Liberty and Constitutionalism: Five Founding Freedoms Summer Teachers’ Academy on the History & Principles of the American Founding Day Three Wednesday, July 14, 2010 Liberty, Property, and the Pursuit of Happiness Visiting Scholar: Michael Zuckert , Department of Government, University of Notre Dame Readings: DOCUMENT PAGE William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation (1623) 2 James Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)-- Excerpt 4 John Locke, Second Treatise , Sections 25-51 (1689) 10 John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters , no. 68, 3 March 1721 24 Bernard Mandeville, The Grumbling Hive; Or, Knaves Turn’d Honest (1705) 26 William Blackstone, Commentaries 1:134-35, 140-141 (1765) 42 James Madison, “Property,” 29 March 1792 45 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813 49 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 28 October 1813 51 1
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Liberty and Constitutionalism: Five Founding FreedomsSummer Teachers’ Academy
on the History & Principles of the American Founding
Day ThreeWednesday, July 14, 2010
Liberty, Property, and the Pursuit of Happiness
Visiting Scholar:Michael Zuckert, Department of Government, University of Notre Dame
Readings:
DOCUMENT PAGE
William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation (1623) 2
James Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)--Excerpt 4
John Locke, Second Treatise , Sections 25-51 (1689) 10
John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters , no. 68, 3 March 1721 24
Bernard Mandeville, The Grumbling Hive; Or, Knaves Turn’d Honest (1705) 26
William Blackstone, Commentaries 1:134-35, 140-141 (1765) 42
James Madison, “Property,” 29 March 1792 45
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813 49
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 28 October 1813 51
Reading for Afternoon Session on Constitutional Law
Mark D. Rosen, "An Important Question of Constitutional Structure" 58
1
William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation (1623)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 1http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s1.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Bradford, William. Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620--1647. Edited by Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Modern Library, 1967.(Excerpt, pp. 120-121)
Document:
William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation (1623)
All this while no supply was heard of, neither knew they when they might expect any. So
they began to think how they might raise as much corn as they could, and obtain a better
crop than they had done, that they might not still thus languish in misery. At length, after
much debate of things, the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) gave
way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to
themselves; in all other things to go on in the general way as before. And so assigned to
every family a parcel of land, according to the proportion of their number, for that end, only
for present use (but made no division for inheritance) and ranged all boys and youth under
some family. This had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much
more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any
other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The
women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn;
which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have
The experience that was had in this common course and condition, tried sundry years and
that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato's and
other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and
bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if
they were wiser than God. For this community (so far as it was) was found to breed much
confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit
and comfort. For the young men, that were most able and fit for labour and service, did
repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men's wives and
children without any recompense. The strong, or man of parts, had no more in division of
victuals and clothes than he that was weak and not able to do a quarter the other could; this
was thought injustice. The aged and graver men to be ranked and equalized in labours and
victuals, clothes, etc., with the meaner and younger sort, thought it some indignity and
disrespect unto them. And for men's wives to be commanded to do service for other men, as
dressing their meat, washing their clothes, etc., they deemed it a kind of slavery, neither
could many husbands well brook it. Upon the point all being to have alike, and all to do
alike, they thought themselves in the like condition, and one as good as another; and so, if it
did not cut off those relations that God hath set amongst men, yet it did at least much
diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them. And
would have been worse if they had been men of another condition. Let none object this is
men's corruption, and nothing to the course itself. I answer, seeing all men have this
corruption in them, God in His wisdom saw another course fitter for them.
3
James Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)--Excerpt
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 15, Document 2http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch15s2.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Excerpt from James Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656, pp. 70-75
Document:
James Harrington, Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)Excerpt, pp. 70--75
By what has been shown in reason and experience it may appear that, though
commonwealths in general be governments of the senate proposing, the people resolving,
and the magistracy executing, yet some are not so good at these orders as others, through
some impediment or defect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which
they are of divers kinds.
The first division of them is into such as are single, as Israel, Athens, Lacedaemon, etc., and
such as are by leagues, as those of the Achaeans, Aetolians, Lyceans, Swiss, and Hollanders.
The second (being Machiavelli's) is into such as are for preservation, as Lacedaemon and
Venice, and such as are for increase, as Athens and Rome, in which I can see no more than
that the former take in no more citizens than are necessary for defense, and the latter so
many as are capable of increase.
The third division (unseen hitherto) is into equal and unequal, and this is the main point
especially as to domestic peace and tranquility. For to make a commonwealth unequal is to
divide it into parties, which sets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavoring to 4
preserve their eminence and inequality, and the other to attain to equality. Whence the
people of Rome derived their perpetual strife with the nobility or Senate. But in an equal
commonwealth there can be no more strife than there can be overbalance in equal weights.
Wherefore the commonwealth of Venice, being that which of all others is the most equal in
the constitution, is that wherein there never happened any strife between the Senate and the
people.
An equal commonwealth is such a one as is equal, both in the balance and foundation and in
the superstructures; that is to say, in her Agrarian Law and in her rotation.
An equal Agrarian is a perpetual law establishing and preserving the balance of dominion
by such a distribution that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few or
aristocracy can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in lands.
As the Agrarian answers to the foundation, so does rotation to the superstructures.
Equal rotation is equal vicissitude in government, or succession unto magistracy conferred
for such convenient terms, enjoying equal vacations, as take in the whole body by parts
succeeding others through the free election or suffrage of the people.
The contrary whereunto is prolongation of magistracy which, trashing the wheel of rotation,
destroys the life or natural motion of a commonwealth.
