The Development of the Islamic Movement in Yemen
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What factors have shaped the development of Yemen’s Islamist Movement since its formation in
1990?
Zaid Rassam
A dissertation presented in the University of Salford in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
BA (HONS) International Relations and Politics.
Advised by Lars Berger
Presented 2012
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ContentsIntroduction...........................................................................................................................................3
Chapter One........................................................................................................................................11
Chapter Two........................................................................................................................................22
Chapter Three......................................................................................................................................35
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................41
Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................43
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Introduction
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party, more commonly known as Islah, was established on
September 13 1990 shortly after the unification of North and South on May 22 1990 and the
legalisation of a multi party system (Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2011). It was seen as an opening by many
movements and groups to take advantage of the new political opportunities that had accompanied
the unification process. A political opportunity is a key pillar of the social movement theory
highlighted in a number of social movement theory interpretations. By carrying out research
regarding Islah’s integration into Yemeni politics it will hopefully highlight the varying stances and
positions it holds depending on what is most beneficial to the stability of the country but more
critically the benefits they reap from the specific positions they hold and support. To be more
precise on the subject of political opportunity, the shifting of alliances of a party to maximise their
political opportunities is something the social movement theory is recognized for.
Yemen’s social and political settings provide a unique case when compared to its regional
neighbours. Since the leniency and range of beliefs and affiliations held by Yemenis is rarely
witnessed in the Arab region. In the space of a few months during 1990, the rights of many Arabs in
their respective countries that are most often granted on paper but less so in reality were being
given a platform to be exercised in Yemen. Furthermore the newly found liberation was not met
with the disappointingly usual oppressive consequences most commonly experienced in various
other Arab states.
In addition to the rareness the Yemeni social and political pluralism brings to the table another
distinctive feature of its political platform presents a rare case when comparing its Islamic
movement with others in the Arab world (Whitaker, 2009) . Islah did not enter the political stage as part
a clear opposition, instead is started off as an ally of the ruling party, the General People’s Congress,
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mostly down to the closeness of some of the elites in both parties at various times in Yemen’s
modern history (Hamzawy ,2009). This matter will be tackled in more detail in the following chapters.
An additional reason as to why Islah stands-out in comparison to its neighbouring Islamist
movements in the Arab region is down to its aims and objectives they wish to accomplish. Unlike
various other Islamic movements in the Middle East who seek to apply Islamic laws to all aspects of
social, political and economic dimensions within their respective states, Islah represents a party who
are ready to compromise on many issues that would otherwise cause a stumbling block in their aim
of keeping out of trouble and putting the countries stability at risk. Despite certain ideological
similarities or sympathy with fundamentalist elements in Yemen, Islah does not aim for an Islamic
confrontation with the state. One of its functions as a representative party has been to play a
mediating role between the state and the country’s more conservative religious elements
(International Crisis Group, 2003).
Cases where Islamist parties or movements or groups for that matter are allies with the ruling party
are not found in abundance. The rare circumstance can be analysed and explored through the
structures and framework of the social movement theory. It has until recently been mainly applied
against European or Western social movements. The Islah represents a perfect opportunity for
analysts and theorists to carry out research on the Islamic movement in Yemen by pitching it against
the social movement theory. Jillian Schwedler’s work highlighted the importance of analyzing these
types of movements first as social movements followed by analysis in terms of their beliefs.
“Thus to understand the motives, objectives , behaviour, and ideological bases of a wide
range of Islamist movements, much is to be gained by analyzing these diverse groups first as
social movements and only later (if ever) in terms of their particular beliefs.”
(Schwedler 2004: p.224)
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The differences Islah hold in comparison to various other Islamic movements in the Muslim world
will result in conclusions and analysis that are unique and original.
Another point Schwedler makes in her work is the ways in which political movements maximise their
political opportunities in parliament and various other civil ministries across Yemen.
The paper aims to address a number of questions regarding The Yemeni Congregation for Reform,
which are:
1. How does Islah use the social movement’s main characteristic of manoeuvring between
various alliances on the political stage, and does it succeed in its efforts of gaining the
maximized benefits?
2. Why and how has it changed its relations with certain political actors?
3. Has it grown stronger or weaker as a result of its opportunistic behaviour?
4. Has Islah’s participation in party politics resulted in a moderation of its demands, reforms
and policies? (This will take into account the ‘inclusion-moderation hypothesis ’.
The topics significance
The papers topic is significant within the current Middle East Climate. Since the turn of the year
there have been uprisings across the Arab peninsula at a surprising speed and level of organisation
and efficiency which had surprised some political observers who thought Arabs were not really
interested in democracy. These uprisings or revolutions, as they have been more commonly labelled
as, were triggered by the Tunisian people’s demands for reforms on social and political levels. These
included the demand for the creation of jobs, and an end to the corruption that had stifled the
regime, which eventually led to the fall of the Zane El-Abdine’s regime and a snowball effect which
resulted in similar fates for other Arab regimes.
The Yemeni uprising followed the initial stages of the Tunisian revolution and occurred
simultaneously with the Egyptian revolution. Though it has taken a considerable longer time to gain
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the results its North African neighbours achieved. It comes down to the complex nature of the
Yemeni social and political dimension. Which includes; firstly the tribal element in Yemen is one of
the strongest if not the strongest in the Middle East. Ali Abdullah Saleh once compared running
Yemen to dancing on the head of snakes.
The protests in Yemen were initially against the rising number of unemployment, the worrying
economic condition and corruption within the government and other civil service institutes. The
demands escalated to calls for Saleh’s resignation. This consequently led to powerful figures from
the army and government to defect and led to large parts of the country being out of Saleh’s control.
A political opportunity has risen for the opposition parties to act, with special reference to Al-Islah
who are the strongest opposition party at this time. They are now part of an umbrella opposition
group that interestingly includes their past foe, Yemeni Socialist Party. The partnership between the
socialist YSP party and Islah will be looked into further in the paper because it backs the social
movement theory’s major principle of switching alliances in order to achieve individual ambitions.
Islah supported the popular uprising from the beginning and have rejected a numerous amount of
offers from the ruling party in a bid to bide their time. Islah’s support of the revolution is very
important because it increases the significance this paper holds in these current times. The social
movement theory states that a movement or a political party would align themselves or frame their
support of a particular group when it best suits their interests. And they have done this by
supporting the youth and other people on the streets and maybe hoping it will benefit them in times
such as elections.
In the Social movement theory, one of the key elements of the political opportunity structure is the
arrangement of elite alliances. So this explains why Islah were close to the ruling party before the
creation. They were seeking to preserve certain conservative elements within the Yemeni society.
Hence they viewed the creation of Islah as a mobilising structure that would further enable them to
reach deeper into parts of Yemen that were not formerly recognised as having a strong Islah support
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base. Examples of these places are the areas in the former South of Yemen. Creating a party would
provide them with the much needed apparatus to achieve their objectives.
The present situation in Yemen will have an impact on all political and social circles because if
everything goes to plan and Saleh is forced out of power then a political vacuum would be left to fill.
Islah is going to be one the main parties to run in the elections following the ousting of Saleh and
subsequently attempt to fulfil their political ambitions. It is important to point out that although
Islah have played a part in governing Yemen, they have not been able to fully ‘spread their wings’
because of a variety of reasons, the major one being for the fear of Saleh clamping down on their
freedom to run efficiently. So if all goes to plan, this phase would add Islah’s manoeuvring from
opposition in 1990, to coalition partner 1993-1997, back to opposition, followed by joining the Joint
Meeting Parties which includes their old foe, the YSP.
