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Joe Cocker, Independent Overview Report Author
PUBLISHED ON 6TH MARCH 2012
SeriousCaseReview
Child K
Statutory review, undertaken on behalf of
the Leeds Safeguarding Children Board, of
professional practice and interagency
cooperation prior to and following the
murder of Child K
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
Child K was murdered inside the family home. The Perpetrator was a registered sex
offender with a significant history of sexual violence. He was living two doors away
from the family.
Child K had been in the UK for approximately 5 weeks. The family returned to Poland
shortly after her murder.
In 2007, the Leeds Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) commissioned a Serious Case
Review (SCR) from the Leeds Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangement Strategic
Management Board to look at the effectiveness of interagency working in this case.
The report was accepted by the LSCB and later submitted to the Office for Standards
in Education (Ofsted) for evaluation. However, it was assessed that the review did
not comply with the statutory guidance governing the conduct of Serious Case
Reviews.
In April 2009, the LSCB agreed terms of reference for this Serious Case Review
leading to the convening of a Serious Case Panel and commissioning of an
Independent Chair and Overview Author.
This Serious Case Review was commissioned in accordance with regulation 5(2) (a)
and (b) (ii) of The Local Safeguarding Children Boards Regulations 2006 which came
into effect on 1 April 2006. Guidance issued in Chapter 8 of “Working Together to
Safeguard Children” (HM Government 2006) has been followed. The Board accepted
the review on 17 December 2010.
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TERMS OF REFERENCE
INDEPENDENT AUTHOR/THE OVERVIEW PANEL
The Overview Panel comprised members of the LSCB standing Serious Cases Review
Panel and representatives of Agencies involved in the case.
Agencies represented:
Children & Young People’s Social Care, Leeds City Council
Education Leeds
Environments and Neighbourhoods, Leeds City Council
Foundation Housing
HM Prison Service National Offender Management Service
Humberside Police
National Probation Service – Humberside
National Probation Service – West Yorkshire
NHS Leeds
Shelter
Stonham
West Yorkshire Police
NSPCC
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The terms of reference for this Serious Case Review were considered by the Standing
SCR Panel of the LSCB and by the Independent Chair of LSCB. They addressed both
the time period to be covered by the SCR and the issues to be considered.
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The period to be covered by the SCR was to be from when Child K’s father
arrived in the country, until the family’s departure from the UK after her
death.
Agencies which provided Individual Management Reviews for the first review
were requested to provide a new review and chronology, covering the new
time period, addressing these terms of reference and the agency specific
issues raised by Ofsted.
The Terms of reference for Individual Management Reviews were based on
Working Together 2006 (8.26) plus consideration of issues specific to this
case:
The adequacy of the protection provided to this family from the presence
of a known sexual / violent offender in their immediate community.
The practical help/assistance that was offered to the family (including any
emotional and psychological support services).
The communication that took place between agencies and whether child
protection procedures were implemented.
Attention was drawn to the recommendations from ‘Learning lessons, taking
action: Ofsted’s evaluations of serious case reviews 01/04/07 – 31/03/08 that
agencies completing individual management reviews should:
o Include information within their chronologies about when the child
was seen and details of that meeting.
o Explicitly address issues of race, language, culture, religion and
disability.
o Focus more attention on why procedures were not followed, as well
as identifying what procedures had not been followed or were
lacking.
The Terms of reference for the Independent Overview Report were based on
Working Together 2006 (8.28):
To construct a comprehensive chronology of involvement by the
agencies and professionals in contact with the child and family.
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To prepare an overview that summarises relevant information known
to the agencies and professionals involved about the child and family
circumstances.
To incorporate lessons identified from the serious case review
undertaken by the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangement
(MAPPA) which focused on the post release management of the
Perpetrator subsequently convicted of the murder of Child K.
To consider how best to obtain and include the views of surviving
family members.
To identify whether, with the benefit of hindsight, the death of Child K
was in any way preventable.
To provide a summary of lessons to be learnt from the case and to
identify recommendations based on the Individual Agency reviews.
To provide comment on the adequacy of the individual reviews
provided by participating agencies.
MANAGEMENT REPORTS
Management reports and chronologies were requested from agencies involved with
family of Child K. The authors were independent of the operational management of
the case.
