Hispanics are the Future of Progressive Strength in America
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HISPANICS ARE THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE
STRENGTH IN AMERICA
A Systematic Quantitative Analysis of Where, When, and How Investing in the Latino Vote will Make the
Difference Between Victory and Defeat for Democrats Nationwide
AUTHORS:
DAVID BROOCKMAN, YALE UNIVERSITYETHAN ROEDER, NEW ORGANIZING INSTITUTE
SEPTEMBER 2010
CONTACT
ETHAN ROEDER
DIRECTOR OF DATA, TECHNOLOGY, AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
NEW ORGANIZING INSTITUTE
ETHAN@NEWORGANIZING.COM
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Executive Summary: Hispanic Strength Is Progressive Strength
No one party can lay claim to the Hispanic vote. Hispanic voters have proven themselves a powerful yet fluid voting bloc,
demonstrating responsiveness to investment from both parties. Furthermore, the Latino vote is growing; Latinos increased their
share of eligible voters from 8.2% to 9.5% in just four years from 2004 to 2008.1 The force of Hispanic electoral strength will continue
to grow at an aggressive pace in the coming decades and investment in Latino voters on either end of the political spectrum will
foretell the future balance of political power in America.
In this report we construct a systematic quantitative forecast of coming demographic patterns in every state and Congressionadistrict in the nation to illustrate where and how progressives can harness the growing political power of Hispanics. We show that
Hispanic growth within the electorate will present unprecedented opportunities for Democrats at all levels of government, though
only if Democrats invest in Hispanic voters. Republicans could neutralize the much-anticipated Democratic gains from Hispanic
population growth if Republican candidates manage to reach out to Hispanics as successfully as they did as recently as 2004.
We also show that Democrats have the tools to capitalize on the growing political influence of Hispanics with new results from our
own reanalysis of original data from well-known, cutting-edge experimental voter contact research. Our results show that Latinos
respond to widely-used campaign tactics at comparable rates to other voters. The results show that this outreach is also incredibly
cost-effective. Democrats thus have the opportunity to begin laying the groundwork for future majorities with outreach to the
Latino community with existing approaches.
Hispanics Are Swing Voters
Hispanics are key to progressive gains not only because of their growing numbers but because they have proven themselves to be
swing voters in the past, greatly responding to candidate and party investment. During the past four election cycles Hispanics have
changed their voting patterns greatly from election to election: Latinos voted for Bill Clinton in 1996 at a rate 18 percentage points
higher than they did for John Kerry in 2004.2 Comparing this swing to that of other demographics such as suburban women and non-
college whites, we show that Hispanics have been one of the demographic groups most responsive to political investment.
To quantify the impact that investment in this crucial swing demographic would have in the coming years we built projections using
the US Census Bureaus own population projection method with granular data from Catalist and the US Census on political behavior
population age structure, and immigration rates from each state and Congressional district.3
We frame the impact that investment in the Hispanic community would have on the electorate within the context of the 2024
Presidential election. We do so in order to present a clear picture of Hispanic electoral impact in the long term, but this should not
be confused for the notion that investment in Latino voters will only begin to matter fourteen years from now. Quite to the contrary
in order to bring Hispanics into the progressive coalition Democrats must begin investing right now and there are gains to be hadright now as well (these interim projections are presented in Appendix A). Furthermore, no one campaign can substitute for
sustained outreach. The gains we project here are not likely to be secured in the space of a single election cycle; only sustained
outreach and investment in Latino voters can insure long-term progressive strength.4
1 Lopez, Mark Hugo and Paul Taylor. Dissecting the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History. Pew Research Center, Washin gton, D.C. (April 30, 2009).2 New Organizing institute analysis of Voter News Service and National Election Pool exit polls.3Sources for these data include the Catalist race/ethnicity, turnout, and partisanship models, the US Census American Communi ty Survey (ACS) and Current
Population Survey (CPS) and exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service and National Election Pool. Our methodology for arriving at these predictions are
described at greater length in the Methodology appendix.4
As we will discuss in greater detail later, we also choose 2024 as our final year because every individual who will be eligible to vote in the 2024 Presidential election
is already alive. This means that we do not make any assumptions about future birth rates, one of the most unpredictable variable in demographic trends.
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Investment Will Shape the Future: Hispanics Will Decide Numerous Elections
Nationwide, we project that investing in Hispanic voters would have a large payoff 2.7 percentage points in the 2024Presidential election. If the Democratic candidate for President in 2024 reproduces results similar to those Bill Clinton
achieved in 1996 among Hispanic voters rather than John Kerrys (poorer) 2004 performance, Democrats would stand to
gain a full 2.7 percentage points nationally. Conversely, a Hispanic voter investment strategy as ineffective as John Kerrys
2004 effort would result in a loss of 2.7 points of Democratic margin in the national popular vote.
In heavily Hispanic states, the payoff from investment in Hispanic voters would be even more dramatic. In swing stateswith large Hispanic populations like Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico, Democrats stand to gain or lose 3.5, 4.8, and 9.5
percentage points respectively. Similarly, Democratic investment in historically Republican Arizona in 2024 could make the
state 5.2 percentage points more Democratic, bringing generic Democratic performance in the state to 49.2%.
Investing in Hispanic voters in states with modest Hispanic populations would still yield an impressive return. In swingstates like Virginia where the Hispanic voting-age population will be far less than the national average at only 8.2%
Hispanic in 2024 Democrats stand to gain over a full percentage point from investment in the Hispanic vote (or lose that
margin without it).
Even states that have few Latinos today would also see the impact from Hispanic voter investment in the next decadeMany states in which the electorate is currently comprised almost entirely of white voters, like Iowa, will also see explosive
Latino growth in the next decade. Though Latinos currently comprise only 3.2% of Iowas voting-age population, they wil
constitute 6.5% by 2024, a more than 100% increase. By 2024, investment in Latino voters would thus yield Democrats
nearly a full percentage point statewide in Iowa.
