· The Kantian Epistemology and Theism. METAPH"SICS is the most human of all departments of knowledge. This can be seen from the fact that the first question of ...

The Kantian Epistemology

and Theism .

A DISSERTATION PRESENT ED TO TH E FACULT" OF

PRINC ETON COLL EG E "OR TH E D EG RE E

OF DOCTOR OF PH ILOSOPH",

o o o o o o o o

C . W IS T A R H OD G E , JR .

T h e T h e i sm re p rin t e d from T h e P re sb y t e ria n a n d R eform edR ev iew ofju ly , 1894.

Pmu oewam

MACCALLA 8: Conn xw ,237

—9Doc x St u n ,

— 1894_

The Kantian Epistemology

and Theism .

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED ToTHE FACULT" O"

PRINC ETON COLL EG E "OR THE DEG REE

O" DOCTO R O" PH ILOSOPH",

C . W IS T A R H O D G E , JR .

T h e T h e ism re p r in t e d from T h e P resb y ter ia n a n d R e form e d

R e v ie w ofJu l y , 1894 .

PH ILAD ELPH IA

MacCA LLA 81 Com mrw ,237

-9Doc x STREET.

—q4

The Kantian Epistemology and Theism.

METAPH"SICS is the most human of al l departments of

knowledge . This can be seen from the fact that the first

question of unreflective though t is the same as that whi ch holds thech ief place in philosophi c reflecti on . Man looks wi th in and w i th

out himsel f, upon his own thoughts and passi ons wh ich come andgo

,out upon the ph enomena of nature

,and the questi on wh ich comes

nearest tothe mi nd and heart of al l i s,What is real ? Where are

we to find the groundofphenomena ? Real i ty there surely is,or else

all phi losophy would be vain . This is the great i ntui t ion of whichth e consci ousness of every age is hei r ; but where is u l timate Real i tyto be found

,and what i s i ts nature ? Such questions

,from thei r very

nature,are the first to suggest themselves to man

,and when once

he has consciously reflected upon th em he becomes aware that notonly are they logical ly and temporal ly the first questions for human

i ty,but that from the standpoin t of worth for the human spi ri t,

Metaphysi cs i s that which man as a rational being must have .

While humani ty exists and stri ves,hopes and despai rs

,rej oices and

sorrows,itsown soul wi th i ts hope of immortal i ty and belief i n i ts

freedom and responsibi l i ty,the world abou t i t

,and the God above

must always be th e questions of the greatest worth,and these are

the questi ons of Metaphys ics .But wh ile we reflect upon Being or Reali ty

,i ts idea has been a

part of our conscious experience, and were th is not so we could nothave reflected upon i t . By the idea of the Real then alone can wesolve our problems . Now the idea or conscious experience ofReali ty is knowledge

,so that the problem of knowledge i s i nseparable

from that of Being . The first question,then

,which reflect ive

thought pu ts i tsel f as i t p roceeds to the sol ution of i ts fundamental

problem is th is,— Is knowledge possible —and of course , the next

question is,

— If possible,how ? In seeking an answer to these two

questions i t is to be remembered that knowledge has been definedas the idea

,that is

,the mi nd ’s grasp of Reality

,so that any answer

which makes knowl edge anythi ng less than th is must be rej ected .

The first question was as to whe th e r or not knowledge i s possible

Now we wi l l find that Kant’s answer to the second questi on,as to

howknowledge is possible,shows that we can’t give a demonstra

ti ve answer to this question ; but i f we assume that knowledge ispossible

,then th e answer to the question how i t is possibl e wi l l lead

to a result which wi l l j usti fy our assumption of i ts possibi l i ty .

Kant has shown that no uncri ti cal demonstration of the possibi li ty of knowledge is possibl e . He was bern i n an age when twosolutions of the problem of knowledge had been given

,and both

had reduced the organic process of experience to a mechani cal basis .The Rational Movement

,beginning wi th DesCartes and endi ng

wi th Wolff,had

,though i n a somewhat d ifferent way in each of i ts

representati ves,postulated a paral leli sm between thought and Be

i ng ; and inWolff the whole of knowi ng had been reduced to themaking expl ici t those ideas which were already implicit i n our concepts, th us overlooking the real question of how the i ndividualmind can go outside i tself and lay hold on Real i ty . Such purelyanalytic j udgments as are yielded by such a method

,says Kant

,are

subjecti vely necessary but do not i ncrease our knowledge, for thequesti on i s

,— How can we obta in objecti vi ty and synthes is ? Kant

then breaks away from the formali sm of Wolff and turns h is attention to the Empi ri cal school of Locke and Hume . His, though , i stoo great a mind to rest long i n such a phi losophy

,and he shows

plai nly i ts weaknesses .Mechani sm reigns supreme here. The mind is a blank, the

objects of knowledge are totally unrelated to and different from

mind . They come i nto contact with our organs of sense and set upnervous excitations which

,by some mysterious transformat ion, be

come conscious impressi ons,or rather impressions of which we are

conscious. But an impressi on is merely subj ecti ve . We cannotsay that i t has any obj ect ive reference

,i f our sole source of infor

mation be our senses. Here, then, i s a purely subjecti ve fact, butth ere seem to be certai n necessary connections between these impressions

,and Hume saw that this necessi ty was the point for which he

must give an account on his own premises ; but he explained i t insuch a manner as to explai n i t away al together . Such relations asidenti ty and causal i ty he reduced to subjecti ve habi ts resulti ng fromassociation

,so that

,strange as i t may seem

,i n turning to the senses

for objectivi ty,we end i n a world of i l l usion , impressions coming

and going,related to we know not what

,their connections with one

another being merely the resul t of h abi tual association . I t i s easyto see that knowledge has been rendered absolutely impossible

,that

we can no more assert the existence of matter than of mind,and

that the most thorough skepticism must be the outcome of a

mechanical and sensational Empiricism .

We cannot,then

,from the contact of the obj ects of knowledge

wi th our sense organs, nor by the analysis of our concepts, demonstrate the possibi l ity of knowledge , that i s, we cannot thus provethat our knowledge is real and obj ecti ve, so that we must approachthe problem in a different way . We must first ask the Kanti anquestion how knowledge is possible

,and the resul t wi l l j usti fy our

assumption of i ts real i ty,that i s

,i ts possibi l i ty . How, then , i s syn

thesis possible ? How are j udgments possible which are necessary

and a p riori, and at the same t ime synthetic and not merely ana

lyticTwo presupposi tions are necessary . The first h as been the

great construct ive work of Kant. It i s the acti v i ty of mi nd .

Mathematical sci ence seems certain,and yet must fal l i f Hume gi ves

the last word for philosophy . For math ematical j udgments aresynthetic and a p riori . Judgments of geometry, while a p riori ,

rest not on the analysis of concepts, but on th e construction of a

p riori i ntui ti on by the producti ve imagination . So also is the case

where time is i nvolved i nstead of space . I f,then

,mathematical sci

ence be possible,Kant says that space and time must not be th ings

or quali ties of thi ngs,but forms of th e mind

,pure a p riori i n tui

ti ons . But i f we advance further we w i l l find that space and timeare only forms for th e possibil i ty of th e cogni tion of objects

,and

that wi th these alone we cannot refer our impressions to one obj ect,

nor can we cognize one obj ect out of i ts relations i n the con text of

our organic experience. We know objects only as a part of whatwe understand as nature w ith its necessary connections. Everything

,then

,must be cognized as necessary i n i ts connecti ons wi th

the other obj ects of our conscious experience,and thus

,according

to Kant,impressions are referred a p riori to objects, and obj ects are

cogni zed i n necessary relat ions wi th each other . The categoriesaccompl ish th is. In the deduction of these we come to the greatlesson to be learned from Kant . His deduction of the categories *

i s substanti al ly this: The conjunction of the mani fold i n an i ntuition can never be given by the senses . Neither is i t contai ned in theform of pure i ntui tion . It is given by the understanding i n an act

c alled synthesis . But the conception ofa conj unction of the manifoldi ncludes that of uni ty

,for conj unction is the un i ty of the manifold

ofsense, so that this synthetic uni ty renders conj unction possible .Now this i s not the category of uni ty because all the categoriespresuppose th is origi nal act of synthesis. This i s the original activi ty of mind which has been laid down as one of the presupposi tionsnecessary to knowledge . The “ I th i nk i s the synthesis of al l impress ions i nto one sel f-consciousness . I t is that whi ch gives objec

‘ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn’

stranslation, chap . l l, sec. 2.

tivity to ourjudgments. It is that which i l l umines al l th i ngs withthe clear li gh t of self-consci ousness . To this uni ty al l representati ons and impressions are to be related

,and the med ia are the cate

gories, h ence thei r deduct ion, th at is thei r j ustificati on as necessaryelements i n knowledge

,i s the fact that they are l inks to sel f-con

sciousness. Things,then

,i f there be such

,which are not related to

th is objecti fying self-consciousness,can never be known . "or a

theory ofknowledge the first and last word must be self-consc iousness . As Le ibni tz says

,

“ th ere i s a l i gh t born wi thi n us.” Therehas been too much cri t ic ism of Kant wh i ch seeks to make h im aBerkeleyan idealist because he taught ph i losophy the great tru ththat th ings exist only in relation to self-consciousness. Suchcr iticism fai ls to recogni ze the d ifference between psychol ogi cal andtranscendental idealism . Psychologi cal i deal ism reduces everythingto a dream of the i ndiv idual mi nd

,while transcendental i deal ism

shows those un iversal rat ional pri nciples which bind the m ind toreal i ty . Moreover cri tic ism such as this does not realize th e factth at Kant’s great mistakes do not foll ow from this hi s great truth ,bu t because he failed to recogn i ze the fact that a second postulatenecessary to knowledge

,— that the real is rat ional

,— is deducible and

fol lows necessari ly from this fi rst truth . This we shall endeavor toshow

,and i t is here that cri tic ism should meet Kantism . Because

al l things exist in rel ation to sel f-consc i ousness,Kant’s i ndiv idual istic

and sensational isti c presuppositions by no means follow . Cri ticstherefore should praise hi m for his great lesson to phi losophy .

