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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.]
MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E.
CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO, doing business under
the name BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEA,
doing business under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEA;
and the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO
TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their respective
capacities as Chairman and Members of the Pre-qualification
Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his
capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as
well as in
their respective personal capacities; and HON. LODRIGIO L.
LEBAQUIN, respondents.
Salas, Villareal & Velasco for petitioners.
Virgilio A. Sindico for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY, DEFINED.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
2. ID.; CHARTERED INSTITUTION; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
BAR.
The 1987 Administrative Code describes a chartered institution
thus: Chartered
institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional
policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges, and the
monetary authority of the state.
(Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the
above definitions that ISCOF is
a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in
its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First,
it was created in pursuance
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of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a
priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio
Treasurer of the state college with
its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices
of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon
request of the president of the
state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even
the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public
service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the
funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law. (Presidential
Decree No. 1523)
3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING INJUNCTION IN
CASES
INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT (P.D. 1818);
POWER OF THE COURTS TO RESTRAIN APPLICATION. In the case of
Datiles
and Co. vs. Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704) this Court interpreted a
similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was
patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or
the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to
judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.
Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of
this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605
from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. We see no
reason why the above ruling
should not apply to P.D. 1818. There are at least two
irregularities committed by PBAC
that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the
project.
4. ID.; POLICIES AND GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED FOR GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE (PD 1594); RULES IMPLEMENTING THEREOF, NOT
SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. Under the Rules
Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for
government
infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders
with the Notice to Pre-
qualification and other relevant information regarding the
proposed work. Prospective
contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors
Confidential Application for
Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential
Pre-qualification Statement
for the Project (prior to the amendment of the rules, this was
referred to as Pre-C1) not
later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid,
after which date no PRE-C2
shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be
advertised for at least three
times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two
weeks in at least two
newspapers of general circulations. (IB 13 1.2-19, Implementing
Rules and Regulations
of P.D. 1594 as amended) PBAC advertised the pre-qualification
deadline as December
2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and announced that
the opening of bids would
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be at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This
scheduled was changed and a
notice of such change was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin
board. The notice
advanced the cut-off time for the submission of
pre-qualification documents to 10 o'clock
in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1
o'clock in the afternoon
of December 12, 1988. The new schedule caused the
pre-disqualification of the
petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC meeting held
on December 6, 1988.
While it may be true that there were fourteen contractors who
were pre-qualified despite
the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect of the
irregular notice. Notably,
the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet
the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. (B.E. & Best Built's
licenses were valid until June 30,
1989. [Ex. P & O respectively: both were marked on December
28, 1988]) We have held
that where the law requires a previous advertisement before
government contracts can be
awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general
rule, render the same
void and of no effect. (Caltex Phil. v. Delgado Bros., 96 Phil.
368) The fact that an
invitation for bids has been communicated to a number of
possible bidders is not
necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is
shown that other possible bidders have not been similarly
notified.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. The purpose of
the rules
implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to
prevent favoritism,
collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. This
purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It
has been held that the
three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public,
an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A
regulation of the matter which
excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character
of the system and thwarts
the purpose of its adoption. (Hannan v. Board of Education, 25
Okla. 372) In the case at
bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the
pre-qualification requirement and the
bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best
Built. It was not because
of their expired licenses, as private respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and
specifications which are the contractors' guide to an
intelligent bid, were not issued on
time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on
equal footing when they
submit their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated
if some contractors are
informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications
that are to be the subject of
their bids.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. It has been
held in a
long line of cases that a contract granted without the
competitive bidding required by law
is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from
it. It has not been shown
that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or
participated in by any of
the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the
private respondents for the
prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the
anomalies described above.
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7. CIVIL LAW; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, WHEN
AVAILABLE.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the
petitioners, compensatory
damage may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear
to be due either.
Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad
faith that characterized the
conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities
in the announcement of
the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF president to
award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they
moved to lift such order.
For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages
at least in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 2221. Nominal
damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. These damages are to be
assessed against the
private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid
separately for each of
petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction.
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J p:
This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D.
1818, which prohibits any
court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure
projects of the
government. prLL
The facts are not disputed.
