All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise FOP SECRETHNOFORN US. FOREIGH shown. CTELLIGERCE INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SURVEILLANCE COURT - Classify By: J23J98T32 206 OCT . Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ua uy bl-1 Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10 2016 . LEEA, i rua ed HA - b3-1 Declassify O i CLERK Ur COURT eclassify On: . WASHINGTON,D.C. b7A-1 ($) IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number: | bl-l , b7A-1 (U) VERIFIED APPLICATION (8) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct is as describedherein, pursuant bl-1. to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b3-1 | b7A-1 States Code (U.S.C), Ss (FISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 | } 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is made by ME a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties at FBI Headquarters include 1-1 b3-1 supervision of the FBI's investigation ofthe above-captioned target based upon eT b7C-1 informationofficially furnished oii b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 SECRETH/NOFORN Classified by: biel Derived from: Pe b3-1 Declassify on: P| | | at OI Tracking No: 143045 17-cv-597(FBI) - 1
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All information is considered
unclassified except where otherwise FOPSECRETHNOFORN US. FOREIGHshown. CTELLIGERCEINTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SURVEILLANCE COURT
- Classify By: J23J98T32 206 OCT .Reason: (C) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTua uy bl-1Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated 102016 . LEEA, i rua ed HA - b3-1Declassify Oi CLERK Ur COURTeclassify On: . WASHINGTON,D.C. b7A-1
($) IN RE CARTER W.PAGE,A U.S. Docket Number:
| bl-l
, b7A-1
(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION
(8) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to
conductisas describedherein, pursuant
bl-1.to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b3-1 |
b7A-1States Code (U.S.C),Ss(FISA or the Act). b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|} 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is
made byMEa Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal
Bureauof Investigation (FBI) whoseofficial duties atFBI Headquarters include 1-1b3-1
supervision of the FBI's investigation ofthe above-captioned target based upon eT
2. ) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.. b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, describedin detail below. The
| b7E-1, 2,3, 6status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information
provided by the U.S. Departmentof State.PO]
3. §) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts
bl-1and circumstances in supportof this application. b3-1
b7A-1
a. () Thetargetof this application is an agent of a foreign power. b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
$8) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a
description of the target andthe target's activities for or on behalf ofthis foreign
power.
(U) (6) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign power as
defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).
(U)(%) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally
recognized foreign governmentand,as of the executionof this application,is listed
in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States DepartmentofState, and in
Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its
establishments in the United States are components thereof.
FOPSECRETHNOFORN
-2-17-cv-597(FBI) - 2
-FOP-SECRET/NOFORN
' ¥S) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation
a
Ss|17-cv-597(FBI) - 3
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b7E- 1,2|(U) (8) Carter W, Pagi
| . b7A-1knowingly engage in
Bly en6a6 b7E- 1, 2
clandestine intelligence activities (other thanintelligence gathering activities) for
or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to
involvea violation of the criminalstatutes of the United States, or knowingly
conspires with other persons to engage insuch activities and, therefore, is an
agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).
(§XMR) This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been
the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Governmenti
ESb3-1
undermine and influence the outcomeof the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in re
; b7C-2violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).Pe
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|1 () (31/0) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.
(SMR) During a recentinterview withan identified news organization, the
Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia hastried to influenceU.S.
elections since the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a tradition in Russia of
interfering with elections, their own and others.” The DNI commentedthat this
influence included providing money to particular ¢candidatesor providing
disinformation. The DNIaddedthat “it shouldn’t comeasabig shock to people, wes
I thinkit’s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can
bring to bear in the same effort.”iii
aMh17-cv-597(FBI) - 5
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(SANKIn or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the
Democratic National Committee (DNC).1Se
7There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was
behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack. Russian
_ President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not
responsible for the hack, butsaid that the release of the DNC documents wasa net
- positive: “The importantthingis the content that was given to the public.” Despite
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* (GKANEX According to information onits website, WikiLeaksis a multi-national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in theanalysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted officialmaterials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open sourceinformation, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it sayse from the accounts of DNCofficials.
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I28,accorcing to 3b7A-1
an October7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the DepartmentofHomeland Security and the b7E- 1, 2,3
Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election Security (Election Security Joint
Statement), the USICis confident that the Russian Government directed the recent
compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S.
political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statementstates that therecent
disclosures of e-mails on; among others,sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the
methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election
Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with
the U.S. election process, activity that is not new to Moscow -— the Russians have
used similar tactics and. techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to
influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statementstatesthat,
basedonthe scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials
could have authorized these activities.
(SHXIEK) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence
US. elections,i27
the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination with Carter Page bl-1
| b3-1» b7A-1
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MIermine anc improperly and illegallyinfluence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
(U) ON)eeeeaestated in thelegislative history of FISA:
Not only doforeign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates toobtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended toharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion, orthe activities of individuals. Such activitiesmayincludepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencingof publicofficials to act in favoror the foreign power), disguised propaganda(including the plantingof false or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whooppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of ourcitizens,
HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).
IL. (U)XGY/KIK) The Russian Government's Attem ts to Influence the 2016 U.S.
es
attempts
to
influencethe2016U.S.
Presidential Election.
XRF) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page(the |
targetof this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part ofhis/her
foreign policy tam.[aa
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athe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts are being
coordinated with Page and perhapsother individuals associated with Candidate
1's campaignSE
es
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-17-cv-597(FBI) - 9
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FtAs discussed below, Pagehasestablished relationships with Russian
Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligenceofficers
111.(U)(g) Carter Page.
(U) A. (&) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.
{XANE) Page, a U.S.citizen,is the founder and managing partner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that
focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets,Fs , pal7E-1, 2.
asa
as
-10-17-cv-597(FBI) - 10
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GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived inRussia
9
(vb
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business dealings withGazprom
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(3XNK) According to information provided by Page during7 a2
agees:
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T
O
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oe . . — -b7C-2GHEE) According to information provided by Page during || interview jon12
with the FBI,
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(U) XSZAXKKIn or about jaruary 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov
and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court
| for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 US.C.§§ 371 and 951
(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign government).
According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the
SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an
employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two
other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of
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Russia.* The complaintstates that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy
and Sporyshevinchided, amongotherthings, attempting to recruit New York City
residentsas intelligence sources for Russia.
‘SYRG
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--b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2
(U) * (@NKIEX Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. At the time ofBuryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshevno longerlived in the United States andwere not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakovpled guilty to conspiring to actin the United States as an agent of Russia, without providingprior notice to theAttorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 months inprison.
oe 17-cv-597(FBI) - 14
ll(U) B. @ANKEXPage’s Coordination with Russian GovernmentOfficials on 2016.
U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.
ASKIN) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to
Russia and delivered the commencement addressat the New Economic School.” In
addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two _
Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI
confidentialhuman source (Source#1)?reported that Page had a
(A)= | :
395and has been an FBI source since
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|Source #1’s reporting has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings 74-1
and the FBIassesses Source #1 to be reliable. Source #1 has been compensated
by the FBI and the FBI is unaware of any derogatory
information pertaining to Source #1.
(TEXRSEX Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence+
firm, was approachedby an identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that a
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U.S.-basedlawfirm had hired the identified U.S. person to conductresearchregarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source#1have a long-standing business relationship). The identified'U.S. person hired Source#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as tothe motivationbehind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBIspeculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.
(U) BSXASBY Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s), describedherein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 and to the FBI.
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XKSZAXR) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 Providedreliable informationto the FBI, the FBI bl-1believes Source #1's teporting herein to be credible. b3-1
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“16- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 16
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secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy
company] and
a
close associate to Russian President Putin.”Fo bl-l
| : 3-1
reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b7A-1
, b7D-1
cooperation and the prospects for an associated moveto lift Ukraine-related Western b7E- 1, 2
sanctions against Rusia,i
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(U) 10 @@KIEX In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentofthe Treasury
(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government
officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was
identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the
President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he
continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from
2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin.
The USDOTsanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone whohas “shown
utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —a key componentto his current standing.”
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XESANE) Feaccording to Source1,
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esmetsecretly with Page
and thattheir agendaforthe meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or
“kompromat”?? that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit
being released to Candidate #1’s campaign."es
11 (bl-1b3-1
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(UU) x» (3) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or Political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or
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|
OUJuly 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that
| Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to makesurePolitical Party #1’s
platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian andrebel
- forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders
in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make
sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give Ukraine the weapons it has
beenasking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016 article published
by an identified news organization characterized Candidate #1 as soundinglike a
supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September [2015], adopted a “milder”
-tone regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The August 2016article further
reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian
territory andlift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. Thearticle opined that
while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was not clear, Candidate #1’s more
conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform,follow
Candidate #1’s recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian
influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor CarterPage. to
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IV.(U) (GME) Page’sDenial of Cooperation with the Russian Government.
(U) (HNMR) On or about September23, 2016, an identified news organization
publishedan article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news
organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence
officials are investigating Page with Tespect to suspected efforts by the Russian
Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential election. Accordingto the September
23rd News Article, US.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin
Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New
Economic School, he met with two senior. Russian officials. The September 23rd
NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Westernintelligence source” told the news
organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former
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Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their
alleged meeting, Sechin raised theissue ofthelifting of sanctions with Page.
According to the September 23rd News Article, the Westernintelligencesource also
reported thatU.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another
top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as
deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by US.officials to have
responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe U.S.election.
(U) (SNE Accordingto the September 23rd News Artide, certain members of
Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed on the alleged meetings and
viewed the meetings as a possible back channel tothe Russiansthat could undercut
‘US. foreign policy. The September 3rd NewsArticle-also stated that, following the
briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, andciting the reports
18 () As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to
conduct research into Candidate#1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results
of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business
associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business
associate in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this — bh
information to the business associate and the FBI. b3-1b7A-1
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The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly
providedthis information to the press. .
