Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 1 Combined Maritime ForcesReady Together Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing CAPT Chris Chambers 19 May.
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Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 1 Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together
Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing
CAPT Chris Chambers
19 May 2009
Overall ClassificationUNCLASSIFIED
2Not Approved by CCMF UNCLASSIFIED 2 Combined Maritime Forces Ready Together
Combined Maritime Forces
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
New ZealandPakistanPortugal
Singapore
Spain Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Australi
a
Bahrai
n
Belgium
Canad
a
Denmark
France
German
y
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Netherl
ands
South Korea
Non-Members with staff presence
Qatar
Yemen
Jordan
Greece• Coalition of the Willing
• Primary Missions:Counter violent extremists
and terrorist networksWork with regional and
coalition partners to improve overall maritime security and stability
• CTF 150Established in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom• CTF 151
Counter-piracy• CTF 152
Arabian Gulf maritime security
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Combined Task Force (CTF) 151
• CMF established CTF 151 as a mission based Task Force:– 12 Jan 09 under a UNSCR counter-piracy mandate
• CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained
• Mandate based upon the range of counter-piracy UNSCRs
• Provides significant flexibility to the command to undertake operations
• Critical factors for mission success:– International force participation in coalition– Maritime merchant community participation and active self defense– Merchant marine active communication with UKMTO/US MARLO to maintain
situational awareness
UNCLASSIFIED
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Area of Responsibility
CTF 152
RDML Tidd, USN
CTF 150
RADM Hinden, FR
FOCUSED OP
FO
CU
SE
D O
P
CTF 151
RDML Howard, USN
CTF 151
RDML Bener, TUR
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Countering Piracy - Strategic Aspects
• Piracy is an international problem requiring an international solution
• Solution is ashore in Somalia– Must establish conditions ashore that preclude criminal activity at sea
– Enforce the rule of law in Somalia to deny pirates safe havens
• Until the solution is reached ashore, counter-piracy must focus on three interrelated elements
1. Improved security and defensive efforts by the shipping industry
2. International naval presence to deter / disrupt / defeat pirate attempts
3. International legal framework for resolving piracy cases
These elements must be addressed in harmony
None will be successful individually
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Piracy – Current Assessment
• There is significant military presence in the GOA (CMF, NATO, EU, National)
– CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies
– CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets
– Knowledge of piracy Pattern-Of-Life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection
• Favorable weather in Somali Basin has enabled pirates to increase activity
– Seasonal trend that follows the monsoon transition periods
• Somali Basin area is 5 times larger than the GOA– Full military coverage of this area will not be possible
• From 25th February – 31st March 2009, 7% of the unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of direct military presence and/or intervention
• The proportion of vessels being attacked is still below 1% in GOA, but has peaked at 1.4% in the Somali Basin
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Piracy – Current Assessment
• Pirate capacity and capability remains high– Number of ships being attacked and pirated has increased– Total number of ships pirates can hold for ransom unknown
• Greater number of reports of attempts / false alarm calls noted by IMB– Assessed due to better awareness in the merchant shipping community
• Military counter-piracy efforts in the GOA continue to have limited success– No direct correlation between coalition presence and piracy incidents, although
greater military presence on whole has resulted in better chances of preventing a successful piracy attack
• The most effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own defensive actions
– Pirates do not give up unless they cannot board or are threatened– Speed with maneuver, charged fire hoses– Professionally trained security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks– Pirates unable to gain control of ship once onboard
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Pirate Tactics
• Motherships– Thought to be a requirement for the long range operations in the Somali Basin
• One recent example of this not being the case
– In GOA, may be a pirated vessel (Dhow, fishing vessel, etc) or an accomplice• Recent example of migrant smugglers acting as mother ship
• Length of attack– GOA attacks tend to be 30 minutes or less
• Threat of military intervention
• Target rich environment (go after something easier)
– Somali Basin attacks average one hour or longer• Less threat of military intervention
• Fewer available targets
• Recent piracy events have shown that different pirate teams communicate and coordinate
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Piracy Statistics Through 31 March
SECURITY TEAMS ARE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-PIRACY CAPABILITY
Category