But there is a second presupposit ion without wh ich knowledge ashere defined i s impossible . I t is that the real i s rational . Th is i snot to be confused wi th the assertion that the rational i s the real ,which is very different . That the real is rational

,however

,i s essen

tial for knowledge. I f we discover sel f-consciousness with i tsacti vi ty and i ts categories

,and then say that they are ind ividual and

h uman merely,differing from that which i s universal , then that

wh ich was to gi ve us real i ty and objecti vi ty shuts usoff from i t ,and we come to suppose that the réal is beyond us ; that th e worldis dead matter which i n some way causes impressions, th at i s, th ati t is noumenon i n the negative sense of the term as that wh ich i snot the obj ect of our sensuous intuiti on , and th at noumen a i n theposi ti ve sense as objects of nonsensuous intui tion are separated fromus and out of al l rel ation

,not knowable because not mechanical ly

known . The real must be rational , and the true nature of sel f-consciousness and knowledge must be recognized . If Kant’s great

“ Leibnitz, On theSupersensuousE lement in K nowledge and On the Immaterz’

al

inNature. A letter to"ueenCharlotte ofPrussia, 1702. Vol . oftranslationsofthe Ph ilosoph ical worksofLeibnitz by G . Duncan.

l esson,that th ings exist only ih relation to self-consci ousness

,be

true,and i f self-consc i ousness be an acti vi ty and hence a real ele

ment i n Being,then this second postulate fol lows necessari ly from

the first,so that i f we follow logical ly Kant’s own princi ple and the

spi ri t of his system,we wil l reach a d ifferent conclusion than that

which he d id . The causes of his fa i l ure to take th is farther stepcan be traced to the fact that he accepted the presuppositions ofthevery school he was endeavoring to refute and against which the wholespi ri t ofhis teaching po ints . After having shown th at obj ects cannot exi st out ofrelat ion to self-consc iousness

,Kan t presupposes that

knowledge is a mech anical process,the putting together of factors

whi ch are separate,hence he must choose whi ch of his two factors

i s the real one,and he turns rou nd i n contrad iction to his own

teach ing and says that the real i s that which afi'

ectsour senses,so

that the next step i s/

to say th at self-consci ousness as known is amere phenomenon ofthe i nternal sense

,and that the synthetic uni ty

of self-consciousness is only a logical noti on . Then of course thebreach can never be healed

,al l the work of mi nd is i ndividual and

subjecti ve,th e impression ofsense , wh ich he has real ly shown cannot

exist,i s the only source from wh ich the mental forms can have con

tent,so that the real world l ies as a sphere of dead “ things i n

themselves which are u nrelated to thought, noumena i n the negat ive sense as al ready explai ned

,whi le noumena i n the posi t ive sense

are beyond even the possibil i ty of the assertion of thei r existence.Aga i nst this is the whole spiri t ofKant’s teach ing as to the activi tyofm ind

,for i f self-consciousness is a sp i r i tual acti vi ty how can i t be

unreal ? We are lead by Kant’s own teach ing on th is first po int toaccept the second presupposi ti on essential for knowledge

,that the

real is rati onal .Not only i s th e spiri t of th e whole Cri tique against the assumpt ions which hold Kant back , but also i t i s opposed to thei r badfrui ts at every stage i n the d iscussion . I f the whole idea of theCri tique is that th ings exist only i n relation tosel f-consc iousnessthen there is always an origi nal synthes is previous to al l analysis

,

so that knowledge may have a uni versal and a parti cu lar aspect,

but i n real i ty the two are one. Knowledge is an organic processand not a mechanical one, and the impressi on of sense whi ch Kant

got from Hume,so far from being the real element i n knowledge

,

does not exist at al l for consci ousness, and things are only known asparts of an organi c system . Hence i n fol lowing the spi ri t ofKant’steach ing we should do away with these false presupposi tions . Atevery step moreover are the bad results of these assumptions contrary to the spi ri t ofhis teaching. Of course we cannot fol low thisout i n detai l

,but wil l choose two points

,which are of speci al im

portance i n relati on to Theism,to showhow the letter contradicts

the spi ri t i n Kant,and how i f we admit the necess i ty for the mind’s

acti v i ty,we are lead into contradicti ons i f we deny i ts uni versal i ty

and reali ty,that is that the real isrational . The first and most im

portant point ina theory of knowledge is,as we have seen

,sel f

consciousness. Now the real i s rational here,knowi ng and being meet

at th is point . Self-consciousness i s obj ecti ve consciousness. Wehave seen how Kant’s presupposi tions lead him to overlook th is.

But i f i t i s an acti v i ty how can i t be a mere logical notion ? Let usexam ine i ts true nature

,and study a li ttle more closely this

,Kant’s

fundamental mistake .I f knowledge i s to be ontological there must be some point whereknowing and being meet. Th is poi nt i s objecti ve sel f-consc iousness .

But Kant argues that as knowledge i s a process i n which the con

tent of the categories must be given by sense i ntui tion, hence th eonly real i ty for knowledge is that whi ch impresses the i nner or

outer sense,so that Being is out of relation to our faculties, and

hence al l our knowledge i s phenomenal . But he saw that the cate

goricamust belong to some subject other than the empi rical self of

the i nner sense which they determi ne,but the metempirical sel f i s

an empty idea . Thus he argues,

* with reference to th e “ possibi l i tyof a conj unction of the mani fold representations given i n sensethat th e presupposi tion of all i s “ the origi nal synthetic uni ty ofapperception .” This i s an admission of the “

cogitoergosum" of

DesCartes, only that Ka

'

nt makes i t an empty idea because it can ’tbe presented to the i nner sense . v Thus under th e “ Paralogism of

Pure Reason ”

1' we find him saying

,

“ I f th is conception is to i ndi "

cate by the term substance,an object th at can be given

,i f i t is to

become a cogni tion,we must have at th e basis of the cogn i tion a

permanent i ntui tion as the i ndispensable condi tion of i ts obj ecti vereal i ty .

” In other words,the only substance i s that which is objec t

only,and that too to sense

,so th at as the i nner sense on ly gi ves my

phenomenal self,that is

,my flowing states of consc iousness, of

course the Ego is a mere necessi ty of conception . If he had realiz ed th at the real i s rational

,that the Ego is real because i t acts and

thi nks,he would h ave been saved his mistake . There is no contra

d iction between Idealism and Realism when the terms are properlyused . Prof. Morri s saysi that we must accept Kant

’s conclusi on asto the Ego if we accept h is presupposi tion that an obj ec t of knowledge can be given only by sense . If the mechanical rel ation

*Knnt, Cri tique of Pure Reason, Mcik lejohn'

s translation,

“ Deduction ofthe Categories.

"

fKant, Oritiqueof Pure Reason, Meiklejolm’

stranslation, p . 244.

i Morris, A Cri tiqueofKant, chap . on The Paralogism ofPu re Reason.

for Phi losophy is very plai n . I t i s th is : In the very first act ofknowledge there is a necessary and v i tal connection between knowing and being wi thi n our consciousness. They imply each o ther .Hence Reali ty is sp iri tual

,and there is no ground for the posi t ing

of l i feless “ th ings i n themselves ” wh ich can never be known,and

nomore ground i s there for regardi ng as unreal that wh ich we doknow . Though t and being are thus together from the very first

,

and Kant’s doctr ine of the synthetic uni ty of appercept ion i s wrong.But there i s another lesson qu i te as important for Phi losophy taughtus here . We learn that al l consciousness i s personal consci ousness .The two are i nseparable

,and there i s nosuch thing as conscious

ness i n the abstract. Existence i s personal conscious existence . I tis to the greatest degree concrete . There i s no such thing as pure

,

unconscious,qual i tyless being

,coming by a necessary evol ution to

be clothed upon w i th concreteness . Phi losophy must start wi thBeing as known i n our self/consc iousness

,otherw ise we cannot know

the nature of Being,and we cannot evolve i t by any ex tra conscious

way . We do not wish to be m isunderstood here . "or wh i l e thevery poi nt of our cri tic ism of Kant is that h e never transcendsi ndiv idual h uman consci ousness

,we stil l bel ieve that Dr . Cai rd i s

m istaken when he says that i f we take our stand i n i ndi v idual con

sciousnesswe can never transcend i t . On th e contrary,the tru th i s

th is,th at i f we do not start w i th our sel f-consciousness we cannever

know the nature of Reali ty . I f, however, we do thus start, we findpr inc i ples wh ich h ave a necess i ty wh ich must come from a sourceabove our i nd ividual consci ousness

,showing that i t i s i n harmony

wi th Uni versal Consc iousness .We must g ive only a very brief space i n showing the contradic

tions i nvolved i n deny ing that the real is rational in the case ofspace and time

,that is knowledge i n the sphere of perception , and

pass on toKant’s doctri ne of causali ty as being of spec ial importance i n relation to Theism

,and furn ish ing a general example of the

categories .As to space and time . The d ifficul ties at this part of Kant’s dis

cussion spri ng from the same source . The cri tical posi tion i n the“ Analy tic ” is that objects ex ist only i n relation to self-consc ious

ness and i n relation to each other . In the jEsthetic,

” however ,Kant seems tohold i t poss ible that obj ects be gi ven and the intelli

gible or i ntellectual rel ations added afterwards. Hence that whichi s a p rior i must be merely subjec t ive, and i f anyth ing i s obj ecti ve i tmust be a “ th ing ” or a quali ty of a thing given by the senses .

Now space and t ime must be a p riori i n order that we may h avesynthetic j udgmen ts a p riori i n Mathematics, and consequently they

Caird, ThePhilosophy ofKant.

cannot be “ th ings or quali ties of thi ngs, and must thereforebe merely subj ecti ve . Now i t seems almost needless to repeat thatal l th is comes from the mere assumption that the real is that whichi s g i ven by the senses

,and that when th is assumption i s done away

w i th,the separation of a p r iori and a posteriori i n knowledge van

ishes, and wi th i t the bel ief that that wh ich is a p riori must besubj ecti ve . We may hold to the a p r ior i character of space and

time, and at the same time on Kantian pri nci ples show thei r oh

jectivity by recognizing the truth that objects must be i n space andtime or they could not ex ist, much less be known , and that wi thoutsensational isti c presuppos i t ions there is noreason forpostulat ing any

other real i ty i n th is sphere . In cri ti ci si ng Kant’s doctrine ofspaceand time

,Trendelenburg * h as shown the entire compatibi l i ty of

a p rioriness and obj ectivi ty , though he destroys the original elementi n them by tryi ng to derive both from motion which

,of course

,

real ly presupposes both . I n order to i ll ustrate what has been saidand to show the con tradiction involved i n denying that real i ty israt ional i n reference to the world in space and time

,we cannot do

better than quote Dr . Ueberweg rt“ The subjecti ve el ement i n

sense perception cannot be separated from the obj ecti ve i n this way,namely that space and time can be referred to the subj ect on ly

,or

i ts material to external thi ngs affecting our senses. For on thispresuppos i tion

,al though i t would be necessary to apprehend the

matter ofsense perception i n any form of space and time,each par

ticular matter would not be referred back to each particu lar form,

and consequently migh t be percei ved i n another form from that i nwhich i t actual ly appears

,wi thout having undergone any real

change . But in percept ion we feel ou rsel ves actual ly confined tothe u n ion of definite forms w i th defini te matters .” Simi lar also i sthe posi tion of Herbartjp Here , then, i s a confirmation of the meces

sity ofrecogni zi ng the second presupposit ion as stated, and a clearv iew of the d i fficul ties i nvolved i n i ts den ial .The categories come next. They are a part of the mind’s syn"thetic acti v i ty

,the first presupposi tion necessary for knowledge

,so

ably expounded by Kant. Their funct ion i n knowledge, as he setsi t forth

,has been stated . But we h av e now to look at th e contra

dictions i nvolved i n denying that the real is rational,that Reason i s

Ontologic . Kant’s only ground for asserti ng the i ndividual andsubjective charac ter of the categories is a contrad iction . Impressions

ofsense are unreal . The forms of sensibil i ty are only potential i ti es,so that the categories are necessary to gi ve reali ty to knowledge .

* Trende1enburg, Logische Untersuchungen, 6.

e berweg, Logic, p . 80 .

t Ueberweg, History of Phi losophy, Vol . 11, p . 271.

Such is the first posi tion taken by Kant,and the next is that knowl

edge i s phenomenal j ust because the categories are necessary, whencea human element is i ntroduced producing subj ecti vi ty . On such acontradiction rests th e doctri ne of thei r subjecti ve and phenomenalcharacter . But i t should be observed that only the necessity for thec ategories is shown

,not thei r i ndi vidual and subjecti ve character .

In order to see how untenable i s the doctri ne of the subj ecti vi ty of

t he categories,i t wi l l be best to take as an example of them that of

causali ty,as thi s ismost intimately connected wi th Theism

,and i t

wi l l be necessary i n examing Kant’s Theistic d iscussion,to know his

exac t v iew of causal i ty . I n hi s discussion of causal ity Kant is eudeavoring to answer Hume . It is necessary to notice that Kant

’smethod of deal ing wi th the problem is to fi rst write as though headmi tted th e precri tical posi tion that we have through perception

experi ence of a series of events while th e understandi ng then addsthe elements ofuniversal i ty and necessi ty, then later to advance toh is own position that the work of the understanding i tself i s useessary to perception . Hume had seen that the nerve of causal i ty layin the necessi ty therei n i nvol ved . This he h ad enti rely explai ned

away by reducing i t to a mere subjective habi t of association .