Hispanics will also drive Democratic growth in numerous Congressional districts. We project that investment in theHispanic vote nationally would, by 2024, flip 34 Congressional Districts as currently drawn to Democratic majorities. Fo
comparison, Democrats won 21 seats in 2008 and 31 seats in 2006 (Republicans won 54 seats in 1994).
However, we project that progressives stand to lose significant ground if Republicans court Hispanic voters. George WBushs successful outreach to Latino voters in 2004 is a reminder that though Latino voters respond to political outreach,
both sides are capable of gaining ground. If progressives fail to reach out to Hispanic voters sufficiently, gains from Hispanic
voter growth would be more than erased in most states. Just as 34 Congressional districts could become Democratic as a
result of Hispanic voter investment, progressives could lose out on majorities in these districts without sufficientinvestment.5
Behind the Investment: Hispanics Are A Growing Part of the Electorate
Part of the reason investment in the Hispanic community will become more important for progressives in the coming years is
because Hispanics will comprise an ever-larger portion of the electorate with each coming election cycle. 7.0% of votes cast in the
2008 Presidential election were cast by Hispanics; in the 2024 Presidential election, Hispanics will cast 9.8% of ballots nationwide a
40% increase.6
This growth alone will have dramatic effects if Hispanics maintain current levels of Democratic support, voter
turnout, and voter registration:
Hispanic voter growth alone will drive Democratic gains in swing states with large Latino populations. In crucial swingstates with large Latino populations, Latino voter growth between 2008 and 2024 will alone drive more than a full
percentage point of Democratic gain respectively 1.3, 1.6, 1.9, and 2.1 percentage points in Colorado, Nevada, NewMexico, and Arizona.
5 Even during a time when many Republicans are positioning themselves aggressively opposite most Hispanics on the issue of immigration, Democrats take the
Hispanic vote for granted at their own peril: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/40927.html6 Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist ethnicity/race and turnout propensity models and American Community Survey data. Note that this figure is
somewhat smaller than the more widely reported 9% figure for the number of votes Latinos cast in 2008. (See
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1) Because Catalist data models ethnicity conservatively, our numbers may correspondingly a more
conservative estimate for Hispanic political impact.
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Congressional races will see impact from Hispanic voter growth, too. Hispanic population growth alone will also beresponsible for flipping 11 Congressional seats (as currently drawn) to Democrats in 2024. However, if Republicans succeed
in investing in the Hispanic vote as successfully as Bush did in 2004, we project that these districts would allretain thei
Republican electoral majorities.
Democrats cannot rest on their laurels anticipated gains from Hispanic growth would disappear if Republicans reachout to Hispanics as successfully as Bush in 2004. The political gains Democrats can expect to reap from Hispanics growing
political participation will fail to materialize if Republicans succeed in winning over Hispanic voters to the extent that theydid as recently as 2004.
Hispanics Respond to Both Traditional and State-of-the-Art Campaign Tactics
Political practitioners may be concerned that Latinos do not respond to the same traditional tactics and messages as other voters. To
probe this concern, we reanalyze the original data from a series of academic and progressive campaign experiments. Key findings
from our analysis are:
Hispanics do respond to traditional and cutting-edge campaign tactics. In all of the experiments we analyze, Hispanicsrespond at statistically significant rates.
Hispanics are just as likely if not more likely to respond to traditional campaign tactics. In none of the experiments weanalyze are Hispanics statistically less responsive to mailings, phone calls, or canvassing than other voters, though in many
cases they appear to be even more likely to respond to these tactics.
Hispanic voter outreach is cost-effective. The results of these experiments show with 95% confidence that Hispanic voteroutreach can be as cost-effective as $6.75 per vote.
Cutting-edge, high-performance tactics are also effective with Hispanics. Our reanalysis of original data from so-calledsocial pressure studies that represent the vanguard of research on GOTV tactics shows conclusively that Hispanics
respond to these tactics at rates that are as high or higher than other voters.
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The Importance of Investing in the Hispanic Vote: Best and Worst Case Scenarios
As the influence of the Hispanic vote grows more decisive with their growing presence in the electorate, progressive investment in
this swing demographic would pay even greater dividends. On the other hand, many of the gains progressives anticipate from
Hispanic voter growth could be erased entirely without effective investment in Hispanic voters.
To quantify the impact of investing in Latino voters we compare three electoral scenarios: a best case, worst case, and baseline. The
baseline simply reflects our projection of the electorate if Hispanics maintain current rates of registration, voting, and Democraticsupport.7 In order to create the best and worst case scenarios we look at Presidential elections from 1996-2008 and take the highest
and the lowest recent rates for each of these metrics for Hispanics: rate of registration, voting rate, and Democratic support. For
instance our low water mark for Democratic support comes from 2004 when Hispanics supported John Kerry at a rate of only
59.5% and our high water mark from Bill Clintons success in 1996 when he garnered 77.7% support from Hispanics.8 Comparing
these maximum and minimum values we can quantify how much swing exists among Hispanic voters. We then simply add or
subtract half of the swing to the baseline to come up with a best or worst case scenario. The resulting estimates thus reflect what
would occur if Hispanics exhibited changes in their political behavior of the same magnitude over the next fourteen years that they
have exhibited in the previous fourteen.
We adjust these scenarios for future elections to demographic estimates that reflect the projected growth of the Hispanic share of
the electorate. In this way our projections show what could occur if historically exemplified variations in Hispanic political behavio
were to occur in the context of the large Hispanic population growth we project will have occurred by 2024. These numbers are also
adjusted for geographic variances in Hispanic and non-Hispanic political behavior in each state and Congressional district to accounfor local political context. A much more detailed accounting of our process can be found in the Methodology appendix.
