G.R. No. L-18740 April 28, 1922WALTER E. OLSEN & CO.,
INC.,petitioner,vs.VICENTE ALDANESE, as Insular Collector of
Customs of the Philippine Islands, and W. TRINIDAD, as Collector of
Internal Revenue,respondents.Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for
petitioner.Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.Araneta
& Zaragoza (amici curiae) for "Manila Tobacco
Association."STATEMENTOn March 29, 1922, respondents' demurrer to
the petition was overruled; on April 3, an answer was duly filed;
and on April 21, the petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.The facts are fully stated in the former
opinion.1Paragraph 4 of the petition contains certain subdivisions
of section 6 of Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, passed
February 4, 1916, entitled "an act to improve the methods of
production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to
develop the export trade therein." They empower the Collector of
Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules
respecting the classification, marking and parking of tobacco for
domestic sale or for exportation to the United States, and, among
other things, provide:No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall
be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until
it shall have been inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue
or his duly authorized representative and found to be standard for
export ...In order to facilitate the free entry of tobacco products
from the Philippine Islands into the United States, the Collector
of Internal Revenue is authorized to act as stamp agent for the
Untied States Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and to certify to
the Insular Collector of Customs that the standard tobacco exported
is the growth and product of the Philippine Islands. The Insular
Collector of Customs upon certificate from the Collector of
Internal Revenue as aforesaid, shall issue such certificate of
origin as may be necessary to insure the speedy admission of the
standard tobacco into the United States free of customs
duties.Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges that under clause B of
section 6 of the Act, the Collector of Internal Revenue promulgated
Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection
Regulations," in which it is said:To be classed as standard, cigars
must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good, clean,
selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has
been harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the
provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be
well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler,
etc.Paragraph 6 pleads the provisions of section 1 of article 1 of
the Constitution of the United States, and paragraph 7 pleads
section 10 of the "Jones Law."The answer admits paragraphs 4, 5, 6,
and 7 of the petition.Paragraph 6 of the answer says:They admit the
facts alleged in Paragraph XI of the petition in so far as they
refer to the Insular Collector of Customs, but they deny that the
acts performed by the said officer are wrongful or illegal; and
they also deny the others facts alleged in the same paragraph
except as they may hereinafter be impliedly admitted, that is, that
on or about February 6, 1922, the petitioner applied to the
Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering
a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and
as the petitioner himself stated on making such application that
the cigars sought to be exported must have been manufactured from
short-filler tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of
Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya, the Collector of Internal
Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination and
inspection of said cigars and stated to the petitioner that he did
not see his ways clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in
view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner's request, in
view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner was seeking
to export were not made with long-filler nor were they made from
tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three mentioned
provinces, and the said cigars were neither inspected nor examined
by the Collector of Internal Revenue.As a special defense, the
respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and
section 5 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the Collector of
Internal Revenue has discretionary power to decide whether the
manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the
United States fulfills the requisites prescribed by Administrative
Order No. 35. That it is not within the jurisdiction of this court
to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate
to the petitioner to the effect that the manufactured tobacco that
the petitioner seeks to export is a product of the Philippine
Islands, but it is for the Collector of Internal Revenue to
exercise the power of issuing said certificate if after an
inspection of said tobacco, he should find that "it conforms to the
conditions required by Administrative order No. 35 with the
exclusion of those conditions which, according to the said decision
of the Supreme Courts, the Collector of Internal Revenue is not
authorized to required under Act No. 2613."That the cigars which
petitioner seeks to export to the United States have not as yet
been examined or inspected by the Collector of Internal
Revenue.Wherefore, the defendants pray that the petition be
dismissed, with costs.The question presented is whether under the
facts admitted, the answer is a good defense to the petition.
JOHNS,J.:The defendants are public officers of the Philippine
Islands, and the acts of which the petitioner complains are their
official acts.In paragraph 11 of the petition, among other things,
it is alleged:That on the 6th day of February the said respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue wrongfully and unlawfully refused and
neglected and still unlawfully refuses and neglects to issue such
certificate of origin on the ground that said cigars were not
manufactured of long-filler tobacco produced exlusively in the
provisions of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.Paragraph 6 of the
answer says:"The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal
Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of
10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco," and represented that
the cigars were made from short-filler tobacco which was not the
product of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of
Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual
examination and inspection of said cigars, and stated to the
petitioner that he did not see his way clear to the granting of
petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the
petitioner was seeking to export were not made with long-filler nor
were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the
three provinces, and the said cigars were neither inspected nor
examined by the Collector of Internal Revenue.In its final
analysis, this is an admission by the defendants the cigars in
question were rejected by the Collector of Internal Revenue, for
the specified reason that they were not long-filler cigars
manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. That
the Collector accepted and treated the statement to the petitioner
as true, and, relying thereon, refused to use the certificate of
origin, for the sole reason that the cigars in question were not
long-filler cigars, and were not manufactured from tobacco grown in
one of the three provinces.If, when the cigars were presented, the
Collector of Internal Revenue had simply refused to issue the
certificate of origin and had not specified any grounds for such
refusal he would then have a legal right to plead and rely upon any
and all grounds of refusal. But where, as in the instant case, it
is alleged in the petition, and, in legal effects, admitted in the
answer, that the cigars were rejected because they were not
long-filler and were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of
the three provinces, then, under the authorities and rule of
construction, the defendants are confined and limited to the
specified grounds of refusal, and cannot be heard to say that the
cigars were rejected upon any other or different grounds than those
specified in the refusal.Again, it appears from the whole purport
and tenor of the answer that, in their refusal, the defendant were
acting under, and relying upon, those portions of Administrative
Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this
court held to be null and void in its former opinion.Although in
this class of cases, as a general rule, a demand and refusal is
prerequisite to the granting of a writ, it is not necessary where
it appears from the record that the demand, if made, would have
been refused.Merrill on Mandamus, section 225, says:The law never
demands a vain thing, and when the conduct and action of the
officer is equivalent to a refusal to perform the duty desired, it
is not necessary to go through the useless formality of demanding
its performance. Anything showing that the defendant does not
intend to perform the duty is sufficient to warrant the issue of
amandamus.Cyc., vol. 26, p. 182, says:Where it appears that a
demand would be unavailing it need not be made, as where the course
and conduct of officers is such as to show a settled purpose not to
perform the imposed duty.In the case of Chicago, K. & W. R.