Summary of the Significance of my paper
The key points as to why the papers topic is significant are the role Islah has played in urging their
supporters to join the protestors against the current regime; the ongoing media and political focus
Islamist parties are under. Examples of this global attention are Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in
Lebanon, two parties that have a strong influence within their respective countries. They have
received positive as well as negative responses as a result of their political participation. Islamist
parties have become an increasingly important force in Arab countries. Whether through violence or
participating in politics, Islamist parties are now contending for national political power. They have
been poorly understood, partly because of its complexity and controversial cultural aspects and
partly because of generalisation made by mass media. The purpose of this paper is to understand
the various elements of Islah as to have a transparent understanding of how and why it functions
the way it does.
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Literature Review
The first piece of work that I have read which covers the theoretical framework of the social/Islamic
movement in Yemen and Middle East in general is Quintan Wikorovicz’s Islamic Activism: A social
Movement Theory Approach.
The piece of valuable literature includes a chapter which places a focus on the Islah party in Yemen.
Jillian Schwedler, also the author of Faith in Moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. She
examines within her chapter how the Islamic movement can be explored though the concepts and
insights of social movements theory. She believes that the study of Islah can contribute to the social
movement theory. This is done be examining the dynamics of contentions as strong ideological
movements that transform into formal political parties with a specific agenda.
Schwedler points out that the shifting alliances across territorial boundaries prior to the unification
of Yemen are essential to understanding the post unification politics, and ultimately the creation of
the opposition party Islah. The main purpose of her piece in Wikorovicz’s book is to point out that
Islah was an important party to the ruling GPC party because they required their assistance in the
North/South struggle following the unification. She argues that the GPC was prepared to form a
coalition government with Islah playing the junior role within the partnership. This was so that they
could conjure up more support together and consequently defeat the YSP which was at the time
before their defeat the main opposition to the ruling party.
Moving on to another piece of literature that has already been written tackling the topic of Islamic
movements in Yemen is Jillian Schwedler’s Faith in Moderation: Islamists parties in Jordan and
Yemen.
Schwedler seems to have two purposes when writing this book, the first being the obvious aim
which is to compare both cases. The other purpose of this book is one that is not spoken about much
within academic texts. She argues against the belief that once Islamist movements move into party
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politics it will by default promote both moderation within the ranks of the movement and
simultaneously reduce radicalisation. But at the same time she does not believe that if Islamist
Movements choose not move in to politics then they will become radical or more radical in some
cases. She goes on to point out that it is very difficult to measure the authentic moderation within
both parties she is comparing. This ultimately results her in providing her own definition of what
moderation means.
“Moderation is therefore identified not as a change in political behaviour, which leaves open
the possibility of feigned moderation, but change in world views of the sort that may be
described as ideological moderation.”
(Schwedler, 2006: p.120)
It provides a comparative study of two parties in which moderation is measured. She concludes by
saying because the IAF in Jordan has been given more support and a longer history it has been able
to take part in politics successfully and become more moderate than Islah. Islah she argues had
various things that resulted in its semi-failure, according to her, of grasping the full notion of
moderation. One of these things that have hindered its devolvement in becoming in a fully
moderate party was the division in the power elite on differing issues.
Another book that has contributed to Islah’s development since its formation in 1990 is Muhammad
Al-Maqrimi’s Al-Tajammu al-Yamani li-l-Islah: al-Ruya wal Masar. This piece of work takes you
through Islah’s development from 1990 to 1997. It highlights the achievements Islah accomplished
in that time span, the decisions Islah made and the reasons behind making decisions. Al-Maqrimi
provides an insight of how an Islahi would think because he is an Islahi. So an insider’s analysis of the
party’s development up until 1997 is priceless.
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The Paper consists of three chapters. The first chapter will deal with the Islah’s background, and how
they became a participant in party politics. The chapter will include a brief description of the key
players and how these players have an impact on the direction the movement heads towards.
Chapter two will speak about the Islah from its first participation in politics up until the 1997
parliamentary elections. This will cover a historical period from Islah’s origins as an opposition party
in 1990 up until the presidential elections in 1997 which was when they first split from the regime
and joined the opposition. The chapter will cover its gradual switching of alliance from coalition
partner to opposition. The chapter will also describe how Islah’s growing popularity, coupled with
the regimes efforts to marginalize it, and eventually pressured it to become a staunch opposition
party.
Chapter three will include the alliance they hold with the YSP since the 1997 elections. It will cover
the Joint Meeting Parties establishment in 2005. In addition it will focus on the contemporary
situation Islah finds itself in.
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Chapter One
Soon after unification in 1990, numerous political parties were formed. The Islah party was one
these, joined by around 50 other parties that participated in the parliamentary elections of 1993.
The large number of parties that contested in unified Yemen’s first elections was down to the
legislation of political parties. It could be described as an urge to go out there and experience
political freedom for the first time in Yemen’s history. Before unification, Islah members had been
made up one of many elements within the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime in the north (Philips, 2007). 1
Watkins (2004) states that:
“The unification agreement of the new Republic of Yemen (ROY) lifted the official legal ban
on opposition parties. Following this action, several groups split from the GPC and formed
their own parties.”2
The Islah members who can be described as the conservative layer of the GPC, broke away to
become a party in its own right under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar. He is the chief of
the largest and most powerful tribal confederation in Yemen (Whitaker, 2009). 3 The name
Congregation for Reform was chosen so that it represents the various elements that make up the
party. These include members of the Muslim Brotherhood, community leaders, businessmen,
sheikhs, academics and doctors.
Reasons behind Islah’s participation in politics
The reasons behind Islah’s participation in Yemeni have not been clear to some, as conflicting views
are made behind Islah’s intentions. However one reason that holds the most substance and level of
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rationality is that the Islah party was created so it could further its ideological reach towards parts of
Yemen that are not recognised as conservative to the extent Islah would want them to be.
Schwedler states, “When opposition groups are permitted to organise and campaign as
political parties, for example, it provides political actors with the opportunity to expand their
support bases, and convey alternative political visions to a wider audience.”4
(Schwedler, 2004: p.206)
The unification of Yemen gave them an opportunity to further its beliefs and ideas. This theory or
reason as to why Islah chose to take part in politics would be strengthened when taking note of the
South of Yemen. According to Mahoney (2009) before the unification of Yemen, the conservative
groups in North Yemen and much of the public there did not approve of the “Godless socialists” 5 in
the South. So they would have wanted to amend this.
In March 1979, southern based National Democratic Front launched regular attacks along the border
against the Northern backed groups. The South Yemen’s government were alleged to be supplying
aid and weapons to the fighters based in the on the north of the border (Herrmann, 1952).6 This was
followed by a defeat of the NDF by the northern regime with a significant role played by groups of
conservatives and Islamists. The groups were predominantly made up of the wider Muslim
Brotherhood, tribal leaders and a few other Islamic groups who did not agree with the southern
ideology (Schwedler, 2004).7
The support offered by these conservative and tribal groups established a firm relationship between
them and the regime. The relationship was represented when Saleh established his party, and the
tribal and Islamists were amongst its members. This was due to the growing influence these people
had and to repay them for the support they provided in fighting the southern NDF (Al-Yemeni,
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2003). 8 These members formed the Islah party eight years later with others that also shared their
visions. It could be argued that Saleh supported the legalisation of opposition parties. This was so
the Islah party could be used as a counter balance against the Socialist party that was at the time a
partner with Saleh’s GPC in government post unification.
Islah’s participation in politics eased the tensions between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia felt
a bit more comfortable with Yemen’s new democracy where there was a conservative Islamist party
involved in the running of the country. One the other hand this tactic could further alienate Western
donors from contributing aid to Yemen (Whitaker, 1993).
