Understanding ethnicity and politics in ghana's 4 th republic
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KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, KUMASI
COLLEGE OF ART AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA‘S 4TH
REPUBLIC
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE POLITICAL STUDIES SECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE BACHELOR OF ARTS
(HONS) DEGREE IN POLITICAL STUDIES
BY
ANTWI EMELDA
NYARKO ABBAM JOHN
NTI BUABENG DENNIS
WOANYAH EYRAM KELVIN
YEWETU OTU ALFRED
APRIL 2014
DECLARATION
We hereby declare that we have wholly undertaken the study herein submitted.
Name Signature Date
ANTWI EMELDA ………………. ……...............
NYARKO ABBAM JOHN ……………… …………….
NTI BUABENG DENNIS …………… ……………..
WOANYAH EYRAM KELVIN ……………. ………………
YEWETU OTU ALFRED …………….. ……………
I have fully supervised the students undertaking the study submitted herein and I confirm
that the students have my permission to present it for assessment.
Supervisor Signature Date
Dr. Edward Brenyah (PhD) …………………. ………………….
iii
ABSTRACT
Politics and ethnicity are two things that influence each other especially in Africa and
Ghana is no exception. Ethnicity has shaped the political structure and history of our
country since the struggle for independence from our former colonial masters. Ethnicity as
a tool for the acquisition of political and social power has been used vehemently by political
entrepreneurs who seek to capitalize on it in order to clinch unto political power or for the
attainment of that power. In this research, the study investigated the role ethnicity plays in
the politicking of modern day Ghana especially in the 4th
Republic. The study sought to find
out the magnitude of power which our politics as a country is being influenced by our
ethnicity and looked at governance and leadership as an aspect of politics since most
researches have looked at it from electioneering perspectives.
The study shows that there is a synergy between politics and ethnicity in Ghana especially
in its 4th
Republic since we returned to constitutional rule.
KEY WORDS: ETHNICITY, POLITICS, SOCIAL CLEAVAGE, GOVERNANCE AND
LEADERS
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DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to our Almighty father, the father of all children on the surface
of the earth and all lecturers in the Department of History and Political Studies especially
Dr. Brenyah Edward and Dr. Bobmilliar M. George for their enormous guidance and
contribution in making this dissertation a success.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
First and foremost, we wish to express our utmost gratitude to the Maker and Holder of the
universe for seeing us through this far. Indeed, if we speak with joy of this work we do so
not with our ability but just by grace He has bestowed on us. Whatever the merits of this
study might be, they are largely attributed to all those who took time to advise and assist us.
We owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Edward Brenyah, lecturer of Political Studies,
Department of History and Political Studies for not only his willingness to undertake the
supervisory role of this work but the compassionate and humane manner with which he
supervised this study and particularly for his suggestions, criticisms and assistance.
We are also grateful to our families especially our parents whom we dedicate this work to
for their immense support in our education and their patience. We would therefore want to
use this opportunity to say a big thank you for all you have suffered and achieved for our
sake.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ................................................................................................................... II
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... III
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENT........................................................................................................V
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... VI
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. VII
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... VIII
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................... 6
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ....................................................................................... 6
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS OR (NULL) HYPOTHESES ......................................... 6
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 7
1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS ........................................................................................... 7
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY .......................................................................... 9
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CRITIQUES .................................. 11
2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 11
2.2 THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AS A SOCIAL CLEAVAGE.................................... 12
2.3 THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP ................................................................................. 14
2.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE ............................................................................. 16
2.5 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT OF ETHNCITY ............................................. 18
CHAPTER 3 METHOD SECTION .................................................................................. 42
CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 45
4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 45
CHAPTER 5 ........................................................................................................................... 65
5.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................... 65
5.2 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTIONS ............... 65
5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 65
5.4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................... 66
5.5 DISCUSSIONS .......................................................................................................... 67
5.6 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 68
5.7 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 70
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 71
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................ 83
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 4-1 ................................................................................................................................. 47
Table 4-2 ................................................................................................................................. 50
Table 4-3 ................................................................................................................................. 51
Table 4-4 ................................................................................................................................. 52
Table 4-5 ................................................................................................................................. 60
Table 4-6 ................................................................................................................................. 61
Table 4-7 ................................................................................................................................. 62
Table 4-8 ................................................................................................................................. 63
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4-1 ................................................................................................................................ 46
Figure 4-2 ................................................................................................................................ 49
Figure 4-3 ................................................................................................................................ 53
Figure 4-4 ................................................................................................................................ 54
Figure 4-5 ................................................................................................................................ 55
Figure 4-6 ................................................................................................................................ 56
Figure 4-7 ................................................................................................................................ 58
Figure 4-8 ................................................................................................................................ 61
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Ethnicity and politics are two interweaving fabrics which cannot be separated especially
within the contextual analyses of the African political systems and its structures, which
Ghana; a country within its western part is no exception. Politics and ethnic sentiments or
identification (ethnicity) dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial times. For example, the
Fantes helped the British to fight against the Ashanti perceived hegemony during the
colonial time. The word “ethnicity” has divergent definitions as some people perceive it as
realistic; while others see it as psychological and emotional feelings of belonging to one
group as an entity with a common history, language, customs, traditions, norms and
practices. It is then a feeling of us as an ―in-group‖ and them as ―out-group‖.
Bulmer (1996) defines the word ethnic group as:― a collectivity within a larger population
having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past, and a cultural focus
upon one or more symbolic elements which define the group‘s identity, such as kinship,
religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance. Members of an
ethnic group are conscious of belonging to the group.‖
According toEriksen 1993, ―ethnicity is often said to be an irreducibly dual phenomenon in
that, by definition, it comprises aspects of both symbolic meaning and instrumental utility.
Ethnic identity offers the individual a sense of belonging and contributes to group cohesion,
while ethnic organization serves the mundane interests of its members (or at least its
leadership). Ethnicity appears whenever there is an ongoing, conventionalized relationship
between individuals who conceive of themselves as belonging to culturally distinctive
groups with different origins‖.
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Ethnicity is about collective identification based on perceived cultural differentiation.
Ethnicity is concerned with culture (shared meanings) but it is rooted in-and a product of
social interactions, especially across boundaries. Ethnicity is neither fixed nor static, any
more than the culture of which it is an aspect. Ethnicity is collective and individual
externalized in institutions and patterns of social interactions and internalized in personal
self-identification. It is important to know that a sense of shared similarity is no less
significant than the construction of a sense of difference from external others. Ethnicity may
be emotionally authentic or tactically and strategically manipulable, or indeed both
simultaneously. These all suggest that, ethnic identifications do not mean anything in
themselves. They are not ‗things‘ sui generis (in a class or group of its own).
Politics is very broad but its usage in this study narrows ―politics‖ to governance and
leadership. Politics on the other hand, involves processes by which a group of people
(perhaps with divergent opinions or interests) reach collective decision-making generally
regarded as binding on the group, and enforced as a common policy.
Governance can be thought of as: ―the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the
overall direction, effectiveness, supervision and accountability of an organization‖.
Governance can be defined as the administrative and process-oriented elements of
governing. Most often than not, the word ―governance‖ is interchanged with the word
―government‖. Government refers to the machinery that steer the affairs of the state and it is
made up of mainly three distinct arms: executive, legislature and the judiciary.
According to the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF), governance can be defined in
the broader terms. It refers to the ―process of interactions and decision-making among the
actors involved in a collective problem, that lead to the creation, reinforcement or
reproduction of social norms and institutions‖. Also, according to the United Nations
Development Programme‘s Regional Project on Local Governance for Latin America
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(UNDP-RPLGALA): “Governance has been defined as the rules of the political system
to solve conflicts between actors and adopt decisions (legality).It has been used to
describe “the proper functioning of institutions and their acceptance by the public”
(legitimacy). And it has been used to invoke the efficacy of government and the
achievement of consensus by democratic means (participation)”.
Leadership can also be described as the process of social influence in which one person can
enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task. Leadership in
this sense is the ability to have people buying into one‘s idea or vision in order to
materialize that idea or vision. Haunschild, et al. 2009 describe leadership as “an exercise
in language that results in the realization of a future that wasn’t going to happen
anyway which future fulfills or (contributes to fulfilling) the concerns of the relevant
parties”. This definition espouses the notion that, leadership focuses on the future including
a focus on fundamental concerns of the relevant parties. Interesting, the definition of
leadership by Sun Tzu is very intriguing because he defined leadership as ―a matter of
intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage and discipline‖. He further argues that
reliance on intelligence alone results in rebelliousness: exercise of humaneness alone results
in weakness: fixation on trust results in folly: dependence on the strength of courage results
in violence and excessive discipline and sternness in command results in cruelty. When one
has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its function, and then one can be leader‖.
The issue of politics in Ghana is a very interesting one since there are so many factors
which go into our daily politicking as a country. Some of the factors which influence our
politics include religion, culture and ethnicity which have a very powerful impact on
political activities in the country.
Additionally, balance of power and distrust among different ethnic groupings has always
been a key to understanding Ghanaian politics. There are about 49 major ethnic groupings
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in Ghana comprising the Akans, Mole-Dagbani, Ewes, Gas, Guans, Grusi, among others.
But interestingly in Ghana, our politics is divided on the lines of the Akans versus the Non-
Akans.
Ethnicity, it must be emphasized thrives on half-truths and perceptions as much as historical
facts and is sustained by stereotypes and prejudice which help to explain why ethnicity
remains a crucial weapon for political mobilization (Frempong 2004).
Furthermore, ethnicity may exhibit a number of paradoxes: firstly, while ethnicity rests on
culturally specified practice and given sets of beliefs, in reality an entire ‗pure‘ group is
extremely rare. Secondly, ethnic groups can generate forces of moderation, constitute a
form of social capital and advance the private fortunes of their members; but they may also
occasionally engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the formation
as a single group (Rothberg 2000;Ayoob 2001). Thirdly, contrary to the conventional
wisdom that is the political elites who manipulate ethnicity for their own interests. Ethnicity
acts as a pole around which groups members can mobilize and compete for control of state
power, economic resources, positions, contract awards and constitutional protection (just
like any other interest group)(Rothschild 1997:4).
It is essential in any analysis of ethnicity to consider the crucial role of the State.
The State is the turf on which ethnic group politics is played. It is the arena for
interaction, encounter, corporation, conflict and struggle over the exercise of power
and the distribution of societal resources.
The State‘s political institutions and capabilities structure ethno political groups‘
choices about policies to be pursued and the means to do so; whether to participate,
protest or rebel.
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When the State is viewed as a prize in the hands of a particular ethnic group, it
creates distrust and insecurity and makes it difficult for the State to be perceived as
an impartial arbiter by the other ethnic groups.
The study is interested in why the labeling of a particular government or administration or
political party as favoring a particular ethnicity group. Sometimes the word ―tribe‖ is be
used to replace ethnicity since there is virtually no sharp difference in the usage of the two
concepts in Ghanaian politics. Specifically, the study is interested in knowing why the
Mahama-Amissah-Arthur administration as a government full of the Northern tribes, why
President Dramani Mahama used$60 million of a World Bank loan of $100 million
loan on projects in the northern sector of the country which are mostly made up of the
ethnic inclinations of the three(3) Northern regions for which he is a member; why the
erstwhile administration of the NPP under former president, J.A. Kuffour was tagged as an
administration of Asante-Akyem (Akans); and why was the Ashanti Region the first to
benefit from the 10 billion Cedis for the Youth Fund disbursed as loans to skilled youth
under the NPP administration. In this regard, this study is interested in finding out what
really influence leaders to pursue certain policies which favors a particular ethnicity group.
