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STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY:THE LITTLE BOOK ON BIG STRATEGY

Harry R. Yarger

February 2006

This publication is a work of the United States Government as defined in Title 17,United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the

provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication downloadshttp://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

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*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, theDepartment of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for publicrelease; distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwardedto: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave,Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSIhomepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may beordered from our homepage. SSIs homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

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The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to updatethe national security community on the research of our analysts, recent andforthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute.Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on ourhomepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-233-0

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CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. A Theory Stated: Strategys Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

III. The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

IV. Theory in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

V. The Strategy Paradigm in Short: A Theory Restated . . . . . . . . . 65

VI. Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

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FOREWORD

The word strategy pervades American conversation and ournews media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, aconcept, a course of action, or a vision of the direction in which toproceed at the personal, organizational, and governmentallocal,state, or federallevels. Such casual use of the term to describenothing more than what we would like to do next is inappropriateand belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. Itreduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlyingthought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategyand planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planning

assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategicthought and setting inappropriately specific expectations ofoutcomes.

This little bookactually a monographtalks about bigstrategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It isapplicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, nationalmilitary strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monographdoes not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it providesa framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentionedabove. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects ofstrategy that appear to have universal application. The theory alsomay have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions,and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offeredherein focus on the nation-state.

This Letort Paper is written to expose emerging senior leaders

and strategists at the U.S. Army War College to the vocabulary,ideas, and concepts that will enable them to construct a frameworkfor developing their own strategic perspective of the trends, issues,opportunities, and threats confronting the United States in the 21stcentury.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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PREFACE

This monograph has been constructed by borrowing freelyfrom the ideas and concepts of others, some of whom have globalrecognition and others who toiled namelessly as faculty membersand students at various senior service colleges. I apologize to allfor those instances wherein I may have misrepresented their ideasor paraphrased too closely without proper recognition in my questfor a synthesis of thought that might qualify as pure theory. I alsoapologize to readers for the frequent redundancy and complexity ofmy workbut strategy is a complex thing that is better understoodwhen examined from different perspectives. In the same light, I

have used examples very sparingly and reluctantly, only as a meansto indicate the path of my thinking. To do more would beg forthe illustration to be challenged instead of the thought, or suggestthe direct application of the lessons of the example to similarcircumstances. A theory of strategy is neither a simple checklistnor a cookbook solution. It is a way to understand how you mightdevelop a perspective and approach for defining and selectingalternative choices in an increasingly complex and rapidly changingworldfocusing on how to think as opposed to what to thinkand articulating your choices in ways that can be understood andimplemented. Strategy is neither simple nor easy, but the goodstrategist seeks to express the logic of strategy in the simplest, clearestterms.

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SUMMARY

Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Goodstrategy demands much of the military professional whether he isformulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do itwell. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindsetand adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This isparticularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when asuccessful military strategy must be closely integrated with and maydepend on other national strategies of the interagency community. Atheory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professional

and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monographadvances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminologyand definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions andpremises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of thestrategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. Theenvironment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and theimplications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinctionbeing made between strategy and planning mindsets. The typicalproblems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategyare discussed. Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art andscience, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends,ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodologyfor articulating strategies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern whatis possible.1

William Murray and Mark Grimsley

In simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation ofobjectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk tocreate more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chanceor at the hands of others. Strategy is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the art and science of developing and employing instrumentsof national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to

achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.2Both ofthese definitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role andcomplexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. Atthese levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and usingthe political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers ofthe state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects thatprotect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or

circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives,concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy successand the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It isa process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity tocircumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishesthis by expressing its logic in rational, linear termsends, ways, andmeans.

Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategy

allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understandingits logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology anddefinitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises,substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, andmethods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify thetheory as appropriate.3

Why study a theory of strategy? Theorys value lies not in a

prescription for success but in how it helps us expand and disciplineour thinking. As Clausewitz reminds us, theory should be for study,not doctrine.

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Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about warfrom books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his judgment,and help him to avoid pitfalls. . . . Theory exists so that one need not startafresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but willfind it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mindof the future commander. . . .4

A theory of strategy educates the strategists mind. It helps disciplineour thinking in order to deal with the complexity and volatilityof the strategic environment and the changes and continuities,issues, opportunities, and threats inherent to it. It encourages us torethink our own assumptions and prejudices, but it also encouragesus to consider the possible assumptions and prejudices of our

adversaries and other actors. Strategic theory opens the mind toall the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to considerthe costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences ofthose of our adversaries, allies, and others. On another level, theoryallows the members of the military profession and the interagencycommunity to communicate intelligently in regard to strategy. Itserves as a common frame of reference for the development andevaluation of an appropriate strategy and the communication of it tothose who must implement it. A disciplined theory of strategy alsoallows the professional to evaluate the merits of a particular strategyand critique it in meaningful terms for those who determine policyand make decisions. Strategic thinking is difficult. It is best viewed as both an artand a science. The framework of theory provides a methodologicalbasis for a disciplined thought process to assist the strategist

in developing strategy, and it also serves as a guide for others tofollow in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing the merits of aparticular strategy. While theory is an important aid for educating themind, it is not a substitute for genius as described by Clausewitz.Historys great strategists possessed a very highly developed mentalaptitude for both the art and science. They had the ability to perceivethe realities and relationships of their environment, and apply themsuccessfully in developing strategy.5True genius is rare, and somesay that it is no longer applicable in the modern, complex world. Itis, they argue, too difficult for a single personeven a geniusto

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comprehend all the nuances of the modern world, and they proposethat strategy is better served by an organizational process. In spiteof these views, however, strategies often are linked to individualpersonalities in the public eye, and some individuals appear to havea particular talent for this art and science.6

It is useful to consider the roles of strategists today. At the U.S.Army War College, three roles for strategists are considered: leader,practitioner, and theorist. Each of these roles requires a distinctset of skills and competencies. The leader provides the vision,inspiration, organizational skills, direction, and personal impetusnecessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner.The practitioner thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy and

their relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policyguidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success. Thetheorist develops theoretical concepts through study and thought andteaches and mentors others. A master of the strategic art is proficientin all three of these areas and may approach Clausewitzs genius.7Strategists function at different levels or in different roles withinthe states organizational hierarchy, but they all need to understandcomprehensive strategies and communicate them effectively amongthemselves and to the leadership, the planners, and the people whomake up the organizations that ultimately implement strategy. Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking tomaximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as thestate moves through a complex and rapidly changing environmentinto the future. Strategists thoroughly examine the environment anddevelop a strategy that identifies objectives, concepts, and resources

required to accomplish the goals established by policy. Theorydisciplines strategic thinking by explaining strategys inherent logic;it serves to remind all involved with strategy neither to promisetoo much nor fail to consider any of the attributes of strategy. Acoherent theory also helps leaders, planners, and others to evaluateand execute strategy.