The Islah party’s official name is aptly called the Congregation Party for Reform. Firstly for the wide
ranging spectrum of members the party has in its ranks ranging from businessmen to tribal
members. Secondly are its aims for reform, that include a wide pool of issues ranging from the
education system to corruption within the government and society as a whole. But they were also
aiming to nullify the southern based Socialist party influence within a united Yemen.
Context of Participation: Background and History
The circumstance in which the Islah party was created requires full attention in order to get a
complete picture of the reasons behind their participation in politics. A brief history of Yemen
political situation would need to be revisited in order to successfully understand the Islah party’s
motives.
The unification of South and North Yemen:
Pre-unification, the North of Yemen and South of Yemen held two different governmental
ideologies. The south adopted a communist ideology and the north held a more traditional Arabian
Islamic ideology based loosely on the Sharia law. The unification of both of these countries took
everyone by surprise (Hansen, 2001). The reasons for doubting the unification were understandable
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because for twenty years between South Yemen’s independence in 1967 and unity negotiations
there were border wars between the two countries in the years of 1972 and 1979. Negotiations
were sped up in 1989; this was boosted by Saleh’s surprise visit to Aden and agreement was reached
that the two countries should unify within the next year (Dunbar, 1992).
Political Programme
Islah’s first political programme was published in 1990. In it they recognised that after the successful
revolutions in both countries against on the one hand imperialist occupation and the other a tyrant
monarch, there will be challenges. The North of Yemen saw a war between royalists of the
Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen and factions of the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962 to 1970.The
war began with a coup that led Imam Al-Badr being dethroned by republican forces led by Abdullah
Al-Sallal. He later declared a republic under his presidency. The South of Yemen was tied to Britain as
a colony from 1937. In 1963 two nationalist groups belonging to the south, the Front for the
Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front began an armed struggle in
late 1963 against British control and by 1967 Southern Yemen became independent as the People’s
Republic of South Yemen. This led to the Islah party in recognising the importance of protecting the
unification and not letting anyone deviate to either royalist groups in the north or under British
influence in the South. The political programme highlights their aims that would be required after
the unification process. Amongst these were the following:
Protection of the united homeland and removal of remaining signs of divisions.
Strengthening of the modern state and developing the new political experiment which is
based on Shura and democracy and a multi-party system.
(Yemeni Islah Party, 2009)
The program made led the voter to believe that these aims and objectives were for their own
benefit. This is an excellent usage of contentious framing which is deliberately constructed. As
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highlighted by Tarrow, David Snow argued that social movements are deeply involved in work of
“naming” grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of
meanings that would resonate with populations cultural predispositions (Tarrow, 2003).
The creation of the Islah party was seen by some members as a continuation of the modern state
which achieved unification through dialogue and interaction. So they believed that the Islamic
movement’s Islah was created via a framework of reform for all those who seek to put forward their
ideas and visions to better the current state guided by an Islamic faith. The Islah party understood
that with the newly unified country in place there would be a hard and challenging road ahead.
However these potential stumbling blocks would not be overcome in a short period of time and
through minor corrections and measures but a wholesome effort from the wider population.
According to the Islah party this will include the participation of both social and political forces
through a programme based on justice, law and order. They put forward plans of reforms and
development which represented their vision of a future state based on Islam as a faith and Sharia as
the law and guidance to governing life in Yemen. With this they took into account the realities
around them to bring about reforms in the most balanced methods possible. Islah’s willingness to
move with the times and taking into account the realities around them will result in a success if
measured against Tarrow’s strategic framing question. She asks how a movement’s fixed symbols
would be enough for future mobilization. Islah’s reply to that would be to move with the times in
order for their movement to be functional in a different context from the one it was created in.
Islah’s message would not be applied in its original form for every context like a holy scripture as
Tarrow assumed. But it would be more like the Marxist theme. The Marxist movement altered its
revolutionary plan as a result of adapting to it ever changing conditions. They pointed out that the
following reforms they put forward will be achieved through the participation in a ruling government
or by an opposition role (Islah Political Program, 1991). Thus by pointing out these methods they
provide an insight into their willingness to work with a wide range of actors, be it in the ruling party
or very small independent groups.
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Principles of Political Programme:
The program includes the following principles that will work as the framework for the reforms they
put forward to the public.
1. Islam as a belief and life governing law (Sharia). The first principle in the programme is Islam,
which shows just how important the role of faith is within their party.
“For Islam is God’s eternal religion, in which Yemeni people believe, permitting what
it permits, forbidding what it forbids, obeying its orders, accepting its guidance and
seek its judgment in their disputes and use it as the basis from which to resolve their
problems.”
(Islah Political Program, 1991)
This illustrates the strong level of religious belief within the Islah party.
2. Justice is the second principle the political programme adheres to. The significance of this
principle is supported by a religious belief that God had sent messengers and scriptures so
that people can be governed with justice. The Islah Political Program (1991) states “Through
justice, balance can be achieved between the rights of individuals and groups.” The rights of
a citizen are highlighted in this principle. It points how they intend to guarantee that the
state and its institutions do not turn against the interests of the citizen.
3. Liberty and Freedom is the third principle. They once again place the importance of religion
in having liberty and freedom in society. The Islah party feel that it is their religious
obligation to provide the most liberal way of life for the people of Yemen. For instance
freedom to oppose the ruling elite. Unlike other parties who do not place any religious basis
as to why they will provide a liberal and free way of life for their citizens. By not placing any
religious importance to liberty then it is not certain they will provide this promise. The Islah
party believe that God created people with a free will. In Islam it is recognised that by
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disallowing a person their freedoms it is going against God’s will. Human rights are given its
due importance within their political and social programs. This is further illustrated when
they state three things that they will implement:
Deepen the awareness of the importance of freedoms.
Monitoring of the activities of the authorities so it becomes an important guarantor
for the protection of the rights of citizens.
Have political means in place to guarantee the freedom of citizens according to the
rules of Islam.
4. Equality is the fourth principle they wish to protect amongst members of society. A promise
is made to work hard to strengthen this principle and that differences such as sex, colour
and social status are not recognised. This principle is once again based on Islamic faith and
that all humans are equal in Islam.
5. Shura is the fifth principle they wish to implement. It is based on the belief of general vice-
regency which is the basis of individual responsibility and means of participation in
governing Yemen by the whole of Yemen. And also for the right of the people to govern
themselves by determining their own affairs and to hold their rulers accountable for any
successes or failures of their actions. The Islah Political Program (1991) backs Shura by
employing Islam, “Shura is a religious duty that must be fulfilled first and foremost.”
Framing of contention
After mentioning the core principles of Islah’s programme there is now a clearer picture on the how
their reforms would be achieved. The majority of the principles they drew attention to all had one
identical element fixed onto them. An element that every, or the majority of Yemenis could relate to
and would support. The vital element is Islam. The employment of Islam as the basis of their vision
and backbone places a unique relationship between the public and the party.
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It is clear from the beginning that implementation of Islam as the base of the party’s thinking would
attract a significant amount of support from the Yemeni public. It can be argued that Islam is the
most dominant factor when it comes to reacting politically and supporting a particular party or
policy. This is because of the significant Islam holds in the Yemeni public’s lives. The tribal factor
intertwines with the Islamic aspect. Yemen is made up of various tribes and villages who could be
labelled as conservative and religious simultaneously especially in the northern parts of Yemen.
Most Yemenis belong to a tribe. The importance of tribes within Yemeni society was highlighted in
an interview with President Saleh when asked if the role of tribes was affecting the state, Egel (2009)
cites Saleh “The state is part of the tribes and our people are a collection of tribes.”