The election or suffrage of the people is freest where it is made or given in such a manner
that it can neither oblige (qui beneficium accepit libertatem vendidit) ["Who accepts a gift
sells liberty"] nor disoblige another or, through fear of an enemy or bashfulness toward a
friend, impair a man's liberty.
Wherefore says Cicero, "Grata populo est tabella quae frontes aperit hominum, mentes
tegit, datque eam libertatem ut quod velint faciant," ["For if the people cherishes its
privilege of voting by ballot, which allows a man to wear a smooth brow while it cloaks the
5
secrets of his heart, and which leaves him free to act as he chooses, while he gives any
promise he may be asked to give, why do you insist that the courts should determine what a
vote cannot?"] the tablet (or ballot of the people of Rome, who gave their votes by throwing
tablets or little pieces of wood secretly into urns marked for the negative or affirmative) was
a welcome constitution to the people, as that which, not impairing the assurance of their
brows, increased the freedom of their judgment. I have not stood upon a more particular
description of this ballot because that of Venice, exemplified in the Model, is of all others
the most perfect.
An equal commonwealth (by that which has been said) is a government established upon an
equal Agrarian, arising into the superstructures or three orders: the senate debating and
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing by an equal rotation through
the suffrage of the people given by the ballot. For though rotation may be without the ballot,
and the ballot without rotation, yet the ballot not only as to the ensuing Model includes both,
but is by far the most equal way; for which cause under the name of the ballot I shall
hereafter understand both that and rotation too.
Now having reasoned the principles of an equal commonwealth, I should come to give an
instance of such a one in experience if I could find it. But if this work be of any value, it lies
in that it is the first example of a commonwealth that is perfectly equal. For Venice, though
she come the nearest, yet is a commonwealth for preservation, and such a one, considering
the paucity of citizens taken in and the number not taken in, is externally unequal. And
though every commonwealth that holds provinces must in that regard be such, yet not to that
degree. Nevertheless, Venice internally and for her capacity is by far the most equal, though
she has not in my judgment arrived at the full perfection of equality, both because her laws
supplying the defect of an Agrarian are not so clear nor effectual at the foundation, nor her
superstructures by the virtue of her ballot or rotation exactly librated, in regard that, through
the paucity of her citizens, her greater magistracies are continually wheeled through a few
hands. As is confessed by Gianotti where he says that if a gentleman come once to be Savio
di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he fails from thenceforth to be adorned with some one
of the greater magistracies, as Savi di mare, Savi di terra ferma, Savi Grandi, Counselors,
6
those of the decemvirate or dictatorian council, the Aurogatori or censors which require no
vacation or interval. Wherefore, if this in Venice or that in Lacedaemon, where the kings
were hereditary and the senators (though elected by the people) for life, cause no inequality
(which is hard to be conceived) in a commonwealth for preservation or such a one as
consists of a few citizens, yet is it manifest that it would cause a very great one in a
commonwealth for increase or consisting of the many, which by the engrossing [of] the
magistracies in a few hands would be obstructed in their rotation.
But there be [those] that say (and think it a strong objection), let a commonwealth be as
equal as you can imagine, two or three men when all is done will govern it; and there is that
in it which, notwithstanding the pretended sufficiency of a popular state, amounts to a plain
confession of the imbecility of that policy and of the prerogative of monarchy, for as much
as popular governments in difficult cases have had recourse to dictatorian power as in Rome.
To which I answer, that as truth is a spark whereunto objections are like bellows, so in this
our commonwealth shines. For the eminence acquired by suffrage of the people in a
commonwealth, especially if it be popular and equal, can be ascended by no other steps than
the universal acknowledgment of virtue; and where men excel in virtue, the commonwealth
is stupid and unjust if accordingly they do not excel in authority. Wherefore this is both the
advantage of virtue, which has her due encouragement, and the commonwealth, which has
her due services. These are the philosophers which Plato would have to be princes, the
princes which Solomon would have to be mounted, and their steeds are those of authority,
not empire. Or, if they be buckled to the chariot of empire, as that of the dictatorian power,
like the chariot of the sun it is glorious for terms and vacations or intervals. And as a
commonwealth is a government of laws and not of men, so is this the principality of the
virtue and not of the man. If that fail or set in one, it rises in another, which is created his
immediate successor.
. . . Uno avulso non deficit alter, Aureus, et simili frondescit virga metallo.
7
["And when [a bough] is torn away, another gold one grows in its place with leaves of the
same metal."]
And this takes away that vanity from under the sun which is an error proceeding more or
less from all other rulers under heaven but an equal commonwealth.
These things considered, it will be convenient in this place to speak a word to such as go
about to insinuate to the nobility or gentry a fear of the people, or into the people a fear of
the nobility or gentry, as if their interests were each destructive to [the] other, when in truth
an army may as well consist of soldiers without officers or of officers without soldiers, as a
commonwealth, especially such a one as is capable of greatness, of a people without a
gentry or of a gentry without a people. Wherefore this (though not always so intended, as
may appear by Machiavelli who else would be guilty) is a pernicious error. There is
something first in the making of a commonwealth, then in the governing of her, and last of
all in the leading of her armies, which, though there be great divines, great lawyers, great
men in all professions, seems to be peculiar to the genius of a gentleman. For so it is in the
universal series of [history], that if any man have founded a commonwealth, he was first a
gentleman. Moses had his education by the daughter of Pharaoh; Theseus and Solon, of
noble birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be kings; Lycurgus was of the blood-
royal; Romulus and Numa princes; Brutus and Publicola patricians; the Gracchi that lost
their lives for the people of Rome and the restitution of that commonwealth were the sons of
a father adorned with two Triumphs, and of Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio, who being
sought in marriage by King Ptolemy, disdained to be the queen of Egypt. And the most
renowned Olphaus Megaletor [Oliver Cromwell], sole Legislator (as you will see) of the
Commonwealth of Oceana, was derived from a noble family. Nor will it be any occasion of
scruple in this case that Hobbes affirms the politics to be no ancienter than his book De cive.