For example, why the Kuffour administration had26 sector ministers out of which 18
were Akans (a third of which were Ashantis) and 8 Non-Akans (3 Mole-Dagbanis, 2
Ewes and 3 Gas).
It is as a result of these, that the study is interested in finding what causes the labeling of our
politics especially in the 4th
Republic on these lines. The study is very interested in fishing
out why the influence of ethnicity plays a key role in our daily politics. In this case, the
study intends to find out the magnitude of influence which ethnicity has on the governance
and leadership of a particular administration in Ghana. Specifically the study seeks to
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examine why people feel that, a particular government belongs to a particular ethnic
grouping and not the entire nation as a whole?
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The study examines why there exist strong relationships between ethnicity and politics (that
is, governance and leadership) in understanding Ghanaian politics. It further investigates
how leadership and governance are being influenced by ethnic identifications and
sentiments.
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of the study is to explore ways in which Ghana as a country can use its ethnic
differences in shaping its politics to bring about visible socio-economic transformations that
will raise the living standards of its citizenry.
Specifically, the study examines how ethnicity influences on our politics. In addition, the
study also investigates how ethnicity is manifested. Lastly, it examines how ethnicity can
serve as a political tool without causing conflicts, tensions, dissatisfactions and instability in
Ghana.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS OR (NULL) HYPOTHESES
It is hypothesized that, ethnicity has an influence on national and local
governmental politics.
Why does the invocation of ethnic identity impact governance and leadership?
How does ethnicity influence the actions and thoughts of political leaders in
authority in the political system?
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To what extent can one say that, the actions of political actors especially leaders are
informed by their ethnic inclinations?
Does the use of ethnicity as a political tool cause harmony in the political system?
How can Ghana ensure that, the use of ethnicity as a political cleavage does not
cause dissatisfaction, instability, violence and conflict?
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The study shows that, indeed ethnicity and politics are two variables that cannot be
separated if Ghanaian politics is to be understood. It further shows that, the use of ethnicity
as a political tool of social cleavage can be possible in the politics of Ghana without causing
dissatisfaction, instability and violence.
1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS
ETHNICITY: The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a
common national or cultural tradition. It is the measure of cultural affiliation. It
is the state of belonging to a human group having racial, religious, and linguistic
and certain other traits in common.
POLITICAL SYSTEM: It is defined as the set of formal legal institutions that
constitute a government or a state. It is a set of processes of interaction or as a
subsystem of the social system interacting with other nonpolitical subsystems,
such as the economic system. A political system consists of the formal and
informal structures which manifest the State's sovereignty over a territory and
people. Political system is a particular definition role and law norms and an
allocation of rights and duties historically determined through conflict, a
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balancing of powers. Those who fill these roles, who have the right to command
others, are the political elite.
SOCIAL CLEAVAGE: It is defined as the division of voters into voting blocs.
The preliminary assumption is that voters don‘t come in predefined groups of
pros and cons for or against a certain subject. Ballot analysis assumes that voters
opt for a certain party, or decide for the solution or option that comes closest to
their own position. Cleavage separates the voters into advocates and adversaries
on a certain issue, or voting for a certain party. Cleavage is the line that divides
political parties into supporters and opponents. It is operationally explained as
the division of individuals into distinct classes or groups.
POLITICS: The part of ethics which has to do with the regulation and
government of a nation or state, the preservation of its safety, peace and
prosperity, the defense of its existence and rights against foreign control or
conquest, the argumentative of its strength and resources, and the protection of
its citizens in their rights, with the preservation and improvement of their
morals. It is operationally defined as the art of government or governing
especially of a political entity such as a nation, and the administration and
control of its external and internal affairs.
REPUBLIC: A government in which supreme power resides in a body of
citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by elected officers and representatives
responsible to them and governing according to law. It is operationally defined
as a state where the people are politically independent and sovereign by
themselves and have a president.
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GOVERNANCE: The use of institutions, structures of authority and even
collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society
or economy. It operationally refers to the processes of running a government.
LEADERSHIP: The action of leading a group of people or a society or
organization. Leadership involves establishing a clear vision, sharing that vision
with others so that they will follow willingly, providing the information,
knowledge and methods to realize that vision, and coordinating and balancing
the conflicting interests of all members and stakeholders.
POLITICAL CLEAVAGE: The division of people into different classes in the
political system. ―Political cleavage is the national, ethnic, linguistic and
religious divisions that affect political allegiances and policies‖
(Conservapedia).
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter 1 presents the introduction, statement of the problem, purpose of the study,
research questions or null hypotheses, significance of the study, definition of terminologies.
Chapter 2 contains the review of related literature and research related to the problem being
investigated. The methodology and procedures used in gathering the data for the study are
presented in Chapter 3. The results of analyses and findings to emerge from the study will
be in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the study and findings, conclusions
drawn from the findings, a discussion and recommendations for future study.
10
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Chapter 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CRITIQUES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Most of the researches conducted in pursuance to ethnicity and politics in Ghana especially
in the Fourth Republic have bordered on the negatives( La Porte et al. 1999: Wa Wamwere
2003) that would emanate if Ghana allows the usage of ethnicity as a political
cleavage(Mahama, 2013: Kimenyi 2003, Wa Wamwere 2003). Some of the writings on
ethnicity and politics have sort to demonize the use of our differentials as a people in our
everyday politicking especially during the 4th
Republic and have largely been centered on
voting patterns during elections. Majority of the scholars argue that, ethnicity is what
mostly influence our voting patterns as a people but they fail to admit that, it is not ethnicity
that has been the major factor for our voting patterns in electing leaders in government but
different issues especially the issue of bringing rapid socioeconomic developments into the
life of the citizenry influence voting patterns. Concomitant to that, most literatures have not
been able to overwhelm convince readers why ethnicity as a political cleavage shouldn‘t be
allowed when it comes to politics.
Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and compete effectively
for state control of power, economic resources, positions, contracts awards and
constitutional protection (Rothschild 1997:4;Adam 1984).
Some people think democracy leads to more ethnic conflicts. Such school of thought argues
that , as more people participate in the political process and differences between ethnic
groups are articulated openly, political leaders in multiethnic societies may be tempted to
use ethnicity as a measure to obtain electoral support (Buzz: 2002:1). In a climate of
uncertainty, a policy of uniting an ethnic group against real or imagined political threat of
12
whipping up ethnic animosity against another ethnic group becomes expedient or
convenient. Whether use effectively to dash out the ambitions of others or offensively to
achieve their own end, ethnicity is primary as a label that is used for political advantage
(Psalides-Parlmetter 2000:238).
Unfortunately, there is little to be found when it comes to relating ethnicity to governance
in the Ghanaian political system especially in its relations to government policies,
programs, styles and regimes of the 4th
Republic. However, a better assessment of the
impact of ethnicity on politics in the 4th
Republican government of Ghana can be obtained
by examining the theories of ethnicity, leadership and governance.
2.2 THEORIES OF ETHNICITY AS A SOCIAL CLEAVAGE
There are essentially three main theories but out of which two are very dominant in
analyzing the meaning and nature of ethnicity.
The first school of thought of ethnicity is that of the “PRIMORDIALISM or
PERENNIALISM‖. This theory argues that, nations are ancient, natural phenomenon.
This school of thought holds that, members of the same ethnic group have a common bond
that determines their personal identity and ―turns the group into a natural community that is
older than the modern (state)‘ (Van de Goor 1994:18; Ake 2003:93). They emphasize the
idea of ethnic identification as a result of inherent long standing and usually unchanging
sets of alliances which often defy rationality and logic explanation (Smith 2000:36). With
this school of thought, ethnicity is an ascribed identity or assigned status, something
inherited from one‘s ancestors or right at birth which can never be changed (Geertz
1963:109-110).To primordialists, it is the primordial bonds or factors such as lineage and
cultural ties that give rise to sustain ethnicity (Geertz 1973; Isaac1975; Van den Berghe
1981).
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The second school of thought is the INSTRUMENTALISTS, which became popular or
prominent in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States of America in the debate about
ethnic persistence. This school of thought sees ethnicity as an instrument or strategic tool
for gaining resources. According to this theoretical framework, people become ethnic and
remain ethnic when their ethnicity yields significant returns to them. In other words,
ethnicity exists and persists because it is useful. The Instrumentalists again see ethnicity
essentially as a means for people, especially leaders to pursue their own purposes such as
‗forming, mobilizing and manipulating groups of people for political ends‘ (Van de Goor
1994:18, Ake 2003:94). They explain ethnicity in terms of a variety of political, economic
and institutional structures which mobilizes, alter and even create an ethnic identity in the
service of political goals (Smith 2000:36; Conteh-Morgan 1997:79 and Moynihan 1975).
The functional advantages of ethnicity range from ‗the moral and material support provided
by ethnic networks to political gains made through ethnic voting bloc‘ (Portes and Bech
1985, 24).
For example, Orlando Patterson (1975, 348) asserted that ―The strength, scope, viability
and bases of ethnic identification are determined by, and used to serve the economic and
general class interest of individuals‖. Hence, interests are the sole determinants of ethnic
identity, and ethnic affiliation tends to be transient or short in duration and situational as the
benefits of ethnicity shifts.
The last school of thought or theoretical framework on ethnicity is the
CONSTRUCTIVISM. This theoretical framework was crafted by Jean Piaget (1967), who
articulated mechanisms by which knowledge is internalized by learners. Starting in the
1970s, the school of the Constructivists began to ascend. The Constructivists views are in
sharp contrast to that of the Primordialism. This school of thought has advanced three
strong arguments. First, ethnicity is a socially constructed identity that is something which
14
was socially created. It is upon this first view that, the name constructionists come to bear.
Secondly, as an extension of a constructed identity, ethnic boundaries are flexible and
changeable. Ethnicity is dynamic. Lastly, ethnic identification is constructed by society.
Ethnicity is a reaction to changes in social environment. Jonathan Sarna, a historian
developed the so-called “theory of ethnicization‖. Saran maintained that, ethnicity is
created by two conditions: ascription and adversity. In here, ascription refers to the
assignment of an individual to a particular ethnic group by outsiders such as government,
churches, schools, media, natives, and other immigrants. Adversity includes hardship,
prejudices, discrimination and hostility. Saran contends that, adversity forces members of
the same group to unite and help create group identity and solidarity.
2.3 THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP
Attribute pattern approach: This theoretical framework argues that, the influence of
individual characteristics on outcomes is best understood by considering the person as an
integrated totality rather than a summation of individual variables. In other words, the
leader attribute pattern approach argues that, integrated constellation or combination of
individual differences may explain substantial variance in both leader emergence and leader
effectiveness.
Behavioral and style theories: This school argues that, leadership takes a strong
personality with a well-developed positive ego (David McClelland, 1967). It argues
leadership as a set of behaviors, evaluate the behavior of successful leaders, and identify
broad leadership styles. The failure of tracing ‗‗gold‘‘ in the trait ‗‗mines‘‘ urged
researchers to examine the behaviors that specific leaders exhibited. Behavioral studies of
leadership aim to identify behaviors that differentiate leaders from non-leaders (Robbins,
1998). Behavioral theories of leadership support that a set of particular behaviors that can
be named as a style of leadership. Leadership style refers to a distinctive behavior adopted
15
by persons in formal positions of leadership (Campell, et al., 1966) and several studies were
conducted to identify those.
