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1/16
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Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic FrameworkAuthor(s): Susan HaackSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 83 (1982 - 1983), pp. 143-157Published by: on behalf ofWiley The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544996Accessed: 27-08-2014 01:14 UTC
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2/16
IX*-THEORIES
OF KNOWLEDGE:
AN
ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
by Susan Haack
Contemporary epistemology
must choose between the
solid security of the ancient foundationalist pyramid and
the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. (Sosa')
One seems forced to choose between the picture of an
elephant
which rests on a tortoise
(What supports the
tortoise?) and the picture
of a
great Hegelian serpent of
knowledge
with
its
tail
in its
mouth
(Where
does
it
begin?).
Neither will
do. (Sellars2)
It is commonly supposed that
one
is
obliged
to
choose, in the
theory
of
knowledge,
between
two, fundamentally opposed
models:
the
foundationalist, according
to
which
the rest of our
knowledge is supported by the foundation of a relatively small
class
of
epistemically privileged beliefs, and the coherentist,
according
to
which the
various
parts
of
our
knowledge are
mutually supportive.
But it is
rarely spelled
out3
what the
characteristic
features of foundationalism and coherentism
are,
or
why they
should be
thought
to
be the only feasible
options.
My
first
object,
in
this
paper,
is
to construct
a scheme of
classificationwithin which one can locate two extreme kindsof
theory,
which
I
will
call
'Pure Foundationalism'
and
'Pure
Coherentism',
and
a whole
range
of intermediate
kinds of
theory
in between.
My
second
object
is
to
examine,
in
the
context
of this
framework,
the
arguments
which have dominated the debate
between
foundationalism
and coherentism.
This
discussion
will,
I
believe,
indicate that there are two
intermediate
types
of
theory capable
of
withstanding
the
arguments
of both
sides.
I
shall make it clear which of these I favour;but spacewill permit
me
only
to hint
at
the reasons for
my preference.
*
Meeting
of
the Aristotelian
Society
held
at 5/7 Tavistock
Place,
London
WC1,
on
Monday,
14
March,
1983 at
6.00 p.m.
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3/16
144 SUSAN
HAACK
I
Let me acknowledge,at the outset, that therewill ofcourse be an
element of arbitrariness
n
the
characterisations
I
shall
give.
But
I
hope
that
the
characterisations
given
here
will
at
any
rate serve
adequately
to
bring
into focus
the
issues
that have
been
debated
between those who call themselves
'foundationalists'
and those
who call
themselves
coherentists',
without
distorting
the
history
of
this debate
any
more than is unavoidable. The use of
the
terms 'foundationalism'
and 'coherentism' in
the
literature
has,
however, been ill-defined and shifting to such an extent that I
doubt that
any
characterisation could
square
with all of
it.
All
the theories to be characterised
in
this
section-Pure
Foundationalism,
Pure Coherentism
and the
intermediate
theories-share
the
assumptions
that we do
have
knowledge,
and that
our
having knowledge requires
(at least)
our
having
beliefs
which
are
justified
as well
as
true;
where
they
differ
is
on
how our justified beliefs
get
their
justification.
By 'Pure
Foundationalism'
I
shall
mean
any theory
according
to
which:
(PF1)
Some beliefs
are,
epistemically,
absolutely
secure
and:
(PF2)
All
beliefs
which
are
justified, but not absolutely
secure (in the sense of (PFI)) are justified wholly by the
support,
direct
or
indirect,
of
these
absolutely secure
beliefs.
I
shall
call
(PF1)-without
pejorative
intent-'Dogmatism
'4
I
have stated
Dogmatism
in
a
very general
way,
because
I
intend
it to cover not
just one,
but a
range
of
views.
