Toward a Naturalism of Intentionality and Consciousness Mark H. Bickhard mark@bickhard.name

Toward a Naturalism of Intentionality and Consciousness

Mark H. Bickhard

mark@bickhard.name

http://bickhard.ws/

Naturalism and Mind Is naturalism consistent with the

normativities of mind? If not, then mind cannot be naturalized If so, how?

What is Naturalism? Naturalism understood in terms of what

the natural sciences study carries with it a metaphysical barrier to naturalizing the mind It cannot address the ontologies of

normativity This barrier is of ancient provenance

Naturalism as a Presupposition of Inquiry It is always legitimate to ask further questions We live in one world — explanations lead to

integration of phenomena

These can be in tension Empedoclean substances integrate many

explanations, but also block further inquiry concerning those substances themselves

They are metaphysically basic, with no further explanations

Conceptual Barriers We live with a conceptual heritage that blocks

understanding of intentionality This barrier puts us in a position that is akin

to attempting to model fire with a better substance than phlogiston So long as fire was conceived of as a substance,

no satisfactory model was possible Our conceptual situation with regard to mind is

similar, but worse

The Western Substance Tradition Parmenides argued that change cannot occur

(arguing against Heraclitus) For A to change into B,

A would have to disappear into nothingness, and B emerge out of nothingness

Nothingness is not possible, it cannot exist Therefore, change cannot occur

Lest you think that this is an odd argument, consider the difficulties that contemporary thought has with representing falsehoods or non-existents

Meinong, Russell, Wittgenstein, Fodor, etc.

In Response There is an underlying substratum —

substance — that does not change Empedocles: divisible substance —

stuff: Earth, Air, Fire, Water

Democritus: indivisible substance Atoms

This Frames Our World Plato and Aristotle both took the

Parmenidean argument very seriously Aristotle’s substance model is much

more sophisticated than Empedocles Perhaps prime matter as basic unchanging

substratum, for example But descendents of substance and atom

metaphysics frame thought today

Two Dirempted Realms Substance makes change require special

explanation Substance makes emergence impossible

Substances can mix and remix, but there is no way to get a new substance

Factual substance is split off from intentional, normative, modal mind

Two fundamentally incompatible metaphysical realms are posited

Two Realms Still Dominant Some have explicitly posited two realms

Aristotle: substance and form Descartes: two kinds of substance Kant: world and subject Analytic: factual science and normative language

Some have tried to make do with just one side of the split

Green, Bradley: idealists — all is “mental” Hobbes, Hume, Quine: all is factual

This “all is factual” (scientific) world assumption is our contemporary dominant framework

Process Metaphysics Re-integrates this Split Change is default

Stability requires explanation Emergence is ubiquitous

Every new organization of process has emergent properties, though not all will be of interest or importance

Emergence of normativity and intentionality within the natural world, thus the integration of the split, becomes possible

Stability of Process Organization Energy Well Stability

E.g., Atoms Far-from-equilibrium Stability

E.g., Self-organization in a chemical bath Self-maintenant Stability

E.g., Candle Flame Recursively Self-maintenant Stability

E.g., Bacterium

Emergence of Normative Function Functional for X

Contributing to the maintenance of far from equilibrium conditions necessary for X

Function is specific to system Heart beat of parasite is functional for

parasite, dysfunctional for host Compare: Etiological Models

E.g., Millikan

Emergence of Representational Truth Value Recursive Self-maintenance

Selection of interaction, or indication of appropriateness of interaction, will be functional in some environments, but not in others

That is, the presuppositions of such selection or indication will sometimes be True and sometimes False

This is the emergence of representational normativity out of functional normativity

Content Indications of appropriateness presuppose

that this environment has the conditions in which the functionality holds

These presuppositions are representational content; they are predicated of the environment

They are implicit, not explicit

Contrast: Encodingism Encodingism: The assumption that (all)

representation is encoding Example: Morse code

“...” encodes “S”

Representation constituted in some kind of encoding correspondence causal, nomological, informational, conventional

Motivated by Substance Approach Signet Ring in Wax Transduction

Problems with Encodingism Myriads of fatal problems:

All such correspondences are logically external, thus require interpreter, which initiates a vicious regress

Too many correspondences Possibility of error Possibility of system detectable error Skepticism/ idealism Piaget’s ‘copy’ problem Incoherence Possibility of emergence

Innatism is not a solution

Internal Relations Green & Bradley:

Everything internally related to everything Including representation to represented change in representation entails change

in represented Strongly rejected by Russell Rare since Quine

Interactive Representation Interactive content is internally related

to indications of interaction appropriateness

Internally related to content, not to represented

not subject to Russell’s complaints

Mentality in the Central Nervous System Evolutionary problem of interaction selection

and guidance Requires anticipation of potential interactions

available for selection Frog

Requires timing in guidance of interaction Turing machines, and equivalents, have

sequence, but no timing

Anticipation and Timing How does the brain accomplish these? Not by way of passive threshold switch

neurons Discrete computationalism does not suffice

And, in any case, that is a false model of central nervous system microfunctioning

The Brain Doesn’t Work that Way

The functioning of the brain cannot be understood in terms of neurons as threshold switches.

Neurons don't work that way, and, in addition, neurons are not the only functional units in the brain.

Microgenesis When we look at how the brain actually

functions, we find strong support for an alternative - microgenetic - model of central nervous system functioning.

Microgenesis, in turn, has strong implications for the nature of representation and cognition. It forces an interactive, pragmatic model of representation.

Functional Processes in the Brain Neurons as:

Threshold switches Connectionist nodes Frequency encoders

All have in common the assumption that neurons are input processors

And that neurons are the only functional units

Both Are Wrong Neurons are endogenously active

In multiple ways They do not just process inputs

And neurons are not the only functional units Glia, for example, are also functional, not

just supportive

Neurons Oscillators

Resonators Modulations of endogenous activity, not

switches of otherwise inert units Turing machine power Timing

Neurons II Silent neurons Volume transmitters

L-Dopa Graded release of transmitters Gap junctions Why multiple transmitters if all synapses are

classical? Transmitters evolved from hormones Classical synapses evolved from volume

transmitters

Astrocytes (Glia) Receive transmitters Emit transmitters Form functional “bubbles” Gap junction connections Calcium waves Modulate synaptogenesis Modulate synaptic functioning

Release, uptake, degree of volume diffusion, …

Multiple Scales These are all modulatory influences at

multiple scales Large and small spatial scales Slow and fast temporal scales

There are also variations in delay times

Evolution has created a large tool box of multiple kinds and scales of modulatory influences

Microgenesis II Larger and slower processes set the context

for smaller and faster processes They set the parameters for the faster and

smaller processes Ion and transmitter concentrations Modes of synaptic functioning

They generate vast concurrent micro-modes of processing across the brain: Microgenesis

Dynamic Programming Parameter setting for dynamic

processes is the dynamic equivalent of programming in a discrete system

Microgenesis sets and changes the programs across the brain

Microgenesis is ongoing and occurs in real time

Functional Anticipation Microgenetic set-up may or may not be

appropriate to the actual flow of interactive processing that occurs in the organism

Microgenesis is functionally anticipatory The anticipation is that the microgenetic

set-up will be appropriate

Anticipation and Timing Thus, microgenetic set up is anticipatory

Generating emergent truth value and content

Modulation of oscillatory processes has inherent timing Controlling interaction in a real temporal

world

Interactive Flow Contentful Situated Embodied From a Point of View Experiential Flow

Primary Consciousness

Anticipative Visual Interaction Visual experiencing

Gibson Piaget: small object Straight line Red

O’Regan

Reflective Consciousness Second Level Interaction

Age 3.5 Some Macro-Functional Circuitry

Properties of Experiencing Experienced in Reflection Qualities of Experiencing - Qualia

Qualia

Constitutive of Experiencing And Properties of Experiencing

Ontological Circularity Very hard problem

Dissolve the Hard Problems of Consciousness

Zombies Inverted and other disordered qualia

Assume externally related properties of experiencing

Qualia problem is hard because of assumptions that entail an ontological circularity

Both are dissolved by this model

Conclusions — Representation

Interactive model of representation Accounts for Emergence of

Representation Accounts for System Detectable Error Internally related content

Avoids Interpreter

Conclusions — Consciousness Captures properties of experiencing

Contentful, situated, point of view, … Renders zombies and disordered qualia

impossible Accounts for Qualia

Dissolves ontological circularity in standard assumptions

Makes consciousness as a part of the natural world much less mysterious

Conclusions — Naturalism Intentionality and consciousness are

natural phenomena But can be understood so only within a

process metaphysics That makes change the default That makes emergence possible And that makes normative, intentional

emergence (thermodynamically) natural