Such also as have gotten any fame in the civil government of a commonwealth, or by the
leading of her armies, have been gentlemen. For so in all other respects were those plebeian
magistrates elected by the people of Rome, being of known descents and of equal virtues,
save only that they were excluded from the name by the usurpation of the patricians.
Holland, through this defect at home, has borrowed princes for her generals and gentlemen
8
for her commanders, of divers nations. And Switzerland, if she have defect in this kind,
rather lends her people to the colors of other princes than makes that noble use of them
herself which should assert the liberty of mankind. For where there is not a nobility to bolt
out the people, they are slothful, regardless of the world and the public interest of liberty, as
even that of Rome had been without her gentry. Wherefore let the people embrace the gentry
in peace as the light of their eyes and in war as the trophy of their arms. And if Cornelia
disdained to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman consul looked down from his tribunal upon the
greatest king, let the nobility love and cherish the people that afford them a throne so much
higher in a commonwealth, and in the acknowledgment of their virtue, than the crowns of
monarchs.
9
John Locke, Second Treatise , Sections 25-51 (1689)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 3http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s3.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:John Locke, Second Treatise (1689), Sections 25-51.
Document:
John Locke, Second Treatise, Sections 25—51 (1689)
25. Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, that Men, being once born, have a
right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as
Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation, which gives us an account of those
Grants God made of the World to Adam, and to Noah, and his Sons, 'tis very clear, that God,
as King David says, Psal. CXV. xvi. has given the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to
Mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how
any one should ever come to have a Property in any thing: I will not content my self to
answer, That if it be difficult to make out Property, upon a supposition, that God gave the
World to Adam and his Posterity in common; it is impossible that any Man, but one
universal Monarch, should have any Property, upon a supposition, that God gave the World
to Adam, and his Heirs in Succession, exclusive of all the rest of his Posterity. But I shall
endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a property in several parts of that which
God gave to Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact of all the
Commoners.
26. God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason to make
use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience. The Earth, and all that is therein, is
Ropes, and all the Materials made use of in the Ship, that brought any of the Commodities
made use of by any of the Workmen, to any part of the Work, all which, 'twould be almost
impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
19
44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, yet
Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the actions or
Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property; and that which made up
the great part of what he applied to the Support or Comfort of his being, when Invention and
Arts had improved the conveniencies of Life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in
common to others.
45. Thus Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property, where-ever any one was
pleased to imploy it, upon what was common, which remained, a long while, the far greater
part, and is yet more than Mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented
themselves with what un-assisted Nature Offered to their Necessities: and though
afterwards, in some parts of the World, (where the Increase of People and Stock, with the
Use of Money) had made Land scarce, and so of some Value, the several Communities
settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories, and by Laws within themselves, regulated the
Properties of the private Men of their Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled
the Property which Labour and Industry began; and the Leagues that have been made
between several States and Kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all Claim and
Right to the Land in the others Possession, have, by common Consent, given up their
Pretences to their natural common Right, which originally they had to those Countries, and
so have, by positive agreement, settled a Property amongst themselves, in distinct Parts and
parcels of the Earth: yet there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the
Inhabitants thereof not having joyned with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of
their common Money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do, or can
make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of
Mankind, that have consented to the use of Money.
46. The greatest part of things really useful to the Life of Man, and such as the necessity of
subsisting made the first Commoners of the World look after, as it doth the Americans now,
are generally things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay
and perish of themselves: Gold, Silver, and Diamonds, are things, that Fancy or Agreement
20
hath put the Value on, more then real Use, and the necessary Support of Life. Now of those
good things which Nature hath provided in common, every one had a Right (as hath been
said) to as much as he could use, and had a Property in all that he could affect with his
Labour: all that his Industry could extend to, to alter from the State Nature had put it in, was
his. He that gathered a Hundred Bushels of Acorns or Apples, had thereby a Property in
them; they were his Goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them
before they spoiled; else he took more than his share, and robb'd others. And indeed it was a
foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave
away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his Possession, these he also
made use of. And if he also bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a Week, for
Nuts that would last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the
common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others, so long as
nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give us Nuts for a piece of Metal,
pleased with its colour; or exchanged his Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or
a Diamond, and keep those by him all his Life, he invaded not the Right of others, he might
heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his
just Property not lying in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing
uselesly in it.
47. And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without
spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but
perishable Supports of Life.
48. And as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different
Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportunity to continue to enlarge
them. For supposing an Island, separated from all possible Commerce with the rest of the
World, wherein there were but a hundred Families, but there were Sheep, Horses and Cows,
with other useful Animals, wholsome Fruits, and Land enough for Corn for a hundred
thousand times as many, but nothing in the Island, either because of its Commonness, or
Perishableness, fit to supply the place of Money: What reason could any one have there to
enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his Family, and a plentiful supply to its
21
Consumption, either in what their own Industry produced, or they could barter for like
perishable, useful Commodities, with others? Where there is not something both lasting and
scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to enlarge their
Possessions of Land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask, What
would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent Land, ready
cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land Parts of America,
where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to him
by the Sale of the Product? It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give
up again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would supply the
Conveniencies of Life to be had there for him and his Family.
49. Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that is now; for no
such thing as Money was any where known. Find out something that hath the Use and Value
of Money amongst his Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to
enlarge his Possessions.
50. But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man in proportion to Food,
Rayment, and Carriage, has its value only from the consent of Men, whereof Labour yet
makes, in great part, the measure, it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and
unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a
way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by
receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without
injury to any one, these metalls not spoileing or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This
partage of things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of
the bounds of Societie, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver and
tacitly agreeing in the use of Money. For in Governments the Laws regulate the right of
property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.
51. And thus, I think, it is very easie to conceive without any difficulty, how Labour could at
first begin a title of Property in the common things of Nature, and how the spending it upon
our uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about Title, nor any
22
doubt about the largeness of Possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as
a Man had a Right to all he could imploy his Labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour
for more than he could make use of. This left no room for Controversie about the Title, nor
for Incroachment on the Right of others; what Portion a Man carved to himself, was easily
seen; and it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much, or take more than he
needed.
23
John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters , no. 68, 3 March 1721
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 4http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s4.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Trenchard, John, and Gordon, Thomas. Cato's Letters. In The English Libertarian Heritage, edited by David L. Jacobson. American Heritage Series. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.Document pp. 177-78.
Document:
John Trenchard, Cato's Letters, no. 68, 3 March 1721
To live securely, happily, and independently, is the End and Effect of Liberty; and it is the
Ambition of all Men to live agreeably to their own Humours and Discretion. Nor did ever
any Man that could live satisfactorily without a Master, desire to live under one; and real or
fancied Necessity alone makes Men the Servants, Followers, and Creatures of one another.
And therefore all Men are animated by the Passion of acquiring and defending Property,
because Property is the best Support of that Independency, so passionately desired by all
Men. Even Men the most dependent have it constantly in their Heads and their Wishes, to
become independent one Time or other; and the Property which they are acquiring, or mean
to acquire by that Dependency, is intended to bring them out of it, and to procure them an
agreeable Independency. And as Happiness is the Effect of Independency, and
Independency the Effect of Property; so certain Property is the Effect of Liberty alone, and
can only be secured by the Laws of Liberty; Laws which are made by Consent, and cannot
All these Blessings, therefore, are only the Gifts and Consequences of Liberty, and only to
be found in free Countries, where Power is fixed on one Side, and Property secured on the
other; where the one cannot break Bounds without Check, Penalties or Forfeiture, nor the
other suffer Diminution without Redress; where the People have no Masters but the Laws,
and such as the Laws appoint; where both Laws and Magistracy are formed by the People or
their Deputies; and no Demands are made upon them, but what are made by the Law, and
they know to a Penny what to pay before it is asked; where they that exact from them more
than the Law allows, are punishable by the Law; and where the Legislators are equally
bound by their own Acts, equally involved in the Consequences.
25
Bernard Mandeville, The Grumbling Hive; Or, Knaves Turn’d Honest (1705)
Online Source:
Jack Lynch, Rutgers UniversityHTTP://ANDROMEDA.RUTGERS.EDU/~JLYNCH/TEXTS/HIVE.HTML
Print Source:The text is transcribed from the 1705 edition of The Grumbling Hive. A few short passages that are illegible in that edition are supplied from The Fable of the Bees (London, 1714).
Document:
Bernard Mandeville, The Grumbling Hive; Or, Knaves Turn’d Honest (1705)
First marched 'some Smiths, with Locks and Grates,
Fetters, and Doors with Iron-Plates; [265]
Next Goalers, Turnkeys, and Assistants:
Before the Goddess, at some distance,
Her cheif and faithful Minister
Squire Catch, the Laws great Finisher,
Bore not th'imaginary Sword, [270]
But his own Tools, an Ax and Cord;
Then on a Cloud the Hood-wink'd fair
Justice her self was push'd by Air:
About her Chariot, and behind,
Were Sergeants, 'Bums of every kind, [275]
Tip-Staffs, and all those Officers,
That squeese a Living out of Tears.
35
Tho' Physick liv'd, whilst Folks were ill,
None would prescribe, but Bees of Skill;
Which, through the Hive dispers'd so wide, [280]
That none of 'em had need to ride,
Waved vain Disputes; and strove to free
The Patients of their Misery;
Left Drugs in cheating Countries grown,
And used the Product of their own, [285]
Knowing the Gods sent no Disease
To Nations without remedies.
Their Clergy rouz'd from Laziness,
Laid not their Charge on Journey-Bees;
But serv'd themselves, exempt from Vice, [290]
The Gods with Pray'r and Sacrifice;
All those, that were unfit, or knew,
Their Service might be spared, withdrew;
Nor was their Business for so many,
(If th'Honest stand in need of any.) [295]
Few only with the High-Priest staid,
To whom the rest Obedience paid:
Himself, employ'd in holy Cares;
Resign'd to others State Affairs:
He chased no Starv'ling from his Door, [300]
Nor pinch'd the Wages of the Poor:
But at his House the Hungry's fed,
The Hireling finds unmeasur'd Bread,
The needy Trav'ler Board and Bed.
36
Among the King's great Ministers, [305]
And all th'inferiour Officers
The Change was great; for frugally
They now lived on their Salary.
That a poor Bee should Ten times come
To ask his Due, a trifling Sum, [310]
And by some well hir'd Clerk be made,
To give a Crown, or ne'er be paid;
Would now be called a down-right Cheat,
Tho' formerly a Perquisite.