Hispanic voters are swing voters
The biggest reason that Hispanics represent a crucial demographic for investment is because they have proven themselves to be
very responsive to changing political circumstances; Hispanics are swing voters. In fact, historically Hispanics have been more likely
to change their votes than almost any other demographic group
and top the list of traditionally likely swing targets. Table 1 shows
the degree to which some demographics often considered to be
swing demographics have actually changed political allegiances
over the past four presidential election cycles. (These numbers
are calculated by taking the difference between these groups
best and worst Democratic performance in network newsPresidential exit polls.) Of all these sought-after demographics
Hispanics have shown themselves to be most likely to change
their allegiances at the ballot box from year to year.9
Figure 1, below, depicts the full pattern of Hispanics and these
other swing demographics support for Democratic candidates
during the previous four Presidential elections. Though the
majority of Hispanics nationwide have never voted fo
7 Registration and Voting rates are taken from the 2008 US Census Community Population Survey (CPS) available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html. Baseline support is an average of support rates from 2004 and 2008 as
reflected in data from exit polls conducted by the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, available atwww.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_08.html and www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_04.html.8 For the best case scenario for 2024, we project Hispanic Democratic voting to increase by 11.5 percentage points, Hispanic voter turnout among registered voters to
increase by 5.15 percentage points and Hispanic voter registration to increase by 2.6 percentage points over the baseline. For the worst case scenario we reduce
Hispanic Democratic voting, turnout, and voter registration by the same amounts. The Methodology appendix to this report discusses in detail how we arrived at
these numbers. It also shows that these extremely variable trends even hold in regions like the West where both parties have sought Hispanic votes intensely for
some time.9 We also analyze dozens of other cohorts, including every gender/racial/age subgroup. Among these dozens of groups, there are only two cohorts that display a
larger swing than Hispanics: black males over sixty and white males under 30. Hispanic segments consistently demonstrated the largest swing margins among all
other groups. (There were generally enough interviews in the Voter News Service / National Election Pool polls to draw inferences with a margin of error of 4
percentage points, though usually less.)
Demographic Swing Magnitude
Hispanic Voters 18%
No-College White Voters 15%
White Women Under 30 11%
Suburban Women 7%
Middle-Aged (31-59) 7%
Table 1. Difference between maximum and minimum Democratic support
among swing cohorts during the past four Presidential elections. Source:
New Organizing Institute analysis of Voter News Service and National
Election Pool exit polls, 1996-2008.
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.htmlhttp://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_08.htmlhttp://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_04.htmlhttp://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_04.htmlhttp://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_08.htmlhttp://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html8/8/2019 Hispanics are the Future of Progressive Strength in America
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Republicans as a bloc, the magnitude of Hispanic support for Democratic presidential candidates has varied greatly. Between 1996
and 2004, nearly 1 in 5 Hispanics changed their vote. Bill Clinton garnered 77.7% of the Hispanic two-party vote10 in 1996. However
after George W. Bushs Hispanic outreach program in 2004, John Kerry was only able to capture 59.5%, a 18.2 percentage point
swing in only 8 years. About 1 in 11 Latinos (8.9%) changed their votes again just four years later as 68.4% of Hispanics voted fo
Barack Obama.11
In sum, Hispanics historically high likelihood of changing their votes between elections mean s that progressives stand to gain (or
lose) a substantial number of votes as a result of Hispanics political decisions. As Hispanics comprise an ever -larger share of the
American electorate, the importance of this outreach will similarly increase greatly.
Figure 1. Support for Democratic Presidential candidates by year among swing cohorts. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Voter
News Service and National Election Pool exit polls.
The Impact of Progressive Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024
What would happen with regard to the Hispanic vote in 2024 if progressives replicated political circumstances similar to 1996
instead of 2004? In this section we answer this question by projecting the impact of investing in Hispanic voters in terms of both raw
improved Democratic performance and Democratic performance relative to how competitive the state or district may be.
In our estimation for the impact of this investment we leave open the question of what exact form this investment may take. Direct
voter engagement including mail, canvassing, phone calls, advertising, and voter registration are all among the more tangible forms
of political investment but other more intangible forms of investment may play a role as well. Passing legislation with high support
among the Hispanic community could also be considered a form of investment, as could generous candidate appearances in Latino
rich areas, Hispanic-targeted earned media efforts, and Hispanic-focused messaging. Later in this report we quantify the potential o
certain more tangible forms of Hispanic voter outreach as a means of investment and demonstrate that traditional campaign
techniques are just as (if not more) efficacious with Hispanics. However, we do not offer a ready-made recipe for successful Hispanic
investment. We only show what is possible; the most effective means to this envisioned end remains a topic to be explored.
10Two-party Democratic vote is the percentage of the vote cast for Democrats among votes cast for the two major parties. Since a third party candidate has never
won a Presidential election, this statistic makes Democratic support more comparable across years.11
New Organizing Institute analysis of Voter News Service and National Election Pool exit polls, 1996-2008. Data available online at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00177/studies?sortBy=7.
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States: Impact of Investment
In Table 2, below, we first list what we project to be the baseline vote a generic Democratic presidential candidate would receive in
each state in 2024. This estimate accounts not only for Hispanic growth but other demographic changes that will occur within the
wider population such as voter aging, immigration, and death. Alongside this baseline estimate is a projection of what would occur i
Democrats 2024 performance with Latino voters were to improve by a historically attainable amount. The next column then reports
what would occur in the worst case scenario for progressives if Republicans succeed in winning the Hispanic vote at levels they
have historically managed and Hispanic voter turnout declined to an extent consistent with recent history. Finally, the last column
represents the difference between the best case and worst cast scenarios: the impact of investment in the Hispanic vote.