Kant saw that even granting that we could have experience of oh

jects through perception alone, this could gi ve knowledge only of

matters of fact,but no necessi ty of connect ion . Granting that we

could percei ve that one event fol lows another,we could never say

that i t must always do so. I f,then

,this cannot be given by percep

t ion,and yet i s a fact

,as Hume admi tted when he sought an ex

planation for i t, we must seek i t i n the synthetic acti vi ty of thought,i n a concept of the u nderstandi ng . But from a concept we cannever advance our knowledge by an analysis of i ts implici t content .We must have a proof that thi s category can be applied to real ob

jec tive sequences. This is given i n the proof of the SecondKant is to prove that all changes take place accord

ing to the law of connection ofcause and effect.” His proof i n substance is as follows : Mere experience of succession is dependent onthe a p riori j udgment of causali ty . For in all empi rical cogni tionthere is a synthesis of the mani fold by the producti ve imagination

,

but th is synthesis may“

have the events i n any order,either pro

gressively or retrogressi vely . But in order that i t may have object i ve val id ity the events must be represented as th ey occur in t ime .Now they occur i n time i n a necessari ly determined order ; therefore i n order that reali ty may be given to the sequence

,this neces

sary order must be given by the category of causal i ty determined intime a p riori as i nvari able sequence. The proof, then , consists in

Kant, CritiqueofPure Reason, Meiklejohn’

stranslation, 141.

apply the category . Watson says that Stirl ing has not understoodKant

,who holds that no experi ence of the obj ecti ve sequence of

objects or events can be had at al l wi thou t the aid of the under .

standi ng,and that so far from trying to show when we are to deter

mine sequences as obj ecti ve,Kant i s real ly asserting that we can

have no exper ience of objective sequence at al l wi thout th e category . Prof. Watson seems to us to be right 'and the cri ticism of

Dr . Sti rling wide of the mark . But nevertheless the Kantian proofis open to cri tic i sm . The question at once suggests i tsel f as towhether this i nvari able sequence is causali ty . Wh i le i t is invariable sequence i n one sense

,i t i s not the i nvariable sequence of caus

al i ty . To i l l ustrate thi s,take an example of subj ecti ve sequence

such as that mentioned by Kant with reference to the perception ofthe parts of a house where the sequence is arbitrary i n order .

_Now

,

i n comparison wi th th is,Kant’s sequence is truly invari able ; for

example,i n one single i nstance the events happen i n a certai n order

whi ch i s i nvariable i n that one case,but not necessari ly so when the

same events happen agai n ; so that they are i nvari able only i n asense very different from that in which a true causal sequence maybe said to be i nvariable . Either Kant must mean invari ablesequence i n one i nstance only as disti nct from the play of fancy

,and

then he has not proved causal i ty ; or i f he has proven causal i ty ,th en he has done away with the possibi l i ty of the experience ofnon-causal sequences which we undoubtedly have . There must be

,

then,some mark by which to distinguish the causal sequence from

the i nvari able sequence of Kant. It i s found i n the dynami c notion

of effi ciency and force . The omissi on ofth is idea i s the fundamental defect i n the Kantian doctri ne on th is subj ect . He holds

,i n the

c'ase where the “ l eaden bal l ” produces a hole i n the “ cush ion,

”

th at i t i s the definite order i n time which bri ngs i t abou t that thehole i n the cushion would not produce the leaden bal l

,thus making

a very m inute disti nction of an order i n time where there i s notnecessari ly a lapse of time . But these two th ings, the bal l andcush ion i n contact

,exist absolutelv simultaneously . Hence i t is not

the order,but the want of energy or force i n one i nstance

,and

the presence of i t in the other , which makes the real differencebetween them . This shows that there is some objecti vi ty i n causat ion other than that shown by Kant . There is an obj ective eth

ciency i n one th ing independently of the fini te mind which is noti n another . The dynamic idea is al l i mportant for science, so wesee that Kant

'

s doctrine of causation is unsatisfactory for science .We must bear th is i n mind when we come to hi s Th eism

,for i f a

doctrine of causation is i nadequate for sc ience,i t must be wrong

a fortiori to use i t i n th e Metaphysical sphere .

Taking this,then

,as an example of al l the categories

,we conclude,

fi rst,that there is a u nity of organic experi ence

,and

,secondly

,an oh

jectivity of the categories, both d ifferent from that held by Kant .

A s to the first of these poi nts,Cai rd* shows that the unity g iven i n

Kant ‘s doctri ne of the u nderstanding is not a necessary but only an

accidental one . If the consci ousness ofself is consciousness of synthes is

,and i f this is j udgment

,then the Ego and i ts categories cannot

be separa ted ; and i f thought i tself is synthetic, and must go out ofi tsel f

,then the understand ing cannot be separated from sense. The

uni ty of conscious experi ence i s not th e mechan ical putting togetherofseparate parts

,bu t the differentiat i ng consciousness of that which

i s al ready un i ted ; the recogn i tion of the d istinct ions i n that whichis a uni ty in diversi ty . And secondly

,al though nature depends on

Mind and i s the revel at i on of an idea,yet i t i s i ndependent of the

fini te m ind . The cosmic order is one where forces are playing

i ndependently of our mind ; forces wh i ch wil l crush us i f we comein the i r path . The reaction from the eighteenth century

,where

th is V i ew was so exaggerated,and where the spon tanei ty of the

i ndivid ual was annih i lated,where i n cogn i t ion th ings must impress

our blank minds,and where i n moral i ty we are i n the chains of

physical necessity,the reaction from all this so grandly expressed

by Kant is carried too far . There is a necessi ty i n the categorieswhich bespeaks an ori gi n other than our fini te minds . Nor is thisa return to the old pos i tion that things exist and are perce ived apartfrom the understanding and the spontanei ty of thought which thenadds on, as i t were , necessity . On th e contrary

,i t is the asserti on

that the work of thought cannot be separated from perception,and

also that the Cosmos is not a dead thi ng as i n the ph i losophy which

Kant was cri ti cisi ng ; i t i s th e assertion of i ts i ntel ligibi li ty , th at i tis bui lt on the framework of reason

,the prod uct of mind

,imma

nent wi th rational i ty,so that the fini te mi nd finds its forms i n i t

,

thus reach i ng truth which is objective and at the same time makingpossible “ synthetic j udgments a p riori .

” To say that the Cosmosis independent of our finite minds i s not to say that i t is independ

ent of the Universal Mi nd . The alternative is before us ; we mustpresuppose that real i ty i s rational or we must go back to Hume .Kant’s posi tion i s not tenable . His obj ectivity consists i n bei ng adistinct ion from feel ing and sensation , i t cannot logical ly be i ndependent of the human consciousness. Dr . Harris '

t has given forcibleexpression to the trai n of thought whi ch we have been following.

He says : “ It is only because the consti tution of the universe i saccordant wi th these pri nciples and i ts ong oing regulated by them ,

“ Cai rd, The Philosop hy of Kant, p . 381.

fHarris, The Phi losop hical Basisof Theism, p . 121.

th at the uni verse is a Cosmos and not a ch aos . They are the‘

flammantia moenia the flaming bulwarks of the universe, which no power, not even though a lmigh ty , can breakthrough or destroy

,and wi thi n wh ich the Cosmos li es i n the l igh t

of rational tr uth,and moves i n the harmony and order of rati onal

law to th e real ization ofrational ideals and ends. Thus the prinei o

ples of Reason,together w ith the truths i nferred from them

,and the

i deals and ends determined '

by them ,are the archetypes ofNature .

”

In v iew of al l the preceding we are forced to concl ude that ifHume is to be answered and refuted

,i t i s not by one of the two

postulates of knowledge laid down,but by both together . Thus

the Kanti an lim i t of knowledge with reference to noumena i n th enegative sense

,th at i s

,with reference to the mysterious unknowable

“ thi ngs ” which cause i n some way our sensations, has beenremoved

,and i t has been removed by showing that on Kant’s own

principles no such “ things ” can exist and that the world of our

knowledge is the real world . This i s the teachi ng of the NeoKantians.

B ut there next arises th e questi on as to noumena i n the posi tivesense, that is, as to objects of non " sensuous i ntui tion .

” Kant saw

that man has a faculty of Reason above the understanding,the

supreme category of this reason being uni ty . Man in seeking un i tyi s not satisfied wi th the system of nature whose uni ty is a concatenation of law . So that the acti v i ty of m ind once shown , the nat

ural course of mental necessity leads us to demand the unconditioned . Here i s th e point where the cri ti c of Kant who is famil iarwi th post-Kantian Phi losophy must praise h im and show that

,

al though h is system was the forerunner of Bri tish Kant ism,such

was not the spi ri t of hi s system . Hamil ton ? praises Kant for hisAgnostic posi tion

,but cri ticises h im for mai ntai ni ng that the i dea

of the unconditioned is natural to the human mi nd and somethingposi tive, instead of showing that i t is merely a negation of the conditioned . Kant is greater than his fol lowers. He recognizes theforce of Reason

,and seeks to leave hi s ideas i n a posi tion that can

be vindicated by the Practical Reason . But the grave defects i n hi ssystem must hear th eir frui t here also

,and a brief survey of them

wi l l prepare the way for a consideration ofh is discussion on Theismor Rational Theology . Reason demands the uncondi tioned uni ty i na series of conditi ons

,Kant tel ls usi I t seeks thi s by syl logisms

which proceed through prosyllogisms to the uncondi ti oned . Thus

Lucretius, De RerumNatura, i, 73.

J( Hamil ton, Essay on the Uncondi tioned.

1Kant, Uritique of Pure Reason, Meiklcjohn'

s translation, “ TranscendentalDialectic, ” 3 .