Co.vs.Harris (30 Pac., 456), on page 459, the court says:The action
of the officers before and since the commencement of this action
clearly shows that a formal demand would have been unavailing. The
commencement of this proceeding was at least a sufficient demand;
and the defendants, instead of indicating a willingness to execute
the bonds, expressly denied the right of the plaintiff to the
bonds, and denied the existence of any obligation or duty to issue
and deliver them. Having distinctly manifested their purpose not to
perform this duty, the question of a formal demand is no longer
important. It appears that it would have been useless and foolish,
and the law rarely requires the doing of a useless act. (Citing a
number of authorities.)In United Statesvs.Auditors of Town of
Brooklyn (8 Fe. Rep., 473), the court says:But while it is
generally true that a court will not issue amandamusto compel the
performance of an act which it is merely anticipated the defendant
will not perform, still if the defendant has shown by his conduct
that he does not intend to perform the act, and that fact is
apparent to the court, it would be a work of supererogation to
require that a demand should be made for its performance.The facts
in this case are peculiar.Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the
Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated
Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections
Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated
by that officer, we have a right to assume that he was acting under
such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate
of origin.It appears from the record that the cigars in question
were not long-filler cigars, and that they were not manufactured
from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.By the express
terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by
the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse
petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin,
because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we
have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the
understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would
indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of
Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars.Having
refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above
assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made
examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused.The
motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ
will issue, as prayed for in the petition, without costs. So
ordered.Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-5612 October 31, 1953SY MAN, doing business under the
name and style of "United China Import Trading",
petitioner-appellee,vs.ALFREDO JACINTO, Commissioner of Customs,
and MELECIO FABROS, Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila,respondents-appellants.Assistant Solicitor General Francisco
Carreon and Solicitor Jesus A. Avancea for appellants.David &
Guevarra for appellee.MONTEMAYOR,J.:This is an appeal by
respondents Alfredo Jacinto, Commissioner of Customs and Melecio
Fabros, Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila (hereafter to
be referred to as Commissioner and Collector, respectively), from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting a
petition for a writ ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
them. The appeal involves only questions of law. The facts of the
case are contained in a portion of the decision appealed from,
which we quote:On January 2, 1951, the Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila ordered the seizure of two shipments of textile and
a number of sewing machines, consigned to this petitioner.On June
4, 1951, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, after due
hearing, rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:Wherefore, for all the foregoing, it is ordered and
decreed that the articles covered by Seizure Identification No.
1006 be, as they are hereby delivered to the importer after payment
of the necessary customs duty, sales tax and other charges due
thereon, in addition to a fine of One hundred fifty-five
pesos(P155) representing five (5) times the difference in duty of
the printed paper in sheets, except the sewing machines which are
hereby declared forfeited to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to be sold at public auction in conformity with law if
found saleable, otherwise, to be destroyed.The Surveyor of the Port
shall return the original of this decision showing action taken.On
June 27, 1951, the herein petitioner (appellee) received a copy of
the aforesaid decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila.On July 12, 1951, counsel for the petitioner (appellee) sent
a letter to the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, asking
for the execution of the decision, in view of the fact that it had
become final and could no longer be reviewed by the Commissioner of
Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of
notification thereof was given to the herein petitioner who did not
appeal from said decision to the Commissioner of Customs within the
aforesaid period of time.On August 21, 1951, counsel for the
petitioner sent another letter to the Collector of Customs,
reiterating the request contained in his letter of July 12, 1951,
and urging that the goods which were found not to have been
imported in violation of law, be released to the petitioner under
the terms and conditions of the aforementioned decision of June 4,
1951.On August 24, 1951, the Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila sent a letter to petitioner's attorneys, informing them that
their letter of July 12, 1951, was endorsed to the Commissioner of
Customs on July 13, 1951, "requesting information whether the
merchandise covered by Seizure Identification No. 1006 may now be
delivered to the owner upon showing that the decision has become
final and executory after fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a
copy of the same by the claimant," to which no reply had been
received from the Commissioner of Customs. (pp. 64-66, rec.)The
petition of Sy Man above mentioned sought (1) to declare null and
void that portion of the Memorandum Order promulgated by the
Insular Collector of Customs dated August 18, 1947, which provides
that as in protected cases, decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, whether appealed or not, are subject to review by
the Insular Collector (now commissioner); that such decisions and
their supporting papers be submitted to his office, and that
pending action by him on such decisions, final disposal of the
goods involved shall not be made; and (2) to order the Collector to
deliver to the petitioner the shipment of textiles covered by
Seizure Identification No. 1006 pursuant to its decision of June 4,
1951, claimed to be final and executory.As already said, the trial
court granted the petition and ordered the Commissioner and the
Collector to execute the decision of the latter dated June 4, 1951,
on the ground that said decision had already become final.For the
purposes of clarification, it should be stated that before the year
1947, the Bureau of Customs had one chief and one assistant chief,
known respectively as Insular Collector of Customs and Insular
Deputy Collector of Customs (section 1138, Revised Administrative
Code).The Insular Collector and the Insular Deputy Collector acted
as the Collector of Customs and Deputy Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila (section 1152, Revised Administrative Code).
