WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATION Dr. Marwa Daoudy IUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)
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WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATIONAND COOPERATION
Dr. Marwa Daoudy
IUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)
WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUEISSUE
PARTIAL PERSPECTIVE: « Crisis » or « war» because of freshwater
scarcity – « geopolitics of water »
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
Sanitary, environmental, political, institutional and financial issues
ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS
INDICATORS:
Global dataResource use per person per yearRate of utilizationDependency rate on external sources
WATER-RELATED DATA WATER-RELATED DATA 263 internationally shared basins (A. Wolf, Oregon State,
Water Database) 70 in Africa, 55 in Europe, 40 in Asia, 33 in South America,
6 in the Middle East 1400 million cubic kilometers (millions of billions of m3),
70% of the earth, only 2.5% of freshwater Renewable resources: 40 000 km3/year, i.e. 0,007% of the
total water volume Not an issue of global availability but geographic
distribution: 9 countries – 60% of world water resources.
CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)
Availability per person per year:
> 1700 m3/h/an: relative water sufficiencyBetween 1700 and 1000 m3/p/year: water
stressBetween 1000 and 500 m3/p/y: scarcity
line< 500 m3/p/y: absolute scarcity
CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)
Rate of dependence on external sources:
Upstream/downstream (main areas of tension)
E.g: Turkmenistan (98%), Egypt (97%), Syria (80%)
INDICATORS (III)INDICATORS (III)
Water utilizations:
70% to agriculture (ME: 80-90%)Global food: need to find a balance
between agriculture/industry/domestic use
ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)
Health-related dilemmas:
Water quality (80% of diseases are water-borne in poor countries - WHO)
Pollution (pesticides and salinity of water and soils)
ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)
Demographic growth:World population: x 3 in 100 yearsPressures on water: x 6 in 100 yearsMainly in developing countriesIncreased urbanization: + pressure on water
(90% of demographic growth is absorbed by cities)
Green Revolution: food security, intensive irrigation practices (vs. Blue Revolution )
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCESORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
Increased water demand (demographic growth)
Decreased water supply and water quality
Main areas of conflict
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCEINTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Decision-making process?Execution of mandates?Accountability, responsibility?
THE DEBATETHE DEBATE
Institutional, economic, ethical, strategic and political issues at stake
No common vision or unified strategy
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTOF THE ENVIRONMENT
Efficiency of international agreements
Legitimacy of procedures
Equitable share of responsibilities
International Water GovernanceInternational Water Governance
Environmental, economic and social issuesSustainable development:
Promoting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
Global good vs. Economic good
Water ethics: International Water Law
MULTILATERALISMMULTILATERALISM
Promoting International Water Governance:
– Stockholm, Rio, Johannesburg 1972, 1992, 2002
INTEGRATED WATER INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT (IWRM)MANAGEMENT (IWRM)
* Sustainable water management and sustainable development
* Integrating sometimes opposed interests (ecosystems/human needs, surface water/underground resources, upstream/downstream interests, different uses…).
* Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 (Rio): water is an economic good
WATER AND ECONOMICS WATER AND ECONOMICS
Symbolic dimension: water = gift from God= public good
Water costs?
WATER ECONOMICS: THE WATER ECONOMICS: THE DEBATEDEBATE
Regional scarcity: need to calculate total distribution costs
Global economic costs: distribution + opportunity + external
Conclusion: need to enhance economic efficiency and environmental, ecological sustainability. Avoid « tragedy of common goods ».
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONSALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Private investments in water sectorInvestments to increase water supplies
(supply management): desalination « Virtual water »: food imports = water
imports (1500 m3/ton of cereals)Water markets
ISSUES AT STAKE ISSUES AT STAKE Privatization of water sector: risks
Water access as human right
Water as global public good
Third way: between total privatization and total State control
WATER ETHICSWATER ETHICS
Need to enhance cooperation among States
International legal standards Slow but steady construction of IL on
utilization of international watercourses for non-navigational purposes (United Nations Convention, 1997).
CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS
Multidimensional issueWater: human survival, economic
growth and political stability « Hydro-politics »: link between
hydraulic issues strategic, economic and political levels (cooperation, conflict, security).
The Theoretical DebateThe Theoretical Debate
I. Water Conflict & Cooperation: some IR theories
II. Debating water issues in the 1990s: environmental security vs. virtual water
III. Debating water issues today: benefit sharing vs. water rights.
Water Specificity – Water Specificity – Some Theoretical implicationsSome Theoretical implications
Global Common Good = need for collective action
Avoid « tragedy of the commons » (Hardin, 1968) or unilateral abuse by developing common and organized management of resources.
Conflict over WaterConflict over WaterClassification criteria (Zeitoun & Warner,
2006):Development disputesControl of water resourcesWater as political toolWater as military targetWater as military tool
Inter-State
Intra-State
Water Conflict and Cooperation Water Conflict and Cooperation
Regime Theory: regional institutions to manage cooperative regimes for natural resources.
International Governance: agent-based resolution of collective problems at local, national and international level.
Water Conflict & Cooperation Water Conflict & Cooperation
Power Matrix:Power Matrix: additional factors (other than asymmetry) to explain link between water and conflict (interests, riparian position, projected power).
Inherent asymmetry as specific nature of conflicts over water (Haftendorn, 2000). – Conflict resolution should address
asymmetric structure of conflict
Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation
Environmental security vs. virtual water (Pessimists vs. Optimists)
Debate in 1990s: very high risks of violent conflict because of increasing water scarcity (e.g., Middle East)
Vs. no conflict despite water scarcity and tensions: additional supply through water embedded in food imports
GEOPOLITICAL STUDIESGEOPOLITICAL STUDIES
Conventional Geopolitics:– Natural resource endowments and
geography are defining features of a State’s status
Geographical and environmental determinism
WATER - GEOPOLITICSWATER - GEOPOLITICS
Neo-Malthusianism: « WATER WARS»Demographic growth, resource scarcity
and violent conflict
Cornucopian perspectives: cooperation vs. conflict
Available but mismanaged resourcesNeed to evaluate resources economically
(price)
The DebateThe Debate
The inevitability of water conflicts is supported by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The link between water and violent conflict is thus confirmed.
As a strategic security concern, water can become a source of conflict but interdependent riparian states are more likely to cooperate over water.
Water & SecurityWater & Security
A new debate on national security: critical security studies (CSS)
Enlargement of threats: from traditional (military, economic) to non-traditional (environment, resources, health)
Link between environmental problems and emergence of conflicts
« Environmental security »
Research QuestionsResearch Questions
What linkages are established between the environment and security? How can they explain the successful securitization of the environment as a referent object since the 1990s.
Some would argue that resource scarcities have been over-securitized in the last decades. How? Why? What about current trends towards the securitization of the environment in relation to development?
Environmental Security (1)Environmental Security (1)
Transnational environmental problems
Resource-based conflicts
EnvironmentalEnvironmental Security (2) Security (2)
Toronto School (Homer-Dixon, 1993, 1994)
Oslo School (Gledditsch, 1998, 2000)Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars (ECSP), Washington.
THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENTRESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Link between environmental problems (water) and national security issues
Threat perception
Securitization of environmental problems: maintain local biosphere as an essential support on which will depend all other human activities (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 74)
ACTORSACTORS
• Defining the Hegemon: State that temporarily gains a preponderance of power in the international and/or regional system
• It can unilaterally dominate the rules
and procedures that guide political and economic relations – and water dynamics
STRUCTURESTRUCTURE
Asymmetry of power (upstream/downstream, military, economic resources)
History of relations (politics, culture, etc..)
Structural power (1st dimension of power)
PROCESSPROCESS
Cooperative, integrative – (win-win)
Conflict-oriented, distributive – (win-lose)
Mixed (but predominantly…)
AGREEMENTSAGREEMENTS
Bilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstable
Structure of agreements =
power structure (Schelling, 1960)BATNA: Best Alternative to No
Agreement
How to reach agreements in situations How to reach agreements in situations of Hydro-Hegemony?of Hydro-Hegemony?
