisation. The

second school of thought led by Jagadish Bhagwati (Professor of Economics at

Columbia University) argues that RTAs are stumbling blocs to multilateral trade

liberalisation. Some other economists, however, have chosen to remain neutral.

South Asia decided to embrace an RTA in 1995 when the SAARC Preferential

Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1995. In early 2004, the much delayed

South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed. Six member countries of

SAFTA have already vouched their support for the WTO. Bhutan, which is the only

non-member of the WTO, has manifested its commitment to the multilateral trade

architecture espoused by the WTO by initiating its accession process. Thus the

SAARC RTA (i.e., SAFTA) is a parallel initiative to the multilateral trade liberalisation

commitments of SAARC member countries.

Critics have pointed out that there is no rationale for an RTA in South Asia

because there are limited complementarities in the region; major trading partners of

the individual South Asian countries are located in the West, etc. The latest World

Bank report on South Asia's trade argues that an RTA in South Asia will lead to

Re-positioning SAFTA


116

substantial trade diversion than trade creation and considers an RTA in the region as 1a stumbling bloc to multilateral trade liberalisation . This argument needs re-

examination and for this purpose it will be worthwhile first to revisit the theoretical

debate on regionalism. This is done in Section II followed by a discussion in Section

III on the South Asian perspective of an RTA. Some concluding remarks are made in

Section IV.

II. The Debate on RTAsi) Arguments in favour of RTAs as building blocs As per Larry Summers, any 'ism' (bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism) is

good as long as its ultimate objective is trade liberalisation. Supporters of this school

of thought, prominently Bergsten (1997) argue: 'Regional arrangements promote freer

trade and multilateralism in at least two sense: that trade creation has generally

exceeded trade diversion, and that the RTAs contribute to both internal and

international dynamics that enhance rather than reduce the prospects for global

liberalisation. The internal dynamic is particularly important for developing

countries: regional commitments, which can be negotiated much faster than global

pacts, lock in domestic reforms against the risk that successive governments will try to

reverse them. Internationally, the RTAs often pioneer new liberalisation ideas that

can subsequently be generalised in the multilateral system. Moreover, regional

liberalisation creates incentives for other regions and individual countries to follow 2suit and thus to 'ratchet up' the global process .

The proponents of regionalism assert that it often has important

demonstration effects. Regional initiatives can accustom officials, governments, and

nations to the liberalisation process and thus increase the probability that they will

subsequently move on to similar multilateral actions. 'Learning by doing' applies to

trade liberalisation as well as to economic development itself, and can often be

experienced both more easily and more extensively in the regional context with far

fewer negotiating partners.

They further contend that it has had positive rather than negative political

effects. Trade and broader economic integration has created the European Union

(EU) in which another war between Germany and France is literally impossible.

Argentina and Brazil have used Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) to end their

historic rivalry, which had taken on nuclear overtones in recent decades. Central goals

of Asia Pacific Economic Commission (APEC) include anchoring the United States

(US) as a stabilising force in Asia and forging institutional links between such 3previous antagonists as Japan, China and the rest of East Asia . One could also hope

that the political rivalry between India and Pakistan is laid to rest after the formation

of SAFTA leading to deeper economic integration in days to come.

However, the favourable impact of an RTA is subject to proviso that RTAs are

able to achieve a deeper degree of economic integration than the multilateral trading

system. This is well within the realm of feasibility because RTAs usually entail

neighbouring like-minded countries. A smaller forum (with homogenous or semi-

homogenous membership) makes it possible to establish the necessary centralised


117 118

4institutions or federalising policy-making and enforcement institutions .

A group of trade economists follow the logic that expansion of RTAs could

have positive effects on the global economy provided the emerging RTAs are 'open' to

trade from outside. One key benefit to the global economy comes from the impact of

RTA in stimulating domestic growth, which in turn increases the demand for extra-

regional exports.

A major analytical contribution dealing with this issue is of Baldwin (1995).

Focusing exclusively on the incentive to seek entry on the part of outsiders, Baldwin

identifies a 'domino' effect, which may yield global free trade through Preferential

Trading Arrangement (PTA) expansion. Using a variant of what have come to be

known as models of economic geography, Baldwin shows that under the 'domino'

effect, more and more outside countries have an incentive to become insiders as a

PTA expands. The countries are assumed to differ in a way that the PTA is not equally

attractive to them. Initially, it attracts one member who finds the entry worthwhile.

The addition of this member enlarges the internal market and makes it more

attractive to yet another outside country at the margin. Once this country joins, yet 5another country finds accession profitable, and so on until the PTA becomes global .

Baldwin (1997) further mentions that this domino theory is derived from the

expansion of the EU. He then goes on to explain about the American dominos.

Indeed, the possibility of facing exclusion due to U.S.-Mexico trade, when the trade

talks were going on between the U.S. and Mexico, Canada requested the parties to

trilateralise talks which led to the birth of North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

Similarly, when other Latin American countries, which were interested to join NAFTA

only received lukewarm response from President George Bush (Senior), four of them

decided to form Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The pressure for inclusion

was so much that Bolivia and Chile joined MERCOUSR as its associate members. Now

that Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) has been announced, covering the entire

Western Hemisphere, virtually every country in the Americas is looking forward to

joining the same under certain conditions.

Not many Asian dominos have fallen so far primarily because ASEAN (the

largest RTA within the continent) has only expanded its membership to 10 countries.

However, the first ever free trade agreement (FTA), which Japan entered into with

Singapore and ASEAN plus three (China, Japan and Korea) is likely to result in falling 6of Asian dominos of tremendous significance .

Closer home, recently Bhutan and Nepal joined an exclusive club of five

countries formerly Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic

Cooperation (BIMST-EC) now renamed Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral

Technical and Economic and Cooperation, because they felt that they could be

marginalised if they did not join the club.

Sapir (2001), who conducted a study on the issue of domino effect in the

Europe, further supports the evidence of the prevalence of domino effects. A la Sapir,

'The empirical findings of the study support the hypothesis that 'domino effects' have

played an important role in Europe. These effects may be partly responsible for the

successive enlargement of the European Community (EC) from its original six to its 7present 15 members.' The fact that the membership of the EU has grown to 25 further

vindicates the above analysis.

However, one important condition for the application of domino theory is

that the incumbent members should be 'open' to include new members. If they have

incentives to create barrier to entry to the new country in the group, domino theory

does not work. Therefore, the concept of 'open regionalism' was propounded.

Bergesten (1997), one of the pioneers of the concept, argues:

The concept represents an effort to achieve the best of both

worlds: the benefits of regional liberalisation, which even the critics

acknowledge, without jeopardising the continued vitality of the

multilateral system. Indeed, proponents of open regionalism (including

the author) view it as a device through which regionalism can be

employed to accelerate the progress toward global liberalisation and 8rule-making.

Asia Pacific Economic Commission was modelled on this concept based on

the suggestions of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), which was chaired by Bergesten

himself. However, Bergesten's idea of open regionalism is contradictory and vague as

explained in Section 2.2.

ii) Arguments for RTAs as stumbling blocs As early as in 1992, Jagadish Bhagwati, who claims himself to be a multilateralist and

a critique of regionalism, posed the following question: is regionalism truly a

building, rather than a stumbling, bloc towards multilateral free trade

for all: in other words, will it fragment, or integrate, the world 9economy? Bhagwati calls 'the revival of regionalism' as 'unfortunate'. He

emphasises the need 'to contain and shape it in ways that it becomes maximally useful

and minimally damaging, and consonant with the objectives of arriving at multilateral 10free trade for all,' which is the end of free trade in his conception.

Expanding on these arguments, Panagariya (1998) uses two different

analyses, through formal model as well as informal arguments to prove that

regionalism is a stumbling bloc to multilateral trading system. He takes two formal 11models by Levy (1997) and Lipsey . As per Levy's model, if the voters in two different

countries, which are the members of both FTA and multilateral trading system were

given a choice to vote, they felt that FTA cannot make previously infeasible

multilateral liberalisation feasible. Krishna uses a three-country, partial-equilibrium,

oligopoly model in which trade policy is chosen to maximise national firms' profits.

He shows that more trade diverting the FTA between two countries in this set up, the

greater the backing it receives and more it reduces the incentive to eventually

liberalise with the third country. With sufficiently large trade diversion, an initially 12feasible multilateral liberalisation can be rendered infeasible by the FTA option .


119

He then analyses the informal arguments in the following sequence. Firstly, it

has been suggested by Summers (1991) and others that multilateral negotiations will

move more rapidly if the number of negotiators is reduced to approximately three via

bloc formation. This argument gained some popularity at the time the Uruguay Round

(UR) negotiations were stalled but has lost force since the successful completion of the

Round. The argument is that due to a large number of members involved at the WTO

and the associated 'free rider problem', negotiations at the WTO are slow and difficult.

If the world is first divided into a handful of blocs, multilateral negotiations will

become easier.

Secondly, according to the second informal argument, PTAs may serve as a

threat to force unwilling parties to negotiate in earnest at the multilateral level. As per

this argument, EU was dragging its feet too long for the conclusion of the UR, but

when President Clinton called for the formation of APEC, the EU decided to conclude

the negotiations during the UR. However, Bhagwati (1996) disagrees with this

interpretation. He asserts that the UR could conclude only because the US wisely

decided to close the UR deal, taking the offer on the table rather than seeking more

concessions.

Thirdly, it is argued that due to their high visibility, PTAs can energise and

unify protectionist lobbies, turning them into effective obstacles against multilateral

liberalisation. Finally, there is the related issue of attention diversion and scarce

negotiating resources. If the President of the United States and his Trade

Representative are preoccupied with cutting deals in Latin America, they will have 13less time and motivation of multilateral negotiations . The World Bank (2000) study

further elaborates this point by arguing that negotiating an RTA will absorb a huge

portion of policymaking skills of a developing country. Perhaps one of the opportunity

costs of RTAs is that less negotiating and political capital are available for multilateral 14negotiations .

Das (1999) argues that growth in regionalism does not necessarily have to

lead to a short cut to free trade or a liberalised trading regime. It is difficult to claim

that the target of free or a liberalised trade is easier to reach in large regional

agreements like the FTAA and the APEC forum with memberships as large as 35 and

21, respectively. These two and other large regional grouping contain economies as 15different in size, outlook and level of development as any in the WTO .

Panagariya (1998) criticises 'open regionalism' by highlighting three critical

limitations of such a concept. His arguments can be summarised in three major

points. First, discrimination against non-members at any point in time remains in 16place by definition as long as the regionalism is of Article XXIV variety . Second,

openness is not as innocuous as it sounds the admission price can include several

unpleasant 'side payments' that are essentially unrelated to trade. Third, open 17membership does not necessarily translate into speedy membership .

Further, Zissimos and Vines (2000) assert: 'If the benefits from membership

of an exclusive club are derived partly by making outsiders worse off, then the club


120

will not throw open its doors to all comers. Facilitating trade between bloc members

has exactly this effect. The purchasing power of block currencies increases, whilst that

of outsiders declines. Consequently, trade blocs do not have an incentive to allow all

applicants to join, because some of the benefits of membership come from being able

to purchase the products of outsiders more cheaply on world markets. So there is a

limit to the expansion that can be expected from existing blocs, and free trade 18between all countries will not arise.'

Open membership also raises the issue of broadening versus deepening.

Broadening the membership of any regional grouping inherently complicates the

process of deepening its integration. Too many new members can make decision

making more time consuming and cumbersome. APEC realised this and imposed a 19moratorium in expanding membership in early 1998.

Srinivasan (1997) too is quite vocal in criticising 'open regionalism'. Argues

he, 'If regional liberalisation is to be extended on the same time table 'in practice and

in law' to non-member countries on an MFN basis, it would be multilateral and not

regional. If that is the case, why should any group initiate it on a regional basis in the 20first place?'. He goes on to call 'open regionalism' an oxymoron. The practical

problems of this concept have been highlighted by the current status of the APEC and

the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) where the 21progress has been far from satisfactory.

iii) Contemporary debate on regionalism: Other viewpointsA comprehensive study done by World Bank (2000) on the debate on regional

integration, titled Trade Blocs finds out that regionalism is generally a building bloc

to multilateral trade liberalisation. It goes on to explain how benefits of trade creation 22resulting from an RTA outweigh the costs of trade diversion . The study looks at

seven recent RTAs by modelling the effect on trade among the countries in the bloc

and the rest of the world to see the impact of trade diversion. As per the study, in four

of the seven countries there was no significant trade diversion, but in three countries

the problem of trade diversification was large enough to be visible. Hence diversion is 23neither so common as to be general, nor so unusual as to be dismissible .

Complementarity between regionalism and multilateralism is also stressed by

Ethier (1998), who argues that 'the new regionalism is in good part a direct result of

the success of multilateral liberalisation, as well as being the means by which new

countries trying to enter the multilateral system (and small countries already in it)

compete among themselves for direct investment'. He also suggests that regionalism

by internalising an important externality plays a key role in expanding and preserving 24the liberal trading order .

Commenting on complementarity of regional liberalisation on services with

multilateral liberalisation, Hoekman (1995) suggests that both conceptual

considerations and the available data on trade and investment flows suggest that

RTAs in the area of services should be easier to negotiate and be more far-reaching

than a multilateral agreement. However, he admits that the two approaches are


121 122

substitutes. Reviewing existing agreements, he concludes that sectors that are

(included) excluded from RTAs are also (included) excluded from multilateral

liberalisation. This suggests 'the GATS is likely to be seen as complementary to the 25regional arrangements by major service industries in OECD countries.'

After analysing all the arguments that were discussed, it is clear that there is

no need to be unnecessarily nervous about regionalism and its potential to derail the

multilateral trade liberalisation. As Baldwin (1997) puts it:

‘Does recent regionalism threaten the future of the world trading

system? My guess is that because trade is already quite free in the major

trading nations, few regional liberalisations are capable of creating

important anti-liberalisation forces (the exceptions are likely to be

South-South FTAs). For this reason, most regional deals will weaken the

key opponents of free trade (import competitors) while simultaneously

strengthening its key proponents (exporters). Regional integration will,

therefore, foster multilateral liberalisation and vice versa, just as it has

done for the past 40 years. If this is right, regional deals are not building

blocks or stumbling blocks. Regionalism is half of the trade

liberalisation 'wheel' that has been rolling towards global free trade 26since 1958’.

The increase in intra-regional trade between the regional partners shows that

benefits of trade creation outweigh costs associated with trade diversion. Regional

economic integration has served the useful purpose of creating a thread for

multilateral trade liberalisation on several counts. If that were not the case, the size

and number of RTAs would not have grown with leaps and bound as is happening,

especially after the formation of the WTO. Indeed, RTA is the favourite of all the

countries of the world whether they are members of the WTO or not.

III. South Asian Perspective on RTAs The initial conditions for South Asia to embark on an RTA seem not very attractive.

Limited complementarities, low intra-regional trade (4-5 per cent), political

turbulence, etc., are acting as impediments to embark on promoting intra-regional

trade. However, there are some valid reasons for engaging in an RTA. The case for

economic cooperation under an RTA can be justified from six perspectives.

First, nearly 60 per cent of global trade now takes place under RTAs and 27more than 250 RTAs in operation , so there are compelling reasons to be in an RTA,

for if not formed member countries could get increasingly marginalised in the

competitive world. In such a context, one can also question the rationale of

multilateral trade liberalisation being identified as the first best option by economists

led by Bhagwati. Theory is based on strong assumptions such as perfect competition

which no longer exists in a world with 250 plus RTAs already in operation. In an

imperfect world, the so-called second best option may be the only option available,

thus the case for an RTA is strong.