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 51, authorizing the Chief Executive to
reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the President issued Executive Order No. 94 signed on
October 4, 1947.Under sections 51 and 52 of said order, the
designation of Insular Collector of Customs, and the position of
Deputy Collector of Customs was changed to that of Collector of
Customs for the Port of Manila.It is the contention of the
applicants that the Commissioner as head of the Bureau of Customs
and the chief executive and administrative officer thereof under
section 550, Revised Administrative Code, and also by virtue of
section 1152 of the same Code has supervision and control over the
Collector, and that by reason of said supervision and control, he
maymotu propioreview and revise decisions of the Collector in
seizure cases even when not appealed by the importer. Under that
theory, the Commissioner of Customs promulgated his Memorandum
Order of August 18, 1947. For reference, we reproduce said
order.DEPARTMENT OF FINANCEBUREAU OF CUSTOMSMANILAAugust
18,1947MEMORANDUM ORDERTo all Collectors of Customs at Sub-Ports:It
has been observed that in seizure cases some Collectors of Customs
merely submit to this Office reports of their seizures and the
subsequent final disposition they made of the articles seized. They
do not transmit the records of the proceedings and their decisions
thereon in due form, as required by Sections 1380 and 1381 of the
Revised Administrative Code.As in protest cases, decisions of
Collectors of Customs in seizure cases, whether appealed or not,
are subject to review by the Insular Collector. To this end, it is
necessary that such decisions and their supporting papers be
submitted to this Office. Pending action by the Insular Collector
on such decisions, final disposition of the goods involved shall
not be made, except upon previous authority from this Office, or
except in cases where such goods are perishable in nature or liable
to deterioration in which case the same may be disposed of Section
1399 of the Revised Administrative Code.Where the articles seized
are subject to forfeiture under section 1363 of the Revised
Administrative Code and a fine is imposed in lieu of forfeiture
under Section 1365 of the same code, the decision thereon in due
form and all the supporting papers shall be transmitted to this
office for confirmation or such other action as may be deemed
proper. Pending receipt of such confirmation the decision shall not
be given effect.All concerned shall be guided accordingly.ALFREDO
DE LEONInsular Collector of Customs
The petitioner-appellee, however, equally claims that when a
decision of the Collector in a seizure case is not appealed by the
importer to the Commissioner within 15 days as provided for in
Section 1380, Revised Administrative Code, then said decision
becomes final not only as to said importer but as to the Government
as well, so that thereafter nothing remains to be done except the
execution of the decision of the Collector, that is to say, the
release of the goods seized, if not forfeited to the Government and
the payment of the amounts mentioned and ordered in the decision.We
are given the impression and we realize that this is the first time
that the Courts have been called upon to interpret the law on this
point and to determine whether or not this supposed power of
revision by the Commissioner of unappealed decisions of the
Collector in seizure cases, is supported by law, and for this
reason we have exerted and exercised extra effort and care in
examining the law on the subject.As we understand it, when
merchandise or goods are imported through any of the ports of the
Philippines, under normal circumstances, said goods are assessed
for purposes of payment of custom duties, fees and other money
charges. If the importer is satisfied with the assessment he pays
the amount assessed and withdraws the goods. Failure to protest
renders the action of the Collector conclusive against the
importer. (See sections 1370 and 1371, Revised Administrative
Code). If dissatisfied he pays the amount of the assessment anyhow
and then files a protest under section 1372, Revised Administrative
Code, and the Collector re-examines the matter thus presented.
(Section 1379, Revised Administrative Code.)However, when property
imported is subject to forfeiture under the customs laws (section
1363, Revised Administrative Code), the goods are seized, a warrant
for their detention is issued, the owner or his agent is notified
in writing and after giving a hearing with reference to the offense
or delinquency which gave rise to the seizure, the Collector in
writing makes a declaration of forfeiture or fixes the amount of
the fine to be imposed or takes such other appropriate steps he may
deem proper. (Sections 1374, 1375, 1379 [paragraph 2], Revised
Administrative Code.)Both under protest and seizure cases the
person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector may appeal to the
Commissioner within 15 days. (Section 1380, Revised Administrative
Code.) Because of its importance to this case, and for purposes of
reference, we are reproducing said section.SEC. 1380. Review by
Commissioner. The person aggrieved by the decision of the collector
of customs in any matter presented upon protest or by his action in
any case of seizure may, within fifteen days after notification in
writing by the collector of his action or decision, give written
notice to the collector signifying his desire to have the matter
reviewed by the Commissioner.Thereupon, the collector of customs
shall forthwith transmit all the papers in the cause to the
Commissioner, who shall approve, modify, or reverse the action of
his subordinate and shall take such steps and make such order or
orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.If the
person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector in a seizure case
does not make such appeal, the decision evidently becomes final, at
least as to him. That was the reason why petitioner-appellee, in
the belief that because he failed or did not choose to appeal from
the decision of June 4, 1951, the same had become final, asked the
court that the same be executed, that is to say, that he be allowed
to pay the amounts fixed in the decision and that the merchandise
be released, with the exception of the sewing machines which were
declared subject to forfeiture. The Commissioner, however, as
already stated, believes that the decision of the Collector in a
seizure case the unappealed does not become final as against the
Government as long as it has not been reviewed and acted upon by
him. He does not state the period if any within which he may or has
to make such revision. In other words, the appellants' claim seems
to be that he (the Commissioner) may hold without action an
appealed seizure case, the decision of which is already final as to
the importer, indefinitely, for months if not for years, as for
instance, when there are too may such cases to study and decide, or
there are other matters that have preference to this attention and
action, a period of time without limit.From the standpoint of the
importer, such a rule or theory is decidedly unsatisfactory and
even unjust, if not oppressive. He is willing to abide by the
decision of the Collector; he wants to pay the amounts fixed and
stated in the decision, including the fines, and desires to get the
goods released so as to be able to dispose of them. The
Commissioner, however, relying exclusively on his power of
supervision and control, as head of the Bureau of Customs, over
Collectors of Customs as his subordinates in that bureau, and
presumably on his Memorandum Order of August 18, 1947, contends
that the seizure case involving goods seized way back on January 2,
1951, and decided by the Collector on June 4,1 951, tho unappealed
by the importer and thereby binding on him, is still unfinished
business as far as the Government is concerned, because he(the
Commissioner) has not yet gotten around to act upon it. For that
matter, we understand that up to the present, the latter part of
1953, the Commissioner has not yet taken any action, approving,
reversing or modifying the decision of the Collector of Customs. As
we have already had occasion to pay, said rule or procedure claimed
for the Government would appear to be unsatisfactory, intolerable
if not oppressive to importers.As regards the Memorandum Order of
August 18, 1947, by the Insular Collector of Customs to Collectors
of Customs, we are afraid that appellants cannot find support and
comfort therein. We are given to understand by the parties or at
least appellants do not deny appellee's assertion that said
memorandum order was never approved by the department head and was
never published in theOfficial Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that every chief of bureau shall
prescribe forms and make regulations or general ordersnot
inconsistent with lawto carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the bureau's jurisdiction. But to become effective
said forms and regulations must be approved by the Department head
and published in theOfficial Gazetteor otherwise publicly
promulgated. Because of this failure of approval by the department
head and of publication, the memorandum order of August 18, 1947
has therefore no legal effect. Moreover, a form or regulation
promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent with law.
