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Transcript
My Experience
with an Australian Grid
BIMAL K. BOSE In my long professional career that has spanned over 40 years, I have
handled many technical consulting projects from industries. These
include settling technical disputes among corporations and complex
failure studies in plants with power electronics equipment. I would like
to share with the readers my experiences regarding one particular
project—hopefully they will find it very interesting.
While in my office one morning, I received a telephone call from
someone in Australia informing me of a fault that had occurred in the large
cycloconverter drive of a mining ore-crushing mill. Around midnight, when the
mill was running at full load, there was a roaring thud—followed by the mill
shutdown and blackout of power supply. Extensive damage occurred to the sys-
tem, and the plant shutdown led to a severe economic loss for the company.
FIGURE 6 –Dual cycloconverter synchronous motor drives for the ore-grinding mill (a simplified diagram).
DECEMBER 2011 n IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE 15
machine is rated at 6 MW, eight-pole
and 0–210 r/min speed range corre-
sponding to the frequency range of
0–14 Hz. Both the motors are con-
trolled to operate at an identical
speed and share the load torque
equally under all conditions.
Because of the phase shift of 30�between the delta and wye phase
groups, the two CCV units receive
gate-firing pulses with a phase skew
angle of 30� (1.67 ms). The advantage
of the phase shifting operation is to
reduce the harmonic orders in the
primary line current. With a six-pulse
operation of each CCV, ideally the
line current has a 12-pulse wave
shape, i.e., the harmonic orders are
11th, 13th, 23rd, 25th, and so on. The
machines do not have any damper
winding and their field excitation is
controlled by the thyristor rectifier.
The motor shafts contribute torque
to the respective pinion through a
mechanical torque-limited coupler
(TLC), and the pinions drive the ring
gear that is coupled directly to the
grinding mill drum as shown in the
figure. Also, the direction of rotation
of the pinions and ring gear in the
motoring mode is shown in the fig-
ure. The TLC limits the shaft torque
to the pinion and decouples the load
if the torque exceeds the safe limit.
The TLCs are shown by dotted lines
because these were not originally
connected.
The speed and torque of each
drive unit is controlled by vector or
field-oriented control with accurate
tracking so that the respective pinions
carry identical driving torque. A sim-
plified control block diagram with the
explanatory phasor diagram is shown
in Figure 7, where all the symbols are
standard [3]. The speed control in the
outer loop generates the torque com-
mand that then generates the torque
component of current IT� as shown in
the figure. The machine always oper-
ates in the constant torque region
with the stator flux (ws) as constant.
The orthogonal relation between ws
and IT and the corresponding flux link-
age relations shown in the phasor dia-
gram are difficult to maintain in the
transient condition because the field
current (If ) response is sluggish. With
the increase in the torque command,
the shortage in If is compensated by
temporarily injecting magnetizing cur-
rent IM from the stator side. Since
I�f ¼ I �M=cos d in the steady state, a
sudden increase in the torque angle dby an increase in the torque command
will increase I�f . But the response
delay of If will cause a finite I �M trying
to maintain constant ws. As If builds
up, IM decreases until it vanishes to
satisfy the steady-state phasor dia-
gram at unity DPF. The motor has a
position sensor, but all the other
feedback signals are estimated from
the machine’s terminal voltages and
currents [3].
Cycloconverter Commutation
Faults and Protection System
The reliable CCV operation on the
grid mainly depends on satisfactory
commutation of the thyristors, which
in turn is dictated by the supply volt-
age waves, as discussed before. Un-
fortunately, the utility power supply is
not 100% reliable. The common causes
of commutation failure are as follows:
n very low supply voltage [defined
as undervoltage (UV)]
n supply voltage interruption by
open or short circuit
n transients in supply voltage
n very high line inductance (Lc) (long
line or new transformer added)
n very high load current.
With the exception of the supply
interruption, the commutation fail-
ure normally occurs in the inverting
mode, as discussed before. Although
in the present system, the CCV is
operated near unity DPF, there will
be always a small angular interval of
the inverting mode operation (see
Figures 4 and 5). The load current
(except the fault condition) is con-
trolled by feedback loops. In the nor-
mal open- or short-circuit condition
of the supply, there is no voltage for
commutation, and therefore, commu-
tation failure occurs easily. In the sup-
ply open-circuit condition, however,
the commutation may be successful if
capacitor or counter electromotive
force (EMF)-type loads remain con-
nected on the power line.