Security dilemmaUnilateral upstream development =
dependence and insecurity for downstream riparians
Bargaining power: reverse of asymmetrical dynamics
Some Counter-Hegemony Some Counter-Hegemony StrategiesStrategies
Issue-Linkage: linkage, securitization process
Change the other riparian’s utilities & alternatives Impact on strategic, economic, security interests
– Immediate interests: food and water security – General interests: regional, border security
International Law: source of bargaining and structural power for dependent and/or downstream riparians
Power Asymmetry: The DebatePower Asymmetry: The Debate
Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water conflict. The will of the stronger states prevails and determines the course of action.
Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water cooperation A difference in power symmetries presents an opportunity for weaker riparians to find solutions and strategies to impact the process and final outcome, thus enhancing the “power of the weak”.
Water Conflict ResolutionWater Conflict Resolution
Asymmetry of power: specific to water conflicts vs. political or some other environmental conflicts
Resolve the conflict by addressing the structure of conflict, not causes
“Desecuritization” process: focus on interests, power and rights
POWER ASYMMETRY AND POWER ASYMMETRY AND HYDRO-HEGEMONYHYDRO-HEGEMONY
Research findings: more efficient outcomes if asymmetry of power (power strategies)
– limits to Hydro-Hegemony
Only bilateral agreements – limits to issue linkage and downstream power
«Cornucopian » perspectives«Cornucopian » perspectives
Political EconomyCooperative solutions through water
markets and pricing of water:Virtual waterDemand managementBenefit-sharing
The DebateThe Debate
Cooperation through joint water management, information-sharing, monitoring, etc. can provide the incentive for broader cooperation between co-riparians that is needed for effective de-securitization, thus allowing for conflict prevention/transformation, mutual benefit-sharing and development of all the concerned riparian states.
Policy & Research FindingsPolicy & Research Findings
“Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing”, Expert Group on Development Issues of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Co-authored with Phillips, Mc Caffrey, Öjendal, & Turton, 2006.
The framework for the approachThe framework for the approach
Specific research and policy-oriented questions:– What role does the sharing of benefits play in the
conflict/cooperation debate?– Can cooperation on the sharing of international
watercourses be utilized as a broader conflict prevention tool?
– What are the key areas for development partners in integrating trans-boundary water management more closely into their overall development agendas?
From ‘Water Wars’ From ‘Water Wars’ to the Sharing of Benefitsto the Sharing of Benefits
Options for cooperation and the amicable sharing of benefits resulting from professionally managed watersheds.
The ‘desecuritization of water resource management’
Benefit-SharingBenefit-Sharing
Sadoff and Grey (2002)
Simplest and most useful general framework to date
Benefits from cooperation over a shared river basin may be divided into four different categories: ‘environmental’, ‘economic’, ‘political’, and ‘catalytic’.
The Inter-SEDE ModelThe Inter-SEDE Model
Phillips et al., 2006: assumption that a well-managed watershed will provide enhanced benefits in terms of Security, Economic Development, and the Environment
Comparative analysis for the Jordan, the Kagera and the Mekong basins
Establishment of relevant categories of indicators for 21 riparians of the three basins
Categories of BenefitsCategories of Benefits
Security: promotion of peaceful relations, reduction of military expenditure, prevention of human and societal insecurity.
Economic development: enhancement of trade,
food production, local household consumption, livelihoods.
Both of the above elements are nested in the environment: contribution to biodiversity, promotion of sustainable management of trans-boundary resources, access to sufficient w. resources.
Identify Key DriversIdentify Key Drivers
Use indicators to identify key drivers
All riparians have been ranked for all the indicators and resulting ranks placed in five bands: 1-5
Conclusions: relative importance of different categories of drivers
CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS Clear need for further development of the
concept as a whole: “one size does not fit all”Over-riding importance of security-related
dynamics: securitization/de-securitization dynamics
Any successful benefit-sharing scheme will require the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of possible benefits to act as an inducement to each co-riparian to be involved.
Benefit-sharing will need to be established based on concrete inducements which can be quantified
Equitable allocation vs. benefits: two sides of same coin
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