Therefore, if the law does not give the Commissioner the power to
review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved
and published in theOfficial Gazette, would equally have no effect
for being inconsistent with law.Let us now see if there is any law
giving authority to the Commissioner of Customs to review and
revise unappealed decisions in seizure cases. In cases involving
assessment of duties, even when the importer fails to protest the
decision of the Collector of Customs, the Commissioner may order a
reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector was
erroneous and unfavorable to the Government; and the Department
Head in his turn if he believes that the decision of the
Commissioner in any unprotested case of assessment of duties is
erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may require the
Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may direct the
Commissioner to certify the case to the Court of First Instance of
Manila. We are reproducing said section 1393..SEC. 1393.
Supervisory authority of Commissioner and of Department Head in
certain cases. If in any case involving the assessment of duties
the importer shall fail to protest the decision of the collector of
customs and the Commissioner shall be of the opinion that the
decision was erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, the
latter may order a reliquidation; and if the decision of the
Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in the opinion of the
Department Head, be erroneous and unfavorable to the Government,
the Department Head may require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public interest
requires, direct the Commissioner to certify the cause to the Court
of First Instance of Manila, in the manner provided in section one
thousand three hundred and eighty-six hereof, there to be reviewed
by the court as other customs cases removed thereto.Except as in
the preceding paragraph provided, the supervisory authority of the
Department Head over the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the
administrative revisal of the decisions of the Commissioner in
matters removable into court.It will be noticed that the section is
entitled "supervisory authority of the Commissioner and of the
Department Head in certain cases." We find no similar legal
provision in seizure cases. The logical inference is that the
lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for
this supervisory authority or power of revision by the Commissioner
and the Department Head on unappealed seizure cases; and it is
highly possible that up to and until 1947, when the memorandum
order of August 18th of that year was issued, it was not the
practice of the Bureau of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases
sent up by Collectors to the Commissioner's office for review and
revision. This we may gather from the memorandum order itself,
where the Commissioner observes that in seizure cases some
collectors of customs merely submit to him their reports of their
seizure and the subsequent final disposition thereof without
transmitting the records of their proceedings, and he therein
asserts the right of the Commissioner of Customs to review
decisions of Collector of Customs in seizure cases though
unappealed. If that right and that practice had existed from the
beginning, it is not likely that Collectors would disregard and
ignore it, to the extent that it was necessary to remind them of it
by means of a memorandum order.Moreover, under section 1380 of the
Revised Administrative Code above reproduced, it would seem that in
a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the papers in the cause
to the Commissioner only when and after the importer notifies him
in writing signifying his desire to have the matter reviewed by the
Commissioner. The section does not say that without the notice of
appeal, the Collector is called upon to submit the papers of the
case to the Commissioner. If this be true, then legally, a case of
seizure unappealed ends right in the office of the Collector,
with-out prejudice of course to the Collector subsequently making a
report of his action to the Commissioner. Furthermore, section 1388
of the Revised Administrative Code provides thus:SEC. 1388.
Settlement of cause by payment of fine or redemption of forfeited
property. If, in any seizure case, the owner or agent shall, while
the cause is yet before the collector of the district of seizure,
pay to such collector the fine imposed by him or, in case of
forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, or if,
after removal of the cause, he shall pay to the Commissioner the
amount of the fine as finally determined by him, or, in case of
forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, such
property shall be forthwith surrendered, and all liability which
may or might attach to the property by virtue of the offense which
was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might have
been incurred under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect
to such property shall thereupon be deemed to be
discharged.Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in
any case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where
the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the
same would be contrary to law.If under the above provisions, in a
seizure case the owner or agent may, while the cause is yet before
the collector, pay the fine imposed, or in case of forfeiture, pay
the appraised value of the property, and thereafter such properties
shall be surrendered and all liability which may attach to said
property by virtue of the offense causing the seizure is to be
deemed discharged, the conclusion to be drawn is that it is within
the power and right of an importer, owner or agent to end the case
in the office of the Collector, thereby precluding any intervention
by the Commissioner in the way of reviewing and revising the
decision of the Collector. Again, under section 1389 immediately
following which reads SEC. 1389. Right of protest in such cases.
Where payment is made or redemption effected as allowed under the
preceding section, the party making payment or effecting the
redemption may, if he desires to test the validity of the
proceedings, make formal protest at the time of making such payment
or affecting such redemption, or within fifteen days thereafter,
and make claim for the repayment of the whole or any part of the
sum so paid by him, whereupon the proceedings shall take the same
course as in ordinary cases of protest against customs duties and
charges generally.the importer or owner of goods seized, after
payment is made or redemption effected, is allowed if he desires to
test the validity or correctness of the decision of the Collector,
to appeal the same to the Commissioner of Customs presumably, to
decrease the amount of his liability or annul the seizure
altogether and have all the amounts paid by him refunded. The
inference follows that by making payment and redeeming the property
seized under the decision of the Collector of Customs, the owner
may terminate the case right there, altho notwithstanding his
payment he still has the right to have the case elevated to the
Office of the Commissioner of Customs. It would seem that the
elevation of the case and the transmittal of the papers thereof to
the Commissioner lies within the owner's exclusive power and
discretion. This argues against the pre-tended power of the
Commissioner of automatic review and revision of decisions of
Collectors in unappealed seizure cases.It is argued that if this
power of review and revision by the Commissioner of unappealed
seizure cases is not conceded, then in cases where the Collector in
his decision commits a blunder prejudicial to the interests of the
Government, or renders a decision through fraud or in collusion
with the importer, the Government cannot protect itself. The
argument is not without merit; but we must bear in mind that the
law is promulgated to operate on ordinary, common, routine cases.
