(00) Admissions and Confessions

8/3/2019 (00) Admissions and Confessions

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ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

HEIRS OF CLEMEA v. HEIRS OF BIEN

FACTS: This piece of land (TD 5299, 20,644 sq. m.) was one of 3

lots involved in 2 consolidated cases for recovery ofpossession and ownership filed in the 1940s byrespondents predecessor Irene Bien (Irene) (through herattorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea) against petitionerspredecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (Pedro).

The pertinent averments in Irenes complaint read:o [T]he plaintiff is xxx the absolute owner of a parcel

of land situated in xxx Albay xxx. Declared as TaxNo. 5299 and assessed at P310.00

o [T]he plaintiff acquired the above parcel of land by

purchase from Victoriano Napa (Napa) as per deed ofsale in her favor xxx; and the Napa in turn acquiredthe same by purchase from Francisco Barrameda(Barrameda) who also bought the said land from theadministrator of the estate of Pedro Clemea yConde (Conde) which sale had been duly authorizedand approved by this Honorable Court in Civil CaseNo. 3410-In re The Estate of Conde xxx;

o [T]he defendant ever since he was removed asadministrator of the estate of Conde in the year1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp thepossession and use of the above described parcel ofland xxx, and has ever since refused to relinquishthe possession of the same to the lawful ownerthereof notwithstanding the fact that he has no rightor any color of title over the said land;

o [B]y reason of this unlawful occupation andusurpation by the defendant, the plaintiff will sufferdamages and in fact has suffered damages beginningthis October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25 cavans ofpalay per harvest or 50 cavans yearly xxx

In his answer, Pedro alleged that the land was his andthat it was in his exclusive possession. His claim ofownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate ofConde to his predecessor-in-interest.

Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of

the trial.o Irene passed away in 1953 and was substituted by

respondents.o Petitioners succeeded Pedro who died in 1955.o The cases were re-raffled to Branch 2 of the RTC of

Legaspi City in November of 1994. On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision

declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of theland in TD 5299 and directing respondents to respectpetitioners possession.

The RTC reconsidered its findings with respect toownership. It ruled that the contending parties had failedto prove their respective claims of ownership and theland in question still belonged to its original owner, theestate of the Conde.

From that order, respondents appealed to the CA.o The CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues

relating to the other 2 parcels of land but reversedthe ruling on the ownership of the land covered byTD 5299. It proceeded to award respondentsP118,000 in damages as compensation for theirhaving been deprived of possession and the ownersshare in the harvest.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in aresolution dated October 1, 2002.

ISSUE/HOLDING: Whether petitioners, the heirs of PedroClemea y Zurbano (heirs of Pedro), should be made to payrespondents, the heirs of Irene B. Bien (heirs of Irene),compensatory damages for depriving them of the owners

share of the harvest from a tract of riceland in Bolo, Albay. YES.

Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of theproperty covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, thathey cannot be held liable to respondents for the harvesbecause (1) they never took possession of the propertydeclared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on todetermine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did fromone of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could nohave been a proper basis for such an award.

RATIO: Petitioners contention that the land wanever in their possession should be dismissed outright for2 reasons.

o First, petitioners predecessor Pedro alleged in his

answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in hisexclusive possession. That statement, insofar as iconfirmed the allegation in the complaint thapetitioners predecessor had retained possession othe land in question, took on the character of a

judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rul129 of the Rules of Court:An admission, verbal or written, made by a party inthe course of proceedings in the same case, does notrequire proof. The admission may be contradictedonly by showing that it was made through palpablemistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party

making it. He cannot thereafter contradict itThe exception is found only in those rareinstances when the trial court, in the exercise oits discretion and because of strong reasons tosupport its stand, may relieve a party from theconsequences of his admission.

Irlanda v. Pitargue: Acts or facts admitted donot require proof and cannot be contradictedunless it can be shown that the admission wasmade through palpable mistake.

Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An admission madein a pleading cannot be controverted by the

party making such admission; and all proosubmitted by him contrary thereto oinconsistent therewith should simply be ignoredby the court, whether objection is interposed bythe opposite party or not.

Cunanan v. Amparo: The allegationsstatements, or admissions contained in apleading are conclusive as against the pleader. Aparty cannot subsequently take a positioncontrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.

Petitioners newly-contrived assertion that theywere never in possession of the land cannot holdup against these pronouncements.

As substituting defendants, they were bound bythe admission of Pedro, their predecessor in thelitigation. Without any showing that the

admission was made through palpable mistakeor that no such admission was made, petitionerscannot now contradict it.

Second, the issue of whether petitioners

ever had possession of the land is undeniably a questionof fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in apetition for review on certiorari as the remedy is confinedto pure questions of law.o This rule has been watered down by a slew o

exceptions. Petitioners invoke a number of theseexceptions, namely: (1) the factual findings of theTC and the CA are contradictory; (2) the decisionsought to be reviewed is against the law and incomplete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3


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there was grave abuse of discretion in theappreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to noticerelevant facts and evidence which if properlyconsidered would justify a different conclusion.

o But this case does not fall within any of these. Forone, petitioners have shown no contradictionbetween the findings of the CA and the RTC. Ourpreceding disquisition on the conclusiveness ofPedros admission of the fact of possession makesthe rest of the grounds invoked by petitionersundeserving of even passing consideration.

o Petitioners next proposition that Gregorio Clemeastestimony was self-serving and an improper basis forthe damages awarded to respondents, is just asunworthy. Self-serving evidence, is a concept much

misunderstood. The term is employed as aweapon to devalue and discredit a partystestimony favorable to his cause. That is thesense in which petitioners are using it now. Thisis a grave error.

Self-serving evidence is not to be takenliterally to mean any evidence that serves itsproponents interest. The term refers only toacts or declarations made by a party in his owninterest at some place and time out of court,and it does not include testimony that he givesas a witness in court. Evidence of this sort isexcluded on the same ground as any hearsayevidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on theconsideration that its admission would open thedoor to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, apartys testimony in court is sworn and subjectto cross-examination by the other party, and notsusceptible to an objection on the ground that itis self-serving.

Petitioners never alleged that his testimony wasinaccurate or untrue. Petitioners objection isfounded solely on the mere fact that he was awitness interested in the outcome of the case. Itis true that a partys interest may to some

extent affect his credibility as a witness.Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to theview that a partys testimony favorable tohimself must be disregarded on account solely ofhis interest in the case. Our justice system willnot survive such a rule for obdurate cynicism onthe part of a court is just as odious to theadministration of justice as utter gullibility.

National Development Company v. Workmens CompensationCommission: Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding apartys testimony. xxx the interest of a witness does not ipsofacto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it tobe disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept asmuch of the witness testimony as he finds credible and toreject the rest.

DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES v.RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.

FACTS:RMNIs properties were covered by fire insurance policies. OnJuly 27, 1988, its radio station, located in SSS Bldg., BacolodCity, was razed by fire. RMNI sought to collect the insuranceproceeds from DBP.

DBP denied liability on the ground that the cause of the losswas an excepted risk excluded under the insurance policy.The exclusion is brought by DBPs allegation that the fire wascaused by members of the CPP-NPA.

Hence, RMNI filed a complaint to claim the insuranceproceeds due it.TC & CA: The insurance companies are liable for the loss. Theevidence failed to support DBPs allegation that the loss wascaused by an excepted risk, i.e. members of the CPP-NPAcaused the fire.SC: Affirmed the TC and CA. The insurance company is liablefor the loss.

