(01)Succession

G.R. No. 128314May 29, 2002RODOLFO V. JAO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO,respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1wphi1.ntIn his opposition,3Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8After the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movants motion to dismiss.SO ORDERED.10Rodolfo filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmedin toto.SO ORDERED.11Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:IRESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.IIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OFEUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.IIIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.IVRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.VRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.VIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.VIIRESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If thedecedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, orletters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedentresides at the time of his death.Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case ofEusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14where we held that thesitusof settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.1wphi1.ntThe contention lacks merit.The facts inEusebiowere different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the courta quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residenceat the time of death,over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertainednot toresidence at the time of death,as required by the Rules of Court, but topermanent residence or domicile. InGarcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16we held:xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotesex vi termini"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statuteor rulein which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residencerather thandomicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.17Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the decedents properties are located.Petitioners argument fails to persuade.It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. InRaymond v. Court of Appeals19andBejer v. Court of Appeals,20we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.21All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the petition isDENIED,and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,vs.CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 65.Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his name.The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the Supreme Court.In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.We find the petition meritorious.The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the municipal court read as follows:ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,FOR: Versus CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------------xCOMPLAINTCOMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court, respectfully avers:xxx xxx xxxThat at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have (sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of P 2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the defendant to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the principal against the defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest from September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:xxx xxx xxx9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons. The proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of first instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent that he committed a very grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of Court and decisions of this honorable Court when he issued anex-partewrit of preliminary attachment, when there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient cause of action, that there is no other security for the claim sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or that the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There was no bond to answer for whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).xxx xxx xxxThe respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a material averment:xxx xxx xxxThat plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;xxx xxx xxxUnder the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of action against petitioner Nacar.Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company(58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a cause of action; (Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of action against the former.It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon. Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order the return of the carabaos said:... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in questions.IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both parties will not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiff who in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to put up the additional bond of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos subject of litigation pending final termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled inMathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, supra:Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds; ...(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no other should be considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said inMaspil v. Romero(61 SCRA 197):Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof.Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the subject writ of attachment.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.SO ORDERED.

[G. R. No.4275.March 23, 1909.]PAULA CONDE,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA,Defendant-Appellant.D E C I S I O NARELLANO,C.J.:From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:chanrobles virtualawlibraryI.As antecedents:chanrobles virtualawlibrarythat Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.II.That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.III.That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court below entered the following judgment:chanrobles virtualawlibraryThat the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that thePetitionerPaula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya. IV.That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented the following statement of errors:chanrobles virtualawlibrary1.The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate proceedings.2.The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.3.The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these proceedings; and4.On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall within the reservation.As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath and signed by witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section. This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep. 436.)cralawThe main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural father.In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only foundation:chanrobles virtualawlibraryIn resolving a similar question Manresa says:chanrobles virtualawlibraryAn acknowledgment can only be demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority. On this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author adds:chanrobles virtualawlibraryIt may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest. (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code. Vol. I.)cralawThe above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants cannot be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up to the present time no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate conclusion could be based.Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same plane as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as a legal maxim, that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the father or the mother who recognizes him, and affords him a participation in the rights of the family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother.Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.Art. 118.The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not lapsed before then.Art. 137.The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:chanrobles virtualawlibrary1.If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority.2.If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such instrument. On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it cannot be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to acknowledge the natural filiation.As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latters action to claim his legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first case, but not the second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose of claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is:chanrobles virtualawlibrary(1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:chanrobles virtualawlibraryThe right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases:chanrobles virtualawlibraryfirst, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:chanrobles virtualawlibrarySanchez Roman, in his Treatise on Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows;There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol. V.)cralawDiaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on The Civil Code as construed by the supreme court of Spain, commenting upon article 137, say:chanrobles virtualawlibraryArticle 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor can it be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one. (Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)cralawNavarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question:chanrobles virtualawlibraryCan the heirs of a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge? And says:chanrobles virtualawlibraryOpinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it cannot be conceived that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child, which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation, and that in this conception the heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by article 118. The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are not legal grounds to warrant the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)cralawIn a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it cannot be understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to article 659 of the Civil Code, the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person, which are not extinguished by his death. If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death, but as any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the childs inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.On the other hand, it said right of action formed a part of the childs inheritance, it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a legitimate child; and if it is unreasonable to compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard,JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 56700 March 28, 1983WARLITO MABALOT and ARACELI MABALOT,petitioners,vs.THE HON. JUDGE TOMAS P. MADELA, JR., in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and PEDRO V. MALIT,respondents.Efren A. Santo for petitioners.Pedro V. Malit in his own behalf.VASQUEZ,J.:This is an unlawful detainer case originally commenced in the City of Manila by private respondent to eject the petitioners from an apartment located at No. 2262 Coral Street, San Andres, Manila. The decision of said court, which was in favor of the petitioners, was appealed by the private respondent to the Court of First Instance of Manila where it was assigned to the branch presided over by respondent Judge Tomas P. Madela, Jr. A decision rendered on January 6, 1981 by Judge Madela reversed the decision of the City Court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises in question.The petitioners took a direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila on the legal question raised by them with respect to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Manila to take cognizance of the basic action.The facts of this case, as synthesized in the decision of Judge Madela and which are impliedly admitted by the petitioners in taking this direct appeal to this Court on a pure question of law, are as follows:From the records and evidence of the case, plaintiff appellant as owner of an apartment No. 2262 located at Coral Street, San Andres, Manila leased it to Atty. Armando Galvez on a monthly basis of P200.00 a month since 1967. Staying with him in said apartment is defendant Araceli Mabalot and a maid the former claiming to be a ward of Atty. Galvez since she was 10 years old when her mother died and her father could not support her (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Dec. 6, 1979). In 1970 Araceli Mabalot married defendant Warlito Mabalot and continued to stay with Atty. Galvez until his death on August 23, 1977. After the death of Atty. Armando Galvez, the arrearages for the monthly rentals of July and August were paid by Atty. Fernando Galvez, a brother of the late Atty. Armando Galvez and for the month of September 1977, Atty. Fernando Galvez issued a check (pay to cash) which he gave to the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiff-appellant. However, the corresponding receipts were issued by plaintiff in the name of Atty. Fernando Galvez.As early as September 1, 1977, in his letter to Atty. Fernando Galvez, the plaintiff-appellant intimated that with the death of his brother, Araceli Mabalot and husband cannot take over the apartment as the contract of lease between him and Atty. Armando Galvez is a personal one and could not be transmitted to them (Exh. "A"). On September 5, 1977, plaintiff wrote the defendants that they could not take over the apartment as it could not be the subject of inheritance and gave them three (3) months to vacate the same (Exhibit "B"). However, defendants refused to receive said letter, as plaintiff with the help of patrolman Tomas Soriaga served it the following morning with the policeman as a witness (Exh. "B-1").Araceli Mabalot admitted that the late Armando Galvez has his own family, a wife and children namely, Cynthia, Rosalinda, Danilo, Jocelyn and Olivia who were mentioned in his application for insurance as his legitimate children with Araceli mentioned as a niece (t.s.n. p. 16, Oct. 25, 1977). The succeeding payments of the rentals were paid by defendants- appellees' counsel, Atty. Efren Santos.The question to be resolved is, whether or not the defendants, Warlito and Araceli Mabalot have the right to continue as tenants of the plaintiff from the death of Atty. Armando Galvez. (Annex "A", Petitioners' Brief, p. 72, Rello.)As may be noted from the definition of the issue by Judge Madela, the question which was raised and argued by the parties in the lower courts was the right of the petitioners to succeed to the lease over the subject apartment previously existing between Armando Galvez and the private respondent. Apparently convinced of the correctness of the holding of Judge Madela that they may not continue said lease inasmuch as the petitioners are not heirs of Armando Galvez (Art. 1311, Civil Code), nor was such lease assigned by Armando Galvez to the petitioners with the consent of private respondent (Art. 1649, Ibid), the petitioners now rely on the alleged legal infirmity of the proceedings had in the lower courts by attacking their jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.It is the petitioners' main contention that the City Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action filed by the private respondent inasmuch as it is not an action for unlawful detainer, but one the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation falling within the original jurisdiction of the court of first instance pursuant to Section 44(a) of the former Judiciary Act. Petitioners argue that an action for unlawful detainer must be filed within one year after the unlawful deprivation of the possession of the subject property by the defendant. They contend that this requirement does not exist in this case inasmuch as petitioner Araceli Mabalot was admittedly staying in the apartment together with Armando Galvez since 1966, and the action to eject her was filed only on January 8, 1978. They further point out that in paragraph 7 of the complaint, the private respondent had expressly alleged that he denied the request of the petitioners to continue the lease of Armando Galvez on the ground "that a lease contract is personal in nature and cannot be the subject of inheritance." By this allegation, so the petitioners contend, the basic issue becomes a determination of whether or not a lease contract may be the subject of inheritance, thereby making the action as one of the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation.Petitioners' submissions are typical examples