Contingency theory: The contingency view of leadership emerged from systems theory
and its impact on organizational and administrative theory. According to this model,
specific leader behaviors relate to group performance and satisfaction. In order to achieve
this, certain variables interact with each other such as the leader himself, the position he
holds, group members, internal, and external environment of the organization. A successful
match between the leader and the group‘s performance and satisfaction is ‗‗contingent‘‘
upon these variables. Three situational variables intervene between the leader‘s style and
effectiveness which are leader-member relations, task structure, and power position. Groups
are classified as either favorable or unfavorable based on these criteria (Monahan &Hengst,
1982).
This theory assumes that different situations call for different characteristics and that no
single optimal psychological profile of a leader exists. According to this theory, ―what an
individual actually does when acting as a leader is in large dependent upon characteristics
of the situation in which he functions‖ (Hemphill 1949).
Trait theory: This theoretical framework argues that, leadership is based an individual
attributes. The study of special traits of leaders emerged from the belief that leadership and
abilities such as intelligence were inherited. In addition to intelligence other factors such as
birth order, status and liberal parents highly correlate with leadership abilities (Carlson,
1996).
Visionary Leadership: Visionary leadership is the ability to create and express a realistic,
attainable, and attractive vision of the future for organizations which grow continuously.
Visionary leaders should create inspiring and innovative visions for their organizations
rendering them credible in the eyes of the people in the organization at the same time.
16
Visionary leaders have three qualities, which are related to their effectiveness. First, is the
ability to explain and articulate the vision to the others? Second, is to express the vision not
just verbally but through the leader‘s behavior. Third, is to communicate the vision to
different leadership contexts.
2.4 THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE
Governance is a new phenomenon that is now gaining ascendancy in the academia and so
little theories are known about it. In this study, we will be looking at three categories of
governance theories or school of thoughts and they are: Policy Network theory, Rational
Choice theory, and ―Interpretive‖ theory.
Rational Choice theory: This school of thought draws on microeconomic analysis, with its
attempt to unpack social life in terms of individual actions and to explain individual actions
in terms of rationality, and especially utility maximization. The rational choice theorists are
often more interested in exploring cases where institutions or norms are honored even in the
absence of a higher authority to enforce them. Rational choice theory attempts to explain all
social phenomena by reference to the micro level of rational individual activity. It unpacks
social facts, institutions and patterns of rule entirely by analyses of individual action. It
models individuals acting on the assumption that they adopt the course of action most in
accord with their preferences. Rational choice theorists furthermore, argue that the absence
of any effective higher authority means that such institutions have to be conceived as self-
enforcing. Again, they argue institutions structure people‘s strategic interactions with one
another; stable institutions influence individuals‘ actions by giving them reasonable
expectations about the outcome of the varied courses of action from which they might
choose.
17
Interpretive theories: Interpretive approaches to governance often emphasize contingency.
They reject the idea that patterns of rule can be properly understood in terms of a historical
or social logic attached to capitalist development, functional differentiation or even
institutional settings. Instead, they emphasize the meaningful character of human actions
and practices. It simply means that, because individuals act on beliefs, ideas, or meanings-
whether conscious or not- their actions can be understood properly only if the significant
meanings are grasped. Some of the interpretive approaches suggest that beliefs, ideas or
meanings are more or less uniform across a culture or society. Hence, they inspire studies
of distinct patterns of governance associated with diverse cultures. Other interpretive
approaches also place greater emphasis on the contests and struggles over meanings that
they take to constitute so much political activity. Hence, they inspire studies of the different
traditions or discourses of governance that are found within any given society.
Policy network theory: This theory argues that, governance is simply self-organizing,
inter-organizational networks that are charged with policy-making (Rhodes 1996, 660;
Stoker 1998a, 18). Any setting with a plurality of actors and no formal control system that
can dictate the relationships between the actors is a governance network (Chhotray& Stoker
2009, 3). Policy-making involves multiple organizations, from the government as well as
from the outside. The policy issues are complex, and even defining the policy problem is
demanding (Stoker 2000, 92). Setting policy goals, defining solutions, and implementation
all require resources that are not held by any single organization, resulting in
interdependence of the organizations. The interdependence in turn provides the
organizations in the network considerable autonomy from central control.
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2.5 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT OF ETHNCITY
Ethnicity has proven to be a very difficult concept to define with much precision. Indeed,
those who have approached the task have not been able to achieve a consensus. Most
usages are both vague and ambiguous in their application to empirical research. What most
scholars consider to be examples of ethnicity, others would consider being cases of such
other variables are regionalism, religious-sectarianism, class conflict and even sheer
―opportunism‖ (Ross 1979:3).
Franck and Rainer (2009) provide an assessment of ethnic favoritism in Sub-Saharan
Africa. They looked at eighteen (18) countries and focused on primary education and infant
mortality of various ethnic groupings under different ethnic leadership in a period of fifty
(50) years. They argued that, ethnic favoritism effects are large and widespread and that,
this causes underdevelopment in these African countries. They went on to say that, ethnic
favoritism are common in states whose governments have control greatly over fiscal
resources but interestingly, they argued that, states of ethnic groups speaking structurally
unrelated languages or live in more segregated locations don‘t display higher levels of
ethnic favoritism.
Moreover, ethnic diversity according to Franck and Rainer (2009) is related to bad
economic policies, slow economic growth and low levels of per capita income. States of
diverse ethnics were found to have poor quality governance, inadequate provision of public
goods and civil wars. (Le Porte et al.1999; Alesina et al. 2003; Montaloo and Reeynal-
Querol, 2003). Ethnic diversity leads to costly rent-seeking by different ethnic groupings
(Easterly and Levine, 1997) and generate conflict over the provision of public goods
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). In other words, politically domineering ethnic groups
will use their powers to provide economic benefits to their own members. In ethnically
heterogeneous societies, it is common for the group that ascends the throne of power to
19
fashion government policies and expropriate the production of goods to their members and
prevent outsiders from benefiting.
Ethnicity is used as an exclusion tool and the dominant ethnic groups redistribute resources
towards their own members (Fearon, 1991; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).
In addition, they argued that whereas theoretical arguments link bad economic
performances of African states to ethnic favoritism, there is no systematic empirical
evidence that members of the ethnic groups actually benefits from having their leaders in
power. In their work, they estimated that on average primary school attendance, completion
and literacy of the leaders ethnic groups grew by 2.5 percent and reduced their infant
mortality by about 0.5 percent. They argued that, leaders‘ ethnicity have strong effects on
education, infant mortality or both in their ethnic groups.
In conclusion, ethnic favoritism is more alarming in states whose governments collect more
revenues and have greater resources to spend on the provision of public goods; that, the
ordinary members of ethnic groups get benefits from their leaders when in power and that,
leaders may deliver even larger favors to narrow subgroups of other ethnic groupings.
Kimenyi (2003) argued ethnicity is an important institution and one which impacts on the
quality of governance. He argues further that, ethnic heterogeneity results in under-
provision of non-excludable public goods and such societies are associated with the
provision of patronage goods. In addition, Kimenyi argued governments provide public
goods because left to private individuals, such goods need not be provided. Governments
step in to correct the inefficiencies of the markets with the intention of maximizing social
welfare and do so efficiently; but surprisingly governments‘ provision in itself is marred by
numerous inefficiencies and short-comings called government failure (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Olson 1965).
20
He explained the failure of government by the use of interest group theory of government.
This theory argues that, public policy makers are not benevolent maximizers of social
welfare as assumed by the market failure model but rather, they are motivated by self-
interests. In addition, the provision for the public is subjected to rent-seeking which
associates with waste of resources and other inefficiencies (Krueger, 1975; Tallock, 1967).
He went further to say other factors explain the inefficiencies of government provision and
focuses on the ―principal agent problems‖ inherent in public provision. The ―principal agent
problems‖ arise from the fact that voters are not motivated to invest resources to monitor
the behavior of public officials.
Moreover, he argued public provision lacks well-defined property rights because voters are
numerous and dispersed. No single person has sufficient wealth at stake to make it
worthwhile to monitor government officials on a day-to-day basis. Interestingly, he goes
beyond to say that the degree of ethnic fractionalization influence the quality of governance
in terms of provision of public goods. One way ethnicity could increase the probability of
government failure is by increasing the transactions costs of achieving cooperation and thus
weakening institutions of governance. The failure to incorporate heterogeneity in the design
of institution leads to the failure of states governments of diverse presence of ethnic groups.
Thus by ignoring the importance of ethnicity in institutional design, many ethnically
fractionalized states are not suited to harmonize ethnic claims (Kimenyi, 1998).
Ethnic groups lower the transaction costs of solving ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖ and therefore are
suited to provide local public goods but they complicate collective action translating into
outcomes that make all members of the society worse off. Ethnically diverse societies are
prone to corruption and poor governance and slow economic growth (Kimenyi, 1987;
Easterly and Levine, 1997; Mauro, 1995; Mbaku, Ogbese and Kimenyi, 2001). Identifying
21
with one‘s ethnic group is highly valued and resources are devoted to make certain that
members of the group continue to identify with that group.
Moreover, Kimenyi argued good governance in the provision of public goods requires an
institutional framework that reduces the cost of cooperation. Such institutional framework
could be supplied by experience built up through repeated interactions, a high level of
social cohesion, trust or a constitutional and legal regime characterized by effectiveness and
legitimacy (Meagler, 2003). Ethnic groups that control government adopt strategies that
make it difficult for other groups to capture the instruments of wealth transfers. The
competition to control the instruments of wealth transfers have been intense carrying ethnic
conflicts and this explains the continued state of conflict and political instability in Africa.
In conclusion, Kimenyi argued that, ethnic fractionalization causes corruption, low public
goods provision and participation, exclusion and instability and that ethnic identification in
politics is revealed by voting patterns because the state fails to insure nonexcludability
which make people turn to their ethnic communities because these ethnic societies serve as
a sort of alternative statehood for the provision of public goods and this process can initiate
a vicious cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy which in turn
reduce the effectiveness of the state thus, intensifying the attitude of illegitimacy.
Thomas Bossuroy (2011) looked at 2004 presidential elections of Ghana in his analyses of
his work. To him, heterogeneity of the populace deter institutions capacity suitable for
economic growth and poverty reduction and brings possible rivalry and non-cooperative
relationships between groups leading to a lower access of development because of the
difficulty they have to work together. The rivalry between groups also impacts the
aggregate social choice generated by democratic processes.
Compromise, balance of power and distrust between ethnic groups have always been
critical in the understanding of the Ghanaian politics. Ghana is a multi-party system which
22
has two parties dominating the system and they are the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and
National Democratic Congress (NDC). He went on further to argue that, economic
opposition between the two (2) leading parties may be one of the motives for voters
choosing between them as well as ethnic opposition. The NPP represent the Akan tradition
and is mostly supported by the heart of the Ashanti Region whilst the NDC gathers support
from the Northern Regions and from the Volta Region where non-Akan people are
majority.
The level of urbanity may also play a key role in structuring the political field in Ghana as
he argues on. In his analyses, the NPP-NDC gained about 97percent in the 2004
Presidential Elections. He found out that, the geographical patterns of votes clearly reveal it
in the votes garnered by the NPP among Akan areas and NDC in the non-Akan areas.
Ethnicity had a very strong effect on the patterns of votes. The NPP had almost 70 percent
of the variance of shared votes when Akan alone is looked at regressively; socioeconomic
variables accounted 55percent of the NPP vote pattern.
In conclusion, Bossuroy argued that political participation is determined by the
socioeconomic conditions of voters, level of education and the remoteness of the residence
areas are determinants of participation. Ethnicity appeared to poorly explain the evolution
of votes when analyzing elections though it plays an important role in the structural patterns
of voting distribution.