RATIO:Ill discuss the different topics for this case based on each

piece of evidence presented by DBP. - rom

On admissions and confessions:Evidence: a letter of one Celso Magilang who claims to be amember of the NPA and to be responsible for the fire This is an admission of a person who is not a party to thepresent action. It is inadmissible under Rule 130.26.WHY? An admission is competent only when the declarant osomeone identified in legal interest with him is a party to theaction.

On Burden of Proof v. Burden of Evidence:Burden of Proof: the duty of ANY party to present evidence toestablish his claim or defense by the amount of evidencerequired by law the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the

burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgmente.g. when the defendant asserts an affirmative defenseas in this case, avoidance of the claim

Evidence: Stipulation in the insurance policy, to wit:In any action, suit or other preceding where the Companieallege that by reason of the provisions condition any loss odamage is not covered by this insurance, the burden oproving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon theInsured.

The burden of proof contemplated by this provision actuallyrefers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward).

It refers to the insureds duty to show that the loss odamage is covered by the policy. Still, the burden of proof

rests on DBP to prove that the damage or loss was caused byan excepted risk in order to escape liability.

On Res Gestae as Exception to the Hearsay Rule:Hearsay Rule: based upon serious concerns about thetrustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence1. such evidence are not given under oath or solemn

affirmation2. such evidence have not been subjected to cross

examination by opposing counsel to test the perceptionmemory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-courtdeclarant or actor upon whose reliability on which theworth of the out-of-court statement depends

Res Gestae: those exclamations or statements made by eithe

the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediatelybefore, during or after the commission of the crime, when thecircumstances are such that the statements were made as aspontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitementof the occasion and there was no opportunity for thedeclarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement applies only when the declarant himself did not testify

and the testimony of the witness who heard the declarancomplies with these requirements:1. that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling

occurrence2. the statements were made before the declarant had

the time to contrive or devise a falsehood3. the statements must concern the occurrence in

question and its immediate attending circumstances


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Evidence: Testimony of the police (Lt. Col. Torres, SFO IIRochar) that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that theperpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. These declarations are not part of res gestae.WHY? It cannot be said that these utterances were madespontaneously by the bystanders and before they had thetime to contrive or devise a falsehood.

These statements were taken by the police while they weremaking investigations during and after the fire. It is

reasonable to assume that when these statements werenoted, the bystanders already had enough time andopportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchangeinformation, not to mention theories and speculations. Thus,it cannot be ascertained whether these utterances were theproducts of truth. That they were mere idle talk is notremote.

On Admissibility of Evidence v. Weight and Sufficiency:Admissibility: depends on its relevance and competenceWeight: pertains to evidence already admitted and thetendency to convince and persuade

Evidence: declaration of bystanders Assuming this is admissible (it is inadmissible), thesedeclarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence

on record.

Res Gestae and Entries in Official Records:Evidence: police blotter, certifications from the Bacolod PoliceStation, Fire Investigation Report These may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule,being entries in official records.BUT: None of these documents categorically stated that theperpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. It only stated inthese documents that it was believed or suspected thatmembers of the CPP-NPA were the perpetrators.

Suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidencebeing the quantum of proof.

PEOPLE v. REYES

Appeal; CFIFACTS:

1. On the night of Apr 19, 1946, while attending a pabasa(reading of life story of Christ) in barrio Cacutud, Arayat,Pampanga, three MPs, Benjamin Neri, Alfredo Laguitanand Francisco Orsino, were taken by four armedindividuals, brought to the road leading to Cabiao andthere shot by them.

2. As a result Neri and Laguitan died. Orsino recovered fromhis wounds.

3. The accused, in the 2 separate cases of violent death(murder) and one case of physical injuries, wereappellants Gatchalian and Austria, Reyes, Perez, G. Dueand M. Due

4. Dismissed as to Perez for insufficiency of evidence andReyes was discharged and used as prosecution witness.G. Due and M. Due have not been arrested or tried.

5. Gatchalian and Austria were found guilty beyondreasonable doubt, on the strength of the following:

a. Testimony of Pedro Reyes, among others: that heran to the rice field and there he met Oliveros(Gervasio Due) and Gatchalian talking, the formerdeclaring he was sure the MP he had shot will dieand Gatchalian making the same assurance as to theMP he (Gatchalian) had shot in turn.

b. Testimony of Orsino (victim): narrated theincident substantially as described by Reyes, butcould not identify the aggressors except the

defendant Severino Austria who he pointed out ashis treacherous assailant.

c. Alleged admission made by GatchalianLieutenants Fidel Martinez and Secundino Quintansdeclared under oath that Vicente Gatchalianadmitted before the latter, which under investigation, that he had shot one of the MPs who died laterGatchalian even showed how he had fired at the MPfrom the back, posing for a picture (Exhibit H).

d. Alleged confession by Austria: LieutenanQuintans likewise asserted that Severino Austria hadvoluntarily signed the confession Exhibit E whereinsaid Austria made the following statements:Q. What did you do on that same night?A. While we were at the back of the "Cenaculo",Oliveros ordered Pepit and FELIPE SESE to PEPIT andFELIPE SESE did as ordered and came with theinformation that here are three MP soldiers in theone of the stores near the "Cenaculo".

Q. What did you do when you mere informedthus?A. BASIBAS, MAGALLANES, BATUIN, OLIVEROS,and I went to the place where the MP soldiers wereand I myself talked with one of the said soldiers, andI asked him to stand and come with me where we

could talk together, but he refused, so I drew mypistol and forced him to come with me. OLIVEROSheld one of the soldiers, Magallanes held the othersand forced them to come with us.

Q. Why and where were you taking the MPsoldiers?A. To talk with them in front of the house ofSEGUNDO GUEVARRA.

Q. What happened when you took the soldiers?A. While we were walking about 10 meters fromthe "Cenaculo" the soldier who was with me tried tograb the pistol that I was holding with my righthand. Suddenly I heard about 4 shots from behind,so I also fired at the soldier who was with me.

ISSUE on Res Gestae: WON testimony of Reyes regardingthe conversation, which he overheard, between G. Due andGatchalian is admissible.HELD: Yes

PRINCIPLE ON RES GESTAE & ON ADMISSIONS &CONFESSIONS

Enough, however, may be gathered from his (Reyestestimony in open court to identify Gatchalian as one othe assailants, the conversation he overhead in the ricefield being admissible as an admission and as part of theres gestae.

Stated otherwise, as in the syllabus: The conversationhad among the accused immediately after theshooting, which was overheard in the rice field bythe prosecuting witness is admissible as anadmission and as part of the res gestae.

Conclusion of the Court: We are thus satisfied from the foregoing of the guilty

participation of the appellants in this gruesome businessTheir defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The SolicitoGeneral's brief substantially proves conspiracy betweenthem and their other co-accused who are still at large.

LICHAUCO v. ATLANTIC GULF

FACTS:


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Appellant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila(Atlantic) is a foreign corporation duly registered andlicensed to do business in the Philippines, with its officeand principal place of business in Manila.

Richard T. Fitzsimmons (Fitzsommons) was the presidentand one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic when thePacific war broke out on December 8, 1941.o He was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month.

o He held 1,000 shares, of which 545 shares had not

been fully paid for, but for which he had executedpromissory notes in favor of Atlantic for P245,250, at

P450/share.o In 1941, the sum of P64,500 had been credited in

his favor on account of the purchase price of the 545shares out of bonuses and dividends.

o Under his agreements with the company dated April

4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without havingfully paid for the 545 shares of stock, Atlantic, at itsoption, may either reacquire the 545 shares byreturning to his estate the amount applied, or issuein favor of his estate the corresponding number ofthe company's shares equivalent to the amount paidat P450/share.

After the Japanese occupied Manila in January 1942, itseized and took possession of the office and all theproperties and assets of Atlantic all its officials, theybeing American citizens.

Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomasinterment camp (ST), and special proceeding wassubsequently instituted in the CFI of Manila for thesettlement of his estate.

Atlantic resumed business operations in March 1945. Atlantic filed a claim against the estate of Fitzsimmons

which, as amended, consisted of the following items:

A. Personal overdraft of Fitzsimmons with Atlantic in currentaccount: P63,000.00

B. Charges from San Francisco (SF) agent of the company

not included in above figure A as of November 30, 1945(P1,002), less subsequent credit advice from SF agent(P133.33)

Atlantic offered to require the 545 shares sold toFitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the amount ofP64,500 paid, and asked the court to authorize the setoffof the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from theamount of P64,500 returnable to the estate.

In his answer to the amended claim, the administratordenied the alleged indebtedness of Fitzsimmons toAtlantic, expressed his conformity to the refund ofP64,500 by Atlantic to the estate and the retransfer bythe latter to the former of the 545 shares of stock, andset up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedlydue the deceased from the claimant corresponding to theyears 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944, at P36,000per annum.

ISSUES/HOLDING:1. Whether appellant's claims of P63,000 and P868.67 have

been established by satisfactory evidence. NO andYES, respectively.

2. Whether Fitzsimmons was entitled to his salary as

president of Atlantic from January 1942, to June 27,1944, when he died in ST. NO.

RATIO:I

Upon the claim of P63,000, the evidence for the claimantconsisted of the testimony of Santiago Inacay (Inacay)and Modesto Flores (Flores), chief and assistantaccountant, respectively, of Atlantic.

Inacayo Personal account of Fitzsimmons, as of the las

statement of account rendered in the year 1941 wasaround P63,000.

o The last statement of account rendered to

Fitzsimmons was that of November, 1941, the officeof the company having closed on December 291941.

o Asked how it was possible for him to remember thestatus of the personal account of Fitzsimmons: have to remember it because it is very shameful xxx

when the officers xxx ask me about their balance, could not tell them the amount xxx.o Asked what would happen at the end of each year to

the personal account, and to the status of thepersonal account of Fitzsimmons: At the each yearafter the declaration of dividends on paid sharesbonuses and directors' fees, the account will balanceto a credit balance.

o On cross-examination, admitted that he could no

recollect the amount of the balance, either debit orcredit, of each of the Americans and otheemployees who maintained a current account withthe company

o On redirect examination, he explained that he

remembered the balance of Fitzsimmons becausexxx I should have knowledge more or less, of thestatus of the account of the president, the treasurerand the rest of the directors.

Floreso Fitzsimmons had an account consisting of cash

advances and of payments for his account xxx for hispersonal use.

o On the credit side of his account were entered his

monthly salaries, dividends declared, bonuses, anddirector's fees.

o When Fitzsimmons withdrew funds by way of cash

advances, he signed receipts which were delivered tothe cashier, who in turn delivered them to him.

o When creditors of Fitzsimmons presented bills to the

accounting department for payments, those billswere approved by Fitzsimmons and the company

paid them and charged them to his account.o All the books, receipts, papers, documents, and

accounts referring to Fitzsimmons were lost duringthe war.

o The personal account of Fitzsimmons on Decembe

29, 1941, was on the debit side, amounting toP63,000 more or less, according to his besrecollection.

o On cross-examination, he testified that in theabsence of the records he could not state what partof the P63,000 represented cash advances andpayments made by the company to the creditors oFitzsimmons.

Testimonies of Mr. Henry J. Belden (Belden) and MrSamuel Garmezy (Garmezy), vice-president-treasureand president, respectively, of Atlantic were objected toby the administrator and the trial court refused to admittheir testimony on the ground that they wereincompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123, they beingnot only large stockholders and members of the board odirectors but also vice-president-treasurer and presidentrespectively, of Atlantic.o Counsel for Atlantic stated in the record that Belden

if permitted to testify, would testify: ThaFitzsimmons, xxx, had a current account xxx whichupon the outbreak of the war in December, 1941had a debt balance against him of P63,000, and thatsaid sum or any part had not been paid.

o With regard to Garmezy, counsel for Atlantic also

said that if said witness were allowed to testify, he


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would testify: That xxx during the last days ofNovember, or the first days of December, 1941, hereceived a copy of the trial balance sheet, and xxxthe personal accounts of each and every one of theofficers of Atlantic including himself, and alsoFitzsimmons, appear; and that xxx on that occasionhe checked up his own personal record with theentries appearing xxx, and he then had occasion tofind out that the account of Fitzsimmons xxx was adebit account in the amount of around P63,000,while the personal account of Garmezy, xxx, showed

a credit account in the sum of P63,000; and that thisaccount P63,000 owed by Fitzsimmons appeared inthat trial balance, xxx, was not paid by Fitzsimmonsuntil the present date.

o The offers of proof were ratified by the witnesses

Belden and Garmezy and made of record by the trialcourt.

The evidence for the administrator against this claim ofP63,000 consisted of Exhibit 1 and the testimony of Mr.Marcial P. Lichauco (Lichauco) explaining thecircumstances under which said document was preparedand signed by the Fitzsimmons.o On December 15, 1942, Fitzsimmons sued his wife

Miguela Malayto (Malayto) for divorce in the CFI ofManila. On August 9, 1943, the court rendered

judgment granting plaintiff's petition and ordering

the dissolution of the marriage. Lichauco representedthe plaintiff. After the decree of divorce had becomefinal, Fitzsimmons submitted to the court aninventory of the assets and liabilities of the conjugalpartnership, with a proposed adjudication or divisionof the net assets among the ex-spouses and theirchildren. A carbon copy of said inventory, signed byFitzsimmons on November 9, 1943, and filed in theCFI of Manila was presented by the administrator asExhibit 1 and admitted by the trial court over theobjection of the claimant. Lichauco testified that heprepared the inventory from the data furnished byFitzsimmons after he had conferred with andexplained to the latter why it was necessary; thatsince Fitzsimmons was married to Malayto in theyear 1939, he had to include all the propertiesacquired by him between the date of his marriageand the date of his divorce, and that all theobligations incurred by him and not yet paid duringthe same period should be included because theyhad to be deducted from the assets in order todetermine the net value of the conjugal properties;that he made it very clear to Fitzsimmons that heshould not forget the obligations he had becausethey would diminish the amount his wife was goingto receive, and that any obligation not included inthe inventory would be borne by him alone after hiswife had received her share.

o According to Exhibit 1 the gross value of the assets

of the conjugal partnership between Fitzsimmonsand Malayto as of November, 1943, was P174,700,

and the total amount of the obligations was P30,082.These obligations consisted of only two items, one ofP21,426 in favor of the Peoples Bank and TrustCompany (PBTC) and another of P8,656 in favor ofthe Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). Noobligation in favor of Atlantic was listed in Exhibit 1.And upon that fact the administrator based hisopposition to the claim in question.