Second, it is argued that there is a large amount of informal trade that is

taking place in the region and if this is added to the formal trade, the overall intra-

regional trade will amount to nearly eight per cent in the SAARC. The argument is

also put forward that despite intra-regional trade being put at 22 per cent in ASEAN,

if the re-exports from Singapore is taken into account, ASEAN intra-regional trade

reduces to 12 per cent. Thus it is argued that there is not much difference between

SAARC and ASEAN in intra-regional trade taking into account that preferential

trading in ASEAN started 20 years before SAARC.

Third, RTAs are not necessarily formed to increase low intra-regional trade to

a higher level. In Europe, intra-regional trade was at 44 per cent at the time of

formation of the EC. The real objective here according to the Cecchini Report (1988)

was to promote economics of neighbourhood and engage in industrial restructuring 28by exploiting economies of scale and specialisation . In other words, to promote

industrial restructuring through complementarities and synergies.

Fourth, the cost of non-cooperation is highlighted to put forward the case for

an RTA. CUTS (1996) showed that consumers in Pakistan paid extra costs of US $

36.3 mn, US $ 48.9 mn. and US $ 33.7 mn. over the calendar years 1992, 1993, and

1994 respectively for their governments importing 82 to 83 per cent of their tea 29import requirements from outside the region, such as UK and Kenya . Despite India

being self-sufficient in sugar, it suffered an underproduction during 1992 and 1993

and had to import sugar. Though Pakistan had exportable surplus during that year,

India chose to import sugar from outside the region, thus incurring additional costs to

the tune of US $ 151 million in 1992 and US $ 215 mn. in 1993. Likewise, Pakistan is

known to import steel from China at a price, which is twice that of exports from India.

RIS (1999) used the unit value method in a comparative static framework to work out

the cost of non-cooperation in the SAARC due to sourcing of imports from non-

SAARC countries. They found the cost of non-cooperation for Sri Lanka and Pakistan 30to be US $ 266 and US $ 511, respectively .

Fifth, the experience of the Indo-Sri Lanka Bilateral Free Trade Agreement

(ILBFTA) can be considered to highlight the benefits of an RTA. Despite fears

expressed by many pessimists in Sri Lanka, the Agreement led to reducing Sri Lanka's

trade deficit with India from 11:1 in 1999 to 5:1 in 2002. Sri Lankan exports to India

accounted for 3.6 per cent of overall exports in 2002 in comparison to 1999, when Sri

Lankan exports to India accounted for one per cent of overall exports. India has

become the 5th largest destination for Sri Lankan exports in 2002 compared to the

rank in the 20s in the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, India has become the largest source of 31imports to Sri Lanka, accounting for 14 per cent of overall imports .

What the Sri Lankan experience shows is that if the regulatory framework in

an RTA is correctly designed to accommodate the disparity between the countries

then a small country could in fact gain from an RTA. In this case, the time frame of

tariff phase out, rules of origin, and negative list were designed to accommodate the

smallness of Sri Lanka's export and production capacity.


123

Sixth, the argument that the South-South RTAs are not very effective in

promoting intra-regional trade may not make much sense if we look at South-South

trade from the intra-regional investment perspective. It has been empirically

demonstrated that the transfer of resources and technology through South-South joint

ventures is more appropriate and cost effective for receiving country than similar

transfers effected by transnational corporations (TNCs) based in industrial countries.

For instance, technology transferred to joint ventures has been found to be

appropriately scaled down to smaller size, made more appropriate for factor

endowments of developing countries, and adopted to local raw materials and market

conditions (RIS, 2004). These joint ventures can promote and supplement South-

South trade. Joint ventures with buy-back arrangements with the home country can

help in correcting the perennial trade imbalances which may emerge because of

limited export capabilities of host countries.

In ASEAN, Japanese investment driven exchanges contributed to stimulating

intra-regional trade among ASEAN countries. ASEAN also started with limited

complementarities in the 1970s with intra-regional trade at six per cent, but by

exploiting the investment-trade nexus, ASEAN managed to increase its intra-regional

trade to 22 per cent at present. In the Greater Mekong Region, ADB funded

infrastructure stimulated the supply side and contributed to increasing trade among

member countries. These experiences where dormant complementarities have been

invigorated by investment have been well documented in the literature.

Like in the EU, if industrial restructuring in the region based on economies of

scale and specialisation is promoted via a SAARC investment area, there may be much

to be gained. For instance, after the EU came into operation, IBM closed down its

individual plants in member countries and initiated specialisation by producing

personal computers in the UK, main frames in Germany, telecom equipment in Italy,

and so on. RIS (2004) argues that a SAARC investment area can facilitate efficiency-

seeking restructuring of industry in the region, thus enabling them to exploit

economies of scale and specialisation. In such an event, Sri Lanka may emerge as the

region's shipping hub and also the hub for rubber-based industries, Bangladesh will

emerge as the hub for energy-based industries, Bhutan, forest-based industries, India

as the hub for IT and textile industries, Maldives for fisheries industries, and so on.

While the arguments for an RTA exist in South Asia, the question is how to

exploit this potential. For SAFTA to be a formidable FTA, it has to cover a large

portion of trade that is currently taking place in South Asia. SAPTA the precursor to 32SAFTA was notified to the WTO under 'Enabling Clause' which allows developing

countries to form RTAs within themselves. However, more serious RTAs are notified

under the Article XXIV of the GATT even if they can in theory be notified under the

Enabling Clause. Because RTAs can be welfare enhancing only if they result in more

trade creation than trade diversion and act as building blocs to multilateral trade

liberalisation, the drafters of the GATT included the requirement to 'liberalise

substantially all the trade' under this Article. This means only serious RTAs can fulfil

the stringent criteria laid down by Article XXIV. Therefore, it can be argued that


124

33SAFTA needs to be notified under this Article so as to make it a formidable RTA .

IV. ConclusionFrom the mere fact that there are more than 250 RTAs, and the USA which was the

main proponent of multilateralism until a decade ago has embarked on NAFTA and

other RTAs with the enactments of the Trade and Development Act of 2000 clearly

indicates that the proponents of an RTA have won the debate. The rationale for a

SAARC RTA was the point of debate but as we have pointed out there is a case for an

RTA in South Asia. The question is the slow progress and the political will to

implement it.

While the case for SAFTA is straightforward, the question is a major political

problem that cut across all areas of economic cooperation. Some South Asian nations

being recent creations, a strong rhetoric has been built around the states and they are

aided by the powers of state institutions. The mapping of the cartography of the

colonial regime has eroded the foundation of regional linking. The division into nation

states is strong. Since the nation-states are themselves in the process of being formed

in the region, the concept of supra-national region seems novel and contradictory to

the immediate task of nation building. Nation states are absolutely central and crucial

for any project in South Asia. SAARC moves slowly because most nation states

themselves have not been very successful

In this milieu, the important question is can SAARC insulate its economic

agenda from regional politics? Irrespective of SAARC summits been postponed to

accommodate political developments, can the economic agenda have a

momentum/life of its own? The answers to all these questions at present are not very

positive. Thus economic cooperation within a framework of an RTA in South Asia will

move slowly and depend on the political equation.

Due to the slow progress of SAPTA, a number of SAARC countries embarked

on working out bilateral, sub-regional, and trans-South Asian regional groupings.

SAARC is thus unique because before moving to an FTA, it has bilateral FTAs within

the grouping and selective RTAs that include some SAARC countries with

neighbouring SAARC non-members. ASEAN, for instance, did not have bilateral FTAs

among ASEAN countries before moving to AFTA, and neither did MERCSOUR. Thus

SAFTA is coming into operation when a 'spaghetti bowl' is already prevailing in the

region. The challenge for SAFTA is either to supercede them or to integrate them.

Given the SAFTA time frame, this may prove to be difficult. The reviewed debate on

regionalism gives little emphasis on such challenges. In this context, the debate on

regionalism can be enriched by the experience in South Asia.

After all, if RTAs are to be building blocs for multilateral liberalisation efforts

then the vision should be to integrate existing RTAs to three or four major blocs such

as FTAA, EU, proposed African Union, and a contemplated Asian Economic

Community. SAFTA, BIMSTEC, ASEAN +3, etc., are RTAs that can eventually

integrate to form the Asian Economic Community. Thus SAFTA has to be re-

positioned in the pan-Asian context and be considered as a building bloc of the Asian


125 126

Economic Community which will eventually become a major global trading bloc that

would in turn be a building bloc of the multilateral trade liberalisation system. Asia

has a long way to go and SAFTA needs to be more aggressive in its commitments to

becoming that building bloc for the Asian Economic Community.

(Dr Kelegama ([email protected]) is the Executive Director of Institute of Policy

Studies, Sri Lanka)

(Ratnakar Adhikari is Executive Director, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics &

Environment (SAWTEE), Kathmandu and can be contacted at

[email protected])

End Notes 1. World Bank, 'Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview', Poverty Reduction and

Economic Management, South Asia Region, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003).2. Fred Bergsten (1997), 'Open Regionalism', Working Paper 97-3, Institute for International

Economic, Washington D.C: 2-3 3. Fred Bergsten, (1997), above, note 2: 3 4. Dilip K Das, (2001), Regional Trading Arrangements and the Global Economy: An Asia-

Pacific Perspective, Monograph, February, Cambridge: Harvard University, Centre for

International Development, ,2001) p. 22 5. Richards E Baldwin, 'The Causes of Regionalism', The World Economy, Vol.20, 1997, pp.

877-8.6. Based on a personal conversation with Prof. Richard Baldwin. 7. Andre Sapir, 'Domino effects in Western European regional trade, 1960-92', European

Journal of Political Economy, Vol 17: 386, 2001.8. Fred Bergsten, (1997), above, note 2:4 9. Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview' in Jagdish Bhagwati,

Pravin Krishna and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to

Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p.7.10. Jagdish Bhagwati in V.N. Balasubramanium (ed.) Writings on International Economics,

(Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 169.11. See Arvind Panagariya, 'The Regionalism Debate: An Overview', The World Economy, Vol.

22, no. 4, (Harvard University: Center for International Development, 1999). pp. 22-23 Ibid at 22-23.

23. Jagdish Bhagwati, (1999), above, note 9: 22-2524. World Bank, Trade Blocs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 104.25. Dilip K. Das, (2001), above, note 4: 4-526. This Article of the GATT provides legal cover to RTAs, which allows for discrimination

against non-members. However, a major condition to qualify as WTO-compatible is that

there should be 'liberalisation of substantially all trade'. 27. It took the EU more than 40 years to grow from 6 members 15. Canada-US free trade

agreement has included only one member by converting itself into NAFTA over a period of

one decade. Attempts by even a tiny country such as Chile have faced serious resistance.

See Arvind Panagariya, (1998), above, note 11: 35 28. Ben Zissimos and David Vines,'Is the WTO's Article XXIV a Free Trade Barrier?' CSGR

Working Paper No. 49/00, February 2000 29. S. Kelegama, 'Open Regionalism and APEC; Rhetoric and Reality', Economic and Political

Weekly, Vol. XXXV, no. 51, 2000a.30. T.N. Srinivasan, 'Regionalism and the World Trade Organisation: Is Non-Discrimination

Passe?' in A. O. Krueger (ed.), The World Trade Organisation as an International

Institute, (The University of Chicago Press, 1997).21. S. Kelegama, (2000a), 'Open Regionalism and APEC; Rhetoric and Reality' above note 19;

S. Kelegama, 'Open Regionalism in the Indian Ocean: How Relevant is the APEC Model

for IOR-ARC ?', Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 5, no. 3, 2000c; and S.

Kelegama, 'Indian Ocean Regionalism: Is there a Future ?', Economic and Political

Weekly, Vol. XXXVII, no. 25, 2002.22. Large scale foreign direct investment from Japan played a key role in stimulating intra-

ASEAN trade via the investment-trade nexus. Further details are given in S. Kelegama,

'SAPTA and its Future', South Asian Survey, Vol. 3, nos. 1 and 2, 1996.23. World Bank, Trade Blocs, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000.24. W. Ethier, 'The New Regionalism', The Economic Journal, Vol.108, 1998, pp. 1149-1161.25. Cf. Sam Laird, 'Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?', World Economy, Vol.

22, no. 9, December 1999, p. 1187.26. Baldwin (1997), above, note 5: p. 888.27. Some 250 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2002, of which 130

were notified after January 1995. Over 170 RTAs are currently in force; an additional 70

are estimated to be operational although not yet notified. By the end of 2005, if RTAs

reportedly planned or already under negotiation are concluded, the total number of RTAs

in force might well approach 300. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm

28. Paolo Cecchini et al, The European Challenge-1992: The Benefits of a Single Market,

(Aldershot, Hants, UK, 1988). 29. CUTS, 'Cost of Non-Cooperation to Consumers in the SAARC Countries: An Illustrative

Study', Working Paper, Consumer Utility Trust Society, Jaipur, 1996.30. RIS, South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004, (New Delhi: Research and

Information System for Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, 2004).31. S. Kelegama, 'Sri Lanka's Exports to India: Impact of the Free Trade Agreement',

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 30, 26 July, 2003.32. Officially known as Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity

and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, 1979 (Tokyo Round). 33. S. Kelegama and R. Adhikari, Regional Integration in the WTO Era: South Asia at

Crossroads, (Kathmandu and Jaipur: SAWTEE and CUTS-Centre for International Trade,

Economics and Environment (CUTS-CITEE), 2002).

BibliographylRichards E. Baldwin, (1997), 'The Causes of Regionalism', The World Economy p. 20.lZissimos Ben and David Vines, 'Is the WTO's Article XXIV a Free Trade Barrier?' CSGR

Working Paper No. 49/00, February 2000. lFred Bergsten, 'Open Regionalism', Working Paper 97-3, Institute for International

Economic, Washington D.C., 1997.lJagdish Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview' in Jagdish Bhagwati,

Pravin Krishna and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to

Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). lPaolo Cecchini et al, The European Challenge- 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market,

(Aldershot, Hants, UK, 1988).lCUTS, 'Cost of Non-Cooperation to Consumers in the SAARC Countries: An Illustrative

Study', Working Paper, Consumer Utility Trust Society, Jaipur, 1996.lDilip K. Das, (2001), Regional Trading Arrangements and the Global Economy: An Asia-

Pacific Perspective, Monograph, February (Centre for International Development,

Harvard University, Cambridge, 2001).lW. Ethier, 'The New Regionalism', The Economic Journal, p. 108, 1998.

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htmlJagdish Bhagwati in V.N. Balasubramanium (ed.), Writings on International Economics,

(Oxford University Press, 1998).


127

lS. Kelegama, 'Indian Ocean Regionalism: Is there a Future?', Economic and Political

Weekly, Vol. XXXVII, no. 25, 2002.lS. Kelegama, 'SAPTA and its Future', South Asian Survey, Vol. 3, nos. 1 and 2, 1996.lS. Kelegama, 'Open Regionalism and APEC; Rhetoric and Reality', Economic and Political

Weekly, Vol. XXXV, no. 51, 2000a.lS. Kelegama, 'Open Regionalism in the Indian Ocean: How Relevant is the APEC Model for

IOR-ARC ?', Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 5, no. 3, 2000b). lS. Kelegama, 'Sri Lanka's Exports to India: Impact of the Free Trade Agreement',

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, no. 30, 26 July, 2003.lS. Kelegama and R. Adhikari, Regional Integration in the WTO Era: South Asia at

Crossroads, (Jaipur and Khatmandu: SAWTEE and CUTS-Centre for International Trade,

Economics and Environment (CUTS-CITEE), 2002). lSam Laird (1999), 'Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?', World Economy,

Vol. 22, no. 9, December. lArvind Panagariya, 'The Regionalism Debate: An Overview', The World Economy, Vol. 22,

no. 4, (Center for International Development, Harvard University: 22-23, 1999).lRIS, South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004, (New Delhi: Research and

Information System for Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, 2004).lAndre Sapir, 'Domino effects in Western European regional trade, 1960-92', European

Journal of Political Economy, Vol 17, 2001.lT. N. Srinivasan, 'Regionalism and the World Trade Organisation: Is Non-Discrimination

Passe?' in A.O. Krueger (ed.), The World Trade Organisation as an International

Institute, (The University of Chicago Press. 1997).lWorld Bank, Trade Blocs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).lWorld Bank, 'Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview', Poverty Reduction and

Economic Management, South Asia Region, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003) .