All
Dogmatists
hold
that there are some
privileged
beliefs
which
enjoy immunity to
certain kinds of epistemic defect; they differ, however, with
regard
to
the kind of
epistemic
defect
they
have in
mind. For
example,
some have
in
mind
immunity
to
error
(the privileged
beliefs
are
'certain',
that
is, roughly,
it
is
impossible
that
they
should be
mistakenly held);
some,
immunity
to
unwarranted-
ness
(the
privileged
beliefs
are
'self-warranting',
hat
is, roughly,
it is
impossible
that
they
should be
unjustifiedlyheld); some,
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4/16
THEORIES OF
KNOWLEDGE: AN ANALY'I'IC FRAMEWORK
145
immunity
to ignorance (the privileged
beliefs are
'self-
manifesting',
that is, roughly,
it is
impossible
that
they
should
fail to be believed when they are true); others, again, hold that
there are privileged
beliefs
which
enjoy some two,
or
even
all
three,
kinds
of
immunity.
(Here, even
in the
remarks
in
which
I
elaborate on my
original, vague
statement,
I
am,
of
course, greatly simplifying
an
extremely complex
matter;
a full account would
call for
careful
textual analysis
of what has been meant
by saying
that some
beliefs
are
'indubitable', 'incorrigible',
'directly evident',
'self-
evident', etc., etc.)5
According
to
(PF2)
the
justification
of
each
justified
but
unprivileged
belief
depends
on the
support
of
some
privileged
belief
or
beliefs:
either
directly (privileged
beliefs
justify
the
unprivileged
belief in
question)
or
indirectly (privileged
beliefs
justify unprivileged
beliefs,
. . . which
justify
the
unprivileged
belief
in
question).
The crucial
point
is that
all the
justification
of
any justified
but
unprivileged
belief
derives, strictly
linearly,
from
the
support
of
privileged
beliefs.
So
I
shall call (PF2)
the
'Strong
Thesis
of One-Directional
Justification'.
(PF1) does
not entail
(PF2);
it
could be that, though there are
absolutely
secure
beliefs, they
do not
serve
to
support the
rest of
our
knowledge.
Neither does
(PF2),
by itself, entail (PFI);6
together
with
the
assumption
that there
are
somejustified beliefs,
however,
it
does.
The negation of (PF1) is:
(NPF1)
No
beliefs
are, epistemically,
absolutely secure.
I
shall
call
(NPF1)
'Fallibilism'.
Like
'Dogmatism', 'Fallibilism'
refers
to
a
family
of
views,
rather than
to
a
single thesis.
While
each
form of Fallibilism
is
incompatible
with
the
corresponding
form
of
Dogmatism,
Fallibilism with
regard
to
one concept
of
epistemic privilege is compatible with Dogmatism with regard
to
another.
The
negation
of
(PF2) is:
(NPF2)
Not all beliefs which
are justified, but
not
absolutely secure, are justified
wholly by the support
of
absolutely
secure
beliefs.
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5/16
146
SUSANHAACK
Any theory
which
accepts (or
entails)
either
of (NPF1) or
(NPF2)
is
incompatible
with
Pure
Foundationalism
(a qualifi-
cation with respectto the kind ofepistemic privilegeconcerned
is
understood here).
By
'Pure
Coherentism'
I
shall
mean
any theory according
to
which:
(NPF1) (Fallibilism)
(PC1)
No belief
is,
in and
of
itself, epistemically more
secure
than
any
other
and:
(PC2) Any
belief that
is
justified
is
justified wholly in
virtue of
its
belonging
to
some set
of beliefs which has
certain
properties
(consistency, comprehensiveness).
I will call
(PC1) 'Epistemic Egalitarianism'.
Like
'Dogmatism'
and 'Fallibilism', 'Epistemic Egalitarianism'refers to a classof
views, differing
with
respect
to
the
particular interpretation
given
to
'epistemically
secure'.
I will call
(PC2)
the 'Thesis
of Mutual
Justification'.
It is
necessary
to
stipulate
Fallibilism, separately,
as a
characteristic
thesis
of Pure
Coherentism,
because
Epistemic
Egalitarianism
s
compatible,
strictly speaking,
with
Dogmatism
as
well as
Fallibilism
(but
on the
Dogmatist assumption
that
some beliefs
are
absolutely
secure, Epistemic Egalitarianism
would
lhave
the
very peculiar consequence
that
all beliefs
are
absolutely secure). However,
Fallibilism with
respect
o
warrant-
orientedprivilege
s
actually
a
consequence
of
the Thesis of
Mutual
Justification,
since if
all
justified
beliefs
get
their
justification in
the
same
way, purely by
means
of
mutual
support, none are
privileged
with
regard
to
justification.
