Token, Transponder und RFID-Tags - SIMEDIA Akademie · Token, Transponder und RFID-Tags Angriffe auf elektronische Zugangskontrollsysteme Timo Kasper Forum Modernes Zutritts- und

Kasper & Oswald GmbH, Bochum, Germany

www.kasper-oswald.com

Berlin, 8. November 2016

Token, Transponder und RFID-Tags Angriffe auf elektronischeZugangskontrollsysteme

Timo Kasper

Forum Modernes Zutritts- undBerechtigungsmanagement

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Dr.-Ing. Timo Kasper Dr.-Ing. David Oswald

Core Competence: Embedded Security

Research, Analysis, Development, Consulting, Training

Many years of Research and Development experience

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Embedded Devices in the Internet of Things

NFC

6

Introduction to (Symmetric) Cryptography

Secret KeyG3H31M

plaintext

Simedia

Cipher

ciphertext9e%~@@²a

Alice

plaintext

Simedia

Cipher

ciphertext9e%~@@²a

Bob

Internet

Oscar

9e%~@@²a

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The core of (IT-)Security

Security

Design AnalysisImprove

Report flaws

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Implementation Attackson Embedded Devices

Fault Injection,Reverse Engineering

Side-Channel Analysis

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Remote Keyless Entry (1)Uni-directional

First systems: Fixed code

123xbhdsgf …123xbhdsgf …123xbhdsgf …

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Remote Keyless Entry (2)Uni-directional with Crypto

Industry reacts: Rolling code

encrypt(124)encrypt(125)

…

Cipher

BUT there are attacks ...

Option 1:Attack key management

Option 2:Attack crypto

KeeLoq(Crypto 2008)

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Principle of Side-Channel Analysis(here: listen to Sound)

A Bank Robbery

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Principle of Side-Channel Analysis

The world is changing…

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Principle of Side-Channel Analysis(Monitor the power consumption / run-time)

The world is changing…

…the tools are, too.

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Applied Side-Channel Analysis (Power)

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Counter

Secret Key

Dynamic Code

Encryption(KeeLoq)

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64?

secret cryptographic key of remote control !

Attack target (2008):KeeLoq remote controls

• very widespreadin cars and garages(world-wide)

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Side-Channel Analysis of KeeLoq:Management Summary

Power-analysis attack (with physical access):

clone a remote control from 10 power measurements

obtain Manufacturer Key from 1 power measurement

Flaw of KeeLoq system:

Key derivation from Manufacturer Key kM

– kremote_control = f(#ser, kM)

– kM used in every receiver of manufacturer M

– Single point-of-failure

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Flavio Garcia, David Oswald,Timo Kasper, Pierre Pavlidès

University of Birmingham / Kasper & Oswald GmbH

Automotive RKE(Usenix 2016)

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VW Group: Affected Vehicles

• Audi: A1, Q3, R8, S3, TT, other types of Audi cars (e.g. remote control 4D0 837 231)

• VW: Amarok, (New) Beetle, Bora, Caddy, Crafter, e-Up, Eos, Fox, Golf 4, Golf 5, Golf 6, Golf Plus, Jetta, Lupo, Passat, Polo, T4, T5, Scirocco, Sharan, Tiguan, Touran, Up

• Seat: Alhambra, Altea, Arosa, Cordoba, Ibiza, Leon, MII, Toledo

• Skoda: City Go, Roomster, Fabia 1, Fabia 2, Octavia, Superb, Yeti

• In summary: probably most VW group vehicles between 1995 and today not using Golf 7 (MQB) platform

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Hitag2 RKE Attack Demo

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Vehicles we tested using Hitag2 RKE

Opel | Astra H | 2008Opel | Corsa D | 2009Fiat | Grande Punto | 2009

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Management Summary

VW Group: secure crypto ≠ secure system

• extract a few worldwide keys

instantly copy a remote control from 1 signal

• RF attack highly practical and scalable

Hitag2: diversified keys but bad crypto

• eavesdrop ≈ 4 to 8 signals (key presses)

copy remote control with some computations

Poor crypto is bad, but poor key management is worse.