Improved Democratic Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024 by State
State Base-
line
Best
Case
Worst
Case
Impact of
Investment
State Base-
line
Best
Case
Worst
Case
Impact of
Investment
New Mexico 54.6 59.6 50.1 9.5 Pennsylvania 53.6 54.2 53.1 1.1
Texas 42.2 46.1 39.0 7.0 Indiana 45.3 45.9 44.9 1.0
California 59.4 63.1 56.4 6.7 Iowa 52.6 53.1 52.2 0.8
Arizona 46.3 49.2 44.0 5.2 Wisconsin 54.0 54.5 53.7 0.8
Nevada 53.5 56.2 51.4 4.8 Minnesota 53.9 54.3 53.6 0.7
Colorado 51.6 53.5 50.0 3.5 Michigan 55.4 55.8 55.1 0.7
New Jersey 56.1 57.9 54.6 3.4 Missouri 48.4 48.8 48.2 0.6
Florida 49.4 51.3 48.0 3.3 Georgia 44.1 44.4 43.9 0.6
New York 61.6 63.1 60.2 2.9 New Hampshire 52.9 53.3 52.7 0.6
Connecticut 59.3 60.8 58.1 2.7 Ohio 50.8 51.1 50.6 0.6
Hawaii 64.1 65.6 63.0 2.6 Arkansas 42.8 43.1 42.5 0.6
Illinois 59.3 60.7 58.2 2.5 Montana 44.4 44.7 44.2 0.5
Rhode Island 63.0 64.1 61.9 2.2 North Carolina 47.2 47.5 47.0 0.5
Utah 31.6 32.8 30.8 1.9 Kentucky 41.4 41.7 41.3 0.4
Massachusetts 63.5 64.3 62.8 1.6 South Carolina 43.0 43.3 42.9 0.4
Kansas 40.2 41.0 39.5 1.5 North Dakota 40.9 41.1 40.8 0.4
Oregon 55.2 56.0 54.6 1.4 Louisiana 42.0 42.3 41.9 0.3
Washington 56.3 57.1 55.7 1.4 West Virginia 43.8 44.0 43.6 0.3
Idaho 34.0 34.8 33.4 1.4 Maine 56.9 57.1 56.8 0.3
Wyoming 31.9 32.6 31.2 1.4 South Dakota 42.5 42.7 42.4 0.3
Virginia 49.7 50.4 49.1 1.3 Tennessee 42.7 42.9 42.6 0.3Maryland 60.0 60.7 59.5 1.2 Mississippi 41.8 42.0 41.7 0.3
Delaware 58.2 58.9 57.7 1.2 Vermont 64.7 64.8 64.6 0.2
Nebraska 38.2 38.9 37.8 1.1 Alabama 38.0 38.1 37.9 0.2
Oklahoma 34.8 35.4 34.3 1.1 Alaska 39.0 39.0 39.0 0.0Table 2.Projected impact of investment in Hispanic voters in terms of improved Democratic performance in 2024. Baseline estimate represents the
base case if Hispanic political behavior remains constant from 2008 to 2024; best and worst cast scenarios correspond to election forecasts in which
Hispanics vote as they have during their best or worst Democratic performances during the past fourteen years. Impact of investment is calculated
as the difference between the best and worst cast scenarios. Investment estimates are in percentage points. Source: New Organizing Institute
analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS)
data.
Our projections in Table 2 show that in more than half of the states Hispanic voter investment would bring Democrats more than a
full percentage point at the polls. In thirteen states Hispanic investment would bring Democrats more than two percentage points o
the final tally, while in eight states these gains would be larger than three percentage points. We also project that Florida andVirginia could have Democratic majorities in 2024 as a result of investment in the Latino community (or have Republican majorities
absent investment). New Mexico, Colorado, and Ohio would all be within less than a percentage point of falling into Republican
hands in a worst case scenario. (Interim projections for all states in 2012, 2016, and 2020 can be found later in this report in
Appendix A.)
Map 1 is a visual representation of the results from Table 2. States in darker purple would see larger impact in terms of improved
Democratic performance from a successful Democratic Hispanic voter investment strategy.
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Map 1. Projected impact of investment in Hispanic voters in terms of improved Democratic performance in 2024. Impact as displayed is the
difference between the best case and worst case scenarios for Hispanic turnout, registration rates, and Democratic support by state. Source:New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models, and US Census
American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Congressional Districts: Impact of Investment
Though states will redraw Congressional districts at least twice between now and 2024 (after the recently completed 2010 census
and then again following the 2020 census)12, Hispanic voter investment would bring about even larger changes in numerous
Congressional districts as currently drawn. In fact, we project that Hispanic voter investment could flip a full 34 House seats (about 1
in 13 seats) to generic Democratic majorities from Republican majorities in 2024.
Table 3, below, shows our estimates for the impact of Latino investment (the percentage point difference between the best case and
worst case scenarios) in the sixty Congressional districts, as currently drawn, where Democrats fortunes would rise and fall most
with Hispanic performance. (Interim impact of investment projections for these and more Congressional districts for 2012, 2016
2020, and 2024 can be found later in this report in Appendix A.)
12 For an informative accounting of state-based redistricting practices including discussion of the many states where district lines may be redrawn multiple times
between centennial censuses, see Taking the Re out of Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing at
http://www.georgetownlawjournal.org/issues/pdf/95-4/levitt&mcdonald.pdf.
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024 by State
Impact of Investment
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Improved Democratic Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024 by CD
District Baseline
Dem
Support
Impact of
Investment
District Baseline
Dem
Support
Impact of
Investment
District Baseline
Dem
Support
Impact of
Investment
FL-21 39.9 19.7 NM-02 50.3 13.2 CA-45 49.5 8.0
CA-38 73.1 18.7 CA-18 58.2 12.4 CA-19 44.8 7.9
TX-15 55.2 18.6 AZ-07 59.8 12.4 CA-49 43.9 7.6
TX-28 53.5 17.9 FL-18 48.0 11.6 CA-26 50.1 7.6TX-16 61.9 17.9 CA-21 43.3 11.6 CA-40 45.4 7.5
CA-34 75.7 17.7 NM-01 58.8 11.6 TX-11 25.2 7.4
CA-32 70.0 17.6 CA-28 76.0 11.0 NJ-08 62.6 7.4
TX-29 61.5 17.4 CA-27 65.1 10.1 CA-41 43.1 7.3
CA-47 62.0 17.1 NM-03 59.9 9.8 IL-03 63.4 7.3
CA-39 67.5 17.0 CA-44 48.4 9.8 CA-29 66.2 7.2
FL-25 43.5 16.3 CA-37 78.0 9.3 TX-19 26.9 7.1
CA-43 67.2 16.1 NJ-13 72.4 9.1 NJ-09 61.1 7.0
TX-27 49.8 16.0 CA-35 82.4 8.8 NY-16 91.9 6.9
CA-51 61.1 15.6 CA-17 71.9 8.8 NY-12 84.1 6.8
TX-20 59.3 15.2 NV-01 63.4 8.5 CA-22 37.3 6.6
AZ-04 68.7 15.1 CA-23 64.3 8.4 TX-21 42.1 6.4
TX-23 44.9 15.0 CA-25 48.0 8.4 FL-08 50.9 6.3
CA-20 57.1 14.7 CA-16 68.7 8.2 CO-07 58.3 6.2
CA-31 80.4 14.0 CA-42 44.2 8.2 CA-05 67.2 6.0
IL-04 84.6 13.3 NY-07 77.5 8.1 TX-25 62.2 5.9Table 3. Projected impact of investment in Hispanic voters in terms of improved Democratic performance in 2024 for selected Congressional
districts, as currently drawn. Baseline estimate represents the base case if Hispanic political behavior remains constant from 2008 to 2024; best
and worst cast scenarios correspond to election forecasts in which Hispanics vote as they have during their best or worst Democratic
performances during the past fourteen years. Impact of investment is calculated as the difference between the best and worst cast scenarios.