It is obviousthatPureCoherentism,asI havecharacterised t,
is
incompatible
with
Pure
Foundationalism.
For, first,
it is
committed
to
Fallibilism.
And,
second,
on
the
assumption
that
there are
justified beliefs, (PC2)
entails
(NPF2); indeed,
that
all
justified
beliefs
are
justified wholly by
mutual
support
entails
not just
that
not
all,
but that no
beliefs are
justified
in
the way
claimed
by (PF2).
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6/16
THEORIES
OF
KNOWLEDGE:
AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
147
In fact Pure
Coherentism,
as this
suggests,
is a
particularly
strong
rival
of
Pure
Foundationalism.
For, first,
it
rejects
both
he
characteristictheses of Pure Foundationalism.And, second, its
denial of each characteristicthesis of Pure
Foundationalism
is as
strong
a denial
as it could be: not
only
are there no beliefs
which
are
epistemically
privileged,
there
aren't even
any
beliefs
which
are at least
epistemically
better off than
others;
and
not
just
not
all, but no justified beliefsget theirjustification in
the
way
the
Pure
Foundationalist
claims.
So we can
expect
there
to be
other, intermediate kinds of
theory which are rivals both of Pure Foundationalism and of
Pure CoherentiSM.8
Among
the intermediate
theories,
I
shall
distinguish
two
categories:
those
which
retain
(PFI)
but
reject
(PF2),
and those
which
(like
Pure
Coherentism) reject
both.
(Since,
on the
assumption
that there are
justified beliefs, (PF2)
entails
(PF1),
there are
no
(non-sceptical)
theories
which
retain
(PF2)
but
reject (PF1).)
In the firstcategory fallsthe
type
of
theory
I
shall call
'Impure
Foundationalism',
and
characterise
as
holding
both:
(PF1) (Dogmatism)
and:
(IPF2) All beliefs which are justified but not absolutely
secure are justified
at least
in
part by the
support of
absolutely
secure
beliefs;
some are also
justified
in
part by
mutual relations of
support among
themselves.
Like the Pure
Foundationalist,
the
Impure
Foundationalist
requires
that
every
unprivileged
but
justified
belief derives
from
some
privileged
belief(s);
unlike the
Pure
Foundationalist,
however, he does not require that the justification for any
justified
but
unprivileged
belief
derive
exclusively rom
privileged
beliefs. For
this
reason,
I
shall
call
(IPF2)
the
'Impure Thesis of
One-Directional
Justification'
(or perhaps 'Thesis
of One-
Directional Justification with
Twiddle' would have been more
perspicuous,
if
less
elegant).
Impure Foundationalism still allows that
epistemically
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7/16
148
SUSAN
HAACK
privileged beliefs play
a
specially
important
role in the
justification
of other beliefs.
But there is
another
possible type
of
position according to which, while there are epistemically
privileged
beliefs,
their
support
is not essential to the
justifica-
tion
of
other
beliefs:
(PF1) (Dogmatism)
(NPF2*)
No
beliefs
which
arejustified but
not
absolutely
secure
are
justified
even
in
part by the support of
absolutely
secure beliefs.
((NPF2*) is,
of
course, incompatible
with
(IPF2) as
well as with
the stronger (PF2).)
I
shall refer
to this as the 'Idle Epistemic Wheels' view. (I say
'view' because,
since
it is
characterisedonly negatively,
it seems
inappropriate
to call
it
a theory.)
Theories
in the second
category
(rejecting (PF1) as well as
(PF2)) deny
that there are
any
absolutely secure beliefs.But
it
is
possible to do this, to be a Fallibilist, without accepting
Epistemic Egalitarianism.
Fallibilism is
quite
compatible, also,
with
the
thesis that
some
beliefs
are
more secure
than others,
'Epistemic
Inegalitarianism';
this
is:
(NPC 1)
Some beliefs
are,
in
and of themselves,
epistemi-
cally
more
secure
than
others.