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of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamedin the
letter, butthearticle indicated that the advisoris Page] and “high ranking
sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin]in Moscow over the
_ summeras evidence of “significant and disturbing ties” between Candidate #1’s
campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.
(U) §SXANB} Based on statementsin the September 23rd News Article, as well as
in other recentarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate f’s
campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attemptto create the
appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #1’s campaign. For example,
the September 23rd News Article noted that Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s
campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1’s
campaign called Page an “informal foreign advisor” who“doesnot speak for
[Candidate #1] or thecampaign.” In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate
#1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and added “[w]e are not aware of any of
his activities, past or present.” However,the article stated thatthe campaign
spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously
described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an
. identified news organization publishedan article that was based primarily on an
_ interview with Candidate #1’s current campaign manager(the September 25th News
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Article). During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Page is] not part of
the campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page is not part of |
Candidate #1’s nationalsecurity or foreign policy briefings since he/she became
campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding
reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to
conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign -
manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the
permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .”PO
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| (U) (SKMKKOn or about September 25, 2016, Page senta letter to the FBI Director.
Inthis letter, Page madereferenceto the accusations in the September 23rd News |
Article anddenied them. Pagestated thatthe source of the accusations is nothing
more than completely false media reports and that he did not meetthis year with
any sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would Be willing to
-25- 17-cv-597(FBI) -25 -
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discuss any “final” questions the FBI mayhave.”
EXANEY Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news
organization published an article that was based onan interview with Page
(September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated
thatall of the accusations are complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with
Sechin or Divyekin. Pagealso stated that he wouldbe taking a leave of absence
from his work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations are a
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aU) b3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
‘ -31- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 31
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3,6|VII. (U) Conclusion.
(U) (SXASEY As discussed above, the FBIbelieves that Page has beencollaborating
“os . . b7A-1and conspiring with the Russian Governneni
, b7E-1, 2
I5503on tneforegoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to
believe that Page(iis
.owinglyengage in
clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gatheringactivities) for or
on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other personsto
engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).
CO) Gx,b7A-1
eeeeth. FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that
such activities involve or are aboutto involve violations of the criminal statutes of
FOPSECRET/NOFORN
-32- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 32
FOPSECRETNOFORN
the UnitedStatsb7A-1
b7E-1, 2
)es
=—
+7;b7E-1, 2
——————
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1,2, 3, 6ii-33- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 33
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
-34- 17-cv-597(FBl) - 34
(8) |b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|
-35- ——-17-ev-597(FBI) - 35
ee>:b3-1
a bratb7E-1,2, 3, 6
4. (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Asto all information acquired
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
Ne
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
through the authorities requested herein, the FBI willfollow
-36- —-17-c\-597(FBI)- 36
bl-1
b3-1.b7A-1b7E-2, 3
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1; b7E-2,3es
C
}Aes |b3-1
b7A-1Ls
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
-37- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 37
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
&)
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(3)bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6\-38- ~ 17-cv-597(FBI) - 38
5. (9%) Nature of th Information Sought Throughthe authorities Py
b7A-1
requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1, 2, 3,6
respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the
certification set forth below. Asindicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis
seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to theability of
the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an
intelligence service or network ofthis foreign powerorby agents of this foreign
power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that
relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally
acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.
(8)
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1,2, 3, 6I
-39- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 39
b1-1ab3-1
b7A-1Sl
esb3-1es yar| : : : _b7E- 1, 2,3,6
es
——EEEes
(4)
bl-1b3-1
aboatb7E-1, 2, 3, 6
~40- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 40
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN
6. () Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor
National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the bl-l
b3-1Presidentas a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfii b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3,6 —
SI2s 20sec, is set forth below.
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2,7
|
(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested
®& The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in
the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the
authorities requested in this application may produce information and material
which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidenceof a
violation of United States law, and this investigation mayresult in an eventual
FOPSECRET/NOFORN
-41- - 47-cv-597(FBI) - 41
FOPSECRET/NOFORN |
criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at
least a significant purpose of this request1 iii__s
ais to collect foreign intelligence information aspart of the FBI’s investigation
of this target.
2b1-1
3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
-42- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 42
FORSECRETHNOFORN .
9. %) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See ds)as'
b3-1
The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same
type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughoutthe entire period requested.
The activitieswhich the United States must identify and monitor are incremental
and continuous, and communicationsrelating to such activities are often disguised
to appear innocuous. The type offoreign intelligence information being sought and
the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a
given time,all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.
Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period
of ninety (90) days.
SS
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E- 1,2
||
-43- : 17-cv-597(FBI) - 43 —
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
TW I
bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2,6
|
|~44- 17-cv-597(FBI) - 44
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1 |
b7E-2||
a & es...b3-1
b7A-1
- b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
TBI
-45- * . 47-cv-597(FBI) - 45
FOPSECRET//NOFORN
eeb3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6
13. () |-46- - 17-cv-597(FBI) - 46
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6|bl-1.b3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(UYS) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information,
the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities
described immediately below for the period requested herein.
~---- The remainder of this pageis intentionally left blank. --~-
8 17-cv-597(FBI) - 52
TOP
SECRET/NOFORN
(U) (8) The FBI has reviewedthisverified application foraccuracy in accordance
with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy ofthe draft to the
appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to
the Court.
----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----
-53- ~ 47-c¢v-597(FBI) - 53
FOP-SECRETHNOEORN
(U) VERIFICATION
($) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information
regarding Carter W.Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United
/o Sbbl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
States Code, § 1746 on
b6-1
b7A-1
Supervisory Special Agent b7C-1Federal Bureauof Investigation
A Wah» LeeAnn Flynn Hall, CI rk, FISC,Certify that this documentisa true and correct copy
FOP
SECRET/NOFORNof the original,
17-cv-597(FBI) - 54
FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN
(U) CERTIFICATION
($) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one ofthe officials
authorized to makethe certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard tothe
EE=equested in this verified application targeting a
| | b7A-1
Carter W.Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 47p-1, 2, 3, 6
(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is |
foreign intelligence information.
(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstandingthe related criminal
mattersdescribedin this application, theprimarypurpose of theauthoritiesOT
requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other
than thosereferred to in the Act, 50 USC. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign
intelligence crimes.
(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities bl-1b3-1
requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6
(D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the
authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), i-e.,
FOP
SECRETF/HNOFORN
55- 47-cv-597(FBI) - 55
FOP
SECRET/NOFORN
information that relates andis necessary to the ability of the UnitedStates to protect
against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this
foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),
ie., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and
is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conductof the foreign affairs
of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign
intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
. vn a bl-1(E) (&) The basis for mycertification that the information soughtis the type b3-1. b7A-1of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
be obtained by normal investigative techniquesis as follows.
the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the current U.S.
Presidential Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-8-
17-cv-597(FBI)-91
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
took actions intended to interfere with the U.S.election process and that these
activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian
Government[in context,thisis likely a reference to the Election Security Joint
Statement].
(SANIRKBased on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence
US. and foreignelections,
i:the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination _ bl-1
oo b3-1
eeb7E-1, 2
I«2 2227: to undermine and
improperly andillegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. P|
(1)
b7A-1
Ss —PoAsstated in the legislative history of FISA:
FOR
SECRETYNOFORMN/FISA
-9-17-cv-597(FBI)-92
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the UnitedStates toobtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended toharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activitiesmayinclude political action (recruiting, bribery orinfluencing of publicofficials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda(includingthe plantingoffalse or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whooppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of ourcitizens.
HLR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978).(U)
B. (YNEX The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influencethe 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
X3/ANK) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the
target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate#1 as part of his/her
foreign policy tear.ae
FYthe FBI believes that the Russian Government'sefforts to influence the
2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other
individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaignisio
esas
Ss
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-10-
17-cv-597(FBI)-93
bl-1
b3-1b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
TOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
Cuss
_
As discussed below, Pagehasestablished relationships with
Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligence officers,
|
|
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
FOR
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-11-
47-cv-597(FBI)-94
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1esb7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
(U)Ill. (& Carter Page.
(U)A. (%) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.
RSKASRY Page, a U.S.citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that
focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging marketsay
b7A-1Ls
bl-1Pe, =|b7A-1esb7E-1,2
bl-1b3-1
b7A-1b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-12-
17-cv-597(FBI)-95
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISAbl-1
es
—
|,b7A-1
CC)5
GEfrom approximately 2004 - 2007, Pagelived inRussiab7A-1
During this time, Page began 7E-1, 2
business dealings with Gazprom
bl-1
XSAN) According to information provided by Page duringi b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2
interview with the FBIPage
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3
FOP
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-13-47-cv-597(FBI)-96
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
eseses
b7E-1, 2eses |eseses
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
FOP
SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-14-
17-cv-597(FBI)-97
FOP
SECREFHNOFORNIFISA
bl-1b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 6I
(U)
—
%SYAXF) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov
and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S.District Court
for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951
(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).
According to the complaint, Buryakov workedin the United States as an agent of the
SVR. Specifically,Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an
employeein the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two
other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gather intelligence on behalf of
Russia.” The complaintstates that the intelligence gatheringefforts of Podobnyy
and Sporyshevincluded, among other things, attemptingto recruit NewYork City
(U) 7 (GAR) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of
Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and
were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act
in the United States as an agentof Russia without providing prior notice to the
Attorney General. In or about May2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin
prison.
FOR
SECREFHNOFORNFISA
-15-17-cv-597(FBI)-98
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
residentsas intelligence sources for Russia,
eee
eesweLs|asaeSeespnLS|:LsmEaesayeses
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-16-
17-cv-597(FBI)-99
FOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA
(U)
B. @YNF) Page’s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016
U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.
(SNK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to
Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.* In
addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two
Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI
confidential human source (Source #1),?PFreported that Page had a
)a
X@SHNE) Source #1 has been an FBI source since
in or about October 2016, the FBI suspendedits
relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of
informationto the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship with
Source #1, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from
Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings. Moreover, the
FBInotes that the incidentthat led to the FBI suspendingits relationship with
Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting thatis described herein.