Alabi (2007) also argued ethnicity play a major role in the acceptability of political
marketing approaches of partisan politics in Ghana. He argues that, when looking at the
activities and functions of political marketing, the political product (the political party)
should be designed to fit into both the social and economic contexts of the target audience
whose votes that particular political party is seeking. The characteristics of the political
product include which personalities, philosophy or ideology, manifesto, past performance,
23
dependability, reliability and brand name or image can be said to determine the
acceptability of that product within the defined environment.
The beliefs, economic and social dispositions of the people are fundamental to ethnicity.
The satisfaction of the needs and aspiration of the voters and the people themselves are the
major determinants of accepting a political party. The acceptance of a political party to a
larger extent is tied to how the people, their beliefs, economic and social disposition
identify with a particular political party based on the party‘s characteristics in terms of party
leadership, party structure, ideology, party‘s image and past performance. Alabi identifies
the political market as a conglomeration of voters, challenges and incumbents. The political
market refers to anywhere political parties and electorates meet or communicate to sell and
buy political products. The electorates are the buyers while the political parties are the
sellers within that surrounding; and there are also competitors of their own strengths and
weaknesses except in one party state.
He went on to say that, the important things to consider in political marketing are what
product, how the product is presented, where is the communication taking place. In political
marketing, the battle field is the mindset of the voter whereas in a society, where ethnicity
and communality plays a vital role, the political market is said to be the mindset of the
floating voter given that the party already has a strong base. This is where the role of ethnic
identification falls in political marketing. Ethnicity pervades all societies and as a result is
essential for every political marketing approach although to a lesser degree in a more
diverse environment.
Political parties learn much about people‘s identities and culture in order to pitch candidates
to win the acceptability of such people. Likewise the performance and acceptability of
political parties among a specific ethnic grouping is fixed to perception, appreciation and
24
how the ethnic group identifies with the party. Ethnic sentiments are one of the important
tools affecting democratization and nation-building.
Complexity of ethnicity in Ghanaian grass root politics is due to the fact that, ethnic groups
are not bond not only by kinship but also principles (NyuotYoh, 2004). Alabi further
described Ghanaian political experience as a chameleonic experience because it has been
full of regime changes both democratic and authoritarian. Yalae (2006) indicates the
entrenchment of ethnicity in Ghana‘s politics is due to the fear of perpetual ethnic
domination-the fear of ethnic subjugation by another ethnic group. Alabi went further to say
the decision of leadership of parties especially the selection of flag bearer and vice
presidential candidate is made in consideration of which ethnic card to play and cites the
NPP as an example. No part of Ghana is ethnically homogenous and the urban areas are the
most ethnically mixed due to migration of people in search of employment.
His analyses of voting pattern indicates that, aside Ashanti, Volta and Western Regions, no
political party can consider any of the urban districts or constituencies as a stronghold due
to the ethnically diverse nature of these constituencies. This implies that, the effect of
ethnicity is more common in rural areas.
In conclusion, Alabi argued that for any party to win any presidential election it needs an
ethnic base as a springboard and the parties with very strong ethnic support bases are those
that have stood the test of time no matter the marketing tools used. Strongholds are
considered pre-requisites for multi-party systems imperative for the sustenance of political
parties.
Oelbaum (2010) in his paper consider the linkage between the spatial dimension of poverty
and war in the conflict-prone Northern areas of Ghana. The research centers on one specific
conflict, the ―Guinea Fowl War‖ of 1994 which he describes as the most violent episode in
Ghana. He specifically looked at the relationship between changes in poverty, interethnic
25
inequality and warfare in that region. He blamed government mixed signals about its
intention for the region to have played a critical role as a driver for the conflict; for
inflaming the aspirations and expectations of non-centralized groups, while generating
resistance and anger from chiefs to whom government was ultimately beholden.
He went on further to say that, the widening of economic inequalities between distinct
reference groups caused the war. Conflict emerges as a result of development and poverty
reduction, and says institutional arrangements could be used to prevent and contain
violence. According to Oelbaum, the war affected 8 administrative districts, and led to the
burning and destruction of four hundred and forty-two (442) separate villages, which
resulted in the displacement of about two hundred thousand (200,000) people.
Again, he argued there is a substantial relationship between warfare and poverty reduction.
According to World Bank(2004),after a typical civil war of seven(7)years duration,
incomes are approximately fifteen(15) percent lower than they would have been if the war
had not happened, which implies a thirty(30)percent increase in the incidence of absolute of
poverty. The most proximate cause of the ―Guinea Fowl War‖ was the petition launched by
the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) and a Konkomba sub-chief to the National
House of Chiefs which sought to cause the elevation of the chief of Saboba (a Konkomba)
to paramount status. The petition was rejected by the Dagomba paramouncy. The
environment surrounding the petition was exacerbated by the actions of the central
government in particular President Rawlings, who had indicated in 1991 that ―minority
groups would be justified in taking up arms to defend their autonomy‖.
A combination of signals of official permissiveness, rumors of war, the intractability of the
issues and the seemingly inability to find alternatives to violence, gave rise to a form of
security dilemma that manifested in a deadly ethnic war (Pul, 2003).
26
Collier (2001) argues people mostly identify with their kin groups, ethnic groups or
religious groups, than with the nation and does this by using two terminologies- ethnic
dominance and ethnic fragmentation. The power of such sub-national identities is
commonly regarded as a course. Societies divided by ethnicity are seen as less likely to
reach cooperative solutions, and more likely to victimize minorities. Civil wars can be
viewed as the extreme manifestation of the more general phenomenon of dysfunctional
politics and have social repercussions far beyond the boundaries of the affected state. This
implies ethnic divisions make cooperation more difficult and victimization more likely.
Collier argues that to solve sub-national ethnic identifications, governments could engage in
the sort of virulent nationalism which Europe used in its own building of national identities.
Alternatively, governments could accede to the demand for ethnic self-determination
creating many new states.
Ethnic diversity neither increases the risk of civil war nor reduces economic growth. Multi-
ethnic societies can usually be socially and economically fully viable. Ethnicity as a basis
for identity is a social rather than psychological phenomenon. It is seen as cultural and
political phenomenon. As a cultural phenomenon, ethnicity is highly persistent i.e. people
choose transmit their culture by marrying within their own group (Bisin and Verdier, 2000).
As a political phenomenon, ethnic diversity is considerably more fluid. It is indeed implied
by ‗national building‘.
Moreover, he argued basing group membership upon kinship provides clear rules of
lifetime membership thereby overcoming the standard problems of adverse selection.
Kinship also provides high observability of behavior that means it ensures groups are well-
informed about anti-social behaviors and discourage moral hazards. A society composed of
multiple kin groups is more efficient than a homogeneous, but atomized society. Kin groups
do not divide a pre-existing whole, but rather aggregate an atomized society into groups
27
large enough to reap the gains from collective actions. Effective political groupings are too
large to be based upon social interaction and so must be based upon an imagined share
identity (Anderson, 1983).
Modern ethnic political loyalties start from reciprocal economic obligations within a kin
group, extend to an imagined community of shared interest within a tribe, and often extend
to allowances with other tribes to form a political party. The fear of ethnic politics in
societies with ethnic minorities will lead to the permanent exclusion of other groups and
discrimination against them. Together with Ashish Garg, they analyzed the effects of ethnic
diversity in the Ghanaian labor market (Collier and Garg, 1999). They found ethnic
diversity had consequences which are highly problematic. Controlling for other
characteristics, they argue that workers from tribes that are locally the largest usually
command a substantial wage premium. This they explained in terms of the power of kin
group patronage in promotions, with larger groups having disproportionate power. The
problem from this scenario is poor national economic policy. Ethnic diversity makes
political cooperation more difficult (Easterly and Levine, 1997).
Collier and Garg (1999) found that in the public sector, the patronage-induced wage
premiums for the locally largest tribe was twenty-five (25) percent whereas in the private
sector, it was zero. They analyzed this by arguing that, in the private sector, competition
force firms to curb the patronage power of kinship. More so, Collier argues ethnic diversity
is damaging if it takes the form of dominance. Political protest is more common in
ethnically diverse societies and political violence is less common. Diversity not
homogeneity lowers the risk of conflict (Bates 1999, p.31). Dominance (one ethnic group
in permanent) may produce victimization and so increase the risk of rebellion.
―Fragmentalization‖ however is predicted to make rebellion more difficult because to be
militarily viable, a rebel organization must maintain cohesion. In Collier‘s work with Anke
28
Hoeffler (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000), they found ethnic dominance indeed doubles
the risk of civil war and fragmentation significantly reduces the risk.
Collier (2001) further went on to look at ethnicity in democratic regimes. To him, if
democratic politics is dysfunctional in ethnically diverse societies, then such societies need
a strong leader ‗above‘ politics to avoid these pressures; the introduction of party loyalties
based on ethnic affiliation does not substantially change outcomes, but rather it is likely to
have significant negative effects in either single-issue politics or multi-issue politics.
Single-issue politics assumes government is constrained and all citizens must benefit
equally from the provision of a public good or service. With this kind of politics, ethnic
politics makes no difference to political decisions regardless of whether diversity takes the
form of fragmentation or dominance. Even when ethnic identification is strongly correlated
with an interest, ethnic politicking makes surprisingly little difference. When diversity takes
the form of fragmentation, ethnic politicking will normally have only a negligible effect;
but when it takes the form of ethnic identification dominance, it will have a significant
effect if the dominant group has a small plurality and if at the same time, there is a large
difference between that group and others.
Multi-issue politics, in this system, the absence of identification makes political parties (if
they exist at all) to be weak. In here, political parties‘ survivals depend on their ability to
deliver ―expenditure‖ to the people, rather than on party loyalties. In multi-issue politics,
there is no ‗core‘, i.e. there is no equilibrium and the likely outcome is therefore instability
(Imman and Rubenstein, 1997). The political system continues to try to build minimum
winning coalitions which capture all the benefits of public expenditure for its own
members. Hence, majorities keep forming and breaking up. The effects of exogenous party
loyalties i.e. no ethnic group constitute majority are mutual gains from cooperation if only a
bargain can be negotiated and enforced. The more ethnically fractionalized a society is, the
29
greater the number of political parties, the more difficult it might arrive at a cooperative
solution.
In conclusion, Collier argues any system in which electoral allegiance is based on identity
will have cooperation problems as well as instability. Ethnic dominance confers durable
power on a winning ethnic group which sacrifices growth and redistribution of resources
and to solve the problems of ethnic dominance, there is the need for better protection of
minority rights in societies with ethnic majorities. Rights of equal treatment, individual or
group need to be incorporate into the popular conception of democracy as well as ethnic
employment patronage in the public sector could be countered by greater transparency in
hiring and promotions perhaps reinforced by targets and quota protection for minorities plus
the boundary between public and private activity should be drawn somewhat different.
Cheeseman and Ford (2007) examine the significance of ethnicity as a political cleavage
across African nations. They look at ‗ethnic voting‘ of all significant parties and ethnic
groups. They divide ethnic voting by dividing it into two- ―ethnic polarization and ethnic
diversity‖. The former captures the importance of ethnic identification in determining party
support levels while the latter captures variations in the ethnic diversity of the support base
of different parties. Ethnicity has long been understood as playing a crucial role in
structuring party politics in Africa (Horowitz, 1985; Palmberg, 1999; Posner, 1999). Norris
and Maltes (2003) find that ethnicity does play an important role in determining support for
ruling parties but ethnicity is not always the primary cleavage in African politics. Scarrit
and Mazaffar (2005) demonstrate that both ethno-political fragmentation and geographical
concentration of ethnic groups are important factors in explaining the number of political
parties.
They argue again that, the vast majority of political parties in Africa are not ‗ethnic parties‘.