Investment estimates are in percentage points. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship,
turnout, and race/ethnicity models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Table 3 makes clear that Hispanic investment would have an enormous impact in numerous Congressional districts. When compared
to baseline performance, 28 congressional districts (as currently drawn) would see gains in Democratic performance of greater than
five percentage points and an additional 32 would see gains of at least two and a half percentage points. In total in almost 1 out ofevery 7 CDs we project that investment would yield 2.5 points improved performance or more over the baseline and, when
compared to the worst case scenarios, these margins are doubled. Map 2 displays these results for all the Congressional districts in
the lower 48 states.
Another important pattern to note from Table 3 is that many of the above districts (18 out of the 60 listed) would likely be held by
Republicans in the baseline scenario. Latino voter investment would not only help protect Democratic gains but also translate to
victory for Democrats in key House races across the nation.
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Map 2. Projected impact of investment in Hispanic voters in terms of improved Democratic performance in 2024 by Congressional district, as
currently drawn. Impact as displayed is the difference between the best case and worst case scenarios for Hispanic turnout, registration rates,
and Democratic support by Congressional district as currently drawn. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls,Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
In Table 4 we list the 34 Congressional districts in which we project Democrats would be favored in 2024 in the best case scenario
but where Republicans would hold majorities in the worst case scenario.
Congressional Districts as Currently Drawn That Would Swing in 2024 Due to Hispanic InvestmentAZ-08 CA-44 FL-15 IL-11 MI-08 NY-13 TX-27
CA-11 CA-45 FL-18 IL-13 MN-01 NY-19 TX-28
CA-24 CA-50 FL-24 IL-14 NJ-07 NY-24 VA-10
CA-25 CO-30 FL-25 IL-16 NM-02 TX-15 WI-01
CA-26 FL-08 IL-08 IN-02 NY-03 TX-23
Table 4. Congressional districts (as currently drawn) where we project Democratic voters would be a majority as a result of (or, where
Republican voters would prevail from a lack of) progressive Hispanic investment by 2024.
Political Reality: Impact Through the Lens of Competitiveness
The above analysis offers a portrait of where and by how much Hispanic investment will add to Democratic vote totals. However,
these gains would ultimately prove far more politically significant in some states than in others: Colorados 3.5 percentage point
impact of investment could prove far more politically consequential than New Jerseys similar 3.4 percentage point figure as
Colorado is typically a more competitive state.
To offer a portrait of where Hispanics will have the most substantive political impact we evaluate the ratio between the impact of
investment and the projected closeness of the state or district. If we project generic Democratic performance in a state to be 45%, it
can be said that this generic candidate would need just over 5 points of improved performance to achieve victory. If we were tocalculate the impact of investment for this state to be 2.5 points, the impact would be 50% of the margin. In this way we capture
both competitiveness and the impact of investment in one metric.
Table 5 lists the top twenty states in terms of the impact of Hispanic investment relative to the competitiveness of the state. Map 3
then depicts these trends for all the states.
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024 by CD
Impact of Investment
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Impact of Investment in Hispanic Voters as a Percentage of Democrats Margin in 2024 by State
State 2024 Baseline
Projection
Total Impact of
Investment in 2024
Impact as a % of Baseline
Projected Margin
Electoral Votes
Florida 49.4 3.3 >100% 27
Virginia 49.7 1.3 >100% 13
Colorado 51.6 3.5 >100% 9
New Mexico 54.6 9.5 >100% 5
Arizona 46.3 5.2 >100% 10Nevada 53.5 4.8 >100% 5
Texas 42.2 7.0 90% 34
California 59.4 6.7 71% 55
Ohio 50.8 0.6 68% 20
New Jersey 56.1 3.4 56% 15
Missouri 48.4 0.6 40% 11
Iowa 52.6 0.8 33% 7
Pennsylvania 53.6 1.1 30% 21
Connecticut 59.3 2.7 29% 7
Oregon 55.2 1.4 28% 7
Illinois 59.3 2.5 27% 21
New York 61.6 2.9 25% 31
Indiana 45.3 1.0 22% 11
Washington 56.3 1.4 22% 11
Wisconsin 54.0 0.8 20% 10Table 5. Impact of investment as a percentage of Democrats' margin in 2024for twenty states with largest impact of investments as percentage
of their margins. States listed in decreasing order of competitive impact of investment, with states where investment would have the most
political impact listed first. This offers a snapshot of where investment will be most politically decisive. Source: New Organizing Institute
analysis.
Map 3. Difference between projected worst and best case scenarios as a percentage of Democrats' margin of victory in the states in 2024.
Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community
Survey (ACS) data.