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II. A THEORY STATED: STRATEGYS LOGIC

There is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods ofhistory because nothing vital to the nature and function of war andstrategy changes.8

Colin S. Gray

Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap betweenthe realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplinedcalculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources withinacceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomesthan might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others.

It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources toachieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time.In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specificinstruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military,and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state incooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their ownpossibly conflictingobjectives.9In other words, it is the application

of the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of thestate toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitivestrategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinateto the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes anddiffers from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but itprovides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-rangeand short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways,and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility,

and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can beunderstood and applied. An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspectiveis that all nation-states and nonstate actors have interests they willpursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end statescategorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorableworld order, and enduring national or group values. Interests are

derived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategicenvironment and can be stated more specifically in the context ofissues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or

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advance national or group interests. Resources are applied throughthe use of instruments of power. The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection,or advancement of these interestswhich are achieved throughthe application of the instruments of power to specific objectivesto create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policyguidanceis accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference fora future state or condition and determines how best to get there. Indoing so, strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors;and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then somefactors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen.10

Rational choice, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies,and competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm.11 Strategyis inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favorablyinfluence the complex and volatile strategic environment byproviding direction for the judicious application of power towardachievement of policy-driven objectives.12

The strategic process is all about how(concept or way) leadershipwill use the power (resources or means) available to the state toexercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locationsto achieve objectives(ends) in accordance with state policy.13Strategyprovides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this powerto achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive,but it is not predictive. Strategy assumes that while the future cannotbe predicted, the strategic environment can be studied, assessed,and, to varying degrees, anticipated and manipulated. Only with

proper analysis can trends, issues, opportunities, and threats beidentified, influenced, and shaped through what the state choosesto do or not do. Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shapethe future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategyis not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisismanagement occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails toproperly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy isthat strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive. A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy;this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz famousdictum, War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.14

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Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of thedesired end state sought by the government. In its finest form,policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment ofthe instruments of power towards the attainment of one or moreobjectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer.Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the endstate and its guidance regarding resources, limitations on actions, orsimilar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidanceyields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, andjustification for the actions embodied in a strategy.15Achievement ofthe objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired endstate. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives

determined by the political purpose. Yet, as Clausewitz notes, thatdoes not mean that policy is a tyrant. The development of strategyinforms policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategicenvironment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures thatstrategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy ofthe art of the possible.16

A third premise is that strategy is subordinate to the nature ofthe strategic environment. Strategy is developed from a thoroughconsideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the natureof the strategic environment. The strategic environment possessesboth physical and metaphysical attributes. It has both domestic andexternal components. The international environment is the externalcomponent, consisting of the physical geographic environment, theinternational system, and other external actorsand their cultures,beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal

physical realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions,and organizational roles at play within the United States. Indeed,within the United States, there are groups that have worldviewssignificantly different from those of the national leadership, whichmakes the domestic element of strategy formulation even morecomplex. Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the statusquo and initiate a search for a new equilibrium. Stability within theenvironment resists change; instability within the environment urgesadoption of a new strategy. The nature of the strategic environmentcan be described as an interactive, chaotic, complex system of

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systems. Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategicenvironment in its formulation and execution. A fourth premise is that strategy is holistic in outlook. It demandscomprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategistmay be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he mustconsider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis inorder to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended purposeat his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors atall levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy.In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizantthat each aspect, objective, concept, and resource has effects onthe environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have a

comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within thestrategic environment and the potential first-, second-, third-,etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above,below, and on the same level with him, whether they be friendly,adversary, or indifferent actors. The strategists efforts must beintegrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, coordinate,and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holisticallythat is,comprehensively. They must be cognizant of both the big picture,their own organizations capabilities and resources, and the impactof their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy isnever developed piecemeal or in isolation. A fifth premise is that any strategy creates a security dilemmafor the strategist and other actors.17 Any strategy, once known orimplemented, introduces change into the strategic environment,even when it seeks to maintain the status quo. Change can occur

on multiordered levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatensthe existing equilibrium or status quo in the strategic environment,raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing arebetter or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategycan anticipate the future though the pursuit of proper objectives, butstrategy cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, neitherthe achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences ofachievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether theattainment of the specified end justifies the risks of initiating action,and the strategist must also consider how other actors may react.

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Domestic EnvironmentExternal Environment

National Secur ity StrategyAll Elements of Power

National InterestsDesired End States in External Environment

National Military StrategyMilitary Element of Power

National Policy

Grand Strategy(All elements of power but rarely documented and published.)

Comprehensiveness of Strategy

National Policy National Policy

Theater StrategyOperational Art

Tactics

Theater StrategyOperational Art

Tactics

Theater StrategyOperational Art

Tactics

Figure 1.

Strategy thus poses a dilemma for the strategist and other states and

actors.A sixth premise is that strategy is grounded in what is to be

accomplished and why it is to be accomplishedstrategy cannot beformulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The strategist mustknow the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfully focuseson a desired or preferred end state among an array of possible endstates in a dynamic environment. Strategy provides direction for the

persuasive or coercive use of the instruments of power to achievespecified objectives to create strategic effects leading to the desired endstate. It is essential that the strategist analyze and fully understand thedesired end state in the context of the strategic environment (bothdomestic and external) in order to develop appropriate objectives inregard to the desired end state. Hence, before proper objectives can bedetermined, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic

i h i f h li d h i

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A seventh premise is that strategy is an inherently humanenterprise. Not solely a consideration of objective factors, strategyinvolves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which arequantifiable.18The role of belief systems, worldviews, and culturalperceptions of all the players is important in the formulation ofstrategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductivebias while ensuring the strategy meets criteria of acceptability athome and abroadcompensating for differences as appropriate. An eighth premise is that friction is an inherent part of strategy.Friction is the difference between the ideal strategy and the appliedstrategyhow it is suppose to work versus how it actually unfoldsin execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic and

complex nature of the strategic environment, chance, and humanfrailty.19Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood andaccounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in theformulation of the strategy. A ninth premise is that strategy focuses on root causes andpurposes. Such primary foci make strategy inherently adaptableand flexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empoweringsubordinate levels. Strategy incorporates learning from experienceand is sufficiently broad in its construction to adapt to unfoldingevents and an adversarys countermoves.20 Strategy addresseslinear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is largelycause and effect, strategy is a process interacting with the strategicenvironment: strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shiftingconditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty,and ambiguity dominate.21 Process is facilitated by constructing

strategy with flexibility and adaptability in its component parts.Strategys focus on root causes and purposes ensures that thedirection provided to subordinate levels is sufficiently broad toallow adaptability and flexibility while not deviating from strategicpurpose. A 10th premise is that strategy is hierarchical. The politicalleadership ensures and maintains its control and influence overthe instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of statestrategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lowerlevels. Generally strategy originates at the top as a consequence ofa grand strategy (often undocumented), national security strategy