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through
its Pre-qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the
publication in the November
25, 26, 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an
Invitation to Bid for the
construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The
notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements
(PRE C-1) ** was
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened
on December 12,
1988, 3 o'clock in the afternoon. 1
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro,
respectively doing business under
the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction,
submitted their pre-
qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1988. Petitioner
Jose Occea submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All
three of them were
not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late,
having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o'clock in
the morning of December 2,
1988.
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On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their
official and personal
capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that although they had
submitted their PRE-C1 on time,
the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. As a result,
they were not included
in the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the
needed plans and other
documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled
bidding.
In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12,
1988 bidding and the
acceptance of their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if
the bidding had already
been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the
project pending resolution of
their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a
restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. 2
On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the
ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining
orders, preliminary
injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.
cdll
The decree reads pertinently as follows:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
infrastructure project,
or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government,
including among
others public utilities for the transport of the goods and
commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with, or continuing the
execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such
public utility, or
pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or
operation.
The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of
a preliminary injunction
had become moot and academic because the restraining order was
received late, at 2
o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988, after the bidding
had been conducted and
closed at eleven thirty in the morning of that date.
In their opposition of the motion, the plaintiffs argued against
the applicability of P.D.
1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had
its own charter and
separate existence and was not part of the national government
or of any local political
subdivision. Even if P.D. 1818 were applicable, the prohibition
presumed a valid and
legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar.
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They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. vs. IAC, 3 where the
Court allowed the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction despite a similar
prohibition found in P.D. 385. The
Court therein stated that:
The government, however, is bound by basic principles of
fairness and decency
under the due process clauses of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385
was never meant to
protect officials of government-lending institutions who take
over the
management of a borrower corporation, lead that corporation to
bankruptcy
through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who,
after
ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid
the consequences
of their misleads (p. 188, emphasis supplied).
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order
and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to
be construed at the ISCOF
was an infrastructure project of the government falling within
the coverage of P.D. 1818.
Even if it were not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction would
still fail because the sheriff's return showed that PBAC was
served a copy of the
restraining order after the bidding sought to be restrained had
already been held.
Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could not be restrained
from awarding the
project because the authority to do so was lodged in the
President of the ISCOF, who was
not a party to the case. 4
In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818
does not cover the ISCOF
because of its separate and distinct corporate personality. It
is also stressed again that the
prohibition under P.D. 1818 could not apply to the present
controversy because the
project was vitiated with irregularities, to wit: prcd
1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of
submission of pre-
qualification document on December 2, 1988 without indicating
any time, yet
after 10:00 o'clock of the given late, the PBAC already refused
to accept
petitioners' documents.
2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12,
1988 at 3:00
p.m. yet it was held at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to
participate, issued a
mimeographed "Invitation to Bid" form, which by law (P.D. 1594
and
Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the particulars of
the project
subject of bidding for the purpose of.
(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate
bids;
(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the
bids;
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(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by
opening to all the particulars of a project.
Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents
and the Itemized Bill of
Quantities therein were left blank. 5 And although the project
in question was a
"Construction," the private respondents used an Invitation to
Bid form for "Materials." 6
The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction had
not yet become moot and academic because even if the bids had
been opened before the
restraining order was issued, the project itself had not yet
been awarded. The ISCOF
president was not an indispensable party because the signing of
the award was merely a
ministerial function which he could perform only upon the
recommendation of the Award
Committee. At any rate, the complaint had already been duly
amended to include him as
a party defendant.
In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since
the members of the board
of trustees of the ISCOF are all government officials under
Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and
since the operations and maintenance of the ISCOF are provided
for in the General
Appropriations Law, it is should be considered a government
institution whose
infrastructure project is covered by P.D. 1818.
Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private
respondents insist that PBAC
posted on the ISCOF bulletin board an announcement that the
deadline for the
submission of pre-qualifications documents was at 10 o'clock of
December 2, 1988, and
the opening of bids would be held at 1 o'clock in the afternoon
of December 12, 1988. As
of ten o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, B.E.
construction and Best Built
construction had filed only their letters of intent. At two
o'clock in the afternoon, B.E.,
and Best Built filed through their common representative,
Nenette Garuello, their pre-
qualification documents which were admitted but stamped
"submitted late." The
petitioners were informed of their disqualification on the same
date, and the
disqualification became final on December 6, 1988. Having failed
to take immediate
action to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their notice
of disqualification, they
cannot now come to this Court to question the binding proper in
which they had not
participated.