I shall
distinguish
three
types
of
Inegalitarian intermediate
theory.
One
type
sees
justification
as
essentiallyone-directional,
from
the
relatively
secure
to the
relatively insecure.
I
will referto
this
as 'Weak
Foundationalism',
and
characterise
it
as the
conjunction
ofi
(NPF1)
(Fallibilism)
(NPCI) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)
and:
(WF2)
The
justification
of less
secure beliefs always
depends upon
the
support
of
more secure
beliefs, and not
vice-versa
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8/16
THEORIESOF KNOWLEDGE:
N
ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
149
which
I
shall call (noting
that
(PF2) implies (WF2), but not vice-
versa)
the 'Weak Thesis of
One-Directional Justification'.
The two other types of Inegalitarian theory reject this linear
conception
of
justification,
seeing
it
as, rather,
a matter of
mutual
support.
The difference between them is that
one,
like
Pure Coherentism, requires
that
justification
be
wholly a
matter
of relations
among
beliefs, while the other, like
Foundationalist
theories,
does not. The first
type
I shall call 'Weak
Coherentism',
and characterise
as
the
conjunction of:
(NPF1) (Fallibilism)
(NPC1) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)
and:
(WC2) Any
belief that
is
justified
is
justified wholly
in
virtue
of
its
relations
to
other
beliefs,
the
justification of
more secure
beliefs
possibly depending upon
the
support
of
less secure
beliefs,
as
well as vice-versa
which
I
shall call
the 'Thesis
of
Weighted
MutualJustification'.
The last
type
of
theory
to
be
characterised is,
as
it
were,
intermediate
between Weak Foundationalism
and
Weak Co-
herentism,
so
I
shall call
it
'Foundherentism';
(NPF1) (Fallibilism)
(NPC 1) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)
and:
(FH2)
The
justification
of
more secure beliefs
may
depend upon
the
support
of less
secure
beliefs, as well as
vice-versa.
I will
refer to
(FH2)
as
'Up-and-Back-ism'. (I note that (WC2)
implies (FH2),
but not the other
way around.)
My
classification
of
types
of
epistemic theory
is
not
exhaustive,
and
it is
exclusive
only
in
a rather
restricted sense.
It is not
exhaustive,
because the
types of theory sketched all
share two
assumptions:
that
we
do have
knowledge,
and
that
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150
SUSAN HAACK
knowledge
is
(at least)justified,
true belief. So
sceptical theories,
and
theories which
reject
this kind of definition
of
knowledge,
fall outside its scope.9 (Nor do I claim to have characterised
every possible type
of
theory
between
my two extremes, though
of course
I
hope
I
have
characterised
the
most
serious
options.)
The classification
s
exclusive
in this
sense: each of the types of
theory
I
have
sketched
is
incompatible
with
each of the others
with respect to any one conception of epistemic privilege, and
with respect to the same class of beliefs.
The former qualification
is
needed
because,
as
I
have
emphasised, there is more than one conception of epistemic
privilege (certainty, self-warrant, etc., etc.),
and
it
is
consistent
to subscribe to different types
of
theory
with
respect to different
conceptions
of
epistemic privilege.
The latter
qualification
is needed
because,
on the
assumption
of,
for
example,
a radical distinction between
logical
and
empirical knowledge,
it would be consistent to subscribe to
one
type
of
theory
with
regard
to the
one,
and another with
regard
to
the other.
It
might
be
useful,
in
view
of
this,
to
distinguish
between
local
and
global epistemic
theories-the latter
but not the
former
aspiring
to
apply
to all human
knowledge.
And with
this
distinction
in
hand,
it would
be
possible
to
characterise
'Contextualism ?
as
a form
of
local
foundationalism: withina
context
'form
of
life', society
or
whatever)
there are
privileged
beliefs and
justification
is
one-directional.
II
Perhaps
Pure
Foundationalism and Pure Coherentism, as I
have characterised
them,
are so
extreme
that no philosopher has
ever
seriously
held either
position.
But the
extreme theories are
nonetheless
important
to
an
understanding of the arguments
traditionally deployed in the debate between 'foundationalism'
and 'coherentism'.