128

India's River Linking Plans Syed Shahid Husain

The Indian government got judicial sanction from its Supreme Court in

October, 2002 to be able to implement its scheme on linking major Indian rivers to

'overcome drought and floods'. The BJP government followed this up with

pronouncements supportive of the scheme. The proposal was not received without

dismay in the neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh, which organised a

series of conferences to highlight the folly inherent in the scheme. The most recent of

these conferences was a three-day international conference on Regional Cooperation

on Trans-boundary Rivers in Dhaka (December, 2004) with a call to India to dispel

mistrust and concerns over its river linking project and to follow a 'no harm policy'

towards its neighbours. This is a phrase used in the Treaty between India and

Bangladesh on Farakka. According to reports, the Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh

assured the Bangladeshis that India would undertake a detailed consultative process

with all concerned. She asserted that the project was still at a conceptual stage. This

does not mean that the proposal has been shelved; hence, the continued concern for

Bangladesh. This conference was a follow up, close on the heels of the August

conference in 2004. Aware of the threat posed by this gigantic project and the

challenges faced by the region on account of population growth, food scarcity, the

Third South Asia Water Forum (SAWAF-III) was held in Dhaka in July, 2004.

The Bangladesh People's Initiative against River Linking (BPIRL) in

collaboration with the South Asian Solidarity for Rivers and Peoples (SARP)

organised the South Asian consultation on River Linking Project (21-22 August 2004),

so as to focus on the implications of the proposal on linking the two large rivers in the

subcontinent. Concerned citizens from India, Pakistan and Nepal joined their

Bangladeshi counterparts to voice their concern at the Indian proposal of changing

the geomorphology of the subcontinent.

Brahmaputra and Jamna Basins account for 65 per cent of surface water in

Bangladesh. In all, 80 per cent of the surface water in Bangladesh comes through

these two rivers (Brahmaputra and Jamna) originating in Himalayas and passing

through Nepal, Bhutan and India. Bangladesh inter alia decided to endorse the

principle of 'more crop for each drop' of water as an alternative to this mega project,

so as to increase water efficiency, to decrease non-structural options, to evolve cost

effective technologies including rain water harvesting as well as re-cycling of effluent

and for action to use water as a source of peace and prosperity rather than a source of

discord.

stThe 21 century is marked with a growing need for global cooperation, in


129 130

general, and regional cooperation, in particular. What could be more important for

global understanding than on water, which is getting scarcer by the day and will get

more so in the future? Days of profligacy are long gone and the mounting pressure of

population has forced the issue of this precious commodity to the fore not only in this

region but also in other parts of the world.

The controversy is not confined to Bangladesh and India. The Ganges-

Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin (GMB) represents a far bigger region comprising

Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and some parts of Tibet. According to a recent

report, India has nearly exhausted underground water reservoirs by pumping water

for irrigation to achieve a mirage of food self-sufficiency. The proposed project is

thought to be the only solution to overcome the problem.

The project consists of thirty river links, 14 on

the Himalayan Rivers and 16 on the peninsular south. The project involves storage of

flood and monsoon water. The important links are four, including Brahmaputra with

Ganges, Subamarekaha and Mahanadi with Brahmaputra so as to irrigate Assam,

West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa.

The proposal for interlinking of rivers is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton first

mooted it in the 19th century primarily for promoting inland navigation. Dr K. L. Rao

later revived the idea in 1972. After that the focus shifted from navigation to the issue

of water scarcity in the south. In 1977 Captain Dastur, a pilot by profession, proposed

construction of two canals named Garland Canal -- because it envisaged 4,200 km

Himalayan Canal and the twice as long Southern Garland Canal, which were to be

connected through pipelines passing through Patna and Delhi.

Much before the Supreme Court decision in 2002, National Water

Development Agency (NWDA) was established in 1980, to carry out two separate

studies, viz. Himalayan and Peninsula rivers. NWDA has to survey and investigate

possible storage size and interconnecting links. There are two action plans. Under

action plan-I, the schedule for implementation is 10 years from the start. It is

stipulated that work will start in 2007 and complete in 2016. Under action plan-II,

two committees have been set up to go into the financial aspects of the project. Both

the committees are to work concurrently. The NWDA has conducted feasibility studies

jointly with the Ministry of Water Resources on six of the thirty possible river links in

the last few decades. It is reported to have completed water balance studies of 137

basins/sub-basins and prepared pre-feasibility studies of 30 links.

A task force has also been set up by the Government of India on December

13, 2002, with Suresh Prabhu as the Chairperson with the following terms:

1. To provide guidance on norms of up-raising of individual projects in respect of

economic liability, socio-economic impacts, environmental impacts and

preparation of re-settlement plans;

India has proposed to

transfer water from the Brahmaputra through a gigantic 324-km long link canal,

which will run from Assam across northern Bangladesh to just above Farraka. The

second part of the proposal envisages three large dams, which are potential

hydropower-cum-flood control sites.

2. Devise suitable mechanisms for brining about a speedy consensus among the

stats;3. Privatise different projects' components for preparation of detailed project reports

and implementation;4. Propose suitable organisational structures for implementing the projects;5. Consider various funding, modalities; and6. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some components of

the project.

A full-fledged cost benefit analysis will follow the feasibility studies and

detailed project reports. It is, however, claimed that phenomenal economic and socio

cultural benefits will accrue, like:

1. Agricultural production will increase by 100 per cent in the next five years;2. 35 million hectares will be added to the command area to the current 90 million

hectares; 3. Loss of crops worth Rs.250b will be saved by preventing drought and floods;4. Savings in foreign exchange of Rs.30b per annum will accrue because of cost

effective alternative navigation and reduced import of oil;5. The country will further be bound together.6. Employment to one million people will be provided in next 10 years; and7. Additional water line defence will be provided along the western and north-

western borders.

There are sceptics who doubt the viability of the scheme or even the

seriousness on the part of India. They suspect that it was an election stunt and will not

go beyond the laying of foundation stone. With the new government in place one has

not heard of it so loudly. 24 years after the project emerged on the public scene, it is

nowhere near completion. But there are those who are afraid of India's seriousness.

Once the government conducts studies, like it did on the Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan,

without involving the stakeholders in a discussion, then a vested interest is created in

going ahead with its execution. Narmada is another example of the same approach.

Consequently, the dam is still incomplete.

The question remains whether there is enough water to sustain the idea.

Except for the Brahmaputra basin in the northeast, there is no surplus water

anywhere. The scheme is predicated on the assumption that there is surplus water in

the rivers that could be diverted to the deficit rivers. Dr Ainun Nishat, Country

representative of IUCN in Bangladesh, in his brilliant exposition at the August

Conference in 2004, brought out -- with the help of data -- that dry deltas in

Bangladesh bring forth (very poignantly) an affirmation of the claim by the critics of

the proposal that not much water is left to flow into the sea. Those who are building a

super-structure over a pipe dream either do not understand or have a sinister agenda

hidden from public view.

The receding snow lines of the Himalayas are another development which

cannot be overlooked. The glacier mass showed a negative trend since the middle of

the last century, signalling a sharp reduction in flow into the rivers in the next 30

years. Himalayan glaciers could disappear by the year 2035 according to some


131

researchers. There is no scientific database on climate pattern and discharge pattern

in the Himalayas. Pakistan is facing its gravest crisis with its existing dams almost

empty and its present and future crops in jeopardy. In-depth studies of glacier

hydrology is in order. The claim that water flows into the sea is no longer true. India

has highly uneven water availability. In Pakistan and India diversions on the mighty

Indus and its tributaries have reduced water outflows into the sea by 80 per cent;

destroying deltaic mangroves that once stretched over 250,000 hectares and were

spawning grounds for coastal fisheries. In Philippines, rights to environment have

been included as fundamental rights.

Engineering a geo-morphologic feature changes both the object and the

process and thus triggers a chain of developments that persist long after the

intervention is over. The system takes its own time to settle into a new equilibrium.

This on a generational time scale is much longer than the executive decisions. The

natural level of all water on earth being the sea, the river -- unlike a canal -- augments

its flow along its path. Such a project will invite the Law of Unintended Consequences.

Moreover the project will involve submergence of forestland, habitations and wild life.

How good is the prevailing use of irrigation water? 70 per cent of river water is wasted

before its delivery into the fields. High intensity use for sugar cane and rice further

compounds the problem. The region faces floods and droughts at the same time.

Obtaining the consent of the states within the Union of India will prove an

almost insurmountable hurdle. The states have full authority over water and yet the

Centre can intervene by taking steps to interfere with their plans for use of the water.

Ironically the states where the rivers are located are the most undeveloped parts of the

country. East Punjab followed Kerala in opposing the project. Punjab and Haryana are

still fighting over the Sutlej water. The annual discharge of the system is 1350 billion

cubic meters with a total drainage area of 1.75 million sq. kms Brahmaputara

contributes 700 BCM, Ganges 500 and Meghna 150.

Tamil Nadu supports the project completely, whereas Andhra Pradesh

supports it conditionally. Tamil Nadu has already completed the Mekkara Dam, which

is to be used in the proposed link even though Kerala is opposed to the project. Kerala

Legislative Assembly has passed a unanimous resolution against the link on August 6,

2003. Gujarat has objections because Daman Ganga-Pinjal River Linking Project,

one of the 30 interstate projects, located in Gujarat will be adversely affected. There

are two out of thirty proposals that fall in Gujarat.

West Bengal is worried. It is demanding adequate funds from the centre to

combat post Farakka problem causing floods and erosion. Assam is opposed to the

project and is of the view that while remaining within the constitution, the Centre

must evolve a consensus of the states. A board or an ordinary bill in parliament

cannot supersede the constitutional provisions. One opinion suggests that Bihar

should not oppose linking of Brahmaputra because there is sufficient water to meet

the needs of the south. However, Nepal will have to be excluded from the plans. Bihar,

after spending over Rs.19b on flood control in the flood prone area, is worse off with

floods affecting almost three times the area (from 2.5m hectares to 6.9m). Bihar also


132

fears that India will reap benefits at its cost.

Bringing the countries of the region, particularly Bangladesh, on board may

be far more difficult for India, especially after the India-Bangladesh Treaty of

December 1996 on the sharing of the Ganges waters. Farakka Barrage, completed in

1975, has been a significant source of friction between India and Bangladesh, much

before the latter's creation. The Barrage allows India to divert the Ganges water into

Hoogly River through a feeder canal. A decline of 51 per cent flow of water is claimed

to have been experienced by Bangladesh after Farakka. Under an ad-hoc arrangement

reached in 1983, pending scientific studies, 39 per cent of the dry season flow was to

be allocated to India, 36 per cent to Bangladesh and the remaining to continue to be

unallocated.

The 1996 Treaty protects the flows at Farakka and any storage upstream of

Farakka will be in breach of that Treaty. Ganges and Brahmapatra are international

waters and their historic use cannot be overlooked. Para 3 of the Preamble of the

Treaty requires the two countries to make optimum utilisation of the water resources

of their region for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries. Article IX of

the Treaty enshrines the principle -- 'Guided by the principles of equity, fairness and

no harm to either party both the Governments agreed to conclude water sharing

Treaties/Agreements with regard to other common rivers'.

According to Bangladesh, its share in Farakka is fixed at 35,000 cusecs, if

availability of water is 75,000 cusecs. In case water exceeds, India will get 40,000

cusecs and Bangladesh the balance. The water sharing arrangement was to be

reviewed by the two governments at five years interval or earlier, but so far no such

review has taken place. Bangladesh took up the issue of the interlinking project at the

Joint River Commission. According to Mr. Hafiz Uddin Ahmad, Bangladesh Minister

for Water Resources, India was reluctant even to discuss it, calling it outside the scope

of the Joint River Commission (JRC). Bangladesh persisted and the discussion

continued for 13 hours, but at the end of the day it was not even minuted. The

marathon discussion was dismissed in a single line signifying, nothing. However,

there may be some meeting of minds with the new government in place in New Delhi.

There are alternatives available to the proposed millennium folly such as

decentralised water harvesting, non-conventional energy sources and conservation

strategies. A former Indian Prime Minister, while addressing state irrigation ministers

in 1986, had this to say: 'Since 1951, 246 big surface irrigation project(s) have been

initiated. Only 66 out of these have been completed. 181 are still under construction.

For 16 years, we have poured out money. The people have got nothing back, no

irrigation, no water, no increase in production, no help in their daily life'. The river

linking project is in fact a river privatisation project. Projects that have already been

planned or executed are being shown as new projects under the scheme. India seems

to be re-making its geography so that water flows where it previously never did.

There is need for a regional treaty that forces each country to honour its

ecological obligations towards the great oceans. The combined population of the


133 134

region is about 600 million. If India thinks that it can exploit its upper riparian

position and its size, China, which has reportedly drawn its own plans to divert rivers

originating in Tibet -- including Brahmaputra, may follow suit. While India plans to

complete the project by the year 2013, China plans to do so by 2009. An estimated 90

per cent of the Tibetan rivers flow downstream to India, Bangladesh, Nepal and

Bhutan. Both India and Bangladesh are at the mercy of China which could for its own

interest withhold water for irrigation and power during dry season and release water

during the flood season. Bangladesh experts brought the issue to the attention of

Indian journalists.

All the rivers flow into the Bay of Bengal. All these countries have abiding

interest in the sustainability of the system in order to ensure livelihood of people, who

depend on agriculture as well as to protect ecology, environment and wild life for

present or future collaboration necessary to evolve common goal of survival. Ganges is

reported to be the most polluted river. The effort is not going to be easy but each

country has to be prepared to make sacrifices and suffer the perceived loss involved in

an agreement. Equity and understanding of the other's point of view are crucial to

any settlement, tentative or permanent.

Another option is that a public interest petition is filed by any concerned

citizen of India requesting review of Supreme Court order, which may possibly review

its own order suo moto in the region's interest. There are other hurdles that India

must cross before establishing feasibility such as:

1. External financing in view of huge external debt may not be forthcoming. The

private sector sees a distinct road for itself in the proposed mega project after

having experienced the privatisation of Sheonath River in Chattisgarh.

2. As per the Constitution, water is a state subject, but no project can be undertaken

without following the planning process, which means every proposal must go

before the central government.

3. Whether or not there will be a political will to interlink rivers is an open question.

A proposal was made to constitute a commission on the lines of the Finance

Commission to examine the project.

There is also the role of international law and treaties. United Nations

Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,

although not ratified, could provide a basis to proceed. The Convention was adopted

by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1997. Watercourse has been

defined as a system of surface waters and ground waters forming a unitary whole

and normally flowing into a common terminus. The Convention was based on the

principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. It

expressed the conviction that a framework Convention will ensure the utilisation,

development, conservation, management and protection of international

watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof for

present and future generations.

Nothing in the Convention shall affect the rights or obligation of the

Watercourse state arising from agreements in force on the date on which that State

became a party to the Convention.