COMPLETION OF THE SERIOUS CASE REVIEW
The LSCB have been in consultation with Regional Government Office about the
timescale for completing this SCR.
The LSCB has accepted the SCR overview report, an executive summary has been
prepared and each agency affected was required to prepare an action plan to ensure
implementation of the overview report recommendations. LSCB Performance
Management sub group will monitor the composite action plan.
AUTHOR
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Joe Cocker is an independent social work consultant and has chaired and authored
Serious Case Reviews for Local Safeguarding Children Boards.
Mr Cocker has been employed as a Safeguarding Children Board Business Manager
since 2003 and has no current professional interests with the Leeds Safeguarding
Children Board or any of the constituent agencies.
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1. CHILD K’S FAMILY
1.1. Very little is known of Child K’s family history other than that the family
are Polish nationals and that her father, a computer software engineer in
Poland, came to work in the UK. After initially moving to the Castleford
area in 2006 he relocated into a two‐bedroom property rented from a
private landlord in Leeds and was later joined in Leeds by his wife, (a
physiotherapist), daughter Child K and 10 year old son.
1.2. Prior to Child K’s murder the only contact between the family and relevant
agencies related to applications for the children to attend local schools.
1.3. Applications were made by Child K’s parents for the children to attend
local schools. Child K accompanied her parents and brother to visit her
brother’s school. She was later described by the head teacher as ‘chatty’.
Child K’s brother was successful in his application to attend a local junior
school. However, Child K’s application, whilst being accepted for a place at
a secondary school, was put on hold due to requests from a high number
of children to the school who did not have English as their first language.
1.4. Child K’s brother attended his first day at an English school on the day of
his sister’s murder.
1.5. It is understood that following Child K’s murder offers were made to the
family for the organisation of support from the Polish community
although the offer was declined. Crisis support was offered by the health
service and was accepted.
1.6. The family returned to Poland shortly after the murder.
1.7. The parents’ cooperation with the review was sought via a West Yorkshire
Police Family Liaison Officer. However, whilst there was an initial
agreement by them to contribute to the review subsequent
communications indicated that they did not wish to do so.
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2. THE PERPETRATOR
2.1. The Perpetrator is a white British national.
2.2. He described his childhood to a psychiatrist in 1997 as ‘unhappy’. His
parents divorced when he was three years old and he was brought up by
his mother and stepfather from whom he witnessed domestic violence
with his mother frequently using physical punishment. He describes being
bullied at school and later expelled from his junior school before attending
a school for the deaf.
2.3. He suffers from a significant hearing impairment although from the
information available it is not possible to comment on the quality of
services or sensitivity shown towards his disability.
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3. SUMMARY
3.1. Child K (15), a Polish national, was raped and murdered at the family
home in Leeds in October 2007. Her parents discovered her body on their
return from a day seeking work. They were subsequently arrested on
suspicion of her murder. At the time of the parents’ arrest, Child K’s
brother was completing his first day at school in England. The parents
were released in the early hours of the following day after the arrest of
the Perpetrator, a neighbour and known violent sexual offender.
3.2. The Perpetrator had a long history of offending, with his offences being
primarily violent and sexual towards women. Between the age of 20 and
40 he received a total of 22 years custody. The Perpetrator was made
subject to a lifetime sex offender notification in 1998 after being convicted
of a violent indecent assault which was witnessed by the victim’s young
son.
3.3. In 1997, a psychiatrist at the request of his solicitor assessed the
Perpetrator. He was diagnosed with a Dissocial Personality Disorder, a
psychopathic disorder that predisposed him to antisocial behaviour
including violence.
3.4. Whilst he had not been convicted of an offence against a child, he had
previously been charged with a sexual offence against children having
being caught masturbating outside a children’s play area. His name was
placed on the Sex Offender Register in 2004.
3.5. The Perpetrator was released from Prison in November 2006, from
outside the Leeds area, eleven months before committing the murder of
Child K. He had completed a three‐year sentence for the serious assault of
a woman (he had originally been charged with rape). During his sentence
he had been released on licence on two occasions although he was
recalled on both due to breaching the conditions of his licence.