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Embedded Devices in the Internet of Things

NFC

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Authentication with Login Tokens

Past: One factor: Password/PIN

Today: Two factors: Password/PIN and an additional token:

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Yubikey 2: Overview

Simulates USB keyboard

Generates and enters One-TimePassword (OTP) on button press

Based on AES w/ 128-bit key

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Yubikey OTP Generation

...

dhbgnhfhjcrl rgukndgttlehvhetuunugglkfetdegjd

dhbgnhfhjcrl trjddibkbugfhnevdebrddvhhhlluhgh

dhbgnhfhjcrl judbdifkcchgjkitgvgvvbinebdigdfd

...

AES encrypted = secure?!

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128-bit AES key of the Yubikey 2 can be recovered(700 EM measurements = 1 hour physical access)

Attacker can compute OTPs w/o Yubikey

Impersonate user:Username and password still needed

Side-Channel Analysis of Yubikey2:Management Summary

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Countermeasures

Side-channel attacks are a threat in practice

FW version 2.4 for Yubikey 2 comes with countermeasures

Newly produced Yubikeys are more secure

Improve

Report flaws

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• can be extended for mutual authentication

• challenge must be random and big enough

ek(Ci) = Ri

Ci

challenge

response

1. computes: R’i = ek(Ci)

2. verifies: R’i = Ri?

Remote Keyless Entry (3)Bi-Directional: Challenge-Response

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Embedded Devices in the Internet of Things

NFC

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Used in

• access control systems

• electronic passports

• payment systems

• ticketing / public transport

• Near Field Communication (NFC)

One insecure example:Mifare Classic

Contactless Smartcards / RFIDISO 14443 / ISO 15693 @ 13.56 MHz

KeeLoq(Crypto 2008)

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Analysis of the ID-Card 1/2 Extracting Keys

• test our key-recovery on ID-Card extraction of all secret keys

• another ID-Card contains the same keys

• a third ID-Card contains the same keys

...• surprising discovery:

All ID-Cards have identical keys !

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• disguised reader, e.g., near a waiting line at the cash desk

• Evil attacker: sets credit of any card in its proximity to 0€ (in 40 ms)

• “Nice“ attacker : charges cards of “victims”

A Practical Threat:Denial of Service

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My favourite Attack:Converting Bits to Cash

• get anonymous ID-Card (10 € deposit)

• modify credit balance

• return card at cash desk

deposit and up to 150 € paid out in cash!

anonymous

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new issued cards are Mifare DESfire (EV1)

old Mifare Classic cards are still working

improved backend: shadow accounts are used(…and still manually checked…)

Analysis of a Contactless Payment System5 years after the Attack ….

Improve

Report flaws

A Versatile NFC Emulator and more

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2006: Kaffeetassen Transponder(Coffee Cup Tag)

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Fake Tag

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The Primal- (2011)

A Versatile Emulator for Contactless Smartcards

Mifare Classic: Crypto1 stream cipher

Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: Auth. with (3)DES

Mifare DESFire EV1: Auth. with AES-128, (3)DES

… and other ISO14443 / ISO15693 cards

Atmel ATXmega32

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Rev.D

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Rev.D

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Rev.E

open source project: https://github.com/emsec/ChameleonMini

• 8 card slots

• Breakableantenna

• Improved USBcommand set

• Widespread

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Rev.E is not enough:Upgrade MCU and FRAM Rev. F

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Crowdfunding via Kickstarter, Day 45

• Project successfully funded.

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Crowdfunding via Kickstarter

…. 6 months later: Production finished.

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Rev.G

• (Basic) RFID Reader• ATXMega128 + FRAM• Li-Ion Battery

• ISO 14443/ ISO 15693• Sniffing• Log Mode

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Rev.GLog Mode / Sniffing

• Emulation: Log reader and Chameleon data• Sniffing: Chameleon is „invisible“ during recording• Precise time stamps• Live logging

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Card Emulator

open source project: https://github.com/emsec/ChameleonMini

Source Code/Firmware and Hardware Layout of Rev.GNow online!

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Creative Usage of (Florian Bache @ RUB)

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Long Range Contactless Card

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A Useful BookReading Range: more than 70 cm

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Chameleon and the Magic DragonPUFF!

CHES 2015 paper:The Gap Between Promise and Reality: On theInsecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs (Georg T. Becker)

Chameleon clonesa PUF (Physically

Unclonable Function)

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Embedded Devices in the Internet of Things

NFC

Case Study:

An Electronic Locking System

(CRYPTO 2013)

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Electronic Locking Systemwith Bi-Directional Authentication Scheme

Token Lock

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Electronic Locking Systemwith Bi-Directional Authentication Scheme

Black-box analysis: Token and lock perform authentication protocol

Token LockAuthenticationprotocol

???