The rule is and the law presumes that in seizure cases Collector of
Customs act honestly and correctly and as Government officials,
always with an eye to the protection of the interests of the
Government employing them. If mistakes are committed at all more
often than not they are in favor of the Government and not against
it, and that is the reason why when the importer feels aggrieved by
their decision, he is given every chance and facility to protest
the decision and appeal to the Commissioner. Cases of erroneous
decisions against the interest of the Government of decisions
rendered in collusion and connivance with importers are the
exception. To protect the Government in such exceptional cases, we
find that in every seizure case, section 1378 of the Revised
Administrative Code requires the Collector to immediately notify
the Commissioner and the Auditor General. It maybe that this
requirement has for its main purpose the recording of and
accounting for the articles seized so that in case of confiscation
the Commissioner and the Auditor General will know what articles
have become government property. But the notice will also inform
the Commissioner and the Auditor General of the seizure. If the
seizure is important or unusual, the Commissioner may, if he so
desires, order the Collector as his subordinate to withhold action
on the seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a reasonable time, the
promulgation of his decision until after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had studied the case and given
suggestions. At that stage of the proceedings before definite
action is taken by the Collector, and a decision rendered by him,
it would seem that any action by him as a subordinate is still
subject to the supervisory authority and control of the
Commissioner as his Chief, and the latter may still influence and
direct the Collector's action if he finds occasion for doing so.But
if the Government deems it necessary to provide for review and
revision by the Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the
decisions of the Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases,
the Legislature may be requested to insert a section in the Revised
Administrative Code similar to Section 1393 which applies to
unprotested cases of assessment duties. The defect in said section
however is that it does not fix the period within which the
automatic review and revision or reliquidation to be ordered by the
Commission and the Secretary of Finance must be effected. This
defect should be remedied.In conclusion, we find and hold that
under the present law governing the Bureau of Customs, the decision
of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case if not protested and
appealed by the importer to the Commissioner of Customs on time,
becomes final not only as to him but against the Government as
well, and neither the Commissioner nor the Department Head has the
power to review, revise or modify such unappealed decision. We also
find and hold that the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of
Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only
because it has not been duly approved by the Department Head and
duly published as required by section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code but also because it is inconsistent with law.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.Paras, C.J., Pablo, Jugo and
Bautista Angelo, JJ.,concur.
Separate OpinionsREYES,J.,concurring:Without denying the power
of the Commissioner of Customs at his own instance to review, alter
or revoke the decision of a collector of customs in seizure cases a
power reasonably to be inferred from section 1152 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which places all collectors of customs "under
the supervision and control of the Commissioner" I vote for the
execution of the decision of the Collector of Customs for the port
of Manila which the Commissioner has not chosen to alter or revoke,
it appearing that, though the said decision was brought to his
attention on July 30,1951, he has not "up to the present, the
latter part of 1953," taken any action thereon.Bengzon and Padilla,
JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellant,vs.HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES,
NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO,accused-appellees.Office of
the Solicitor General for appellant.Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr.
for appellees.AQUINO,J.:t.hqwThis is a case involving the validity
of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.On March 7, 1969
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator
in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the
complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969
resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo
Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with
motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored
gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as
sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end
of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached
to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or
equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).Upon motion of
the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna
affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is
now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic
Act No. 5440.The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be
penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and
that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since
the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.As legal
background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries
Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in
fishing.Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an
obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more
than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five
years.It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted
below:+.wph!1SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL
WATERS+.wph!1OF THE PHILIPPINES.Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No.
4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following
rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing
in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the
information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!1SECTION 1.
Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as
follows:(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the
Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as
defined in the t between the United States and Spain, dated
respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight
and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of
this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are
included.(b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of
fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of
many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated
and from and available source of electric current.(c) 'Persons'
includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.(d)
'Fish' includes other aquatic products.SEC. 2. Prohibition. It
shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to
catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the
Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific
purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all
times.SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this
Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not
exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not
extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the
Court.SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Administrative Order are hereby revoked.SEC. 5. Effectivity. This
Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its
publication in the Office Gazette.On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by
restricting the ban against electro fishing tofresh water
fisheries(63 O.G. 9963).Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the
Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: "infresh water fisheriesin the
Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals
and other bodies of fresh water."The Court of First Instance and
the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section
76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law
"or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
(P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court."That assumption is incorrect because 3 of
the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not
exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount
the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their
own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe
penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at
penalty imposed in section 83.Had Administrative Order No. 84
adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of
electro fishing would be within theexclusive original
jurisdictionof the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law;
People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,We have discussed this pre
point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the
crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500,
falls within theconcurrent original jurisdictionof the inferior
courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno,
L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited
therein).And since the instant case was filed in the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d
rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the
Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and
last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila,
L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).It results that the Court of
First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the
case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal
is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a
direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People
vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).In this appeal, the prosecution
argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued
under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above,
punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance.
This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the
Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro
fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious
or poisonous substance under section 11.The prosecution cites as
the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department
Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of
the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to
execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for
the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of
fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the
declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our
fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section
83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation
of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than
two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both, in the discretion of the court."As already pointed out above,
the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because
the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84
is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.We are of the
opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic
Act No. 3512.The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal
basis.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in
the old Fisheries Law.That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing
in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4)
illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to
report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other
violations.Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically
punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro
fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the
category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the
penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the
penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty
for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section
83 of the Fisheries Law.The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute
an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People
vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11
32).Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro
fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was
confined tofresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could
be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the
view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro
fishing.However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro
fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be
penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential
Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws
and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was
promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes
electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.That decree
provides:+.wph!1SEC. 33.Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall he unlawful for
any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or
gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with
the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the
use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d),
respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ...The decree Act No. 4003, as
amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential
Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec.