(This
debate
has,
of
course, been conducted
without benefit of the scheme
of classification
I
have just offered;
so,
in
what
follows, my
use of the
terms 'foundationalism' (with a
small
'f)
and 'coherentism'
(with a small 'c') should not be
understood as
presupposing
that
scheme.)
Unless
foundationalism
is
true,
its
sympathisers sometimes
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10/16
IDLE WHEELS VIEW
SCEPTICISM
(PF1) Dogmatism
NON-JUSTIFICATION
(NPF2*)
No beliefs are
DEFINITIONS
OF
justified
as
in
(PF2)
KNOWLEDGE
PURE
IMPURE FOUNDHERENTISM
W
FOUNDATIONALISM
FOUNDATIONALISM
(NPFI)
Fallibilism (N
(PF1) Dogmatism
(PFI) Dogmatism
(NPCl) Epitemic (N
Some
belief's are
absolutely
NPI
ptei(PC)Esem
Someurellef
are
absotutely
(IPF2) ImpureThesisof One- Inegalitarianism
DIrectional
_ustifica-
(FH2)
Up-and-Backism
So
(PF2) Strong,
Thesis
of
One-
hlon
. .
tha
Directional
Just~fication
All beliefs
which are
justified
beliefs
may depend
on less
(W
All
beliefs
which
arejustified
but not
absolutely
secure
are
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but
not
absolutely
secure are
Justifiedat leastin
part
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ii
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absolutely
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WEAK
FOUNDATIONALISM
(NPFI) Fallibilism
(NPC1) EpistemicEgali-
larianism
(WF2)
Weak Thesis
of
One-
Directional
ustifica-
lion
Justification of less secure
be-
liefs
always depends
on
more
secure, not v-v.
8/11/2019 theories of knowledge an analytic framework.pdf
11/16
152
SUSAN
HAACK
argue,
there
is no
way
in
which
our beliefscould
bejustified,
and
we should have
no
knowledge. Foundationalism must
be
accepted, because the only alternative is a surrender to
scepticism.
I
will call
this
the
'No
Tolerable Alternatives
Argument'.
Of course,
the
argument
depends upon
the
assumption that
scepticism
is
intolerable.
But I shall leave aside the issues raised
by
this
assumption,
to concentrate
on the claim that foundation-
alism
is the
only
alternative
to
scepticism.
The claim is that foundationalism offers
the
only possible
account of how a person'sbeliefscould bejustified. Suppose, the
argument goes,
someone believes
something
on the
basis
of
certain other
things
he
believes,
and that
he
holds these beliefs
on the
basis
of certain further beliefs,
. . .
and
so
on.
If
this
process eventually ends
with
beliefs
which
do
not
themselves
depend
on further
beliefs,
and
yet
which are themselves
secure,
the original
belief can be
justified.
But
not
otherwise;
not
if
the
process comes to an end
with
'terminal'
beliefs which are
insecure,
or if it does not come to an end at all, but
goes
round in
a
circle,
with
one belief
supported
by
others to
which,
in
turn,
it
lends
support.
Now, first, the
sort
of epistemic privilege
in
the terminal
beliefs
which is
called for
by
this
argument must, surely,
be
warrant-oriented.
he
plausible
assumption implicit
in the
argument
is
that
a person
cannot
be
justified
in
believing
something if he believes it on the basis of somethingelse he isnot
justified
in
believing.
More particularly,
second, what
the
argument requires s that
there
be terminal
beliefs which are
justifled,
but not
ustifed by the
supportof
other
beliefs.
For unless the
process
of
justification
eventually
reaches
beliefs which are not
dependent
on
further
beliefs,
it has not
come to an end.
So
what the
No
Tolerable
Alternatives
Argument
requires
is
that there be
some beliefs
which are, as I shall say, 'independently warranted'.
Some foundationalists
have,
I
think, had
in
mind
that
experiential
beliefs
have this status:
they
are
justified,
not
by
the
support
of other
beliefs,
but
by experience. Other foundationa-
lists,
of
a
less
empiricist11
tripe, have offered other candidates.