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or other stated national-level strategies and policy statements inregard to specific issues. Grand and national security strategies layout broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instrumentsof power. National policy provides broad strategic guidance frompolitical leaders, generally articulating the national interests as theyrelate to specific strategic circumstances. From these strategies andpolicies the major activities and departments develop subordinatestrategies. For the military, a National Defense Strategy and NationalMilitary Strategy are derived from the National Security Strategy. Inturn, the National Military Strategy leads to theater strategies. The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02)defines the levels of strategy as they pertain to the military element

of power within the state as:

Grand Strategy. An overarching strategy summarizing thenational vision for developing, applying, and coordinating allthe instruments of national power in order to accomplish thegrand strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolsternational economic prosperity; and promote national values.Grand Strategy may be stated or implied.22

National Security Strategy (also sometimes referred to as GrandStrategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing,applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieveobjectives that contribute to national security.23

National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing andapplying military power to attain national objectives in peace andwar.24

Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integratedstrategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securingthe objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policyand strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, oroperations not involving the use of force within a theater.25

Other levels of strategy, such as The National Defense Strategy of The

United States of America,may be inserted in the hierarchy by leadershipat various times.26The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates spanof control. It provides a logical means of delegating responsibility,authority, and accountability within the senior leadership. It also

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suggests that if strategy consists of objectives, concepts, andresources, each should be appropriate to the level of strategy and

consistent with one another. Thus strategy at the national militarylevel should articulate military objectives at the national level andexpress the concepts and resources in terms appropriate to thenational level for the specified objective.

At some level, thinking and action fall below the strategicthreshold. Under the National Military Strategy, the CombatantCommanders develop Theater Strategy and subsequent campaign

plans. At this juncture, the line between strategy and planning blurswith campaign planning that may be either at the theater strategiclevel or in the realm of pure operational art. Graphically, therelationship between strategy and the levels of war is shown inFigure 2.

Levels of War and Hierarchy of Strategy

Strategic Level

Operational LevelJTFs & Corps

TacticalCorps, Divisions

& Below

Theater Strategy

Campaign Planning

National Military Strategy

Tactical Planning

National Defense Strategy

National Security Strategy

Figure 2.

Strategy differs from operational art and tactics in functional,

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duration that can be as small as a firefight between two small unitsor as large as a battle between corps. Operational art is the domain ofthe campaign, a series of battles taking place over a longer period oftime. Strategy is the domain of war which encompasses the spectrumof conflict among nations and other international actors. Tacticsconcerns itself with the parts or pieces, operational art with thecombination of the pieces, and strategy with the combinations of thesecombinations. Geographically, tactics are very narrowly defined,the operational level is broader and more regional in orientation,and strategy is theater-wide, intercontinental, or global. The timehorizon is greater at the strategic level than at the operational andtactical levels. However, it is worth noting that with the advances

in transportation and communications, there has been a spatialand temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and tactics.Increasingly, in part due to increasing communications capabilities,events at the tactical level have strategic consequences.27

An 11th premise of strategic theory is that strategy has a symbioticrelationship with time. A key component of strategic competency isthinking in timethe ability to foresee continuity of strategic choiceswith the past and the consequences of their intended and unintendedeffects in the future. A strategic choice must have continuity withthe past as it bridges to the future. Strategy must account for thepast in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction andhistory within the strategic environment. A strategic action that hascharacteristics contrary to the past experience or culture of the societyit affects is less likely to be successful. The strategist extrapolatesthe possible futures from the present strategic circumstances with a

clear sense of the long past from which these possible futures flow;he then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeksto shape a more favorable future. Deciding when to undertake astrategy is also critical. If the historical timing is correct, then smallactions can have large strategic effects. If the timing is wrong, resultsinvariably take larger efforts and cost more in terms of tangible andintangible resources. The strategist is concerned with continuitiesand change, with both history and the future. History suggeststhe right questions to ask and provides perspective for the futureconsequences of the available choices.28 Futurism identifies the

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possibilities and probabilities of change. Strategic analysis suggeststhe timing. A 12th premise is that strategy is cumulative. Effects in thestrategic environment are cumulative; once enacted, they becomea part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulativefrom several different perspectives. It is cumulative from theperspective that once implemented, a strategy becomes part of thecontinuities of the strategic environment. Regardless of whether itis successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change andinteraction in the strategic environment, and its consequences mustbe considered in any future strategy. Strategy is cumulative from astratified perspective also. The effect of a policy is the summation of

the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interactionrelated to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of theparts. It is also possible that the value of one level of strategic effortsmight be negated by the effects of another level. Strategies at differentlevels interact, with the cumulative effects influencing the success ofhigher and lower strategy and planning over time.

A 13th premise is that efficiency is subordinate to effectivenessin strategy. This is not to say that efficiency is not desired. Goodstrategy is both effective and efficient, but the purpose of strategyis to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished,create or contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favorthe achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategybeing analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Strategymust emphasize effectiveness because failure, however efficientlyexecuted, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated

multiordered consequences. Concepts and resources serve objectiveswithout undue risk of failure or unintended effectsefficiency isnecessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.29

A 14th premise is that strategy provides a proper relationship orbalance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursuethe objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought atits level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways,and means are part of an integral whole and work synergisticallyto achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well ascontribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, andmeans must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally

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and externally. Thus qualitatively, a National Security Strategy(NSS) objective seeks to achieve the desired effect using any of thenecessary and appropriate instruments of power available to thestatethe qualitative questions ask whether achieving the objectivewill produce the strategic effects and whether the effects will justifythe objective chosen, the methods used, the resources required, andthe social and political costs incurred. A National Military Strategywill identify at the national level appropriate military ends usingnational military concepts and resources. The National MilitaryStrategy is bounded by the NSS and is subject to the qualitativequestions, but the state cannot logically ask the military to dowhat it is incapable of accomplishing because of lack of ability or

resourceswhich are qualitative relationships. In a similar manner,a theater or combatant commander would have appropriate theater-level objectives for which he would develop theater concepts anduse resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, concepts mightinclude the integration of other than military instruments of power, ifthey can be integrated and capabilities and resources are available.

The levels of strategy, as well as war, are distinct but interrelatedbecause of the hierarchical and comprehensive nature of strategyand war. Hence, operational or tactical concepts achieve operationalor tactical objectives and cannot be elevated to a strategic level eventhough operational or tactical objectives contribute to the cumulativenature of strategy, and actions at these levels on occasion createstrategic consequences. In a similar manner, strategic objectivesand concepts have a proper relationship within a strategy, butmust also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative

relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourcedwith the appropriate types and quantity of resources. From thesynergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achievessuitability and acceptabilitythe attainment of the objectives usingthe instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes thestrategic effects desired at acceptable costs. The synergistic balancealso achieves feasibilitythe strategic concept is executable with theresources made available.