When commutation failure occurs,
both the incoming and outgoing thyr-
istors continue to conduct. This will
short circuit the line voltage, and
therefore, fault current will build up. If
subsequent thyristors are fired by the
gate drive circuit, short circuit will
occur in all the three phases building
up large fault current. The fault will
be normally fed by the synchronous
machine EMF (the motor will act as a
generator, where the grinding mill
inertia supplies the energy) as well as
the power line. The machine gener-
ates the EMF due to its speed and field
excitation, and the line voltage will
feed the fault through the transformer
if the line circuit breaker is closed. If
the line CCB is opened under the fault
condition, the fault current fed by the
machine will attenuate due to large
transformer self-inductance (instead
of usual leakage or commutating in-
ductance). The scenario will be some-
what similar for line open-circuit
conditions. For the symmetrical short
circuit of the line, the fault will be fed
by the machine with the transformer
leakage inductance in the circuit.
Note that the instants of commuta-
tion fault of the two CCVs are different
because of a 30� phase-shift (1.67 ms)
operation. Therefore, fault develop-
ment and the resulting fault current
profiles will be somewhat unsymmet-
rical in the two CCVs. Again, at the
fault condition, the control system
operation is erratic in nature and the
performance prediction becomes ex-
tremely difficult.
The large fault current at the
commutation failure is usually alter-
nating and unbalanced in the three
phases with a decaying dc compo-
nent. Since the machines remain fully
excited, this current interacts with
the field flux to generate a large pul-
sating or oscillating torque. This tor-
que is transmitted to the grinding
mill through the respective pinions
and ring gear. Again, because of the
asymmetry of the faults between the
CCVs, the pulsating torques are out
of phase. The pulsating torques can
easily overload the pinions and ring
gear causing severe damage. The
plant mechanical system coupled to
16 IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE n DECEMBER 2011
the machine shafts is normally char-
acterized by multimodal natural fre-
quencies of torsional oscillation. The
pulsating torque frequency spectrum
can have a frequency component
near a natural frequency so that the
applied torque will be magnified by
the resonance condition, thus con-
tributing to more damage. There may
be some amount of damping in the
electrical circuit and the mechanical
elements, but the system is generally
underdamped. If the gate drive re-
mains activated with the erroneous
operation of the control system, the
fault scenario will be much more
complex. Eventually, the overcurrent
protection will trip the line breaker
and the fault current will become
zero when the machine stops.
The CCVs and machines in Figure 6
were designed to be robust enough
to withstand the commutation fault
successfully without causing any dam-
age. Thyristors have a large thermal
capacity so that large transient fault
currents can flow without exceeding
∗ Im∗
cos δIr =
ωr∗
ψe∗
ψs
ψsψr
ψe
ωr
ωr
SpeedCommand
+ +– –
P-I P-ITe∗
Te
IT∗
IM∗
Im∗
IT
IT
IrIT
IM
Im
IM
IM
+
+
+
+
–
–
–
–
P-I
P-I∗Vm
∗Vc
∗Va∗Vb
∗VT
cos α
cos δ
cos δ
δ
cos θo
sin θo
sin α
34 ac Line
VR Cylcoconverter
Ir
Ir
Ir
ia, ib, ic
va, vb, vc
×
÷ WFSM
Flux Program
+ –P-I
P.S.
qoqo ′
θe
θe
Io
vs
α = θe + δ
d s d e
d e ′π2
q s
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 7 – (a) A simplified control block diagram of a cycloconverter-synchronous motor drive with (b) a phasor diagram.
DECEMBER 2011 n IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE 17
the safe junction temperature (TJ )
limit. The machine windings also have
a large thermal time constant. The
drive motor shaft is also robust enough
to absorb large pulsating torque. The
shaft was actually designed to with-
stand nine times the rated torque on
the drive end and 4.5 times on the non-
drive end.
The CCV theory is generally well
documented in books [2], [3] and
published literature. However, CCV
failure modes and the corresponding
generation of fault current, pulsating
torque, and torsional oscillation of
the mechanical system are very com-
plex, and the information is available
only on a piece-meal basis [4]–[6].
Generally, CCV drive manufacturers
make internal study based on the
particular system configuration, and
the information is available only as
internal documents. To have a pro-
per understanding of the fault per-
formance and to effectively design the
protection system to prevent any
damage in the plant equipment, it is
necessary to have systematic system
analysis, modeling, and computer sim-
ulation study of the drive system
along with the plant mechanical sys-
tem under fault conditions. Unfortu-
nately, such a study is laborious, time
consuming, and expensive and is
hardly done by the manufacturers.