There are 37 Articles to the Convention. The Articles in the Convention relate

to subjects like watercourse agreements, equitable and reasonable utilisation

participation, factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to

cause significant harm, general obligation to cooperate and settlement of disputes, thetc. The Convention shall enter into force following ratification of 35 Instrument. So

far the Convention has attracted perhaps no more than 16 signatures and 11

ratifications. 103 nations including Bangladesh had voted in favour. Surprisingly

India and Pakistan were on the same side and were amongst 27 nations that had

abstained from voting.

Times have changed; the demand for water is growing. Dams and

megaprojects are known to disrupt the existing pattern of water use. Where people

depend on fish, flood plains or deltas for their livelihood, big dams can wreak great

havoc. Watershed eco-systems suffer and fragmentation of aquatic and terrestrial eco

systems cause growing threat to the ecological integrity is one of the many factors

impacting on the change in climate.

The growing rate of extraction of fresh water has put enormous pressure on

aquifers. Sedimentation causes the dams to lose storage capacity at an estimated rate

of 05-1 per cent per annum. In the next 25 to 50 years, 25 per cent of the existing

storage will have been lost mostly in the developing countries. In three Asian

countries -- China, India and Pakistan -- the water table is sinking at the alarming rate

of 1 to 2 metres a year. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Israel are the most water

stressed countries. Pakistan is close to Germany in being less stressed.

Today most of the countries are focusing their attention on management of

existing water resources including the dams. The effort involves rehabilitation,

renovation and optimisation. Demand side management and improvement of

efficiency of the existing supply are receiving greater attention.

There are bound to be difficulties for the countries of the region along the

way. However, inaction is not an option. If the waters in the basin are sufficient to

justify an equitable and just sharing of waters and the social, economic, political and

environmental impact of such structural intervention on common river systems is

manageable, then the project cannot be dismissed as being unfeasible. It will require

cooler heads in the spirit of give and take for the stakeholders in all the countries of

the region to grapple with hard choices. The outcome may yet produce a win-win

situation for everybody. The growing population of all the countries of the region,

which they have failed to control, imposes an obligation on their leaders to do

something substantial to avert the looming disaster of famine and poverty.


135

Forming a common front against India as being the largest country in the

region will be a self-defeating strategy. After all Pakistan did the unthinkable of

bartering away three of its six rivers for the sake of peace and amity in the largest part

of the subcontinent. The important thing to note is that the intervention of the World

Bank proved crucial to the culmination of the effort in the signing of the Treaty.

(Syed Shahid Husain has served as Secretary, Water and Power in the Government

of Pakistan and as Chief Secretary, Balochistan. Mr. Husain may be contacted at

[email protected])

BibliographylIndus Water Treaty 1960.lProfessor Hap Dunning , 'Water Law', in Water Resource Management, fourth

edition. l'Riparian Rights Case Summaries', Environment Probe. lIslam M. Faisal, 'Managing International Rivers in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-

Meghna (GBM)'.lJayanta Bandyopadhyay and Shama Perveen on Doubts over the scientific validity

of the justifications for the proposed inter linking of rivers in India. lMostafa Kamal Majumdar, 'River Linking and the Environment'.lDr. Sudhirendar Sharma, 'Interlinking Rivers , Whose Concern is it Anyway?'. lDr. Asif Nazrul, The RLP and International Law lDr. Uma Shankari, Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and Confrontations, A

Report on the electronic debate ([email protected])


136

Nepal: A Tragedy of Triple ConflictDr Bishnu Raj Upreti

I. IntroductionNepal is facing an unprecedented crisis in its modern history. The 'people's war',

started by a radical party, Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), since 1996 has

not only taken lives of more than ten thousand people and caused a loss of billions of

rupees of property, but also challenged centuries-old authoritarian regime and

structures. The circumstances in the current Nepalese polity are pointing towards a

'failed-state', i. e., sustained conflict between insurgents and the government has

displaced the constitutional regime and has paralysed the whole system of governance

with ruling elite incapable of finding a solution to both the constitutional crisis and

the Maoist insurgency.

Three communist parties, who believed in Mao's ideology and a strategy of

people's war, had formed Communist Party of Nepal-Unity Centre (CPN-UC), as a

'political front' to join the 1990s popular Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

(MRD). They wanted more radical changes through a constituent assembly to decide

the issues of constitution and monarchy. However, major MRD forces (Nepali 1Congress Party and United Leftist Front ) rejected the approach of convening a

constituent assembly demanded by CPN-UC. The negotiations between the king and

the major MRD parties led to a compromise on a constitutional monarchy.

Despite disappointment, the CPN-UC did participate in the 1991 national

election, won nine out of 205 parliamentary seats and became the third largest party

of Nepal. Their decision to participate in the parliamentary election was, however,

tactical to 'lay-bare the contradictions and limits of the parliamentary system' (Misra,

2004). The CPN-UC wanted to implement political programme within the strict

framework of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideology in accordance with the concrete

situation of Nepal. After one year of underground preparation for the 'people's war',

the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) was reorganised in 1995 who initiated

a 'People's War' in February 1996 (Philipson, 2002; Nickson, 2003; Thapa, and

Sijapati, 2003; Upreti, 2004). This armed conflict has severely shaken the existing

political structures and governance system established by the 1990s political change.

Prior to 4th October, 2002, there were only two visible power centres in the

conflict: Constitutional forces -- the king/parliamentary parties -- and the Maoists.

However, after the dissolution of the parliament and removal of the elected

government, the country is now divided among three forces: The Palace and pro-

monarchy elements; political parties struggling for the restoration of constitutional

rule; and the Maoists wanting a constituent assembly. However, the Maoists are in


137 138

2004). However, malpractice and irregularities observed in the 12 years of democratic

rule coupled with the deliberate regressive attempts by the palace and traditional

power centres to reverse the democratic process have caused disillusionment among

the people about the future of democratic governance.

The monarchists were able to penetrate the political parties and pursue an

undemocratic course to reverse the gains of the people. The undemocratic forces

succeeded in splitting the major political parties and the democratic movement

against regression (Thapa, 2003; Raj, 2004). Heterogeneous development and

mismatch of social and political is another fundamental cause behind the conflict

(Upreti, 2003). The following conceptual matrix presents this mismatch leading to

violent conflict in Nepal:

The Mismatch between Development Practices as Source of Conflict

Source: Adapted from Upreti, 2004

Of the three, political development is the most sensitive indicator of conflict if

it mismatches with the other two. In contrast, social development sans political and

economic development does not lead to overt conflict, while economic empowerment

alone leads to the further pursuit of economic wealth at least in the short and

medium-term. Low development on all three indices leads to latent conflict, which

may not erupt in violence for a long time. However, the grave potential for such

situations becoming violent remains strong, and even insignificant triggers may result

in a full-blown conflict. The 1990s’ popular movement is an example of manifestation

of this situation. The post-1990 empowerment phenomena shows that overall political

empowerment is high and social and economic empowerment is low and only elite,

and neo-elite, benefited from socio-political development. Nepal's planned

development has the proven history of grand failure (Pandey, 1999; Upreti, 2004) in

terms of addressing root causes of the conflict, providing fertile breeding ground to

the Maoist insurgency (Philipson, 2002; Raj, 2004; Upreti, 2004). Thus, it is

imperative that mismatch between social, economic and political development and a

lack of empowerment of the people are addressed.

IV. Ideological Basis There is strong ideological dimension to the Maoist conflict. Whether it is right or

wrong, the Mao's ideology and 'people's war' strategy propounded by Mao Zedong to

advantageous position vis-a-vis the newly-emerged power equation, as parliamentary

parties and the Maoists are willy-nilly moving closer and the Palace is distancing from

its traditional allies. Consequently, the republican slogans chanted by students and

workers and systematically raised by the Maoists from the beginning of their

insurgency, are finding concurrence on the streets. The parliamentary parties still

committed to constitutional monarchy are not able to side-track the demand for a

'republic'. This may lead to extended confrontation between the Palace and traditional

forces, on the one hand, and those who want a republic with no place for monarchy.

II. Causes of the Conflict Nepal was a monolithic, feudal, autocratic, centralised and closed state for centuries

(Thapa, 2003; Karki and Seddon, 2003). The governing system in the entire history

of modern Nepal was orchestrated by combining threat of suppression and use of

coercive power by the state (Kumar, 2004). Such characteristics of the state,

consequently, excluded vast majority of Nepalese people from the nation-building

process (Karki and Seddon, 2003; Thapa, 2003, Raj, 2004). Such a vast alienation of

the masses virtually became a breeding ground for the peasant insurgency in Nepal.

Rampant poverty, abject destitution, systematic and deliberate exclusion, multiple

caste, gender, and ethnic discriminations, and greater injustice helped fuel

insurgency. (Thapa, 2003; Karki and Seddon, 2003; Misra, 2004, Rana and

Sharma, 2004; Upreti, 2004). These causes are also accepted by the Dhami (1997)

and Deuba (2000) Commissions, which were constituted by the government to

recommend ways to resolve the conflict. The Maoists started their 'people's war' when

social conditions were ripe for that (Raj, 2004). According to the Maoists, 'the

principal objective of the people's war is, thus, to develop the social productive forces

and create a higher form of society through a continuous revolution… by putting

'politics in command' (Kumar, 2004). Therefore, the Maoists argue that they are not 2the problem but the solution to the problem facing the nation since long time .

In a context of complex conflict, like the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, it is very

hard to identify and separate causes and effects, as causes become effects and effects

turns into causes. However, the following interrelated causes can help analyse the

Maoist insurgency in Nepal and its consequences on the future of the state. III. Structural Causes Though political conflicts are an integral part of evolving system of governance

(Pahari, 2003; Kumar, 2004); failure to ensure public participation, evolve

mechanisms to resolve conflict and find ways to establish the writ of the state has

resulted in a deep crisis. Centuries-old relations of production, archaic social

structures and non-functional governance system maintained by the forces of past

aligned with the monarchy, severely skewed resource distribution and perpetuated a

system of injustice, racial, ethnic, geographical, gender and social discriminations,

rampant poverty and unemployment that have helped ignite the insurgency (Thapa,

2003; Thapa and Sijapati, 2003; Upreti, 2004). The 1990s’ popular movement was

the first attempt to dismantle this feudal system and some how succeeded in

containing the interests of the feudal elite and traditional power groups. But, the

traditional power centres continued to weaken the newly evolved democracy (Kumar,

Conflict Prognosis Political development

Social development

Economic development

Manifestation of effects of mismatch in Nepal

No overt conflict High

High

High

Never observed high level of all three developments

Greatest propensity for overt conflict

High

Low

Low

The situation of current conflict

Medium propensity for overt conflict

High

High

Low

Not observed yet

Existence of latent (not overt) conflict, which may require multiple triggers to emerge

Low

Low

Low

Observed during autocratic panchyat political system before 1990

No overt conflict (mainly urban phenomenon)

Low

Low

High

Existing situation in urban areas and city centres


139

rely upon and mobilise the people guides and shapes the Maoist insurgency (Thapa

and Sijapati, 2003). Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), insurgency of Peru, is also an

inspiring source for the Maoist in Nepal (Nickson, 2003; Raj, 2004). The CPN

(Maoist) is the founding member of the RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist

Movement) and CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and

Organisations of South Asia). Perhaps CPN (M) is the most influential member of

both the organisations. (It is yet to be seen whether the Maoists will, ultimately, take

a political course allowing pluralism or that of Pol Pot which depends, essentially,

upon the talks). {If the Maoists take the course of armed takeover of the capital they

may bring havoc to Nepal and end up as an isolated dictatorship; and if they are

brought into a pluralistic-democratic frame, they may help in the emergence of a

republic attuned to people’s needs (Editor)}. The 'people's war' of Nepalese Maoists is

ideologically influenced by RIM and CCOMPOSA (see box below).

Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South

Asia (CCOMPOSA)

1. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)2. Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)(People's War Group)3. Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)4. Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM)5. Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist)6. Communist Party of India (ML)(Naxalbari)7. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC)8. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punarghathan Kendra)9. Bangladesh Samyabadi Party (ML)10. Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist)

V. Triggers and Catalysts Triggers or catalysts are (such) events that initiate or fuel conflict (Upreti, 2004).

While looking to the Maoist conflict, several triggers or catalysts have tremendously

contributed to escalate conflict. Some of them are: i) Coercive approach Although the mal-performance of parliamentary parities was not the fundamental

cause behind the Maoist insurgency, failure to address causes of the conflict through

radical reforms and good governance practices during their tenure show that they

failed to come up to the expectations of the people (Upreti, 2004; Raj, 2004). They

never tried sincerely and honestly to address the root causes behind the miseries of

the people and to settle the conflict politically. Rather, they used the conflict as a

means to grab or share power in a system that was least responsive to the needs of the

people. They interpret the Maoist insurgency simply as a law and order problem and

attempt to control it by using force (e.g., cordon and search-Killo Sera II operation).

Special 'Armed Police Force' was created to control the insurgency. Later, they

imposed a State of Emergency and mobilised military to control the insurgency. The

government also declared the Maoists as terrorists, issued red warrants through

Source: Adapted from Upreti 2004


140

Interpol and fixed bounty on the heads of the Maoist leaders. Consequently, the

insurgency spread all over the countryside, mainly because of an extremely coercive

approach.

ii) Royal massacreThe royal massacre (in extremely mysterious circumstances) added another

complexity to the conflict. Immediately after the royal massacre, the Maoists publicly

declared that the conventional Monarchy had come to an end and the circumstances

had become favourable to install a republican setup in the country (Thapa and

Sijapati, 2004). They concentrated their efforts at undermining the new king and

weaken the monarchy. The royal massacre broke the myth of monarchy and created a

void and an environment for Maoist cadres to attract people and organise them

militarily to expand the base of insurgency.

iii) Terrorist attack of 11 September, 2001 The terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington

on 11 September, 2001 had direct impact on the Nepalese conflict. India, USA and

some other countries supported Nepal with arms, technology and military aid to

control terrorism. India also declared Maoists as terrorists and formally sealed the

border. The Nepalese government got strong support from India to control the

Maoists militarily. After 9/11, successive Nepali governments took an aggressive

course. This approach worsened the situation and the conflict was further aggravated.

iv) 4th October, 2002 The ambition of the new king to be assertive, proactive and not only to be seen but

also heard as a ruler of the 21st century Nepal and his subsequent action to sack the

elected government has pushed the country into a deep crisis, further exacerbating the

contradictions among the dominant elites. The king's action led to a deeper conflict

between the parliamentary parties and the monarch. The Maoists successfully

capitalised on the tussle between the king and the parliamentary parties to their

advantage. Mobilisation of security forces (police force, Royal Nepal Army, state

intelligence service) as a unified command under the Royal Nepal Army did not get

full support of political parties. All democratic and civil institutions have been

weakened. In the absence of a parliament, the country has been ruled by ordinances

and royal decrees. This has great bearing on the expansion of Maoists. Almost 80 per

cent of the country is said to be under the control of Maoist rebels at present.

v) Role of media In the past, particularly before August 2003, the Nepalese media had disseminated

sensational and escalatory news stories, instead of promoting peace. This has great

impacts in escalating conflict (Upreti, 2004). There was no code of conduct while

reporting the conflict. However, after August 2003, the role of media is becoming

more responsible and positive in promoting peace.

vi) International dimensions The role of major international and regional powers has been inconsistent,

contradictory and often produced opposite results. It is very hard to assess the exact


141 142

strategy of India towards resolving the Nepalese crisis. Its response towards the

Maoists has always been contradictory and created doubts. For example, handing over

some Maoist leaders arrested in Indian to the Nepalese government at one time, and

taking legal action in the Indian courts against the others; supporting the military

action, on the one hand, and insisting that the insurgency problem should be solved

politically, on the other. Major routes and sources of arms and ammunitions for

Maoists come through the Indian territories, but India is not doing enough to stop it.