(U) @f8NK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligence
firm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that a
U'S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research
regarding Candidate #1’sties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1
have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source
#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 asto
the motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI
speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information that
could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.
FOR
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-17-
17-cv-597(FBI)-100
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2,4
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2,5
F
O
P
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
(U) XESYANB) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 and to the FBI.
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1,2
(RXASE) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source#1's previousreporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI bl-1believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible. b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1b7E-1,2
17-cv-597(FBI)-101
FOP-SECRET/HNOFORN/FISA
_ secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy
bl-1
company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.” ceported a '
that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy eT 5
cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western
sanctions against Russia.[i
a
a |bl-1
JOCKSANE) MEE according to Source 1IIS 55)
a ELsl b7E-1, 2
—bI-Ib3-1
. b7D-1
(U) 1 (SMM) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentofthe Treasury b7E-1, 2
(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government
officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was
identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the
President and Chairman of the ManagementBoardfor Rosneft, a position he
continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from
2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin.
The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone whohas “shown
utter loyalty to Viadimir Putin - a key componentto his current standing.”
: bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
47-cv-597(FBI)-102
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
REDivyckin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j
I3230:seccetiy with Pageand that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or
“kompromat”®that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it
being released to Candidate #1’scampaign.
(TS)aeses
(U)8 @) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity orblackmail.
17-cv-597(FBI)-103
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
FOR-SECRETHNOFORNFISA
bl-1
b3-1
Se
==—
77b7D-1
Oeoe?
bl1-1
b3-1
ACSHKIEXse b7A-1
RebE.b7E-1, 2
abl-1b3-1b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFHNOFORNFISA
-21-17-cv-597(FBI)-104
F
O
P
SECRET/NGOFORN/FISA
bl1-1esb7A-1Aesb7E-1, 2
a.July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that
Candidate #1’s campaign worked behindthe scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s
platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel
forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders
in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought “to make
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-22-
17-cv-597(FBI)-105
FOPSECRET/NGOFORN/FISA
sure that[Political Party #1] would not pledgeto give Ukraine the weaponsit has
been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016article published
by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding
like a supporter of Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that
Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of
Crimea. The August 2016article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate
#1 might recognize Crimeaas Russianterritory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions
against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was
not clear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party
#1's official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people
sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, includingforeign policy advisor Carter
Pageeeb3-1
ee=fb7E-1, 2
(Roa
bl-1
ae
|
|:b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-23-
17-cv-597(FBl)-106
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
Iv.) SXANEX Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian GovernmenttoInfluence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(U) (SXAEX On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization
publishedan article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news
organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S.intelligence
officials are investigating Page with respect to suspectedefforts by the Russian
Governmentto influencethe U.S. Presidential election. According to the September
23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page wasin
Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New
Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd
NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news
organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former
Russian deputy minister whois now the executive chairmanof Rosneft. At their
alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue ofthelifting of sanctions with Page.
According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also
reported that U.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another
top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as
deputy chief for internalpolicy andis believed by U.S.officials to have
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-24-
17-cv-597(FBI)-107
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
FOR
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.”
(U) SXRSEF According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of
Congress were “taken aback” after being briefed on the alleged meetings between
Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the
Russians that could undercut U.S.foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle
19 (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired bya business associate to
conduct research into Candidate#1’sties to Russia. Source #1 provided theresults
of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business
associate likely provided this information to the law firm thathired the business
associate in thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this
information to the business associate and the FBI.
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directly
provided this information to the identified news organization that published the
September 23rd News Article.
(U) (XSKNK) In or aboutlate October 2016, however,after the Director of the
FBI senta letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of
new informationthat might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was
conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with |
this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S.Presidential |
election. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, and
againstthe prior admonishmentfrom the FBI to speak only with the FBI onthis
matter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified news
organization. Although the FBI continuesto assess Source #1’s reporting is
reliable, as noted above, the FBI has suspendedits relationship with Source #1
because of this disclosure.
FOP
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-25-
17-cv-597(FBI)-108
FOP
SECREFT/NOFORN/FISA
also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI
Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the
advisor was unnamedin the letter, but the article indicated that the advisoris Page]
and “high ranking sanctionedindividuals” [in context, likely a referenceto Sechin]
in Moscow over the summeras evidenceof “significant and disturbingties”
between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated
by the FBI.
(U) (SMF) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as
in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s
campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate
#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that
Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaignis unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a
spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign
advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,
another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and
added “[w]e are not awareof any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the
article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why
Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about
September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-26-
17-cv-597(FBI)-109
TOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA
based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.
During the interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the
campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager addedthat Page has not been part
of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became
campaign manager. In responseto a question from the interviewer regarding
reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to
conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign
manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the
permission or knowledgeof the campaign... .”PO
es) b7E-1, 2
“(U) (SXANF) On or about September25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.
In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News
Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing
more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any
sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss
FOPSECRETHNOFORNFISA
-27-
: 17-cv-597(FBI)-110
FOPR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
any “final” questions the FBI may have.”
PSE Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news
organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page
(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated
- that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with
Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his
work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”
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TOPSECRETFHNGEORN/FISA
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17-cv-597(FBI)-115
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FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA
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FORSECRET//NOFORN/FISA
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FOP
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FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
Bi sxx)
FOPSECRET//NOFORN/FISA
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17-cv-597(FBI)-120
wn >
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FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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iMo bit
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b3-1
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F
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17-cv-597(FBl)-123
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISAbl-1
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||
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VII. (U) Conclusion.
(U) (S{XNR) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating b7A-1b7E-1,2
and conspiring with the Russian Governmentiii
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-43-
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foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to
b7A-1
believe that PageimsEE«.owingly engagein
clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or
on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to
engagein suchactivities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign poweras defined by
50 U.S.C.§ 1801(b)(2)(E).
CO) (SNK)ee
Me|
ee}:FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7E-1,2
such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of
Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States toobtain information, they also engagein activities which are intendedtoharm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, thecourse of public opinion, orthe activities of individuals. Such activitiesmay includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of publicofficials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda(including the plantingof false or misleadingarticles or stories), andharassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals whoopposethe foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democraticinstitutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of ourcitizens.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).
(U) B. X$NX) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influencethe 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(SXNEX In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? and Carter Page (the
target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her
foreign policy teor.ees
|
OYthe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the
2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other
individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaign.asi
“
F
O
P
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-10-
17-cv-597(FBI)-191
b1-1
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FOPSECREFYNGFORNFISA
Chote |As discussed below, Page has established relationships with
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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-11-
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FOPSECRETYNOEORN/FISA
Russian Governmentofficials, including Russian intelligence officers,P| b7A-1b7D-1
Ss
a—“‘t‘SCtSSSb3-1
ee7].b7E-1, 2,3
III. (U)(S) Carter Page. :
(U)A. (8) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS. (
(SANK) Page, a U.S.citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global i
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment managementand advisory firm that
focuses on the energy sector primarily in emergingmarkets.
b7A-1b7E-1, 2
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-12-
17-cv-597(FBI)-193
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
7b7E-1, 2
es>)b3-1
sfb7E-1, 2
CO)SN)
PRcom approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in RussiaPO
b7A-1
SEuring this time, Page began 575-1,
business dealings withGazprom
bl1-1
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-13-17-cv-597(FBI)-194
FOPSECREFTHNOFORN/FISA
(ARK) According to information provided by Page duringPo
rJ ga ointerview with the FBI
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-14-
17-cv-597(FBI)-195
b7A-1b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2 -
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1b3-1
b7A-1b7E-1, 2,3
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
b6-2(XRF) Accordingto information provided by Page duringafoterview b7A-1
b7C-2
withChe b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1,2,6
(U) (KR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy,along with Evgeny Buryakov
and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaintin the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New Yorkfor violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951
(conspiringto act, andacting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government).
According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the
SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an
employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two
other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-15-
17-cv-597(FBI)-196
FOP-SECRETYNOFORNFISA
Russia.? The complaintstates that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy
and Sporyshev included, amongother things, attempting to-recruit New York City
residents as intelligence sources for Russia. |
bl1-1
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o o tw
b7A-1
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(U) 8 (6XRIE) Buryakov wasarrestedin or about January 2015. At the time of
Buryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev nolongerlived in the United States and
were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiringto act
in the United States as an agentof Russia without providing prior notice to the
Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov wassentenced to 30 monthsin
prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons,
Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.
FOPR-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-16-17-cv-597(FBl)-197
TOP
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
ee|:b3-1
ab6-2
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—*b7E-1, 2
(U)B. S6XRB{ Page’s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016
U.S.Presidential Election Influence Activities.
KXBNEY According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to
Russia and delivered the commencementaddressat the New Economic School.? In
addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page metwith at least two a
| b7A-1Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI p7p-1
b7E-1, 2
confidential human source (Source#1),reported that Page had a
b3-1
b7A-1
O) > 5)ee 71,2,4
10 (POLAND} Source #1
had been an FBI source since b1-1
Source #1 has been compensate ‘by the FBI. As (TS) b3-1
discussed below in footnote 20, in or about October2016, the FBI suspendedits b7A-1
relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of b7E-1, 2,5
informationto the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source.
Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from
Source #1 has been corroborated and usedin criminal proceedings. Moreover, the
TOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-17-17-cv-597(FBl)-198
FOP
SECRETHNGFORN/FISA
FBInotes that the incidentthatled the FBI to terminateits relationship withSource #1 occurred after Source #1 providedthe reporting that is described herein.
(U)
—
GESXANEX Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financialintelligencefirm, was approachedby an identified U.S. person, whoindicated to Source #1 that aU.S.-based law firm hadhiredthe identified U.S. person to conduct researchregarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as tothe motivation behindthe research into Candidate #1’sties to Russia. The FBIspeculates thatthe identified U.S. person was likely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.
(U) KDEX/MF) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 andto the FBI.