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Lock

Embedded code?

Read-out protection!

Token

Electronic Locking System:PIC Microcontroller in Token and Lock

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Decapping an IC (1)

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Decapping an IC (2)

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Decapping an IC (3)

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Decapping an IC (4)

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Microscopic View of the Silicon Die

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Exposure to UV-C: Disable Read-Out Protection (1)

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Exposure to UV-C: Disable Read-Out Protection (2)

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Exposure to UV-C: Disable Read-Out Protection (2)

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Read Out the Contentof the PIC Microcontroller

• Use standard programmer• Reverse-Engineer (e.g., IDA)

all secrets known

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𝑰𝑫𝑳

𝑰𝑫𝑻

challenge 𝑪

𝑫

both: compute 𝑹𝑲𝑻(𝑪, 𝑫, 𝑰𝑫𝑻, 𝑰𝑫𝑳) = 𝑹𝑻 𝑹𝑳

(verify 𝑹𝑳)

𝑲𝑻 𝑲𝑳

compute 𝑲𝑻 = 𝑺𝑲𝑳(𝑰𝑫𝑻, 𝑫)

response 𝑹𝑻

response 𝑹𝑳

(verify 𝑹𝑻)

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32

32

24

32

80

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Weaknesses and Attacks (1)Hardware

Each lock stores installation-wide cryptographic key

UV-C attack in ~ 30 min (decap PIC)

EM - side-channel attack in ~ 15 min (close to PIC)

Attacking one lock gives access to all doors

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𝑰𝑫𝑳

𝑰𝑫𝑻

challenge 𝑪

𝑫

both: compute 𝑹𝑲𝑻(𝑪, 𝑫, 𝑰𝑫𝑻, 𝑰𝑫𝑳) = 𝑹𝑻 𝑹𝑳

(verify 𝑹𝑳)

𝑲𝑻 𝑲𝑳

compute 𝑲𝑻 = 𝑺𝑲𝑳(𝑰𝑫𝑻, 𝑫)

response 𝑹𝑻

response 𝑹𝑳

(verify 𝑹𝑻)

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32

32

24

32

80

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𝑰𝑫𝑻

𝑫

𝑲𝑳

O*64DES*

1..64O

65..128

128

128 𝑲𝑻128

128

𝑹𝑻 𝑹𝑳𝑫𝑪 O

128

128 64

128

O DES*1..64

65..128

128

𝑰𝑫𝑻

𝑰𝑫𝑳

Cryptographic Functions R and S

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𝑰𝑫𝑻

𝑫

𝑲𝑳

O*64DES*

1..64O

65..128

128

128 𝑲𝑻128

128

𝑹𝑻 𝑹𝑳𝑫𝑪 O

128

128 64

128

O DES*1..64

65..128

128

𝑰𝑫𝑻

𝑰𝑫𝑳

𝒁𝑹

𝒁𝑺

Cryptographic Functions R and SSecurity Vulnerabilities

1.) 40 Bits of 𝒁𝑹 reused as C leaks internal value

2.) 128-Bit key 𝑲𝑻 computedfrom 64 unknown bits

3.) O has bad cryptographic properties

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Protocol Runs Run-Time Key Candidates

3 3,36 min 21,34

4 11,5 s 1

5 1,2 s 1

6 650 ms 1

Weaknesses and Attacks (2) Wireless Lock-only attack

Efforts for computing 𝑲𝑻 on a PC:

• initiate some (not successful) protocol runs• compute valid 𝑲𝑻 open door(s)

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A System Designer‘s Perspective:How to Secure the Internet of Things?

Use peer-reviewed crypto and random numbers

Do not educate your attacker

– Do not start with a weak product that must be upgraded

Implementation attacks: Practical threat, but:

– Use certified devices (secure hardware)

– Algorithmic countermeasures (secure software)

System level: Second line of defense!

– Shadow accounts / Logging (detect fraud)

– Key diversification (minimize impact)

Expect the Unexpected

Thank you!

Questions? Comments?

Contact: info@kasper-oswald.com

www.kasper-oswald.com

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Secure Against Cyber Attacks

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