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3.6. In the months prior to his release the Perpetrator consistently stated his
intention to move to Leeds. Whilst a number of Leeds housing agencies
had been actively involved in seeking accommodation in Leeds for the
perpetrator in the months leading up to his release, the Leeds Multi‐
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) only became aware of
his move to the city the day before his arrival. He was allocated
temporary accommodation (where he was to remain for the period of 11
months) and registered with the police as a sexual offender. He was
monitored by West Yorkshire Police throughout his time in the city,
initially being visited monthly before the frequency was reduced to every
three months four months prior to the murder.
3.7. The Perpetrator came to the attention of the police on four occasions over
the 11‐month period. Firstly after being stopped and searched for acting
suspiciously and suspected of abusing solvents. He was then arrested
after threatening a neighbour (he was later released without charge) and
was again arrested and later charged with threatening behaviour and
criminal damage. Finally, he reported to the police that he had been
assaulted at a public house although evidence indicated that he had been
the aggressor. However, the officers responsible for monitoring him were
not informed of these contacts.
3.8. During their short period living in Leeds, the family of Child K were
‘befriended’ by the Perpetrator, which included him visiting their home
and taking the family shopping and to a fair. The family were unaware of
his offending history or that he was a registered sex offender.
3.9. On the day the parents took their son to attend his first day at school in
England, they returned home and had breakfast with Child K before
leaving to go into the city seeking work. They returned to the family home
at 15:30 and discovered their daughter’s body. The police received
multiple 999 calls and attended the home with paramedics. They found
the partially clothed body of Child K with wounds to her neck and chest
and a badly bruised face. The West Yorkshire Police’s Homicide and Major
Enquiry Team subsequently commenced a murder investigation.
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3.10. The parents were arrested at the scene on suspicion of their daughter’s
murder and taken to separate police stations. The Perpetrator was
arrested later the same day.
3.11. The parents were released without being charged in the early hours of the
following day. The family returned to Poland within days of the murder.
3.12. The Perpetrator was later charged with the murder and rape of Child K
and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
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4. CONCLUSION
4.1. Mr K moved to England in January 2006 seeking work with his wife and
children joining him in Leeds in September 2007. The Perpetrator, after
receiving sentences of imprisonment totalling 22 years over a period of 20
years had spent a significant proportion of his adult life in prison for
violent and sexual offences against women. He moved into the same
street on his release from prison on 17 November 2006 having been
drawn to the city by the hope of employment.
AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE K FAMILY
4.2. The management reports and chronologies provide little information or
insight into the lives of the K family beyond Mr K’s move to England and
his family’s move to be with him in Leeds the following year. Whilst in
Leeds Child K appears to have only been seen by one agency; Child K’s
brother’s school who described her as ‘chatty’.
4.3. Press reports stated that the Perpetrator ‘befriended’ the K family, giving
them lifts to the shops and on one occasion to a fair and that he offered
them the use of his computer.
4.4. The K family applied for Child K and her brother to attend local schools.
Child K’s brother quickly secured a placed at a local primary school.
However, although Child K was allocated a place it was put on hold by the
school due to the high number of children having been admitted where
English was not their first language.
4.5. It is noted that, Child K as a European Union national had a right to be
treated in the same way as an English child. Consequently, the action of
the school breached the national school admissions code by discriminating
against her on the basis of her language.
4.6. On the day of her murder, Child K remained at home whilst her parents
took her brother to school before going into the city centre to look for
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work. Child K was murdered in the family home and was found by her
parents on their return.
4.7. The fact that Child K was not in school has raised questions as to whether
this factor was causal to her murder; simply, had Child K been allocated a
place in school on that day she would not have been murdered. However,
considerable caution needs to be taken in evaluating the significance of
this. Ultimately, it is reasonable to assert that a person should be safe
from harm within their own home. Child K was murdered by a man who
had been assessed as posing a risk to members of the public, and in
particular to women. Whilst it may be true that had Child K not been
home she would not have been murdered at that time and place; this
does not exclude harm to either Child K or someone else at another time
or place.
AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE PERPETRATOR
4.8. It was to counter such crimes that the Multi Agency Public Protection
Arrangements were introduced. However, it should be recognised that no
system can eliminate risk. Rather it has to be managed and the harm
reduced either through the reduction of the likelihood of a risk occurring or
the reduction of its impact should it occur1.