All Places; managed first by Three, [315]
Who watch'd each other's Knavery,
And often for a Fellow-feeling,
Promoted, one anothers Stealing,
Are happily supply'd by one;
By which some Thousands more are gone. [320]
No Honour now could be content,
To live, and owe for what was spent.
Liveries in Brokers Shops are hung,
They part with Coaches for a Song;
Sell Stately Horses by whole Sets; [325]
And Country Houses to pay Debts.
Vain Cost is shunn'd as much as Fraud;
They have no forces kept Abroad;
Laugh at the Esteem of Foreigners,
And empty Glory got by Wars; [330]
They fight but for their Country's Sake,
When Right or Liberty's at Stake.
37
Now mind the glorious Hive, and see,
How Honesty and Trade agree:
The Shew is gone, it thins apace; [335]
And looks with quite another Face,
For 'twas not only that they went,
By whom vast Sums were Yearly spent;
But Multitudes, that lived on them,
Were daily forc'd to do the same. [340]
In vain to other Trades they'd fly;
All were o're-stocked accordingly.
The Price of Land, and Houses falls
Mirac'lous Palaces, whose Walls,
Like those of THEBES, were raised by Play, [345]
Are to be let; whilst the once gay,
Well-seated Houshould Gods would be
More pleased t'expire in Flames, than see;
The mean Inscription on the Door
Smile at the lofty Ones they bore. [350]
The Building Trace is quite destroy'd,
Artificers are not employ'd;
No Limner for his Art is famed;
Stone-cutters, Garvers are not named.
Those, that remain'd, grown temp'rate, strive, [355]
So how to spend; but how to live;
And, when they paid the Tavern Score,
Resolv'd to enter it no more:
No Vintners Jilt in all the Hive
Could wear now Cloth of Gold and thrive; [360]
Nor TORCOL; such vast sums advance,
38
For BURGUNDY and ORTELANS;
The Courtier's gone, that with his Miss
Supp'd at his House on CHRISTMASS Peas;
Spending as much in two Hours stay, [365]
As keeps a Troop of Horse a Day.
The Haughty CHLOE; to live Great,
Had made her Husband rob the State:
But now she sells her Furniture,
Which the INDIES had been ransack'd for; [370]
Contracts the expensive Bill of Fare,
And wears her strong Suit a whole Year:
The slight and fickle Age is past;
And Cloaths, as wel as Fashions last.
Weavers that ioyn'd rich Silk with Plate, [375]
And all the Trades subordinate,
Are gone. Still Peace and Plenty reign,
And every thing is cheap, tho' plain;
Kind Nature, free from Gard'ners Force,
Allows all Fruits in her own Course; [380]
But Rarities cannot be had,
Where Pains to get 'em are not paid.
As Pride and Luxury decrease,
So by degrees they leave the Seas,
Not Merchants now; but Companies [385]
Remove whole Manufacturies.
All Arts and Crafts neglected lie;
Content the Bane of Industry,
Makes 'em admire their homely Store,
And neither seek, nor covet more. [390]
39
So few in the vast Hive remain;
The Hundredth part they can't maintain
Against th'Insults of numerous Foes;
Whom yet they valiantly oppose;
Till some well-fenced Retreat is found; [395]
And here they die, or stand their Ground,
No Hireling in their Armies known;
But bravely fighting for their own;
Their Courage and Integrity
At last were crown'd with Victory. [400]
They triumph'd not without their Cost,
For many Thousand Bees were lost.
Hard'ned with Toils, and Exercise
They counted Ease it self a Vice;
Which so improv'd their Temperance, [405]
That to avoid Extravagance,
They flew into a hollow tree,
Blest with content and Honesty.
THE M O R A L.
THEN LEAVE COMPLAINTS: FOOLS ONLY STRIVE
TO MAKE A GREAT AN HONEST HIVE. [410]
T'ENJOY THE WORLD'S CONVENIENCIES,
BE FAMED IN WAR, YET LIVE IN EASE
WITHOUT GREAT VICES, IS A VAIN
EUTOPIA SEATED IN THE BRAIN.
FRAUD, LUXURY, AND PRIDE MUST LIVE; [415]
WHILST WE THE BENEFITS RECEIVE.
HUNGER'S A DREADFUL PLAGUE NO DOUBT,
40
YET WHO DIGESTS OR THRIVES WITHOUT?
DO WE NOT OWE THE GROWTH OF WINE
TO THE DRY, CROOKED, SHABBY VINE? [420]
WHICH, WHIST ITS SHUTES NEGLECTED STOOD,
CHOAK'D OTHER PLANTS, AND RAN TO WOOD;
BUT BLEST US WITH HIS NOBLE FRUIT;
AS SOON AS IT WAS TIED, AND CUT:
SO VICE IS BENEFICIAL FOUND, [425]
WHEN IT'S BY JUSTICE LOPT AND BOUND;
NAY, WHERE THE PEOPLE WOULD BE GREAT,
AS NECESSARY TO THE STATE,
AT HUNGER IS TO MAKE 'EM EAT.
BARE VERTUE CAN'T MAKE NATIONS LIVE [430]
IN SPLENDOUR; THEY, THAT WOULD REVIVE
A GOLDEN AGE, MUST BE AS FREE,
FOR ACORNS, AS FOR HONESTY.