Projected Impact of Investment as a Percentage of Democrats Margin in 2024 by State
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As with states, we also present a metric of where investment would prove most politically consequential in US Congressiona
districts. Table 6, below, displays these results for the sixty Congressional districts where investment would represent the largest
share of a states projected margin. In 74 Congressional districts, as currently drawn, the difference between the worst and best case
scenarios is larger than a generic Democrats margin of victory; it is more than halfthe margin in an additional 37 districts.
Impact of Investment in Hispanic Voters as a Percentage of Democrats Margin in 2024: Top 60 CDs
District Baseline Impact % of
Margin
District Baseline Impact % of
Margin
District Baseline Impact % of
Margin
AZ-01 46.5 4.3 >100% CO-03 48 5.3 >100% NJ-07 50.1 2.9 >100%
AZ-05 47.8 3.7 >100% FL-08 50.9 6.3 >100% NM-01 58.8 11.6 >100%
AZ-07 59.8 12.4 >100% FL-10 50.8 1.5 >100% NM-02 50.3 13.2 >100%
AZ-08 47.8 4.5 >100% FL-12 46.9 4.6 >100% NV-02 47.6 4.4 >100%
CA-11 51 5.3 >100% FL-15 48 5.6 >100% NV-03 54.3 5.6 >100%
CA-18 58.2 12.4 >100% FL-18 48 11.6 >100% NY-01 51.6 2.9 >100%
CA-19 44.8 7.9 >100% FL-21 39.9 19.7 >100% NY-03 48.7 2.6 >100%
CA-20 57.1 14.7 >100% FL-24 48.1 4.0 >100% NY-13 48.6 4.9 >100%
CA-21 43.3 11.6 >100% FL-25 43.5 16.3 >100% NY-19 49.5 3.1 >100%
CA-24 49.1 5.6 >100% IL-06 52.9 4.0 >100% NY-20 49.2 1.0 >100%
CA-25 48 8.4 >100% IL-08 50.9 2.7 >100% NY-24 49.9 1.4 >100%
CA-26 50.1 7.6 >100% IL-11 50.8 2.2 >100% TX-15 55.2 18.6 >100%
CA-40 45.4 7.5 >100% IL-13 50.4 2.5 >100% TX-16 61.9 17.9 >100%CA-42 44.2 8.2 >100% IL-14 51.3 4.0 >100% TX-20 59.3 15.2 >100%
CA-44 48.4 9.8 >100% IL-16 49.4 1.7 >100% TX-23 44.9 15.0 >100%
CA-45 49.5 8.0 >100% IN-02 49.5 1.3 >100% TX-27 49.8 16.0 >100%
CA-47 62 17.1 >100% KS-03 48.8 1.9 >100% TX-28 53.5 17.9 >100%
CA-49 43.9 7.6 >100% MI-08 50.1 0.9 >100% TX-29 61.5 17.4 >100%
CA-50 48.8 3.6 >100% MN-01 50.2 1.0 >100% VA-10 49.7 2.9 >100%
CA-51 61.1 15.6 >100% NJ-03 51 1.6 >100% WI-01 49.8 1.6 >100%Table 6. Impact of investment as a percentage of Democrats' margin in 2024. Districts listed alphabetically. This offers a snapshot of where investment will be
most politically decisive. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis.
Map 4. Difference between projected best and worst case scenarios as a percentage of Democrats' anticipated margins in CDs (as currently drawn) in 2024.
Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Projected Impact of Investment as a Percentage of Democrats Margin in 2024 by CD
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Democrats Cannot Afford to Rest on Their Laurels
Though the gains to be had from Latino voter investment will grow more substantial with time, so too will the losses progressives
may suffer; Democrats cannot take the electoral benefit they will accrue from Hispanic voter growth alone for granted. In every
single state, the losses from failure to invest in the Hispanic community would dwarf the much-anticipated impact of the growth in
the number of Hispanic voters. Through strategies similar to Bushs 2004 outreach to Hispanics, Republicans could more than erase
the gains Democrats might otherwise expect from Latino voter growth.
For example, New Mexico can expect to grow 1.9 percentage points more Democratic by 2024 from Hispanic voter growth aloneYet, if Republicans in New Mexico manage to reach out to Hispanics in 2024 just as successfully as Bush did in 2004, the state will
instead turn 3.5 percentage points more Republican relative to today, reducing Democrats margin in the state to 50.1 percent
Likewise, though Colorado will grow 1.3 percentage points more Democratic by 2024 as a result of Latino voter growth, these gains
would be entirely erased if Republicans successfully invest in the Hispanic community there. Instead of winning with 53.5 percent o
the vote in Colorado in a dream scenario, we project that in a worst case scenario the state would be a complete toss-up with a
generic Democrat barely winning 50.02 percent of the vote.
Gains matter everywhere
Though Hispanic investment would bring the most significant changes to swing races, Democrats odds would drastically improve in
more challenging terrain as well. For example, though Texas will likely not vote Democratic in a presidential election for a
generation, Latino investment would swing the states vote totals by a full 7 percentage points in 2024. Such a swing could make the
election of a Democratic governor or Senator a much more attainable goal. Arizona could grow to a projected 49.2 percentagepoints Democratic in a best case scenario for Hispanic investment, putting the state well within striking distance for the Democratic
nominee. Conversely, a lack of investment could enable continued Republican control of both states at every level.
Just as Hispanic investment would put many formerly safe Republican states into play, Republican investment in Hispanic voters
could also force Democrats to defend many formerly safe seats. For example, though Nevada is steadily becoming more progressive
a worst case scenario with successful Republican investment in Nevadas Latino voters could erase progressive gains to a margin of
only 1.4 percentage points: 51.4%.
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Summary
Though individual campaigns alone are unlikely to be able to move from a worst to a best case scenario, successful efforts can
improve Democrats performance among Hispanics over time. Voter outreach can take place in many ways, from targeted
communications to policy positions, the election of Hispanic candidates or community-based voter mobilization campaigns. Our
projections serve to show that such a sustained efforts if successful would ultimately have enormous consequences.