In the petitioners' Reply, they raise as an additional
irregularity the violation of the rule
that where the estimate project cost is from P1M to P5M, the
issuance of plans,
specifications and proposal book forms should made thirty days
before the date of
bidding. 7 They point out that these forms were issued only on
December 2, 1988, and
not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the beginning of the
30-day period prior to the
scheduled bidding.
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In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the
documents of B.E. and Best Built
were received although filed late and were reviewed by the Award
Committee, which
discovered that the contractors had expired licenses. B.E.'s
temporary certificate of
Renewal of Contractor's License was valid only until September
30, 1988, while Best
Built's license was valid only up to June 30, 1988. llcd
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light
of their testimonial and
documentary evidence and the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It finds for the
petitioners.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or
operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory
Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a
government instrumentality. First,
it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries
development policy of the State, a
priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic
life of the nation.
Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be
the ex-officio Treasurer
of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of
bureaus and offices of the
National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president
of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and
even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public
service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the
funds of the National
Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law. 8
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Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is
covered by the prohibition in
the said decree.
In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, 9 this Court
interpreted a similar prohibition
contained in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was
patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or
the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to
judge these matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.
Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of
this dimension and involving
questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605
from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D.
1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that
justified injunction of the
bidding and the award of the project. LLjur
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the
opening of bids and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective
participants.
Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and
guidelines for
government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide
prospective bidders with the
Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant information
regarding the proposed work.
Prospective contractors shall be required to file their
ARC-Contractors Confidential
Application for Registration & Classifications & the
PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-
qualification Statement for the Project (prior to the amendment
of the rules, this was
referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the
published Invitation to Bid,
after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received.
Invitations to Bid shall be
advertised for at least three times within a reasonable period
but in no case less than two
weeks in at least two newspapers of general circulations. 10
PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2,
1988, without stating the
hour thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would be at
3 o'clock in the
afternoon of December 12, 1988. This schedule was changed and a
notice of such change
was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice
advanced the cut-off time for
the submission of pre-qualification documents to 10 o'clock in
the morning of December
2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o'clock in the afternoon
of December 12, 1988.
The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the
petitioners as recorded in the
minutes of the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it
may be true that there
were fourteen contractors who were pre-qualified despite the
change in schedule, this fact
did not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably, the
petitioners were disqualified
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because they failed to meet the new deadline and not because of
their expired licenses.
***
We have held that where the law requires a previous
advertisement before government
contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement
will, as a general rule,
render the same void and of no effect. 11 The facts that an
invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily
sufficient to establish
compliance with the requirements of the law if it is shown that
other public bidders have
not been similarly notified. 12
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants
the plans, specifications
and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days
before the date of bidding if
the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not
denied that these
forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days
before the bidding
scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should
have issued them on
November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from
the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical
matters. What is involved here is
non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which
required strict observance.
The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure
competitive bidding and to
prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these
contracts to the detriment of
the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities
committed by PBAC. LLpr
It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are
the offer to the public, an
opportunity for competition and a basis for exact comparison of
bids. A regulation of the
matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the
distinctive character of the
system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. 13
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding
the pre-qualification
requirement and the bidding that caused the elimination of
petitioners B.E. and Best
Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private
respondents now claim.
Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the
contractors' guide to an intelligent
bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that
contractors be placed on
equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of
competitive bidding is negated
if some contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the
plans and specifications that
are to be the subject of their bids.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny
irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described.
Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent
judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from
Annex Q of the
private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject
project has already been
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"100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This fait
accompli has made the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and
academic.
We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted
without the competitive
bidding required by law is void, and the party to whom it is
awarded cannot benefit from
it. 14 It has not been shown that the irregularities committed
by PBAC were induced by
or participated in by any of the contractors. Hence, liability
shall attach only to the
private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the
petitioners as a result of the
anomalies described above.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the
petitioners, compensatory
damage may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear
to be due either.
Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad
faith that characterized the
conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities
in the announcement of
the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF president to
award the project after
two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they
moved to lift such order.
For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages
at least in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states:
"Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant
may be
vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
These damages are to assessed against the private respondents in
the amount of
P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for each of petitioners
B.E. Construction and Best
Built Construction. The other petitioner, Occea Builders, is not
entitled to relief because
it admittedly submitted its pre-qualification documents on
December 5, 1988, or three
days after the deadline. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the
restraining order dated
December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D.
1818; b) ordering the
chairman and the members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely
Manuel R. Penachos,
Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita Villanueva, to
each pay separately to
petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro nominal
damages P10,000.00 each;
and c) removing the said chairman and members from the PBAC
board of trustees, or
whoever among them is still incumbent therein, for their
malfeasance in office. Costs
against PBAC.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
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SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, September 03,
1992)
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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the
City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y.
VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA,
MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO,
and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL
ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice,
respondents.
Fidela Vargas, Leonardo S. Gonzales and Raul Gonzales for
petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor
General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and
for other Purposes," the
same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution as it separates
from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
such Act. They likewise
impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as
undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor General
maintains that there is
no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality
of the statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa
to reorganize the
judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as
the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of
any support in law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects
of the case, the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment thereof
was in answer to a
pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the
judiciary; that the attendant
abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their
incumbents to cease from
holding office does not impair the independence of the judiciary
and the security of
-
tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good
performance and clean
records can be named anew in legal contemplation without
interruption in the
continuity of their service; that the provision granting the
President authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives
the test of undue
delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly
adopted therefor; that
the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be
carried out in accordance
with the President's constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully
executed, and the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional
rights.
The petition was dismissed. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee
dissented in
a separate opinion; Justices Felix V. Makasiar and Venicio
Escolin concurred with the
main opinion; Justice Hermogenes Concepcion concurred in the
result; Justices
Antonio P. Barredo, Ramon C. Aquino, Ramon C. Fernandez, Juvenal
K Guerrero,
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta concurred in
separate opinions;
Justices Vicente Abad-Santos and Efren I. Plana submitted
separate concurring and
dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PARTIES; CAPACITY
TO
SUE; PETITIONERS' LEGAL STANDING DEMONSTRATED. The argument as
to
the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far
as Judge de Ia Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in
Justice Laurel's opinion in
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). Thus: "The unchallenged
rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement."
The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the
court cannot be considered
as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to
this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, L-40004,
Jan. 31, 1975; "Then there is the attack on the standing of
petitioners, as vindicating at
most what they consider a public right and not protecting their
rights as individuals. This
is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma at an
inhibition to parties intent on
keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by
Jaffe: `The protection of private right is an essential
constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights.
Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the
totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their
capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION
ACT
OF 1980; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN ANSWER TO A PRESSING AND
URGENT
NEED; GOOD FAITH OBSERVED IN ITS ENACTMENT. The enactment of
Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would firstly, result in the attainment "of
more efficiency in the
-
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of
justice dispensed by the
courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of
the court's dockets.
Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together
with the reallocation of
jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are
designated to suit the court
system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the
foreseeable future." It may be observed that the volume
containing the minutes of the
proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were
devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time
and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on
August 14, 1981. With
such a background, it become quite manifest how lacking in
factual basis is the allegation
that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What
appears undoubted and
undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment
from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature. cdasia
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTING ABOLITION OF COURTS IN GOOD FAITH,
WITH
DUE RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE;
VALIDITY
OF ABOLITION OF AN OFFICE, SETTLED RULE. Nothing is better
settled in our
law than that the abolition of an office within the competence
of a legitimate body if done
in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v.
Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968, reiterated such a
doctrine: "We find this point
urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or
separation of petitioners from
the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition
of their offices. This is a
legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known
rule also that valid abolition
of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
. . . And, of course, if the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased
to hold office. The
preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the
case. As well-settled as the
rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent
is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must
be made in good faith." The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. vs.
Provincial Governor, L-
28614, Jan. 17, 1974, two earlier cases enunciating a similar
doctrine having preceded it.