India does not like the involvement of international mediation of the conflict and has

objected when UN showed interest in mediation.

The U.S. is another main international player in this conflict. It is more

consistent in its approach towards dealing with the Maoists. The U.S. wants to control

the Maoists militarily. Therefore, it is supporting the RNA in terms of financial and

material resources as well as by supplying military equipments and training. The

Maoists are also deadly opposed to the U.S. intervention. A vast majority of Nepalese

people deeply suspect the U.S. approach of dealing with the Nepalese conflict, as it is

worsening the situation instead of solving the problem.

The U.K. is also working with double standards in dealing with the Maoist

insurgency. It is supplying arms and war planes to the RNA but says it should be

resolved politically. However, the U.K. has shown greater concern for the violation of

human rights. United Nations, European Union, Amnesty International, Centre for

Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC are other major international actors devoted to resolve

this conflict politically. However, their efforts are constrained or their role is

minimised by the above-mentioned three international powers. Norway, Switzerland

and many other West European countries are also trying to resolve this conflict

peacefully but their role is again limited because of non cooperation from India and

the U.S. It is extremely hard to settle this crisis without full support from India.

However, India's role, so far, is not quite encouraging (Upreti, 2004).

vii) Attitude towards change

Power Dynamics and Attitude of Change in Nepal

The three major power centres have their own agendas of change shaped and

orchestrated by perceived risks, unfounded imaginations and unrealistic ambitions.

The establishment (the king and the post 4 October, 2002 nominated governments)

want to pacify and slow down the much-desired change by ordinary citizens,

especially. While perpetuating the status quo, the establishment makes the situation

worse in a political vacuum, instead of bringing the democratic process back on the

rail. The post-4 October, 2002 governing practices have demonstrated that 'guided

democracy' seems to be the ruling framework of the king where changes will be

regulated and controlled by him. Hence, major parliamentary parties are sidelined

from the mainstream politics and the nominated governments, whose legitimacy is

seriously questioned, have ruled the country through ordinances. The parliamentary

parties are also not ready to initiate a radical reform agenda as they failed to

implement their election manifestos when they were in power during the 12 years of

democracy. They want some change in a slow and incremental manner. Perhaps, amid

raised expectations for change by the Maoists, their agenda for change is too little and

too slow. The Maoists want to change rather quickly although not all people believe

the feasibility of their way of bringing change. In the current circumstances, none of

them would be able to achieve alone what they wanted, without the support of at least

another force. This is the real bottleneck which may not be solved and result in the

failure of all centres of power to resolve the crisis either way.

viii) Brutalisation of society One of the most serious implications of this insurgency is the widening of human

insecurity. Amnesty International and other national human rights organisations,

such as Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), have documented evidences on

severe human rights violations during the conflict (INSEC, 2003). Air bombardment

by the security forces (e.g., in Binayak and Mudvara VDCs of Doti districts) and mass

abduction of villagers and school children by the Maoists from their areas of influence

have created wide spread fear and uncertainty. Although no accurate data is available,

more than 300,000 thousand people are estimated to have been internally displaced.

Children, elderly people and women are the worst victims of the conflict.

ix) Denial psyche The individual and collective political psyche has so far preferred to ignore the reality

rather than accept the challenge (Upreti, 2004). A powerful defence mechanism, used

by all actors is the denial of reality. They deny the seriousness of the current situation;

afraid of admitting that their prevailing attitudes and practices are inappropriate and

causing problems, they feel even more obstinately defensive when Nepali people

confront them with evidence of their bad deeds and ask for change. In Nepal, denial is

rooted in the individual psyche and at the institutional level -- be they Maoists,

parliamentary political parties, the government or the king. Overcoming this

magnitude of denial requires replacing the ideas, values, greed, and orthodoxy with a

new set of ideas and values. If this paradigm shift in value system takes place, the

current conflict may turn into an opportunity for a fundamental reform of Nepali

society. There is also a growing feeling of injustice and revenge, as innocent people are

increasingly becoming victims to the conflict. Many people who were neglected by the

state are supporting the rebellion with the hope that their life will be better under the

Maoists' rule (Pahari, 2003).

x) Deep mistrustDistrust is pervasive across the present Nepalese politics and distorts political process

that fuels conflict. Trust plays fundamental role in a democratisation processes, to

Major power centres Intension to change and radical reform The King and the post-October 4

governments Parliamentary parties

Maoists

Resistant to change (guided practices)

Slow and peaceful change (democratic practices)

Quick and violent change (authoritarian)


143

promote civic engagement, public participation, mutual learning, concerted efforts for

negotiations and political stability (Upreti, 2004). When the civil war had pitted

Nepalese people against each other, hostility and suspicion were rife. Restoring

mutual confidence is needed on all sides to overcome distrust and to resolve conflict

in Nepal. Creating and maintaining peace require an active engagement of all actors of

society from ordinary citizens and security forces to politicians. Peace cannot be

achieved without addressing root causes of conflict and initiating a political and social

transformation process.

VI. Cost of Conflict In the name of controlling terrorism, successive Nepalese governments have sharply

increased defence expenditure, as shown in the following Table (1). Consequently,

funds for the social development have been diverted to unproductive military

expenditure. The total number of security forces has also sharply increased during the

period of insurgency.

Table 1 clearly indicates that the security expenditure has increased by almost 300 per

cent within 5 years (from 5.16 billions to 15.09 billions). Most of the increased budget

is shifted from the social sectors (health, education, etc.). Illegal trade, proliferation of

small arms and light weapons, criminalisation of trade and transit coupled with rural

crime have created a war economy.

Table 1: Defence Expenditure in Nepal (Rs. Billion/Year)

Year Royal Nepal Army (Rs.

Billion)

Police (Rs.

Billion)

Total (Rs.

Billion)

Annual Growth (%)

% of Regular Expenditure

% of Total Expenditure

% of GDP Nominal

1997/98 2.68 2.53 5.16

1998/99 3.03 2.92 5.95 15.3

1999/00 3.51 3.32 6.83 14.8 19.8 10.3 1.7

2000/01 3.90 5.27 9.17 34.3 21.4 11.5 2.3

2001/02 5.88 7.28 13.16 43.5 27.1 16.4 3.1

2002/03 7.50 7.59 15.09 14.7

Source: Rana & Sharma (2004).

Table 2: Estimated cost of conflict in Nepal (2001/02 & 2002/03) Expenditures/Loss Cost Direct cost Direct expenditure on security (Govt.) 39.63 billion (10% of GDP at factor

cost1) Maoist Armys Expense 1.94 2.13 Billion 4 Damage on physical infrastructures and banks

525 Billion

Sub total 66.63 Billion Indirect cost Loss in business due to strike and Banda (closure) 1 billion Loss due to decrease in the number of tourists inflow 11.05 billion Impact on the income due to damage in human resources

14.04 billion

Loss in income due to displacement 8 billion6 Loss due to shift of development expenditure to defence

12.30 billion

Impact on the direct foreign investment 6.05 billion Sub-total 52.44 Billion Total 119.07 Billion

Source: Rana & Sharma (2004).


144

Table 2 reveals the general scenario of cost of conflict in Nepal. This data is

for only 2 years and it might be increased even in higher proportion this year. The

state is also paying more than NRs. 1 billion as compensation for the loss of the lives

of the people at the hands of the Maoists. Reduction in tourism, business losses due to

strikes, sanctions by and control of rebels in their areas, displacement of economically

productive workforce, reduction of foreign investment, closing down of industries

have serious negative impact on the national economy.

VII. ConclusionThe Maoist insurgency is not the cause behind the failure of the 12 years of democracy

in Nepal. It is, rather, a reaction to the failure of 234 years of governance system of

modern Nepal. All three major power centres are on a colluding course which has

pushed the country into a deep crisis. All of them are prisoners of their own narrow

vision and one-sided approach, regardless of the fact, which they don't realise, that

the people want peace. The first and foremost need for ordinary Nepalese people is

peace and prosperity, freedom and functional multiparty democracy, which are to be

achieved through dialogue. The king imagines that guided and regulated democracy

under his assertive leadership is the will of Nepalese people and they support him.

Civic receptions organised by the government in different parts of the country might

have further strengthened his imagination. He might have perceived that he is the

best choice among three power centres, as the parliamentary parties have already

failed and the world does not support the Maoists. October 4, 2002 royal takeover and

subsequent actions is the clear reflection of this imagination. His reliable constituency

for this new experiment is among traditional forces like the army and royalist

Panchas. However, the 19-month direct rule of the king has demonstrated that this

experiment, as expected, did not produce desired results.

The parliamentary parties think that they are the true representatives of the

Nepalese people because they are elected by them. However, they are not yet able to

realise that their behaviour in the past 12 years (April 1990 to September 2002) had

deeply annoyed the Nepalese people. Parliamentary parties alone are not fully

responsible for what is happening at present. However, they are responsible for not

playing a constructive role in resolving the Maoist conflict. Their course of action

during past 12 years was shaped by the powers that be who wanted to weaken

multiparty democracy, create and maintain instability in the country and strengthen

the traditional position of the palace.

The Maoists, on the other hand, have a false sense of supremacy and have

opted for a dangerous course of action. They feel that what they are doing (change

through the barrel of gun) is acceptable to the Nepalese people and they can change

the state structures through violence. They ignore the fact that the conflict has caused

over 10,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. They

are not able to understand that their Maoist project is out of pace with the world and

is totally isolated. They have caused misery and will bring greater misery in a country

with no developed productive forces. Most people will not disagree with the social-

change agenda of the Maoists on social and economic issues. However, most people


145 146

will disagree on the approach they took to bring these changes.

It is not possible to resolve this conflict militarily, whatever support USA,

India and U.K. may give to strengthen the military capacity (ICG, 2003a &b). The best

way of resolving this crisis is to address the structural causes, i.e., fundamental

restructuring of the state, economy, polity and society. The armed rebellion brought

century-old problems to surface, empowered ethnic minorities, backward and

suppressed people, women, dalit, and poor sections of society to seek their rights and

severely challenged the status quo of the traditional elite and power centres. This

insurgency has also tremendously raised the expectations of the people, such as ethnic

minorities that could lead to ethnic conflicts and separatism, if not properly tackled.

At present, the country is facing unprecedented crisis and all executive power

is concentrated in the hands of the king. Therefore, the king must take an initiative to

overcome the triangular conflict and settle the Maoist insurgency through a

negotiated process. For that to happen, the parliamentary parties and the Maoists

should agree to a minimum agenda to force the Palace to come to terms with the

aspirations of the people.

(Dr Bishnu Raj Upreti is a conflict management specialist and Director of Friends

for Peace, a Kathmandu-based Peace Resource and Research Centre. Dr Upreti is

available for feedback on [email protected]).

End Notes1. United Front was formed by seven communist parties of Nepal to make the MRD successful.

United Front and Nepali Congress Party worked together to restore multiparty democracy.2. See Bhattarai Baburam, ‘Maobadi Samasya ki Maobadi Samadhan’ (Maoist problem or

Maoist solution) in B. Bhattarai, Barta ra tatkalin rajnatik nikas ko prasanga (The

question of contemporary political resolution through negotiation), (Kathmandu: Pawan

prakasan, 2003). 3. Including foreign aid for security expenses (US Aid: 1.33 billion; UK: 780 million; India: 3.2

billion and additional 1.6 billion rupees).4. With adjusted estimates of Rs. 2 billion for Maoist army expenses.5. Loss due to damage in infrastructure construction: 20 billion.6. Loss due to closure of agriculture production and cottage industries. BibliographylCPN (Maoist) 2058. Policy and Programme of URPC, 2058 BS. lInternational Crisis Group (ICG) 2003a. Nepal Obstacle to Peace. Brussels/Kathmandu:

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Strategic Pause, 10th April 2003 Brussels/Kathmandu: ICG. Research No 50lINSEC 2003. Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2003. Kathmandu: INSEC. lA. Karki and D. Seddon (eds.), The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives, (New Delhi:

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study of Nepal’, at Nagarkot, Feb 21-22, 2004.lD. Thapa (ed.), Understanding the Maoist Movement in Nepal, (Kathmandu:

MartinChautari, 2003).lD. Thapa and B. Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to

2003, (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003).lB. R. Upreti, The Price of Neglect: From Resource Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the

Himalayan Kingdom, (Kathmandu: Bhrukuti Academic Publications, 2004).lB. R. Upreti, ‘Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Nepal’, A Background Paper

prepared for the Human Development Report 2003 of UNDP Nepal, (Draft), 20053.

J. Mackinlay and B. R. Upreti, ‘The King and Mao’, The World Today, (London: Royal


147

Absurdity of Nuclear DeterrenceAchin Vanaik

uclear strategists are a strange breed. These are people who devote most of their Nthinking not to the task of how best to de-legitimise and get rid of nuclear

weapons but to justifying their possession, operationalising their threat and, if

considered necessary, organising their actual use. This community has two branches.

Sitting on one branch are those who pay lip service to eventual global nuclear

disarmament. But it is just lip service -- for it is only the far horizon of their thought

and, therefore, is of little consequence for the actual preoccupations that constitute

their fundamental political contributions. On the other branch are those who no

longer pay even such lip service. We have nuclear weapons. They will never go away.

We have to live with them now and forever. But both branches are connected to the

same trunk. Basically, they share a common mind-set, and the dominant

characteristic of this mind-set is its inability or unwillingness to think deeply about its

own highly problematic foundational assumptions and its preference to preoccupy

itself with thinking as comprehensively and cleverly as possible within the framework

of those accepted assumptions. It is, of course, from the ranks of just this community

of strategic experts in India and Pakistan that the loudest and most frequent voices

are raised in support of the claim that nuclear weapons are to be welcomed because,

through the 'wondrous' workings of deterrence, they enhance the stability and security

of the countries (India-Pakistan) and South Asia.

I. Nuclear Weapons and Security Claimsi) Uncovering illusions

A simple enough way of highlighting the problematic character of such claims for

the efficacy of nuclear weapons in South Asia after the 1998 tests in India is to

look at the early predictions/claims made by the prominent supporters of those

tests (the pro-bomb lobby) who, in one way or the other, were able to enter the

domain of public discourse in India. Each and every such prominent member

made at least one of the following predictions. Very few made all of the below

listed predictions. Most made more than one of these predictions. Pakistani anti-

nuclear activists can, no doubt, draw up their own list of failed predictions/claims

made by their country's pro-nuclear lobby.

a) Mutual nuclear deterrence would now ensure that there would not be any

danger of an actual nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. During the

Kargil conflict of 1999 some of these very predictors now publicly argued that

Pakistan would not dare attack India with nuclear weapons because the U.S.

would not allow Pakistan to do so. The justification had shifted from the efficacy

of mutual deterrence to the powerful restraint imposed by the U.S. on an


148

otherwise not-to-be-trusted foe. Others declared that there could not be a

guarantee that Pakistan might not resort to nuclear weapons although given

India's greater nuclear firepower this would be foolish on its part. Nevertheless,

India had to be prepared just in case. In effect, in the context of a war-like

situation, one-time confident proponents of deterrence efficacy exhibited a much

more diluted sense of confidence in the power of mutual deterrence.

(b) The advent of nuclear weapons in both countries would now prevent even

conventional wars from taking place. Kargil took place partly because of the

thinking that Pakistan possessed a 'nuclear shield' behind which they could take

new risks on the conventional warfare front. To be sure, Pakistan started the war

but shouldn't our 'strategic experts' have exhibited less trust in the efficacy of

nuclear weapons in this respect? Obviously, at the time (just after the 1998 tests)

their priority was drumming up any and all arguments for supporting bomb

acquisition.