'Justified,
but not
by
the
support
of
other beliefs'
is
how I
would
make sense
of the
prima
facie
rather
puzzling claim
that
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12/16
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
153
some
beliefs are
'self-justifying'.
It is also
a
possible
interpreta-
tion
of
the
suggestion
that
some beliefs 'do not stand in
need of
justification': they do not need justification by other beliefs,
since they
get
their
justification
elsewhere.
(I
suspect,however,
that if, at times, the
claim
that
purely
experiential beliefs do not
stand
in need
ofjustification
has
been meant more
literally
than
this,
it has been because of a confusion
between
an
experience
itself,
and a
belief
about
the
experience.)
Beliefs
which have some other kind of
epistemic
privilege,
but
are
not
independently
warranted,
may
be
epistemically
Idle
Wheels. (I do not want to enter, here, into the very complicated
considerations involved
in
the
question
of
the
logical relations
between
independent
warrant
and other
forms of
epistemic
privilege.
It will
suffice
to
point
out
that
if,
if
a
belief
is
independently
warranted,
it
follows
that
it
has some
other
type
of
epistemic
privilege,
the weaker
type
of
privilege is,
so to
speak,
implicitly required
by
the No Tolerable
Alternatives
Argument;
but
if,
if a belief
has
some other
type
of
privilege,
it
follows
that
it
is
independently
warranted,
the
stronger
type
of
epistemic
privilege
is
not
required, even
implicitly, by the No
Tolerable
Alternatives
Argument.)
The
No
Tolerable Alternatives
Argument
simply
dismisses
out
of hand the
idea that
the
process
of
justification
might 'go
round
in
a circle'.
Sympathisers
with
coherentismmight
protest
that
they propose
nothing
so
crass as
one
belief's
being justified
by the support of another, which depends on a further
belief,
. . .
which
depends
on
the
first;
he
'mutual
support' they
envisage,
to which the
foundationalist
disingenuously
refers as
'going
round
in
a
circle', is,
rather,
a
matter
of beliefs
deriving
their
justification
from
the
fact
that
they
belong
to
a
suitably
cohesive and
comprehensive
set
of
beliefs.
The
second
argument
I
want to
consider
is
an
explicit
critique
of this
proposal.
The
coherentist,
the
argument
goes, tries
to
give an
account of
justification purely in terms of the relationsamong a person's
beliefs,
with no
reference
to
anything
external,
over
and
above
the
beliefs themselves. But this
simply
cannot
be
done;
for
no
such
internal
relationswithin a
set
of
beliefs
could be
sufficientto
show them to be
justified.
There are
too
many
'coherent'
belief
sets,
and the coherentist
is
quite
unable to
discriminate
among
them.
(In
what
I
regard
as
its
most
plausible
form,
this
argument
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13/16
154
SUSAN HAACK
points out,
in
particular,
that the coherentist has to allow that
a
person might bejustified
in beliefswhich are
wholly
disconnected
from his sensory experience, provided only that they cohere
internally
in an
appropriate way.)
I will call this the
'Drunken
Sailors
Argument' (justification,
in the coherentist
account,
is
like
two
drunken
sailors back
to
back-what are
they standing
on?).
This makes explicit what,
as I
suggested,
was
implicit
in
the
No Tolerable
Alternatives
Argument:
that an
acceptable theory
of
justification
must make
reference to
something beyond
a
person'sbeliefs.
Neither a Pure
nor
a Weak Coherentist
theory can allow
such
a
reference.
Foundationalist and
Foundherentist
theories, however, can
allow
it;
and those
which
spell
out the
notion of
(absolute
or
relative) epistemic privilege
in
terms of
independent warrant
do, implicitly, appeal
to
something
outside one's
beliefs.
Neither of the arguments considered here, however, shows
that an acceptable theory must admit absolutelyprivileged
beliefs.
One may,
I
take
it,
be more or
less
justified
in
believing
something.
The No Tolerable Alternatives
Argument
does not
establish
that
there must be
terminal beliefs
which
are
absolutely secure,
in the
sense of
completely justified, in-
dependently
of
the
support
of
furtherbeliefs.