18

tion . I f, then, we deny the possibi li ty of knowledge i n the sphereof Reason we deny that the real is rational

,and i f we deny thi s we

can have no knowledge i n the sphere of science,so that we must

conclude that the postulates necessary to render knowledge possiblei n sci ent ific cogni tion make i t possible i n all spheres . Aga inmust say ei ther Hume or a knowledge of the ideas of Reason

,

Kant’s half-way posi tion i s untenable .We leave the Rational stage wi th i n the sphere of the Relati ve

whi ch demands the recogni tion of the relati ve noumena,and turn

to the sphere of Reason proper which demands the Absol ute as theground of al l Relati vi ty . Reason ’s category uni ty cannot be sat isfied with two relati ve noumena

,and moreover the consciousness of

ourselves as dependent and finite,i nvolves the knowledge th at A bso

l ute Being must exist . This i s the first great truth of Philosophy,

th at back of the Relati ve exists Absolute Being . Bu t immediatelyquestions of the greatest importance press upon us. What i s thenature ofAbsol ute Being ? Can i t be known ? The importance ofthese questi ons cannot wel l be exaggerated . The importance of

the former for the problem of knowledge,which we have been con

sidering, i s fundamental . The complete justification ofth e assumption that the real i s rational wi l l depend upon the determi nation ofthe Absolu te as self-conscious

,personal Spi ri t. We may define th e

Absolute as existi ng out of al l relation to the Relati ve and as incl uding al l possible modes ofBei ng

,or as th e One Substance

,orUncon

sci ous Idea, the resul t ofwhich will be to give the Absolute a naturewhi ch has no warrant for i ts truth in experience

,a nature such

that al l knowledge of i t i s impossible under those categories in

which we must have knowledge of i t i f we can know it at al l .The conclusion must be that i f the Absol ute is out of al l relation tous we can never attai n any knowledge of i t

,and that i f Being i s iden

tical with Non-being or Nothing,the whole process of knowledge

has i ts formal basis i n logic takeii away,and the Absol ute of this

Phi losophy becomes the Unknowable of the Agnosti cs who h avebeen lead to thei r posi tion from the Metaphysical standpoint byj ust thi s defini tion of the Absol ute as the negation of al l th at wecan know . But

,on the other hand

,i f Absolute Bei ng is God

,a

self-conscious personal Spiri t,then the postulates of knowledge are

fully j ustified . Knowledge we saw was impossible on the supposition that there was any real i ty other than the content of our objecti ve ideas

,that i n real i ty is that which is the direct obj ect of our

consciousness and there is no thing in itsel f which makes this unreal or phenomenal . But i n order that we may show that th is i sknowledge i n the true sense

,we must show that the world is the

product of Intelligence ; for i f an i ntelligent idea i s not immanent

i n i t,i t cannot be i n di rect rel ation to consciousness as th e object of

i ts knowledge,and our knowledge i s subjecti ve a fter al l . Also i f

the Absolute be not more completely determined i ts unknowabi li tymust follow. Religi on and Moral i ty are also at stake . Everything

depends on hold i ng righ t ideas as to the relation ofman , the world ,and God . If they are not kept disti nct, Rel igion and Moral i ty,wh ich have to do wi th the relation of the i ndividual to God andDuty

,suffer. I f on the other h and , these th ree ideas are isolated

and out of mutual relations our knowledge of al l that i s unphe

nomenal becomes imposs ible . Now i t i s only God and not anabstraction such as Absolute Being which can stand in proper relations to man and the world . As Coleridge

,the poet-phi losopher

puts i t :Tis the sub l ime ofman,Ournoontide majesty, toknowourselvesPartsand p roportionsqt

‘

one wond rousWholeTh is fraternizesman, th isconstitutesOur charitiesand bearings. But

’

tisGod

D ifi'

used th rough all , that doth make al l onewhole.

The Absol ute Being must be ofsuch a nature as to reveal Himsel f to us i n all the relations i nvolved i n Knowledge , Morali ty , andRelig ion . We must choose between the doctrine “Omnis determina

tio est nege lie,” and that ofLe ibni tz, who says

“ The perfectionsof God are those of our own souls, bu t He possesses them withoutbounds. He is an ocean from whom we have recei ved but a fewdrops . There i s some power, some knowledge, some goodness i nus

, but they are whole and entire i n God . Order, proport ions and

harmony enchant us; painting and music are samples of them .

God i s al l order. He always keeps an exquisi te justness of proport ions. He creates the universal harmony . All beauty is an ex pansion of H is rays .” From what has been sa id i t wi l l be seen that i ti s necessary th at the Absolute be Spi rit. But this noti on i nvol vesfi rst i ntell igence

,and secondly energi zing acti vi ty i n accordance

with a moral nature . Now these two notions i nvolve those of sel fconsci ousness and personal i ty

,and thus the highest metaphysic

accords wi th experience for,whi le we know unconscious states of

self-conscious spi ri t,we do not know unconscious spiri t

,and that

which we do know by direct introspection is conscious and personal .Lotze teaches usthat experience j ustifies the posi tion we have stated .

He says,1

' “We cannot,however, for a moment admit that this con

ception of an unconscious Spiri t has i n this sense any real meaningwhatever . We cannot

,i ndeed

,deny that there are with i n ou r sp ir

itual l i fe unconscious states and processes, bu t i t does not fol low

Leibnitz, Essaisde Theodiceé, quoted by Salsset, Modern Pantheism.

fLol z e, Phi losophy of Religion, p . 55 .

th at th ese, as unconscious, and as at the same time states ofa Sp i ri t ,ever occur except i n those beings wh i ch are by nature consc iousspi ri ts. We must only look upon them as cases in which a con

scious,spi ri tu al l i fe is arrested or l im i ted .

” We have learned,then ,

that for the sake of the gravest interests of humani ty , the Absolutemust be recogni zed as a selfoconscious and personal spi r i t

,and from

Lotze we have learned that thi s accords wi th experience . .Morc

over the solution of al l subsequent questions of Metaphysics w i l lh ave a character determi ned by the way i n which th is fi rst questioni s settled . It i s not enough to say that the Ul timate Real i ty isspi ri t . The whole Hegel ian movement was anti -material isti c, butbecause i t fai led to attribute sel f-consc i ousness and personal i ty to

Absolute Being,i t could not grasp the fact of Creation in any other

way than that of the necessary evol ution of the Absolute, th us

l osi ng al l the Real i ty of the Relative, th e consequences ofwhich i n

the sphere of Religion and Moral ity be ing too obvious to requ i re

stating. Thus the doctrine of creation and wi th i t that of the human

psyche and the Cosmos, depend on the question at issue . Furthermore Being whi ch is nothing

,is an abstracti on which can never

b ecome clothed upon with concreteness u nless i t have i n i t a

necessary pri nc iple of movement, but i f i t i s Non-being orNoth ing

how can we say that there is a liv i ng dialecti c i n i t, and why isnot Agnostic ism a more logical development from such a doctrine

t han Hegelianism ? It Metaphys ic is to be at al l possible i n any true

sense,we must h ave God as the start ing point and not the culm ina

t ion only . Thu§ the question to be d iscussed and i n which we are

toseek the cure forAgnosticism, should at th e same time be a cor

rective for the Panthe ism of Hegel . That Agnosticism and Pantheism are to have the same remedy does not seem strange whenwe reflect that i t was the defect ofKantism which led on to "ichte,Schell ing

,and Hegel . This same poi nt should be one of correct ion

for the school of thi nkers who th ink that the problem of knowl

edge is to be solved by breaking away from the i ndiv i d ualistic ten.

denciesof Kant, but who are not careful to avoid h is abstract ion .

I t i s not by avoiding any one cause of the Kanti an l im i tations thatwe can hope to find a satisfactory solution of the problem of knowl

edge. It can be done only by a careful consideration of the meritsand fai lures revealed by the history of though t. Kant has shownthat the categories and synthet ic un i ty of apperception are neces

sary for knowledge . But this sel f-consciousness was human and

moreover only an empty notion . Now,says the school i n question

,

the rati onal is the real , so for the i ndiv idual thought w i thout athi nker substi tute 9. Un iversal Idea or sp i ri tual pri nci ple wi thouttranscendent personal i ty, and the problem is solved . But when we

mentioned Agnosticism . Its cure lies just at this point . Kant’squestion was that of knowledge

,and so we are espec i al ly con.

cerned wi th th is relati on ofTheism to Epistemology . The immediate cause of Agnostici sm is Epistemological

,th at is the sub

jectivity of the human Reason , but th e cause of this is the ideat ification of the Absolute wi th Non -being or pure abstraction . Arethe categories

,which render possible synthet ic j udgments a p rior i ,

those ofGod who created the Uni verse rational and placed i n our

mind the frame work of real i ty,or are they merely i nd iv idual

forms,and we thus forever shu t up to Kantism ? The answer to

th is depends on our determi nati on of the Absolute as a sel f-consci ous and personal Spi ri t

,for onlv such a Being can be self-reveal

i ng,

- and,as has been

“said

,i f m en are l eft with a reason which

d iffers essentially from reason Uni versal,to grope after God , they

must end i n despai r,and everywhere w i l l be found altars “

to theunknown God .

” But i f He he a sel f-consci ous,personal Spi ri t then

i s He near to each one of us and every way to Him i s one which

He Himsel f has made and which humani ty has but to traverse .

Reason,the great emotions common to al l humani ty

,Sc i ence,

Moral i ty and Rel igion,every road wi l l lead us to Him

,humani ty

wi l l be fi l led with H is presence,and Ph i losophy ’s mai n problem

wil l be solved .

There i s another thought which wil l help us i n exami ningKant’s Theism

,and whi ch i s suggested by the two movements

resul ting from his system,and which have been mentioned . Both

transcendental Idealism and Agnostici sm stand al ike open toeri ticism for making Bei ng Nothing

,but there is another point of v iew

i n whi ch they d iffer totally,and from wh ich a lesson of vital

importance i n exami ning Kant w i l l be gained . The differencebetween the two systems mentioned may be expressed by the wordimmanence . The Agnosticism ofSpencer

,besides coming from his

abstract defini ti on of the A bsol ute, resu l ts also from the fact that heth inks that he can expl ai n the world by matter and a Relati veForce

,so that th e Absolu te stands apart and is unknowable . But

i n Hegeli anism the case i s entirely differen t . The Absolute i severything to th is system . Immanence is the profound tru th to belearned from this system

,and which

,i f rightly apprehended

,wil l do

away with Agnosticism . Kant’s God i s only transcendent, and h i sdoctri ne must be transcended i n a system which wil l recognize th etruth of immanence

,and the great questi on now i s how can we

have an immanent and at th e same time a transcendent God,and a

world and creatures distinct from H im and fini te . I f we ascribeself-consciousness and personal i ty to God , and reali ze that thisi nvol ves a consciousness of sel f as dist inct from both nature and

other personal i ti es,the n God can be conceived as separate from

,as

well as revealed i n,nature and the human psyche. Transcendence

is not to be lost sigh t of i n emphasizi ng immanence ; we must havea God above as wel l as i n man and nature or we must give upEthics

,yes

,and Chr istianity too

,for there i s not one B ible doctrine

that can stand i f only immanence be true . But immanence i s onlyhalf the truth . There is no opposi ti on between immanence andtranscendence. But only a sel f-conscious and personal God can beat the same t ime immanent and transcenden t .Now the true nature of The ism which holds fast both immanenceand transcendence

,and can show that they are not mu tual ly excl u

s ive ideas because God is sel f-conscious and personal,needs empha

si s . No less a th inker than Schopenhauer;has not grasped i t

,and

he speaks of the far-away Unknowable of Agnosticism and themechanical ly conceived God of the eighteenth

‘ century De ism asthough they were the God ofTheism

,saying that before Kant there

was a di lemma between Mater ial ism and Thei sm ,but that Kant has

given us a starting point for a thi rd al ternati ve whi ch wi l l free usfrom the d i lemma . He says Before Kant there was a realdi lemma between Materi alism and Theism

,that i s

,between the

supposition that ei ther a bl ind fate,or an Intel ligence d i recting

th ings from the outs ide according to ends and concepts,had

brough t the world into being,nor was there any th i rd al ternati ve.

But now Kant,by his profound disti nction between phe

nomenon and the thing i n i tself,has taken the

.

foundat ion fromThei sm

,and has opened the way on the other hand to an enti rely

d ifferent and more profound i nterpretation ofB eing . Here we see

that Schopenh auer has misunderstood Thei sm . I t is true thatKant h as “ taken away the foundation from the theory that anIntel l igence di rect ing i n a mechanical way from withou t is at theground of th i ngs

,but th is i s De ism and not The ism . Now between

Material ism and Theism r igh tly understood as i ncluding bothimmanence and transcendence

,ou r choice has sti l l

,and always wi ll

have tobe made,for

,as Schopenhauer says

,Kant has driven us from

Deism,and we cannot accept any theory which recogni zes only

i mmanence because personal i ty and self-consciousness are u lt imates .The answer of Schopenhauer to the great quest ion is no better thanthat ofHegel , forwe cannot say that the D ing an sich i s bli nd wil lstri v ing to be , because wil l separated from Intel ligence is as muchofan abstraction and impossibi li ty as Bei ng wh ich is Noth ing andhasto “ become before i t can real ly and self-consci ously be . If i tcould be so

,despai r would be the last word of Ph ilosophy . Amid

the deep sorrows of l i fe and i ts daily cares which sometimes seem

Schopenhauer, DieWelt alsWillsand Vorstellung, p 608.

so heavy, instead of hope to sustai n men , the best th at they could dowou ld be to cease to wi l l to l ive . Between Theism

,then

,and the

bl inder "ufal l our choice must be made . Blind chance or Intelligence, and not Intelligence merely but personal self‘ consciousIntelligence

,for here alone immanence and transcendence can uni te .