(c) Nuclear weapons would bring in greater regional stability and better relations

between India and Pakistan. Despite the recent thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations

for reasons that have nothing to do with nuclear weapons, in a broader historical

survey, the period since 1998 was marked by a war in Kargil, a level of massive

military mobilisation-brinkmanship of a kind that has never taken place between

two countries in peacetime since 1947, a failed summit, verbal expressions of

hostility between the two governments reaching new lows, attempts to play off

the U.S. against each other, continued impasse in Kashmir.

(d) Since nuclear weapons would prevent conventional warfare, as well as bring

about greater stability, expenditure on conventional forms of military defence

and preparedness would soon be reduced. Defence expenditure in India, in real

terms, has greatly increased and most pro-bomb advocates would say this is

unavoidable because nuclear weapons cannot address the needs that

conventional weapons address.

(e) There would be no competitive nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

The former President of India, K. R. Narayanan, was far from alone in publicly

and repeatedly declaring that there was no danger of a competitive arms race

between the two countries. One searched in vain for pro-bomb advocates who had

the grace or the honesty to say that although there was bound to be action-

reaction preparations between the two countries, i.e., a competitive arms race of

some sort, this would be managed and controlled, but not prevented or

preventable. Both countries would be stockpiling fissile materials, extending

missile ranges, drawing up target plans, and so on. Which is, of course, what did

happen.

(f) India would only have a 'minimum credible deterrent'. There can be no stable

'minimum deterrent', since this is never a fixed position but a moving one

connected to the preparations and arsenal development of one's presumed

opponents. Further complicating the picture is the Indian desire to have such a


149 150

deterrent vis-à-vis China (some voices even call for preparing such a deterrent

vis-à-vis the U.S.) which propels Pakistan to worry about how minimum its

deterrent should, or can be. Meanwhile, U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

development will push China to consider expanding and developing its arsenal

with all the knock-on effects this can be expected to have on India and Pakistan.

The end result in India is that lots of pro-nuclearists talk of only having a

minimum but when it comes to specifying what this means, vagueness,

imprecision and uncertainty abound.

(g) Nuclear weapons would make India more independent - nay - defiant of the U.S.

in its foreign policy behaviour. The most striking characteristic of Indian foreign

policy behaviour since 1998 vis-à-vis the U.S. is its subservient character and the

near-desperation with which Indian governments are wooing the U.S. and

wanting a 'strategic partnership' with it wherein the terms can never be those of

genuine equality or partnership (given the enormous asymmetry of power

between the two, regardless of India's nuclear weapons) but must basically be on

the lines established by the much more powerful country, the U.S. Despite all

declarations to the contrary and self-delusions disguised by calls to serve the

needs of 'national interest', India has behaved with obsequiousness towards the

U.S. once it accepted India as a de facto nuclear power; but one which

Washington is determined to maintain at the level of a 'small nuclear power'

(SNP). The point is not whether India is now justified or not in seeking a strategic

alliance with the U.S. but that this earlier confident declaration has been

disproved by subsequent turn of events. Nor is it enough to say that the U.S. has

taken India more seriously after 1998. It has done the same with Pakistan after

September 11, 2001.

(h) A nuclear India with now enhanced bargaining power would actually help the

cause of global nuclear disarmament by strengthening the momentum towards

it. In a context where the post-1998 'nuclear India' does not possess the courage

to come out forcefully against the BMD and instead is manoeuvring for some

contract crumbs on offer from the BMD-TMD programme as a whole, the less

said about this ridiculous claim the better. It is tantamount to claiming that the

best way to nuclearly disarm is to nuclearly arm! This is as silly as it sounds.

ii) A triad of views and former ambiguistsWhen, in mid-2003, India finally called off its 10-month long massive military

mobilisation along the border with Pakistan and began the process of reducing the

tensions it had unnecessarily ratcheted up earlier, a revealing episode took place. The

then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, declared the mobilisation a great success.

India had, in effect, called Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff'. India had shown that it was not

afraid to risk war or teach a lesson militarily to Pakistan. General Musharraf, on the

other side, was equally quick to declare that Pakistan's nuclear weapons, far from

being a bluff, were the key reason why India 'backed off' and did not militarily attack

Pakistan. In effect, he had, through his nuclear arsenal called India's bluff. The BJP-

chosen presidential candidate at the time, A. P. J. Kalam, while on his campaign trail

and when asked by the press for his opinion, publicly declared that nuclear weapons

had prevented the outbreak of conventional war between India and Pakistan despite

the massive mobilisation. In effect, to the embarrassment of his BJP backers, he was

publicly endorsing the claim made by Gen. Musharraf himself. The BJP had to quickly

announce that this was Mr. Kalam's personal opinion not shared by the BJP. Shortly

after this, the retired former Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V. P. Malik, publicly disputed

both the claims of Mr. Vajpayee and of Mr. Kalam. Nuclear weapons, he declared,

were irrelevant to the issue of conventional war and could not deter such wars. They

could only deter nuclear exchanges and wars.

What is revealing here is that three senior figures all believe that nuclear

weapons are efficacious but they cannot come to an agreement about what they are

efficacious about or the range is over which their 'wondrous' deterrent properties

work. They not only disagreed with each other in a concrete historical situation,

showing that the outcome of a specific historical context still does not give a decisive

answer to claims and counter-claims made even by the members of the pro-bomb

lobby, which otherwise shares a belief in the general efficacy of nuclear weapons, but

actually and forcefully, contradicted each other. In its own way, this episode

highlighted precisely this dilemma about the essentially problematic nature of efficacy

claims made for nuclear deterrence.

Just as revealing is what happened immediately after the Pokharan II tests of

May 11, 1998 when long-time nuclear ambiguists suddenly became nuclear advocates.

These were people who before May 11 had argued in favour of India's posture of

ambiguity, of neither closing the nuclear option or of exercising it. When they were

ambiguists for longer periods, in many cases over decades, they justified their position

by positing both the deterrent potential of nuclear weapons and by pointing out the

limitations and weakness, even fallacies, of nuclear deterrence thinking and

arguments. After May 11, having endorsed the tests, they could now only base their

case on the 'undeniable' deterrence value of nuclear weapons. The last thing they

would wish to do, and for the most part avoided doing, is highlighting the problematic

nature of nuclear weapons and the limitations of deterrence thinking because that

could only weaken the case they were now propagating in their new role as

unwavering supporters of nuclear weapons acquisition. Salesmanship had effectively

overtaken intellectual scrupulousness.

iii) Abstractions of nuclear deterrenceAll claims for the efficacy of nuclear weapons rest on the presumed properties of

deterrence. Deterrence arguments at their most rigorous provide an utterly abstract

logic to explain why countries that have nuclear weapons will not engage each other in

a nuclear war. The case made for nuclear weapons through the acceptance of this

logic, carries serious flaws.

1. The argument is coherent only within the strictest and most demanding conditions

of rationality of behaviour, which are unavailable and inoperable in the real world

we live in. To believe that nuclear deterrence can be relied upon to 'always work' is

to impose extraordinary conditions on the key agents concerned, namely those


151

who control, command and man the nuclear weapon systems of the countries

having them. Nuclear deterrence is the faith-like belief that terrible fear (of the

consequences of nuclear war) will always promote wise decisions by fallible human

beings operating under conditions of sometimes extreme tension and always

operating under circumstances that neither the side seeking to deter or the side

supposed to be deterred can ever fully control. Deterrence is hope disguised as

strategic wisdom.

2. The abstract logic of deterrence -- being abstract -- applies universally. That is to

say, the same fundamental arguments and efficacy claims apply everywhere and

for all countries that have the capacities to make nuclear weapons. If having

nuclear weapons enhances the safety of one country with actual or potential

nuclear opponents, they do so for all other countries having actual or potential

nuclear opponents. Very few nuclear strategists (Kenneth Waltz is a partial

exception) are prepared to be so consistent as to endorse all countries having the

capacity to do so to actually go ahead and possess such weapons because they

would presumably make their regions and the world in general safer. Most

strategists and pro-nuclear thinkers retreat from the demands of such an abstract

logic, and from the factitious world of super-rational human beings and super-

controlled environment that this logic assumes, to the real world, where horizontal

proliferation of such weapons to other parts of the world is seen as de-stabilising

or dangerous. Such strategists and supporters of the bomb for their own country

are intellectually 'irresponsible' in being deeply inconsistent. They hypocritically

combine the use of the abstract logic of deterrence to justify their own country's

acquisition of nuclear weapons but parade a more sober sense of 'responsibility'

and a much more down-to-earth (rather than abstract) sense of reality in

recognising the dangers involved by such proliferation elsewhere.

3. The abstractness of the case made for the efficacy of nuclear weapons means it is

also a strongly de-historicised, de-socialised, indeed de-politicised, way of thinking

about the impact and implications of nuclear weapons in the world we live in. To

make the case for nuclear weapons logically consistent and highly rigorous

requires constructing a case that must not be embedded in an actual or living

politics that, of course, is always historicised and socialised. That is why so much

of nuclear strategising takes the form of game-theoretic, rational choice modelling,

which for all its incidental insights and chess-like attractions to devoted

practitioners, is effectively a retreat from thinking seriously and sophisticatedly

about the actual world we live in. Like a lot of neo-classical economic theorising,

there is quite sophisticated argumentation by economists (and nuclear strategists)

at secondary and tertiary levels, but it is encased within a broader framework of

extraordinary foundational and empirical inadequacy.

Given this abstract character, it is hardly surprising that nuclear strategists and

run-of-the-mill bomb supporters are invariably one kind of realist or the other.

Realism, here, does not imply being highly realistic; in fact, far from it. It refers to

the formal label for a particular school of thought (and its various branches)


152

concerning how to understand international relations. Realism, whether

understood as theory or paradigm or even as merely a world-view, is also marked

by its fundamentally ahistoric and asocial character. Realism is basically a crude,

but within severe limits also useful, manual for the conduct of foreign policy

statecraft for strong or aspiring powers. It is a manual divided essentially into two

parts -- one part providing the language of apologetics for governments; and the

other providing rough guidelines, a tool-kit of do’s and don'ts, that can then help

operationalise foreign policy behaviour.

4. Nuclear deterrence logic addresses concerns about nuclear war prevention. But it

does not at all adequately address another issue that is also a basic motivation for

countries acquiring nuclear weapons -- wanting such weapons because they are

seen as instruments of power for general foreign policy support. Quite apart from

the issue of how useful nuclear weapons (as such putative instruments) are, what

this means is that their possession, development, deployment, brandishing and

flaunting is always embedded in a politics that has little to do with issues of basic

nuclear survival, and far more to do with the issue of how best to enhance the

state's political or foreign policy 'advantages', 'authority', 'power', 'status', etc. The

idea that nuclear weapons must only be treated as 'instruments of last resort' is

thus vitiated from the very beginning. They are never treated as only that! What does this imply? First, it means that between politically hostile nuclear rivals

like India and Pakistan, there invariably arise situations of nuclear-related

tensions not because either side actually wants to use nuclear weapons against the

other but simply because nuclear weapons are themselves embedded in the logic of

confrontational politics and not in some unreal, abstract logic of 'deterrence

behaviour' models. Nuclear-related tensions emerge out of the very fact of nuclear

weapons possession. A new layer of tension is thereby added to the levels of

tension between politically hostile rivals that pre-exist the advent of nuclear

weapons. This, in itself, is a standing refutation of the standard pro-nuclear claim

that nuclear weapons reduce tensions and enhance stability and security. Second, the greatest danger of nuclear weapons use lies in the 'escalatory dynamic'

that always resides in real-life political crisis situations for which the reassurances

provided by the abstract logic of deterrence are either misleading, or at best,

irrelevant. The chain of events that threaten to erupt in circumstances of political

hostility between nuclear-equipped rivals goes like this: political hostility does lead

to periodic crisis situations that all too often carry an escalatory dynamic which

has the potential to reach the level of actual nuclear exchanges. The very point

about an escalatory dynamic is that escalation beyond a point is rarely deliberate

and controlled but indeed its opposite -- taking on an essentially uncontrolled and

'reactive' character on both sides. A situation of dangerous uncertainty is thereby

reached which neither side to begin with had any desire or intention of reaching

whatever the later, post-crisis/post-facto, self-serving rationalisations might be.

This is the crucial lesson of the Cuban missile crisis and indeed of the various crisis

situations of the past between India and Pakistan. No one should claim that such a


153 154

situation will definitely lead to a nuclear exchange or that it will never ever do so.

But it must be recognised that this chain of developments with its in-built

tendency towards an 'escalatory dynamic' most certainly exists.

5. The claim that nuclear weapons bring stability and security ultimately rests on a

foundation that cannot properly bear the weight of such a judgement. Nuclear

weapons are supposed to have provided enhanced security and stability because

after their acquisition there has been no nuclear war. Why has there been no

nuclear war or exchange? This is because nuclear deterrence works. How do I

know it works? Because there has been no nuclear war or exchange.

There are two crucial problems with this 'enhanced security' claim. First,

there is the counterfactual nature of the claim itself whereby it cannot be either

definitively proved or refuted. This being so, the case for and against its

efficaciousness must be decided on the basis of a 'balance of plausibility' keeping in

view the coherence of the arguments themselves and whatever illuminating historical

evidence there is. Here the anti-nuclear case wins hands-down, i.e., it is much more

plausible.

Second, there is not just an extreme or merely 'breakdown' test of whether or

not nuclear weapons bring security. There is another more routinely applicable,

continuous and pervasive test that exists quite apart from the 'breakdown' issue: do

nuclear weapons actually make rival countries hostile to each other more secure? Was

this the case between the U.S. and USSR during their hostile Cold War past? The

same between India and Pakistan and between Israel and, say Iran, tomorrow? Will

the future development and deployment of the BMD by the U.S. and its impact on

Russian and Chinese nuclear preparations and developments make matters more

secure? The very diffuseness, generality and partial intangibility of the notion of

security means there is no universally acceptable answer to this question. But once

again, the 'balance of plausibility', given the actual evolution of the world we live in --

the insane levels of actual nuclear weapons production, storage, deployment, R&D,

proliferation -- favours the anti-nuclear side, not the pro-nuclear side.

In this regard, it may be noted that George Lee Butler, the head of the

Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the U.S. between 1991-94 (the one person the U.S.

president had to speak to before pressing the nuclear button), and one-time staunch

believer in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, on retirement declared that the honest

truth was that throughout the Cold War period, the nuclear establishment of both the

USSR and US did not feel secure, hence the absurd character and levels of their

nuclear preparations, but deeply insecure. There is, in fact, one piece of evidence

favouring the anti-nuclear case that, though not clinching, is certainly revealing -- the

proportion of defectors from the one-time pro-nuclear side to the anti-nuclear side is

far greater than the opposite flow of defectors. It is probably around 25-30 times

greater. Admittedly, this usually happens after retirement (itself revealing about the

relationship between deterrence advocacy and the pressures of careerism) but the

number has included the topmost civilian and military 'nuclear warriors' of the past,

now repudiating that past.

II. Moving Towards Nuclear SanityWe cannot stabilise a nuclear regime in South Asia. Nuclear weapons destabilise the

security conditions between rival nuclear-equipped countries like India and Pakistan

and the region (South Asia) where they exist cheek-by-jowl. Of course, one can fully

expect the two governments of India and Pakistan to make such stability claims. But 1that does not mean we should take this seriously. The tenuousness of such stability

claims can be easily perceived by just asking ourselves what would most likely happen

in South Asia if the U.S. government decides to carry out nuclear testing once again!

As long as nuclear weapons exist, you can only try and make the situation less

unstable and less insecure by transitional measures such as nuclear risk reduction.