41
William Blackstone, Commentaries 1:134-35, 140-141 (1765)
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 5http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s5.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765--1769. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.(Document: Commentaries 1:134--35, 140—41)
Document:
William Blackstone, Commentaries 1:134--35, 140-41 (1765)
III. The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which
consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. The original of private property is probably
founded in nature, as will be more fully explained in the second book of the ensuing
commentaries: but certainly the modifications under which we at present find it, the method
of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely
derived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every
individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of England are therefore, in
point of honor and justice, extremely watchful in ascertaining and protecting this right. Upon
this principle the great charter has declared that no freeman shall be disseised, or divested, of
his freehold, or of his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the
law of the land. And by a variety of antient statutes it is enacted, that no man's lands or
goods shall be seised into the king's hands, against the great charter, and the law of the land;
and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of his franchises or freehold, unless he be
duly brought to answer, and be forejudged by course of law; and if any thing be done to the
contrary, it shall be redressed, and holden for none.
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the
least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new
road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps
be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this
without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the
individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any
private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide
whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially
interested, than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the
municipal law. In this, and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently
does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and
compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but
by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The
public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All
that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable
price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and
which nothing but the legislature can perform.
Nor is this the only instance in which the law of the land has postponed even public
necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property. For no subject of England
can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the support
of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his representatives in
parliament.
. . . . .
In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of
Englishmen: liberties more generally talked of, than thoroughly understood; and yet highly
43
necessary to be perfectly known and considered by every man of rank or property, lest his
ignorance of the points whereon it is founded should hurry him into faction and
licentiousness on the one hand, or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on
the other. And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of
personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. So long as these remain
inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny and
oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having no other object upon
which it can possibly be employed. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary that the
constitution of parliaments be supported in it's full vigor; and limits certainly known, be set
to the royal prerogative. And, lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or
attacked, the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration
and free course of justice in the courts of law; next to the right of petitioning the king and
parliament for redress of grievances; and lastly to the right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defense. And all these rights and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy
entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints.
Restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear upon farther enquiry, that no
man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice
to do every thing that a good man would desire to do; and are restrained from nothing, but
what would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow citizens. So that this review of
our situation may fully justify the observation of a learned French author, who indeed
generally both thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom; and who hath not
scrupled to profess, even in the very bosom of his native country, that the English is the only
nation in the world, where political or civil liberty is the direct end of it's constitution.
Recommending therefore to the student in our laws a farther and more accurate search into
this extensive and important title, I shall close my remarks upon it with the expiring wish of
the famous father Paul to his country, "Esto perpetua!"
44
James Madison, “Property,” 29 March 1792
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 23http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s23.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
The Papers of James Madison. Edited by William T. Hutchinson et al. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1962--77 (vols. 1--10); Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977--(vols. 11--).(Document Vol. 14, pp. 266-68)
Document:
James Madison, “Property,” 29 March 1792
This term in its particular application means "that dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value
and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the profession and
practice dictated by them.
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on
which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a
property in his rights.
Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in
his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his possessions.
Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the same, tho' from an opposite cause.
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the
various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the
end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own.
According to this standard of merit, the praise of affording a just securing to property,
should be sparingly bestowed on a government which, however scrupulously guarding the
possessions of individuals, does not protect them in the enjoyment and communication of
their opinions, in which they have an equal, and in the estimation of some, a more valuable
property.
More sparingly should this praise be allowed to a government, where a man's religious rights
are violated by penalties, or fettered by tests, or taxed by a hierarchy. Conscience is the most
sacred of all property; other property depending in part on positive law, the exercise of that,
being a natural and unalienable right. To guard a man's house as his castle, to pay public and
enforce private debts with the most exact faith, can give no title to invade a man's
conscience which is more sacred than his castle, or to withhold from it that debt of
protection, for which the public faith is pledged, by the very nature and original conditions
of the social pact.
46
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where the property which a
man has in his personal safety and personal liberty, is violated by arbitrary seizures of one
class of citizens for the service of the rest. A magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang,
would be in his proper functions in Turkey or Indostan, under appellations proverbial of the
most compleat despotism.
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions,
exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and
free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general sense
of the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called. What must be the
spirit of legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in
a linen shroud, in order to favour his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where the
manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again forbidden the oeconomical use of
buttons of that material, in favor of the manufacturer of buttons of other materials!
A just security to property is not afforded by that government, under which unequal taxes
oppress one species of property and reward another species: where arbitrary taxes invade the
domestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the faces of the poor; where the
keenness and competitions of want are deemed an insufficient spur to labor, and taxes are
again applied, by an unfeeling policy, as another spur; in violation of that sacred property,
which Heaven, in decreeing man to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, kindly reserved
to him, in the small repose that could be spared from the supply of his necessities.
If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability of property;
which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnification
to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which individuals have in their opinions,
their religion, their persons, and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their
property, in their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily subsistence, and in
the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares, the
influence [inference?] will have been anticipated, that such a government is not a pattern for
the United States.
47
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise due to wise and just
governments, they will equally respect the rights of property, and the property in rights: they
will rival the government that most sacredly guards the former; and by repelling its example
in violating the latter, will make themselves a pattern to that and all other governments.
48
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813
Online Source:
The Founders' ConstitutionVolume 1, Chapter 16, Document 25http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s25.htmlThe University of Chicago Press
Print Source:
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh. 20 vols. Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905.Document: Volume 13, pp. 333-34.