Generally,
I
take it,
justification is,
so to
speak,
'diluted' as
one
passes from
supporting
beliefs
to
the beliefs
they support;
I
mean, that even
if
one
is
completely justified
in
some initial
beliefs,
one
will
usually
only
be
justified
to some extent in the
further
beliefs
one holds on
their basis.
Now,
if it
were
required
that in
order for a belief to
count as knowledge
one
should be completely justified in
holding it,
then
only epistemically privileged
beliefs
would
qualify
as
knowledge anyway,
and
the
foundationaliststructure
ofjustificationwould be simply irrelevant.If,on the otherhand,
it is
required only (as seems more plausible) that, in order for a
belief
to
count as
knowledge, one must have sufficient ustifica-
tion
for
holding it,
then
it
is
not
necessary
or the
terminal beliefs
to
be
completely justified independently
of
the support of other
beliefs;
it is
necessary only
that
they
be
justified enough to pass
on sufficient
justification
to
the rest.
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THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN
ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
155
And
it
would
be
sufficient,
to
meet the
Drunken
Sailors
Argument, to
allow
that there
are
some beliefs
which are at
least
partially justified otherwise than by the support of further
beliefs;
it is
not
necessary
that
there
be beliefs
which
are
completely justified
in this
way.
So if
these two
arguments
are
accepted,
they
leave
some
Inegalitarian
theories
(Weak
Foundationalism
and
Found-
herentism) as well
as the
Dogmatist
theories
(Pure and
Impure
Foundationalism)
in
the
field.
Let me next consider an
argument
used
by
sympathiserswith
coherentism.Foundationalism, it is sometimesargued, requires
there
to be
beliefs
which
are both
secure,
and
at the
same
time
rich
enough
in
content to
be
capable
of
supporting
the rest
of
one's
knowledge.
But no beliefs
could
be
both
secure
enough
and
rich
enough;
if
any
are
absolutely
secure,
it
can
only
be
because
they
have been so
stripped
of content
as to
take no
epistemic
risk,
and such
beliefs
would be
quite
incapable
of
serving
as
the
foundations for the rest of
one's
knowledge.
I
shall call
this
the
'Swings and Roundabouts
Argument'
(what
you gain
on
the
swings
of
security you
lose
on
the
roundabouts
of
content).
Though
it
is
vaguer
than
one
would like
as
to
exactly
what
the
relation is
between
security
and
content, still,
I
think, this
argument
has
some
plausibility
(especially,
perhaps,
in
view of
the
tendency
for
foundationalists to
restrict
the
content of
their
basic
beliefs when their
claim
to
security
is
under
threat).
The
chief point I want to make about the argumenthere is a simple
one: that
it is
the more
plausible
the
more
secure the
privileged
beliefs are
supposed
to
be,
and
the
greater
the
burden
of
the
support
of
unprivileged
beliefs
they
are
supposed
to
bear. This
means that
it is
most
persuasive
against
Pure
Foundationalism,
which
requires
its
privileged
beliefs to
be both
absolutely
secure
and
wholly responsible
for
the
justification
of
other
beliefs. It is
not
quite
so
persuasive
against
Impure
Foundationalism,
which,
though it requiresits privilegedbeliefsto be absolutelysecure,
does not
require
them to
be
quite
wholly responsible
for
the
support
of
other beliefs.
And it
need not
be
a serious
threat to
Weak
Foundationalism,
which,
not
requiring
absolute
security,
can start with
more
content in its
basic
beliefs
than
either
the
Pure or the
Impure
forms.
So,
of
the
types
of
theory
I
have
characterised,
it
looks as if
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15/16
156
SUSAN
HAACK
two-Weak
Foundationalism
and
Foundherentism
(both:
with
respect
to independent
warrant)-may
be able to
survive
the
arguments of both sides in the traditional debate between
foundationalism
and
coherentism.
Of these
two
types
of
theory,
I
regard
Foundherentism
as the
more
plausible.
Central
among my
reasonsfor this
preference
is that
this
kind
of
theory
seemsto me able
to offer
a better account
of the role
of
experience
in
justification.