4.9. The MAPPA Guidance states that the management of risk requires
defensible decisions, rigorous risk assessment, risk management plans
that match the public protection need and the evaluation of
performance2. Whilst each element is essential, good risk management
depends upon effective interagency working and, where a case is
transferred across an administrative boundary the public protection
arrangements must employ the same rigour to protecting those living
outside an agency’s boundaries as would be afforded to those living within
the local area.
1 Kemshall (2003)
2 MAPPA Guidance (2003)
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4.10. Protecting the public from violent and sexual offenders is an area where
considerable progress has been made. However, there are significant
limitations especially when, as in this case, there are no additional
external constraints (beyond offender registration) to manage a person’s
behaviour. Consequently, in the absence of statutory controls, additional
importance is placed upon the way in which agencies and practitioners
work together and across boundaries.
4.11. In this matter there were missed opportunities in relation to the inter and
intra agency and cross boundary working including a lack of active
cooperation between the Humberside and Leeds MAPPAs, engagement of
housing providers within the Leeds MAPPA and a breakdown within West
Yorkshire Police to communicate vital information to the officers
responsible for the Perpetrator’s supervision. Consequently, within the
limited public protection measures available, the core principle of
effective inter and intra‐agency working was absent at key points.
4.12. In autumn 2006 the Perpetrator was facing the end of his period of
custody with the professional attention focussed on his post release
management. Until the decision of the Parole Board in September 2006
(not to further release the perpetrator under licence but to detain him in
custody until his sentence expiry date), the plan was for a managed
release making use of the limited remaining period of sentence for his
supervision in the community. Consequently, once the Parole Board had
taken the decision, it appears the Multi Agency Public Protection Panel
(MAPPP) focussed its attention on supporting the Perpetrator to find
accommodation and the formality of notifying West Yorkshire Police prior
to his release.
4.13. It has not been possible to reach a judgement regarding the level and
nature of communication between the two police forces. However,
irrespective of who notified whom and when, the Leeds MAPPA only
became aware of the Perpetrator’s intention to move to the city the day
before his release. Whilst there had been electronic contact between the
Police forces, receipt of the notification does not appear to have been
confirmed or followed up with direct communication. Consequently, the
Perpetrator arrived in Leeds without a locally agreed Risk Management
Plan and unknown to the public protection agencies.
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4.14. The ineffective communication resulted in a lack of formal engagement of
the Leeds MAPPA prior to the Perpetrator’s move. Notwithstanding the
involvement of several Leeds based housing services prior to the
perpetrator’s release, the formal involvement of the Leeds MAPPP at this
stage may have assisted the search for suitable accommodation.
4.15. Once alerted to the Perpetrator’s arrival the Leeds MAPPA Coordinator
expressed concern and agreed to an ‘emergency’ MAPPP. However, it
took almost a month to be convened. Despite this West Yorkshire Police
made contact with the Perpetrator, undertook an assessment and agreed
to a regime of visits in excess of the frequency outlined in local and
national guidance.
4.16. Whilst there are questions regarding the adequacy of the assessment
processes, the actions of West Yorkshire Police’s Child and Public
Protection Unit’s (CPPU) level of monitoring accorded with good practice.
However, the diligence shown by the Unit was not matched by the
shortcomings in the performance of West Yorkshire Police’s information
and intelligence processes which ensured that information relating to the
Perpetrator’s resurgent offending was not transmitted to the officers
charged with his monitoring.
4.17. The decision to reduce contact with the Perpetrator to every three
months came at the end of a period of perceived stability. However, the
dynamic factors considered in the CPPU officer’s assessment represented
only minor aspects of the Perpetrator’s offending behaviour when set
against an (adult) life of serious violent and sexual offending. Focussing on
such factors was overly optimistic although the decision to reduce contact
was mitigated by the absence of more detailed current clinical
assessments and the fact that the reduction in visits accorded with local
guidance.
EVENTS FOLLOWING CHILD K’S MURDER
4.18. It is difficult to comprehend the scene confronted by Mr and Mrs K on the
1st October 2007. However, their trauma was compounded by their
subsequent arrest and detention on suspicion of their daughter’s murder.