The positive impact of Hispanic voter growth alone is dwarfed by the large advantages progressives could attain throughactive investment in Hispanic voters. Investment could yield Democrats more than two full percentage points of improvedperformance in thirteen states and more than four percentage points in five of those states. When our projections of the
best and worst case scenarios are compared for a generic Democratic candidate, Florida and Virginia would also change
hands in the 2024 Presidential election as a result of this investment. With these two states alone, Hispanic voters would
command 40 electoral votes (per current apportionment) a margin greater than the electoral votes by which two of the
last three Presidential elections were decided.13
Numerous Congressional districts would change hands as a result of investment in Latino voters. We project that 34Congressional districts as currently drawn would have Democratic majorities only with successful Hispanic investment.
These large gains are attainable with historically recent Hispanic political behavior. Bill Clintons 1996 win was powered inlarge part by Latinos fourteen years ago; in another fourteen years, our projections show that progressives will have
significant opportunities and imperatives to invest in Hispanic voters.
Progressives would lose significant ground if Republicans gain ground with Hispanics.George W. Bushs 2004 successfuoutreach to Hispanic voters is a reminder that though Hispanics respond positively to political outreach, both sides are
capable of taking this approach. If progressives fail to reach out to Hispanic voters, the gains progressives may expect from
Latino voter growth alone would be more than erased in most states, in some states twice over. Just as 34 Congressiona
districts could become Democratic as a result of Hispanic investment, progressives stand to lose vote majorities in these
districts if they fail to invest sufficiently.
Gains matter everywhere. Even in states that will likely not change hands in the 2024 Presidential election, numerousgubernatorial and Senatorial races in other states could see their fortunes drastically improve as a result of Latino
investment.
13 The source for this also happens to be a very fun political toy allowing the user to manufacture different presidential election outcomes and view the results:
http://www.270towin.com/.
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Behind the Investment: The Causes and Consequences of Hispanic Voter Growth
Even before political investment is considered, Hispanics are a powerful and growing force in American elections. Though Latino
growth in the electorate will not materialize overnight, Hispanics are rapidly becoming an ever more indispensable component of
the progressive coalition. 7.0% of votes cast in the 2008 Presidential election were cast by Latinos; in the 2024 Presidential election
Latinos will cast 9.8% of ballots nationwide, a 40% increase.14
States: Hispanic Voter Growth
Table 7, below, offers a picture of where Latino political impact will grow most: it shows the fifteen states where votes cast by
Latinos will grow most as a percentage of all votes cast. Note that this table thus shows states that can anticipate the most change
relative the status quo (but not necessarily where Hispanics will possess the most total influence).
Hispanic Voter Growth in 2024 by State
State % of Votes Cast by Hispanics
in 2008
% of Votes Cast by Hispanics
in 2024
Percentage Point Growth
Nevada 11.2 16.6 5.4
California 19.9 24.6 4.7
Arizona 12.4 17.0 4.6
Texas 20.4 24.4 3.9
Connecticut 6.0 9.6 3.5Hawaii 6.5 10.0 3.4
New Mexico 31.2 34.6 3.4
Colorado 8.5 11.8 3.3
Rhode Island 6.0 9.3 3.2
Florida 10.5 13.5 3.0
New Jersey 9.5 12.2 2.7
Utah 3.5 6.1 2.6
Illinois 6.5 9.1 2.6
Massachusetts 4.1 6.5 2.4
Idaho 3.1 5.4 2.3Table 7. States that will experience the greatest amount of Hispanic voter growth between 2008 and 2024. Source: New Organizing Institute
analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and American Community Survey data.
Map 5, below, displays these results for all states.
Those familiar with Hispanic politics in places like New Mexico and Florida may recognize that simply focusing on where Hispanics
will grow most as a percentage of the population would obscure the significant differences that exist in Latino political behavior and
age composition across the country. Other demographic patterns, such as the aging of the Hispanic electorate and the large numbe
of white voters from other states moving into Texas, for example, will also have an impact on Hispanics relative strength. O u
projections take these factors into account by modeling non-Hispanic population changes and drawing on Catalists extensive voter
information and sophisticated partisanship and turnout models.
Note also that the states where Hispanic population growth will be largest are not the same as states where Hispanic votergrowth
will be largest. In fact, due to dynamics such as the different age distributions of the Hispanic populations across states and declines
in populations of other cohorts in some states, half of the top ten states in Hispanic voter growth are not top ten states in Hispanic
population growth: New Jersey, Hawaii, Nevada, New York, and Colorado.
14 New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist race/ethnicity and turnout models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
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Map 5. Projected change in Hispanics' percentage of all voters between 2008 and 2024. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist
partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Congressional Districts: Hispanic Voter Growth
We also project that Hispanics will constitute a notably larger share of the voting electorate in scores of Congressional districts. 33
currently existing Congressional districts will see Hispanic voters grow by more than ten percentage points as a proportion of al
voters (in terms of votes cast), while 122 Congressional districts as currently drawn will see the percent of votes cast by Hispanics
grow by more than five points between 2008 and 2024. Table 8 shows the thirty Congressional districts where His panics politica
presence will grow most.
Hispanic Voter Growth in 2024 by CD
District Hispanic Voter Growth District Hispanic Voter Growth District Hispanic Voter Growth
AZ-04 26.3 CA-32 16.6 CA-31 13.4
FL-21 25.9 NV-01 15.5 CA-51 13.0
CA-47 22.0 CA-18 14.7 CA-44 12.6
TX-29 20.4 NY-16 14.5 NM-01 12.3
IL-04 19.8 CA-21 14.4 NY-17 12.1
CA-39 19.5 NY-07 14.3 CA-37 12.1
CA-43 19.2 FL-25 14.2 CO-07 11.5
CA-34 18.6 NM-02 14.2 CA-27 11.3
CA-38 17.8 CA-28 13.9 TX-15 10.9
CA-35 17.0 IL-03 13.5 CA-42 10.7Table 8. Districts where the percentage of all votes cast that will be cast by Hispanics will grow most. All figures are in percentage points.
Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community
Survey (ACS) data.
Map 6 displays these results visually for all Congressional districts.