I t is clear,then

,that the i nterests nearest the heart of humani ty

depend on whether or not th e Absolu te Being is God , that is a selfconscious and personal Spiri t .The question

,then

,i s whether the Absolute of Phi losophy is

God,th at is

,a self-conscious

,personal Spi ri t .

The question now comesup as to whether there i s any ap riori reason for beli ev ing that this is so . Reason gives an affirmativeanswer . Her supreme category i s Uni ty . A complete and abso

lute Uni ty must be attained . Now there are the spheres of natureand of freedom . But nature is i ndependent of our fini te wi l ls. I ftherefore al l we can say is that Absolute Being exists

,the dual ism

between _nature and freedom cannot be done away w i th . The onlypossible uni ty is one where the ends of freedom are reali zed i nnature

,and this can be only i f nature i s control led by a Unitary

Being which is active for ends,direct ing nature for the reali zation

of these ends of freedom . Mechani sm i s not chance but law, andthe idea of l aw i ncludes i n i t th at of an end . Thus mechanism leadsby necessi ty to Teleology

,and the only uni ty is a teleological one

where self consc ious i ntel l igence and wil l i s subj ect ing Mechanismto i ts own ends. The supreme un i ty is found when Mechanism and

Teleology harmonize i n the nature of a Bei ng who i s the source ofboth moral and natural law. Reason is satisfied only where theheart is satisfied

,i n thebel ief and knowledge that above al l i s one

personal,self-conscious Spi ri t

,the Absolute God who has predeter

mined al l things for the real ization of His own glory and the wel lbei ng of humani ty . Kant recognizes th is a p riori necessi ty . Heargues * th at the Absolute must be concei ved as one and i ndi vidualbecause i t i s the primal source ofal l thi ngs and i n another place

,1'

he tel ls us that the h ighest uni ty is a teleological one so th at Intelligence must be predicated of the Absol ute . I n fact the connectingl i nk of Kant’s whole system is Teleology . He sets forth Natureand her categories i n th e Critiqueof Pure Reason ; and after leavingnoumena beyond the reach of knowl edge so that we cannot even saythat they exist

,he shows us that they exi st a nd opens up the world

of freedom i n the Critiqueof Practical Reason but he connects thetwo spheres in h is Critique of Judgment by means of the Teleologi

* Kant, Cr itique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn'

stranslation,

“ TranscendentalDialectic, Bk . ii, chap . iii, 2.

fCr i tiqueofPwreReason, A ppendix tothe “ Transcendental Dialectic.

his remarks on the Theisti c arguments is the God ofeighteenth -century Deism

,andofcourse they ava i l against this. His theory of knowl

edge was marred by i ts mechanistic character,and so the objects of

knowledge come to have a mechanism about them and exist apartfrom consci ousness. God stands apart and i n a purely external andmechanical relation to the world and man . The idea ofGod whichhe gi ves has three elements. Fi rst the sum total of the possib ility of all experience . Second the conception of an ens realissimum. And i n the thi rd place the attributes which we get by whathe calls hypostat izing the idea ; that is, he argues that from i t al lth ings deri ve thei r real i ty and so i t i s regarded as primal . A primalBeing must be one and simp l e . Then we regard i t as the groundofal l thi ngs

,and cogitate th e whole sum ofour experience as an i h

di v idual whole,gi ving the idea of i ndividual i ty

,and so reach the

idea of God . Now nothing could be more mechanical than th is .God i s not the sum total of al l existence regarded as a whole andi ndi vidual . He is not a sort ofm ine or fund of real i ty from whichwe draw. He is not a sum total of al l real ity as though real i tywere

,as a house

,made of different mechan ical ly constructed parts .

God i s a Spiri t existing i n spi ri tu al rel ations to His fini te creatures .I t was j ust such a mechan ical and pantheisti c definition as th iswh ich lead Si r Willi am Hami lton and Dean Mansel i nto so manydifficul ties. Dr . Runz e j

L speaks to the poi nt on th is mechanical

concepti on . He says that the mechanical conception of a sum totalwh ich l imi ts God to a mere aggregate

,is not i nterchangeable with

the idea ofthe Highest Being . Much rather,

” he says,does the

h ighest reali ty l ie at the foundation of the possibi li ty of al l things

as a cause and not as a sum total .”

We must carefu lly bear i n mi nd that i t is God,a l i vi ng Spi ri t

whoexists i n spi ri tual rel at ions to us, whom we are seeking ; andnot a God whoi s afar off, and i n merely mechanical relat ions to us,or else out ofal l relation .

The Theistic arguments,Kant’s treatment of which we are now

to exam ine,are four in number . There is the Ontological argu "

men t whi ch tells us a priori that i f the Absol ute or Necessary Beingex ist we must predicate i nfin i ty of all i ts attributes

,and ident i fy i t

w i th the Al l Perfect Being ; and a posteriori this argument expresses the truth that God through thi s perfect idea has spoken i n and

tothe consciousnessofhuman i ty,so that His existence may be i nferred

as the cause ofthis idea . Next there is the Cosmological argumentwhich proceeds from the contingent to the necessary

,and thus from

Kant, Critique ofPureReason, Meik lejohn’

stranslation, “ Transc. D ialect,chap . iii, § 2.

JrRunz e, Der Ontologische Gottcsbeweis, p . 81.

th is we infer the existence of a necessary Being which the Ontological argument on i ts a p riori si de tel ls us is the Most Perfect, the In .

finite Being. Then there is the Teleological argument,which

argues from the adaptations of means to ends i n nature to des ign,

and thence i nfers that Intel ligence is to be predicated of the Absolute .Lastly we have the Moral argument

,which from our moral nature

and the supreme categories of Moral i ty i nfers the moral nature ofthe Absol ute .The most notable and important fact with reference to these

arguments is thei r vital connection with,and mutual assistance of

,

each other ; while at the same time each preserves i ts own identi tyi n the performance of i ts special function . They are parts of onewhole

,which cannot stand hosti le cri ticism if separately requ ired to

perform the whole task . Thus the Cosmological argument gives ust he existence of the Necessary Being, but nothi ng more. The Teleological and Moral arguments give us attributes of thi s Being

,while

we leave experience and say a priori that these attributes are i nfini teand so identify the Absolute wi th God . Therefore these argumentscan nei ther be separated nor identified . They have been mosthappi ly l ikened to a bundle of twigs, which when bound togetherthe strongest arm cannot break

,but when separated may be broken

by the weakest . They are the a posteriori ground of th at firm conv iction that the Absolute of Ph i losophy i s the God ofthe Bible

,and

together w ith the a p riori ground of thi s same bel ief they change i ti nto a reflecti ve knowledge by which man’s reason bids his hearttake courage as i t faces the assau lts of skepticism .

Kant first cri ticises the Ontologi cal argument.* He discusses i ti n itsa p r iori form . Anselm-

f i s the author of this, so we mustlook to h im for a statement of i t . He gi ves i t thus : “ And webeli eve that Thou art a Being than whom a greater cannot be conceived And certainly th at than which a greater cannot beconcei ved cannot be in the i ntel lect alone . For i f i t be i n the mindonly there can be thought a Being existing i n real i ty also

,which i s

greater . I f therefore that than wh ich a greater cannot be conceivedis i n the mind only

,i t follows that that

,than which a greater can

not be conceived is that,a greater than which can be conceived : but

certainly this can not be. There exists, therefore, beyond a doubt aBeing than whom there can be no greater

,both i n thought and i n

real i ty .

” Anselm ’s reasoning i s simply that i f we could concei vethe non-existence of that than which a greater cannot be conceived

,

then a greater could be conceived,which is a contradiction . But

,of

* Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, Meiklejohn’

s translation,

“ TranscendentalD ialectic , ” chap. iii § 4.

1’ A nselm, Pgoslogion, Caput 11.

course,thi s i s after al l merely a necessi ty of conception founded on

the impossibi l i ty ofconceivi ng the Opposi te . I t asserts a cO'

kradietion i n the removal of existence as a predicate

,asserting that i t i s

contained necessari ly i n the concept. Now Kant’s fi rst cri ticism isthat the arguments wh ich h ave been drawn to show the corre

spondence between thought and th ings have been taken from judgments

,not from th i ngs. This cri ti cism attacks the argument as

though Anselm ’s posi tion were that what exists in intellectu

exists also in re. But this is not h is argument,as Dr . Patton* shows .

His argument i s,as has been stated

,that exi stence is necessari ly

i n th e concept of the Perfect Being. Kant reali zed thi s , and proceeded to cri ticise the argument i n thi s form by showing the d ifference between analytic and syntheticjudgments, and that being i s not areal predicate . He argues as fol lows : I f there is a contradicti oni nvolved i n the deni al of th is predicate

,i t must be conta ined i n the

concept ; and must therefore be a mere"y logi cal predicate and so saynoth ing as to real i ty : therefore though the annih i lation Of th is predicate i nvol ves a contradi ction

,both subject and predicate may be

together suppressed wi thout contrad iction . But i f the j udgmen t i sto express existence

,that is i f being is a real predicate, i t must add

something to the concept and so its removal w il l not i nvolve a contradiction. Moreover exi stence i s not a real predicate, or therenever could be a correspondence between the concept and obj ect

,

the object always being greater.Now in order to estimate th e force of this we wil l state three p ositi ons whi ch may be held wi th reference to the Ontological argument .1. There are those l ike Anselm

,who hold that i t i s an a priori

demonstration of ex istence .2. There i s the view of Leibnitz

,i' who beli eves that Anselm’s

argument needs to show firs t that the idea of a Most Perfect Bei ngi s possible

,that then the concl usion fol lows

,and that this is done

when i t i s shown that there are no contradi ctions i nvolved in th isIdea conceived as exi sting.

3 . There is the posi tion which we have i nd icated,that th e a.

priori side of the argument i s not des igned to prove existence, bu t toshow that the Necessary Being of the Cosmological argument i s theInfinite and Perfect Being of ou r idea. And a posteriori thi s argument is to express God’s wi tness to humanity of His existence

,

through th i s perfect i dea .

Now th e first of these posi tions Kant hassuccessfu lly overthrown .

His arguments against any a priori demonstration of God’s existence

merely from the i dea are u nanswerable. There are a priori rea

*Patton, Syl labusof Lectureson Theism.

1' Leibnitz, Thoughtson Knowledge, Truth and Ideas.

possible i f God had not i nspi red our consciousness wi th the posi ti veidea of Himself as the Father of our spiri ts . In ourselves we feelHis presence

,and then know i t i n the world we see an Ideal th at i s

not Of the world . God as a sel f-conscious and personal Spi ri t canbe thus near to us. The strongest and most spi ri tual minds i n al lages have fel t His presence

,and have testified to the truth of Mysti

cism. God is truly present to the consc iousness of humani ty bothi n i ts idea of Him and i n its aspi rati ons after Him . He has spokento men

,and Rationalism can never dissuade them from belief i n

thi s tru th .

Kant next criti cises the Cosmological argument . This is theargument from the conti ngen t to the necessary . Aristotle is i tsau thor . He argues * for the existence of a First Mover, thus

regarding the world under the category of motion,as contingen t .