It necessary for us to pass upon the trial court's rejectionof the testimonies of Belden and Garmezy and itsadmission of Exhibit 1.

o WON the officers of a corporation party to an action

against an executor or administrator of a deceasedperson are disqualified from testifying as to anymatter of fact occurring before the death of such

deceased person, under Rule 123, section 26(c), othe Rules of Court, which provides:Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or personsin whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against anexecutor or administrator or other representative oa deceased person, or against a person of unsoundmind, upon a claim or demand against the estate ofsuch deceased person or against such person ounsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of facoccurring before the death of such deceased personor before such person became of unsound mind.

o

This provision was taken from section 383(7), of ourformer Code of Civil Procedure, which was derivedfrom section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure oCalifornia.

o City Savings Bank vs. Enos: The provision applies

only to parties or assignors of parties, xxx. xxxinterest no longer disqualifies under our law, xxxxxx section 14, Civ. Code, xxx "person" includes acorporation; xxx, as the corporation can only speakthrough its officers, the section must be held toapply to all who are officially related to thecorporation. A corporation may be conceded to be aperson, xxx. To hold that the statute disqualifies alpersons from testifying who are officers ostockholders of a corporation would be equivalent tomaterially amending the statute by judicia

interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only"parties or assignors of parties," and does not applyto persons who are merely employed by such partiesor assignors of parties.

o Merriman vs. Wickersman: xxx, vice-president and

one of its principal stockholders, was allowed totestify to matters and facts in issue. It is contendedthat the evidence was improperly admitted, inviolation of section 1880 of the Code of CivProcedure, xxx. At common law, interest disqualifiedany person from being a witness. That rule has beenmodified by statute. In this state, interest is nolonger a disqualification, and the disqualifications areonly such as the law imposes. An examination of theauthorities from other states will disclose that their

decisions rest upon the wordings of their statutesbut that generally, where interest in the litigation oits outcome has ceased to disqualify, officers anddirectors of corporations are not considered to beparties within the meaning of the law.

o Our own statute xxx neither disqualifies parties to a

contract nor persons in interest, but only parties tothe action; xxx our statute does not exclude fromtestifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether hebe but a stockholder, or whether, in addition, he be adirector or officer.

o The appellee admits xxx where the "dead man'

statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officersand stockholders of the corporation have beenallowed to testify in favor of the corporation, whilexxx where "parties and persons interested in the

outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under thestatute, officers and stockholders of the corporationhave been held to be incompetent to testify againsthe estate of a deceased person.

o Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies

only parties or assignors of parties, we areconstrained to hold that the officers and/ostockholders of a corporation are not disqualifiedfrom testifying, for or against the corporation whichis a party to an action upon a claim or demandagainst the estate of a deceased person, as to anymatter of fact occurring before the death of suchdeceased person.


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o The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony

of Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary,however, to remand the case because theirtestimonies would be merely corroborative, and ifpermitted, already appears in the record and we canconsider it together with the testimony of the Inacayand Flores who were "the only ones in the best ofposition to testify on the status of the personalaccount" of the Fitzsimmons.

WON Exhibit 1 is admissible.o Appellant contends that it is a self-serving

declaration, while appellee contends that it is adeclaration against interest.

o A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to

the interest of the declarant. It is not admissible inevidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vitalobjection to the admission of this kind of evidence isits hearsay character. Furthermore such declarationsare untrustworthy; to permit their introduction inevidence would open the door to frauds andperjuries."

o A declaration against the interest of the person

making it is admissible in evidence, notwithstandingits hearsay character, if the declaration is relevantand the declarant has died, become insane, or forsome other reason is not available as a witness. "Thetrue test in reference to the reliability of thedeclaration is not whether it was made ante litemmotam, as is the case with reference to some classesof hearsay evidence, whether the declaration wasuttered under circumstances justifying the conclusionthat there was no probable motive to falsify."

o We find no merit, that Exhibit 1 was a declaration

against the interest of Fitzsimmons. He having sincedied and therefore no longer available as a witness,said document was correctly admitted by the trialcourt in evidence.

Neither counsel for the appellant nor counsel for the

appellee pursued the examination of the witness todetermine, if possible, the approximate amount of thedividends, bonuses, and director's fees that would have

been credited to Fitzsimmons as of the end of the year1941. But enough appears in the testimony to warrantthe deduction that had the war not forced the corporationto close office on December 29, 1941, dividends,bonuses, and director's fees for the year 1941 would, asof the and of that year, have been declared and creditedto the account of Fitzsimmons, which as in previous yearswould or might have brought that account on the creditside.

We are confronted only by the oral testimony of thewitnesses for the claimant based entirely on theirmemory as to the status of Fitzsimmons' account, andnot on the other by Exhibit 1. Realizing the frailty andunreliability of human memory, we find no sufficientbasis upon which to reverse the trial court's finding thatthis claim had not been satisfactorily proven.

With reference to the item of P868.67, we find it to havebeen sufficiently proven by Inacay and Flores, supportedby documents which establish the fact that in Novemberand December, 1941, the SF agent of the companydeposited in the Crocker First National Bank of SF(Crocker) the total sum of $500 to the account ofFitzsimmons, which agent debited against the company.Debit notices of the deposits were not received by thecompany until after the liberation.o The administrator admitted in his testimony that

after the death of Fitzsimmons, he received fromCrocker the balance of Fitzsimmons' account in thesum of P1,788.75. Aside from that debit of P1,000against Atlantic for the account of Fitzsimmons, theagent also paid $1 or P2 for Fitzsimmons'

subscription to the SF Chronicle, making a total oP1,002. From this was deducted a credit of P133.33consisting of a payment made on June 30, 1946, bya creditor of Fitzsimmons named J. H. Chew astestified to by Flores and supported by Exhibit Eleaving a balance of P868.67.

o The trial court therefore erred in not allowing said

claim.

II

There was no resolution either of the stockholders or theboard of directors of the company authorizing thepayment of the salaries of the president or any otherofficer or employee of the corporation for the period ofthe war when the corporation was forced completely tosuspend its business operations and when its officerswere interned or virtually held prisoners by the enemy.

The theory of the appellee, which was sustained by thetrial court, is that as long as a corporation officer with afixed salary retains the office, he is entitled to that salarynotwithstanding his inability to perform his duties.o The main case cited by the appellee in support of his

theory is Brown vs. Galvenston Wharf Co.: Thepresident of the defendants corporation claimed hissalary for a period of almost eleven months, duringwhich he was on an indefinite leave of absence, and

the court allowed it, holding that "so long as heremained the president of the company, the salarywas an incident to the office, and ran with it for thewhole time, although he may have failed to performthe duties of president for any given part of suchtime."

o If such a sweeping pronouncement is to be applied

regardless of WON the corporation was in operationduring the period covered by the claim for the salarywe cannot subscribe to it.

o We know of no principle of law that would authorize

the court to compel a corporation, which for a longperiod was not in operation and did not receive anyincome, to pay the salaries of its officers during suchperiod, even though they were incapacitated and did

not perform any service. To do so would betantamount to depriving the corporation or itsstockholders of their property without due process olaw.

o The resolutions of the stockholders are invoked by

the appellee to support the proposition thaFitzsimmons, during his internment, performedcertain acts as president of the corporation, whichwere ratified and confirmed by the stockholders intheir annual meeting on January 21, 1946. But thoseacts consisted merely of borrowing money fohimself and the other officers of the corporation andtheir respective families to enable them to eke ouan existence during their internment. The ratificationof those acts by the stockholders had for its purpose

to relieve Fitzsimmons of personal liability for theobligations thus contracted by him in the name othe company. To say that by ratifying those acts oFitzsimmons the corporation became obligated topay his salaries during his internment aggregatingP90,000, would be the height of absurdity.

o We are of the opinion that the estate of Fitzsimmons

is not entitled to its counterclaim of P90,000 or anypart thereof.