The CCV drive system in Figure 6
was designed with the following
protections:
n Undervoltage Protection: If the sup-
ply voltage falls below 85% of the
rated value, the thyristor gate
pulses are blocked, and at the
same time, the line breaker CCB is
tripped. However, the CCB restarts
automatically (in case, restart is
enabled) if the voltage level ex-
ceeds 90% within 200 ms. This is
the only CCV protection for malop-
eration of the power supply.
n Overcurrent Protection: In a well-
grounded condition of the drive,
the load current is controlled to
be within the safe value by the
feedback control. In case of over-
current due to the CCV fault, the
CCB and gate pulse inhibit are
activated as mentioned previously.
n Transformer Differential Protec-
tion: This protection detects the
difference in the two CCV input
currents and trips the system, if
the magnitude difference exceeds
a certain limit.
n Earth Fault Monitoring: If a stator
phase winding is shorted to the
stator core (ground) by insulation
failure, it trips the system as afore-
mentioned. One-phase earth fault
is not a problem, but if two phases
have earth faults, the load short
circuit occurs that tends to cause
commutation failure.
Note that the utility system fre-
quency rarely falls below a small
fraction of a hertz. Besides, underfre-
quency in a grid does not affect the
commutation process as long as the
voltage waveforms are sinusoidal
with adequate magnitude. Therefore,
underfrequency protection is not used
in the grid-connected CCVs.
Grid-Connected Cycloconverter
Drive with Cogeneration from
Gas Turbine Generators
The present CCV drive system is con-
nected to the grid in parallel with
a cogeneration system as shown in
Figure 8. The radial grid line at 132 kV
is 310 mi long. It is stepped down to
33 kV by a transformer and con-
nected to the bus through a circuit
breaker CB1. Since the grid line has
limited power capability and is sub-
jected to reliability problems, the
local cogeneration by a private com-
pany is added for the reliable op-
eration of the grinding mill. The
cogeneration system uses two gas
turbine generators at 11 kV (40 MW
each) and feed the 33-kV bus
AustralianPower GridOre-Grinding
Mill CCV Drive
CCB
33 kV
CB1td
33 kV Bus33 kV Bus
310 mi 132 kV
Grid Supplyto Grinding Mill
CB249 Hz, td3
CB4CB3
CB5
47 Hz, td447 Hz, td4Future
Low-FrequencyProtection
(UnderfrequencyProtection–Added Later)
49.5 Hz, td5
UndervoltageProtection85%V, td2
11 kV
40 MW EachG3 G2 G!
Gas Turbine Generators
FIGURE 8 –Grinding mill operation on the Australian grid with local cogeneration from thegas turbine generators.
The turn-off angle is crucial for the successful
turn-off of the outgoing thyristor.
18 IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE n DECEMBER 2011
through the respective transformer
and circuit breaker. A third genera-
tor is planned for the future expan-
sion. The waste heat of the gas
turbines is used for space heating.
Suffice it to say that the protection
system of the CCV drive should be
designed such that it operates satis-
factorily for all the possible power
supply malfunctions, either in the
combined grid operation mode or
islanding mode with the cogenera-
tion system. All the protective
elements should have proper co-
ordination. The actual protections
in Figure 8 can be summarized as
follows:
n grid line breaker (CB1)—over-
current protection, time delay
td ¼ 10 s
n gate pulse inhibiting (both CCVs),
td1 ¼ 1:67 and 3.33 ms, respec-
tively (worst case)
n CCV breaker (CCB)—undervolt-
age protection, 85% voltage, td2 ¼150 ms þ low-pass filter (LPF)
n underfrequency protection, 49.5 Hz,
td5 ¼ 150 ms (added later)
n cogeneration system breakers:
1) line breaker (CB2)—low-
frequency back-up protection,
49 Hz, td3 ¼ 10 cycles þ 500
ms þ LPF
2) generator breakers (CB3 and
CB4)—low-frequency protection,
47 Hz, td4 ¼ 200 ms þ LPF
where LPF filters are the primary sig-
nal with a typical delay of 100 ms.
Problem Diagnosis
One night when the CCV drive system
of the grinding mill was operating at a
full load with the grid and cogenera-
tion system in parallel, there was sud-
denly a very loud bang/thud in the
mill, which lasted approximately 1 s. It
was then followed by the mill shut-
down and a power supply blackout.
The damage in the mechanical system
(including pinions and ring gear) was
extensive. It was found that this
scenario occurred simultaneously
with the gas supply failure of both the
turbines in the cogeneration plant.
Then, the investigation started with
all the recorded evidences to study
the problem and suggest a solution.