Kant gi ves the argument so as to i nc lude the fini te ego under thecategory of contingency . He gives the argument as follows :1'

“ If

someth ing exists,an absol utely necessary being must l ikewise exist .

Now I,at least

,exist. Therefore there exists an absol utely neces

sary being.

” The argument,he says

,proceeds thus . “ A necessary

being can be determined only in one way,that is by only one of al l

th e opposed predicates ; therefore, i t i s completely determined byi ts concept

,and there i s only one concept which can completely

determine a th ing a p riori, that i s the concept of an ensrealissimumtherefore

,as th is is th e only concept by and in which we can cogi

tate a necessary bei ng, therefore a supreme being necessari lyexists .”

Now,i n order to meet th e Kantian cri ticism of the Cosmological

argument,we must have a clear idea of i ts function and relation to

the Ontological argument ; that is, to the a priori side of thata rgument

,which i t is to be remembered Kant always means ,

and wh ich for convenience we wi l l refe r to as the Ontological argument i n d iscussing Kant ’s c ri ti cism of the Cosmological . The Cosmological argument gi ves us the existence of a necessary Being, butcannot determine the nature of th at Being. The Ontological argument a p rior i shows us that i f such a Be ing exists i ts nature mustbe ofa certain character ; but i t cannot give a p riori demonstrati onof the ex istence of th i s Being. NowKant makes an error simi larto that whi ch he made i n cri ticising the Ontological argument . He

cri ti cised that argument as though i t were designed to demonstratea p rior i the existence of a Being correspond ing to i ts concept.Now we see that he states the Cosmological argument as though i t

A ristotle, Metaphysics, Bk . 11, chap . vn.

fli ant, Cr itique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn’

s translation,

“ TranscendentalD ialectic, chap . iii, "S, sq.

were meant to perform not only i ts own work, but that also of theOntological argument i n the determinati on of the nature of the

necessary Be ing. That whi ch h e terms the fi rst part of the argu

ment shows that an absolutely necessary Be ing ex ists . Now ,i nstead

of seei ng that thi s is al l tha t is requi red of th is argument, he pro

ceeds to add the Ontological argument as a second step i n the Cosmological ; and then states as hi s first point of cri ti cism

,th at ex peri

ence,that i s the Cosmological argument

,merely aids Reason to

make the first step to the ex istence of the necessary Being ; and thatwe must turn away from experience to the concepti onof an ens

realissz’

mum to determine the properties of th i s Being,so that the

Cosmological argument becomes the Ontological . Now i t is perfectly true that the Cosmological argument is i nsufficient by i tsel f ;but Kant should have reali zed that the i nference to the existenceof a necessary Being i s al l th at this argument can be legi timatelyrequi red to do . Moreover

,when

,after adding the Ontological argu

ment i n i ts a p riom'

aspect as a second step i n the Cosmol ogical,he

says that reason believes that we may infer the existence of a necessary Bei ng from the concept of an ens realissimum

,h e seems to

have forgotten that he has admitted on the very same page th atexperience i s held to aid reason i n showing the existence of anecessary Being

,and that he h imsel f added this second part “ to

determine the propert ies,

” and not to demonstrate the existence ofthis Being . We see, then , that Kant

’s first cri ticism of this argument consists i n putt ing the Ontological and Cosmological arguments together

,and cri t icising each because i t cannot perform sepa

rately thei r j oi nt task . He tries also to bring out th is samecr i tic ism by logi c. He says that the nervus p robande

'

of the Cosmological argumen t i s the proposition that every absol utely necessary be ing is an ens realz

'

ssz'

mum and i f thi s be true,since al l entia

realt’

ssz’

ma are al i ke,it foll ows that th is proposi tion may be con

verted simply,and we have the proposi tion that every ensrealissi

mum i s a necessary being ; and this proposi tion being determined

a prz’

orz’

by concepts,we have the Ontological argument . In short

,

he says that i n the ident ification of the ens realt’

ssz’

mum wi th thenecessary Being, we assume that we can i nfer the latter from theformer . But thi s is not true . It is difficul t to see why the Cosmological argument

,in turni ng to th e Ontological to determi ne the

nature of the Necessary Being as Infinite i n i ts attribu tes,after

h av ing shown i ts exi stence,must proceed on the assumption that

the Ontologi cal argument must show a p riori the fac t of existence .Kant also makes the fol lowi ng objections to th e Cosmolog ical

argument :* First, that the transcendental principle of causal i ty is

* Kant, Cr itique of Pure Reason, “ Transcendental D ialectic, chap . i ii, §5,

p . 3 74.

only val id i n the sensuous world,because the purely i ntelligible or

i ntel lectual conception would never produce a synthetic, that is, anobj ecti ve proposi tion . The answer to thi s objecti on i s the rejecti on of h is doctri ne of the limi t of knowledge . Though t i s synthetic of i tsel f

,and i t i s not the object of sense wh i ch makes i t so .

And i t is obvi ously false reasoning to argue that,because i n scien

tific cogni t ion the content of the category is given i n the sphere ofexperience

,therefore

,thi s is the on ly kind of causal i ty adm issible .

Of course,i f we define causal i ty as i nvariable sequence

,and then

say that thi s i ncl udes al l causal i ty,we rule out the Cosmolog ical

argument by definition . But his doctrine of causal i ty as merelyinvari able sequence i s i nadequate for science ; howmuch more so ,then

,must i t be for metaphysics

,and howunfai r i ts appl ication i n

th is sphere . We cannot use a purely mechanical and physicalcategory when we h ave reached the sphere of spi r it. The contingent i nvolves the necessary

,but a caused cause is sti l l contingent .

Our i dea of causation is not fully sat isfied with a cause that i s i tsel fcaused

,as is the case wi th every cause i n the relati ve sphere ; and

the mind must find i ts type of causation i n the causal i ty of wi ll determined by motive and character, but free from physical necessi ty .

I f this be not admitted,the al ternati ve is physi cal necessi ty

,and

this leads to,or rather i nvol ves

,materialism . The categories of

science may be used with no materi al isti c implications at all ; theyhave thei r legitimate sphere . It is only when the metaphysiciantries to use them th at materi al ism ensues. Thus Mr. Spencer

,i n

trying to explai n the universe by relative and material forces,ex

'

hypothesi shuts himself offfrom any vali d i nference to the Absol uteand his postul ate of the Unknowable has noth ing on which to rest.I f i t i s mani fested i n the materi al and relati ve force whi ch expl ainsthe un i verse

,the impl ication i s materi al isti c as to the nature of

ul t imate real i ty ; or i f this Unknowable is enti rely apart from therelat i ve force which explains th ings

,then why postulate i t ? This

i s merely to show the danger of making physical categories dometaphysical work . However

,i n maki ng the i nference of the

Cosmologi cal argument , we go beyond the sphere of natural causati on i n the very idea ofthe argument

,which expresses the necessi ty

of the exi stence ofAbsolute Being .

Kant ’s last objection to th is argument i s that the impossibi li ty

of an infini te seri es of causes is assumed , and that th is is a prin

ciple wh ich cannot be justified . Thi s is simply a statement, i n asl igh t ly different form

,of the pri nciple of which we have j ust

been speaking,or

,more accurately

,may be inferred from thi s

principle,— that everyth ing contingent must have a cause . The

highest category of causation i s not satisfied with anything bu t

pursue our observations wi th the i nfini ty of spaceoin one di rection ,or i nto i ts i l l im itable di visions i n the other

,whether we regard the

world i n i ts greatest or i ts least mani festations , even after we haveattai ned to the highest summ i t ofknowledge whi ch ourweak m indscan reach

,we find that l anguage

,i n the presence of wonders so in

conceivable,has lost i ts force

,and number i ts power toreckon, nay,

even thought fai ls to concei ve adequately,and our concept ion of

the whole d issolves i nto an astoni shment wi thout the power of expression

,al l the more eloquent that i t i s dumb .

” Kant’s cri ticismsof the Teleological argument i n the Critique of Pure Reason are

two i n number,and arise

,as before

,from the fact that h e requi res

thi s argument to do the work of three. He says, i n the chapterfrom which we h ave j ust quoted

,

“We cannot approve of th ecla ims which this argument advances to a demonstrat ive certai ntyand to a recept ion on i ts own meri ts

,apart from favor or support

from other arguments .” Nowwe do not make this cl a im for i t. We

nei ther claim for i t demonstrati ve certai nty,

” nor that i t can be con

sidered apart from other arguments. Let us see exactly what can be

expected from i t in i ts organic connec tion wi th the other arguments.The Cosmological argument shows us that a Necessary Be ing must

exist,and now by the Teleological argument we infer that i t must be

possessed of Intel l igence wonderful ly great,which the Ontolog ical

argument on i tsa. priori s ide shows to be i nfini te . The Teleologicalargument

,then

,i s to show that the cause of the world i s an Intel li

gent Cause,and this i s all that ‘

can be legi timately requi red of i t .

In order to indicate how i t does th is we cannot do better than quotefrom this same chapter of the Cr itique of Pure Reason : Thechief momenta i n the physico-teleologi cal argument are as fol lowsF i rst

,we observe i n the world man i fest signs ofan arrangement ful l

of purpose,executed wi th great wisdom

,and existing i n a whole

ofa content i ndescribably vari ous,and of an extent w i thout l imi ts .

Second,this arrangement of means and ends i s entirely foreign to

the th ings exi sting i n the world,i t belongs to them merely as a con

tingen t attribute ; i n other words, the natureofdifferent th i ngs couldnot of i tself

,whatever means were employed

,harmoniously tend

towards certai n purposes,were they not chosen and di rected for those

purposes by a rational and disposing principle i n accordance w i thcertai n fundamental ideas. Third , there ex ists, therefore, a subl imeand wise cause

,or several

,which is not merely a bli nd

,all -power

ful nature,producing the beings and events which fi l l the world i n

unconscious fecundi ty,but a free and i ntel l igent cause of the world .

Fourth,the uni ty of this cause may be i nferred from the un i ty of

a reci procal relation exi sting between the parts of the world,as

portions ofan artistic edifice,an i nference which al l our observati on

favors,and all princi plesof analogy support .

”

In this chapter of the Cr itique of Pure Reason Kant makes twocri ticisms of th is argument. The fi rst he expresses thus According to the physicoteleological argument the connection and barmony existing i n the world evidence the contingency of the formmerely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world .

This proof can at the most therefore demonstrate the ex istenceofan arch i tect of the world whose efforts are l imi ted by the capabilitiesof th e material with which he works

,but not of a creator of

the world,to whom al l th ings are subj ect .” Now i n the first place this

object ion i nvolves the ask ing toomuch of this argument : al l th at issough t from this argument is to show that the Absolute Being

, of

whose existence as the cause ofal l rel ati vi ty we are assured on othergrounds, i s possessed of i ntel l igence . This would be a suffic ientanswer to Kant’s cri ti ci sm

,but we may go even farther. Dr . Fl int

*

says that th is objection can be urged , only i f order were not of thevery essence of matter i tsel f

,and not merely something superim

posed in the arrangement of i t .“ Science

,

” he says,

“ shows thatthe order i n the heavens and in the most complicated organisms isnot more wonderful than the orde r i n the ul ti mate a toms themsel ves. The balance of evidence is that order penetrates as deep asmatter i tsel f.Kant’s second cri tic ism is that from the order i n the world we

can i nfer only a cause proportionate thereto. We can conclude therefore from th is argument

,only that the Intel ligence and Powerof the

world -cause is very great ; but not that th e Intel l igence i s i nfini teand the Power absolute ; and they must be so determi ned , assucha pred icate as “ very great gi ves no determinate conception ofth is Being

,nor does i t inform uswhat i t may be . Empi rical con

siderations fai ling to give this determi nat ion to the concept,we ac

complish thi s by fal ling back upon the Cosmological argument,which is the Ontologi cal in disguise .