PEOPLE v. YATCO

FACTS: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney o

QC, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and anothe


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whose identity is still unknown, were charged with havingconspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos

During the progress of the trial, while the prosecutionwas questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavierof the NBI, in connection with the making of a certainextra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) byConsunjio Counsel for Panganiban interposed a general

objection to any evidence on such confession on theground that it was hearsay and thereforeincompetent as against the other accused

Panganiban Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidenceobjected to, but on an altogether different groundo That the prosecution could not be permitted to

introduce the confessions of defendants Consunji andPanganiban to prove conspiracy between them,without prior proof of such conspiracy by a numberof definite acts, conditions, and circumstances

The ff remarks were made:o FISCAL LUSTRE: May we know from counsel if he is

also objecting to the admissibility of the confessionof Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself?

o COURT: That would be premature because there is

already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove aconfession unless you prove first conspiracy thru anumber of indefinite acts, conditions and

circumstances as required by law. Prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the order of

exclusion, but the motion was denied Hence this petition for certiorari was brought by the

Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of thelower Court's order completely excluding any evidence onthe extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji andPanganiban without prior proof of conspiracy

ISSUE:

WON the lower Court committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion in ordering the complete exclusion of theprosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of theaccused Consunji at the stage of the trial when the rulingwas made? YES

RATIO: Section 14, Rule 123, ROC, is specific as to the

admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of anaccused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence againsthim

o SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused

expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as tothe offense charged, may be given in evidenceagainst him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, evenif Consunji's confession may not be competent as againsthis co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to thelatter, or to prove conspiracy between them without theconspiracy being established by other evidence, theconfession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible asevidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should havebeen admitted as such.

Rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusionof the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123:o SEC 12. The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existencemay be given in evidence against the co-conspiratorafter the conspiracy is shown by evidence other thansuch act or declaration.

Sec 12 refers to statements made by one conspiratorduring the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("duringits existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to

a confession made, as in this case, long after theconspiracy had been brought to an end

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered theconfessions to prove conspiracy between the twoaccused, nor as evidence against both of themo In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and

in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified(the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely fothe purpose of identifying the confessions), muchless formally offered in evidence

o For all we know, the prosecution might still be able

to adduce other proof of conspiracy betweenConsunji and Panganiban before their confessionsare formally offered in evidence

o Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also

applies to the confessions in question, it waspremature for the respondent Court to exclude themcompletely on the ground that there was no priorproof of conspiracy

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of theproferred confessions was not made on the basis of theobjection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but uponan altogether different ground, which the Court issuedmotu proprioo By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to

object is a mere privilege which the parties may

waive; and if the ground for objection is known andnot reasonably made, the objection is deemedwaived and the Court has no power, on its ownmotion, to disregard the evidence

We see no need for the present to discuss the question othe admissibility of the individual extrajudiciaconfessions of two or more accused for the purpose oestablishing conspiracy between them through theidentity of the confessions in essential detailso After all, the confessions are not before us and have

not even been formally offered in evidence for anypurpose

o Lower Court should have allowed such confessions to

be given in evidence at least as against the partieswho made them, and admit the same conditionally toestablish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution

a chance to get into the record all the relevanevidence at its disposal to prove the charges

Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co.o In the course of long experience we have observed

that justice is most effectively and expeditiouslyadministered in the courts where trial objections tothe admission of proof are received with least favor

o The practice of excluding evidence on doubtfu

objections to its materiality or technical objections tothe form of the questions should be avoided

o In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge

of first instance, in the early stages of thedevelopment of the proof, to know with any certaintywhether testimony is relevant or not; and wherethere is no indication of bad faith on the part of the

Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as arule safely accept the testimony upon the statementof the attorney that the proof offered will beconnected later

o A judge of first instance may possibly fall into erro

in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair andlogical connection is in fact shown. When such amistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruledout, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finditself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct theeffects of the error without returning the case for anew trial, a step which this Court is always veryloath to take.


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o On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court

of first instance, even if the question as to its form,materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never resultin much harm to either litigant, because the trial

judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty,upon final consideration of the case, to distinguishthe relevant and material from the irrelevant andimmaterial

o If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted

to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court thenhas all the material before it necessary to make a

correct judgment There is greater reason to adhere to such policy incriminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility ofevidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusionof evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of theaccused or the dismissal of the charges, from which thePeople can no longer appeal.

HELD:Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accusedJuan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and setaside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trialin accordance with law and this opinion.

US v. BAY

Servando Bay charged w the crime of rape Witnesses for the prosecution:o Bay & Florentina Alcones were neighbors he forced

himself on hero Bay got angry at her resistance & tk out a dagger

o Boat w ppl passed by & heard her cries, boat cameashore & a person walked over to where they were &asked Bay whats this?

o Bay didnt explain & just left immediately

o Alcones, accompanied by some of the ppl from the

boat, made a complaint to the councilmano Bay admitted to the crime to the councilman case

filed accused was convicted based on this evidence Counsel for accused:

o There are apparent contradictions & inconsistenciesin the testimonies of the witnesses

o TC was erred in accepting as true the testimony of

the witnesses & Alconeso Emphasized the inherent improbability of the story

told by Alcones

Shes more than twice the age of Bay & anythingbut attractive (sama naman ng lawyer nato!!!Grabe hahaha)

o charge of rape is a pure fabrication & brought for the

sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and spite onBay whom she had a quarrel over the trespass ofone of his carabaos on her land

I: WON the testimonies are sufficient to prove the guilt of

Bay. YES there are contradictions & inconsistencies in thetestimonies & difficult to understand why Bay, young &married, cldve been so lost to all sense of right &decency as to assault a woman so much older than him(his neighbor & old frnd of the family) BUT the evidence of Alcones, supported by the otherwitnesses is so convincing & conclusive in cases of this nature it is the duty of the Cts toscrutinized with the utmost care the story told by thecomplaining witness and the witnesses called tocorroborate hero esp when it appears either that the offended party

did not make immediate outcry or that there was

any unexplained delay in instituting criminaproceedings

Here, Alcones sought assistance & made a formal &official complaint immediately after the commission othe crime the precludes the possibility btwn conspiracybtwn her & the witnesses to press a false charge She couldnt have anticipated the party on the boapassing by & hearing her cries nor their arrival, had sheplanned the filing of false charges on Bayo These were fortunate coincidences

Theres a direct conflict in the testimony as to

whether Bay, when the complaint was made to thecouncilman, did or did not admit his guilt, and thisevidence is so contradictory that its difficult to make anexpress finding on this But whatever be the truth as to these allegedadmissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room fodoubt that neither at the moment when the party in theboat came upon him in company with his victim nor whenhe appeared before the councilman upon her complaindid he claim, as he does now, that her charge that hehad assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented forthe purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him Under such circumstances, an innocent man wouldinstantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, andattempt there and then to establish his innocenceexplaining how he came to be there present with the

woman, and the conditions under which she had madethe false charge there is not the slightest indication in the evidencethat there was on the part of Bay any such indignantdenials and protests as would be expected from aninnocent man suddenly confronted with such a chargeunder such circumstances his conduct at that time was wholly at variance withthat which might fairly be expected from him, grantingthe truth of his testimony and that of the other witnessesfor the defense

ABALLE v. PEOPLE

FACTS: Quirino Banguis, and family went to a birthday partyat 7pm, leaving at home alone their 12-y.o. daughteJennie. When they returned 8.30pm the same night, theyfound Jennie in the sala, lying dead in a pool of her ownblood, with several stab wounds all over her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing. At daybreak of the following day, acting oninformation furnished by the Quirino, a police teamheaded by Sgt. Marante sought the accused Peter Pau(Pitoy! Hehehe.) Aballe for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of thecommunal bathroom in Saypon and wearing whaappeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused withoutanyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed

Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toripolice station for interrogation. While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 yearsold, a school dropout and next door neighbor of thevictim, brought the police to his house and pointed tothem the pot at the "bangera" where he had concealedthe death weapon which was a four-inch kitchen knife. Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red andwhite striped T-shirt which he claimed he wore during thecommission of the crime. Aballe also made an extrajudicial confessionadmitting his guilt in killing Jennie while under theinfluence of liquor and marijuana. The sworn affidavit gave details regarding the


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commission of the crime. The affidavit also shows that Aballe was readhis Constitutional right to remain silent and right topresence and assistance of counsel, and that Aballewaived these rights. An information charging Aballe with homicide wasfiled. Aballe pleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on theground that it was obtained through coercion and in theabsence of counsel.