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
(2SYANH) Notwithstanding Source#1's reason for conducting the research bilinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previousreporting history b3-]with the FBI, whereby Source #1 providedreliable information to the FBI, the FBI b7A-1believes Source #1's reportin g herein to be credible. b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
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FOP-SECRETH/NOFORN/FISA
-18-
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FOR
SECREFHNOFORNFISA|
bl-1
. ;b3-1
secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy b7A-1
b7D-1 |
company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.”GE-eported b7E-1,2.
b3-1 :b7A-1 |b7D-1 |
b7E-1, 2.
(
|bl-1b3-1
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.
b7D-1
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i
ee
b7D-17
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1 (FONK)bi-1b3-1b7A-1b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
(U) 2y¥$¢f50R) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury
(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government
officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was
_ identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the
President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he
continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from
2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin.
The USDOTsanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has “shown
utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin — a key componentto his current standing.”
FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-19-17-cv-597(FBI)-200
FOR
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA !that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b1-1
b3-1cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western va
b7E-1, 2senctions against Russia
I
iirra
(TSAR)Ieccording to Source #1IIISammmmmmees ba
b3-1ee b7A-1b7D-1RRDivyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin], J b7E-1,2
esmet secretly with Page
andthattheir agendafor the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or
“kompromat”™that the Kremlin Possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it
b1-113 KSANR)
(b3-1
b7A-1
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b7E-1, 2
(U) # @&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about aPolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity or
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-20-
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA
being released to Candidate #1’s mpeign
FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA
-21-
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bl-1b3-1
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-b7E-1, 2
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-22-
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F
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SECRET//NGEORN/FISA
bl-1b3-1
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a EdPsila,aa.July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that
Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to makesure Political Party #1’s
platform would notcall for giving weaponsto Ukraineto fight Russian and rebel
forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders
F
O
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SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-23-
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FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make
sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has
been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016article published
by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding
like a supporterof Ukraine’sterritorial integrity in September[2015], noted that
Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of
| Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate
#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions
against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was
notclear, Candidate #1’s more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party
#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people
sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter
IV. (U)GYAN Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto
Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(U) SXANEF Onor about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization
published anarticle (September 23rd News Article), which waswritten by the news
organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence
officials are investigating Page with respect to suspectedefforts by the Russian
Governmentto influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September
23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in
Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement addressat the New
Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd
NewsArticle stated that a“well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news
organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former
Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their
alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issueof thelifting of sanctions with Page.
According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Westernintelligence source also
reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another
top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as
FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-25-17-cv-597(FBI)-206
FOP
SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S. officials to have
responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe US. election.”°
(U) (SKN) Accordingto the September 23rd News Article, certain members of
Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between
Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the
Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle
* (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate toconduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 providedthe resultsof his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the businessassociate likely provided this information to the law firm thathired the businessassociatein thefirst place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided thisinformation to the business associate and the FBI.
b1-1
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b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
The FBI doesnotbelieve that Source #1 directlyprovided this information to the identified newsorganization that published theSeptember 23rd NewsArticle.
(U) (¥8ANK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the Director of theFBIsenta letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned ofnew information that might be pertinentto an investigation that the FBI wasconducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated withthis action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidentialelection. In response to Source #1’s concerns, Source #1 independently, andagainstthe prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on thismatter, released the reporting discussed herein to an identified newsorganization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1’s reporting isreliable, as noted above, the FBI has now closed Source #1 as an active source.
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-26-
17-cv-597(FBI)-207
FOP-SECREF/NOFORN/FISA
also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI
Director, andciting the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the
advisor was unnamedin theletter, but thearticle indicated that the advisoris Page]
and “high ranking sanctioned individuals” [in context, likely a reference to Sechin]
in Moscow over the summerasevidence of “significant and disturbingties”
between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated
by the FBI.
(U) (S{XMX) Based on statementsin the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as
in otherarticles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s
campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate
#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that
Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. According to the article, a
spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informalforeign
advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,
another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and
added “[w]e are not aware of any ofhis activities, past or present.” However, the
article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why
Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about
September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-27-
17-cv-597(FBI)-208
FOP
SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.
Duringthe interview,the campaign managerstated, “[Page is] not part of the
campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page has not been part
of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became
campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding
reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to
conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign
manager responded,“If [Pageis] doing that, he’s certainly not doingit with the
7
permission or knowledge of the campaign... .’
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
(U) (XK) On or about September25, 2016, Page senta letter to the FBI Director.
In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News
Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing
more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any
sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-28-|
17-cv-597(FBI)-209
FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA
any “final” questions the FBI may have.”
(SMXR) Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news
organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page
(September 26th News Article). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated
that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with
Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his
work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”
FOR
SECREFHNOFORNFISA
-29-17-cv-597(FBI)-210
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17-cv-597(FBI)-211
bl-1
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FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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17-cv-597(FBI)-212
FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA
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FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-32-
47-cv-597(FBI)-213
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-35-
17-cv-597(FBI)-216
TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-36-
17-cv-597(FBI)-217
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-37-
17-cv-597(FBI)-218
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
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FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-38-
17-cv-597(FBl)-219
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-39-
17-cv-597(FBI)-220
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl1-1
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FORSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-40-17-cv-597(FBI)-221
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
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17-cv-597(FBI)-222
FOP-SECRET/NOEORN/FISA
b1-1
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FOP-SECRET/NOFEORN/FISA
-42-
17-cv-597(FBl)-223
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-43-
17-cv-597(FBI)-224
FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
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a(U) G. (8//NF) Page’sLetter to the U.S. DepartmentofJustice.
(SANEKIn or around February 2017, Page senta letter to the U.S.
Department of justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of
what Page claimed was“severe election fraud in the form of disinformation,
suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of
[Candidate #2’s] campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page
claimsthat hehas notdirectly supported a political campaign since September
2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of
Candidate #2’s campaign basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his
academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in
Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in
the September 23rd NewsArticle that Page met with two senior Russian officials
FOP-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-44-
17-cv-597(FBI)-225
FOR
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
(i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016to give the
commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claimsis “false
evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page further claims that the information
relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and
the mediaare lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2’s paid
consultants and private investigators.
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-45-17-cv-597(FBI)-226
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2
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F
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SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
(SHINE) l(SANK)
FOP
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-46-
17-cv-597(FBI)-227
bl-1b3-1
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FOP
SECREFINOFORN/FISA
bl-1
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(SANE)
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-47-
17-cv-597(FBI)-228
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
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FOP
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-48-
17-cv-597(FBI)-229
FOR
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-50-
17-cv-597(FBI)-231
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
5
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-51-
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17-cv-597(FBl)-232
FORSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-52-
17-cv-597(FBI)-233
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17-cv-597(FBI)-234
FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-54-
17-cv-597(FBI)-235
b7C- |b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
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VIII. (U) Conclusion. (U) (SINK) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating
and conspiring with the Russian Governmentii
EEBase! on the
foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to
believe that Page[Is
NS<1owingly engage in
clandestineintelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or
b7A-1
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-55-
17-cv-597(FBl)-236
FORSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
Ss =nnas()
Pothe FBI submits that there is probable causeto believe that b7A-1
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such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of
the United Statesiii
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FOPSECRETF/NOFORN/FISA
-56-
17-cv-597(FBI)-237
(8)
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17-cv-597(FBI)-238
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-58-
b1-1
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b7A-1
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17-cv-597(FBI)-239
FOPSECRETY/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-59-
17-cv-597(FBI)-240
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-60-
17-cv-597(FBI)-241
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
= 4. (& Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired
through the authorities requested herein, the FBI willfollow
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-61-
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FORSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-62-
17-cv-597(FBI)-243
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b7A-1requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with }77) > 3 6
5. (& Nature of the Information Sought Throughthe authorities
respectto the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the
certification set forth below. Asindicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is
seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of
the United States to protect against clandestineintelligence activities by an
intelligence service or network of this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign
power, and information with respect to a foreign powerorforeign territory that
relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conductof the
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-63-
17-cv-597(FBl)-244
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally
acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.
6. (SX Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for _b1-1 |
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National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the nt 33.6 |“hy Sy > 6
' President as a certifying official in Executive Order Numberfi
Es22ered, is set forth below.
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-65-17-cv-597(FBI)-246
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
(U) The Purposeof the Authorities Requested
(3) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in
the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the
authorities requested in this application may produceinformation and material
which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a
violation of United States law, andthis investigation may result in an eventual
criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at
bl-1least a significant purposeofthis request(os b3-1b7A-1
7is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI’s investigation 7E-1,2,3,6 —
of this target.
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FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-66-
17-cv-597(FBI)-247
FOP-SECREFHYNOFORN/FISA
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_ nes bl-19. (&) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See0b3-1
b7A-1
The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b7E-1,2, 3,6
intelligence information hasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same
type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughout the entire period requested.
The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental
and continuous, and communicationsrelating to such activities are often disguised
to appear innocuous. Thetype of foreign intelligence information being sought and
the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing precludethe conclusionthat, ata
given time, all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.
Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period
of ninety (90) days.
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-67-17-cv-597(FBI)-248
FOR
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
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FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-68-
17-cv-597(FBI)-249
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FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-69-
417-cv-597(FBI)-250
FOP
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
INFOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-70-
17-cv-597(FBI)-251
b1-1b3-1b7A-1 |b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
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-71-
17-cv-597(FBI)-252
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
(%) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information,
the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conducttheactivities
described immediately below for the period requested herein.
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FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-72-
17-cv-597(FBI)-253
FOPSECRETHINOFORN/FISA
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b7E-1, 2, 3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-254
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6a
M >
bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 :b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
| ee
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-255
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
5S
ee
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
blllb3-1
b7A-1
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-75-
17-cv-597(FBl)-256
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-76-
17-cv-597(FBI)-257
FOP-SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
es
=
(3.1b7A-1
nneeee—s—SC—CCSCSCSs‘(‘aS Ow b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-258
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/ .FISA bt
b3-1a bIA-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(U) (&) The FBI has reviewedthis verified application for accuracy in accordance
with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the
appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures waspreviously provided to
the Court.
FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-78-
17-cv-597(FBI)-259
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
(U) VERIFICATION
(8) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information
regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bl-l
States Code, § 1746 0n_April[M20 bat
b6-1
b7A-1
b7C-1 . Supervisory Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation —
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-79..
17-cv-597(FBI)-260
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
(U) CERTIFICATION
(&) I, the undersigned, having been designated as oneof the officials
authorized to makethecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard tothe
b1-1 cecuestedin this verified application targeting b3-1
b7A-1
Carter W.Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power,as follows: 7E-1,2,3,6 |
(A) (U) The information sought throughthe authorities requested herein is
foreign intelligence information.
(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstandingthe related criminal
matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities
requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other
than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign
intelligence crimes.
(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities bl-1b3-1
requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. an 136
(D) (&) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the
_authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C), ie.,
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-80-
17-cv-597(FBI)-261
FOR
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA |
informationthat relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect
against clandestineintelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this
foreign poweror by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), |
| i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and
is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs .
of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire foreign
intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). bled
b3-1
(E) %) Thebasis for my certification that the information sought is the type b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
of foreignintelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot
be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis as follows.
5)a. bl1-1 |
Psb7A-1 |
ee Eb?
SS)
Ss)FOP
SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA
-81-
17-cv-597(FBI)-262
FOP-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
SS5bi-1b3-1a b7A-1b7E-1, 2
55
bl1-1a b3-1b7A-1eeEe
b1-1a b3-1b7A-1
sf
F
O
P
SECREFHNGEORN/FISA
-82-
17-cv-597(FBI)-263
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 8|
a.
|
(U) (&) b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-83-17-cv-597(FBl)-264
FOPSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
a
FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-84-
17-cv-597(FBI)-265
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1,2
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
bl1-1
b3-1
eeeee—s—CSCCSC‘(‘CNSCSSRRSSb7E-1, 2, 3
TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-85-17-cv-597(FBl)-266
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
B
bl-1
se 86b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3
Se bI-1b3-1
ee
—
7Ab7E-1, 2,3
es°b3-1
eeb7E-1, 2,3
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-86-
17-cv-597(FBI)-267
FOP-SECRETHNOFORNFISA
(U) (&) Based uponthe foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that
the authorities requested herein targeting Pagearecritical investigative means for
obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.
FOPSEGCRETHNOFORN/FISA
-87-
17-cv-597(FBI)-268
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
FOR-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
%&) Accordingly, I executethis certification regarding Carter W. Pagein
accordance with the requirementsof the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Actof
1978, as amended,
{Jaynes B. Comey / Rex Tillerson
irector Secretary of State
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Andrew G, McCabe
Deputy Director Deputy Secretary of State
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael R. Pompeo _ JamesN. Mattis .
Director of the Central Secretary of Defense
Intelligence Agency
Daniel R. Coats H.R. McMaster
Director of NationalIntelligence Assistant to thePresidentfor
National Security Affairs
Principal Deputy Directorof
National Intelligence
bl-1b3-1b7A-1
FOP-SECRETHNGFORN/FISA
-88-
17-cv-597(FBI)-269
FOR-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
(U) APPROVAL
(U) (8) I find that this application regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the
criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveitsfiling
with this Court.
Se: bl-1
b3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 6
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-89-
17-cv-597(FBI)-270
FOP-SECRETHNOFPORN/FISA
(8) Accordingly, I approvethefiling of this application regarding Carter
W. Page with theCou,
LiceLoraDanaJ. Boente?”
Acting Attorney Generalof the United Statesa?
” (U) Pursuantto Executive Order 13787 (March 31, 2017), DanaJ. Boenteis serving as the Acting Attorney General with respect to this matter by virtue ofthe Attorney General’s recusal.
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-90-
bl-1
b3-1b7A-1
- b7E-1
17-cv-597(FBI)-271
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
(U) (9) WHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application
regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that
- this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed
orders and warrants which accompanythis application.
Respectfully submitted,
b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3
U.S. DepartmentofJustice
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
17-cv-597(FBI)-272
All information is considered unclassified
Fitge
except where otherwise shown. haa feed Staton Rane: |SECRET intelligence sone ForeignClassify By: J23J98T32 Urveillance Court |Reason: (C)APR 2017Derived From: FBI NSICG,dated UNITED STATES |of
LeeannFlynn Hail, cy |. ;
» Clerk of CourtDeclassifyOn: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 1-1b3-1
WASHINGTON,D. C. b7A-1
IN RE CARTER W.PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:
bl1-1PERSON a| b3-1b7A-1
PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT
I, An application having been made by the United States of America
pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50
U.S.C.SSSAor the Act), for an order and warrant
(hereinafter “order’) for[iond fullconsideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds
: bl-1as follows: 7 b3-1
b7A-1
Attorney General;
3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is
probable causeto believe that:
SECRET
Application to the USFISC bl-1Derived from: b3-1in Docket Number captioned above 7
Declassify on:
17-cv-597(FBI)-273
2. The application has been madebya Federalofficer and approved by the b7E-1, 2, 3,6
Pe Pact
SECREF
(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign
powerand Carter W.Pageis an agent of Russia, as defined by ea ,
| _ 4, The minimization procedures proposedin the applicationhave been ~~ _—_iOb*I-1
. b3-1
adopted by the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization er 336)
procedures ndici 5. The application contains all statements andcertifications requiredoy
Dethe certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis 1-1~ b3-1
ofthe statements madein874: b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
any other information furishedncWHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority
conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United Statesis
GRANTED,andit is
FURTHER ORDERED,as follows:
17-cv-597(FBl)-274
SECRET
Zi 1. The United States is authorized to conducfii
Eetarget as follows;res
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1 |
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1,2,3,6 |
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
i!'1
||
|
17-cv-597(FBI)-275
:|
‘ _ ‘
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBl)-276
bl1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
-b7C-2
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-277
t nN T
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-278
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-279
SECREF
eS|b3-1
esb7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl1-l
b3-1b7A-1 :b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
i
i bi-lb3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-280
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1ab7E-1,2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-281
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6art
-10-17-cv-597(FBI)-282
SECRET
EE OE bitb3-1as b7A-1b7E-1,2,3,6 |
bI-l |es b3-1 :|b7A-1 i
ns
6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unlesse= Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approvedherein, .as
-1the FBI shall follow b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
otherwise ordered by this Court.
-11-
17-cv-597(FBI)-283
-12-
bl-1 |b3-1 !b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6 bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-284
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
|Jf.
;
-13-17-cv-597(FBI)-285
-14-
||
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1b3-1 |
b7A-1b7E-1,2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-286
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
eS:. b3-1
eS°|| : b7E-1, 2,3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|
:
-15-17-cv-597(FBl)-287
SECREF
es
|
+71,2,3,6
a
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
bl-1 |b3-1 |
es b7A-1 |b7E-1, 2,3, 6
|OO
.
:
| -16- 17-cv-597(FBI)-288
Ml-17-
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-289
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.-----
-18-17-cv-597(FBl)-290
SECREF
This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires atIEastern Time
day of June, 2017. bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
on the
ied
stned paDate
Eastern Time
ime
ANNE C. CONWAYJudge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
Bnew! (ghee
b6-3b7A-1b7C-3
-19-17-cv-597(FBI)-291
FOP-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA oe
UNITED STATESAll information is considered unclassified
(&) IN RE CARTERW. PAGE, A USS. Docket Number:bl-1
PERSON.7 b3-1
b7A-1
(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION
(8) The United States of America herebyapplies to this Court for authority to
<ondc2s lescribed herein, pursuant i-1. ~ b3-1
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended,Title 50, United b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
States Code (U.S.C), 5en154or theAct).
- 1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is pL
, 3-1
made byPFa Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)of the Federal Bureau 6-1
b7A-1
of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision )7C-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
of the FBI’s investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information
officially furnishedto
TOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
eeDerived from: FP
ee 1
Declassify on:. f
OI Tracking No. 147743
47-cv-597(FBI)-292
FOP
SECREF/NOFORN/FISA
2. (8) Identity of the Target Thetargetofthis application is Carter W.
Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power,described in detail below. The bi1-1b3-1status of the target was determinedin or about June 2017 from information provided 67A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6by the US, Department of Sia,III
3. (8) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts j-}
b3-]and circumstancesin support of this application. b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6
a. (&%) Thetarget of this applicationis an agentof a foreign power.
(3) The following describes the foreign powerandsets forth in detail a
description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign
power.
(U) (% This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's
investigation of the above captioned target since the mostrecent application
described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous
applications has been summarized or removed not becauseit was factually
inaccurate butin orderto create a more concise document.
(U) &) The Governmentof the Russian Federationis a foreign poweras
defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).
FOP
SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-2-
17-cv-597(FBI)-293
FOP-SECRET/INGFORN/FISA
(U) (&% The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally
recognized foreign governmentand,as of the execution of this application, is listed
in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Departmentof State, and in
Permanent Missionsto the United Nations published by the United Nations, andits
establishments in the United States are componentsthereof.
&) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation
Se
bl-1
es}3-b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
17-cv-597(FBI)-294
FOPSECREFHYNOFORN/FISA
bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
%
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
Cc(U)
—
B) CarterW, Pac[I
owingly engagein 53-1
b7A-1
clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for b7E-1, 2
or on behalf of such foreign power, whichactivities involve or are aboutto
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly
conspires with other persons to engage in suchactivities and, therefore, is an
agent of a foreign poweras defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).
FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA
17-cv-597(FBI)-295
TFOPR-SECRETINOFORN/FISA
I. (U) Overview.
(S//KIE) This application seeks renewed authority to conductigbl-1
eeCarter Page. The FBIbelieves that Page has been b3-1. b6-2
the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government eines
(G//INK) Pageis a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S.