“After elevati ng our

selves to adm i ration ”of the power and wisdom of the world’s

au thor,and finding that we can advance no farther by this method

,

we proceed to i nfer the conti ngency of th e world from the order i ni t,and then argue from i ts contingency to the existence of a

Necessary Being,and thence to the concept of the ens rea lissimum.

This object ion obv iously arises from the demand that the Teleologi cal shal l alone do the work of al l three arguments, and i t only

g ives an i l lustrat ion of thei r uni ty and organi c connection . WhenIntel ligence has been predicated ofth e Absolute, th is argument hasperformed i ts functi on . When once th is is done al l materi al i stic

"l int, moism, Lect. v i.

explanations of ul timate reali ty become impossible,and we are then

obliged a p riori to say that thi s I ntel l igence i s infini te. Thus i trefers di rectly to the a priori argument and not i ndi rectly through the

Cosmological as Kant says . I t does not, then, depend on th i s argument

,much less is i t identical w i th i t . I t needs only th e Ontolog

ical argument on i ts a p riori si de for i ts completion , wh i le the Cosmological argument needs both the other two.

Kant’s cri ticism,then

,amounts to showi ng the connecti on of these

arguments,si nce h is obj ections may be al l classed under two heads

First,those cri ticisms which do not rest on the separati on of th e

arguments,but which we h ave seen only to avai l against themechani

cally concei ved God of Deism,but not against a God who is a Spiri t

at once immanent and transcendent ; and secondly , those cri t icismswhich rest on the separation of the arguments

,and the requi rement

ofone to do the work ofal l ; and these we have shown to be unfai r .We may learn from this th at every road

,whether a p riori or a pos

teriori,wi l l lead us to some aspect of Absolute Being . In God are

al l things,and every l i ne of reasoning must culminate i n Him while

no one way can lead us to the whole truth,which i s so vast th at the

human mind can never hope to comprehend i t. The inspi redwriter was only expressing the sense i n which we must al l be Agnostics

,when he said Canst thou by searching find out God And

yet i t i s because“ He i s not far from every one ofus that we ap

prehend Him in every thi ng .

We have yet,however

,to consider Kant's most subtle cri ticism of

the Teleological argument . This is gi ven i n the CritiqueofJudgment

where i t is di scussed much more elaborately th an i n the Critique ofPure Reason. This cri ticism is that finali ty is merely a subjecti vepri nci ple of reflect ive j udgment .I n order to make clear his somewhat confused discussion i t wi l lbe necessary to state a li ttle more precisely the steps i n the Telcological argument. Lotze * has h i t the nerve of the design argument,though his cri tici sm of i t does not seem j ust. He says that the argument i s i nvolved i n a piece ofci rcular reasoning

,because i t rests on

the assertion of the improbabil i ty of certai n results happening i fthey were not designed ; but that thi s improbabili ty holds only i fwe presuppose design

,for then things whi ch resul ted wi thout being

designed would seem exceptions to the general rul e ; but i f we do notpresuppose design , then al l th is improbab i l i ty vanishes ; for the argument, says Lotze, rests on the bel ief that what is w i thout purpose,perverse and i rrati onal

,has a better ti tle i tsel f toex istence

,or i s

more l ikely , assuch , to be real , than what i s not so.” Th is is not

true . The design argument makes no presupposi ti ons as to what

* Lotze, Phi losophy of Religion, chap . i, 10, 11.

consc ious Intell igence than that of which we know noth ing, noteven i ts possibil i ty . Either the F i rst Cause i s absol utely unknowable or else th is much anthropomorphism is necessary . I t is thefact that we are created i n God ’s image that enables us to know H im .

So th at anthropomorph ism i s the assert ion that His nature i s i n ustoan imperfec t degree

,and not an imputation ofour nature to Him

and i t i s difficul t tosee why "oomorph ism should be preferred toth i s . We are now concerned

,however

,not wi th the Ph i losophy of

the Unconscious,but w i th Kant’s doctri ne of subjecti ve final i ty ; but

because ofthe d ifficul t nature of his discussion of thi s,we have out

l ined these steps i n the argument i n order that we may use them asguides i n our examination ofthe Kan tian doctri ne

,to whi ch we now

proceed .

As to the fi rst step i n the argument,th e order and adaptation

observable i n nature . This he re cogn izes and presupposes i n theCr i tique of Judgment, direct ing h iswhole discussion to the last twosteps as stated . He asks whether th is adaptation is “ purpos ive

,

”

and whether we can infer an Intel l igent Cause of the world . Buthe m ingles these twopo ints in th e d iscussi on

,sometimes consider ing

both at once and sometimes going from one to the oth er , so that wew i l l endeavor

,for the sake ofclearness

,to separate these points, and

to present a br ief statement of h i s v iews on each of these poi nts, asg i ven by him i n th e Cr itique of Judgment.But before exam ining h is theorv of final i ty

,we must see what

th e assumption of order and harmony i nvol ves. Dr . Flint * takesthe pos i tion that i t i s merely a k ind of final i ty ; but Janet ;

Land

Dimant make order the bas is of a separate argument for intelligence

,so that even though we cannot i nfer final i ty from order

,we may

use the l atter i n our Theist ic argument. Kant takes this order forgranted

,and then says that mechanical causes expla in i t, except in

some cases where mechanism breaks down and’

wherc we must con

ceive an Intel l igent Cause . Janet has made th i s mistake also, and

Dr. Patton § has cri tic ised h im for i t . The relat ion of i ntell igentcausati on to mechan i sm i s not that the former comes in when thel atter breaks down . There is a deeper relation than this. We ask ,even where th ings areexplained by mechan ical causes

,what is the

cause of these causes? The Cosmos is a vast system ofmathemati cal rel at ions and dynam ic sequences apar t from any question of

final i ty . Now we cannot propose mechan ical l aw as the explana

t ion,because i t i s prec isely th is lawwh ich we are seek i ng to account

for,so that thiswould be begging the quest ion . Law itselfisthe th ing

*"l int, Theism, Lect. 11. "Janet, "inal Causes, Bk . i , chap . v .

IDirnau, The Theistic A rgument, chap . iv .

sPatton, Syllabusof Lectureson Theism.

tobe expla ined,and our al ternatives are chance and intel ligence, so

that i f we abandon the former we are dri ven to the latter . Thereis noother al ternati ve

,si nce we have seen i t tobe a p eti tiop rincip i i

to hypostatize law ,mak ing a metaphys ical enti ty out of i t for i ts

own explanation . And no more canwe hypostati ze chance . So thati t seems that i ntel l igence i s the only possible conclusion . Theworld

,considered as a Cosmos

,i s nearly as wonderful as when con

sidered under the category of final i ty . I t seems, then , that Kant’s

adm iss ion of th e re ign of law makes the concess ion which theThe ist wishes

,even though final i ty could not be proved . The

argument from final i ty,however

,i s a sti l l stronger evidence of ia

tel ligent causation, so that i t is of the greatest importance to th eThe ist i n gi ving the a posteriori s ide of Theism. We proceed

,there

fore,to a cri t ical exami nat ion of the Kantian doctri ne of final i ty .

I n consideri ng the question which has been given as the secondstep of the argument

,whether we can i nfer final i ty from order and

adaptation observed,Kant seeks to show th at final i ty i s merely a

subject ive pri nciple of the reflecti ve j udgment . I ts orig i n be explai ns substant ially as fol lows The Understanding legislatesa p rior i for knowledge of Nature as an object of sense. The Reason l egisl ates a p r iori for the causali ty of freedom i n the supersens ible sphere . But the supersens ible must be able to determine thesens ible i n regard to the causal i ty of freedom,

because the effectsmust take place in the sensibl e world , and al though the possibil i tyof th i s cannot be comprehended

,i t must be presupposed . The

effect i n accordance w i th the concept of freedom is the final causewhich ought to resul t i n the natural world, hence the cond i tions ofi ts resul t ing are presupposed in Nature . The Teleological j udgment does th is

,and thus bridges the gap between the phenomenal

and noumenal Spheres . Therefore, i t is a necessary j udgment .But what i s i ts nature ? Judgment i n general is the facul ty ofthink ing the parti cular as contai ned in the universal . Now

,i f this

uni versal be a necessary concept which renders experience possible ,as do the categori es of the Understanding, then the j udgmen t iscal led a determi nan t one. But i f we have only a part icular empiri

cal law,and try to find the concept for i t, then thejudgment which

makes the subsumpti on is called a reflect ive j udgment . Such aj udgment cannot borrow i ts princ iple from exper ience, for i t i sseek ing a necessary pr inc iple ; nor can i t get i t from the Understandi ng

,for then i t would be a determi nant j udgment ; therefore the fac

ulty ofjudgment must i tsel f supply this princi ple a p riori . Thepr inc iple is this . For reflection onNature

,i f th i s i s to be possible

,

* Kant, Cr itique of Judgment, translation by Bernard , Introduction and

D ivision 2.

the same a p riori certai nty must be concei ved to be i n the particu

lar l aws of nature as i n the uni versal ones. They must be consid

ered as i f they proceeded from an Understanding,though not our

own, so as to render possible a system of experience embrac i ng the

whole of nature ; i n short, nature must be conceived as purposi ve .Here are Kant’s own words “ As uni versal l aws of nature havethei r ground in our understanding which prescribes them to nature

,

al though only accord ing to the uni versal concept of i t as nature ; sopart icular empi rical l aws

,i n respect of what i s i n them left unde

termined by these universal l aws,must be considered i n accordance

wi th such a unity as they would have i f an Understanding, thoughnot our Understanding

,had furnish ed them to our cogni ti ve facul

ties so as to make possibl e a system of experience accord ing to particular l aws of nature . Not as i f i n this way, such an Understand

i ng must be assumed as actual,for i t i s only our reflective j udgment

to which thi s Idea serves as a pri ncipl e,for reflecti ng, not for deter

mi ni ng ; but this facul ty thus gives a. law only to i tself and not to

nature .” This concept,then

,i s only necessary for our understand

i ng ; and whether or not i t i s true object ively we cannot say, becausei t arises from the peculiari ty of our understandi ng. I t is the peouliarity of the human Understand ing, says Kant, that i t i s discursi ve ,th at i t proceeds from universals to parti culars. But as these areundetermi ned by the universal concept, i n order that they may besubsumed under i t Reason demands that they be conceived as pur

posive . But Kant goes on to say th at we must recognize the possibility of an Understanding whi ch i s i ntui ti ve and not discursive .

Such an Understanding would intui te th e whole and i ts parts i n one

act, so th at there would be no necessi ty for any distinction betweenfinal and efficient causes but the whole coul d contain the possibi l i tyof th e parts

,and i tsel f be merely the resul t of them as causes ; bu t

i n accordance with the pecul iari ty of our Understand ing the wholemust he considered the resul t of the parts

,and i t is impossible that

i t should contai n th e ground of the possibil i ty of the parts,so th at

th e idea of the whole must contain the possibi l i ty of the form andadj ustment of the parts

,and this idea of the whole is a pu rpose .

So Kant concludes that final i ty i s merely a concept necessary forour minds . This consti tutes the nerve of his objec ti on to theTeleological argument ; for when we come to consider the two criticiems which he makes on the thi rd step of the argument, th at ofthe i nference to an Intel ligen t Cause of finali ty , we wi l l find thatthis same doctri ne of subjective final i ty i s repeated

,and that i t i s

the only one of the two cri ticisms which could have any weight.So that this second poi nt being establ ished

,the Theist would have

* Kant, Oritiquoof Judgment, translated by Bernard, Introduction, 14.

such subj ec ti ve necessi ty . And s ince we see final i ty i n some th ingsand not i n others there must be some objecti ve ground for this d isti nction .