In spite of this, Aballe was convicted.

ISSUES:1. WON Aballes extrajudicial admission is admissible. No.2. WON Sgt. Marantes testimony regarding Aballes

extrajudicial admission is admissible. Yes.Sub-issues:1. Is the kitchen knife admissible? No.2. Is the bloodstained shirt admissible? Yes.

Aballes extrajudicial admission Should have been disregarded. At no stage of theentire proceedings was it shown that Aballe was everrepresented by counsel.

Since the execution of the extrajudicialstatement was admittedly made in the absence ofcounsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and thewaiver of counsel was not made with theassistance of counsel as mandated by theprovisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973Constitution, said confession should have beendiscarded by the lower court.

The kitchen knife Inadmissible because it was recovered from Aballeafter his capture and after the police had started toquestion him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, thefatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionallyinfirm interrogation and must consequently bedisallowed.

The bloodstained T-shirt

Admissible because it is in the nature of anevidence in plain view which an arresting officer maytake and introduce in evidence The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "anofficer making an arrest may take from the personarrested any money or property found upon his personwhich was used in the commission of the crime or wasthe fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisonerwith the means of committing violence or escaping, orwhich may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause . ..

But there is no escape! Marantes testimony finally

leads to Aballes doom. Even with the exclusion of the extrajudicialconfession and the fatal weapon the SC agrees with thetrial court that Aballes guilt has been established beyondreasonable doubt. Even before the taking of the extrajudicialconfession, the accused confessed to Marante that hekilled Jennie. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oralconfession is competent evidence to positively linkthe accused to the aforesaid killing. Sgt. Marantes testimony details how heapprehended Aballe. He said that as per info from Jennies father that hesuspected Aballe, they subsequently found him at the

communal bathroom. When Aballe saw Marante, he tried to hide thebloodstains on his shirt. Marante asked him what those were, then Aballebroke down and confessed. Marante was not in uniform at that time and that hethought Aballe only knew that he was a policeman whenhe finally took him to the station where theysubsequently read him his rights and here theextrajudicial confession was taken.

Rule 130, Sec. 33. (Sec. 30 in the Old ROC): "Thedeclaration of an accused expressly acknowledging hisguilt of the offenses charged may be given in evidenceagainst him."

The rule is that any person, otherwisecompetent as a witness, who heard the confession,is competent to testify as to the substance of whathe heard if he heard and understood all of it. Anoral confession need not be repeated verbatim, butin such case it must be given in its substance. (23C.J.S. 196)(Pp. vs. Tawat)

Compliance with the constitutional procedureson custodial investigation is not applicable to aspontaneous statement, not elicited throughquestioning, but given in an ordinary mannerwhereby the accused orally admitted having slainthe victim.

SC affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty becausethe crime was mitigated by Aballes minority, but aggravatedby dwelling.

PEOPLE v. MOLAS

FACTS:

1. Josue Molas was charged with murder for killing 2 womenand an 8 year old child.

2. the two women were his girlfriend, Dulcesima Resonableand her mom, Soledad; while the 8 year old child wasDulcesimas younger bro, Abelardo.

3. Upon arraignment, Molas pleaded not guilty.

4. what happened was that when Bernardo (the gfs dadwent home from the farm, he saw his son at the doorwaycovered with blood.

5. Important fact: Abelardo, (the 8 year old son) toldhis dad that it was Josue Molas who did thestabbing and that his mom and sister were stabbedas well

6. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in adried carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengthsfrom his house. He carried her into the house and lookedfor his wife whose corpse he found near the bench by thedoor of the house

7. He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain(Labe) and sought help from the authorities in themunicipal building of Valencia.

8. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought to the Negros OrientaProvincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in ahouse on higher ground. Abelardo expired the next day.

9. Molas surrendered to the patrolman Geronimo. And alsosurrendered the knife he used. He was then jailed.

10. The next morning, after he was informed of hisConstitutional rights, Molas refused to give any statementto the police

11. Important fact: However, on March 10, 1983Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the stationinvestigator at the Valencia Police Station, tookdown the sworn statement which Molas freely andvoluntarily gave with the assistance or presence ocounsel.


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12. In the sworn statement, Molas said that when he went tohis gfs house, he saw the mom who told him It's goodthat you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill myown daughter (in bisaya dialect). The mom then boxedher daughter so Molas tried to stop the mom. But themom then boxed him then again the daughter. Molasthen grabbed the weapon in his waist and stabbed themom. Abelardo, the younger brother, boxed Molasbuttock so Molas also stabbed the child. Dulcesima, thegf, told MOlas How could you do this to my parent, killme also so we'll all die together (in bisaya dialect) So

Molas killed her as well.13. Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P.Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia after thelatter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents ofhis affidavit into the Cebuano dialect. Molas did notobject to any of the contents of his affidavit astranslated. He signed the document willingly, after whichthe judge affixed his own signature thereon.

14. BUT!! During the trial, Molas, testifying as the lonewitness in his own behalf, spun a different tale

15. During the trial, MOlas said that when he arrived at thestore of the mom, he saw the dead body of Dulcesimabeside the dried mud pool and believing she is still aliveasked day what is this. There was no response. He sawthe mom leaning on the wall and asked her as well. Againthere was no response. . He discovered that Soledad was

wounded in the neck and bathed with blood. Then heheard someone moaning. He got a lamp and saw hisfuture brother-in-law, Abelardo, under a table, still alive,with a hunting knife stuck in his back. He pulled out theknife, held it, and shouted to Nicolas Resonable for help,but nobody responded. Suddenly, he heard a voicecoming from behind the store saying: "Don't shout, Bay,if you don't want to die!" When he looked, he saw three(3) unidentified persons chasing him. During his flight, hestumbled and injured his middle and small fingers withthe hunting knife in his hand. He then went home to tellhis mom. After that he went to the police station tosurrender. While Patrolman Renzal was investigating him,Patrolman Geronimo Vallaga arrived and informed Renzalthat Abelardo Resonable tagged Molas as the killer of hismother and his sister so that he was put in the Pamplona

Municipal jail.16. Molas admitted having signed an affidavit on March 10,

1983 but he denied knowing its contents because it waswritten in English and allegedly was not translated tohim.

17. RTC convicted MOlas. His testimony is riddled withinconsistencies. He could not explain, during cross-examination, why he did not shout for help when he waschased by "unidentified persons," and why he "forgot" totell his mother that Abelardo Resonable, his futurebrother-in-law, was also wounded.

18. Molas appealed.

ISSUES:1. WON RTC erred in admitting as evidence against him his

extra-judicial confession which was executed without theassistance of counsel, as required by the Constitution NO. though the court said that the extrajudicialconfession was really inadmissible. The reason given bycourt here was on a different ground.

2. WON RTC erred in giving full faith and credit to the dyingdeclaration of Abelardo Resonable NO.

RATIO:Issue #1

1. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicialconfession was made without the advice and assistanceof counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could betreated as a verbal admission of the accusedestablished through the testimonies of the persons

who heard it or who conducted the investigation othe accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; Peoplevs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20SCRA 249).

2. The Valencia Police Station investigator, PatrolmanPaquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court onOctober 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accusedThe trial court, which observed his deportment on thewitness stand, found him credible.

Issue # 2

1. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas whoinflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother andsister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay adeath's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon andspinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hourslater. It was indubitably a dying declaration.

2. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (Requisites)a) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances o

the declarant's death;b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was

under a consciousness of impending death;c) that he was a competent witness; andd) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a

criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide inwhich the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130,Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427).

**All of these circumstances were present whenAbelardo made his dying declaration.

** At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on theextrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if thaconfession were disregard, there was more that enoughevidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himselup to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, hisblood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hoursafter the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and thetestimonies of the policemen in the police stations inPamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilconstitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonabledoubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima andSoledad Resonable.

** While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifyingcircumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victimswas raised to murder by the presence of the qualifyingcircumstance of abuse of superior strength. There was abuseof superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortawounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger andstronger, was armed with a weapon which he used inseriously wounding her. That circumstance was also presentwhen he hacked eight-year old Abelardo and also Dulcesimawho, besides being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed.

PEOPLE v. MAQUEDA

Facts leading to the case and procedural facts:

Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the WorldBank, & his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza lived in TubaBenguet.

Aug 27, 1991, during a robbery, Horace was brutallyslain & Teresita was badly battered with lead pipes.

Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to ReneSalvamante, the victims former houseboy, as one of theperpetrators of the crime.

As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially

included one Richard Malig y Severino in the informationfor robbery with homicide and serious physical injuriesfiled on 19 Nov 1991 with Branch 10 of the RTC oBenguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.

Only Richard Malig was arrested on 22 January 1992prior to arraignment,


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o The prosecution filed a motion to amend the

information to implead as co-accused HectorMaqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of theevidence subsequently submitted established hiscomplicity in the crime,

o At the hearing of the motion, the Prosecutor furtherasked that accused Malig be dropped from theinformation because further evaluation of theevidence disclosed no sufficient evidence againsthim.

Motion to drop Malig granted

o Warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante andMaqueda were issued.

Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992

9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. He

categorically stated therein that "he is willing andvolunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitledcase, it appearing that he is the least guilty among theaccused in this case."

22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended

Informations with only Salvamante and Maqueda as theaccused.

Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and hasremained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea of notguilty on 22 April 1992.

RTC Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of robbery with homicide and serious physicalinjuries and sentenced him to :

o Suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and

o To indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in theamount of P50,000.00 for the death of WilliamHorace Barker, P41,681,00 representing actualexpenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and topay the costs.

Witnesses for the prosecution: Mrs. Teresita MendozaBarker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, MikeTayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje,prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez,SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in itsevidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Witnesses for the accused: Hector Maqueda took thewitness stand and SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence inchief & Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.(Sour daw e Ndi sur accdg to the txt Im using)

Facts accdg to the prosecution:(I didnt remove a lot from the statement of facts bec maammight ask some questions about it.)Accdg to Maqueda: he was in Manila at the time of the crimeteaching other workers about polvoron making in a polvoronfactory. B/in 10:30 & 11:00 pm. 26 Aug, the sps went to their

bedroom after Teresita had checked the houses main

doors if they had been locked & bolted. Around 6:00 a.m. of the ff day, Norie, who shared a

room w/ her cousin, Julieta, got up & went to thelavatory to wash her face, & went to the toilet. When sheopened the door of the toilet & switched on the light &she saw Salvamante. a former houseboy whom she &Julieta had replaced.

Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she wasfighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and shesaw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridgednose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at thetrial as Maqueda. After she broke free, Norie fled towardsthe garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased herand pulled her back inside the house.

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts ofNorie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door ofher room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and shortpants brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters infront of her who she identified as Maqueda at the trialShe got scared & immediately closed the door. Since thedoor knob turned as if someone was forcing his way intothe room, she held on to it & shouted for help.

The shouts awakened Teresita. She rose from her bedand went down the stairs to the dining room and she sawSalvamante & his companion. They rushed towards her

and beat her up with lead pipesntil she lost consciousnessdespite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurther. During trial, she identified Maqueda as Salvamante'scompanion.

Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back

and at the back of her right hand. She fell to the concretefloor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garageand hid under the car. After a few seconds, she wennear the door of the garage and because she could notopen it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door andthey rushed to their room and closed the door. Whenthey saw that the doorknob was being turned, theybraced themselves against the door to prevent anyonefrom entering. While locked in their room, they heard themoans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker"That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When thenoise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of wateflowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.

At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, Mike Tabayan & MarkPacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin roadat Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometeaway from the house of the Barkers. They saw two menapproaching them from a curve. When the two menreached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller ofthe two had an amputated left hand and a right handwith a missing thumb and index finger. This man wascarrying a black bag on his right shoulder

The taller man asked Mike and Mark in Tagalog whetherthe road they were following would lead to Naguilian, LaUnion. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, apassenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and

driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. Thetwo men boarded it, Mike again noticed that the talleman had the defects above mentioned because the latteused his right hand with only three fingers to hold on tothe bar of the jeepney as he boarded it. In theInvestigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identifiedthrough a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and atthe hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.

9:00 a.m., Norie and Julieta gathered enough courage toleave the room where they had earlier barricadedthemselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key tothe gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw theBarkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julietarushed out of the house and ran to the place of JanetAlbon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call thepolice, they returned to the Barker's house but did not

enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They juststayed near the road.

Soon after, security guards of the Baguio CollegeFoundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio CityPolice Station, headed by Police Officer PolicarpioCambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the CityHealth Department, also arrived. They conducted aninitial investigation only because it found out that thescene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the TubaPolice Station, which was difficult to get in touch with atthat time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barkerinside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketchshowing its location. They went around the house andfound a lead pipe at the toilet, a black T-shirt, and agreen hand towel. He also discovered another lead pipe


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the back of the door of the house. He then interviewedthe two househelps who provided him with descriptionsof the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCFSecurity Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard.Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation.

Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master'sbedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered onthe floor & an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprintsat the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, &observed that the grass below it was parted as ifsomeone had passed through and created a trail amidst

the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba. Upon hisrequest, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, wassent to the house to secure the premises. Enriquez thenleft after Dalit's arrival.

5:00 p.m., members of the Tuba Police Station arrived atthe Barker house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez,who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to theBarker house.

The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towelrecovered from the Barker house by the Baguio CityPolice were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Serviceat Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, and then to the ct.

The body of William Horace Barker was taken to theBaguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City,where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje,Municipal Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. He found

twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused bya blunt instrument, determined the cause of death ashemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate.

Teresita was brought to the Baguio General Hospital andMedical Center where she was treated and confined foreight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L.Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr.Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerationsprimarily on the left side of the occipital area, bleeding inthe left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the musclesadjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regainedconsciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opinedthat her injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, likea lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had beenleft unattended, she would have died by noontime due to

bleeding or hemorrhagic shock. 1 Sept 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station

came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed herpictures of several persons, and asked her to identify thepersons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a personwho turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed ofthe investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of theteam that it was improper for them to conduct it withoutfirst consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fullyrecovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had notyet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and shehad double vision.

3 Sept 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated.Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital andupon getting home, tried to determine the items lost

during the robbery. She requested Enriquez to get backthe pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP. The TubaPNP gave them to Enriquez. Mrs. Barker discovered thather Canon camera, radio cassette recorder, and somepieces of jewelry were missing. The aggregate value ofthe missing items was P204,250.00. She then executedan affidavit on these missing items.

Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke'sHospital in QC. It was revealed that she sustained adamaged artery on her left eye which could causeblindness. She then sought treatment at the St. Luke'sRoosevelt Hospital in New York where she underwent anunsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatmentat the New York Medical Center.

29 Nov 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, EVP of BCF, Enriquez to

go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the policein determining the whereabouts of accused SalvamanteIn Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain informationfrom the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he sawSalvamante together with a certain "Putol" in Sep1991;but, they already left.