49, P. D. No. 704).The inclusion in that decree of provisions
defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law.
It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally
adequate to penalize electro fishing.Note that the definition of
electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old
Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note
further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment
from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe
than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of
not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84.An examination of the rule-making power
of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law
sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro
fishing by means of an administrative order.Administrative agent
are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law
and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes
(People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz,
L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta,
102 Phil. 706, 712).The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for
all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S.
vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220
U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal
Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of
legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary
because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil.
328).Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the
law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs.
Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs.
General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).The
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
(University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal
Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78
Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative,
L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).There is no question that
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary
"shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and
regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested
in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised
Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.Section 4(h) of
Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and
execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the
development of fisheries."Section 79(B) of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have
the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules,
regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions,not contrary
to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of
his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution
of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe
penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized
by law."Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in
conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of
culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique
Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As
he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking
body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound
demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power;
otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in
his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.Article
7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that
administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution."As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for
constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to
the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute
relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it."
"department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority
conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493,
496-8)."Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by
law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after
expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying
out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency
entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said
that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197,
cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).In case of discrepancy between the
basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim,
108 Phil. 1091).This Court in its decision in the Lim case,supra,
promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men
in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to
the importance and necessity of closely following the legal
provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any
possible misunderstanding or confusion.The rule is that the
violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the
government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing
such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender
liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).In other words, a
violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued
can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing
statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil.
1125, 1132).It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute
a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively
in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body
or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs.
Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).In the instant case the regulation
penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued,because the
law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.The instant
case is similar toPeople vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. TheSantoscase
involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries
Law.Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not
licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative
order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands
and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and
military reservations authorities of the United States only upon
receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be
granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or
naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be
proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal
Code.Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing
boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the
Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor
Island.This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit
boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers
of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the
United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval
authorities concerned.As the said law does not penalize the act
mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to
legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be
delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking
body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a
legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said
provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge
against Santos was dismiss.A penal statute is strictly construed.
While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.
An administrative agency can have only the administrative or
policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2
Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).Where the legislature has delegated to
executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the
rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect
of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting
statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate
(State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).In a prosecution
for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear
that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority
conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Milessupra).TheMilescase
involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to
adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable
rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting thetakingof the
various classes of game.Under that statute, the Game Commission
promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or
receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting,
pursuing, taking, killing ordisplayingof any game animal, game bird
or game fish or any part thereof."Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a
sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to
the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open
for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a
violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.It
was held that there was no statute penalizing thedisplayof game.
What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking
body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily
said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend
or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was
quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.WHEREFORE, the
lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of
appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is
affirmed. Costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92646-47 October 4, 1991AUGUSTO
TOLEDO,petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,respondents.Toledo & Toledo for
petitioner.Itaas-Fetalino, Limare and Huerta for
CSC.PARAS,J.:pPetitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then
Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and
Information Department of the Comelec, on May 21, 1986. At the time
of his appointment, petitioner, having been born on July 8, 1927
was already more than fifty-seven (57) years old. It was the first
time petitioner joined the government service as he was then
engaged in active private practice prior to said
appointment.Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil
Service Form No. 333 and his oath of office were endorsed by the
Comelec to the Civil Service Commission (CSC, for brevity) on June
11, 1986, for approval and attestation. However, no prior request
for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP, for
brevity) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of
persons 57 years old or above into the government service without
prior approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1983).Petitioner officially reported for
work and assumed the functions of his office on June 16, 1986.On
January 29, 1989, public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the
lack of authority required under Section 22, Rule III of the
CSRPAP, and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 issued
Resolution No. 2066, the pertinent portion of which is hereinbelow
quoted, to wit:WHEREAS, for the validity then of the appointment of
Atty. Toledo as Manager of the Education and Information Department
it was necessary that not only must prior authority from the Civil
Service Commission be obtained considering that he was more than
fifty-seven (57) years old at the time, it must as well be shown
that (a) the exigencies of the service so required, (b) Atty.
Toledo possesses special qualification not possessed by other
officers or employees in the Commission, and (c) the vacancy cannot
be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees in the
Commission;WHEREAS, there is nothing in the 120 File of Atty.
Toledo that indicates that such authority was even obtained from
the Civil Service Commission or from the President of the
Philippines; moreover, conditions (a), (b) and (c) stated in the
immediately preceding clause did not then exist;WHEREAS, the
appointment then of Atty. Toledo was made in violation of law and
pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action, the appointment was void from the beginning.NOW,
THEREFORE, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to DECLARE as
VOID from the beginning the appointment of Atty. Augusto Toledo as
Manager of the Education and Information Department of this
Commission. (pp. 49-50, Rollo)Petitioner appealed the foregoing
Comelec Resolution No. 2066 to public respondent CSC on February 4,
1989.On July 12, 1989, public respondent CSC promulgated Resolution
No. 89-468 which disposed of the appeal, thus:WHEREFORE, foregoing
premises considered, the Commission resolved to declare, as it
hereby declares the appointment of Augusto V. Toledo as Manager,
Information and Education Department, Commission on Elections,
there being no basis in law, merely voidable and not voidab initio.
Hence, Atty. Toledo is considered a de facto officer from the time
he assumed office on June 16, 1986, until and up to the
promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2066 on January 29, 1989.