” Trendelenburg also shows a contradiction at th is point

of Kant’s argument. Here is his view , as summarized by Janet :*

“ If final i ty were a necessary form of our knowledge, as space andtime are necessary forms of our sense i ntui tion

,all th ings would

appear to us in the relat ion of means to ends . But no,accord ing to

Kant,the hel p of final i ty is cal led inwhen the explanation by effic ient

causes no longer suffices ; i t i s the object itsel f wh ich forces the m ind

to quit the road i t was fol lowi ng . I t is th en the object which

determines when we must apply the purely subject ive pri nci pl e offinali ty .

" The demand for this pri nci pl e is occasioned by observat ion of nature . It is true

,as Kant says

,that our m inds be ing con

stituted as th ey are we must conceive nature thus . But thi s is nota suffic ient guarantee of i ts subjecti v i ty . The assertion that i t is , ismerely his assertion of the relati vi ty of knowl edge, which postulates wi thou t grounds the existence of a reali ty which is not theobject of consc iousness. Knowledge implies a knowi ng mind, i t i sthe m i nd’s grasp of object ive truth . We cannot say then , thatbecause i t requi res a mind to know

,knowledge is subjecti ve . The

knot of the quest ion is whether or not there is any connect ionbetween ourm inds and thei r pri nc iples of knowledge

,and Uni versal

Reason which is the ground of al l th i ngs. I f we deny th is connection

,absolute skeptic ism must be the resu l t. This object ion of

Kant to finali ty on the ground of i ts subjecti vi ty finds i ts strongestanswer in a cr i ticism of his theory of knowledge . lve concl ude

,

then,that final i ty i s an object ive fact whi ch demands our acceptati onand cal ls for explanation .

With reference to the th i rd step of the Teleolog ical argument asstated

,Kant’s cri ticism is twofold .

The firstone is th iszj' After cri tic isi ng the doctri nes ofEpicurus,Spinoza

,and of lIylozoism, he says of Theism that, whi le i t i s

the best of all systems because i t ascribes the purposes of nature toIntelligence, i t nevertheless does not establ ish i ts claims, because i trests i ts i nference on the basis of final i ty

,wh ich has been shown to

be only a subjecti ve pri nciple . The second cri tic ism ,gi ven i n the

section enti tled “ Physico-Theology,

” i s thisz t However far Physi co-Theology be pushed

,i t can never disclose the ul timate pu rpose

of creation, because i t does not extend i ts i nqu i ri es beyond ex pe

ricuce . I t is based on i nquiries i nto the purpose for wh ich natureexists

,and on this the concept of a Supreme Intel ligence rests

.Our

Janet, "inal Causes.

1Kant, Cr itiqueof Judgment, Bernard '

s translation, 73.

IKant, Critiqueof Judgment, 85 .

ignorance of this ul timate purpose prevents us from inferr ing anIntel ligen t Cause of final i ty .

The first objection,that final i ty is merely a subj ec ti ve pr inci ple

,

has been already deal t w i th and we have seen that final i ty is a realtruth to be explained

,and

,as Kant says

,grant ing th is

,The ism

seems a more reasonable theory than those ofEpicurus and Sp inozaand

, we may add , than that of Hegel .The second cri ticism wasthat the argument presupposed a knowledge of th e ul timate end for wh ich nature was created ; and that ou rignorance of this v iti ates th e argument

,since from the knowledge

ofcontingent ends i n nature we cannot i nfer an Infini te Intell igence .

l Vith reference to this,i t may be said that this a posteriori argu

ment does not seek to i nfer Infini te Intel ligence,but only to show

that the Fi rst Cause is possessed of i ntel ligence . I t therefore doesnot presuppose any knowledge ofu l timate ends ; but from the wonderful adaptation of means to ends i n nature

,the mi nd concl udes

that th e cause of al l this must have been an i ntell igent cause .When this is done th is argument has performed i ts spec ial function .

Th is l ast cri ti cism is i rrelevan t,because i t requires the argument to

prove too much .

As long as men conti nue to seek adequate reasons for th e phenomena about them this argument wi l l conti nue to have weight

,i n

spi te of the subtle cr i ticisms of pli ilOSOphers. Men never can bemade to bel ieve that th is vast and wonderful cosmos resul ted from

chance or that mechan ical l aw i s sel f-expl anatory . Ne i ther w i l lthey believe that i t resu l ted from the evol ution of an immanentprinc i ple wh ich reaches self-consci ousness only i n man

,and so can

not be “ external to anyth ing ;" no more wi l l they bel ieve that

thei r firm convicti on i s a mere vagary resu l ting from the peculi ari ty

of thei r mi nd . The bel ief w i l l always exist that Conscious Intel ligence is at the beginning of things as wel l as that i t i s thei r ground

,

immanent i n nature and man, yet external to both . The supernatural can never be reduced merely to the spi ri tual .

The conclusi on from all this would seem to be that th e posi tionreached a p riori is confirmed by a posteriori considerations . That

we get a true v iew of real i ty , no matter which of the two stand

po ints we take . That they thus agree i s strong evid ence of the

truth of each .

To leave the consideration of any aspec t of Kantism withouti ncluding the resul ts of the Metaphysicsof E thics and the Critiqueq/ the P ractica l Reason would be unj ust and would g ive no ade

quate conception of h is system . In an age when the commands ofd uty had been reduced to max ims ofprudence or of incl i nation

,he

raised h is voice more powerfully thanany other to show the sacred

ness ofduty ; for in spi te of th e Util i tari an way i n whi ch his cate

gorical imperati ve voices i tself, this is g iven as a test rather than aground of Rightness, the ground being found i n man

’s noumenal

nature,which connects him through freedom to Reason Univer

sal . The autonomy of the wi l l is the basis of his Ethics , and is

Open to severe cri ti cism but he certai nly d id uphold duty as aga insta calculating moral i ty . And furthermore he showed the necessi tyofa Metaphysical basis for Eth ics . We w i l l have toconsider

,then

,

very briefly,h is Ethical teach ing

,and here of course only so far as

i t bears d i rectly on Theism .

The relation of The ism and E thics he conce ived,we bel ieve

,

i nadequately . The true relation between them ,or the moral argu

ment for Theism is,briefly

,this . The three fundamental categori es

ofEthics are Moral obligation,the Righ t

,and the Good . Our eon

sciousnesstells us that we are under an uncondi tional obl igation toconform our conduct to a certai n standard of Rightness and to reali ze a certai n end or sumznum bonuin. This i s al l that our moralconsciousness tells us

,but there must be some ultimate metaphysical

expl anati on of these categori es. Begi nning with the fact of moralobligation

,we see that to gi ve th is any empi ri cal deduction would

result i n reduci ng i t to a hypothetical imperative and to make thewil l absolutely and uncondi ti onally legislat i ve for i tsel f must resultei ther i n a phi losophy of capr ice which would explai n away the

categori cal imperative,or else i n the Ethical Pan thei sm of Fich te .

The only adequate explanati on of the categori cal imperat ive,there

fore,i s one which distinctly separates the Absolute and Rel ati ve

w i l ls ; regardi ng moral obligation as the W i l l of God binding H is

creatures to Right,which must consequently be explained as H is

nature,and to real ize th e good , which must embrace human wel l

being or perfect ion and happi ness,and God ’s glory . That the

Absol ute must be possessed ofmoral attributes i s thus the testimonyof moral phenomena . Let us now examine Kant’s doctrine of therel ation of Theism and Ethics . Il e lays down what he beli eves tobe the two grea t foundations of Eth ics in his Metaphysicsof E thics.

He tells us* that from experience we can never tel l of an actionwhether i t i s obj ecti vely righ t only , or whether i t i s also subj eetively righ t , that is, done merely out of respect for the moral lawbut that we conclude that whether or not there are actions of th islatter kind cannot be the question

,and that Reason i tsel f

,independ

ent of all experience,tel ls us what ought to take pl ace

,and that

this imperative is categorical . Thi s imperative , be ing a fact ofconsciousness, must have some explanation which wi l l render i t poss ible. He lays down the princi ple of the autonomy of the wil l as

Kant, Metaphysicsof E th ics, Abbot’

stranslation, Preface, g2.

they are the ex pression of Hisnature . It is the fact of the determinism of the di v ine wi l l which makes a necessi ty of the Chr istianMystery in the Incarnation and Atonement . Surely as far as arbitrariness i s concerned nothi ng could be more so than Kant’s theory .

It i s j ust because God is the ratioessendi of al l the ethi cal categori es that we ascr ibe to Him a moral nature . The objection thatwe can have no “ intui tion of the d ivine perfection could be u rgedonly i f God were ent irely different from us and out of al l rel ationto us . But i t has been seen that th e Self-reveal ing Spi ri t wh ich a

true Metaphysics gi ves us,can be l i ke us because we have been

formed i n H is i mage . It i s thi s truth tha t makes al l knowledgepossible

,and Agnosti cism must be the resul t of denying i t . I n

order to know nature,we must determine our series ofstates of con

sc iousness i n t ime in relation to a relati ng and un i fying sel f-conseiousnesswhich cannot be part of the series and th is i n turn must

be a true copy of that sel f-consciousness wh ich makes nature possi

ble . I f then our noumenal sel f carry wi th i t a moral ideal so mustGod also be concei ved as possessed of moral attributes .

But even pass ing any defects i n Kant’s theory, we may ask , Upon

what does i t all rest ? What i s h is ground for asserting that the

Practical Reason opens up the noumenal sphere ? Kant says* th ati t is not opened toknowledge. Freedom

,God and Immortal i ty are

not matters of knowledge but only deduc ible from the Moral law,

which is the one poi nt where the noumenal world enters our con

sciousness. But we may well ask what special righ t i t has to thi sunique posi ti on . Examination of consciousness wi l l show us th at

the necessi ty accompanying our theoretical pri nc iples isjust asstrong

and true, j ust as un iversal . It Would seem,then

,that we must

adm i t the val idi ty of our th eoretical princi ples i n th e noumenal

sphere,or else become agnostic i n Ethics also . Kant ’s posi t ion is

not logical . He i s not logical ly construc ti ve . "et th rough al l,

this was his aim,thi s was the Spiri t of h is whole system .

The rul ing categories of eigh teenth -cen tury though t were those

of i ndi vidualism ,mechan ism

,and sensational ism . These had such

a hold on the human m ind that i t seemed as i f Ph i losophy was to

be forever impossible . Knowledge must be explai ned mechanical ly

and sensat ional ly,or its possib i li ty denied . Moral i ty must be

reduced to phys ical necessi ty,or at best _to a calcul us of prudence .

Rel igion was an empty name . Kant l i ved and thought j ust at th ist ime . He gi ves noble expression to the power and worth of thehuman spi r i t . He i l lumines everyth ing wi th the l igh t of sel f-con

sciousness. He brings out the a prz'

om'

elements i n knowledge . Heplaces moral i ty above prudence . He causes the great movement

Kant, Cr itiqueof Practical Reason, Preface .

of German Ideal ism . In short he makes possible the whole in tellectual l i fe of the n ineteenth century . He rises

,an i ntel lectual

giant,tearing himsel f from the fetters of the preceding thought ;

and though he is held back half chained,as i t were

,by the very

bonds whose power he fough t so nobly tobreak, and did break, yetthe fi rst step was the h ardest to take

,and h e must be cl assed wi th

the world ’s great th inkers whose i nfluence has been posi ti ve andconstructi ve . He wi l l always be, as Dr . Sti rl i ng says, der ehrl i cheKant .”

PRINCETON. C. WISTA R HODG E , JR .