Total Piracy Incidents / (Total Number Including Suspicious Events) 186 - Pirated (security on board) 35 1 27% 52 1 31% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 68 8 53% 89 8 53% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 26 0 20% 28 0 16%
Total Number of Suspicious Events Reported
Total Piracy Incidents - Pirated (security on board) 26 1 26% 41 1 30% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 47 8 48% 67 8 49% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 26 0 26% 28 0 21% - Suspicious event / report
Total Piracy Incidents - Pirated (security on board) 9 0 30% 11 0 33% - Unsuccessful attempts: MV action (security on board) 21 0 70% 22 0 67% - Unsuccessful attempts: Military Presence (security on board) 0 0 0% 0 0 0% - Suspicious event / report
(222 days)
TOTAL INCIDENTS
SUSPICIOUS EVENTS
169129
(01 Jan 08 - 31 Mar 09)
17
99 136
12 14
Post-MSPA(22 Aug - 31 Mar)
Total Stats
3 3
30 33
GOA
East Coast
15
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Attacks by Time of DayDistribution of piracy events over day and night (GOA)
0
5
10
15
20
25
0000-0100
0100-0200
0200-0300
0300-0400
0400-0500
0500-0600
0600-0700
0700-0800
0800-0900
0900-1000
1000-1100
1100-1200
1200-1300
1300-1400
1400-1500
1500-1600
1600-1700
1700-1800
1800-1900
1900-2000
2000-2100
2100-2200
2200-2300
2300-0000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Daylight
Piracy Events
Distribution of piracy events over day and night (HOA+SOB)
0
5
10
15
20
25
0000-0100
0100-0200
0200-0300
0300-0400
0400-0500
0500-0600
0600-0700
0700-0800
0800-0900
0900-1000
1000-1100
1100-1200
1200-1300
1300-1400
1400-1500
1500-1600
1600-1700
1700-1800
1800-1900
1900-2000
2000-2100
2100-2200
2200-2300
2300-0000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Daylight
Piracy Events
REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES
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Piracy Risk To Shipping
• March in GOA, 0.51% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.05% pirated• March in Somali Basin, less than 1.4% of vessels have been attacked and less
than 0.65% pirated (47% of ships attacked)• In February, 0.049% of vessels were pirated in GOA and 0% in the Somali Basin
Percentage of Vessels Attacked in GOA andSomali Basin
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
Ja
n-0
8
Fe
b-0
8
Ma
r-0
8
Ap
r-0
8
Ma
y-0
8
Ju
n-0
8
Ju
l-0
8
Au
g-0
8
Se
p-0
8
Oc
t-0
8
No
v-0
8
De
c-0
8
Ja
n-0
9
Fe
b-0
9
Ma
r-0
9
Percentage MVs Attacked Somali Basin Percentage MVs Attacked GOAPercentage Pirated Somali Basin Percentage Pirated GOA
31st March 2009
TRENDS SHOW TYPICAL SEASONAL INCREASE IN PIRACY, BUT PROPORTIONALLY INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS
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Total Pirate AttacksMonthly Total Number of Piracy Events with Monsoon Transition Periods
(JAN 2008 - 18 APR 2009)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09Month
Nu
mb
er
of
Pir
acy
Ev
en
ts (
Pir
ate
d, A
ttac
ke
d +
Att
em
pt)
TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN MONSOONS
Monthly Total Number of Piracy Events with Monsoon Transition Periods(JAN 2008 - 18 APR 2009)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09Month
Nu
mb
er
of
Pir
acy
Ev
en
ts (
Pir
ate
d, A
ttac
ke
d +
Att
em
pt)
TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN MONSOONS
SPIKES IN PIRATE ATTACKS BROADLY COINCIDE WITH FAVORABLE WEATHER TRANSITION PERIODS BETWEEN MONSOON SEASONS
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2008 GOA Piracy Events
Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during
most of 2008
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2009 GOA Piracy Events
Piracy evenly distributed across
GOA in 2009
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2008 Somali Basin Piracy
400nm
Most open ocean piracy
events in 2008 were inside
400nm
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2009 Somali Basin Piracy
400nm
In 2009, pirates have increased
open ocean activity and
followed vessels out to 600+ nm
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0
4
8
12
16
GO
A
SB
GO
A
SB
GO
A
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GO
A
SB
GO
A
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GO
A
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GO
A
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GO
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GO
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GO
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GO
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GO
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GO
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GO
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GO
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A
SB
Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded PiratedEvaded Pirated Evaded Pirated Evaded
Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09
PiratedEvaded with No Military presenceMilitary presence
Campaign Results – 243 Days
• 320 pirates encountered:– 175 released– 133 turned over for prosecution– 8 killed– 17 pending
• Pirate vessels destroyed: 24• Pirate vessels confiscated: 12
UNCLASSIFIED
Campaign start – 22 AUG 08, 17 vessels currently pirated
10 10 12 12 12 18 12 16Average Monthly Assets in CP Campaign
• Weapons confiscated: 162 small arms, 30 RPG launchers, 61 RPG projectiles
• Other paraphernalia confiscated : – 28 ladders– 9 GPS – 23 phones
International Response
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What Does it all Mean?