The 15th and final premise of strategy is that risk is inherent in allactivity. The best we can do is seriously consider the risks involved,producing a favorable balance against failure. Strategy is subject to

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the nature of the strategic environment, and uncertainty is inherent inthat environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and interactionwith other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigatedby questioning the thinking behind the strategy. For example, whatassumptions were made in developing the strategy, and what are theconsequences if an assumption is wrong? What internal or externalfactors are the bases for this strategy? What changes would enhanceor detract from this strategy? What flexibility or adaptability isinherent in the components of the strategy? How can the strategy bemodified and at what costs? Nonetheless, no matter how probing thequestions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either thefailure to achieve ones own objectives, thus providing a significant

advantage to ones adversaries, or creating unintended adverseeffects. In sum, strategy has an inherent logic that can be understood andapplied. It is distinct from planning and serves a unique purpose.It differs from planning in its attributes, scope, assumptions, andpremises, but provides the overall structure and parameters formore detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategyand planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by thecriteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Good strategyis founded in a proper understanding and analysis of the strategicenvironment and national interests and policy, and an understandingof the theory and role of strategy. The strategist accepts that thefuture cannot be predicted, but believes that it can be anticipatedand shaped in favorable terms through creation of judicious strategiceffects. Strategic theory guides and disciplines the development and

execution of good strategy.

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III. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean thateverything is very easy.30

Clausewitz

Strategy seeks to cause specific effects in the environmenttoadvance favorable outcomes and preclude unfavorable ones. For thestate, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadershipinteracts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of thestate. This environment consists of the internal and external context,conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities,

interactions, and effects that influence the success of the state inrelation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, andthe possible futures. The strategic environment functions as a self-organizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relativeequilibrium, or to find a new acceptable balance. In this environment,some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some areplausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It

is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily ina direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particularinterest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment resultsin both intended and unintended effects.31The strategist ultimatelyseeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within thestrategic environment through creation of multiordered effects.Conceptually, a model of strategy is simpleends, ways, andmeansbut the nature of the strategic environment makes it difficult

to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the natureof the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistentwith it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors orto chance. The nature of the strategic environment has been describednumerous times by different authorities. This environment,encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College in the acronym VUCA,

is marked by:a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, whereconflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend

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and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel andpersonnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked byvolatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).32

Characterized by the four earmarksvolatility, uncertainty,

complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)the strategic environment isalways in a greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or chaos.The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility,manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve theambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and incompliance with policy guidance.

VUCA thinking argues that the strategic environment isvolatile. It is subject to rapid and explosive reaction and change,often characterized by violence. Uncertainty also characterizes thisenvironment, which is inherently problematic and unstable. Newissues appear, and old problems repeat or reveal themselves in newways so that past solutions are dubious, and the perceived greatertruth often vacillates with time. Everything is subject to question andchange. This environment is extremely complex. It is composed of manyparts that are intricately related in such a manner that understanding

them collectively or separating them distinctly is extremely difficultand often impossible. Sometimes the environment is so complicatedor entangled that complete understanding and permanent solutionsare improbable. The strategic environment is also characterizedby ambiguity. The environment can be interpreted from multipleperspectives with various conclusions that may suggest a variety ofequally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good andothers bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions maybe surmised, but never entirely known. VUCA thinking describesthe appearance of the environment without providing a theoreticalunderstanding of it. Since the role of the strategist is ultimately toadvocate actions that will lead to desirable outcomes while avoidingundesirable ones, the strategist must understand the nature of theenvironment in order to exert influence within it.33

The nature of the strategic environment, as the VUCA acronym

suggests, is difficult to grasp and is perhaps the most challenging taskfor the strategist. Yet understanding its nature explains strategyspossibilities and limitations, and provides the insight and parameters

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for articulating strategic objectives, concepts, and resources. Twotheorieschaos theory and complexity theoryserve as appropriatemetaphors for understanding the nature of the strategic environment,providing an analogous description of its attributes and functioning.While founded in abstract mathematical extrapolations, these twotheories capture the essence of the observed VUCA behavior of thestrategic environment and have been adapted by some politicalscientists to describe the international strategic environment. Someeven suggest these theories might be applied directly to the evaluationand selection of strategic choices, but that is not the purpose of theiruse in this monograph.34Here, chaos theory and complexity theoryare used to help the strategist think conceptually and pragmatically

about the functioning of the strategic environment. Chaos theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligentmeteorologist who, while searching for a way to produce moreaccurate weather predictions, discovered the butterfly effect. Henoticed that miniscule changes in his initial input to mathematicalcalculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary andunpredictable effects on the outcomes. He concluded that the futurebehavior of complex and dynamic systems is incredibly sensitiveto tiny variations in initial conditions.35 Over 150 years earlier,Clausewitz understood and described this phenomenon in war andwrapped it into his definition of friction: Everything in war is verysimple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulateand end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unlessone has experienced war.36Likewise, folklore captured this samereality: For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe,

the horse was lost; for want of a horse . . . , the kingdom was lost!Computers allow scientists to do the calculations to study this effectin mathematically simple systems, thereby illuminating the chaoticbehavior of the strategic environment and other complex systems. Chaos theory is a different way of viewing reality. Prior to thedevelopment of chaos theory, two world views dominated thinking.Systems were defined as deterministic and predictable, or randomand disorderedthus unpredictable. Deterministic systems arepredictable because the same inputs will yield the same outputsevery time the experiment is conducted. In maths chaos theory,chaos is not a state of utter confusionrandom, unpredictable, and

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uncontrollablebut an observable reality that adheres to certain ruleseven as it appears chaotic in the evident sense. It explains observedphysical behavior that possesses characteristics in common withboth order and randomness as opposed to the more traditional eitherorderliness or randomness. Put more scientifically, chaos theorydescribes unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlineardynamical systems. A dynamical system is one that interacts andchanges over time. Behavior in chaotic systems is aperiodic, meaningthat no variable describing the state of the system undergoes aregular repetition of valueseach changes in some part over time.The behavior in a chaotic system continues to manifest the effectsof any small difference, and consequently a preciseprediction of a

future state in a given system that is aperiodic is impossible. On theother hand, chaotic behavior as a mathematical process does possessstructure or patterns and, as a consequence, can be predicted andinfluenced to some extent, with the most influence occurring in theinitial conditions.37

Chaos theory is important because it helps explain whydeterministic or linear systems sometimes produce unpredictablebehavior. Chaos theory also demonstrates that much that appearsas random, in reality is notthere are indirect cause-and-effectrelationships at work, sometimes not detectable. The deterministicnature of a chaotic system ensures there is some manifestation ofcontinuity from one state to the next, while the nonlinearity meansthat the consequences of any changes may appear as spontaneousand extreme. In a chaotic system, early changes can have anextraordinary effect on the long term, but the results are bounded

from the extremity of total randomness. Thus chaotic systems are amixture of continuities and change. The strategic environment canbe viewed as a chaotic system in which human history representsaperiodic behaviorbroad patterns in the rise and fall of civilizationsare evident, but no event is ever repeated exactly.38