President (Candidate #1).’ As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that
the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome
bi1-1
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.eeb3-1
b7A-1
Oe W7E-L2
1 (8) On or about November8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. biel
Although Candidate #1 is now the President, in order to maintain the historical b3-1
accuracy of the background information, unless otherwise stated, the original b7A-1
references to Candidate #1 and membersof Candidate #1’s campaign team will
remain the same asin previous applications filed in this matter (see docket numbers
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
47-cv-597(FBI)-296
FOP-SECREFH/NOFORN/FISA
es bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
II. (U) (3//IXR) The FBI Believes that the Russian Government Engages inInfluence Operations Against the United States.
(U) A. @//MR) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.
(3//NE) During a September 2016 interview with an identified news
organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, “Russia has
tried to influence U.S.electionssince the 1960s during the Cold War”and “there’s a
tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others.” The then
DNI commentedthatthis influence included providing moneyto particular
candidatesor providing disinformation. The then DNI addedthat“it shouldn’t
comeas a big shock to people, ... I think it’s more dramatic maybe because they
have the cybertools that they can bringto bear in the sameeffort.”PF
bl-1Pe,b7A-1STes
17-cv-597(FBI)-297
FORSECRETANGFORN/FISA
(S7/INK) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the
Democratic National Committee (ONC)?aaa
GEThere has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government
was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvementin the hack.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was
not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a
net positive: “The important thing is the content that was given to the public.”
Despite Russia'sdena!
2 @//MK) According to information on its website, WikiLeaksis a multi-
national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the
analysis and publication oflarge datasets of censored or otherwiserestricted official
materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source
information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousandsof e-mails it says
are from the accounts of DNC officials.
TOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-7-
17-cv-597(FBI)-298
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
Ss —: b3-1
es1 bEb7E-1, 2,3
addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statementfrom the Departmentof
Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNationalIntelligence on Election
Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian
Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and
institutions, including from U.S.political organizations. The Election Security Joint
Statementstates that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, amongothers,sites like
WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed
efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and
disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S.election process; activity thatis
not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across
Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election
Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these
efforts, only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized theseactivities.
Morerecently, on December29, 2016, the White Houseissued a statementthat the
U.S.President had ordered a numberofactionsin response to the Russian
Government's aggressive harassmentof U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at
the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
17-cv-597(FBI)-299
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions
intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could
only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context,
this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].
(%/KE) Based on the Russian Government’s historical efforts to influence
US. and foreignelections,PBand the information discussed herein regarding Russia’s coordination bi-l
b3-1
. b7A-1with Carter Pa[Iams 1
I«3 28:20t0 undermine andimproperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. po
CO) S/XK)ee
ee bEb7E-1, 2
POAsstated in thelegislative history of FISA:
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-9-
17-cv-597(FBI)-300
FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA
Notonly do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to
obtain information, they also engagein activities which are intended to
harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the
course of public opinion,or the activities of individuals. Such activities
may includepolitical action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public
officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda
(including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and
harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who
oppose the foreign power. Suchactivity can undermine our democratic
institutions as well as directly threaten the peace andsafety of ourcitizens.
ELR. Rep. No. 95-1283,pt. 1, at 41 (1978).
(U) B. (3//KE) The Russian Government’s Coordinated Efforts to Influence
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(8//NB) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos? andCarter Page (the
target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her
foreign policy te.rr br.b3-1
b7A-1abyD.1
b7E-1, 2PFthe FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the
2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhapsother
individuals associated with Candidate #1’s campaignii bl-1b3-1
b7A-1ab7D-1b7E-1, 2
eee ; bl-1
- b3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-10-
17-cv-597(FBl)-301
FORSECREFYNGEORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
sori As discussed below, Page hasestablished relationships with b3-1. b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
FOPR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-11-
17-cv-597(FBI)-302
' FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
Russian Governmentofficials, including Russianintelligence officersi
Ii. (U)&) Carter Page.
(U) A, (@) Page’s Connections to Russia and the RIS.
(H/INR) Page, a USS.citizen, is the founder and managingpartner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that
focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.Po
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-12-
17-cv-597(FBI)-303
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2,3
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
U) (3XC)re
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2comapproximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in RussiaPo
EE(uring this time, Page began
business dealings with Gazpromi
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2 FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-13-
17-cv-597(FBl)-304
FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA
(S{/MIR) According to information provided by Page duringQi b7A-1b7E-1, 2
interview with the FE iiiiiiiiinneD2c
bl-1
ieee—“(C;isSCSCSCSCsiésC®S,b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1,2
b1-1b3-1
6 (&//KIE) b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1,2
bl-1b3-1b7A-1 |b7E-1,2,3
FOPSECREFI/NOFORN/FISA
-14-
17-cv-597(FBI)-305
FOP
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA b6-2b7A-1
(//KIK) According to information provided by Page during AZinterview ae 5
v
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 6
z. > ct|
@ ee ow
(U) (8//IMR) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov
and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951
(conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agentof a foreign government).
Accordingto the complaint, Buryakov workedin the United States as an agentof the
SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an
employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakovworked with two
other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev,to gatherintelligence on behalf of
FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-15-
17-cv-597(FBl)-306
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
Russia.’ The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy
and Sporyshev included, amongotherthings, attempting to recruit New York City
residents as intelligence sources for Russia.
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
:
(U) * (8//MK) Buryakov wasarrested in or about January 2015. Atthe time ofBuryakov’s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshevnolongerlived in the United States and
. were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act
in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the
Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 monthsin
prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureauof Prisons,
Buryakov wasreleased on March 31, 2017.
FORSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-16-
17-cv-597(FBI)-307
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
(U) B. (&//IIK) Page’s Coordination with Russian GovernmentOfficials on
2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.
(8//XIK) According to open source information,in July 2016, Page traveled to
Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.’ In
addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page metwith at least two
Russian officials duringthis trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI at
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
confidential human source (Source #1),<poried that Page had a
(U)> (S//<X)ee! ||}a |
b7A-1b7E-1,2, 4
10 (KSV/MIR) Source #1
Source #1 has been compensated . bl-1
discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its —_b3-1
relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1’s unauthorized disclosure of - b7A-1
information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. b7E-1, 2,5
Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from
Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-17-
17-cv-597(FBl)-308
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminateits relationship with
Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.
(U) (KS¥/MK) Source #1, who now ownsa foreign business/financial intelligencefirm, was approachedbyan identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that aU.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research
regarding Candidate #1’s ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1
have a long-standing businessrelationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source
#1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to
the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. The FBI
speculates that the identified U.S. person waslikely looking for information thatcould be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.
(U) (X3//INR) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisiteinformation. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) describedherein, Source #1 provided the informationto the identified U.S. person who hadhired Source #1 andto the FBI.
@£8//NK) Notwithstanding Source #1’s reason for conducting the researchinto Candidate #1’s ties to Russia, based on Source #1’s previous reporting historywith the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI
believes Source #1’s reporting herein to be credible.
FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-18-
17-cv-597(FBI)-309
b3-1 |b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-lb3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1| . b7A-1
company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.”EDreported b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
secret meeting with Igor Sechin, whois the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
Ub7A-1(U)ES//DER) aeb7E-1, 2
1 (S/R) bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
=
Sle
12 (//ME) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury(USDOT)announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government
officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was
identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the
President and Chairman of the ManagementBoard for Rosneft, a position he
continues to hold. The USDOT announcementalso stated Sechin was formerly the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from
2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin.
The USDOTsanctions announcementidentified Sechin as someone who has “shown
utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin —- a key componentto his current standing.”
FOPR-SECREFHNOFORNFISA
17-cv-597(FBI)-310 :
FOP-SECRETINGFORN/FISA
that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy
cooperation and the prospects for an associated movetolift Ukraine-related Western
sanctions against Russia,Ias
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-20-
17-cv-597(FBI)-311
bi-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
(80) Icording to Source #1aa(O/ occording 7b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
Divyekin [whois assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],§j
(S/H) | bl-1b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-21-
17-cv-597(FBI)-312
FOPSECRETFYNOFORN/FISA
Ictsecretly with Pageand that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekinraising a dossier or
“kompromat”’ that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility ofit
being released to Candidate #1’s campaign.'*i
(U) * (&) Kompromatis a Russian term for compromising material about apolitician or political figure, whichis typically used to create negative publicity orblackmail.
7 (XS//MR)
18 (KX/NIE)
FOPR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-22-
17-cv-597(FBI)-313
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1 :b3-1b7A-1b7D-1b7E-1, 2
FOR-SECRETANOFORNFISA
-23-
17-cv-597(FBI)-314
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b6-4
b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2
b6-4
b7A-1
b7C-4
b7E-1, 2
FOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA
es 8b3-1
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E12
Re
S/R)
a
a
rs(|b3-1
= 8=—(b7D-1
es hl
a
es
a
DO
SS
a
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFINOFORN/FISA
-24-
17-cv-597(FBl)-315
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
b1-1
Ssb7A-1
b7D-1
0b7A-1
2F|a July 2016article in an identified news organization reported that
Candidate #1’s campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1’s
platform would notcall for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel
forces, contradicting the view of almostall Political Party #1’s foreign policy leaders
in Washington. Thearticle stated that Candidate #1’s campaign sought “to make
sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weaponsit has
been asking for from the United States.” Further, an August 2016article published
by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding
like a supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that
Candidate #1 had recently adopted a “milder” tone regarding Russia’s annexation of
Crimea. The August 2016article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate
#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions
against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1’s shift was
not clear, Candidate #1’s moreconciliatory words, which contradict Political Party
#1’s official platform, follow Candidate #1’s recent association with several people
FOP-SECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-25-
17-cv-597(FBI)-316
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carterbl-1
b3-1Page.age b7A-1
7B12
esb3-1
eSb7D-1
rs
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
aeb7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
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b7E-1, 2,5
FOPSECREFANOFORN/FISA
-26-
17-cv-597(FBI)-317
FOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-27-
17-cv-597(FBI)-318
FOP-SECREFT/NGOFEORN/FISA
abl-1
S|b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
Iv. (U)g/m) Page’s Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Governmentto
Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(U) (S/R) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization
published an article (September 23rd NewsArticle), which was written by the news _
organization’s Chief Investigative Correspondent,alleging that U.S.intelligence
officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian
Governmentto influence the U.S.Presidential election. According to the September
23rd NewsArticle, U.S.officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in
Moscowin July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencementaddressat the New
Economic School, he met with two senior Russianofficials. The September 23rd
NewsArticle stated that a “well-placed Western intelligence source” told the news
organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-28-
17-cv-597(FBI)-319
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their
alleged meeting, Sechin raisedtheissueof thelifting of sanctions with Page.