As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so
it is with the Judiciary.
The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that
element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the
lack of merit of this
petition becomes even more apparent.
4. ID.; ID; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF MAINTAINS UNIMPAIRED
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; TERMINATION BY VIRTUE OF
THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT IMPAIR SECURITY OF
TENURE; SUPREME COURT TO BE CONSULTED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY.
Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior
Courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
under Article X, Section
7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935
Constitution. It did not,
-
however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to
supervise
administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is
empowered "to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their
dismissal. "Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges.
Under the Judiciary
Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to
be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the stand-
point of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished,
the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the
Judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view
be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court
does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by
this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of
removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged
Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way
to do so. The principle
that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to
avoid any
unconstitutional taint must be applied.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FIX THE
COMPENSATION
AND ALLOWANCES OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES NOT AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; EXISTENCE OF A STANDARD TO
AVOID THE TAINT OF UNDUE DELEGATION CLEAR. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the
Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to
-
have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language
of the statute is quite
clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: "Intermediate
Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal
Trial Judges, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and
allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in
Letter of Implementation No.
93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by
Presidential Decree No.
1597." (Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The
existence of a standard is
thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of
non-delegation is that it is the
legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make
laws and to alter and
repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in
all its terms and provisions
when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24,
1970, "To avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repeal. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried
out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO AMBIGUITY EXISTS IN THE EXECUTION OF
THE
REORGANIZATION LAW. Another objection based on the absence in
the statute of
what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation"
is equally bereft of merit.
They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The
Supreme Court shall submit
to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act
which shall be the basis of
the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." (Sec. 43, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The
first sentence of the next
Section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act
shall be immediately carried
out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." (Sec. 44, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129) Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to
argue that the President is
insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. In
the meanwhile, the existing Inferior Courts affected continue
functioning as before, "until
the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President.
Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. "There is no
ambiguity. The incumbents of
the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold
office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean
record justify their being named anew, in legal contemplation
without any interruption in
the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to
assume that from the ranks of
-
lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or
law professors will come
the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little
more time is necessary in the
appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is
pertinence to this observation
of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization
that courts ordinarily should
not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as
earlier shown by the principle
that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon
against using common sense
in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." (Cf,
Roschen v. Ward, 279 US
337, 339 [1929]) LLjur
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL JUSTICES IN THE
PREPARATION
OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION NOT OBJECTIONABLE;
SUPREME COURT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH JUDICIAL REFORM. On the
morning of the hearing of the petition, petitioners sought to
disqualify the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices Ramon Aquino and Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera because the first
named was the Chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. The motion was denied. It was made clear then
and there that not one of
the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in
the discussion of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not
testify. The challenged
legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the
legislative body. Their work was
limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting
alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies.
Ever since 1973, this
Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior
courts. It has had the
opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is
conducted and how it may
be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, either the
then Chairman or members
of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines consulted members of
the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the
judiciary. It is not inappropriate to
cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court
Review: "In the Twentieth
century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a
leading part in judicial reform.
A variety of conditions have been responsible for the
development of this role, and
foremost among them has been the creation of explicit
institutional structures designed to
facilitate reform." Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid
exposure to and direct
involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial
federalism arise, at the state level as well." (Fish, William
Howard Taft and Charles Evan
Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review 123)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OBSERVED.
It is
a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it
is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted.
Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly
or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body
politic. The Constitution
does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is
a public trust." (Art.
-
XIII, Sec. I) That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a
legal imperative. The law may
vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable
them to perform his functions
and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from
that standpoint that the security
of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be
viewed. It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even
more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates
of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The
independence of which
they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending
that of a purely personal
right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation was
thus subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal,
lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly
embedded in the national
consciousness.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED DESPITE
THE
REORGANIZATION OF INFERIOR COURTS. At emphasized by former
Chief
Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 O.G.