Complexity theory also offers insights into the nature of thestrategic environment, often shared by or augmenting chaos theory.The strategic environment is by definition a complex system. A systemexists when a set of elements are interconnected so that changes insome elements or their relations produce changes in other parts ofthe system, and the system taken as a whole exhibits properties and

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behaviors that are different from those of the sum of the parts. Systemsare generally dynamic, and social systems are especially so. Systemsmay be very large or very small, and in some complex systems, largeand small components live cooperatively. Complexity occurs in bothnatural and man-made systems. The level of complexity depends onthe character of the systems, the environment, and the nature of theinteractions among them. The different parts of complex systems arelinked and affect one another in a synergistic manner through bothpositive and negative feedback. In a complex system, the numerousindependent elements continuously interact and spontaneouslyself-organize and adapt for survival in increasingly more elaborateand sophisticated structures over time. Cause and effect are not

proportional to each other and often cannot be related. Such a systemis neither completely deterministic nor completely random, butrather exhibits both characteristicsadhering to the chaos theorymodel. Complex systems, therefore, are not precisely predictable,and the sum of their interactions is greater than the parts.

Complex systems appear to evolve naturally to a state of self-organized criticality, at which time they lie on the border of orderand disorder, teetering on the edge of chaos. At the point where acomplex, dynamical, chaotic system becomes sufficiently unstable, anattractor (such as a minor event similar to Lorenzs tiny mathematicalchanges) instigates the stress, and the system splits. This is calledbifurcationthe point at which significant change occurs, and thenewly resulting systems are distinct from the original while stillhaving continuities. The edge of chaos is important; it is the stagewhen the system can carry out the most complex operations and

the point when both opportunities (positive feedbacks) and threats(negative feedbacks) are greatest. If the system cannot maintain itsbalance, it seeks a new equilibrium. At the point of bifurcation, littlechanges produce great outcomes.39

Chaos and complexity theories offer a perspective that describesthe strategic environment as it is, as opposed to a direct and simplisticcause-and-effect linear model. These theories recognize that the worldis composed of both linear and nonlinear dynamics. Grasping thisdistinction is critical to the kind of analysis the strategist undertakes!Complexity theory does not seek prediction but understanding ofthe various elements of the environment and the actors involved. It

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offers a complex worldview that accepts contradictions, anomalies,and dialectic processes. It alerts the strategist to the existence ofmulticausal situations, unintended consequences, circumstances ripefor change, the roles of feedback and self-fulfilling expectations, andother abnormalities discounted, or even disparaged, by the rationalplanning model.40

Chaos and complexity theories serve as useful metaphors forthe strategic environment because they provide insights to VUCAphenomena and the relationship between the strategic environmentand strategy. The strategic environment is composed of elementsrepresenting both continuity and change. Relationships andinteraction are the keys to understanding the nature and dynamism

of the strategic environment. Characterized by instability andaperiodic behavior, it does not repeat itself precisely, althoughsituations may closely approximate those of the past. Thus itpossesses the attributes of both linearity and nonlinearity. Thestrategic environment is deterministic in that change is bounded bya variety of factors, including, to some degree, by what has occurredbefore. It will have continuities, but the exact nature and extremityof change are not necessarily predictable because of the nonlinearattributes. The strategic environment is often particularly sensitiveto early changes at critical times, and the outcomes are often notproportional to the inputs, thus creating unpredictable, and at timesunintended, outcomes.

Major changes at the strategic level often can have verysimple causes. Any change that occurs creates feedback (effect)which eventually must be accounted for within the equilibrium

of the strategic environment. Chaotic behavior is more evident inlong-term systems than in short-term systems. This observationilluminates why plannings shorter time horizons support morecertainty than strategys longer view. At the same time, a chaoticsystem actually can evolve in a way that appears to be smooth andordered, suggesting that strategy is practical and can produce results.Strategy therefore must account for the chaotic, complex nature ofthe strategic environment and shape it by creating and anticipatingeffects in order to be successful.41

Often referred to as a system of systems in order to emphasizeits complexity, the strategic environment is a composite of complex

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systems, linked vertically and horizontally. As such, the strategicenvironment exhibits complex, self-organizing behavioritcontinuously seeks to find an acceptable order or relative balance inwhich it can exist. Its complexity results from individual decisionsor acts and the interactions resulting from the decisions or changingcircumstances. Its numerous parts and agents act individually orcollectively, according to their own circumstances and interests. Inacting, these parts and agents can globally affect the circumstancesand interests of all other parts or agents. Some of the interactions arepredicable, some are chaotic, and some are stochastic (determinedby chance). What this means is that the strategic environment isinherently uncertain, and that unpredictability must be taken as a

natural part of the system. As a result, traditional ideas of controldirect cause and effectare not as applicable. We find instead aform of control that is macroscopic, not seeking to impose precisedomination over details because these are inherently uncontrollableat the strategic level. Strategy provides broad, meaningful directionand structure suitable to the changing complexity of the strategicenvironmentretaining adaptability and flexibility by directingactions to favorably alter the environment rather than trying tocontrol it absolutely.42

As the theories illustrate, all complex systems are inherentlynonlinear, and outcomes cannot be predicted or understood by thesimple act of adding up the parts and the relationships. In linearsystems, changes in output are nearly proportional to input; the sumof the inputs equals the output in a more-or-less predictable fashion.Most people think from a linear perspective and in a linear fashion,

and indeed planning operates in large measure on linear assumptionseven though practical experience often belies this approach. Thedifference is accounted for in planning with reserve forces andplanned branches and sequels. In a system at the strategic level,complexity enters the simplest actions, no matter how deterministicthey appear. The effect of one action may depend on or conflictwith the status of another variable, and the net effect may changethe conditions that affect other or all variables. On a primary level,then, to understand outcomes the strategist must examine his ownchoices in light of the goals, resources, and policies of the opposingactor and the continuities and variables of the rest of the strategic

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environment. However, strategic acts are not one-sided, and theopposing or other actors may make choices in regard to respondingto an action or even preempt it, so that the complexity confrontingthe strategist is compounded by what the other actors may chooseto do. On yet another level, the chaotic nature of complex systemsmeans that initial behaviors and outcomes cause changes thatproduce unintended dynamics with cascading effects that can alter,limit, enhance, or otherwise affect future choices or require reaction.43Thus the nonlinear characteristics of the strategic environment resultfrom the interaction among chance and subordinate or integral self-organizing and adaptive systemsstates, other actors, and thephysical world.