Document:
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813
It has been pretended by some, (and in England especially,) that inventors have a natural and
exclusive right to their inventions, and not merely for their own lives, but inheritable to their
heirs. But while it is a moot question whether the origin of any kind of property is derived
from nature at all, it would be singular to admit a natural and even an hereditary right to
inventors. It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the subject, that no individual
has, of natural right, a separate property in an acre of land, for instance. By an universal law,
indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all men equally and in common, is
the property for the moment of him who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the
occupation, the property goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given
late in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation
of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property. If
nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as
long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of
it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as
he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently
designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without
lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our
physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot,
in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising
from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim
or complaint from anybody. Accordingly, it is a fact, as far as I am informed, that England
was, until we copied her, the only country on earth which ever, by a general law, gave a
legal right to the exclusive use of an idea. In some other countries it is sometimes done, in a
great case, and by a special and personal act, but, generally speaking, other nations have
thought that these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society; and
it may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are as fruitful as
England in new and useful devices.
50
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 28 October 1813
Online Source:
From Revolution to Reconstruction, an HTML ProjectUniversity of GroningenHTTP://WWW.LET.RUG.NL/USA/P/TJ3/WRITINGS/BRF/JEFL223.HTM
Print Source:
The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams. Edited by Lester J. Cappon. 2 vols. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1959.Document: Volume 2, pp. 387-92.
Document:
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 28 October 1813
DEAR SIR,
-- According to the reservation between us, of taking up one of the subjects of our
correspondence at a time, I turn to your letters of Aug. 16. and Sep. 2.
The passage you quote from Theognis, I think has an Ethical, rather than a political object.
The whole piece is a moral exhortation, {parainesis}, and this passage particularly seems to
be a reproof to man, who, while with his domestic animals he is curious to improve the race
by employing always the finest male, pays no attention to the improvement of his own race,
but intermarries with the vicious, the ugly, or the old, for considerations of wealth or
ambition. It is in conformity with the principle adopted afterwards by the Pythagoreans, and
expressed by Ocellus in another form. {Peri de tes ek ton allelon anthropon geneseos} etc. --
{oych edones eneka e} {mixis}. Which, as literally as intelligibility will admit, may be thus
translated. `Concerning the interprocreation of men, how, and of whom it shall be, in a
perfect manner, and according to the laws of modesty and sanctity, conjointly, this is what I 51
Our discussion will center on three sets of materials: (1) an exchange concerning the scope of presidential powers between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison known as the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, (2) the relationship between two Supreme Court cases, the famous decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), authored by Chief Justice Marshall, and the lesser known opinion in Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884), and (3) a recent debate concerning the constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
As we shall see, all materials implicate a very basic, important “structural” question of constitutional law: whether constitutionally allocated power is exclusively held by a single institution or instead can be concurrently held (and exercised) by two institutions. Because the Constitution spends most of its time allocating power to specific institutions, this question is of pervasive significance.
I. The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates
In 1778 the United States entered into the Treaty of Alliance with France in which the United States pledged to come to France’s aid if it 1 Prepared for Seminar on the History and Principles of the American Founding, and sponsored by the Jack Miller Center for the Teaching of America’s Founding Principles and the Montesquieu Forum. Much of the material herein is excerpted from Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1051 (2010).
58
were attacked by Great Britain. Fifteen years later, France found itself at war with Great Britain. President Washington wanted to issue a proclamation declaring that the United States was not obligated by the Treaty to enter the war on behalf of France.
The question that divided Hamilton and Madison was whether President Washington had the power to interpret the Treaty and issue such a proclamation. The sticking point was that the Constitution explicitly grants Congress – not the President – the power “To declare War.” U.S. Const. Article I, §8, cl. 11. Madison, writing under the name “Helvidius,” argued that only Congress had power to interpret the Treaty on account of its power to declare war. Writing under the pseudonym of “Pacificus,” Hamilton argued that both the President and Congress had power to interpret the Treaty.
Hamilton acknowledged that Congress had the power to interpret the Treaty pursuant to its power to declare war, but urged that the President also had the power to interpret the Treaty under the President’s executive powers:
[H]owever true it may be, that tháeñ right of the Legislature to declare waárñ includes the right of judging whether the Náationñ be under obligations to make War or not—it will not follow that the Executive is in any case excluded from a similar right of Judgment, in the execution of its own functions.
According to Hamilton, the source of the President’s power to interpret the treaty was the Vesting Clause, which provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” U.S. Const. Article II, §1, cl. 1. Hamilton believed that the “executive power” encompassed a broad swath of foreign relations powers.
Madison vehemently disagreed with Hamilton’s view, dedicating the bulk of his Helvidius Number II to disputing it. Madison’s position boils down to three arguments.
1. First, Madison says that he has identified a “material error” in 59
Hamilton’s position insofar Hamilton failed to fully apply his own principles:
[Hamilton] had before admitted that the right to declare war . . . includes the right to judge whether the United States be obliged to declare war or not. Can the inference be avoided, that the executive instead of having a similar right to judge, is as much excluded from the right to judge as from the right to declare?
Why cannot such an “inference be avoided”? This is what Madison says:
[T]he same specific function or act, cannot possibly belong to the two departments and be separately exerciseable by each . . . A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same function with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory.
2. Madison’s second argument is as follows:
[Hamilton] cannot disentangle himself by considering the right of the executive to judge as concurrent with that of the legislature. For if the executive have a concurrent right to judge, and the right to judge be included in (it is in fact the very essence of) the right to declare, he must go on and say that the executive has a concurrent right also to declare.3. Madison’s final argument is that Hamilton’s approach opens the
door to potential conflicts:
If the legislature and executive have both a right to judge of the obligations to make war or not, it must sometimes happen . . . that they will judge differently. . . . In what light does this present the constitution to the people who established it? In what light would it present to the world, a nation, thus speaking, thro’ two different organs, equally constitutional and authentic, two opposite languages, on the same subject and under the same existing circumstances?President Washington followed Hamilton’s view and issued the
Neutrality Proclamation in 1793.