147(1955) "there is no surer
guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character
and fitness of those
appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed
tenure of office during
good behaviour, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to
be subservient to one
administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one
litigant after another, the
independence of the Judiciary will be nothing more than a myth
or any empty ideal. Our
judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke,
regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein
exercised to reorganize
inferior courts."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF WILL
NOT
RESULT IN DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this
suit to annul Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious
consequences to the
administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition
In good faith of the existing
inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals and the creation
of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to
discharge with independence
its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor
should there be any fear that
less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing
power vested in the
Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient
Judiciary is something to
the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been
said that the fundamental
principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so,
that the three departments
are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and
aspirations and to fulfill the
hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution.
Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 Phil.
600 (1932) said: "Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should
it as strictly confine its
-
own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our
constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
BARREDO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION
ACT
OF 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129); JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION
NOT
CONTRARY TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY PRINCIPLE. It
being conceded that the power to create or establish carries
with it the power to abolish,
and it is a legal axiom, or at least a pragmatic reality, that
the tenure of the holder of an
office must of necessity end when his office no longer exists,
We have no alternative than
to hold that petitioners' invocation of the
independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the
Constitution is unavailing in the cases at bar. To insist that
what Batas Pambansa 129 is
doing is just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual
modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system, assuming a close scrutiny
might somehow support
such a conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly
and unequivocally
provided in the Section in question that said courts "are deemed
abolished" and further,
as if to make it most unmistakably emphatic, that "incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold
office." Dura lex, sed lex.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION, AN URGENT NEED;
TWO-FOLD
OBJECTIVES OF THE LAW ALIGNED WITH THE FOUNDATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THe JUDICIARY. Judicial
reorganization
becomes urgent and inevitable not alone because of structural
inadequacies of the system
or of the cumbersomeness and technicality-peppered and dragging
procedural rules in
force, but also when it becomes evident that a good number of
those occupying positions
in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and take advantage
of their office for selfish
personal ends and yet, those in authority cannot expeditiously
cope with the situation
under existing laws and rules. It is my personal assessment of
the present situation in our
judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity
two-pronged, for the most ideal
judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the
interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein
possess the character,
competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their
devotion to duty and absolute
impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft
and corruption, including the
usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of
the powers that be. I
am certain that Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa
129 encompasses both of
these objectives which indeed are aligned with the foundation of
the principle of
independence of the judiciary. LLphil
-
3. ID.; CONSTITUTION; CHARTER TIMELESS EXCEPT FOR ADOPTION
OF
MEASURES DURING VERY UNUSUAL INSTANCES; INTEGRITY OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW UNDIMINISHED THEREBY. The Constitution is not
just a
cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling purely idealism and
nobility in the recognition
of human dignity, protection of individual liberties and
providing security and promotion
of the general welfare under a government of laws. The
fundamental law of the land is a
living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the
demands of obtaining
circumstances. It is written for all seasons, except for very
unusual instances that human
ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its language
even if read in its broadest
sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and
supreme in peace and in
war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding
recourse to extraordinary
solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, "Grandes males,
grandes remedios," such
inordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so,
history records that in the face
of grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally
idealistic countries have, at one
time or another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations,
adopted corresponding
realistic measures, which perilously tether along the periphery
of their Charters, to the
extent of creating impressions, of course erroneous, that the
same had been transgressed,
although in truth their integrity and imperiousness remained
undiminished and
unimpaired.
4. ID.; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION; Batas Pambansa Blg.
129
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
OBJECTS IT SEEKS TO PURSUE. If indeed there could be some doubt
as to the
correctness of this Court's judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is
not unconstitutional,
particularly its Sec. 44, I am convinced that the critical
situation of our judiciary today
calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform
strictly with the letter of the
Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent.
The Charter is not just a
construction of words to whose literal ironclad meanings we must
feel hidebound,
without regard to every Constitution's desirable inherent nature
of adjustability and
adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and
fundamental intent and
objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129
is one such adaptation
that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental
objectives it seeks to pursue.