On average, opposition parties are less ethnically diverse than ruling parties and both ruling
30
and opposition parties are diverging. While ruling parties are becoming increasing
ethnically diverse and less ethnically polarized, the opposite is generally true of opposition
parties, making the evolution of ethnicity as a political cleavage complex. The need for
incumbent parties to build large coalitions in order to retain power appears to have
encouraged the development of multi-ethnic political alliances which are becoming
increasingly representative of the national population. This scenario is likely to continue as
aspirant leaders recognize the electoral need to prevent themselves as national, rather than
sectional or regional leaders.
They argue that, if this continue, it is more likely to undermine the salience of ethnic
identifications as cleavages. Interestingly, many opposition parties have responded to
electoral defeat by mobilizing increasingly ethnically homogenous communities. The
underlying tension between the ‗included‘ and the ‗excluded‘ if not dealt with could prove
divisive in the future. The level of ethnic representation is significant as it is likely to have a
strong impact in question of legitimacy of regimes, trust and ultimately political stability.
The majority of ruling parties between 2001 and 2006 have been ethnically
‗unrepresentative‘ of the population they serve. This is as a result, of incumbent parties
becoming more ethnically diverse and less ethnically polarized. This could reduce the
significance of ethnicity as a political dividing line and suggests that multi-party elections
may promote ,rather than hinder the emergence of a ‗non ethnic‘ politics.
In addition, they argue that there is a synergy between ethnic identity and party affiliation.
In Ghana after 2001, using a kappa score, Ghana scored 0.508(2001), 0.340(2003) and
0.352(2006). Countries scoring below 0.250 suggest that ethnicity is not the predominant
political factor in those countries and they included Botswana - 0.168(2001), 0.088(2003)
and0.136 (2006) and Mali after 2001 – 0.216(2003) and 0.244(2006). In 2001 and 2006,out
of ten(10) countries, eight(8) showed that ethnic polarization of support of ruling parties fell
31
between these periods suggesting that incumbent were recruiting support from across the
societies they ruled. Surprisingly, ethnic polarization of opposing parties supports rose in
six(6) out of the ten(10) countries surveyed of which Ghana recorded
0.452(2001),0.312(2003) and 0.364(2006).
Based on knowing whether parties are ethnic parties, they classified ethnic parties in five
categories as follows:-
(I) Parties which receive 85 percent and 100 percent of their support from one
ethnic group as ‗ethnic parties‘.
(II) Parties receiving less than 85 percent but more than 66.6 percent of their support
from on ethnic group as ‗potentially ethnic‘ parties. Such parties are neither so
dominated by one group that they will be encouraged to tailor policies solely to
that community nor independent enough of the support of the group that the
party leadership can risk alienating this support base.
(III) Parties which receive between 33.3 percent and 66.6 percent of their votes from
one ethnic group as ‗multi-ethnic‘ parties. These are genuinely broad based
alliance in which the party is reliant on support from a number of different
ethnic groups. The importance of cross-ethnic support to these parties must offer
policies which are attractive to a range of communities.
(IV) Multi-ethnic parties-majority ethnic group receive between 50 percent and 66.6
percent and mottle-ethnic party-no majority ethnic group (33.3 percent and 50
percent).
(V) Finally, where the largest ethnic group constitute less than a third of the parties
total support. The party is ‗non ethnic‘.
Mahama (2013) examines the potential dangers of ethnic manipulation as capital tool on
one hand and ethnic conflict on the other and how they affect the consolidation of Ghana‘s
32
effort of democracy. He argues that continued spread of ethnic conflict and deepening of
existing ones coupled with the dangers of ethnic identity by political entrepreneurs is not
only threat but harmful to the country‘s democracy. He affirms that strengthening
democratic institutions and civil society among others is the way forward for the
consolidation of our fragile democracy. Ethnic groups possess their culture, customs,
norms, beliefs and traditions. There is usually a common language and boundary
maintenance between members and non-members.
He goes on to argue ethnic rivalries of the pre-colonial era, variance in the impact of
colonialism upon different regions of the country, and the uneven distribution of social and
economic amenities in post-independence Ghana have all contributed to the present-day
tensions among ethnics. Ethnic and regional considerations have played significant roles in
the fortunes of political parties in Ghana. Ethnic mobilization and exploitation have
characterized Ghanaian politics for very long and the deepening of this trend is a hindrance
to our efforts of consolidating our democracy. The effort of consolidating our democracy is
not a choice but a necessity if we are to continue priding ourselves as the beacon of African
democracy. The deepening of ethnic division mostly aligned to the political division and the
upsurge and/or renewal of ethnic conflict due to apparent political manipulation for
electoral gain is a worry as far as our future of democracy is concerned.
In addition to these, conflict situations are caused by several factors including chieftaincy
issues though the bottom line is often ethnic and examples are the Bawku conflict between
the Kusasis and Mamprusis, the Dagombas and Nanumbas and more recently between the
Fantes and Ewes in Ekumfi. Ethnic diversity is not just beautiful due partly to the exquisite
blend of culture, but when characterized by unity; togetherness and tolerance could yield
many dividends in our country‘s national life. Ethnic discrimination and stereotyping by
33
some ethnic groups against others easily draw people closer to where they feel accepted and
identified with and that could account for this significant alignment.
Finally, injustice is a breeding grounding for anarchy and self-defense. Ghana‘s democracy
is characterized by weak institutions, lack luster civil society and corruption which render
the country‘s democracy more vulnerable and susceptible to the dangers of ethnic
politicking and manipulative ethnic conflicts for political gains. Political leadership should
also work towards strengthening the capacity of government and democratic institutions to
allow for their effective and efficient functioning to help provide the needed services to
Ghanaians.
Ansell and Gash (2007) look at what is termed ‗collaborative governance‘ both in theory
and practice. Collaborative governance brings public and private stakeholders together in
collective forum with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making.
They examine the conditions under which collaborative governance will be more or less
effective as an approach to policy making and public management. Collaborative
governance emerged as a response to the failures of downstream implementation and to the
high cost and politicization of regulation. It also arose from the growth of knowledge and
institutional capacity. They define collaborative governance as ‗a governing arrangement
where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective
decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims
to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets‘. Lynn, Heinrich
and Hill (2007) construe governance broadly as ―regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions,
and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly
supported goods and services.
They define collaborative governance as a type of governance in which public and private
actors work collectively in distinctive ways, using particular processes, to establish laws
34
and rules for the provision of public goods. Their definition stipulates a specific role for
public agencies and look specifically at the executive branch. Public agencies initiate
collaborative forums either to fulfill their own purposes or to comply with a mandate
including court orders, legislation or rules governing the allocation of central government
funds. Stakeholder is defined by them as the participation of citizens as individuals and to
the participation of organized groups. Collaborative governance is never consultative. It
implies two-way communication and influence between agencies and stakeholders and also
opportunities for stakeholders to talk with each other. The institutionalization of a collective
decision-making process is paramount in understanding collaborative governance.
In addition to these arguments, resources/liabilities of collaboration include a level of trust,
conflict and social capital. Power imbalances between stakeholders are a commonly noted
problem in collaborative governance and they produce distrust or weak commitment. If
some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status or resources to participate
or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance
process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors. The power imbalances are
particularly problematic where important stakeholders do not have the organizational
infrastructure to be represented in the governance process. Another problem is that, some
stakeholders may not have the skills and expertise to engage in discussions about highly
technical problems(Gunton and Day,2003;Lasker and Weiss,2003;Merkhofer et
al.,1997;Murdock et al.,2005;Warner,2006).
A third is that, some stakeholders do not have the time, energy or liberty to engage in time-
intensive collaborative processes (Yaffee and Wondoleak, 2003). Power and resource
imbalances affect the incentives of groups to participate in collaborative process (Gunton
and Day, 2003; Imperial, 2005). Power differences among players influence their
willingness to come to the table (Gray, 1989). Incentives to participate depend in part upon
35
stakeholders‘ expectations about where the collaborative processes will yield meaningful
results especially against the balance of time and energy (Bradford, 1998; Geoghegan and
Renard, 2002; Rogers et al. 1993; Schneider et al. 2003; Warner 2006).
In conclusion, they argue that venue shopping can easily undercut collaborative processes.
Incentives to participate in collaborative governance will also increase if stakeholders
perceive achievements of their goals to be dependent on cooperation from other
stakeholders(Logsdon,1991);where incentives to participate are weak, power and resources
are asymmetrically distributed and prior antagonisms are high, leadership becomes all the
more important. The more stakeholders fundamentally distrust each other, the more
leadership must assume the role of honest broker.
Tong (2009) looks at the causes of ethnic peace and that of ethnic violence. She examines
how ‗master narratives‘, scarce resources and democratic institutions have influenced the
occurrence of ethnic violence. She uses four (4) countries- Ghana, Cote d‘Ivoire, Kenya and
Tanzania in analysis ethnic peace and ethnic violence. She pairs a peaceful one with a
violent one and so pairs as specific ―Ghana and Cote d‘Ivoire‖ and ―Kenya and Tanzania‖.
In order to ensure peace, nations ought to learn how to cultivate societies of civic trust
across ethnic lines. Colonialism has influenced how African nations have attempted to
develop and the way in which democracy has been pursued. Political institutions best
explain the occurrence of ethnic peace. Free press, independent legislatures and viable
opposition parties provide peaceful ways to resolve competitions between ethnic groups.
She further argues cultural identity, scarce resources and political manipulations by elites
are not sufficient variables for understanding all facets of ethnic violence. Without
politically viable ethnic cleavages, there is nothing for elites to exploit, nor is there any sort
of ethnic bases for such conflicts. Ethnic groups are used by political elites or the people to
make the rational choice to compete with other ethnic groups over scarce resources or
36
access to political power such as executive office. While economic scarcity empirically
explains some cases of violence, it fails to explain how it is that so many poor countries are
peaceful. The same can be said for political manipulation which is present in many cases of
violence.
In conclusion, Tong argues strong institutions create civic trust which means citizens
believe that the ballot is more powerful than the bullet and therefore, institutions prevent
ethnic violence and contribute to the existence of ethnic peace in various countries.
Jedwab (2001) argues that the strength of communal expressions of identity very often
depend upon the extent to which a group is able to mobilize persons around shared interests
and objectives. Understanding the processes by which leaders emerge can provide valuable
insights into institutional life and the manner in which a community sets its agenda and
establishes priorities. The ability to retain and recruit effective leaders could be an
important source of group persistence. He examines the relationship between leadership,
governance and politics of identity. Social identity presumes that ‗part of a person‘s self-
definition is the knowledge of membership in a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel, 1982). The feelings
for differentials among people are a panacea for ethnic identification (Barth, 1969).
He defines an ethnic group as comprising of persons who view themselves as belonging to
a special group and sharing particular attributes. Identity formation and the resulting
communal leadership are undoubtedly influenced by historic and demographic
considerations as well as the broader socioeconomic contexts within which the group
evolves. Aside the degree of openness or hostility of the surrounding environment to the
promotion of varying expression of identity such as rootedness of the society, pattern of
immigration of a group, its unity and diversity are important to identity formation
(Rosenberg and Jedwab, 1992). Notion of leadership is very much linked to the issue of
37
power and influence. Power cannot be separated from the control of resources because
many of the key decisions in political systems deal with such matters.
Moreover, the economic conditions and social status of a society may have a significant
bearing on the nature of governance and leadership as identity needs are addressed by
institutions and the individuals who run them. Finally, knowledge of the evolution of the
ethno cultural communities in not only critical to understanding their modes of governance,
as well as leadership development and identity formation, but effective leadership networks
are formed where opportunities are maximized for the pooling of resources and the
combination of action.
Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004) look at ethnic structures, inequality and governance in
the public sector in Ghana. They argue that, no part of Ghana is ethnically homogenous, an
overriding feature of the country‘s ethnic polarization of north-south divide. The problem
of inequality has been partially addressed through representation and the symbolism of
appointments of individuals from a variety of ethno-territorial and religious backgrounds to
prominent positions in government, the public and quasi state services. It appears
institutional structures as well as distribution of symbolic and bureaucratic resources which
foster inclusion, cohesion and participation have helped the checking of ethnic polarization
in the Ghanaian society.
They analyze the effectiveness of the governance institutions or arrangements and public
policies to regulate political competition and conflicts in the public sector in order to build a
peace, stable and inclusive society; how successive governments have perceived and
managed the main cleavages and inequalities and most crucially, what types of institutions
and public sectors have been adopted by governments successively in the management of
these cleavages and inequalities. They argued that inequality in Ghana has been determined
by factors such as geography, gender, disability and class. Inequality of opportunities
38
among the peoples of Ghana is often the result of the combined effect of objective factors
such as differentials of resource endowment, history and public policy, as well as subjective
factors such as prejudices and attitudes (Ghana Human Development Report, 1997).
In addition, they argue that ethnic politics in Ghana emerged after the overthrow of
Nkrumah‘s Convention People CPP in 1966 by what they described as ‗the comrades in
crime‘, Ashanti (Major Afrifa) and Ewe (Colonel Kotoka).
They further say Ashanti-Ewe rivalry has persisted into the 4th
Republic with Ashanti-Ewe
exceptionalism in voting patterns. While other regions distribute their votes, Ashanti and
Volta Regions concentrate their votes on their home-based parties in all the elections held
since the commencement of the 4th
Republic. The NDC sweeping votes of Volta region by
94.5percent,93.2percent and 88.47percent respectively in the 1992.1996 and 2000
presidential elections, while the NPP won approximately 66percent,61percent and
80percent respectively in Ashanti region. The regional impact on electoral outcome in
Ghana is very difficult to gauge mainly because some regions are largely coterminous with
ethnic groups or sub-groups of ethnic groups while others are not. Akan voters often
support and vote for individuals and candidates who are not Akans and similarly, non-Akan
voters support and vote also for parties and individuals who are Akans.
Moreover, they argue that, although regional patterns of voting could contain hidden ethnic
dimensions, the trajectory of electoral politics in Ghana depict that, even though ethnic
cleavage is significant, it is nevertheless the sole variable which determines the outcomes of
elections. The conscious efforts on the part of political parties to present ethnically mixed
presidential slates in elections have contributed largely to the diffusion of ethnic imbalance
in the voting pattern in presidential elections.
Again, they cite the 2000 Elections as example and were quick to say ethno-regional factors
alone would not significantly explain the patterns of voting in the three (3) Northern
39
Regions as NDC retained its dominance by winning the majority of the votes cast in both
presidential ballots but the NPP managed to increase its share of votes from about
30percent in the first round to about 49percent in the run-off due partly because the
People‘s National Convention (PNC) gave its support to the NPP. In the Public Service,
they focused on the position of Chief Directors for the various ministries and other
establishments. The first appointments were made in September, 1993. Out of the
seventeen(17) people appointed, eleven(11) were Akans, three(3) Ewes, two(2) Gas and a
Northern under NDC but when the NPP came to power, out of the seventeen(17) Chief
Directors appointed in 2003, nine(9) were Akans, two(2) Ewes, four(4) Gas and two(2)
Northerners.
Also, they argue that, there is a strong belief that party affiliation, ethnic identification and
region of origin are highly influential and possibly the most influential factors in public
service appointments aside based on merits. The 1992 Constitution contains notable
proclamation and extensive provisions on good governance and participation. It does this
through the entrenchment of certain rights and innovations such as recognition of
economic, educational and cultural rights, along with the traditional constitutional concern
with civil, political and private property rights. They argue these are to promote policies
and programs that override sectional, ethnic and other loyalties in recruitment and
appointments to public office. They also seek to foster the inclusion of groups and regions
who do not support or vote for the government of the day to be represented in government.
Finally, they point to the provision in the 1992 Constitution which require a person to attain
a vote of more than 50percent to be president encourage politicians and political parties to
forge alliances and to broaden their support by seeking votes outside their traditional ethnic
strongholds. The overall dominance of the Akan group in economic and social life and in
the public sector represent the main features of ethnic and regional polarization in Ghana
40
and fragmentation among the various ethnic groups encourage cross-ethnic coalitions and
help to foster crude but stable inter-ethnic conflicts.
Ofosu (2008) looks at connections between ethnicity and political choices during elections
and applies institutional analyses. She uses Fanteakwa electoral politics to explain
democratization and ethnic identity and uses three institutions of local powers to explain
when ethnicity becomes a significant factor as a political tool. She argues that, although
people determine their political allegiance on the basis of political familiarity, they also do
so because of economic well-being as a basis. To her, the institutional relationship and
features of a political party locally, local government administration and chieftaincy define
how resources are apportioned, who gets what and when and because of this, electorates are
sometimes made to rely on ethnic cleavages. Locality is also a more salient factor than
ethnicity in determining how people reason about their political choices in a multi-ethnic
setting. Again, formal institutions determine the kinds of social cleavages that matter in
politics. Institutions delineate the strategic context of social, economic and political
interactions in which ethnicity would or could not be salient but critical in the processes of
democratization which introduce political parties and decentralized local government into
local setting already structured politically in part by differentials in ethnicity.
Moreover, Ofosu argues chieftaincy gives ethnicity its potential verve in its relation to local
political parties and the district assembly. Ethnicity is a sociocultural and historical variable
shaped by the character of the institutions operating at the local levels as well as an
instrument in the context of those institutions. Other sociopolitical organizations such as
villages, clans, administrative areas and political parties are influential in the political
process. Ultimately, political interests are defined by one‘s village of origin and immediate
chiefly authority.
41
Finally, she argues ethnicity is the major challenge to an equitable distribution of the
benefits of national citizenship. In fact, it is the positioning of local interests within an
institutional framework of chieftaincy, district assembly and political parties that determine
who can fully exercise the rights of national citizenship at the local level.
In conclusion, ethnic identity occurs when there is ethnocentrism, competition for resources
and inequalities in power. Ethnocentrism makes groups disparaged depending on the extent
of their differences from the majority; competitions among groups occurs when they vie for
the same resources but it need not lead to the feel of being ethnically identified if values
concerning freedoms and equality are held and enforced; and the inequality in power
enables one group to impose its will upon the others. Power permits the dominant group to
render the subordinate groups ineffectual as competitors and to institutionalize the
distribution of rewards and opportunities to consolidate their positions. Ethnicity is a factor
when it comes to the analyses of Ghanaian politics and it is a way of understanding why
certain policies and programs are made by different governments under different leadership
era but there are other significant factors which underpin the reasons for various styles of
governance and leadership in their running of their administrations.
42
Chapter 3
METHOD SECTION
The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools but it is rooted
in much of a quantitative epistemological position that recognizes the significance of
locating the research within a particular socio-cultural perspectives. It took essentially
the identities participants construct within them. The study looked at Ghana‘s politics in
relation to how ethnic identification influences it especially in the 4th
Republic. In
addition, the study involved the use of documentaries, case studies and field works, and
employment of both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses.
Documentary research involves the use of texts and documents as source materials. We
employed those obtained from newspapers, census publications and pictorial sources in
both the paper and electronic media in Ghana.
With the case studies, it is a descriptive, exploratory or explanatory analysis of issues.
In the case studies analyses, we will employ the retrospective analyses, where criteria
are established for selecting our case studies from historical resources such as the votes
obtained by both presidential candidates in the 2012 elections in relation to their home
regions.
The field work entailed intensive internet and documentary researches to help us with
the theoretical foundations of the study. Again, it entails the usage of face-to-face
interviewing and issuance of questionnaires to various people from all works of life in
order to sample their views and opinions about ―ethnicity and politics in the Ghanaian
4th
Republic‖. With the issuance of the questionnaires, people were sent a short epitome
of the study‘s aim and possible questions and the interviews entails the asking of
participants through personal contacts by using well coded questions.
43
At the onset of the personal interviews, people were informed of the relevance of
conducting such research and clarifications and distortions were made and expelled
from participants‘ minds.
We used a sample size of 375 in all because we want it to really be representative of the
population, in this case the people of Ghana. We employed the use of random
probability sampling by using that of the multi-cluster sampling techniques, where we
take regions such as Greater Accra, Eastern and Ashanti, and we scale them down to
district, municipal and metropolitan areas such as the Ga-West Municipal, Akim-Oda
District, Kumasi Metropolitan and Asokore-Mampong Municipality. After finding the
areas, we chose households randomly and from each household at least two people
were selected and at most four.
The issuances of questionnaires to participants were 200 and interviewed 175 people.
Out of the 375, we used a purposive sampling of 70% as men and 30% as women
because a pilot test with about 100 people was carried out and we realized that, women
are reluctant when it comes to the issue of politics and men are more active players of
politics in Ghana.
Qualitative methods are used because; they have the ability to obtain more realistic
views of participants which cannot be experienced in ‗8numerical data and statistical
analyses. Also, they yield results that can be helpful in pioneering new ways of
understanding and providing holistic views of the phenomena under investigation but
they are limited by drafting away from the marginal objectives of the research in
response to the changing nature of the context, arriving at different conclusions based
on the same information depending on the personal characteristics of the research.
Again, we employed quantitative methods such as the student t-test due to the
employment of the inferential statistics, chi-square- for comparing the categorical
44
responses between two variables, Cohen Kappa, for measuring the agreement between
the two raters, i.e. ethnicity and politics in terms of looking at the Akans and non-
Akans, the confidence level for the reliability of such data to be obtained, and
correlation coefficient by using the Pearson‘s product-moment correlation. The
Pearson‘s correlation is used to check the relationships that exist between two or more
variables by looking at their dependencies or independence of one another.
Finally, we employed the use of computational method through the usage of SPSS
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software.
45
Chapter 4
DATA ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we looked at the influence of ethnicity in the Ghanaian politics
especially in the 4th
Republic. Looking at the factor of ethnicity in the Ghanaian
politics, we issued 200 questionnaires to people who are 18years and above and of
sound mind that are deemed eligible to exercise their franchise to elect leaders in any
general election.
Out of the 200 interviewees, majority of the people were Akans (i.e. 99 people
representing 49.5 percent), and about 5.5 percent said they do not consider themselves
as belonging to an ethnic group. Out the 200 respondents, 136 voted in the at least the
last General Election representing 68 percent; and out of the 136 people about 46
percent did vote for the New Patriotic Party (NPP), about 40 percent for the National
Democratic Congress (NDC), and about 7 percent each voted for the Progressive
People‘s Party (PPP) and the others.
46
Figure 4-1
Source: Field study 2014
Interestingly, out of 136 respondents who voted in the last elections, 96 representing
close to 71 percent are party supporters or sympathizers of the various parties.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
votes percentages
46
40
7 7
NPP
NDC
PPP
OTHERS
47
Table 4-1
Source: Field Study 2014
In reference to the choices of influence in terms of choosing candidates, only 134
people answered that portion of it. Out of these respondents, 14.2 percent went for
personality; 5.2 percent said manifesto (party platform) influenced them; 23.1 percent
were influenced by past achievements of the various parties particularly the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC); ideology (i.e. what the
political party stands for) was the major influence which represents 32.1 percent and
finally 25.4 percent being influenced by ethnic affiliations.