According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, the Western intelligence source also
reported that U.S.intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another
top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now servesas
deputy chief for internal policy andis believed by U.S.officials to have
responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies aboutthe U.S.election.
* (S) As discussed above, Source #1 washired by a business associate toconduct research into Candidate #1’s ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the resultsof his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the businessassociate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the businessassociate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only providedthisinformation to the business associate and the FBI.
The FBI does notbelieve that Source #1 directlyprovidedthis information to the identified news organization that published theSeptember 23rd NewsArticle.
(U) (X8//NK) In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent aletter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new informationthat might be pertinentto an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate#2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she wasfrustrated with this action and believeditwould likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1’sconcerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishmentfrom theFBI to speak only with the FBI onthis matter, released the reporting discussed
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-29-
17-cv-597(FBI)-320
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFTINOFORN/FISA
(U) (&//IX® According to the September 23rd NewsArticle, certain members of
Congress were “taken aback”after being briefed on the alleged meetings between
Page and Russianofficials and viewedthe meetings as a possible back channelto the
Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd NewsArticle
also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI
Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the
advisor was unnamedin theletter, butthe article indicated that the advisoris Page]
and “high ranking sanctioned individuals”[in context, likely a reference to Sechin]
in Moscow overthe summeras evidenceof “significant and disturbing ties”
between Candidate #1’s campaign and the Kremlin that neededto be investigated
by the FBI.
(U) (8//INK) Based on statements in the September 23rd NewsArticle, as well as
in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1’s
campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attemptto distance Candidate
#1’s campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd NewsArticle noted that
Page’s precise role in Candidate #1’s campaign is unclear. Accordingto thearticle, a
spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign called Page an “informal foreign
herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continuesto assess
Source #1’s reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active
source.
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-30-
17-cv-597(FBI)-321
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
advisor” who “does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign.” In addition,
another spokesperson for Candidate #1’s campaign said that Page “has no role” and
added “[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present.” However, the
article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond whenasked why
Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about
September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was
based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1’s then campaign manager.
Duringthe interview, the campaign managerstated, “[Pageis] not part of the
campaign I’m running.” The campaign manager added that Page has not been part
of Candidate #1’s national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became
campaign manager. In responseto a question from theinterviewer regarding |
reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to
conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign
manager responded,“If [Page is] doing that, he’s certainly not doing it with the
permission or knowledge of the campaign... .”Po
(U) (&//RE) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-3]-
17-cv-597(FBI)-322
FOPSECRETF/NGFORN/FISA
In this letter, Page madereference to the accusations in the September 23rd News
Article and denied them. Pagestated that the source of the accusations was nothing
more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any
sanctionedofficial in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss
any “final” questions the FBI may have.
(U)(S7/KK) Additionally, on or about September26, 2016, an identified news
organization published anarticle that was based on an interview with Page
(September 26th NewsArticle). In the September 26th NewsArticle, Page stated
that all of the accusations were complete “garbage” and that he did not meet with
Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he wastaking a leave of absence from his
work with Candidate #1’s campaign because the accusations were a “distraction.”
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-123 (8/ASE) b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-32-
17-cv-597(FBI)-323
a
< (G//KIX)
(3//XR)
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-33-
17-cv-597(FBI)-324
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2, 6
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
(S/N)
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
U)b7A-1
sb7E.1, 2,3
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
FOR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-34-
17-cv-597(FBI)-325
FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3
Bax)
3
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-35-
17-cv-597(FBI)-326
FOP-SECREFYNOFEORN/FISA
1.
SE
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl1-1
ES°°
FORSECREFHNOFORNFISA
-36-
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6»
17-cv-597(FBI)-327
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
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b7E-1, 2, 3,6
TORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-37-
17-cv-597(FBI)-328
FOPSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 |b7E-1, 2, 3,6
FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-38-
17-cv-597(FBI)-329
FOPSECRETYNGFORN/FISA
5rs
5 (S/R)
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
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17-cv-597(FBI)-330
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
FOPSECREF/NGOFORN/FISA
ae|b3-1
ee7.b7E-1, 2, 3,6
ee
EE
6ok)bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
:
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
FOPSECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-40-
17-cv-597(FBI)-331
FOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1. b3-1
ES. b7A-1
b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-41-
_17-cv-597(FBI)-332
FOPRSECRETINOFORN/FISA
(S/O)re
bl-1b3-1b6-2 |b7A-1b7C-2b7E-1, 2
bl-1b3-1b6-2b7A-1b7C-2 |b7E-1, 2,3,6 |
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-42-
17-cv-597(FBl)-333
TFOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
%
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-43-
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)-334
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
Bos
FOPSECREFHYNOFORN/FISA
-44-
17-cv-597(FBI)-335
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7D-1
b7E-1, 2
(5/5b3-1
LEb7D-1
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
:
EST°b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
ns171,2,3,
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-45-
17-cv-597(FBI)-336
FOPSECRETHNGOFEORN/FISA
bl-1b3-1
b6-2b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-46-
17-cv-597(FBI)-337
FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
72-1,2,3,6
|
bi-1b3-1b6-2
ns(7-1. . —_ b7C-2
b7E-1, 2,3, 6
FOPSECRETHYNOFORN/FISA
-47-
17-cv-597(FBl)-338
F
O
P
SECRETJ/NOFORN/ ]FISA bl-1 !
b3-1 :
ESb7A-1
n° :b7E-1, 2, 3,6
(5/5 !
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
ES°°b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
[oob1-1
es|:b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
a@(U) b3-1b7A-1b7E-2
F
O
P
SECREFTHNOFORN/FISA
-48-
17-cv-597(FBl)-339
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
bl1-1
°°b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(U) G. (&/AXF) Page’s Letter to the U.S. Departmentof Justice.
(6//K®) In or around February2017, Pagesent a letter to the U.S. Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page
claimed was“severeelection fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of
dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2’s]
campaign andtheir political allies last year.” In his letter, Page claims that he has
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-49-
17-cv-597(FBI)-340
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
not directly supported a political campaign since September2016, but continues to
be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2’s campaign
basedonfictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related
meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the
U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd NewsArticle that
Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was
in Moscowin July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic
School, which Pageclaimsis “false evidence,” to Candidate #2’s campaign. Page
further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2’s campaign, certain
membersof the U.S. Congress, and the mediaarelies that were completely
fabricated by Candidate #2’s paid consultants and private investigators.
4, (§) Proposed Minimization Procedures Astoall information acquired
| throughthe authorities requested herein, the FBI will followP|
b1-1ee
b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
FOPSECRETYNGOFORN/FISA
-70-
17-cv-597(FBI)-361
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
aa
)
re
a
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-2, 3
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
FOPSECRET/NOFORMFISA
-71-
17-cv-597(FBI)-362
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
CC
OOe—“(tisSCSsSSSNSb3-1
ee b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
ee
ee
SS bib3-1b7A-1
ee =§—07-1, 2,3,6
FOPSECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-72-
17-cv-597(FBl)-363
b7E-1,2,3,6
5. (3) Nature of the Information Sought Throughtheauthorities a
; ; . ne ; . ; 4 b7A-1requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1.23,6
respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the
certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBIis |
seeking foreign intelligence informationthat relates andis necessary to the ability of
the United States to protect against clandestine intelligenceactivities by an
intelligence service or networkof this foreign poweror by agentsof this foreign
power, and information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that
relates and is necessaryto the national defense, security, and the conductof the
foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally
acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.
re
Psb3-1
b7A-1ee b7E-1, 2,3,6
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-73-
17-cv-597(FBI)-364
FOPSECRET//NOFORN/FISA
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
S)rrbl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
eeb3-1
ae b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3,6
ee
FOPSECRETHNOEORN/FISA
-74-
17-cv-597(FBI)-365
FOPSECRETF/NOFORN/FISA
6. (8) Certification Thecertification of the Assistant to the Presidentfor bl-1
b3-1
NationalSecurity Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
Presidentas a certifying official in Executive OrderNumber
s amended,is set forth below.
rs
es+11. b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1b7C-2
b7E-1,2, 7
(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested
(%) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in
the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However,the
authorities requested in this application may produce information and material
which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a
FOPSECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-75-
17-cv-597(FBl)-366
FOPSECRETFYNOEORNFISA
violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual
criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussedin thecertification, at
b1-1
least a significant purposeof this request 1 (ii_on :
| ; a . ; hoi ote ge. DIE-1, 2, 3, 6ais to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation
of this target.
5
bl-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|
,eeeb3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
TOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-76-
17-cv-597(FBI)-367
.
F
O
P
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
bi-1esb7A-1a b7E-1, 2, 3,6
9 & Duration of the Authorities Requested (See 7:
i
__
; bl-1The authorities requested should not automatically terminate whenforeign b3-1b7A-1
intelligence informationhasfirst been obtained. Additional information of the same 7E-1,2, 3, 6
type will be obtained on a continuousbasis throughoutthe entire period requested.
Theactivities which the United States mustidentify and monitor are incremental
and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised
to appearinnocuous. Thetypeofforeign intelligence information being sought and
the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionthat, at a
given time, all such information has been obtained andcollection can be ended.
Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period
of ninety (90) days.
2|
es blab3-1as | | b7A-1
| b7E-1, 2
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-77-
17-cv-597(FBl)-368
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
||b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
FOR
SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-78-
17-cv-597(FBI)-369
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
Rl bl-1
esb7A-1
Ce b7E-12
5)
|ee
bl-1
b3-1
eS
—
(8b7E-2, 6
bi-1
eeb7A-1b7E-2, 6
5
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
aes
eS
we
Oe
-79-17-cv-597(FBI)-370
FOP
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6l)bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
FOP-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-80-
17-cv-597(FBI)-371
TOR
SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
a831b3-1
: 7 b7A-1 |
rs
°°" |
.b3-1 |
aWaasb7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
bl-1
es ib7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
—_—
aa
FOR
SECREFHNOFORNIFISA
-81-17-cv-597(FBI)-372
FOP
SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
(U) (&) Specific Authorities Requested Based uponthe foregoing information,the UnitedStates requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct-the activitiesdescribed immediately below for the period requested herein.
(S)aa
bl-1P| )b3-1b7A-1Ps
, b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
Ss
bl-1 |b3-1 |b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6 |
bl-1Hic)b3-1b6-2
- b7A-1; (2)b7C-2b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
FOP
SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-82-
17-cv-597(FBI)-373
FOPSECREFHNOFORNFISA
)
FOR-SECREFYNOFORN/FISA
-83-
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
- b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBl)-374
b1-1Ls |b6-2ee vab7C-2es b7E-1,2,3,6
as
a
2b3-1Lsb7A-1ES bre?b7E-1, 2, 3, 6Ss
Ss
ee btb3-1b6-2
b7A-12b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-375
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
a b7E-1, 2,3,6
bl1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
SS
5
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
bl-1b3-1 |b7A-1 |b7E-1,2,3,6
17-cv-597(FBl)-376
FOPSECREFYNOEORN/FISA
SS
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-86-
bl1-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-377
TOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA
b3-1
Seb7E-1, 2, 3,6
esSsSe
i b3-1
|b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
aSa
a bib3-1
esa b7E1.2,3,6
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-87-17-cv-597(FBl)-378
FOP-SECRETFYNOFORN/FISA
b3-1
b7A-1
Ss
HE2.3.6
i: bl-1Ms 8b7A-123,6
(U) (8) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance
with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copyof the draft to the
appropriatefield office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to
the Court.
wao~ The remainderofthis page is intentionally left blank. -----
FOPSECRETFHNOFORN/FISA
-88-
17-cv-597(FBI)-379
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
(U) VERIFICATION
(&) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information
regarding Carter W. Pageis true and correct. Executed pursuantto Title 28, United bL-l
States Code, § 1746 on | 2011 b3-1
b7A-1
b6-1
b7A-1
. b7C-1 upervisory special Agen
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-89-
17-cv-597(FBI)-380
FOPSECRETINOFORN/FISA
(U) CERTIFICATION
(3) I, the undersigned, having been designatedas one ofthe officials
authorized to make thecertifications required by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do herebycertify with regard to h_iii
EE¢cested in this verified application targeting
/ b1-1Carter W. Page, an agent of the Governmentof Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b3-1
b7A-1. . vs _, b7E-1, 2, 3,6
(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is
foreign intelligence information.
(B) (U) Atleast a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal
matters described in this application, the primary purposeof the authorities
requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other
than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign
intelligence crimes.
|
| (C) (U) Theforeign intelligence information sought by the authoritiesa bl-1iz requested herein cannotbe reasonably obtained by normalinvestigative techniques. on 1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|
}
| D Thetype of foreign intelligence information being sought through the——— (D) @) typ & & § Soug 8
es authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(C),i.e.,
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
-90-17-cv-597(FBI)-381
FOP-SECRETHNOFORN/FISA
informationthatrelates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect
against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this
foreign poweror by agentsofthis foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),
i.e., information with respect to a foreign poweror foreign territory that relates and
is necessary to the national defenseor security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs
of the United States. These same authorities mayalso incidentally acquire foreign
intelligence information asdefined by other subsectionsof 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
bl-1
(E) (8) The basis for my certification that the information soughtis the type 3-1
b7A-1
of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-1,2, 3,6
be obtained by normalinvestigative techniquesis as follows.
5)a
ee :b3-1
Os bab7E-1, 2
FOP-SECREFHNOFORNFISA
-91-17-cv-597(FBI)-382
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
2esbI-1b3-1a b7A-1b7E-1, 22:
a bl-1b3-12 °es|b7E-1, 2
Ss bhb3-1
b7A-12es°
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-92.
17-cv-597(FBI)-383
FORSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
@)
il(U) (®
FOPR-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
-93-17-cv-597(FBI)-384
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2,8
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
FOPR-SECRETYNOFORN/FISA |
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3Ml
FOP
SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-94-
17-cv-597(FBI)-385
TFOP-SECREFHNOFORN/FISA
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3il(a
eeeedb3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3
FOR-SECRETHNOFORNIFISA
-95-47-cv-597(FBI)-386
FOP
SECRET/NGOEORN/FISA
b1-1
b3-1
9eseT
eses
bl-1
eeee
2)eesespannea: bes brateseesesesey
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2,3
&)esbi-tb3-1
FOP-SECREFYNGFORN/FISA
-96-
17-cv-597(FBI)-387
FOPSECRETHNOFORN/FISA
eSb3-1
LUb7E-1, 2, 3
rsaS
aSa
}
- |
( —b3-1
7b7E-1, 2, 3
es(U) (8) Based upon the foregoing information,it is the Government's belief that |
the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for
obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.
FOP-SECRETHYNOFORN/FISA
'-97- .17-cv-597(FBl)-388
-FORSECREH/NOFORN/FISA
(&) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W.Pagein
accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, as amended.
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Rex Tillerson
Secretary of State
AndrewDeputy Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
John J. Sullivan
Deputy Secretaryof Stale
Michael Pompeo
Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
James N. Mattis
Secretary of Defense
Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence
Principal Deputy Director of
NationalIntelligence
ea
7
Date
H.R. McMaster
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
FOR
SECRETYNOFORN/FISA
-98-
17-cv-597(FBI)-389
FOP
SECREFINOFORN/FISA
(U) APPROVAL
(U) (&) I find thatthis application regarding Carter W. Pagesatisfies the
criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approveits filing |
with this Court.
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 6
FOP-SECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-99-
17-cv-597(FBI)-390
-FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
(8) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter
b3-1
anes 7$= b7A-1SL). oo b7E-1
General of the United States
FOPSECRET/NOFORN/FISA
-100-
47-cv-597(FBI)-391
TORSECREHNOTORITITSA
YsWHEREFORE,the United States submits that this application
regarding Carter W.Pagesatisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Actof 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that
this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed
orders and warrants which accompany this application.
Respectfully submitted,
b6-3
b7A-1
b7C-3
U.S. DepartmentofJustice
TOPSBERERHNCEDRNFISA
-101-
17-cv-597(FBI)-392
Filed
SECRET IntotigesosSeriesun
All Information is considered UNITED STATES JUN Za 2017
unclassified except whereLeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk
otherwise shown FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT reverk of Court
Classify By: J23J98T32bl-1
Reason: (C) WASHINGTON,D.C.b3-1
Derived From: FBI NSICG_dated
062017 Deckeronb7A-1
IN RECA v. PAGE, A U.S. Docket Number:
PERSONRa
b7A-1
PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT
1. An application having been made bythe United States of America
pursuantto the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50
U.S.C. §§eessor the Act), for an order and warrant
(hereinafter “order”)ora27
consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Courtfinds
bl-1
as follows:b3-1
b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
2. The application has been madeby a Federalofficer and approved by the
Attorney General,
3. Onthebasis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there isr?
probablecauseto believe that:
SECREF
Derived from: Application to the USFISC b1-1
in Docket Number captioned above b3-1
Declassify on: f b7A-1
17-cv-597(FBI)-393
of the statements made und
SECRET
(A) The Governmentof the Russian Federation (Russia)is a foreign
power and Carter W.Pageis an agentof Russia, as defined by b7A-1b7E-1, 2lh
4, The minimization procedures proposedin the application have been _b1-1b3-1b7A-1
adoptedby the Attorney General and meetthe definition of minimization b7E-1, 2.3.6
procedures unde
5. The application containsall statements and: certifications required by ble
b3-1
FS
ssCStandthe certification is not clearly erroneousonthebasis b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6d
any other information furnished und
WHEREFORE,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,pursuantto the authority
conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is
GRANTED,anditis
FURTHER ORDERED,asfollows:
17-cv-597(FBI)-394
SECREF
[a 1. The United States is authorized to condci
SEhetarget as(011s;bl-1
SEb7A-1
Pe
fe bl-1
eSb7A-1
a .' b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
|
eeb3-1
ks: b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-395
Ale I
TLbl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-396
I] 1}
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6|I
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-397
i!
ilbl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b6-2
b7A-1
b7C-2
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
I b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-398
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3,6
bi-1b3-1b7A-1b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-399
eseses
eeesESeses
eseeaesSEespe
-8-
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1,2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1es2, 3,6
SECRET
17-cv-597(FBI)-400
WI MI iI
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-401
b1-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1
b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6Hibl-1
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17-cv-597(FBI)-402
SECRET
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. SECREE-11-
17-cv-597(FBl)-403
—
|6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless
otherwiseordered by this Court.
Asto all information acquired throughthe authorities approved herein,
the FBI shall follow
-12-
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17-cv-597(FBI)-404
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17-cv-597(FBl)-405
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17-cv-597(FBI)-406
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47-cv-597(FBI)-407
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17-cv-597(FBI)-408
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17-cv-597(FBI)-410
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17-cv-597(FBI)-411
SECREF
This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expiresatEastern Time
on the: |day of September, 2017.
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06a291,Signed Eastern Time
Date Time
Intelligence Surveillance Court
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