As a society we have to accept that parents are capable of such crimes,
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although in this case, whilst also accepting the difficult role the police
have to undertake on our behalf, the arrest of Child K’s parents appeared
overly cautious, and raises questions about the rationale provided to the
review.
4.19. Child K’s brother’s school learned of Child K’s murder at the end of his first
day when his parents failed to collect him. In the circumstances the school
and the attending police officer demonstrated a commendable sensitivity
and humanity in their breaking the news to him of his sister’s death and in
the support they gave to him in the absence of his parents. Although there
are questions in respect of the professional practice in accommodating
Child K’s brother following his parent’s detention, the support provided by
the school and the Polish speaking non‐teaching assistant in caring for him
was outstanding.
CONCLUSION
4.20. The causes of Child K’s murder lay within the Perpetrator’s psyche; a man
defined by a history of violence and sexual abuse perpetrated on women;
crimes for which he had spent a significant proportion of his adult life in
prison. However, the questions for this review are whether all reasonable
actions were taken by those agencies with a responsibility for protecting
the public and whether Child K’s murder could have been prevented.
4.21. Child K’s murder was not foreseeable although the review has identified
deficiencies across many of the agencies in their practice and processes.
More should have been done to effectively manage the risk posed by the
Perpetrator and, had everything been done that should have been done,
the outcome may have been different. However, the review also identifies
limitations in the processes employed to manage such offenders, such
that, even had everything been done fully under the current system, it is
highly probable that the Perpetrator would have murdered or seriously
harmed someone.
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5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations arise from the analysis and findings reached within
the report.
OVERALL
Finding 1. It is assessed as highly probable and foreseeable, based on the
information available during the period under review that the
Perpetrator would have seriously harmed a female and that the harm
would have included physical and sexual violence. However, Child K’s
murder was not foreseeable, although it:
Was potentially preventable had there been mechanisms in place
restricting or denying the liberty of persons known to pose a high
risk of harm to the public.
May have been prevented had the agencies (according to their
role and level of responsibility) charged with protecting the
public from high risk offenders worked more effectively within
the mechanisms available.
HUMBERSIDE MAPPA AREA
Finding 2. It is assessed that the Humberside MAPPA’s planning was overly
restricted to the Perpetrator remaining in the Humberside area and
paid insufficient attention to his consistent intention to move to
Leeds. This represented a missed opportunity to formally engage the
principal Leeds public protection agencies in the planning required to
resettle a high‐risk offender in an area with which he had no ties.
Finding 3. It is assessed that there was a missed opportunity by Humberside
MAPPA to engage their counterparts in Leeds, which was contrary to
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national MAPPA Guidance. It is further assessed that engagement of
the Leeds MAPPA would have benefited the Leeds MAPPP’s planning.
Recommendation 1. (Findings 2 & 3) The Humberside Strategic
Management Board Chairperson must ensure continuity of planning
whenever a high‐risk offender moves to a different MAPPA area.
HUMBERSIDE POLICE
Finding 4. It is assessed that the transfer via the Violent and Sex Offender
Register (ViSOR) on the 10th November 2006 without an auditable
alert or secondary communication was not proportionate to the risk
posed by the Perpetrator.
Recommendation 2. (Finding 4) The Chief Constable of Humberside Police
should ensure that all notifications, to another police area, of a high‐
risk offender’s intention to move outside the area are acknowledged
by the receiving area either in writing or, where undertaken verbally,
recorded on file.
HUMBERSIDE PROBATION SERVICE
Finding 5. It is assessed that Humberside Probation Service’s delay in providing
Stonham’s Offender Accommodation Service with information
relating to the risk posed by the Perpetrator was contrary to good
information sharing practice.
HM PRISON HULL
Finding 6. There was a missed opportunity by Her Majesty’s Prison Service and
Humberside Probation Service to share with local and cross boundary
colleagues a psychiatric report on the perpetrator, prepared at the
request of his defence solicitor in 1997, in which he was diagnosed as
having a Dissocial Personality Disorder. Despite the fact that this was
an old report, its value as a professional assessment may have helped
to inform a more complete understanding of the perpetrator had it
been made available to the Leeds MAPPP. However, it is also
accepted that the report was not considered at any stage by the
Humberside MAPPP, before his release from custody.