These are transitional measures because they cannot, in themselves, make the region

nuclear safe; in fact, they make it only less unsafe. Genuine and enduring nuclear

safety comes from being 'nuclear free' regionally and globally. There is no substitute

for nuclear disarmament and to believe that we must always 'live with nuclear

weapons' is to make a grievous mistake. Interestingly, and perhaps revealingly, the

most serious efforts by South Asians to elaborate on nuclear risk reduction measures

for India and Pakistan in the public domain, have come from the ranks of opponents, 2not defenders, of nuclear weaponisation in South Asia. Moreover, there is an

unavoidable trade-off between the strongest demands of nuclear safety (avoiding

accidental or unauthorised detonation or launching) and the strongest requirements

of deterrence 'readiness'. This being so, it is best to come down on the side of greater

safety through de-mating and substantial time-absorbing separation of warheads and

delivery systems.

However, risk reduction is not a substitute for moving towards regional

disarmament, as well as promoting a process of global disarmament. Cynics who

think all talk of disarmament is utterly far-fetched tend to forget that countries like

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have disarmed as indeed South Africa; while others

like Brazil and Argentina have renounced threshold status and yet others like Libya

have renounced the search for such weapons capability. Even North Korea has clearly

expressed its willingness to go in for fully verifiable and complete nuclear

disarmament if only the U.S. would agree to a non-aggression pact against it. The

point is that it is the mind-set of certain leaders, not anything else, which constitutes

the biggest stumbling block towards taking serious steps of actual nuclear

disarmament.

The Pakistani and Indian governments have made proposals and counter-

proposals to each other since 1998 regarding issues like ‘No First Use’ (NFU), regional

nuclear disarmament, a non-aggression pact. Whatever the reservations on both sides

concerning the 'bad faith' of the other and the play of diplomatic one-upmanship

involved, since these proposals have entered the domain of official pronouncements,

they should be explored. Pakistan should move towards adoption of NFU. India

should tighten its current ‘no-first-use’ commitment (which reserves the right to use

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states as retaliation against use of other

weapons of mass destruction) and both countries should not violate the spirit and true

purpose of such a commitment by developing tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons.


155

India should move towards a non-aggression pact with Pakistan. After coming to

power, General Musharraf has repeatedly suggested publicly his willingness to move

towards regional de-nuclearisation, partly as a way of conducting diplomatic one-

upmanship but also because 'non-nuclear parity' between India and Pakistan has

always been more attractive to Pakistan than to India, despite the growing belief in

Pakistan that their nuclear arsenal is valuable for countering India's conventional

superiority. This path should be explored but it is unrealistic to expect the current

nuclear establishment in India to do so without a sea-change in mentality that only

longer-term processes can hope to bring about. If Pakistan's bomb was, and is, India-

centric, the Indian bomb has been sought after for purposes beyond 'deterring'

Pakistan.

There are two other stabilising measures that can and should be considered.

First, both countries should agree to a certain non-deployment zone on both sides of

their common border wherein there will be no presence of missiles or aircraft that

could carry nuclear warheads or bombs. Second, there is every reason why both

countries should consider declaring Kashmir (all of it on both sides of the border) as a

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). In practical terms it costs nothing to either

government since neither side has actual nuclear-related deployments in this area.

But its political implications are considerable. Apart from reassuring the people of

Kashmir, it reassures the rest of the public of both countries as well as sending a

message to the rest of the world that both governments are committed to not letting

Kashmir become a nuclear flashpoint. This should also appeal to the pro-bomb

lobbies on both sides (especially on the Indian side) that feel irritated by the

assumption of so many others that after 1998, Kashmir is being seen as just such a

'hot spot'. It also becomes a significant, original and remarkable political contribution

to easing Kashmir-related tensions between the two countries. Nor does such a

declaration of all of Kashmir as a NWFZ imply any retreat from official government

positions concerning their respective claims of sovereignty over the region in dispute,

while at the same time also appealing to Kashmiris because of its implicit recognition

of the distinctiveness of their region and the problems besetting them.

Finally, there are ways of exploring how to bring in the governments and

societies of the neighbouring countries of South Asia -- Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri

Lanka into the process of addressing the nuclear problem. India and Pakistan see the

bomb issue as their issue and not something that these other governments and

societies should concern themselves with, beyond giving their endorsement to what

the two countries did in 1998 and what they have done since. But this is a South Asian

issue. In a nuclear exchange, radiation is no respecter of formal territorial boundaries.

There is a broad agenda of activities and proposals that can be explored, discussed

and pursued by civil society activists and groups in the neighbouring countries to put

pressure on their own governments and through this pressure create political

difficulties for New Delhi and Islamabad. Matters worth seriously exploring are the

possibilities of Bangladesh and/or Sri Lanka joining an extended Bangkok Treaty or

the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) or Nepal considering the

emulation of Austria and Mongolia as independently declared 'nuclear-free nations'.


156

Given existing circumstances, we cannot expect short-term or even medium-

term success. But despite the possibility of being accused of making wish-list

suggestions, these can, nevertheless, serve as signposts that point out the direction

and journey we must take. Insofar as the politics of nuclearism is embedded in the

wider (historicised and socialised) politics of India-Pakistan relations, we have to

address the four main barriers preventing a positive transformation of relations

between the two countries.

1. Pakistan has to move towards the stable institutionalisation of democratic rule,

i.e., an end to the decisive power of a military that has always had a strong vested

interest in periodically promoting an anti-Indian nationalism as a self-serving

justification for its own authority and role in preventing the establishment of

genuine democracy at home.

2. India has to move towards a permanent stabilisation of the secular and

democratic character of its own polity, which means above all, decisively

defeating the profoundly authoritarian threat presented by the most pernicious

internal force independent India has ever faced -- the forces of the Sangh Parivar.

One of the foundational pillars on which the whole political-ideological construct

of the Sangh rests is anti-Muslimness. Reactionary Muslim fundamentalist forces

in Pakistan are anti-Indian but they don't have to be anti-Hindu. Reactionary

right-wing Hindu communal forces in India are not merely at some level or the

other anti-Pakistani; they also have to be anti-Muslim. Such right-wing reaction

on both sides represents a serious obstacle to lasting friendship or even long-term

peaceful coexistence between both countries.

3. India and Pakistan have to move towards each other independently of the U.S.

The U.S. presence in the region is not a boon to either country, whatever the

short-term and pragmatic considerations of New Delhi and Islamabad might be.

The U.S. presence in Central, South and West Asia is part of its global Empire-

building project for which it perceives India and Pakistan has serving quite

separate needs and interests and therefore seeks to suborn both countries but in

different ways. Defeating this larger U.S. imperial project is vital. But this

requires the kind of profound revision in the foreign policy of the two

governments, vis-à-vis the U.S. -- precisely what is not in the least visible in either

of the two capitals in South Asia. The current triangulated relationship between

the U.S., India and Pakistan benefits primarily the U.S.

4. There can be no political stabilisation of South Asia without a just resolution of

the Kashmir issue. The emphasis here is on the word 'just'. The Indian and

Pakistan governments should disabuse themselves of the notion that there can be

a stable resolution of this problem without providing a considerable measure of

justice to the people of Kashmir. And pursuing justice for Kashmiris means this is

not an issue wherein any solution can emerge through purely bilateral

negotiations between the two governments or even through external third party

mediation via the UN or the U.S. (which will develop its own 'regional

perspectives' on how Kashmir should fit into its wider geo-strategic plans). The


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serious search for a just, and, therefore, stable solution of the Kashmir issue will

require bringing in the independent (not government controlled or manipulated)

representatives of Kashmiris on both sides of the border into the framework of

deliberations about the future of Kashmir. Neither government, whatever their

public declarations of concern for Kashmiris, has so far been prepared to promote

this development in any serious way.

Since this paper started off with some reflections on the mind-set of nuclear

strategists and later pointed out its connections with the broader realist mind-set

regarding the understanding of international relations, it will also end with some

general reflections in this respect. The kind of politics for South Asia we need to think

about and engage in is not the kind that will emerge out of the restricted imagination

of conventional 'realism'. This can only provide a more or less managerialist

perspective, rationalised and justified in the name of a restricted conception of politics

as the art of the possible. Here, the vision of what constitutes the possible is flawed by

a strong presentist bias and a narrow and strongly state-centred conception of how

changes take place in the world we live in. Realists are accurately described as

basically 'sentimentalisers of the status quo' and 'worshippers of the accomplished

fact'. We have every reason to be grateful that those in Palestine opposing the brutal

and vicious occupation by Israel and those in Iraq and elsewhere opposed to the

Empire project of the U.S., and on whose struggles the eventual prospects of Israel

and the U.S. will be decisively determined, have mind-sets so very different from the

'realist' members of the foreign policy establishments of India, Pakistan and

elsewhere. What we need in South Asia is a transformative political imagination that

has a wider conception of what the forces of change are, where and how to work for it,

and a very different conception of the possibilities that exist in and through political

behaviour. Here the spectrum of political operation is not the space defined by

conventional notions of the 'art of the possible' but the space that exists between the

rejection of the pursuit of the probably impossible and the endorsement of the pursuit

of the improbably possible.

(Achin Vanaik is a prominent Indian political commentator and long-time anti-

nuclear activist. Mr. Vanaik can be contacted at [email protected])

End Notes1. Expert-level talks on nuclear confidence building measures held in New Delhi on June 19-

20, 2004 claimed: ‘Recognising that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based

on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability.’ This formulation

was repeated in the statement after the meeting of the two foreign secretaries in New Delhi

on June 27-28, 2004.2. R. Rajaraman, M. V. Ramana, Zia Mian, 'Possession and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons

in South Asia: An Assessment of Some Risks' in Economic and Political Weekly, (Mumbai,

June 22, 2002). See also, 'Nuclear risk Reduction Measures between India and Pakistan',

the title of a pamphlet publicly released by the Movement in India for Nuclear

Disarmament (MIND), May-June 2002.

Lahore DeclarationMedia and Reconciliation

in South AsiaSAFMA: South Asia Free Media Conference-IV on ‘Media and Reconciliation

Processes in South Asia’November 20-21, 2004

he media persons from the South Asian region met in Lahore, Pakistan, on

November 20-21, 2004, at South Asian Free Media Association's 4th South Asian TFree Media Conference on 'Media and Reconciliation Processes in South Asia'. After

having exhaustively analysing the state of negotiation processes between India and

Pakistan, New Delhi and Dhaka, Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Elam (LTTE) and the crisis in Nepal while critically evaluating the role of media

on these processes in each member country of SAARC and reflecting upon the

independence of media in the post-9/11 situation and the bloodshed in Iraq arrived at

the following broader understanding:

a. Reiterating our commitment to peaceful resolution of all inter- and intra-state

conflicts in South Asia through sustained and productive dialogue while rejecting

the use of force, both by state and non-state actors, and coercive or sham

diplomacy to solve differences and disputes as enshrined in SAFMA's Kathmandu

Declaration on 'Media and Peace', New Delhi Declaration on 'Interstate Conflicts

in South Asia' and Colombo Declaration on 'Intrastate Conflicts in South Asia'; b. Recalling our resolve to rise above the national, ethnic, religious and ideological

divides while performing our professional duties as reporters, opinion makers,

producers and compares without indulging in acrimony, falsification,

demonisation, jingoism or embedding with respective officialdoms; c. Restating our adherence to the roadmap and Guidelines adopted by SAFMA's

conference at Dhaka on 'Regional Cooperation in South Asia' that show the path

to all-sided regional cooperation in the best interests of all countries of the region; d. Appreciating joint statements of January 6th and September 24th issued by

Pakistan and India initiating composite dialogue, stopping cross-border

infiltration and repression, exploring all possible options on Kashmir to find a

solution to the satisfaction of peoples of Jammu and Kashmir and India and

Pakistan and, simultaneously, normalising relations, taking confidence-building

measures in all spheres and expanding areas of bilateral cooperation; e. Considering that the slow pace of negotiations between India and Pakistan,

suspension of ongoing negotiation process between Sri Lankan government and

the LTTE, failure to initiate reconciliation, in Nepal, and inability of New Deli and

Dhaka to put together a comprehensive negotiation framework to iron out

differences and find mutually beneficial solutions to the disputes is causing


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anxiety among the people; f. Taking note of a set of options proposed to open a debate on the Kashmir

imbroglio by President Pervez Musharraf, reduction in troops deployed in J&K

announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and confidence building

measurers being proposed by the two governments regarding Kashmir, including

proposed bus services between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, Jammu and Sialkot; g. Concerned about the deadlock over resumption of dialogue between the

government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE; h. Cognizant of serious differences between Bangladesh and India over cross-border

infiltrations, re-demarcation of certain points of border, including numerous

enclaves, redistribution of water and issues of trade, etc; i. Worried about the continuing political and constitutional crisis in Nepal, Maoist

insurgency, delay in resumption of dialogue between the Maoists and the

government and the Palace and the political parties; j. Taking a serious exception to the pretext of using inter and intra sate conflicts or

war against terrorism to clip civil liberties, introduce draconian laws, suppression

of the democratic aspirations of the people, violence against the civilian

population, especially women and children, who often become a victim in the

crossfire of parties to the conflict;k. Appreciating the voices of sanity for peaceful resolution of conflicts from the civil

societies and the media while expressing disappointment over those sections of

media still embedded to the so-called 'national consensus' or respective

establishments; l. Welcoming the visit of Pakistani journalists across the Line of Control and return

visit by the journalists to this side of LoC that have set a good precedence to open

all 'no-go areas' to journalists; m. Encouraged by the decision of the last SAARC Council of Ministers' meeting to

associate SAFMA as an Associate Body of SAARC and an assurances given by New

Delhi and Islamabad regarding liberalisation of visa regime for the journalists

across South Asia, and announcement by the Ministry of External Affairs of India

to relatively relax visa for the Pakistani journalists with the hope that the

announcement made by President Pervez Musharraf at this conference allowing

multiple-entry visa valid for the whole country to the journalists from the

countries of South Asia will be implemented;

The Conference resolves that: 1. The peoples of South Asia have suffered too much and for too long due to inter-

and intra-state conflicts. Some disputes are perennial that sustain hostility and

proliferate ancillary disputes to further complicate the prospects for regional

peace and postpone the agenda of regional cooperation and economic integration

as envisaged by SAARC; 2. Rejecting all violent means by any party to resolve inter and intra state conflicts,

this conference endorses peaceful approaches to resolving all disputes and

differences through meaningful, sustainable and productive negotiations; 3. In pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations, there is always a need to

manage and defuse the conflicts and take confidence building measures that are

crucial to creating an enabling environment for the resolution of core disputes


160

and addressing real causes behind the conflicts;4. Looking beyond the traditional notions of security and focusing on cooperative

security, the South Asian nations must act in their self-enlightened interest to

ensure security within their states and beyond their borders at the regional level

while avoiding to exploit an intrastate conflict in any manner; 5. The choice is not between conflict resolution and regional cooperation: the only

way out is to simultaneously move forward in finding solutions to the political

disputes and expanding all avenues of economic and cultural cooperation, both at

the bilateral and regional levels, while allowing greater interaction among the

people, especially free movement of journalists and media-products across

borders as proposed by the SAFMA Protocol;6. All reconciliation processes and negotiations have to be even-handed, attuned to

the priorities of the parties to the conflict, balanced, productive and mutually

beneficial, and need to be framed and phased in a manner that the interlocutors

continue to benefit from the process and are able to move forward; 7. As nuclear powers, putting at risk the entire region, India and Pakistan must

respect the desire for peace of their peoples and not let them down by slipping

back into their old official postures; it would require approaching the outstanding

issues with flexibility of approach and innovation, especially with regard to

Jammu and Kashmir; the ancillary disputes should be quickly resolved to create

an environment favorable to the resolution of perennial dispute; 8. As Indo-Pak composite dialogue enters its second phase, it is essential to remind

the interlocutors to avoid beating about the same bush and outlive the habit of

perpetuating stalemate and the belligerent tendency of not making any

concession or compromise, and the need to be more flexible, creative, adjustable

and pragmatic in a spirit of give and take. The New Delhi conference had resolved

that the confidence building measures should be taken while simultaneously

examining various proposals regarding the Jammu & Kashmir issue with a

sincerity of purpose. There was a consensus that Kashmiri interests and

aspirations needed to be addressed by the governments; the representatives of

Kashmiris from both parts should be consulted so that a viable solution from

which all parties felt they had gained could emerge; 9. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-

Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pak water disputes since Regional Riparian

statutes are obligatory under RRR statute model respecting Helsinki Convention

that envisages 8K upstream and downstream rights; 10. Recent cooling of Indo-Bangladesh relations is a mater of concern; New Delhi's

complaints of Dhaka's alleged 'help' to militants from India's North-east and

Bangladesh's concern over India's 'refusal' to correct the trade imbalance and

differences over the river-linking project by India seem to have strained their

relations; while India should do more to remove tariff barriers on exports from

Bangladesh and take Dhaka into confidence over the river-linking project, both

the countries must take each other's security concerns more seriously and prevent

cross-border hostilities;11. The political conflict in Sri Lanka, that has assumed an ethnic form due to the

marginalisation and exclusion of ethnic minorities, cannot be resolved with a


161 162

mind set of an already defined majoritarian-hegemonic state, nor can a distinct

Tamil political identity in north-eastern region be recognised, without ensuring

equality to other ethnic and religious minorities, territorial integrity of the state

and stopping human rights violation from all sides and guaranteeing the rights of

minorities. In the interim, the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 need to be

strengthened and the urgent needs of the people of the war zone, including the

rights of the minorities, necessitate the establishment of an interim

administration structure without further delay;12. Reviewing Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Letters exchanged in 1950 and

1965, there is a need to effectively regulate Nepal-India border to stop cross-

border activities that are detrimental to peace and security of the two counties.