• Piracy has increased in the Somali Basin– Spring and fall seasonal monsoon predicted this
• Piracy is further off the coast of Somalia than in previous years– Merchant shipping has heeded advice to transit further east– Pirates have adapted tactics to pursue targets at a greater distance
• Pirates in GOA are still very active– Learning to find the easy targets– Learning to coordinate in effort to counter effects of Naval presence
• Current maritime force cannot defeat pirates alone– Avg number of ships per day is 15-17 units available to patrol high risk areas– IRTC is a 480 x 12 mile corridor = 5760 sq miles of open sea
• Does not account for the whole of the Gulf of Aden (~100,000 sq miles)
– Somali Basin is a 1000 nm coast out to 600 miles = 600,000 sq miles of open sea• Traffic in Somali Basin does not follow a predictable route• Somali Basin is not as well suited as GOA for a transit corridor to manage traffic
• Capture, imprisonment and death are not deterring pirates
INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF
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Countering Piracy - Military Aspects
• Coordination / Deconfliction / Working together– CMF, EUNAVFOR, NATO, Malaysia, Russia, China, India, Japan
• Current naval actions– Presence / deterrence / disruption / suppression of pirate activity
• Intervening against pirate attacks in progress
• Boarding suspected pirate vessels when encountered
• Interdicting motherships
• Collecting information to better understand piracy Pattern-of-Life
– Providing warning to commercial shipping of potential pirate locations
– Group transit plan for commercial shipping
– Surveillance / communications support after ships have been taken
– Providing piracy data and best practice recommendations to industry
What we do now
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• There is significant military presence in the region (CMF, NATO, EU, National),
presenting...
– National tasking makes inefficient use of limited assets
– Navies answer to individual national authorities with varying rules of engagement (ROE)
– NATO, EU, CMF, and other forces have independent chains-of-command
– Incompatible communications hamper coordination efforts
– Knowledge of piracy pattern-of-life is still in development – military assets focused on
deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection
– CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating
navies – membership is growing
– CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize
effectiveness of limited assets
– CMF provides logistics and/or communications services to 20 countries engaged in
counter piracy ops
• Includes fuel, CENTRIXS secure computer network, and development of unclassified common
operational picture (COP)
Challenges and Opportunities
Challenges
… and Opportunities
UNCLASSIFIED
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Counter-Piracy Information Sharing / Coordination
MERCHANT / CIVILIAN SHIPPING
INDEPENDENT
NAVIES
(RUS, CHN, MAL, IND, JPN)
CMF
EUNAVFOR
(MSC-HOA, FEXWEB)
UKMTO / MARLO
Communications Hub
CTF 151 has assumed the role of tactically de-conflicting warships in GOA
SHARED AWARENESS AND DE-CONFLICTION TALKS ARE KEY TO COORDINATED EFFORT
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Military Coordination/Synchronization
• CMF conducts monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meeting in Bahrain
– Over 20 nations participate– EU and NATO participate– Developing shared UNCLAS picture– Developing shared UNCLAS database– Refining positioning of assets in the IRTC– Synchronized CMF, EU and NATO operations– Includes industry reps– 30 nations participating in or planning to conduct counter piracy operations
• CTF-151 lead in tactical coordination/de-confliction/synchronization
• UKMTO (Dubai) and MARLO (Bahrain) link navies with industry
UNCLASSIFIED
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Countering Piracy – Military Challenges
• Navies answer to individual national authorities– Collective political will to take aggressive military action is needed
– Rules of engagement vary between Navies
• No unified political body under which to consolidate military effort– NATO, EU, & CMF and other forces each have an independent chain of command
– Although a challenge, it is opening new avenues for military coordination between nations (SHADE, daily coordination between Task Forces)