On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, & three others wen

back to Guinyangan to find out whether Salvamante and"Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Requeron

that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron tonotify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putolreturned.

4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez toinform him that Putol / Maqueda, had been arrested inGuinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chieof the Tuba Police Station, together with anothepoliceman, went to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan PoliceStation turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who thenbrought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.

Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda

had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNPMobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, QuezonIts commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directedSP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. Hedid so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of hisrights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signeda Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated hisparticipation in the crime at the Barker house.

9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maquedafiled a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he iswilling and volunteering to be a State witness in the caseit appearing that he is the least guilty among the accusedin this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk withMaqueda regarding such statement and asked him if hewas in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 inentering the house of the Barkers. After he received anaffirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda thathe would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maquedawas the only accused on trial.

When Salvosa visited Maqueda, he narrated to Salvosa

that Rene brought him to Baguio, in order to find a job asa peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to theBarker house and it was only when they were at thevicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that hisreal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob theBarkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later onagreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barkehouse, one of the househelps was already thereSalvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed;then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, toattack her with the lead pipe provided by SalvamanteAfter he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante inbeating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wifedownstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on thefloor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes latercame down bringing with him a radio cassette and some

pieces of jewelry. They then changed clothes, went out othe house, walked toward the road where they Saw twopersons from whom they asked directions, and when apassenger jeepney stopped and they were informed bythe two persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he andSalvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere alongAlbano Street in Baguio City and walked until theyreached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where theyboarded a bus for Manila.

Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial andalibi: denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that he was at the polvoron factory owned by

Minda Castrense located in Muntinlupa. He was employed


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as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he workedcontinuously there up to August 27, 1991. It was hissister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job ascaretaker. As caretaker, it was his duty to supervise theEes in the factory & whenever his Er was not around, hewas in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees allsleep inside the factory.

Aug 26, 1991, he reported for work although he couldnot recall what he did that day. He slept inside thefactory that night & on Aug 27, 1991, he was teachingthe new employees how to make the seasoning for the

polvoron. December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas,Guinyangan, Quezon as it was his vacation time. He wasto be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992.

Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, he sawRene, his childhood playmate, having gone to the sameelementary school. He had no chance to talk to him thatday when he saw him and so they just waved to eachother. He again saw Rene after Christmas on the roadbeside their Renes house. He invited him to go toCalauag, Quezon and roam around. He agreed to go ashe also wanted to visit his brother, Jose who residedthere. When the two accused were at Calauag,Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him in sellinga cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City.Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio

through Renes mother. They were able to sell thecassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had theirmeal and went to visit Maqueda's brother. After that, henever saw Rene again.

After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work at thepolvoron factory until Feb 29, 1992. Roselyn Merca, a co-worker and townmate, asked him to accompany herhome. He agreed. He was arrested at the house ofRoselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was thenbrought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to theTuba Police Station. There he was told to cooperate withthe police so he would not stay long in the Province ofBenguet. He was also told that if he would point toaccused, he would be freed and he could also become astate witness. He told them that he could attest to thefact that he accompanied accused Rene in selling the

cassette recorder. March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial

Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has remained underdetention up to the present.

The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector by

presenting Fredesminda Castrence, the owner of thepolvoron factory where he worked, who testified that shestarted her business only on 30 Aug 1991 and thus it wasimpossible for her to have hired him on 5 July 1991.SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of hisconstitutional rights before he was investigated and thathe voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay.

Judgment and Ratio of TC: Although the trial court had doubts on the identification

of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita MendozaBarker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thusdisregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed aconviction "based on the confession and the proof ofcorpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence.

o In order to establish the guilt of the accused through

circumstantia1 evidence, the following requisitesmust be present: 1) there must be more than Onecircumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proved; and 3) the combination of allthe circumstances is such as to produce a convictionbeyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit). Theremust be an unbroken chain of circumstances which

leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointingto the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, asthe author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen).

The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tendto show the guilt of the accused are:

1. No objection that despite being handicapped, accusedcould well & easily grip a lead pipe & strike a cement post wsuch force to a resounding vibration. Not farfetched toconclude that accused could have easily beat Mr. Barker todeath.2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right

after the incident in the company of Rene was testified to byMike Tabayan, the only prosecution witness who noticed thedefective hands of the accused. They asked for directionfrom the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they werestrangers to the place3. Accused knows or is familiar with Rene Salvamante as theyfrom the same town. By his own testimony, Maqueda hasestablished that they are close friends to the point that theywent out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 andeven accompanied Salvamante in selling the black radiocassette recorder.4. His Motion to Grant Bail contains this statement that he iswilling and volunteering to be State witness, the accused inappearing that he is the least guilty. which supports hisextrajudicial confession trade to the police although he claimsthat he just did as he was told to be released from detention

this is a flimsy excuse. Had he not understood what themotion meant, he could have easily asked his sister andbrother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures upalready affixed on the motion.5. His admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at theBarker house that morning and to Salvosa as to what heactually did.6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line ocases, alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication(Ppl vs. Martinado). For alibi to be given credence, it must noonly appear that the accused interposing the same was atsome other place but also that it was physically impossible fohim to be at the scene of the crime at the time of itscommission (Pplvs. Pugal,). The defense is easily rebuttedas Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crimescene.

The combination of all these circs plus extrajudicial confessionproduce the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt thaindeed Maqueda is guilty of the crime.

The extrajudicial confession referred to is theSinumpaang Salaysayof Maqueda taken by SP02 Mollenoimmediately after Maqueda was arrested.

Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction.

ISSUE/HELD: WON Maqueda has been correctly convictedby the TC through the confession and corpus delicti.

RATIO: [TOPIC] The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility o

the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelpsidentifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced

because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. TeresitaMendoza Barker and the two housemaids were not ableto positively identify Magueda, The trial court based hisconviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof ocorpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. Heshould have focused his attention and arguments onthese.

From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction

between an extrajudicial confession, the SinumpaangSalaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbaadmissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa.

A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince

us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only anextrajudicial admission.


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o There is a distinction between. the former and thelatter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule130 of the Rules of Court:Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act,declaration or omission of party as to a relevantfact may be given in evidence against him. xxxxxx xxxSec. 33. Confession. The declaration of anaccused acknowledging his guilt of the offensecharged, or of any offense necessarily includedtherein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt.o

[Wharton] an acknowledgment in express terms, bya party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crimecharged

The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases tostatements of fact by the accused which do not directlyinvolve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminalintent to commit the offense with which he is charged.o [Wharton] statement by accused, direct or implied,

of facts pertinent to issue & tending, in connection wproof of other facts, to prove his guilt. An admission is something less than a

confession, and is but an acknowledgment ofsome fact or circumstance which in itself isinsufficient to authorize a conviction and whichtends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.

And under Sec3 of Rule133, extrajudicial confession

made by the accused is not sufficient for convictionunless corroborated by evidence ofcorpus delicti.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the confession can be admissible inevidence. NO.

TC: admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused by

saying at the time of the confession, the accused wasalready facing charges in court. He no longer had theright to remain silent and to counsel but he had the rightto refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudicewhatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,despite his knowing fully well that a case had alreadybeen filed in court, he still confessed when he did nothave to do so.

o Admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysayshould notbe tested under the aforequoted Section 12(1),Article III of the Constitution, but on thevoluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness ispresumed, Maqueda had the burden of provingotherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, theSinumpaang Salaysaywas admissible against him.

o In any case, it is settled that when testimony ispresented to establish not the truth but the tenor ofthe statement or the fact that such statement wasmade, it is not hearsay (Peo

(00) Admissions and Confessions

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