of the arguments advanced by defendants in ejectment cases in their attempt to prolong their occupancy of premises over which they ceased to have valid ground to possess, by keeping alive the litigation involving their ejectment therefrom. The records of our courts will reveal that a considerable percentage of the cases pending in them are actions for forcible entry and detainer. Ordained by law to be commenced in the courts at the municipal or city level, they pass thru all the other grades of courts in the judicial system up to the Highest Court of the land. It is ironic that a forcible entry or detainer case which is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to terminate. It has become a truism that, if a landlord would like to eject a tenant in the shortest possible time, the worst thing that he could do is to file an ejectment case. It is, indeed, about time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and vital litigations.The time limitation of one year within which to file an action for forcible entry and detainer is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the defendant, but from the time that his possession becomes unlawful. The occupancy of the apartment by Araceli Mabalot in 1966 was not unlawful because she was then a member of the household of Armando Galvez who was the lessee of the premises in question. The possession of the petitioners became unlawful only after Armando Galvez died, which was on August 23, 1977. Such death of Armando Galvez terminated the lease in his favor. Petitioners do not have any colorable right to occupy the apartment thereafter. The filing of the case on January 8, 1978 was well within one year period from August 23, 1977.There is less merit in the contention that the action filed by the private respondent is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation just because it involves the legal question as to the right of the petitioners to continue the lease by reason of inheritance. Such legal issue is purely incidental to the question of whether they are entitled to possess the apartment in question. The action is for the recovery of the possession of real property brought within one year from the time the possession of the defendant became unlawful, technically known as an action for unlawful detainer. Although it is a real action which should ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance (now the regional trial court), the law vests the exclusive original jurisdiction over it in the courts at the municipal or city level as an exception to the general rule on jurisdiction over real actions, presumably in view of the summary nature of the proceedings contemplated to be taken therein. This kind of action is different and distinct from the class of actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action does not become one where the subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation by the mere fact that an issue of law is raised therein. Such a view would result in converting virtually all civil actions into that category, and in depriving the municipal and city trial courts of jurisdiction over all civil cases where a party raises a question of law.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14127 August 21, 1962ISIDORO M. MERCADO,plaintiff-appellee,vs.LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA,defendants-appellants.-----------------------------G.R. No. L-14128 August 21, 1962LEON C. VIARDO,plaintiff-appellant,vs.PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ, JOAQUINA DRIZ, ISIDORO MERCADO,TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA FLORES,PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,defendants-appellees.No. L-14127:Agustin C. Bagasao for plaintiff-appellee.Manuel A. Concordia for defendants-appellants.No. L-14128:Manuel A. Concordia for plaintiff-appellant.E. A. Bello, M. Y. Macias and A. A. Reyes for defendant-appellee Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc.Cecilio F. Wycoco for defendants-appellees Pilar Belmonte and Teresita Flores.Carlos M. Ferrer for defendants-appellees Patricia Driz, et al.PADILLA,J.:In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled Leon C. Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution was issued and levy was made "upon all the rights, interest and participation which the spouses Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in a parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A, p.3). This certificate of title covers a parcel of land (Lot No. 1, Psu-14371) in the barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, province of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less. The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa Belmonte, Pilar Belmonte and Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition that share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is usufructuary "correspondiendo la nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en participaciones iguales quienes se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre' " (Exhibit A, p. 2).On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half () of the following property:TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA, PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA ECIJA.A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the North by property of Felisa Belmonte; on the East by Sapang Dalagot; on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman; on the South by the property of Felisa Belmonte; and on then West by the property of Cirilo Acosta; containing an area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or less. Declared under tax No. 11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed value of P8,400.00.The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C. Viardo, who paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax corresponding to such interest (Exhibit B). When the judgment debtors failed to redeem the property within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale (21 February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on 12 May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property described in Exhibit B in favor of Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was issued to Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE share; FELISA BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share; and INES DE GUZMAN, share, upon the payment of the corresponding fees (Exhibit D).However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 (Exhibit A) that the above-mentioned order was not carried out and that said original certificate of title was not cancelled.On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying that judgment be rendered against the defendant:(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor of plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption price in accordance with law, or the sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per month for twelve (12) months from February 27, 1941 to February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting the undivided one-half () portion of the property of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cause, situated in the Sitio of Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of Zaragoza, which is involved in the said controversy against the defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and which is more particularly described under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs' complaint a copy of which is hereby presented, hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following annotation on the back of original certificate of title No. 3484:Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind Lis Pendens Executed in favor of Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte; Conditions Al the rights, interests, and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this title is the subject of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16 of the C.F.I. of N.E. now pending for action. Date of the instrument June 4, 1946; Date of the inscription June 6, 1946 at 3:18 (?) p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon, Acting Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Pilar Belmonte, one of the plaintiffs, entered into the following contracts involving her interest or rights over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484:(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Isidro M. Mercado & Trinidad Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of Seven and One-Half (7-) hectares of the property described in this title for the sum of P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-11: S-1948, Herminio E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind Sale with right of repurchase: Executed in favor of Federico Aquino; Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold with a right of repurchase seven and one-half (7-) hectares of her share, interest and participation in this title for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28, 1948; Date of the Inscription June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind Resale: Executed in favor of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions Federico Aquino resold his share in this title consisting of 7- Has. for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-63: P-15: B-6: S-1949, Jose E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 8, 1958: Date of the Inscription April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of seven (7) Has. of her share and participation in this title for the sum of P7,000.00. (D-64: P-15: B-6: S-1949, J. E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 9, 1949; Date of the Inscription April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 4)On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in civil case No. 161, as follows:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the defendant from the complaint of the plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiffs are absolved from the counter complaint of the defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff. (Exhibit G.)Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the following transactions involving the interest or rights of Pilar Belmonte over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 took place:(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind Partition: Executed in favor of Felisa Belmonte, et al.; Conditions By virtue of a deed of partition, the share of the deceased Ines de Guzman and Isidro Belmonte has been adjudicated in favor of the heirs of said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind Agreement: Executed in favor of Felisa Belmonte, et al; Conditions By virtue of an agreement of the parties concerned in the partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of 300,000 sq. m. and 80,000 sq.m., more or less, respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-36340, a portion of lot 1 described on plan Psu-14371, of this title, have been adjudicated in favor of Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-G with an area of 75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the same subdivision, has been adjudicated in favor of Isidoro Mercado, See TCT No. 15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, P. Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Jan. 22, 1952: Date of the Inscription Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Sp. Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil sold all their rights and interest in this title consisting of seven hectares for the sum of P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.) Date of the Inst. Feb. 4, 1952; Date of Inscription May 13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind Project of Partition Executed in favor of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions By virtue of a project of partition re-estate of the late Ines de Guzman, a portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land described in this title has been adjudicated in favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1wph1.t(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Joaquin Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the subdivision plan of this title Psd-36340 a portion taken from her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of 52,775 sq.m., more or less, for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol. No. 83. (D-160: P-33: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Aug. 23, 1954; Date of the Inscription Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Patricia Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36340 being a portion of Lot 1 described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 17910, of this title for the sum of P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000 sq.m., with respect to her share of 13.2775 hectares. See TCT No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V: S-1954, H. V. Garcia, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Aug. 31, 1954: Date of the Inscription Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Patricia Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title for the sum of P850.00. See TCT No. NT-16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the Inscription Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed favor of Patricia Driz; Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title, with an area of 79,848 sq.m., more or less the subdivision plan of this title, was sold for the sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-16546, Vol. 83. (D-172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Sept. 11, 1954; Date of the Inscription Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions mentioned above, the Court of Appeals passed a resolution granting the prayer of defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that the children and only heirs, namely, Artemio, Patricia, Mario, Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz, who were all of age, be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz (the husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding damages prayed for in the counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment made the following findings and conclusions:. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By computation, this is capable of producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the basis of 70-30, defendant is entitled to 225 cavans of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are under obligation to deliver to defendant this quantity of palay every agricultural year from the filing of defendant's answer on August 5, 1946, up to the time he vacates said land, or pay the equivalent value thereof at P12.00 a cavan.Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is entitled to its possession. Inasmuch as the court below did not order plaintiffs to restore the possession of the land in question, we hereby order them to vacate the same and restore possession thereof to defendant. (Exhibit H.)This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and the records were remanded to the lower court. On 16 December 1954 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The return made by Chief of Police of the Municipality of Zaragoza on 14 February 1955 states that Leon C. Viardo had been placed in possession of the parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a total of 86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the same were deposited in a warehouse (Exhibit X).On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third party claim with the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the claim states that Isidoro M. Mercado and his wife purchased from Pilar Belmonte on 28 June 1948 seven and one-half hectares of her undivided share in the land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on the same day the deed of sale was registered, that a transfer certificate of title was issued in their names, and that since 1948 up to the time of the levy on execution he had been in actual possession of the parcel of land, paying the corresponding taxes thereon and had exclusively benefited from the harvests therein, (Exhibit Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy on the harvest in the parcel of land they were claiming.On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C. Viardo and the Provincial Sheriff. The complaint alleged that improper levy had been made on the harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to return the palay levied upon, together with damages. On 26 February 1955 the defendants answered that plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of land in question from Pilar Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the courts might render in civil case No. 161 between Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October 1955 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order suspending the trial of the case, in view of the information by counsel for the defendant that his client Leon C. Viardo would file a