In order to fully analyse Islah’s participation in politics it is important to take into account the tribal
character of Yemeni society. Yemen’s tribes hold an overwhelming influence on the running of the
country. They can drop all support of a candidate if it will stand them in a better position as a tribe,
so all affiliations are created on the basis that it would help their tribe or tribal leader in some way.
The patronage system has been something that a lot of political commentators talk about when
describing Yemen’s political system. The creation of such a system according to some analysts is to
keep tribes happy by ways of proving incentives in exchange for political compliances (Phillips,
2010). Some tribes and tribal leaders are important and have a certain amount of power and some
are not so strong. Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar, the chief of the Hashid tribe was until his death widely
recognised as the second most powerful person in Yemen after the President. This illustrates the
point that tribes play an important part on a social and political level.
Therefore the tribal and Islamic factors have helped Islah garner lots of support. It could be argued
that the Islah party is truly using Islam as the basis of their reforms because of the party’s belief and
sense of responsibility towards drawing the people of Yemen closer to God. It can be said that the
Islah party have been lucky they have that ‘card’ to play when it comes to gaining support from the
public.
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Or it can also be argued that the Islah party are merely employing Islam as a means to gain the most
amounts of votes and public confidence, and not really whole heartedly believing what they preach.
This would be a sceptic’s point of view but it is a possibility that cannot be dismissed because of the
riches people can gain from having a powerful support base. Islah’s usage of particular rhetoric or
symbols would intertwine with the social movement theory’s pillar of framing contentions.
“The one dilemma of social movements is to mediate between inherited symbols that are
familiar but lead to passivity, and new ones that are electrifying which may be unfamiliar.”
(Tarrow, 2003: p.106)
Islah’s framing of Islam can be argued to be a blend of both symbols, the inherited and new. Islam
plays a big part in ordinary people’s lives in Yemen, so it could be called an inherited symbol.
However the usage of Islam in politics is a new thing to the people of Yemen, which may or may not
result in being unfamiliar with the public. This is dilemma the Islah party has and a dilemma they
don’t mind having by the looks of it.
Prominent/Key Players
The need to introduce these key players is important to understand why the Islah party chooses
certain positions. They play an important role in the direction the Islah party decides to move
towards.
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar and his family have played an important role in Yemen since mid 1950.
His father Sheikh Hussein bin Nasser Al-Ahmar was the chief of the Hashid tribal confederation until
the late 1950’s when he was executed by the Imamate for attempting to topple Imam Ahmed.
Sheikh Al-Ahmar’s importance was recognised when he was elected to chair of the National Council
for Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). On the establishment of the Consultative Council in 1979,
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein Al-Ahmar was elected a member thereof and he was also appointed as
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member of the Permanent Committee of People General Congress (PGC) since its establishment in
1982 until Reunification in 1990 (Al-Ahmar, 2007).
He was elected speaker of the parliament four consecutive times from 1993 through to 2007 when
he died of cancer (Hamzawy, 2009). He was a part of Saleh’s congress party until his decision to
create Al-Islah party in 1990. Most of Islah’s power and success comes down to Sheikh Al-Ahmar’s
influence in Yemeni political circles and his strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and Saleh. His links
with the Saudi kingdom were available for everyone to witness when Saleh entrusted him with the
responsibility of sorting the border problems between the two neighbours. The signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding made on 22nd February 1995 opened the way for the re-
normalization of relations between Republic of Yemen and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia leading to
signing of the Borders Agreement on 13th June 2000 (Al-Ahmar, 2007). He was widely known to
support Saleh even after establishing Islah; this was illustrated when he supported Saleh in the 1997
elections. The late Al-Ahmar was a popular figure between all parts of the political and tribal
systems.
“It is rare to find a figure capable of uniting parties like that; evidence of this was
demonstrated through his funeral procession which was attended by approximately one
million citizens.”
(Madayash, 2008)
Sheikh Abdulmajid Al-Zandani is the founder of the Iman University in Yemen, and founder of the
global Body for Miracles in the Quran and Sunnah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Until 2007, he headed
Islah’s Shura Council and also one of the most important founders of the Muslim Brotherhood
Yemen branch which makes up an essential component of the Islah party. He took over educational
affairs in 1983 when he was appointed as the Minister of Education. It was under his leadership,
along with the support from President Saleh and Sheikh Al-Ahmar that scientific institutes began
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spreading across North Yemen as a counterbalance to the Marxist ideology that was being taught in
the South of Yemen. Some of his work was published and used as part of the national curriculum for
secondary schools. He was appointed to the Presidency Council after the 1993 elections. Zindani has
an excellent position in the hearts of the Yemenis in the north of the country especially those who
live in tribal areas. Although there are those who do warm towards Zindani’s political views, they
simultaneously acknowledge his power and influence within the Yemeni community. Member of
Parliament, Shawki Al-Qahidi, disagrees with many of the Sheikhs views but backs his strong
influence and says it is impossible to refute. The MP goes as far to claim that many Yemenis favoured
Zindani as a possible president more than Saleh (Murdoch, 2010).
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Chapter Two
In the social movement theory, one key element of the political opportunity structure is the shifting
of alliances in accordance with the opportunities that arise from political liberalization. Equally
broader power struggles also structure political opportunities and result in impacting the role Islah
plays within the Yemeni political arena. The Islah Party has switched sides during its spell in politics,
moving from an ally of the ruling party, the General People’s Congress, to an opposition party. This
shifting of alliances is a perfect example of social movement theory’s core principle of shifting
alliances in order for political opportunities to arise.
The 1993 elections were recognized by the wider international community as a stepping stone
towards more pluralistic governance. However attitudes amongst all Yemenis did not mirror those of
the international community. The openings for political opportunities were vastly seen prior to the
elections. This came in the mode of bargaining parliamentary seats between the big three parties,
the Yemeni Socialist Party, the GPC and Islah. These agreements were carried out by withdrawing a
candidate from one party in favour of another candidate from another party.
This illustrates the point of benefiting from a political opportunity that arises. So what structured the
political opportunities was a power struggle between the three parties, which in turn impacts the
role the Islah party plays in the political arena.
The Islah party fielded 196 candidates to run in the 1993 parliamentary elections, of them 63 won
their respective constituencies (Saba News, 2011). This was a surprising result given that they were
competing with two parties that were previously the ruling party’s of the South and North Yemen.
Islah took second place and 20% of the total votes. This result was followed by the creation of a
coalition which included the GPC and YSP. The coalition only lasted a year as a result of the 1994 civil
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war between the previous North and South Yemen’s. The GPC and Islah continued the coalition until
the next parliamentary elections in 1997.
The first stage of opposition was between 1990 and 1993. This opposition was not directed towards
any party or individual but the policies that were in motion. Islah did not have a significant bloc of
representatives in parliament (twenty members). Its mode of gathering support for its reform was
through a social means. Public gatherings that included speeches, protests, and other peaceful
means were used to conjure up support and pressure the government to listen to and act (Al-
Maqrimi, 1998).
One of the first issues to be contended by the Islah party was the desire of altering the constitution.
The unification of Yemen was on the basis of a constitution which stated that Sharia was the
principle source of law. After the unification the YSP was calling for a change in the source of law and
make it more secular.
A founder of Islah was quoted: “felt it was necessary to call for the constitution to be an
Islamic constitution because the Yemeni population is Muslim”.
(Founder of Islah, 2011)
This demand was refused by both parties, so the Islah party organised the a million man march on 11
May 1991. The people did not leave the presidential house until they were promised that the
amendment of the constitution will state that Sharia will be the sole source of law. They asked the
government to provide grants for the 850,000 Yemenis that were expelled from the Gulf States as a
result of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support of Iraq in invading Kuwait.