The study indicated that there
was, in fact, a commutation failure in
the CCVs, and the protection system
did not work. The study also indi-
cated that although the mechanical
system damage was extensive, there
was no damage at all to the CCVs and
drive motors. Apparently, the CCV
drive system was designed to be
robust for any commutation fault, as
mentioned previously. However, evi-
dently, as discussed before, the com-
mutation failure caused excessive
pulsating torque and the resulting
torsional oscillation caused the
mechanical damage. It appeared that
the manufacturers designed the
equipment and the protection sys-
tem to protect their own equipment,
and no consideration was given to
protect the user’s equipment. Also,
at this point, it appeared that the pro-
tection system was designed for the
usual utility system operation and no
importance was given for the opera-
tion with the cogeneration system.
The study indicated that when
the gas supply failed (with the loss
of power from the local generators),
the grinding mill power was auto-
matically transferred to the grid.
This, in turn, overloaded the grid
and tripped the line breaker CB1
with a time delay tdð Þ causing island-
ing mode operation of the drive with
the cogeneration system. The CCV
drive operated with a 50-Hz power
supply.
System Analysis
The scenario of the system (Figure 8)
under the fault condition can be
summarized as follows. When the
gas supply to the turbines of gen-
erators G1 and G2 failed, these
generators ceased to be normal
generators with the cutoff of prime
mover power supplies. Instead,
the machines (with full excitation)
operated as synchronous motors
that drove the turbines as pumps
in the same direction extracting
power from the stored kinetic
energy of the rotating system. The
mode of operation is similar to
generating-to-motoring mode op-
eration in a four-quadrant drive
system. At this condition, the mill
power demand was automatically
transferred to the grid with the
subsequent overload tripping of
the line breaker (CB1). After the
line breaker tripping, the equiva-
lent system topology is shown in
Figure 9. In the system, the grind-
ing mill power was extracted from
Turbine
InertiaLoad If
Gas Turbine Generators(Two in Parallel)
CB3CB4
CB2
CCB33 kV
ParallelLoad
CCV-Synchronous Motor Drives(Two in Parallel)
Grinding Mill Grinding MillLoadCCV
If
FIGURE 9 –An equivalent topology of a cycloconverter drive system in the islanding modefrom the grid with the gas turbine generators operating under the gas failure condition.
The reliable CCV operation on the grid
mainly depends on satisfactory commutation
of the thyristors.
DECEMBER 2011 n IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE 19
FIGURE 10 –A sketch of line frequency and voltage curves at the cycloconverter terminal under the turbine gas failure condition andtripping of circuit breakers (not to scale).
The plant mechanical system coupled
to the machine shafts is normally characterized
by multimodal natural frequencies
of torsional oscillation.
20 IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE n DECEMBER 2011
References[1] T. Wildi, Electrical Machines, Drives, and
Power Systems, 6th ed. Upper SaddleRiver, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2006.
[2] B. R. Pelly, Thyristor Phase-Controlled Con-verters and Cycloconverters. New York:Wiley, 1971.
[3] B. K. Bose, Modern Power Electronics andAC Drives. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002.
[4] J. Pontt, J. Rodriguez, E. Caceres, I. Illanes,and J. Rebolledo, ‘‘Cycloconverter behav-ior for a grinding mill drive under firingpulses fault conditions,’’ in Proc. IEEE IASConf. Rec., 2005, pp. 645–649.
[5] J. Rodriguez, J. Pontt, P. Newman, L.Moran, and G. Alzamora, ‘‘Technical evalu-ation and practical experience of highpower grinding mill drives in mining appli-
cations,’’ in Proc. IEEE IAS Conf. Rec., 2003,pp. 1629–1636.
[6] J. O. Pontt, J. P. Rodriguez, J. C. Rebolledo,K. Tischler, and N. Becker, ‘‘Operation ofhigh power cycloconverter-fed gearlessdrives under abnormal conditions,’’ IEEETrans. Ind. Applicat., vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 814–820, May/June 2007.
[7] H. Stemmler, ‘‘High power industrial
drives,’’ Proc. IEEE, vol. 82, pp. 1266–1286,Aug. 1994.
[8] R. A. Errath, ‘‘15000-HP gearless ball milldrive in cement—why not!’’ IEEE Trans.Ind. Applicat., vol. 32, pp. 663–669, May/June 1996.
[9] B. K. Bose, Power Electronics and MotorDrives—Advances and Trends. New York:Academy Press, 2006.
[10] B. K. Bose, ‘‘Power electronics and motordrives—Recent progress and perspec-tive,’’ IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron, vol. 56,pp. 581–588, Feb. 2009.
22 IEEE INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE n DECEMBER 2011