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SHELTER
Finding 7. It is assessed that although Shelter worked correctly within the
framework of their contractual requirements there was a wider issue
with a lack of clarity regarding Shelter’s responsibilities in the context
of the wider public protection arrangements. The result being there
was insufficient clarity around how the information about the risk
posed by the Perpetrator to the public and professionals was shared
throughout the referrals to housing providers.
Recommendation 3. (Finding 7) The Chief Executive of Shelter must ensure
that personnel who provide advice or advocacy to high risk offenders
must always consider the risk posed to professionals or the public.
Specifically, Shelter should:
Have a process for identifying risk and ensuring effective
information sharing with public protection agencies and other
relevant providers of services to offenders.
Provide training to all personnel providing advice or advocacy to
high‐risk offenders on their role and responsibilities within the
public protection system and the assessment of risk.
LEEDS MAPPA AREA
WEST YORKSHIRE POLICE
Finding 8. Although the risk management plan implemented by the supervising
police officers was appropriate to what was known and understood
about the risk posed by the perpetrator, it is assessed that this was
based on a limited approach to risk assessment used by the Police.
This overly focused on static factors, with an insufficient regard for
and understanding of dynamic risk factors.. It is also noted that police
officers are not trained in the use of comprehensive risk assessments
and do not have routine access to specialist assessors.
Finding 9. It is assessed that weaknesses of West Yorkshire Police’s electronic
systems, relating to the introduction of NICHE (a record management
system), contributed to a failure to communicate crucial information
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to the responsible officer. The impact of the weakness resulted in the
Perpetrator’s risk assessment and management not being amended
in light of his renewed offending.
Finding 10. It is assessed that the failure of the Divisional Intelligence Unit to
place a ‘flag’ onto NICHE resulted in officers attending the incidents
involving the Perpetrator not being aware of his status as a high risk
offender with the consequence that they were not prompted to pass
the crucial information to the CPPU.
Finding 11. In the absence of the CPPU’s knowledge of the Perpetrator’s
escalating offending behaviour, it is assessed that the risk
management plan was appropriate to what was known of his risk
with examples of good and diligent practice. Specifically, reviews
exceeding the frequency recommended in guidance, the involvement
of housing agencies in the planning and the pursuing of the
Perpetrator’s relationship with other known offenders.
Finding 12. The arrest of Mr and Mrs K, based on the information provided,
appears overly cautious. There is no indication of consideration being
given to the detrimental impact of the arrest on the welfare of the
family or of the use of other more sensitive options to preserve the
crime scene including treating Mr and Mrs K as ‘significant witnesses’.
Finding 13. The Homicide and Murder Investigation Team’s Senior Investigating
Officer responsible for the enquiry along with the Family Liaison
Officers attached to the K family are to be commended for their
sensitive and compassionate response to the family which acted to
secure the family’s cooperation and confidence in West Yorkshire
Police.
Recommendation 4. (Findings 9 & 10) The Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire Police should ensure that changes made to NICHE and
related processes introduced both prior to and subsequent to the
death of Child K are effective in managing intelligence in relation to
Registered Sex Offenders.
Recommendation 5. (Finding 12) The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
Police should ensure that whilst it is critical that the effective
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investigation of a serious crime is not compromised, the police should
reflect upon the impact of their actions when making an arrest and
fully consider the range of alternative options available.
LEEDS CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE’S SOCIAL CARE
Finding 14. Whilst the placing of Child K’s brother with his Polish Teaching
Assistant demonstrated sensitivity and good expedient practice, his
accommodation without the permission of his parents, a legal order
or being taken into Police Protection, was not compliant with good
practice or guidance.
Finding 15. It is assessed that Children and Young People Social Care did not
assert their statutory role with West Yorkshire Police in respect of the
placement of Child K’s brother. Consequently, professional roles
became confused with the police assuming the local authority’s legal
responsibility in assessing Child K’s brother’s discharge from care.