The Islah Party mobilised public opinion through methods such as seminars, political and intellectual
debates. Part of framing contentions, is the methods used to deliberately spread the views of a
social actor among parts of a population (Tarrow, 2003). Consensus mobilization is a way of
competing with other organisations and the government. Islah organised public events to expand
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their visibility and preparation for the 1993 elections. They held a series of conferences that would
be organised around issues that were a priority like the amendment of the constitution. On the 27-
30th December leaders organised a conference called - Unity and Peace (Schwedler, 2006).
Whilst Islah were eager to challenge the ruling party and place their stamp on the political scene,
they were simultaneously cautious in the way they conducted themselves. Even though Yemen had
entered a new liberalised era in terms of free press and opposition parties being legalised, the Islah
party were not about to let this opportunity be the reason for their demise. Senior members of the
Islah party were worried that the GPC would call for a state of emergency on the country if Islah
were gaining more support than expected or if Islah was acting in an aggressive or forceful manner
towards the ruling party (Philips, 2007). So a more cautious approach was applied to Islah’s methods
of acting as an opposition party. This cautious approach was thought to be only temporary approach
until Islah believed they had strong enough support with other elements of the political arena and
with the Yemeni public.
This method of doing things in the Islah party represented a dilemma. It holds dangers towards their
position as movement and opposition. The Yemeni public could label them as weak and not ready to
go against Saleh and his ruling party. According to some social movement theorists a major dilemma
for movements or parties is the mediation between inherited symbols that are within the limits
which they find themselves placed under or new symbols that are “electrifying” but may be too
unfamiliar to lead to action (Tarrow, 2003). But in Yemen’s case electrifying the public would not be
a problem as much as it would be to the government. So the problem with using inherited symbols,
in this case the non-usage of aggressive or forceful tactics, is the danger that they may lead to
passivity from the public. Moreover the problem of using new symbols is that they may be too
unfamiliar for the government at accept and thus produce a kind of snap reflex response which
would subsequently damage the Islah party.
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The leader of the Islah party was quoted as saying
“President Saleh could call a state of emergency and dissolve Islah, other political parties
and the parliament, and arrest thousands of Islahis... Right now we are pushing for progress
but we avoid the more sensitive issues.”
(Al-Yadoumi cited by Phillips, 2007)
So it would be counterproductive for Islah to politically demand reforms that were a threat to the
regime because if there were a state of emergency there were would be more chaos. Although some
Islahis have recognized this as a stumbling block that can ultimately damage their standing with the
Yemeni public, they have been put-off demanding huge changes too assertively for fear of losing
ground gained since their participation in 1990. Therefore although they might have the public’s
interest in mind when they champion reforms they perceive it as counterproductive at such an early
stage of their existence. Islah’s 1993 election manifesto mirrors prior analysis of how they side-
stepped the more important issues.
Brian Whitaker (2009) wrote in his book, The Birth of Modern Yemen, that there were strong
similarities in all of three major parties policies. This backs the earlier claim that it becomes a
dilemma for a movement to use new symbols because of the certain restrictions placed upon them
as a party.
“Islah focused on ‘restoring’ Islam to a central position in Yemen society but presented its
case with a subtlety that appeared progressive rather than reactionary or revolutionary.”
Judged by the election manifestos, there was a substantial degree of unanimity on policy particularly
in the fields of health, education, decentralisation of government and civil rights. A comparison of
policies (Whitaker, 2009) is show in below in table format (Figure 1).
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Figure 1
GPC YSP Islah
Basic principles:
Loyalty to God, homeland and the republican revolution.
Basic principles:
Strengthen national unity and democracy; bring about social justice.
Basic principles:
Islam is a system which directs all aspects of life. Committed to the republican system.
Unity and democracy:
Protection of unity and de-mocracy based on the multi-party system.
Unity and democracy:
Strengthen national unity and democracy.
Unification of armed forces is an urgent task.
Unity and democracy:
Oppose all divisive factors, so as to preserve national unity.
Support “peaceful alternation of power through the ballot box”.
Strengthen parliament: “The reform of the country’s constitution will not take place until parliament becomes an effective instrument.”
Religion:
Party adheres to Islam as a faith and a Sharia law.
Religion:
Establish Islamic university.
Religion:
Sharia should be the source of all legislation.
Close Aden brewery, which is “a challenge to God’s law”.
Health:
Invest in health care.
Health:
Improve training and living standard of health workers.
Involve local councils in management of health services; allow private investment in health sector.
Health:
Improve health sector generally.
Better distribution of hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country.
Private investment in hospitals.
Education:
Expand education.
Help mosques to fulfil their educational role.
Education:
Continue free schooling.
Higher education: establish Islamic university; speed up construction of Ta’izz and Hadramaut universities.
Education:
Establish scientific institutes and schools for Qur’anic learning.
Broader educational opportunities for women.
Civil rights:
Guarantee the right of op-position, the right of expression in its different forms.
Civil rights:
Respect freedom of opinion, right to free association, public demonstration and the right to
Civil rights:
Support a free press, free from all outside influence. Media must play their role in “developing the
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Adhere to the constitution, constitutional legitimacy, and the peaceful transfer of power.
strike.
Guarantee the rights of women.
people’s conscience”, making them more responsible, in promoting trust between government and governed.
Devolution:
Reform local government and introduce the electoral principle.
Devolution:
“Local authority [devolved power] is the essential basis of democracy”.
Devolution:
Support decentralisation.
Women:
Guarantee rights of women under the Qur’an and the constitution.
Women:
Guarantee the rights of women.
Women:
Protect women from exploitation.
Broader educational opportunities for women.
Corruption:
Reform administrative bodies to end corruption.
Corruption:
War on corruption: “the root cause of all our ills”.
Corruption:
All-out struggle against financial and administrative corruption.
There are certain issues that show the Islah party is different from other parties because of their
Islamic position. The issue of women was only tackled to a certain extent compared to the GPC and
YSP. The level of moderation is still low in terms of the universal level of women’s rights. This is
because of their lack of integration with other parties particularly the YSP who hold a clearer policy
on women’s rights. This should change according to the inclusion moderation hypothesis which
concludes that the more a party delves into party politics the more moderate they become.
The framing of contentions in the 1993 election program was used to good effect. The introduction
points out that all the positions it holds is ultimately down to the belief that it is their Islamic duty to
implement them. By pointing out that it is their religious responsibility to carry out these policies it
indicates to the electorate that their intentions are genuine and are not for any selfish purposes.
Contentious framing is generally used to frame a movement’s or party’s policies in ways that will
attract the most followers and build on present social networks. Islah framed the closure of the
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single brewery in Yemen as beneficial for them (the public). They do this by putting it in the middle
of the list of issues they are contending. Thus making it seem that the issue of the brewery holds the
same importance as amending the constitution and fighting corruption.
“When the Islah party hold a position on important domestic issues, like the issue of
amendment of the constitution, the issue of the closure of the brewery or the issue of wide
corruption, then we hold them on the basis of our Islamic belief.”
(Islah Political Program, 1991)
Elections 1993
The result of the 1993 elections altered the political landscape in Yemen. The Islah party had now
overtaken the YSP to become the second most popular party in Yemen. The YSP had slid to third
place behind Islah as shown in the chart below (Figure 2) provided by the US Agency for
International Development, (2008).
Source: USAID
This occurred even though the YSP had gained more seats in the North than Islah gained in the
South. The socialist party won 27% of its total seats in the northern governorates (15 out of 56). Its
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partner in government, the GPC, won less than 3% in the southern and eastern governorates (3 out
of 123) (Al-Bab website). The Islah party did not win a single seat in the south. Election results by
province provide a clearer picture of how each party performed in the south as shown in Figure 3
below produced by Al-Bab (2011). Mohammed Al-Maqrimi identifies the reason for this as being the
YSP’s rigorous election campaign in the south where they were the ruling party prior to unification.