The Maoist conflict cannot be solved militarily and, therefore, calls for a

negotiated settlement that can happen only if the constitutional forces reach an

agreement to bring the constitutional process back on the rail and the Maoists are

brought on board to settle the conflict on a democratic basis. There is an urgent

need to stop violence and violations of human rights by the security forces and the

Maoists. 13. The states of South Asia have to collectively face up to the challenges such as low

river-water discharges and global trade disparities in order to prevent the birth of

a new inward-looking era in which each sate fends for itself in the face of

essentially collective problems. 14. Call upon all the governments and the parties to the conflicts, be they inter or

intrastate, to respect internationally recognised fundamental human rights and

democratic aspirations of the people;15. Appeal to the South Asian media fraternity to join hands in reinforcing the values

of independence, sanity, sobriety, objectivity and neutrality of their profession to

strengthen the reconciliation processes in South Asia, encouraging open debate

and dialogue to create room for flexibility and compromise, rather than becoming

instrumental in the hands of officialdoms or a prisoner of respective rigid national

standpoints.

Delhi DeclarationResolution of Interstate Conflicts in South Asia

(Declaration of South Asian Free Media Association's (SAFMA) Conference on ‘Interstate Conflicts in South Asia’, October 9-10, New Delhi)

ournalists from South Asia met in New Delhi on October 9-10, 2004 at the South

Asian Free Media Association's Conference, to deliberate on 'Interstate Conflicts Jin South Asia'.

Reiterating SAFMA's commitment to a peaceful settlement of all disputes and

differences among states as emphasised by the Declaration issued by the Second

South Asian Free Media Conference held at Kathmandu, January 1-2, 2002.

Reaffirming our principled position as defined by the SAFMA's Guidelines for

South Asian Cooperation;

The main obstacle to improving connectivity remains political. The prevailing

barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial nor logistical sense and

originate in the pathologies of interstate, as well as domestic politics. The political

leaders of South Asia should, therefore, dismantle the political barriers to free

movement of people.

South Asian nations should look beyond the traditional notions of security

and focus on cooperative security. This notion recognises the profound condition of

interdependence that binds South Asia and calls on the states of the region to act in

their own enlightened self-interest to resolve the current problems facing them

through peaceful means.

In South Asia, the choice is often posed between regional cooperation and

conflict resolution. We urge all states to simultaneously move forward to address

long-standing political disputes and intensify economic cooperation and people-to-

people contact.

The Conference on Interstate Conflicts reached the following

understanding:South Asia has lagged behind the rest of the world in the resolution of its regional

disputes that have led to conflict and threaten its peace in the future. Some of the

disputes are perennial and maintain interstate hostility at a steady boil. Other issues

crop up regularly as a result of this hostility, further complicating the prospects of

regional peace and postponing the agenda of regional economic integration envisaged

at SAARC.

There is a need to address these disputes urgently in order to stop a virtual

proliferation of ancillary disputes, especially in a changing regional-ecological and


163

global environment. The states of South Asia have to face up collectively to challenges

such as low river-water discharges and global trade disparities in order to prevent the

birth of a new inward-looking era in which each state fends for itself in the face of

essentially collective problems.

The SAFMA Conference noted with satisfaction the new efforts by India and

Pakistan to discuss their bilateral issues in a composite dialogue while taking

measures to normalise relations. Meetings between the leaders of the two countries

have ushered in a period of unprecedented hope, raising the expectations of the

people on both sides of the border. As nuclear powers putting at risk the entire region,

India and Pakistan must respect the desire for peace of their respective peoples and

not let them down by slipping back into their old official postures. This would require

approaching the outstanding issues with flexibility of approach and innovation,

especially in regard to Jammu & Kashmir. The lesser differences should be quickly

resolved to create an environment favourable to the resolution of the main issue.

Delegates to the SAFMA conference were agreed that India should make

more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its neighbours problems relating to river

waters. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve

Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water disputes. The conference

noted that India-Sri Lanka relations had improved and that their bilateral free-trade

agreement could serve as a model for a SAARC free-trade regime.

On Indo-Nepal RelationsCountries of the GMB region are encouraged to conduct the preliminary survey of the

technical feasibility of the proposed 'NIBB Water Ways: 21st Century Project'. NIBB

Water Ways is a vision to develop navigation (shipping) starting from Bay of Bengal to

Koshi Tappu and other riparian cities. Regional Riparian Statutes are obligatory to

resolve Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water disputes. RRR statute

model respecting Helsinki Convention proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights.

SAFMA suggests:lTo review the 1950 treaty and letters of exchange in 1950 and 1965. lTo effectively regulate and manage Nepal-India border to stop cross-border

criminal activities, detrimental to the peace and security of both countries.lTo educate, implement, promote and maintain water harnessing in a broader

perspective so that the poor living standards of the potentially rich subcontinent

can be upgraded. lResolving the political crisis through a process of negotiations and engagement of

all sides to restore democracy and peace in Nepal.

On Indo-Bangladesh RelationsThe SAFMA Conference noted with concern the recent cooling of relations between

India and Bangladesh over several issues. India's complaints of Dhaka's 'help' to

militants from India's North-east and Bangladesh's concern over the Indian 'refusal'

to correct the trade imbalance and over the river-linking project in India seem to have

particularly strained relations between the two countries.

The Conference recommended that India should do more to withdraw the

tariff barriers on the export of Bangladeshi goods to India. It also suggested that New


164

Delhi take Dhaka into confidence over the river-linking project. The Conference also

recommended that Bangladesh and India take each other's security concerns more

seriously and act on them.

On Indo-Pakistan RelationsThe conference warmly appreciated the January 6th and September 24th (2004)

Joint Statements issued by the leaders of India and Pakistan and called on both

countries to implement them in letter and spirit. It expressed the hope that

confidence-building measures will be taken while simultaneously examining various

proposals regarding the Jammu & Kashmir issue with a sincerity of purpose.

On KashmirSAFMA welcomes the positive and constructive tone of the meeting between

President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in New

York, and the jointly expressed determination to engage in constructive and

meaningful dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir without preconditions. In that

spirit the SAFMA Conference discussed several alternatives on Kashmir for going

ahead with the dialogue. The conference concluded that the twin processes of

normalizing relations between India and Pakistan and, simultaneously, addressing

the Kashmir issue with vigour. Stabilisation of Indo-Pak relations and confidence-

building measures will, however, deepen trust and facilitate progress on Kashmir.

There was a consensus that Kashmiri interests and aspirations needed to be

addressed by both governments. It was felt that the representatives of Kashmiris from

both parts should be consulted by the respective governments. The SAFMA

conference generally agreed that only a solution from which all parties felt they had

gained would be viable in the long run.

On Sri LankaThe Conference strongly endorsed the view that the return of peace, harmony and

prosperity to the people of Sri Lanka calls for the sustained pursuit of the peace

process that has been initiated. Unsettling developments that have marred the process

in the past must not be allowed to impede its progress.

On Stabilising the South Asian Nuclear RegimeAppreciating the already agreed upon measures intended to stabilise the South Asian

nuclear regime, the conference proposed the following additional measures:

lKashmir should be declared a nuclear-free zone through a bilateral Indo-Pak

agreement.lBoth India and Pakistan must ensure that missile deployments (conventional or

nuclear capable) do not directly threaten the other side.lBoth sides should ensure that in crisis situations, direct communication channels

remain functional. In addition to the arrangements in place and measures which

have already been suggested, such channels must operate at other key levels of

diplomacy and governance.

However, SAFMA reiterates its opposition to all weapons of mass destruction

and commits itself to strive for their elimination.


165 166

Colombo DeclarationIntrastate Conflicts in South Asia

SAFMA Regional Conference on ‘Intrastate Conflicts in South Asia’, 5 - 7

November, 2004, Colombo, Sri Lanka

e the media persons from the countries of South Asia having deliberated on Wconflicts within the states at the South Asian Free Media Association's

Regional Conference on Intrastate Conflicts in South Asia in Colombo, Sri Lanka,

from November 5 to 7, 2004, reached a broader understanding on the following lines:

1. South Asian countries are beset with a variety of intrastate conflicts that often

develop into interstate conflicts due to ethno-religious overlapping across

geographically contiguous or too close frontiers, such as an ethnic conflict

between majority Sinhala-Buddhist and minority Tamil-Hindu communities in

Sri Lanka, communal and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan and India, mini

insurgencies of the indigenous peoples of North-East for their self-assertion in

India, Maoist insurrection for the rights of the rural and disposed people and

constitutional crisis in Nepal and the resistance of indigenous people of

Chittagong in Bangladesh. 2. The fact of the matter is that all these conflicts have been caused due to the denial

of fundamental rights and aspirations of and discrimination against the people

who happen to be in minority and have either been marginalised or excluded from

the nation-building, political, social, cultural, economic and developmental

processes that have been designed to suit, with varying degrees, the cultural,

lingual, religious, economic and political interests of the majority community in

mostly multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies. 3. In almost all these instances of the intrastate conflicts, the majority communities

took the road of aggressive nationalism, based on the consensus among the

majority community, or communalism/sectarianism which has been exclusionary

and chauvinistic that often resorted to the armed repression of the struggle for

equal rights and resistance to authoritarianism. 4. On the other hand the minority communities, be they ethnic or religious, have

continued to resist all kinds of discriminations at various levels and, on denial of

their right to peacefully resist, had to resort to violent means to face the armed

repression by the state or forces from the majority community.5. Even the countries like India and Pakistan, who took the opposite courses of

nation-building, the dominant tendency was essentially over-centralisation or

authoritarian as far as the rights of the deprived communities are concerned.

Despite subscribing to opposite ideologies, India and Pakistan could not fully

ensure the rights of minorities and strengthen pluralism due to various

majoritarian versions of nation-building or democracy. Communal and sectarian

conflicts have continued to sadly reflect upon the plight of religious minorities.

Even if a secular state like India pursued a secular polity, the forces of religious

revivalism, Hindutva or its soft versions, played havoc with the life and property

of the minorities, as demonstrated by the demolition of Babri mosque and the

Gujarat pogrom. Despite being created in the name of faith, Pakistan maltreated

its ethnic majority, the people of Muslim Bengal, that resulted in the breakup of

the country and the minority sects from within Islam became a victim of

discrimination practiced by the state and attacks by the extremists from the

majority sect. Rise of religious revivalism, communalism and extremism in

Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is increasingly threatening the

minority religious communities or sects with adverse affects on non-extremist

character of South Asian societies. 6. A lack of respect for the identity, exclusion from the mainstream and

marginalisation of certain religious and ethnic communities, castes, ethnic and

the poor, caused a backlash among the dispossessed and disfranchised people that

took an exclusivist form to resist the forcible assimilation and integration. 7. In these conflict situations, communal and ethnic divides, the people from the

oppressed and deprived communities suffered most, especially non-combatant

civilians, women and children. No less disappointing is the fact that, as these

communities were forced to resort to arms in some cases, such as Tamils of Elam,

the armed wings of these resistance movements also showed intolerance to the

non-combatant civilians and badly treated the minorities living under their areas

of influence. 8. The interstate conflicts, suspicions and differences among the states of South Asia,

such as between India and Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka and India and

Bangladesh, encouraged the respective states to use, with varying degrees, the

intrastate conflicts and differences of the adversary to their advantage, thus,

further exacerbating the intrastate conflicts. 9. These conflicts have had not only distorted the whole processes of nation-

building, socio-economic development, but have also retarded growth, increased

incidence of poverty and caused greater miseries to the people since the scarce

resources have increasingly been diverted to military security at the cost of human

security. No less devastation is caused to the environment, ecology and culture of

the indigenous people. 10. As is always the case in such situations, the greater sufferer of these conflicts has

been the women who had to pay greater price at the hands of the parties to the

conflicts, even if certain movements did encourage women to play a relatively

greater role. 11. In these conflict situations, the media, with few laudable exceptions, also became

partisan and got divided on chauvinist lines while becoming a tool in the hands of

dominant interest groups and their ideologies or competing nationalisms. No

doubt the media practitioners had to suffer casualties and victimization while

performing their duties in the conflict situations, most of them have not tried to

rise above the 'us' and 'they' divides and have often followed the official line or so-

called 'national consensus' sacrificing neutrality, objectivity and independence.


167

On NepalThe Maoists conflict cannot be solved militarily and therefore, calls for a negotiated

settlement. But that can happen only if the constitutional forces including the king

and the political parties come to an understanding on the question of bringing the

constitutional process back on the rail.

It is also time that Maoists sincerely prove that theirs is a political movement

which respects the rights and existence of dissent within as well as outside their

movement. Maoists should accept peace and dialogue as the way to seek legitimacy of

their objectives. Equally necessary is a total stop on human rights violation by both

the security forces as well as the insurgents so as to create a situation for dialogue.

On IndiaThe problem of insurgency in northeast India was because of two reasons: a) a weak

sense of Indian nationalism among the people of the region, particularly those who

inhabit the hill areas and b) large-scale illegal immigration into the northeast that has

been going on since centuries. The first cause is rooted in history. The people of

northeast India lived in isolation till the coming of independence. They remained

outside the sphere of the great Indian national movement and so they never got the

opportunity to identify themselves with the Indian ethos.

To remedy the situation it was felt that the government and the policy

planners should take into account this historical distortion. It was also felt that the

Indian media had a huge role to play as far as integrating the people of the northeast

are concerned. The media should give more coverage to affairs concerning the

northeast people so that the psychological and emotional gaps between the northeast

people and mainland India are bridged.

07 - Interstate Conflicts in South Asia

Documents

new regional understanding

interintrastate conflicts

people of south asia

indopakistan water disputes

regional riparian statutes

regional cooperation

negotiation process

states of south asia