Majority of the Akan ethnic group said they voted for the New Patriotic Party (NPP)
representing 69.5 percent of those who voted and about 20.3 percent voted for the
National Democratic Congress (NDC). With the non- Akans, especially the Ewes,
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
14.20%
5.20%
23.10%
32.10%
25.40%
Choice of Influence
choice of influence
48
majority voted for the NDC (i.e. 69.6 percent voted for the NDC) followed by the Gas
representing 48 percent of the valid votes cast among the respondents.
Of the 55 people who voted for the NDC, about 78.2 percent of them belong to the non-
Akan ethnic groups whilst about 30.5 percent did vote for the NPP.
With the issue of trust of government among these multi-polar ethnic groups we have in
Ghana, only about 33.7 percent said they trust the governments meaning about 66.3
percent have no trust in the government. With the question of parties campaigning on
ethnic lines, 96 people said either the NPP or NDC campaigned mutually exclusively or
both representing 48 percent of all the respondents which calls for serious analyses.
The question on whether only leaders from their ethnic groups could really advocate for
the needs of their people, 43.6 percent said they agree and another 39.6 percent saying
that they disagree with that perception and about 19. 7 percent are not sure whether they
agree or disagree with such analyses.
49
Figure 4-2
Source: Field Study 2014
0
14
0
12
4
1
22
Ethnic Groups
CPP
NDC
NONE
NPP
PNC
PPP
50
Table 4-2
Ethnic Groups Total
Akan Mole Dagbani Ewe Ga Others
second choice
Missing
(unticked)
45 1 7 7 1 61
CPP 14 0 1 3 4 22
NDC 0 3 1 2 1 7
None 12 3 11 13 6 45
NPP 4 0 5 2 1 12
PNC 1 3 1 1 2 8
PPP 22 1 5 4 1 33
Total 98 11 31 32 16 188
Source: Field Study 2014
Interestingly, when the question of if people were made to cast a second vote for
another party, only 127 answered that portion and out of the answered, 45
representing an approximation of 35% answered none of the parties, meaning that about
56% of them are entrenched supporters or sympathizers of all political parties (i.e.
missing and none together) and about 26% of the respondents answered that, they
would have casted a second ballot for the Progressive People‘s Party (PPP).
When the issue of ethnicity was asked as being dangerous to governance in Ghana,176
respondents believe it is strongly dangerous representing 84.3 percent of the sample
population which means that, whenever one picks 100 Ghanaians to sample their views
on ethnicity, it is estimated that about 84 people are likely to kick against campaigning
or politicking on ethnic lines.
51
We further looked what the major factors which influence ethnic groups when voting
for a person and this was how the respondents answered them:
Table 4-3
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
ethnic group * choice of
influence
130 65.0% 70 35.0% 200 100.0%
Source: Field Study
In the table above, it looks at the relationship between various ethnic groups and their
choice of influence. In here, only 130 people answered representing a percentage of
65% of all respondents during the interview session.
52
Table 4-4
Choice of Influence
Total
personality party platform
past
achievements ideology Ethnicity
Ethnic
Group
Akan 5 5 17 21 5 53
Mole Dagbani 3 0 4 2 2 11
Ewe 3 1 5 11 6 26
Ga 8 0 2 3 13 26
Others 0 1 3 2 8 14
Total 19 7 31 39 34 130
Source: Field Study 2014
The table shows the choices of influences when it comes to the selections of leaders as
well as what influences various ethnic groups in their voting choices in the political
despension.
53
Figure 4-3
Source: Field Study 2014
From the graph above, ethnicity had 9% of the influence in terms of how Akans voted
with about 40% and 32% representing ideology (i.e. what they party stands for) and
achievements of the party respectively.
personality 10%
manifesto 9%
achievements 32%
ideology 40%
ethnicity 9%
Akans
personality
manifesto
achievements
ideology
ethnicity
54
Figure 4-4
Source: Field Study 2014
With that of Mole-Dagbani, 18.1% were influenced by their ethnicity and 63.7% being
influenced by either personality or achievement of the person or party.
27.30%
0
36.40%
18.10%
18.10%
Mole-Dagbani
personality
achievements
ideology
ethnicity
55
Figure 4-5
Source: Field Study 2014
Among the Ewe respondents, 23.1% said they were influenced by ethnicity, 11.5%
influenced by personality, 19.2% influenced by achievements of the person or party
with manifesto taking 3.8% as a factor of influence.
11.50% 3.80%
19.20%
42.30%
23.10%
Ewe
personality
manifesto
achievements
ideology
ethnicity
56
Figure 4-6
Source: Field Study 2014
Among the respondents who were Gas, 50% said ethnicity influenced their pattern of
voting, 7.7% said they were influenced by party or personality achievements, 30.8%
being influenced by personality and 11.50% were influenced by ideology of the parties
they casted their votes for.
Finally, we looked at the trust of state institutions in Ghana and the following were the
revelations unrevealed after the survey was conducted.
In sampling the views of people in terms of their trust of state institutions, we decided
to take about eight (8) and here is the breakdown of people‘s ratings of the state
institutions. From 0 to 4 shows the lowest rating of state institutions (i.e. not trusting at
all) and from 8-10 shows the highest rating (trust very well) in terms of trusting the
institution
With Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA), about 29.5% of the participants say they
really don‘t know whether they trust the institutions or they don‘t. Out of the 200
30.80%
7.70%
11.50%
50%
Ga
personality
achievements
ideology
ethnicity
57
participants representing 26 percent say they trust the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
as an institution and about 88 people representing 44% not trusting.
Political parties in terms of trust had 29% of the participants, 12% of the participants
didn‘t know whether they trusted the institution or not, 118 people representing 59% of
the participants not trusting the political parties as a singular institution. With reference
to the cabinet as an institution, about 6 people represent 3% trust the institution, 113
people representing 56.5% not trusting the Cabinet as an institution, 12.5% of the
participants not knowing their levels of trust, and finally 28% lying in between trusting
and not trusting.
With Parliament, 12 people representing 6% trust the institution of Parliament, 109
people representing 54.5% not trusting the Parliament as an institution, 19 people
representing 9.5% not knowing their levels of trust and finally, 60 people representing
30% lying in between trusting and distrusting. About 83 people representing 41.5% do
not trust the Courts,30 people representing 15% highly trusting them,66 people
representing 33% lying in between not trusting and trusting very well of the Courts as
an institution, and finally about 21 people representing 10.5% not knowing their level of
personal trust for the institution.
With the issue of people trusting the Civil Service, about 36.5% don‘t trust the civil
service at all, 11.5% really trust the civil service, 12% in a dilemma of trusting or not
trusting and the ambivalence level of trust is about 40%.With the police as a key
institution of the state, about 7% representing 14 people really cannot ascertain their
level of trust in the institution, 11% representing 22 people really do have trust in the
police as an institution, 30% representing about 60 people lying in between not trusting
at all and really trusting the police as an institution and ultimately, 52% of the
respondents answered that, they do not trust the police as an institution of the state at
58
all. Amazingly, with the issue of trusting politicians, out of the 200 respondents, only 2
people representing 1.0% claim to trust them very well, about 8% not knowing their
level of trust of politicians, 27 people representing 14% lying in between trusting and
not trusting at all and a whopping number of 154 participants representing 77% not
trusting the politicians at all.
Figure 4-7
Source: Field Study, 2014.
COHEN KAPPA CO-EFFICIENT
( ) ( )
( )
During another interview, 100 people indicated that indeed ethnicity did influence them
in their choice of party affiliations when it came to voting but did say it was not the
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
average of trust of institutions
28.42%
13.58% 14.09%
11.86% 13.25%
14.62%
9.94% 9.36%
kma
political parties
cabinet
parliament
courts
civil service
police
politicians
59
main reason for their choice of candidate or party and the breakdown of their influences
and non-influences of the various groups are as follows.
AKANS
YES NO
NON AKANS
YES 20 25
NO 20 35
The ―Yes‖ and ―No‖ refers to whether they were influenced or not by ethnicity.
Pr (a) is the relative observed agreement among the raters; that is the agreement
between both Akans and Non-Akans that ethnicity influence them or not when it comes
to politics are 15 and 35 which are in the yes and nay places respectively. So to find Pr
(a), we add
. To calculate the Pr (e), that is the hypothetical
probability of chance agreements, using the observed data to calculate the probability of
each observer randomly. In order to find Pr (e), we note that:
*The Non-Akans said yes to a tune of 45 and says no to a tune of 55. Thus, Non-Akans
say yes to ethnicity as an influence 45.0%.
*The Akans said yes to a tune of 40 and nay to a tune of 60. Thus, the Akan
respondents said yes to ethnicity as a social cleavage as an influence in choosing their
leading 40.0%.
Therefore, the probability that both respondents are influenced by ethnicity is
0.40•0.45=0.18 and the probability that, both respondent replied in affirmative not as a
factor of influencing their choices in politics is 0.60•0.55=0.33. Thus, the overall
probability of random agreement is Pr (e) =0.18+0.33=0.51
So, therefore applying the formulae for Cohen's Kappa, we get:
60
K=Pr(a) Pr(e)
Pr( )
The Kappa co-efficient shows that there is a slight agreement among Akans and Non-
Akans that, indeed ethnicity as a social cleavage does influence their choice of voting.
Finally, with another 75 respondents answering to their level of closeness to the
state(Ghana), region and ethnic groupings in term of hierarchy, the statistics below
shows the number of persons who consider the state first or region first or ethnic group
first.
Table 4-5
STATE ETHNIC REGION
FIRST 40 23 12
SECOND 11 24 40
THIRD 24 28 23
Source: Field Study 2014
61
Figure 4-8
Source: Field Study 2014
Making an inference from the above data, it means that about 53.3% of the respondents
firstly consider themselves as Ghanaians, about 30.7% then see themselves coming
from an ethnic background and just a percentage of 16% see themselves as belonging to
their respective regions of residence. Secondly, in terms of second priority, the same
number of 40 people representing a percentage of about 53.3% consider region as very
important, then the ethnic group with a percentage of 32% followed by the state
(Ghana) with a percentage of 14.7%.
In another breadth, we looked at the 2004 General Election using archival research to
find out if ethnicity played a key role in the election that saw the second term of John
Agyekum Kuffour, a man perceived to have promoted the hegemony of Ashanti‘s, a
group of Akans
Table 4-6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
first second third
state
ethnic
region
62
Western 1774037 1388738 78.28
Central 1476584 1208608 81.96
Greater Accra 2679991 1065509 39.7
Eastern 1980719 1031498 52.08
Ashanti 3154862 2458088 77.91
Brong Ahafo 1705612 1069744 62.71
Volta 1525744 129384 8.48
Northern Region 1740700 174469 10.02
Upper East 851537 19186 2.25
Upper West 5480807 17524 3.19
SOURCE: GHANA STATISTICAL SERVICE, 2000 POPULATION CENSUS.
The first section refers to the regions in Ghana, second shows total population per
region, and next is Akan population per region and lastly the percentage of Akans in
each region.
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF 2004 GENERAL ELECTION
Table 4-7
REGION POLITICAL PARTIES
NPP NDC PNC CPP IND.
Greater Accra 17 10 0 0 0
Ashanti Region 36 2 0 0 0
Eastern 22 6 0 0 0
Central 16 2 0 1 0
Western 12 8 0 2 0
Volta 1 20 0 0 0
Brong Ahafo 14 10 0 0 0
Northern 8 17 0 0 1
SOURCE: PEACEFMONLINE.COM.
From this data, it shows empirically that, ethnicity played a major role in determining
the outcome of the 2004 General Election since the NPP which is dominated by Akans
had majority of their parliamentary seats from there especially in Ashanti Region
63
where, the leader of the party, J.A. Kuffour had more seats there and that region alone
contributed almost about 28% of their parliamentary seats.