Therefore it was a foregone conclusion that would win the majority of seats if not all of the seats in
the south (Al-Maqrimi, 1998).
Figure 3
Southern provinces GPC YSP Islah Other Indep. Total
Aden 0 8 0 0 3 11
Lahj 0 8 0 0 4 12
Abyan 1 7 0 0 0 8
Shabwah 1 5 0 0 0 6
Hadramawt 1 11 0 0 5 17
al-Maharah 0 2 0 0 0 2
Sub-total 3 41 0 0 12 56
Source: Al-Wahda al-Yamaniyya.
In addition to the above analysis another finding from the election results found that the
independent candidates’ success surpassed all expectations. A large number of those independents
are known to belong to one of the three major parties (GPC, YSP and Islah). Their candidature was
thus seen as either a political tactic or as a protest against their own parties which in the last minute
favoured other candidates. The reason for large parties allowing their candidates to run as
independents was so that they could attract voters they otherwise couldn’t. And if they succeed
then they would rejoin the party. This was a common trait used by all parties in Yemen.
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The leader of the Islah party recognised the fact that his party had achieved a political mile stone by
coming in second before the YSP.
“We are the sole party that plays a part in the government through the ballot boxes because
we held no influence prior to unification.”
(Al-Yadoumi cited by Al-Maqrimi, 1998: p.110)
After the elections, the five man presidential council was altered in order to reflect the election
results which meant including a member of the Islah party. Islah was eventually given a seat in
expense a GPC member, therefore altering the makeup of the council to be two GPC members’ two
YSP members and one Islah member. The reason for the GPC giving up one of its seats was because
everyone wanted to appease the southern members and protect the unity between the two sides.
A three way coalition was then created. The reason for the GPC in including the YSP as well as the
Islah party was because they could dictate their moves more easily as a result of the two parties not
being an opposition party. Saleh thought it would his rule would be safer if he had the two parties on
his side rather than against him. If he could play Islah and YSP against each other then he could
control both of them. In addition, by including Islah in the coalition it will create the most broadly
based government possible. This will help in dealing with a wide range of problems a single party
would not be able to achieve (Whitaker 1993).
Civil War
With the civil war of 1994 between south and north forces, a significant change occurred in terms of
elite-level alliances. The Islah party and GPC alliance who had obviously been a close ally to Saleh’s
GPC had altered in terms of constraints placed on them. This was explained by the YSP’s exclusion
from the political equation.
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The Islah party which was according to Whitaker (1994) “underrepresented in the previous
government but supported the president enthusiastically during the war, hoped to be rewarded with
an increase in political power.”
Their anticipation came into fruition when Saleh awarded many political positions that were
previously held by the YSP members to Islahi members. These included minister of justice, trade,
education, electricity and water and fisheries. The shallow appointments demonstrated how the GPC
were treating Islah and its members after the war. But nonetheless Islah were to work efficiently
with what they were given. They were pleased with the opportunity to effect change in the areas
considered to be of great importance (Schwedler, 2004). Post civil war saw a number of constitution
alterations that were previously blocked by the YSP. The closeness witnessed between the GPC and
Islah after the civil war was highlighted at the Islah general conference on September 1994.
“During the past period, we have strengthened our relationship with General People’s
Congress, which we share many common dominators with and found a good relationship
between the two parties, where we were able to come to agreements on a number of issues
and have overcome a lot of negative issues.”
(Islah Party Conference, 1994)
An interesting point made by Schwedler is that most of the ministerial posts given to Islah were filled
by widely recognised moderates within the party.
“The selection of moderates to fill ministerial positions is meaningful because it suggests
that the leadership realized that to maximise the party’s influence, Islah needed to present
moderate ministers would receive wide government support as well as popular expectance.”
(Schwedler, 2004: p.219)
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This fits into the social movement framework of representation by maximising political opportunities
by preserving their ties to the highest level of power. Mohammed Al-Yadoumi was adamant that the
Islah party will not be a mere part of the coalition that it’s only purpose would be to point out the
wrongs like an opposition party would do. He felt strongly about actually moving forward and taking
part in implementing Islah’s visions for reforms (Al-Maqrimi, 1998). One of these reforms was to
challenge corruption within government institutions. Their stubbornness and eagerness in
challenging the GPC on these high level issues hit a raw nerve and maybe was the ultimate reason
behind Islah’s decline as a political power from the period 1994-1997.
Now that the YSP hold no danger to the GPC’s position in power, the need of a third party ( Islah) to
challenge the YSP was no longer a priority for the GPC (Schwedler, 2004). Disagreements arose
between the two parties (Islah and GPC) on certain issues such as the economy and corruption
which ultimately led Islah coming to terms with their position within the government. After
evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of acting as a coalition party they decided they would
no longer act a partner in government but as opposition party. This was down to the realisation that
they were no longer able to implement their visions whilst in government. Another thing that led
them to this decision was realisation that the GPC were aiming to win a majority of seats in the 1997
parliamentary elections therefore no longer wanting to work alongside Islah (Schwedler, 2006).
Other reasons for opposing the GPC leading up to the 1997 elections were the finding out of voting
irregularities, disputes between GPC and Islah members on the issue of high level corruption, not
being allowed to carry out work to the highest of standards due to restrictions placed on their
members, annoyance of being contentiously labelled Islamist.
In addition the ministries under Islah control were not able to be reformed for a number of reasons
one being the inability to overhaul the staff even though many of them did not turn up to work.
These ministries were filled with staff chosen by the GPC as a result of the patronage system that
was in place (Schwedler, 2004). This claim was to be backed by Al-Ahmar (2009) when he claimed
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that all the ministries are filled and run by “Saleh’s people.” Several ministries, such as the one
Abdul-Rahman Bafadl had Supply and Trade, argued about the rate at which currency was
transferred between ministries. According to an interview conducted by Schwedler (2004) with
Bafadl, he was pressured into accepting inflated currency rates and was not free to explore
alternative means of exchange.
The dissatisfaction with GPC’s attempts to halt Islah’s efforts in fighting corruption and inability to
run their designated ministries in a way they believed would help Yemen resulted in several Islah
ministers resigning their posts. They included Mohammed Al-Jubari of Supply and Trade, his
successor Mohammed Al-Afandi resigned later in 1995. Abdullah Al-Akwa, minister of water and
electricity. These Islahi ministers were later replaced by the GPC. So it seems as though the GPC
intentionally pushed them out of their positions by placing restrictions on their work. Another
reason as to why Islah were fed up with the GPC was their constant labelling of their moves as
Islamist. This was alleged to mobilise support against Islah coming up to the elections.
All these reasons led to the Islah holding discussions with Yemen’s first opposition coalition,
Supreme Coordination Council for Opposition (Khaled, 2008). Interestingly the YSP was the leading
party within this council. The discussion between the YSP and Islah came as a surprise to everyone
who has followed the Yemen since its unification. The discussions between these two political
nemeses were a complete turnaround in their relationship. Only a couple of years prior to this
milestone both parties were at each other’s throats in the civil war. So it provided a turning point in
terms of the strained relationship they had. Nevertheless they ultimately believed that by coming to
some sort of agreement before the election they would worry the GPC and subsequently listen to
other voices in the political arena. Islah at the time believed that by the GPC planning to win a
majority of seats in the upcoming elections they would be jeopardizing the democratic platform the
unification was based on and thus drive Yemen backwards and not forward. In an interview with
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Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar (BBC, 2001) described his party’s relationship with the YSP and other
opposition parties as “co-ordination to prompt the government to return to the democratic path.”