• This is a law enforcement operation– Does not fall under the law of armed conflict
– Limits military options for the use of force
– Strict rules of evidence for prosecuting pirates
• Legal options are limited– Few countries willing to prosecute pirates captured by Naval forces
• Limited military assets to cover a vast area
What limits our ability to respond
THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED BY NAVAL FORCES ALONE
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Recommended Risk Mitigation Process
• Conduct thorough piracy threat assessment– If at all possible, avoid transit through areas with pirate threat
• If avoidance of piracy area is not possible…– Conduct timely and deliberate self-assessment to determine risk to vessel– Consider vulnerability factors such as vessel speed, low points of access, and
time of exposure in piracy areas– Consider self-protection options to mitigate risk
• Cost-benefit analysis will determine level of acceptable risk– Benefits of conducting safe transit must outweigh the cost of implementing
protective measures– If costs outweigh the benefits (profits), ships are likely to seek naval escort
• Ships must re-evaluate risk and decide to accept one of the following…– Cost of re-routing– Cost of sufficient protective measures– Risk of piracy
Industry must submit request for escort / protection to UKMTO
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Complexity
Vessel Risk Assessment
Exp
osu
re T
ime
in
Hig
h R
isk
Zo
ne
Sp
eed
Lowest Point of Access
UNCLASSIFIED
LowHigh
Fas
tS
low High Risk
Low Risk
Self Protection measures reduce the risk•Enhanced lookout •Physical measure taken on board the vessel (e.g. barbed wire, rigged fire hoses, etc.) •Trained, unarmed security team on board
Trained armed security teams nearly eliminate the risk
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Industry Best Practices
• Passive defense measures– Comprehensive security plan to include a risk assessment
– Remove external ladders
– Lookouts at all times
– Speed and maneuver: speed up and take evasive action if pirates approach
– Limited lighting
– Register with Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
– Stay in communication with MSCHOA, UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO), and/or Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
– Routing – avoid high-risk areas if possible
– Participate in group transits
• Active defense measures– Secure hatches, limit access to crew and control spaces
– Rig fire hoses
– Rig barriers such as barbed wire, fencing, etc., especially in low access areas
– Non lethal measures such as LRAD, flares, etc
– Professional security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks
Bottom Line: Do not allow yourselves to become easy targets
UNCLASSIFIED
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Summary
• Combined Maritime Forces / International Navies have taken action– Maritime Security Patrol Area and World Food Program escorts
– Deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment
– Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information
– Provide best practices to shipping industry
– Communications support to pirated vessels during negotiations
– Suspected pirates have been captured by DK, US, UK and EU forces• Suspected Pirates taken by DK handed over to the Flag state of the attacked vessel• Suspected Pirates taken by UK, US and EU have been handed over to Kenya per MOUs
• These actions alone will not solve the problem• More aggressive naval actions will not succeed until other elements put in place
– Patrol area is enormous; requires coordinated tasking of naval assets from all countries
– Shipping industry must follow recommended best practices
– Shipping industry should consider embarking security detachments
– Additional airborne reconnaissance required to increase probability of encounter
– Retaking pirated ships involves high risk to the lives of hostages
– There is currently no mandate for military action ashore against pirate bases
THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA
UNTIL THEN, INDUSTRY MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE
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Counter-PiracyGlobal Maritime Partnerships
Legend
European Union
CTF 151
CTF 150
National Tasking
Potential Interest
Country
Questions?
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