Nonlinearity suggests a world in which the future has bothcontinuities and unpredicted threats and opportunities. It suggests aninteractive process in which strategic choices produce effects that inturn generate reactions that may or may not create major or complexchanges. Other actorsfriendly, adversarial, or indifferentwithregard to a strategys objectives may choose to act, react, or preempt.The smallest friction, whether by lack of foresight, slow execution,or factors beyond the actors control, can amplify itself into a cascadeof things going wrong to create potential chaos. Further, chanceevents, purely stochastic phenomena, occur and shape the strategicenvironment in favor of or against the strategy. And, of course,actors, friction, and chance function interactively to further influencethe strategic environment and affect the strategy.

Thus the world is more a place of instability, discontinuity,synergies, and unpredictability than planners prefer. Although a

meaningful degree of linearity can be achieved, results often vary fromthe original intent, at times costing more than anticipated becauseof the need to manage the chaos within the strategic environmentover the strategys timeline. Thus, in the strategy process, scientificanalysis must be combined with historical perspective to createa comprehensive strategy that provides for dynamic change,innovation, responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability.44 The artof strategy allows the strategist to see the nature of the strategicenvironment and a path or multiple paths to his goals; and thescientific aspect of strategy provides a methodology to quantify a

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path and marshal the resources to shape the strategic environmentin favorable terms. As a complex system, the strategic environment is interactive andadaptive because the states and actors have the capacity to respondindividually and collectively (in a myriad of bilateral and multilateralrelationships) to new challenges to the relationships and structuresthat provided stability in the past. When the balance is lost, the statesand actors, individually and collectively, seek to self-organize theirpatterns of behavior into new patterns intended either to restore theformer equilibrium or to obtain changes favorable to their interests.As in any complex system, to do this they must accommodate change,changing or responding in ways that provide for success in the new

environment. At the same time, continuities with the past remain andare embedded in the emergent order. The adaptive task for the stateor other actor is to maintain an acceptable balance between internalneeds and external demands; sufficient actions and resources mustbe dedicated to the demands of the external environment, but at thesame time the needs and expectations of the domestic environmentmust be appropriately addressed. The actors must adapt more orless in concert with the strategic environment, making externaladjustments of their relationships with each other and the overallenvironment in order to survive.

If sufficient coevolution does not occurwhether because of alack of adaptability on the part of leadership, insufficient materialresources, or whatever other reasonone or more states or actors andtheir internal systems collapse, and new structures and relationshipsemerge in their place. This process of adaptation and change does not

have to occur continuously or evenly; varying periods of stasis maybe punctuated by rapid change until a new equilibrium is reached.Given this phenomenon, small events can sometimes seeminglytrigger major changesthe so-called butterfly effect. In a similarmanner, small decisions made or not made early in a period ofenvironmental change can have a dramatic impact, possibly leadingto irreversible consequences that may result in significantly differentoutcomes than would otherwise be the case. The strategist canfall victim to this phenomenonreacting to its consequencesor,through judicious study and analysis, seek to use it to advance theinterests of the state.

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Again, the strategic environment is a complex system consistingof systems within systems. The strategist must recognize that, tobe successful, a strategy must account for both the external andinternal components of the strategic environment. For the politicalstate, these can be identified as the domestic and internationalenvironments on a grand scale, but external elements can be furtherdivided into adversaries, allies, and other actors. In addition, thephysical or natural environment is one of the external elements,acting as another complex system within the strategic environment.Internal environments can be subdivided into the general public,interest groups, other parts of the governmental bureaucracy, andthe subsystems or actors of the strategists own organization. The

strategic environment on all its levels is characterized by VUCA,but to say that the strategic environment is VUCA is not to say thatit defies study, analysis, and evaluation, or that future changes ordevelopments cannot be anticipated. It is simply to say that to predictor control it with any significant degree of certainty is exceptionallycomplex and difficult. The chaotic and complex nature of the strategicenvironment has implications for the development of strategy at alllevels. Like any complex system, the international environment isconstantly subject to change, experiencing periods of stability andinstability. Instability tends to increase as the degree of interactionrises, particularly if one or more actors seek to impose change on thestrategic environment. Periods exhibiting lower degrees of interactionare generally more stable. Periods characterized by stability tend tofavor linear approaches to problems or challenges, while periods

exhibiting greater instability tend to require nonlinear perspectivesand problem-solving. As the level or complexity of interaction rises,the strategic environment potentially moves into a state of self-organizing criticality, at which time it lies on the border of order anddisorder, and then is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing.The strategic equilibrium is adjusted continuously, but on theseoccasions the strategic environment experiences dramatic change.Such major changes really reflect upheavals in the key continuities ofthe strategic environment. Strategists in the first quarter of the 21stcentury must recognize that the emerging strategic environment isthe product of such an upheaval. In terms of chaos or complexity

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theory, the strategic environment is in the process of bifurcation. Theorder or relative balance of the bipolar Cold War becomes part of thepast as a new order is formed. While not all the rules must change,many will need to be changed or reinterpreted as states and actorsseek a new equilibrium.

Figure 3.

What is the nature of this new strategic environment? A vastarray of existing literature that attempts to grasp or describe the newstrategic environment in terms meaningful to different communitiesbusiness, government, academic, military, religion, etc.45What theyshare in common is an appreciation that the strategic environmentis in the midst of a major reshaping as a result of changes generallyattributed to the convergence of a number of events or trends: theend of the Cold War, massive changes in economic relationships,

the rise of globalization, and seminal advances in technology. Atthe heart of these changes is the establishment of informationand knowledgetheir production, dissemination, storage, and

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useas the fundamental social and economic activity, rather thanthe cultivation of agriculture or the production of manufacturedgoods.46 It is a transformation of social and economic life on aglobal scale. Such a widespread change in multiple subsystems hasdramatic implications for the strategic environment and the statesand actors that compose the international system. Morever, it willimpose further change both at the international and domestic levelsof most, if not all, actors.

This period of great and rapid change presents both threats andopportunities. The period has already displayed its characteristicsin broad terms. It favors service economies over industrialmanufacturing economies; it is global and local in scope at the same

timeglobal in its reach and local in its focus; it allows and encouragesdecentralized production while it democratizes decisionmaking;it challenges and replaces authorities who cannot compete; and itappears to be ushering in a period of hyper-competition amongbusinesses, cultures, and nation-states or other new state-likeactors.47In essence, it will be a period of revolutionary change untila new equilibrium is achieved, with the strategic environment nowteetering on the edge of chaos. It is a period of great opportunityand risk for the strategist in any system. In retrospect, the latter ColdWar period appears to have been relatively stable, with establishedrules for the international strategic environment that orchestratedthe relationships and interaction among the states and actorsinshort, an equilibrium. Strategy is made difficult by the chaotic and complex natureof the strategic environment. It represents a daunting challenge

for the military profession, but it is this very nature that justifies adiscipline of strategyotherwise, planning would suffice. If chaosand complexity theory apply, the radical alteration of the strategicenvironment that resulted from the end of the Cold War offerseven greater opportunities and risks (or threats) as the strategicenvironment reorders itself toward a new and as-yet undefinedequilibrium in the 21st century. The role of the strategist is evenmore critical in this period as policymakers seek help in ensuringthat the reshaping of the strategic environment occurs in termsfavorable to the state. The strategists role increases in importanceas the instability and difficulty increase. Yet the fundamental tasks

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remain the same: understand the nature of the strategic environmentand its various subsystems and construct a strategy that focuses thestate on its long-term well-being. How well the strategist is able todo this depends on his ability to anticipate the interaction within thestrategic environment and to develop appropriate strategic actionsto serve national interests.