Islah’s realisation of their swindling power in the government was the basis of their decision to hold
discussions with the opposition parties. The switching of alliances to gain the maximum political
opportunities was Islah’s aim which illustrates one of the social movement theory’s core pillars. The
joining of the two parties that were for years at odds with each other as a result of their clashing
ideologies exemplifies the benefits of switching of alliance in order to gain the maximum political
opportunities. There is no other occasion in Yemen’s political history where this type of thing
happens. Islah had realised that with the YSP’s support base in the south and their support in the
north they could be a power worth putting their history behind them (Schwedler, 2004).
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Chapter Three
William Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld wrote in 1993 that social movements rely on the media to
mobilise political support and legitimise the mainstream discourse (Barker, 2008). The official Yemen
television channels are run by the government. The media controlled by the government such as
Yemen TV, Aden TV, Sabaa TV, Al-Saeeda are not neutral bystanders when framing Islah’s events. So
Islah recognised that these media outlets would not portray their actions in a fair way and even if
they did the coverage will fade or the coverage will focus on certain negative aspects of Islah’s
actions.
So Islah recognised the need to counter GPC’s control of the media in Yemen in order for them to
get on a fairer playing field. This problem was fixed by setting up a television channel vaguely
dedicated to the Islah party. Suhail TV was founded and funded by Hameed Al-Ahmar, one of the
wealthy businessmen in Islah. The channel has been airing since 2009 but was forced to shut down
by the government because of legality reasons. Since then it has been airing from secret locations.
The media plays a vital part in Islah’s efforts of mobilising support and spreading a set agenda to as
many people as possible. Another media outlet that backs Islah is the weekly newspaper Al-Sahwa,
who until recently Mohammed Al-Yadoumi was its editor. Al-Sahwa has been running for more than
two decades supporting the Muslim Brotherhood cause in Yemen. To illustrate the importance of
these two media outlets to Islah’s cause, the Yemeni military attacked there offices in the recent
uprising in 2011. The attacks came as a result of Islah’s backing and participation of the revolution.
Cooperation with Opposition bloc
The consequences of Islah party’s lack of cooperation, whilst in the coalition, with opposition parties
until the 1997 elections were being realised by members of party. In October 1996, Muhammad
Alawi, lamented Islah’s years of isolation from the opposition parties.
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“Lack of dialogue with other parties was a gross error. Islah has now taken an historical step
by talking to other parties... It is rumoured that Islah has started talking to the opposition for
political gains. I say this is not so.”
(Alawi cited by Schwedler, 2004: p.220)
These accusations were that the Islah party were only cooperating with the opposition for personal
gains which matches the social movement theory pillar of shifting alliances in order to gain
maximum opportunities.
The Islah party and SCCO signed an agreement on March 1997 work together to root out any
possible fraud in the elections. This agreement came to nothing after the YSP boycotted the
elections because they knew the GPC were going to win a majority by way of fraud. Nevertheless
this agreement was a stepping stone for bigger things to come out of this peculiar relationship. After
the 1997 elections, the results did not come as a surprise to Islah after the GPC’s desire to win a
majority. The GPC did obtain a majority share of the votes and thus able to form a government on
their own. The chart below provides a clearer picture of how the election results panned out (Figure
4).
Figure 4
Adaptation to other Forces
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Once Islah found out the election results and identified that they would no longer be needed by the
GPC to form a coalition government, they had no other choice but to move back to the opposition
camp. This shifting of alignments or “electoral realignments” as recognised by Sidney Tarrow (2003)
in opening opportunities is important. By shifting realignments towards the opposition bloc the Islah
Party would have to support a number of reforms and policies they would not otherwise support.
The difficulty in adapting to various other forces in the opposition was highlighted when Sheikh
Abdullah Al-Ahmar was asked why Islah had not formally joined the HCCO he responded by saying:
“The HCCO includes political parties that are close with each other in terms of thoughts,
attitudes and policy.”
(Al-Ahmar, 1998)
Islah’s willingness not to formally join up with the HCCO after the 1997 elections was a result of
them making a decision on whether they could still come to an agreement with the GPC. It was also
because they didn’t want to upset the GPC and face the potential consequences of going against the
party that technically provided them with the chance of forming the Islah party in the first place.
There was also a feeling that Islah was not yet ready to run for government and oppose Saleh
because of their limited recourses compared to the GPC’s recourses (Schwedler, 2006). This was
later backed by Islah’s inability to present a suitable candidate to run for presidency in the 1999
presidential elections and subsequently support Saleh’s candidacy.
The inability to officially join the opposition party bloc of the HCCO was maybe down to the
disagreements within in the party. Senior members were saying different things, Sheikh Al-Ahmar
was not comfortable with joining ideological rivals and another senior member was lamenting Islah’s
ignorance for not cooperating with the opposition parties sooner.
Sheila Carapico highlighted the negative aspects of Islah becoming an official opposition party when
she commented in 2003 that it was the 1997 elections that finally moved Islah into opposition and
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meant they were left powerless. The GPC now according to Carapico (2003) “easily rubber stamped
any government proposal including an extension of its own parliamentary term of office”. Islah was
offered no cabinet portfolios in the new government except for the re-election of speaker of
parliament Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar.
The Islah party were now officially an opposition party; something the Islah party was gracious in
embracing. Mohammed Al-Maqrimi (2008) considered the opposition as being the one of two wings
in the political system, and without the success and functionality of either wing, than the political
system cannot “fly high”. Moreover he points out that democracy cannot play its role without a true
functional opposition.
So seemingly the Islah party have approached the circumstances they find themselves in, the
isolation from the ruling party, with an open mind. The first chapter highlighted Islah’s promise to
function accordingly to their surroundings. This adaptation would eventually be mirrored in their
future standings on certain issues.
Part of political framing is the issue of keeping a fixed symbolism or having the content of the
movement interpreted according to the context in which they were contending in. So the
modification and appropriation of the Islah manifesto is important in being successful. Islah’s
position can be compared to the Marxist theme. The long wait for seizing the moment of capitalisms
collapse resulted in its adaptation to its existing condition such as the embracing of trade unionism
(Tarrow, 2003). So as argued by Tarrow, the symbols of action are not best read like a “text book”
which is independent of conditions in which they struggle in.
Strong cooperation with opposition
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By 2005 a complete break of relationship between the GPC and Islah occurred. This divide was
helped by Sheikh Al-Ahmar no longer being in the equation following his death. His support of Saleh
for patronage reasons was a sticking point in the Islah party’s intentions to move forward. Islah’s
acceptance of the YSP was also helped by the isolation of Sheikh Al-Zandani within the Islah party.
His hostility towards the YSP caused a difficulty in Islah joining the opposition sooner. By late 2005,
the Joint Meeting Parties platform was released for the 2006 presidential and local elections. The
JMP included the Islah party and the YSP. If anything this officially registered as a breakaway from
relationship with the ruling party and proved to the remaining sceptics that Islah was now at full
throttle opposing Saleh and his ruling party.
The JMP claimed the only option for them was a complete reform from top to bottom (JMP
Document, 2005). The document called for reform on the constitution, parliament, and judiciary.
The alliance’s greatest sign of unity was when the JMP announced that a southerner would run for
presidency. Faisal Bin Shamlan’s candidacy mirrored the JMP unity and support for each other.
Although Islah was the strongest party in the JMP they felt that by choosing someone from the south
it would strengthen the unification between the South and North of Yemen. Another reason could
be so that Islah party could be portrayed as a party that has move forward and become more
moderate to the extent they are willing to support a candidate from the former south. This could
also be done so they could attract maximum support in the South in the elections therefore
maximising their political opportunities.