II. From Marbury to Ames
A. Marbury v. Madison60
Background: President Adams had nominated William Marbury to serve as justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury’s nomination was approved by the U.S. Senate, as required under federal law, but the secretary of state refused to deliver Marbury’s commission, preventing him from assuming office as justice of the peace. Marbury filed a lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court, asking that the Court issue an order of mandamus directing Secretary of State Madison to deliver Marbury’s commission.
Why had Marbury filed his suit in the Supreme Court? He had relied on section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 – one of Congress’ first pieces of legislation – which provided that the Supreme Court “shall have power to issue . . . writs of mandamus . . . to any . . . persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Relevant Constitutional Materials
Article III of the Constitution creates the federal judiciary. It further provides that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. 2. The federal district courts and/or state courts had original jurisdiction over other matters that fell within the scope of Article III’s judicial power. Courts with “original jurisdiction” are where cases are tried. “Appellate jurisdiction” refers to courts with power to check the determinations of the courts that exercise original jurisdiction.
Question Presented and the Marbury Court’s analysis
The substantive question presented in Marbury v. Madison was whether the part of section 13 of the Judiciary Act that granted the
61
Supreme Court power to issue writs of mandamus constitutional. Everyone understood that the Constitution’s language of “public Ministers and Consuls” referred only to diplomats from other countries, not to a federal official like the Secretary of State. The constitutional question in Marbury hence boiled down to the question of whether Congress had power under the Constitution to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the three categories enumerated in the Constitution.
The Marbury Court specifically considered the question of whether Congress could “assign original jurisdiction to [the Supreme Court] in other cases than those specified in” the Constitution. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall rejected this proposition, explaining that “[a]ffirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.” In other words, from the fact that the Constitution “apportion[ed] the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts,” the Chief Justice concluded that only the institution that had been constitutionally allocated original jurisdiction could exercise original jurisdiction. Any other interpretation would render the Constitution’s language “mere surplusage.”
B. Ames v. Kansas
Background
A lawsuit brought by the state of Kansas against several corporations was in federal district court. The Judicial Act of 1789 had a provision that granted federal district courts jurisdiction in the lawsuit that Kansas had brought. At issue in Ames v. Kansas was the constitutionality of that federal statute in this circumstance. The argument on behalf of the statute’s unconstitutionality was based on Article III’s grant of original
62
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in those cases “in which a State shall be a Party.” No one disputed that Kansas was a State that was a party to the lawsuit, and hence everyone acknowledged that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this case under the Constitution. Did Congress have the power to statutorily grant original jurisdiction to another federal court (i.e., to the federal district court)?
Reasoning
The Court in Ames acknowledged that Marbury “used language . . . which might, perhaps, imply that such original jurisdiction as had been granted by the Constitution was exclusive.” On this approach, the Supreme Court alone (among federal courts) would have had original jurisdiction over cases such as this in which a state was a party.
But Ames rejected Marbury’s approach and upheld Congress’s power to grant inferior courts original jurisdiction over the same subjects that fall within the Supreme Court’s constitutionally granted original jurisdiction. Instead of Marbury’s exclusivity, Ames reasoned as follows:
[T]he grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject matter to one court does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question [in the Constitution] there is nothing but mere affirmative words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other courts of the United States on the same subject matter.Ames supported its holding by referring to an analogous practice that
had arisen in relation to federal district courts’ jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors. The same section of the Constitution that grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits involving states provides that “the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction . . . [i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors.” But since the early days of our Republic, this language has not been understood to mean that only the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in cases affecting Ambassadors. The 1789 Judiciary Act provided that the Supreme Court “‘shall have
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exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors’” but “‘original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors . . . .’” The Ames Court specifically noted that this legislation reflected Congress’s “construction” of the Constitution, and the Court provided a practical rationale for Congress’s “understand[ing] that the original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court was [not] necessarily exclusive:”
[K]eep[ing] open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in the first instance, of suits involving . . . a diplomat or commercial representative of a foreign government . . . was due to the rank and dignity of those for whom the [constitutional] provision was made; but to . . . deprive an ambassador, public minister or consul of the privilege of suing in any court he chose having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of his action, would be, in many cases, to convert what was intended as a favor into a burden.The Ames Court also noted that this “construction” of Article III was
provided by “the first Congress, in which were many who had been leading and influential members of the convention, and who were familiar with the discussions that preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the States and with the objections urged against it.”
III. The Treaty Power
The Constitution specifies only one mechanism by which the United States can create international agreements—the treaty—concerning which it states that the “[President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Many of the most important international agreements that the United States entered into during the twentieth century, however, are not treaties, but, instead, are congressional-executive agreements, which are negotiated by the President and approved by simple majorities of both houses of Congress
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pursuant to Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
A prominent example of the congressional-executive agreement is the North American Free Trade Agreement, which received sixty-one supporting votes and thirty-eight “noes” in the Senate—short of the two-thirds of senators present necessary for a treaty. The agreement bringing the United States into the World Trade Organization was also a congressional-executive agreement, not a treaty.
Laurence Tribe, one of our country’s leading constitutional scholars, has argued that the NAFTA is unconstitutional on the ground that agreements like NAFTA can only be created by treaty. Other prominent constitutional scholars disagree. The question has not been presented to the United States Supreme Court.