While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out
some justices and judges before
the end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual
administrative
investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru means that, in
the light of the prevailing
conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; Batas Pambansa 129 DOES NOT RENDER MEANINGLESS
THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; ABOLITION OF EXISTING COURTS
ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Notwithstanding this decision,
the
independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from
being insubstantial, much less
meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened
our eyes to how,
despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so
construed as to make it possible
-
for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an
upright judiciary and
overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
LibLex
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES TO THE BENCH WILL
BE
CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. By this decision, the Court has in factual
effect albeit
not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the
Batasang Pambansa, and more
specifically to the President, its own constitutionally
conferred power of removal of
judges. Section 44 of the Batasan Act declares that all of them
shall be deemed to have
ceased to hold office, leaving it to the President to appoint
those whom he may see fit to
occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not be appointed can
be considered as
"ceasing to hold their respective offices," or, as others would
say they would be in fact
removed. How the President will make his choice is beyond Our
power to control. But
even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed
of the reason therefor,
much less being given the opportunity to be heard, the past
actuations of the President on
all matters of deep public interest should serve as sufficient
assurance that when he
ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath
"to do justice to every man,"
hence, he will equip himself first with the fullest reliable
information before he acts.
AQUINO, J ., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY
RELIEF
AND PROHIBITION NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO TEST THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW; NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY IN
CASE
AT BAR. The petition should have been dismissed outright because
this Court has no
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and prohibition is not
the proper remedy to test the
constitutionality of the law. The petition is premature. No
jurisdictional question is
involved. There is no justiciable controversy wherein the
constitutionality of the law is in
issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body
before enacting it looked
into the constitutional angle.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES; PETITIONERS WITHOUT PERSONALITY TO
ASSAIL
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION LAW.
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have
no personality to assail
the constitutionality of the law even as taxpayers. The eighth
petitioner, Gualberto J. de la
Llana, a city judge, has no cause of action for prohibition. He
is not being removed from
his position.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION;
Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN GOOD FAITH. The
Judiciary
Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not "to
cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose." In enacting the said law,
the lawmaking body acted
within the scope of its constitutional powers and
prerogatives.
-
GUERRERO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION
ACT
OF 1980; OBJECTIVES. The institutional reforms and changes
envisioned by the law
are clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests.
The objectives of the
legislation, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the
creation of an Intermediate
Appellate Court, thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A
re-apportionment of
jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency; (c) A
simplification of procedures; and (d)
The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary
Act of 1948 and other
statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines are
undoubtedly intended to
improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good
and order. Indeed, the
purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note,
which is "to embody
reforms in the structure, organization and composition of the
Judiciary, with the aim of
improving the administration of justice, of decongesting
judicial dockets, and coping with
the more complex problems on the present and foreseeable future"
cannot but "promote
the welfare of society, since that is the final cause of law."
(Cardozo, the Nature of the
Judicial Process, p. 66)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW CONSTITUTIONAL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF
GENERAL
UTILITY AND FUNCTIONAL VALUE. From the standpoint of the general
utility
and functional value of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, there
should be no difficulty,
doubt or disbelief in its legality and constitutionality. That
there are ills and evils
plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The notorious and
scandalous congestion of
court dockets is too well-known to be ignored as are the causes
which create and produce
such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more
practical, workable and economical.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF PRESUMED REGULAR AND DONE
IN
GOOD FAITH. In the light of the known evils and infirmities of
the judicial system, it
would be absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators
did not act upon them in
good faith and honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It
is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed. The presumption of regularity
is not confined to the
acts of the individual officers but also applies to the acts of
boards, such as administrative
board or bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies. Good faith
is always to be presumed in
the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none in
the case at bar. It could not
be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and
credit to the lawmakers' deep
sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high
office as the duly-elected
representatives of the people.