Shamlan is widely recognised as man of the people for years. He is known for his efforts in fighting
corruption in the government. So by supporting a candidate that has previous history with fighting
corruption it will go hand in hand with Islah’s promises of fighting corruption. It becomes a logical
decision and one that would mean a lot to the voters.
Moderation
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Islam can be compatible with democracy but it does depend to what degree. The best answer would
be to say that there can be a compromise between Islam and democracy. One must also look at the
way that, theologically, Islam accommodates democracy. At a time, 1600 years ago, when the
concept of democracy was seen as madness, Islam was regulating that leaders should be selected
through a consultative process, or Shura. Therefore there is a clearly room for democracy and Islam
to be compatible and evidence can be seen in an oft-quoted verse of the Qur’an used in many infant
Muslim democracies parliament’s, ‘(those who conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation.’
The JMP document illustrated Islah’s new moderate theme by announcing that women would be
trained as candidates for the 2006 elections. The cooperation and engagement with a wide range of
forces would eventually lead to moderation or compromising of Islah’s agenda.
The first evidence to a portion of the election program dedicated to the role of women and their civil
rights was seen in the Joint Meeting Parties election program of 2006. This was the first time the
Islah party had formally run for elections under the JMP umbrella. So the integration with other
elements of the opposition had an impact on the party’s stand on things. The inclusion-moderation
hypothesis comes into play here. The narrowing of political opportunity for the Islah party, which
was caused by the 1997 election results, resulted in the widening engagement with other political
forces. Jillian Schwedler (2006) argues that it is not always the case that for a party to show
increasing levels moderation they would have to participate in “pluralistic processes per se, but from
engagement with multiple narratives.” According to this logic parties would cooperate with former
enemies when the incentives outweigh the disadvantages.
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Conclusion
The uprising in Yemen has been proved to be a window of opportunity for the Yemeni people to
demand a more democratic Yemen. They have called for an end to the totalitarian regime lead by
Saleh. The public’s disapproval of the direction Yemen is going towards has saw them take matter
into their own hands and sacrificed their lives for the betterment of Yemen. The JMP have
categorically declined any of Saleh’s offers to reform and have stood with the people of Yemen.
From the revolutions infancy Islah has organised mass rallies across Yemen.
To highlight how far Islah has moved forward from their early days in politics you only have to take
note of who has been the symbol of the revolution. That person belongs to the Islah party and also
this member of the Islah party who has rallied the Yemeni public to go call for the fall of the regime
is a woman. Tawakul Karman has for a half a decade called for an improvement in women’s rights in
Yemen. She has stages numerous protests demanding more rights for women and freedom for
journalists. She has been recognised for her work in Yemen by being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in October 2011.
The fact that a Yemeni woman from the Islah party has been awarded such as international
prestigious award can only highlight Islah’s development since 1990. They started out as an
opposition party in 1990 to 1993 then achieved success in the 1993 elections which resulted in them
becoming a coalition partner in government, followed by moving back to the opposition camp after
the 1997 elections and firmly becoming an opposition party following the disappointment of those
elections. In between the years 1997 and 2005 they were stuck in limbo between the oppositional
forces and the ruling force. Those were the years when Islah were trying to figure out which
direction they willing to take. They held numerous discussions and negotiations with both sides and
weighing up which option would be the most beneficial to them in terms of political opportunities.
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This uncertainty was also down the complicated relationship between them and the GPC. A
relationship that had numerous edges and dimensions associated to it which made it difficult for
them to firmly be independent. It is widely understood that in Yemen personal alliances outweigh
political alliances so Sheikh Al-Ahmar’s and Sheikh Al-Zandani’s close relationship with Saleh added a
complex dimension to Islah’s relationship with the GPC.
Political opportunities have widened and narrowed between 1990 and now, which subsequently
dictated Islah’s positions and actions throughout this time. They have held certain positions
depending on what they thought would bring the maximum political opportunities. The integration
with opposition forces was a result of those narrowing political opportunities most notably after the
1997 election. This integration with other forces caused moderation in their policies. So Jillian
Schwedler’s comments were right when she said that it isn’t necessarily the inclusion of movements
within party politics that moderates their outlook but exclusion from elite alliance and the need to
cooperate with various forces in order to survive.
It can be said that throughout the twenty years Islah has been in politics, they have been through a
cycle and now they are close to achieving success. This has come via the revolution currently at its
later stages. If the revolution goes to plan Islah under the JMP will no longer play second fiddle with
the ruling elite but will be calling the shots.
They have waited under the tree for the apple to fall and now the apple has finally fallen.
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2. Al-Maqrami, M. A., 1998. Al-Tajammu al-Yamani li-l-Islah: al-Ruya wal Masar -Dirasa fi al-Nasha wa-l-Tatawwur. Sana’a, Dar-Alkutub, p. 23
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7. Tarrow, S., 2003. Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.107
8. Phillips, S., 2007. Evaluating Political Reform, Carnegie Papers. [Online] Available at:<www.carnegieEndowment.org/pubs. [Accessed on: 11 October 2011].
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15. Al-Maqrimi, M. A., 1998. Al-Tajammu al-Yamani li-l-Islah: al-Ruya wal Masar -Dirasa fi al-Nasha wa-l-Tatawwur. Sana’a, Dar-Alkutub, p.110
16. Whitaker, B., 1993. Three party coalition. Middle East International, June, p.13
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18. Schwedler, J., 2004. The Islah Party in Yemen. In: Q. Wiktorowicz, ed. 2004. Islamic Activism, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p.218
19. The Yemeni Congregation for Reform. 1994. Islah General Conference. [online] Yemeni Congregation for Reform.
Available at: < http://www.al-islah.net/details.aspx?pageid=406&pagename=com> [Accessed 23 October 2011]. 20. Schwedler, J., 2004. The Islah Party in Yemen. In: Q. Wiktorowicz, ed. 2004. Islamic Activism, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, p.219
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22. Schwedler, J., 2004. The Islah Party in Yemen. In: Q. Wiktorowicz, ed. 2004. Islamic Activism, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p.218
23. Schwedler, J., 2006. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.113
24. Schwedler, J., 2004. The Islah Party in Yemen. In: Q. Wiktorowicz, ed. 2004. Islamic Activism, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p.218
25. Al-Ahmar, H., 2009. Bilaa Hadood Interviewed by... Lonah Al-Shabal [TV] Al-Jazeera, 5 August 2009.
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University Press, p.218
Chapter 3
1. Barker, M., 2008, Mass Media and Social Movements. Global Research, [online] 22 April. Available at: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8761> [Accessed 1 November 2011]
2. Schwedler, J., 2004. The Islah Party in Yemen. In: Q. Wiktorowicz, ed. 2004. Islamic Activism, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p.220
3. Tarrow, S., 2003. Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.78
4. British Broadcasting Cooperation interview, July 1998.
5. Schwedler, J., 2006. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.190
6. Carapico, S., 2003. How Yemen’s ruling party secured an electoral landslide, Middle East Research and Information Project, [online] Available at:< http://www.merip.org/mero/mero051603> [Accessed 22 November 2011].
7. Al-Maqrimi, M. A., 1998. Al-Tajammu al-Yamani li-l-Islah: al-Ruya wal Masar -Dirasa fi al-Nasha wa-l-Tatawwur. Sana’a, Dar-Alkutub, p.164
8. Tarrow, S., 2003. Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.108
9. Joint Meeting Parties Document on National and Political Reform.10. Schwedler, J., 2006. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, p.147
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