Recommendation 6. (Findings 14 & 15) The Leeds City Council’s Director
for Children should ensure a protocol exists with West Yorkshire
Police governing the relationship between the police and Children and
Young People’s Social Care in cases where parents have been
arrested. The protocol should address issues relating to the
accommodation and welfare of children, the respective roles of each
agency and the importance of parental participation.
EDUCATION LEEDS
Finding 16. It is assessed that the school’s decision to delay allocating Child K a
place on the basis of their difficulties in accommodating a high
number of non English speaking children amounted to discrimination
and contravened the School Admissions Code.
Finding 17. The action of the Non‐Teaching Assistant and Head Teacher
demonstrated a level of outstanding practice that was above and
beyond their professional duty and must be strongly commended.
Recommendation 7. (Finding 16) The Leeds City Council Director for
Children should ensure that maintained schools within the city comply
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fully with the School Admissions Code. Specifically, schools should be
directed to not discriminate against children on the basis of language.
LEEDS HOUSING DEPARTMENT
Finding 18. It is assessed that Leeds Housing Department, as an agency with a
duty to cooperate, did not undertake timely checks as to the
Perpetrator’s sex offender status with the Leeds MAPPA Coordinator
after receiving information from Shelter on the 9th November 2006.
Recommendation 8. (Finding 18) The Leeds City Council’s Director for
Housing should ensure that checks are undertaken by housing
personnel with the MAPPA Coordinator whenever a suspected high
risk offender applies for accommodation in local authority housing.
EXTERNAL AGENCIES
NATIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICE
Recommendation 9. (Findings 2, 3 & 4) The Chief Executive of the National
Offender Management Service should take steps to ensure all cases of
high and very high risk offenders who move across MAPPA boundaries
are subject to the same degree of planning as afforded to cases that
remain within the local area. Specifically, a review of guidance should
cover:
The need for the MAPPA coordinator within the receiving area to
be informed by the transferring area of the likelihood of a high or
very high risk offender moving to their area.
The desirability for representatives of the receiving MAPPA to
attend MAPPPs within the transferring area where it has been
established that there is a strong likelihood of an offender
moving to the receiving MAPPA’s area.
The need to transfer a copy of all relevant documents to the
receiving area at the point where the case becomes managed by
that area. The documents should always include medical and
psychiatric reports, past and present risk assessments along with
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a single document containing full details of past and present
offences.
Recommendation 10. (Findings 6 & 8) The National Offender Management
Service should ensure that MAPPA Guidance promotes consistency of
practice across the region in respect of the assessments of MAPPA
offenders and the need to consider all relevant information including
medical and treatment reports. Assessments should include a
prognosis of change in respect of the person’s offending behaviour
alongside predictors of risk.
Recommendation 11. (Finding 6) The National Offender Management
Service should ensure national consistency of practice by issuing
guidance in relation to the transfer to the police of all relevant
information relating to a MAPPA offender’s prognosis where a case is
closed to the Probation Service, and where a case is no longer subject
to MAPPP meetings.
Recommendation 12. (Finding 5) The National Offender Management
Service should ensure national consistency of practice by issuing
guidance in the sharing of information to non‐statutory providers of
services to offenders. Specifically, consideration should be given to
establishing in each MAPPA Strategic Management Board area
directory of approved non‐statutory service providers to whom
sensitive information can be provided.
Recommendation 13. (Finding 7) The Chief Executive of the National
Offender Management Service should ensure that when
commissioning external providers of services to offenders in Her
Majesty’s Prison Service, the contracts must, where appropriate,
include requirements to comply with public protection arrangements.
Specifically, providers of housing, advice and advocacy services should
be required to consider risk and the wider public protection interest
when acting on behalf of an offender.
THE MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE
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Recommendation 14. (Finding 1) The Home Secretary should review the
adequacy of current controls on persons assessed as posing a high or
very high risk of serious physical or sexual harm to the public and who
are not subject to statutory supervision by a criminal justice agency.
THE LEEDS SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN BOARD
Recommendation 15. It is recommended that within three months the
Independent Chair of Leeds SCB ensures that a review of the process
and decisions made whilst undertaking this SCR is undertaken to
identify key lessons that may inform the future practice as regards the
commissioning and execution of future SCRs in Leeds.
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