complaint against all persons claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V. Viardo against Pilar Belmonte, Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro, Zacarias Belmonte, Teresita Flores, Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. and the Philippine National Bank, as parties claiming some right, participation, share or interest in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title derived therefrom. The defendants filed their answers. After trial,1on 24 August 1956 the trial court rendered judgment in civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case 2004, Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Patricia Driz are hereby declared CO-OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-16864, which is the share of Pilar Belmonte in Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484 in the following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C. VIARDO; 7 hectares for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7 hectares for Zacarias Belmonte, and the remainder for Patricia Driz, it being understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia Driz in the partition shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank; the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of Patricia Driz, Exhibits R and S are declared NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition Exhibits L and N, are set aside, and the certificates of title issued in favor of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro M. Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P, Q, R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil case 1718 Isidoro M. Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the products which had been levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No damages are awarded. The parties in civil case 2004 shall come to an amicable settlement with respect to the partition. Upon their failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, commissioner shall be appointed by this Court in accordance with a law to make the partition.With costs against the defendants in both cases.Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and defendant in civil case No. 1718, appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter certified and forwarded the appeals to this Court because the facts are not in dispute and "the questions raised by appellant in his brief are purely legal in nature."In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not annulling the sale executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M. Mercado, marked as Exhibit I, and to Dominador Asuncion and Teresita Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof he argues that the three sales took place and were registered after he had become the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the parcel of land owned by Pilar Belmonte and after notice oflis pendenshad been recorded on the title of Pilar Belmonte.The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant became the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth interest owned by Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484; that before Pilar Belmonte sold parts of her undivided share in the parcel of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador Asuncion and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte, there was notice oflis pendensrecorded on the certificate of title; and that this notice is binding upon all who should acquire an interest in the property subsequent to the record of thelis pendens. The notice oflis pendens(Exhibit A), however, was limited to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar Belmonte. The other one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in litigation and therefore the trial court correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right to sell it and could convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of her remaining interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which she could not do, because this one-fourth in interest had not yet been subdivided to show the interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo, amounting to one-half of the said one-fourth interest. This defect, however, does not result in the nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to her remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid, subject only to the condition that the interests acquired by the vendees were limited to the parts which might be assigned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Article 493, Civil Code).In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not annulling the sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of lots 1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of Plan PSD 36340."Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the original one-fourth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484, which interest was levied upon and thereafter acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of one-half, but from another one-fourth interest in the same parcel of land, which belonged originally to Ines de Guzman, the mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest subsequently devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two sisters. The three sisters partitioned this one-fourth interest among themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B were assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters. These sales, the appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as creditor.The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this contention is that the sales were made by the mother to her daughters. This is not enough evidence to hold the sale fictitious and fraudulent. There is no evidence whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the time she sold the lots, had outstanding debts or was in an otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the credit of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only after the sales were executed, when the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court in civil case No. 161 by awarding damages to him. There is no merit, therefore, in the second assignment of error.In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in declaring that the "product raised in the portion under the occupancy of Isidoro Mercado, therefore, pertains to him and was not subject to the levy or execution in favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 161." In support of this assignment the appellant again harps on the fact that the time Isidoro Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was notice oflis pendens, and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is not a purchaser in good faith."This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of error when the notice oflis pendens(Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, but to the one-eighth interest which Leon C. Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the latter was trying to recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who caused the notice oflis pendensto be recorded to subject "all the rights, interests and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this Title" to the result of the litigation in the aforesaid civil case No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her remaining one-eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she had filed against Leon C. Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte to the outcome of his counterclaim in civil case No. 161, he should have asked for it.The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment of error renders it unnecessary for the Court to discuss the respective rights and liabilities of co-owners when one co-owner, without the knowledge and/or consent of the other co-owners, plants or builds on the property owned in common.The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in concluding that the heirs of Bartolome Driz could not be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be subject to the payment of the judgment in favor of Leon C. Viardo."The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit. The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligationsto the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor, was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property.The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial court erred in not awarding damages to the plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004." Obviously the appellant refers t