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)Unable to obtain a reconsideration from the
aforesaid Resolution, petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari.It is first contended by petitioner that CSC Resolution
No. 89-468 is without legal basis because the CSRPAP is invalid and
unenforceable for not having been published in the Official Gazette
or in any newspaper of general circulation as required under
Section 9(b) of P.D. 807. This being the case, petitioner argues
that the requirement of prior CSC authority to appoint persons 57
years or older under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP has not
"become effective" and cannot be invoked against him.It will be
recalled that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260)
took effect on June 19, 1959. That act, among other things,
established a Civil Service Commission one of the functions of
which was, "with the approval by the President, to prescribe,
amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to
become effective thirty days after publication in the Official
Gazette" [Sec. 16 (e)].The Commission subsequently adopted and
promulgated rules intended to carry the law into effect, known as
the Revised Civil Service Rules. Those rules were published in the
supplement to Vol. 58, No. 49 of the Official Gazette, dated
December 3, 1962.Section 5, Rule VI of those Revised Civil Service
Rules provided that:SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or
reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the
President of the Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, determines that he possesses special
qualifications and his services are needed.It is worthy of note,
however, that the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government service
of any person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring
that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment in
the Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of
the Civil Service Commission.On October 6, 1975, pursuant to the
1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 807 was issued by
President Marcos, establishing "an independent Civil Service
Commission." The decree, known as the "Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines," repealed or accordingly modified all laws, rules, and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent" with its provisions
(Sec. 59), although it declared that "the former Civil Service
Commission created under Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, and as
organized under the Integrated Reorganization Plan may serve as the
nucleus of the Civil Service Commission" (Fourth Whereas Clause,
Preamble). Like RA 2260 which it superseded, PD 807 empowered the
Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree,"
and also provided that said "rules and regulations shall become
effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation."The new Civil
Service Commission adopted "rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions" of the Civil Service Decree on November 20,
1983. The rules were named, "Civil Service Rules on Personnel
Actions and Policies" (CSRPAP). Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP
is substantially the same as Section 5, Rule VI of the quondam
"Revised Civil Service Rules" and it reads as follows:SEC. 22. No
person shall be appointed, reinstated, or re-employed in the
service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President, or the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of employees in the
judiciary, determines that he possesses special qualifications
urgently needed by the hiring agency.Omitted, it will be observed,
was reference to the "President of the Senate" and the "Speaker of
the House of Representatives," both of whom were expressly
mentioned in the counterpart provision in the former rules (Section
5, Rule VI,supra).Noteworthy, too, is that there is no provision at
all in PD 807 dealing in any manner with the appointment,
reinstatement or re-employment in the Government service of any
person already 57 years or any particular age, for that matter.
Again, the provision regarding persons 57 years of age was purely a
creation of the Commission, having no reference to any provision in
the decree intended to be implemented.It was this provision of the
CSRPAP (Sec. 22, Rule III) which was applied to Toledo. According
to the CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's appointment had
never been obtained indeed, it would appear that the appointment
papers were not transmitted by the COMELEC to the CSC until
February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment was "approved as
permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSCthe appointment had
to be struck down.Now, these rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were
never published either in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of
general circulation, at least as of the time that Section 22, Rule
III thereof was applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. As
much was admitted by the Chairman of the Commission, Hon. Patricia
A. Sto. Tomas in a letter written by her to Toledo dated February
2, 1989. In that letter, the Chairman stated that (a) the
Commission had "no record of the publication of said Rules ("Rules
on Personnel Actions and Policies") in newspapers of general
circulation" although said Rules were "published and distributed by
the National Media Production Center in 1975," and that (b) only
"the Rule on Promotion embodied in CSC Resolution No. 83-343
repealing Rule V of the said Rules was published on August 15, 1983
in Volume 79 No. 33 of the Official Gazette" (Annex I, petition).
The lack of publication is also attested by the Director of the
National Printing Office who, in a Certification issued by him on
January 30, 1989, stated that "the RULES ON PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND
POLICIES' promulgated on November 20, 1975 by the Civil Service
Commission implementing Presidential Decree No. 807 was not
submitted to this office for publication" (Annex J, petition).The
Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be
considered valid and effective after RA 2260 was repealed and
superseded by PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended to take the
place of RA 2260. In all matters dealt with by both laws, the
provisions of PD 807 were obviously intended to be controlling. So,
also, the rules promulgated by the Civil Service Commission to
carry the provisions of PD 807 into effect were meant to supersede
or take the place of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other
words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP were intended to make RA 2260 and its
implementing rulesfunctus officio, render them without force and
effect except only as regards any provision, if at all, not dealt
with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.Now, it may reasonably be assumed that
the law-making authority at the time, the President, was aware of
the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service
Rules promulgated under RA 2260. Yet when he promulgated PD 807 the
President did not see fit to incorporate therein any provision
regarding 57-year old persons or for that matter, to prescribe any
age beyond which persons could become ineligible for appointment,
reintatement or re-employment. This surely is an indication of an
intention not to continue the provision in effect.In any event, the
provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules
(under said RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity. As already
pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service
Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to
implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific
provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect, such
as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a
factor in the employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a
direction that there be a determination of some point in a person's
life at which he becomes unemployable, or employable only under
specific conditions. It was therefore an unauthorized act of
legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot
be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating
rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may
legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no
prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons
in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in
employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an
implementing rule on the matter.The power vested in the Civil
Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect,
not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to
supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said
regulations 'cannot amend an act of Congress.' " (Teoxon v. Members
of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419
[1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174
SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).The considerations
just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section,
relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation
on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no
relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to
be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension
of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.Apart from
this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of
the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason
that said rules were never published, as is admitted on all sides.