-
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTANT ABOLITION OF COURTS; SUPREME
COURT
CANNOT INQUIRE INTO THE WISDOM OF THE LAW. In Morfe vs. Mutuc,
L-
20387, Jan. 31, 1968, the Supreme Court held: "It is not the
province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety
and common sense. That
is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern. The Courts
are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the
wisdom of the law." Chief
Justice Fernando who penned the Morfe decision writes in The
Constitution of the
Philippines that while "(i)t is thus settled, to paraphrase
Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional
power or competence, not
the wisdom of action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid," he adds that
it is "useful to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel
that 'the Judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative
departments of the government.'" In any case, petitioners have
not shown an iota of proof
of bad faith. There is no factual foundation of bad faith on
record. I do not consider the
statement in the sponsorship speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of
Minister of Justice
Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more efficient vehicle
of "eliminating
incompetent and unfit Judges" as indicative of impermissible
legislative motive.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECURITY OF TENURE; NATURE AND CONCEPT OF A
PUBLIC
OFFICE. The Justices and judges directly affected by the law,
being lawyers, should
know or are expected to know the nature and concept of a public
office. It is created for
the purpose of effecting the ends for which government has been
instituted, which are for
the common good, and not the profit, honor or private interest
of any one man, family or
class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental that
public offices are public
trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected
solely with a view to the
public welfare. In the last analysis, a public office is a
privilege in the gift of the State.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VESTED INTEREST EXISTS IN AN
OFFICE;
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT TERMINATES WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE
COURT. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate
in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an
office or its salary. When an office is created by the
Constitution, it cannot be abolished
by the legislature, but when created by the State under the
authority of the Constitution, it
may be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived of his
office. Acceptance of a
judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule
that "when the court is
abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of
such a court takes office
with that encumbrance and knowledge. The Judge's right to his
full term and his full
salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also
upon the contingency that
the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and
establishing the courts, from
time to time consider his office unnecessary and abolish it.
-
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMOVAL AND RE-APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES UNDER
THE
JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT, A PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
PREROGATIVE. The removal from office of an incumbent is merely
incidental to the
valid act of abolition of the office as demanded by the superior
and paramount interest of
the people. The bad and the crooked judges must be removed. The
good and the straight,
sober judges should be reappointed but that is the sole power
and prerogative of the
President who, I am certain, will act according to the best
interest of the nation and in
accordance with his solemn oath of office "to preserve and
defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to everyone." There and then the
proper balance between the
desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of
promoting the public good shall
have been struck. cdtai
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF
THE LAW TO BE ADOPTED. The Supreme Court has been called the
conscience of
the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of constitutional
government. It must,
however, be remembered "that legislatures are ultimate guardians
of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts."
(Missouri, K. & T. Co. vs.
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270) The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislatures as well. It adheres,
therefore, to the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of
a statute" for which reason it will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution
"except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera [1937], 65 Phil.
56).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE FUNCTIONAL
UTILITY OF
THE LAW SUFFICIENT TO UPHOLD ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. I view
the
controversy presented as a conflict of opinions on judicial
independence, whether
impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the
courts, whether abolition of
office or removal therefrom; and on delegation of legislative
power, whether authorized
or unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force
and brilliance of their
advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to
stand on the social
justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold
its constitutionality. In the
light of contemporaneous events from which the New Republic
emerged and evolved
new ideals of national growth and development, particularly in
law and government, a
kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is
necessary to justify as the ratio
decidendi of Our judgment.
DE CASTRO, J ., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; CREATION AND ORGANIZATION
OF
COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE LEGISLATURE. A
creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme
Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and
necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish
them to give way to new or
-
substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to
forget a basic doctrine of
constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
dctai
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO CREATE STATUTORY COURTS INCLUDES
THE
POWER TO ABOLISH THEM; JUDICIAL SECURITY OF TENURE NOT A
LEGAL
IMPEDIMENT TO THE EXERCISE THEREOF. The power to create courts
and
organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which
would thereafter arise the
security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions
of said courts. In the
natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to speak
of security of tenure of
judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into
being, the right to security
of tenure takes a secondary position to the basic and primary
power of creating the courts
to provide for a fair and strong judicial system. If the
legislature, in the exercise of its
authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a new set of
courts, and in doing so, it
feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce more to its
objective of improving the
judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one
of policy and wisdom into
which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire,
much less interfere with.
By this secondary position it has to the primary power of the
legislature to create courts,
the security of tenure given to the incumbents should not be a
legal impediment to the
exercise of that basic power of creating the statutory courts
which, by necessary
implication, includes the power to abolish them in order to
create new ones. This primary
legislative power is a continuing one, and the resultant right
of security of tenure of those
appointed to said courts could not bring about the exhaustion of
that power.
Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and
that power can never be
exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental
precept of constitutional
and