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IV. THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD

In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practicethere is.

Yogi Berra

If strategy is simply the calculation of objectives, concepts, andresources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorablepossibilities than might otherwise exist by chance or at the handsof others, why do effective strategies so often appear to elude thestrategist? The answer, of course, is that successful strategy is muchmore complex than the calculation of objectives, concepts, andresources. Strategic theory in the real world confronts the dynamicnature of the strategic environment and the mind of the strategisthow strategists approach strategy-making in the context of theirstrategic environments. It also depends on the caliber of the executionof the strategy. Good strategy flows from understanding the natureof the environment and creating a symmetry and synergy of objectives,concepts, and resourcesthat offer the best probability of achieving thepolicy aims. The strategist is assisted by the logic of strategy and

the construct of planning, but the strategist is not a planner. Goodstrategy development provides for flexibility and adaptability sothat planning and execution can be tailored to more immediatecircumstances and respond to unanticipated opportunities andconstraints. Good strategy remains, however, valid in its focus anddirection and achieves its intent even when these opportunitiesand constraints are taken into account. This chapter discusses theimplications of the environment for strategy development, thenecessary and distinct mindset required of the strategist, and theobstacles encountered as the theory of strategy is applied in the realworld.

Implications of the Strategic Environment.

Strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment in

which the strategy they are developing is to be appliedunderstandthe kind of world they live in or that will emerge.48As advancedin Part III with the analogies of chaos and complexity theories,

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the strategic environment is not totally random, unpredictable, oruncontrollable. Rather, the environment exhibits some characteristicsof both randomness and order. Change may be induced in it bydesign or chance, but, because of its complexity, any change mayproduce results totally out of proportion to the initiating changeeither greater or lesser than anticipatedand thus a degree ofuncertainty and unpredictability is inherent to its nature. Changescome from actors, interactive circumstances, or chance. Actors mayintroduce rational and irrational changes through action or selectiveinaction, or through simple indifference or ignorance. Yet manystrategists reduce strategy to overly linear and detailed directivesthat do not allow for the flexibility and adaptability to accommodate

such unpredictability. On the other hand, much of the strategic environment isdeterministic and adheres to certain rules; continuities guide itsgeneral behavior over time and extendto varying degreesintoperiods of major upheaval and new equilibriums. These rules areboth physical, as is the case with gravity, geography, and weather,and incorporeal. Rules of international behavior are an example ofan incorporeal continuity. When in effect, these rules bound whatis workable and acceptable within the international environment.Continuities may be codified and thus formally acknowledged, ormay just be accepted practices. In some cases, they exist below theawareness level of the actors in the environment. Continuities alwaysseek to reassert themselves, but their validity cannot be taken forgranted. Continuities can be leveraged so that a strategy is assisted bythe environments natural inclinations, thus moving with the flow of

history. Collective security is arguably a continuity that emerged inthe 20th century and may be leveraged into the 21st century. On theother hand, a particular continuitys role may not be the same eventhough it still exists. Gravity continued to exist after the invention ofthe airplane, but its effect on warfare changed. Too few strategistscritically consider the role of continuities in strategy development,missing opportunities or making invalid assumptions. For example,with the collapse the Soviet Union, many strategists focused on thepromises of liberal capitalism and globalization and missed theimplications of the resurgence of the continuities of nationalism andreligion. Critical examination of continuities and change focuses

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the strategist on what needs to change, what continuities can beleveraged for the necessary changes, and what should not or cannotbe changed. All are important! Understanding the strategic environment as a system of systemsis a daunting intellectual challenge. Each system within it has externaland internal componentsand all interrelate to varying degrees. Themultilayered interaction results in complexity and nonlinearity. Thechaotic nature of this interaction is difficult to fathom, and it is evenmore difficult to manipulate effectively. Nothing is ever quite whatit seems and all is subject to greater or lesser changes. It is a worldof unlimited possibilities and seemingly great promise, temperedby competing interests and often unclear or less than desirable

alternatives. Much appears insidious and Machiavellian or subject tonature and chance. Policy is often stated in lofty and ideal terms withtoo little regard for political reality and available resourcesleavingthe strategist without practical goals and adequate resources. All areinterrelated, often confusing and convoluted, and very complex. Astrategist must be comfortable in the VUCA environment. Too fewprofessional military officers are prepared for this actuality. The strategist is immersed in the complexity of the system ofsystems represented by the strategic environment. For example, a U.S.strategist assigned to NATO sees it from a national perspective as anexternal component even as he works within NATO to shape the restof the international environment. Within NATO, he is an internalpart of an organizational actor in the international environment. Thecomplexity of relationships and interactions grows exponentially.The domestic environment is an internal component of the strategic

environment relative to any national defense strategy. It consists ofdomestic actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles,as well as the physical realities of resources and capabilities. Thestrategist is confronted with the domestic interaction of individuals,news media, special interest groups, civilian think tanks, branches ofgovernment, other departments of the executive branch, and officesand sub-organizations within DOD itself. Thus, any strategy issubject to interaction and reaction with domestic interests and actors,the nuances of interests within the strategists own organization, andthe interests and actors of the international arena. Some domesticinterests may actually be working at odds with the strategist, trying

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to frustrate his efforts for political or other reasons. Too few nationalsecurity professionals are willingly capable of accepting andworking with this complexity and nonlinearity. Strategy remains inthe too-hard box, and insufficient time and resources are devotedto its consideration. As a result, strategic thinking is often reducedto simple assumptions that are often ill-founded, but misleadinglyseem to allow strategy to unfold like good planning. Strategistsmust study and analyze the whole environment and then shape it bythe design and articulation of strategy. Strategy is too critical to be ignored or placed at risk by virtueof erroneous assumptions or by relegating it to a planning model.Strategic environments may be difficult to analyze, but good

strategywhich must be based on sound strategic-level analysiscan shape the environment more positively than chance or lack ofstrategic direction. For as surely as uncertainty characterizes thefuture, the future will nonetheless come: Strategy abhors a vacuum:if the strategic function is lacking, strategic effect will be generatedby the casual accumulation of tactical and operational outcomes.49Carefully crafted strategic initiatives bound future results inoutcomes more acceptable to policymakers than those offered bychance, expediency, or adversaries. As chaos theory suggests, earlyactions can have a disproportionate effect on the overall pattern ofchange in the strategic environment. Strategists, particularly whenover-focused on immediate demands of decisionmakers, often failto look to the future with sufficient depth of analysis and act toolate to create positive strategic effects at relatively low costs. Relyingon expediency and planning methodologies in lieu of proper

strategic thinking ignores the advantages that accrue from intendedcumulative effects and increases the costs for and risks to the statessecurity. The strategic environment can be analyzed from differentperspectives. In this monograph, the reader is asked to consider it fromthe perspective of systems within systems interactingin both linear andnonlinear ways. The strategist must understand the systems, but theproper focus of strategy is on the dimensions of interaction. Strategyhas many dimensions, and all are in play to a greater or lesser extentat all times. A weakness in considering any one dimension can provefatal to the whole enterprise. Colin Gray suggests that there are 17