The argument that the CSRPAP need not be published, because they
were "a mere reiteration of existing law" and had been
"circularized," flies in the teeth of the explicit and categorical
requirement of PD 807 that rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty
(30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any
newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, the CSRPAP cannot
properly be considered a mere reiteration of existing law, for as
already discussed, the implementing rule governing 57-year old
persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be considered "existing
law."Assuming without conceding that the rule regarding employment
of 57-year old persons is valid and enforceable, it can only apply,
according to its express terms, to employees under the supervision
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the President of
the Philippines, these two being the only officials mentioned as
having to give consent to the employment of said persons. It cannot
be construed as applying to employees over whom neither the
President nor the Chief Justice exercises supervision, such as the
Senate or the House of Representatives, or the COMELEC or other
Constitutional Commissions.One last word. There is absolutely no
question about the fact that the only reason for Toledo's
separation from the service was the fact that he was already more
than 57 years old when he was invited to work in the COMELEC by its
former Chairman, but through no fault of his own, not all the
conditions for his employment appear to have been satisfied. There
is no question that it was not Toledo's fault that his papers were
tardily submitted to the Civil Service Commission and approval of
his appointment was made only by the Executive Director of the
Commission and not by the Chairman thereof (to whom the function of
the President of approving appointments like those of Toledo had
been delegated under LOI 47, CSC Memo Circular No. 5, Series of
1983). There is no question, too, that he was actively engaged in
law practice when taken into the COMELEC. There is absolutely no
question about the fact that he was otherwise a competent and
efficient officer of the COMELEC and had not given the remotest
cause for dismissal. These are equitable considerations proscribing
application to him of the provision in question, assuming its
validity, or impelling at least a restrictive application thereof
so that it may not work to his prejudice.Premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108358 January 20, 1995COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, R.O.H. AUTO
PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS,respondents.VITUG,J.:On 22 August 1986, during the period
when the President of the Republic still wielded legislative
powers, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time
tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate
and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981
to 1985.Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto
Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November
1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41 and Supplemental Tax
Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes due.Prior to this availment, petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by
private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter
deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30
September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of
P1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it had
been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax
notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was
denied by the Commissioner, in his letter of 22 November 1988, on
the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09
February 1987, implementing Executive Order No. 41, had construed
the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive
order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.
The invoked provisions of the memorandum order read:TO: All
Internal Revenue Officers and Others Concerned:1.0. To give effect
and substance to the immunity provisions of the tax amnesty under
Executive Order No. 41, as expanded by Executive Order No. 64, the
following instructions are hereby issued:xxx xxx xxx1.02. A
certification by the Tax Amnesty Implementation Officer of the fact
of availment of the said tax amnesty shall be a sufficient basis
for:xxx xxx xxx1.02.3. In appropriate cases, the
cancellation/withdrawal ofassessment notices and letters of demand
issued after August 21, 1986 for the collection of income,
business, estate or donor's taxes due during the same taxable
years.1(Emphasis supplied)Private respondent appealed the
Commissioner's denial to the Court of Tax Appeals. Ruling for the
taxpayer, the tax court said:Respondent (herein petitioner
Commissioner) failed to present any case or law which proves that
an assessment can withstand or negate the force and effects of a
tax amnesty. This burden of proof on the petitioner (herein
respondent taxpayer) was created by the clear and express terms of
the executive order's intention qualified availers of the amnesty
may pay an amnesty tax in lieu of said unpaid taxes which are
forgiven (Section 2, Section 5, Executive Order No. 41, as
amended). More specifically, the plain provisions in the statute
granting tax amnesty for unpaid taxes for the period January 1,
1981 to December 31, 1985 shifted the burden of proof on respondent
to show how the issuance of an assessment before the date of the
promulgation of the executive order could have a reasonable
relation with the objective periods of the amnesty, so as to make
petitioner still answerable for a tax liability which, through the
statute, should have been erased with the proper availment of the
amnesty.Additionally, the exceptions enumerated in Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 41, as amended, do not indicate any reference
to an assessment or pending investigation aside from one arising
from information furnished by an informer. . . . Thus, we deem that
the rule in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 promulgating that
only assessments issued after August 21, 1986 shall be abated by
the amnesty is beyond the contemplation of Executive Order No. 41,
as amended.2On appeal by the Commissioner to the Court of Appeals,
the decision of the tax court was affirmed. The appellate court
further observed:In the instant case, examining carefully the words
used in Executive Order No. 41, as amended, we find nothing which
justifies petitioner Commissioner's ground for denying respondent
taxpayer's claim to the benefits of the amnesty law. Section 4 of
the subject law enumerates, in no uncertain terms, taxpayers who
may not avail of the amnesty granted,. . . .Admittedly, respondent
taxpayer does not fall under any of the . . . exceptions. The added
exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope of the
amnesty clearly amounts to an act of administrative legislation
quite contrary to the mandate of the law which the regulation ought
to implement.xxx xxx xxxLastly, by its very nature, a tax amnesty,
being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of
its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of
evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an
absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to
collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense,
prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to
relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby
become a part of the new society with a clean slate. (Republic vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court. 196 SCRA 335, 340 [1991] citing
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Shipping Corp., 20
SCRA 487) To follow [the restrictive application of Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87 pressed by petitioner Commissioner would
be to work against theraison d'etreof E.O. 41, as amended, i.e., to
raise government revenues by encouraging taxpayers to declare their
untaxed income and pay the tax due thereon. (E.O. 41, first
paragraph)]3In this petition for review, the Commissioner raises
these related issues:1. WHETHER OR NOT REVENUE MEMORANDUM ORDER NO.
4-87, PROMULGATED TO IMPLEMENT E.O. NO. 41, IS VALID;2. WHETHER OR
NOT SAID DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENTS IN QUESTION WERE EXTINGUISHED BY
REASON OR PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S AVAILMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 41
AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 64;3. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF
ASSESSMENTS.4The authority of the Minister of Finance (now the
Secretary of Finance), in conjunction with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations
for the effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be
controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and
regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,
ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much
more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all
such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out,
neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.The real and only issue
is whether or not the position taken by the Commissioner coincides
with the meaning and intent of executive Order No. 41.We agree with
both the court of Appeals and court of Tax Appeals that Executive
Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond
a simple application of its provisions. It reads:Sec. 1. Scope of
Amnesty. A one-time tax amnesty covering unpaid income taxes for
the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby declared.Sec. 2. Conditions of the
Amnesty. A taxpayer who wishes to avail himself of the tax amnesty
shall, on or before October 31, 1986;a) file a sworn statement
declaring his net worth as of December 31, 1985;b) file a certified
true copy of his statement declaring his net worth as of December
31, 1980 on record with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or if no
such record exists, file a statement of said net worth therewith,
subject to verification by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;c) file a
return and pay a tax equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of t