Like
Quine
(and
before
him, Dewey
and
Peirce),
I
conceive
of
the theoryof knowledgenaturalistically,as centrallyconcerned
with
the
ways
in which human
beings
learn about the world
by
means
of their
interactions
with
it.
And,
like
them,
I
think
of
experience
as
playing
an
important
role
in
the
justification
of a
person's
beliefs.
The
human
subjecthas experiences,
and
in the light of those
experiences
he
modifies
his beliefs.
Some of his beliefs
depend
largely
upon
experience,
some
largely upon
other beliefs of
his.
But none
depend
solely
on
experience;
for the beliefs he
already
has
affect
what beliefs
he
acquires
as
a
result
of
experience.
Weak Foundationalism,
like
Foundherentism,
is
Inegalitar-
ian,
and
so allows
that some beliefs
get more
of their
justification
than others
from
experience.
Weak Foundationa-
lism,
again
like
Foundherentism,
is
Fallibilist,
and so denies that
any
beliefs
are
completely
justified
by
experience
alone. But
while Foundherentism
can
explain
that
this
is
because even
beliefs very
close
to
experience depend
in
some small measure
upon
the
support
of
more
'theoretical'
beliefs (e.g.,
about
the
conditions
of
perception),
Weak Foundationalism
cannot;
which
is
a
reason
to
prefer
Foundherentism.This, of
course,
cuts
a
very long story very
short
indeed;
but
a
comprehensive
defense
of
Up-and-Back-ism
is
beyond
the
scope
of this
paper.12*
*
The final version ol
this
paper
was
written
up
while
I
was a
Visiting
Fellow
at the
Australian National University.
I
am
very grateful
to
Howard
Burdick for
detailed
comments on
a draft.
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THEORIES OF
KNOWLEDGE: AN
ANALYTIC
FRAMEWORK
157
NOTES
'Sosa, E,
'The
Raft and the
Pyramid',
in MidwestStudies n
Philosophy, ,
ed.
French,
P. et al., Minnesota UP, p. 3.
2Sellars,
W.
'Empiricism
and the
Philosophy
of
Mind',
in
Science, erception
ndReality,
RKP, 1963, p. 170.
'But
cf.
Sosa, op. cit.,
and
Pollock, J.,
'A
Plethora
of
Epistemological Theories', in
Justification
nd
Knowledge,
d.
Pappas, G., Reidel, 1979,
93-113.
4A
usage
I
derive
from Peirce.
5Cf.
Alston, W. P., 'Varieties of Privileged Access',Americanhilosophical uarterly,,
1971, 223-41.
6Taking
the 'all'
as
in the
predicate
calculus.
'In 'Fallibilism and Necessity', Synthese, 1, 1979, 37-63,
without
benefit of this
framework,
I
used the term
'fallibilism'
to
refer to
one member of this family.
'Any
Egalitarian theory
which held that
all beliefsgot theirjustification
in
some other
way than
that
specified by (PC2)
would
be
a rival
of Pure
Foundationalism as strong as
Pure Coherentism;
but I know of no serious candidate.
'See e.g., Goldman, A.,
'A
Causal
Theory
of
Knowing',
Journal
of Philosophy,
4,
355-372.
Popper
would be another
example
of a writer who
rejects
the
justification
requirement; he is a sceptic with respect to justification, but not with respect to
knowledge.
'0See e.g., Wittgenstein, L.,
On
Certainty, lackwell, 1969;Annis, D., 'AContextualist
Theory of Epistemic Justification', American hilosophicalQuarterly, 5, 1978, 213-9.
I
would not want
this
to
suggest
that
I
regard
the
distinction
between 'empiricist'
and 'rationalist'
approaches
as
unproblematic;
it
might possibly
be
amenable
to
a
treatment roughly analogous
to the
one
I
have
employed
in
part
I
of this paper, with
approaches according
to
which
all
knowledge
derives from
experience
at one extreme
and
approaches according
to
which
all
knowledge
derives from reason at the other.
12
I
have discussed
this matter in much
more detail in two unpublished papers,
'Taking Away the given ' and
'An
Empire State Building Made Out of Toothpicks'(a
critique of C. I. Lewis's Impure Foundationalism).
top related