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or more of these dimensions: people, society, culture, politics, ethics,economics and logistics, organization, administration, informationand intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology,operations, command, geography, friction/chance/uncertainty,adversary, and time. These must be considered holisticallythatis, individuallybut at the same time in context with the others.50Some have argued that the transformation of strategy has occurredover the last 2,400 years on a more extended and integrated scale.They would list the major dimensions as bureaucracy, mass politics,ideology, technology and economic power. Here, too, it is recognizedthat the interaction of these affect outcomes exponentially.51Historymakes clear that particular dimensions play a greater role or are

more critical at particular times, and that none can be ignored overtime. Hence, as the Cold War wound down and the new world orderbegan to emerge, ideology (communism versus liberal capitalism)appeared to wane in importance only to reemerge in the Global WarOn Terror (radical Islam versus secularism). It matters significantlywhat the topic of confrontation or the dimension of competition orcollaboration is in developing a strategy. An economic issue maydemand a conceptualization or model of interaction different froman ideological one and a different weighting of effort among theinstruments of power. Just so, any other dimension may be affected,and all must be considered in the development of a strategy. As acomplex system of systems, the strategic environment may evolveinto new dimensions that must also be considered. Many strategiststhink too little about interaction, the dimensions in which it occurs,and the relationships among the dimensions.

All strategy is about the future. The future is where strategyhas its effect. In dealing with unknowns and uncertainties, strategyforecasts from a knowledge and understanding of the systems of thestrategic environmentwhat they are (facts and assumptions) andhow they interact (observation, reason, and assumptions) withinthe dimensions of strategy. From this understanding, the strategistderives the key factors which contribute causally to the achievementof policy aimsassisting or precluding success. These factors may betangible or intangible, representing any aspect of the environment.The existence of other states and actors, internal and external, is oneof many factors that must be considered in any strategy development

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effort. Factors constitute the key facts, continuities, and emergingtrendsthey are at the point of interaction within the systemand among systems. In strategic analysis these factors are keys todeveloping an effective strategy, because using or influencing them ishow policy goals are achieved. The strategist seeks to change, leverage,or overcome these, in effect modifying the equilibrium within thestrategic environment to support policy aims. Balancing continuitiesand emerging trends is the most intellectually challenging task indeveloping strategyseeking to address one aspect of a complexsystem without inducing unfavorable ripple effects elsewhere in thesystem. The strategists analysis of how best to do this is reflectedin his selection of ends, ways, and meansthe rational output of

strategic thought. Too often in strategy development, insufficientanalysis is applied to the identification and use of key factors, and asa consequence key factors are often overlooked, misidentified, or illaddressed. Strategy is about thinking big and over time. Strategic thinkingis not about reductionism, although the strategy eventually will besimplified and stated clearly as ends, ways, and means. Strategicthinking is about thoroughness and holistic thinking. It seeks tounderstand how the parts interact to form the whole by lookingat parts and relationships among themthe effects they have onone another in the past, present, and anticipated future. It sharesthis perspective with chaos and complexity theories. Articulatingstrategic thinking as ends, ways, and means is only one step in asophisticated intellectual process seeking to create a synthesisof consensus, efforts, and circumstances to influence the overall

environment favorably while managing the risks involved inpursuing opportunities or reacting to threats.52 While ends, ways,and means get at the essence of the strategy and must flow froma strategic perspective, thus collectively creating a strategic effect,they do not obviate an explanation ofwhy, one of the paramountpurposes of strategy. A strategy must work on different planesand speak to different audiences. In this sense, another purpose ofstrategy development is to explain and forecast in order to generatea domestic and foreign consensus in favor of the policy pursued. Todo this, strategy must have a sense of where the state has been andwhere it is headed. Anything less in regard to the past is to neglect

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the direction in which the historical winds have been blowing. Andthe best grand strategies, like the most efficient navigators, keepthe winds behind them.53Anything less in regard to the future isto strike blindly into the dark at nothing, even while asking othersto follow you into the darkness. Balancing continuities of the pastand emerging possibilities is essential; a strategy must articulate thetransition from the past state to the future in a manner that resonateswith multiple audiences. As a result of the complexity of the environment, strategyinherently creates a security dilemma for other states andactors that must be considered. Actions taken or not taken by onestate or actor always have the potential to affect other states and

actors, particularly their role in the strategic environment andtheir perception of that role. Any action risks changing the statusquo for friends and adversaries alike, creating an element ofinstability in the equilibrium and introducing an element of riskfor all. Because of its chaotic nature, the environment is subject tounintended multiordered effects and chance.54Strategy is never tobe undertaken lightly and must be approached comprehensively.At the state level, according to MacGregor Knox, Violence, chance,and politics; danger and friction; escalatory interaction betweenadversaries, remain the terrain of those who make strategy.55Thestakes are always potentially high! Many strategists too often focuson one-dimensional first-order effects, foregoing consideration ofsecond- and third-order effects, how a strategy will be perceivedby others, or the role of chance. In failing to properly consider themultidimensional and multiordered effects, strategists increase the

potential risks. Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative, but canbe accommodated or nullified by interactions within the system,counterstrategies, or chance. As a complex system of systems, theenvironment seeks an equilibrium that allows its subsystems tocoexist. As subsystems, states and actors seek to survive or advancein the environment according to what they deem acceptable and thesystem will tolerate. Changes can cancel one another in whole orpartalthough states and actors tend to have long memories, andimportant interests persevere. Once a change becomes part of thefabric of the environment, it lingers, influencing the nature of future

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change. It then becomes one level of consideration among many forfuture strategies but often reemerges in a different context. Much ofthis activity may appear below the noise level of the strategist, butthe role of the strategist is to be aware of what and who influence thewell-being of the state and how. Too few strategists give considerationto the role of continuitieswhat they are, the roles they play, andwhen they are important to strategy. As a chaotic, complex system, the strategic environment isalso time sensitivetiming and rate of change matter. Somewhatparadoxically, periods of stability are the best time to contemplatebold shifts in strategy and the most difficult time to get a decision todo it. The environment is always rebalancing itself at the margins,

and states apply the nuances of diplomacy and f