2012 GENERALELECTIONS- PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS
Table 4-8
REGION NEW
PATRIOTIC
PARTY
SEATS
(%)
REGION NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC
CONGRESS
SEATS
(%)
ASHANTI ASANTI
BRONG
AHAFO
BRONG
AHAFO
CENTRAL CENTRAL
EASTERN 26 EASTERN
GREATER
ACCRA
GREATER
ACCRA
NORTHERN NORTHERN
UPPER
EAST
UPPER
EAST
UPPER
WEST
UPPER
WEST
VOLTA VOLTA
WESTERN WESTERN
64
SOURCE: ELECTORAL COMMISSION, GHANA.
From the data above, it is evidently clear that ethnicity as a social cleavage in terms of
being a political tool for mobilization did not play a key instrument as the National
Democratic Congress(NDC) convincingly won most of the Akans dominated areas, that
is Central, Brong Ahafo and Western Regions as against a political party perceived as
an Akin dominated affiliate aside the Non-Akans but let me quickly add that, in fact
ethnicity played a role especially for the two parties leaders since they are won
convincingly in their native regions, that is Eastern and Northern Regions.
65
Chapter 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS, FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to explore ways in which Ghana as a country can use its
ethnic differences to shape its politics to bring about visible socioeconomic
transformations that will raise the living standards of its citizenry. Specifically, the
study examines how ethnicity influence our politics; investigates how ethnicity is
manifested in Ghanaian politicking and how ethnicity can serve as a political tool
without causing conflicts, tensions, dissatisfaction and instability in Ghana.
5.2 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND QUESTIONS
The research questions for this study are: (1) ethnicity has an influence on national and
local governmental politics in Ghana. (2) How does the invocation of ethnic identity
impact governance and leadership in Ghanaian politics? (3) How can Ghana ensure
that, the use of ethnic identification as a political cleavage does not cause
dissatisfaction, instability, tensions, conflicts and violence? (4) To what extent can one
say the actions of political actors especially leaders are influenced by their ethnic
inclinations?
5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research used descriptive research methodology, face-to- face interviews and
survey techniques to collect data from respondents who partook in helping us get the
66
information needed across the country by the using of a probability sampling technique
(i.e. multi-cluster probability sampling technique). Data collected from the survey and
face-to-face interview respondents represented their views, opinions and perceptions
regarding ethnicity in Ghanaian politics and performance of leaders.
A coded stratified random sample was selected from the population of Ghana. The
interviewees completed a survey questionnaire that addressed their views and
perceptions of ethnic influence in Ghanaian politics. The sample in the study is
disaggregated by regions to address the fact that there is wide variation in the number of
Ghanaians within each of the selected areas. The numbers in the sample are based on
studies by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). A coded stratified random sample of 375
respondents was utilized for this study.
5.4 RESULTS
Out of the total surveys and face-to- face interviews analyzed, 80 people representing
about 21% of all respondents were from the Ga-West Municipal Assembly in Greater
Accra Region. 95 people representing about 25% of all respondents from the Kwame
University of Science and Technology (KNUST), 20 people from the Eastern Region
and 180 people from the surroundings of both Asokore-Mampong Municipal Assembly
as well as Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly.
The majority of the participants indicated that they live in the cities (90%). Next, 8
percent reported suburban and only 2 % indicated they live in the rural communities.
The ethnic affiliations and identifications reported by those who responded to the
survey and interviews. The majority of the respondents are males (75%) and females
(25%) but mostly from the Akan ethnic group.
67
Section A of the survey contained four questions (1-4) which required selected
respondents to talk about their ethnic identification; Section B containing political
participation and party identification (5-11). Section C contained questions on
perception of leaders‘ performance (12-13), Section D with that of political trust (14-
16) and other issues in Section E (17-20). Results indicated that the majority of the
interviewees (95%) considered themselves as belonging to an ethnic group. More than
65% considered themselves as being attached to their ethnic groups with the breakdown
as follows: close (20%) or very close (45%).
5.5 DISCUSSIONS
Ethnic groups are ancient and natural phenomenon. Ethnicity is as a result of inherent
long standing ascribed identity which was inherited from one‘s ancestors and can never
be changed. Also, ethnicity is seen as an instrument for gaining resources especially that
of political and economic. The usage of ethnicity yields dividends to its users; and
ethnicity is a socially construed terminology.
From the study, people are much attached to their ethnic orientations and majority of
the respondents confirm that indeed they all belong to various ethnic groups since they
all come from families confirming the theory of the primordialists view. In addition to
that, most people argued that indeed they first consider themselves as Ghanaians but it
is just that when one is seen or spoken to, people immediately ask whether they are
from this particular ethnic affiliation or not, thus also confirming that, indeed ethnic
identity is also a constructed identity which affirms the view of the Constructionists.
Furthermore, the study shows that, ethnicity is a social construction especially for
socio-political goals since majority of Ghanaians first and foremost see themselves as
68
distinct ethnic groupings when it comes to lobbying of appointments and seeking the
mandates of the electorates during electoral voting but after that, these same people and
politicians try to draw the electorates‘ attention of being Ghanaians first before their
regions of residence or ethnic belonging.
With a multi-polar society like Ghana, the trust of political institutions are very low
ranging between 10 percent and 29 percent of the population and there is also lack of
social cohesion among citizens since majority of the populace of Ghana look at their
ethnic interests at the utmost expense of the state leading the retardation of socio-
economic and political development. Interestingly, majority of Ghanaians consider
ethnicity as dangerous to national cohesion and development.
Finally, most Ghanaians are torn in between whether only leaders from their various
ethnics could adequately represent them or not; about the same percentage argued for
that view and also against such phenomenon in the Ghanaian politics.
5.6 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Reformation of social policies should include the protection of the vulnerable by
systematically reducing inequalities in the distributions of incomes and
resources.
2. Facilitation of conditions for full social, economic and political participation of
all people no matter their ethnic identification.
3. Politicized ethnicity has been detrimental to national unity and socioeconomic
well-being. Distribution of economic resources has often been skewed to favor a
particular group, pushing marginalized groups to use their ethnic inclination to
mobilize for equality.
69
4. Economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in
Ghana. Competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic
conflict conflicts and not all conflicts are violent but cause tension.
5. The fear and insecurity of ethnic groups during transition. It is opined that
extremists build upon these fears to polarize the society. Additionally, memories
of past traumas magnify these anxieties. These interactions produce a toxic brew
of distrust and suspicion that leads to ethnic violence.
6. Ethnic conflict is a sign of weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties.
Therefore in crucial or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of
governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs.
7. Stability of Ghana is threatened not by ethnic identification per se, but the
failure of national institutions to recognize and accommodate ethnic diversity
and interests. To solve this, governments should not discriminate against
groups.
8. The role of good political leadership is good to help solve the issues of conflict
managements. Importance of civil societies is also very crucial to helping
conflict managements.
9. Politics along ethnic lines could lead to instability. Whether democracies in
diverse societies become stable or unstable however depend to some extent on
the institutional designs of the country. The anxiety of ethnic politics is due to
the transformation of ethnic politics from the mono-ethnic nature of yester years
to an emerging poly-ethnic type today.
10. The recognition of multiple identities provides incentives for different political
actors to mobilize along different cleavages. It prevents privilege mobilization
along one identity and generating a multi-polar society.
70
11. The saliency of an ethnic identity is not stable but depends of situations and
contexts. Non existing identities (non-attitudes) can be induced by the questions
in a survey.
5.7 CONCLUSION
The findings in this study indicate that ethnicity plays a key role in Ghanaian politics
representing about 25.4 percent and that during the run-up to the 2012 General Election,
campaigning on ethnic lines were evident representing about 48 percent and that
another key tool for understanding why people vote for a particular party is look at the
ideological framework of the party and its past achievements as a government when
they were in power. Moreover, in a heterogeneous ethnic society, trust of institutions of
the state is very low.
71
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http://ghanaelections.peacefmonline.com/pages/2004/
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APPENDIX
KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES
TOPIC: ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA‘S 4TH
REPUBLIC
INTRODUCTION
We are a group of students from the Department of History and Political Studies
conducting a research on the topic “ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN GHANA’S
4TH
REPUBLIC”.
It is our firm believes that the findings of this study will help us to ascertain the
influence of ethnicity in Ghanaian politics especially in the fourth Republic.
The research is purely an academic activity, initiated and designed and executed by
students of the above department. It is neither intended to delve into people‘s private
lives, nor gather personal information for any organization or government.
We therefore hope we can count on your maximum co-operation.
Please note that the information gathered here will only be used for academic
purposes and information will be kept confidential.
QUESTIONNAIRE
ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION
Please, kindly tick the right answers corresponding to the questions.
QE01. Do you consider yourself as belonging to an ethnic group?
1. Yes
2. No →QE 2
84
QE02. Which group?
Answer; …………………………………………..
QE03. If yes, which group?
1. Akan
2. Mole Dagbani
3. Ewe
4. Ga
5. Others (specify) ……………………
QE04. How would you describe your feelings towards this group?
1. Very close
2. Somehow close
3. Close
4. Not very close
5. Not close at all
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
QE05. Did you vote in the last General elections?
1. Yes
2. No
QE06. Which party did you voted for in the Presidential Elections?
1. NPP
2. NDC
3. PPP
4. Others (specify) ……………………………
85
QE07. Generally speaking, do you think yourself as supporting or belonging to any
party? If yes indicate.
Answer …………………………..
QE08. How would you describe your support for the party?
1. Very strong
2. strong
3. neither
4. Not strong
5. Not very strong
QE09. If the voting paper had required you to give two votes, in order of preference,
which party would you have put as your second choice?
Answer …
QE10. During the run−up to Election, did you think any political party campaigned
specifically to woo the vote of a particular ethnic group?
1. Yes
2. No
QE11. If yes, which party or parties?
Answer ……………………………………
PERCEPTION OF LEADERS’ PERFORMANCE
QE12. How would rate the performance of John D. Mahama in the last 12 months?
1. Excellent
2. Very satisfactory
3. Satisfactory
86
4. Neither satisfactory nor dissatisfied
5. Poor
QE13. How do you think the general economic situation in Ghana has changed over the
last 12 months? Has it….
1. Got a lot better
2. Got a little better
3. Stayed the same
4. Got a little worse
5. Or, got a lot worse?
POLITICAL TRUST
QE14. How well can you trust this government (NDC) to deliver to change the society?
1. Extremely confident
2. confident
3. neither confident nor unconfident
4. not confident
5. Not very confident
QE15. How satisfied are you with the government in doing its job?
1. Very satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Not satisfied or dissatisfied
4. Dissatisfied.
87
5. Very dissatisfied
QE16. How strongly do you personally trust each of these institutions?
Not trust at all Very strong trust
Don’t know
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88
KUMASI
METROPOLITAN
Assembly
The Political Party
The Cabinet
The National
Parliament
The Courts
The civil Service
88
The Police
Politicians
ISSUES
QE17. On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Ghana?
1. Very satisfactory
2. Fairly satisfactory
3. Not satisfactory or dissatisfactory
4. dissatisfied
5. Not at all satisfactory
QE18. Do you agree that the use of ethnicity is dangerous for our governance?
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
QE19. How much do you agree or disagree that only MPs or Presidents from their
ethnic groups can properly represent the real interests of their groups?
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
89
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
QE20. When you voted in the last Election, what made you vote for that party?
1. Personality
2. Party platforms
3. Past achievements
4. Ideology
5. Ethnicity
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