Growth in Percentage of Votes Cast by Hispanics from 2008 to 2024
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Map 6. Growth in Hispanic share of votes cast from 2008 to 2024 by Congressional district. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of
Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
This growth alone will have a large impact for progressives. Map 7 shows why: in all areas shown in any shade of blue, Hispanic
communities lean towards Democrats; in many areas, Hispanics lean towards Democrats very strongly.
Map 7. Projection for overall democratic performance of Hispanic communities in the United States in 2024 on the congressional district
level (as currently drawn). Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models
partisanship model data.
As a result of this growth and Hispanics tendency to vote for Democrats, the Democratic party itself will also rely on the Latino vote
to a growing extent. In the 2008 election, Hispanics cast 9.3% of the votes that were cast for Barack Obama nationwide. By 2024 we
project that Latinos will be casting 12.6% of Democrats votes nationwide, a 36% increase from 2008.
Projected Democratic Support of Hispanic Voters in 2024 by CD
Growth in Percentage of Votes Cast by Hispanics from 2008 to 2024
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Whats Driving Hispanic Population Growth
Three factors underlie the coming explosion of Hispanic participation in American democracy: immigration, birth rates, and age
distribution.15
Immigration
Census data show that 575,000 Hispanics immigrate to the United States every year.16 In fact, Hispanics accounted for half of all new
immigration to the United States from 1990 to 2000.
17
To put these figures in perspective, at current rates of migration the UnitedStates will grow by 1% due to Latino immigration alone every six years.
Birth Rates
Hispanics higher birth rates also drive Hispanic growth in the long term. The average US woman gives birth to 1.9 children over her
lifetime; broken down by ethnicity, Asian-American women give birth to 1.7 children, white women 1.8, African American women
2.0, and Hispanic women 2.3.18Hispanics higher rates of birth are additionally significant becausetotalAmerican population growth
is driven almost entirely by Latino growth. Brookings Institution demographer William Frey has said that its the Hispanic growth
that is keeping us above water. That is, non-Hispanics have children at a level so low that without Hispanics higher birth rates
(momentarily excepting immigration) there would be a net decrease in the American population.1920
Whats Driving Growing Latino Political Participation
Though immigration and birth rates are drivers of long-term Hispanic growth in the electorate, the changing age distribution ofHispanics is by far the most powerful driver of growth over the next two decades.
Figure 3, below, shows that the Hispanic population is disproportionately young,
meaning that many Hispanics currently below voting age will grow into the electorate in
the next two decades. Though Hispanics make up 10% or less of the population over 45
Hispanics make up nearly 20% of the population in age cohorts under 35. Crucially, this
pattern holds for cohorts under 18. Because Hispanic babies born in 2008 and after wil
not be eligible to vote until 2026, the movement of Hispanics under 18 in 2008 into the
electorate between 2008 and 2026 drives the growth in the Hispanic share of the voting
age population (rather than birth rates).
Yet aging will play a more important role for voters already eligible today. Table 9shows
why aging matters with a display of voter turnout rates by age for Hispanics and the
total population. First, Table 9 makes clear that Hispanics are about 10 percent points
less likely to vote than other Americans of similar age. However, just like the American
population as a whole, Hispanics become about 9 percentage points more likely to vote
with every ten years they age.
See in Figure 3 that Latinos also currently occupy a large percentage of the population
between the ages of 20 and 45. In the next two decades, these already-voting-eligible Hispanics can be expected to turn out at much
higher rates with significant consequences for progressives. Hispanics already of voting age but who currently do not vote will thus
drive Hispanic political participation to the greatest extent.
15 For a more extensive discussion of population growth dynamics and a series of projections even further into the future, see t he Pew Hispanic Centers report US
Population Projections: 2005-2050, available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=85.16US Census American Community Survey (ACS).17 Pew Hispanic Center: Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in US Immigration 1992-2004, September, 2005, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf.18Fertility of American Women: 2006. United States Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p20-558.pdf.19Quoted in Hispanic fertility growth drives US population growth, Dallas Morning News, 19 August 2008.
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/nation/stories/081908dnnatbirthrate.39dcfdf.html.20Those interested in exploring the dynamics of fertility in the United States should see Pews New Demography of American Motherhood, available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/754/new-demography-of-american-motherhood.
Age Hispanic
Turnout
Overall
Turnout
18 to 30 9% 17%
30 to 39 16% 38%
40 to 49 25% 43%
50 to 59 36% 52%
60 to 69 45% 68%
70 plus 52% 65%Table 9. Relative Hispanic and overall American
turnout by age among entire US population.
Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of
Catalist turnout and race/ethnicity models and
American Community Survey (ACS) data.
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Figure 3. National share of the population in 2008 by race/ethnicity and age group. Source: 2008 US Census American Community Survey
(ACS).
The contrast between Figures 4 and 5 below show how significant these trends will be. First, Figure 4 shows that Latino population
growth itself will be especially concentrated in age cohorts between 40 and 69. Furthermore, even though growth in the 18 to 30
and 30 to 39 age cohorts is still large in Figure 4, Figure 5 shows that this growth will have comparatively little political impact. On
the other hand, the ranks of Hispanic voters between the ages of 50 and 69 will swell by 3.3 million, accounting for almost two-
thirds of the 5.2 million new votes Hispanics will cast in the 2024 Presidential election.
Figure 2. Projected Hispanic population growth over 18 between 2008 and 2024 by age. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of US
Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
56% 58% 60% 61% 61%62% 61% 59% 65%
72% 77%79% 83%
86%
15% 15% 15%16% 16% 14%
13% 13%
13%12%
10% 9%8% 7%
25% 22% 20%18% 17% 18% 20% 21%
16%11% 8% 7%
6% 5%4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 7% 6% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
National Share of Population in 2008 by Race/Ethnicity and Age
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White
3,085,652
1,647,376
3,357,980
4,051,673
3,199,822
536,326
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
18 to 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 70 and above
Hispanic Population Growth - 2008 to 2024
New Organizing Institute
New Organizing Institute
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Figure 3. Projected Hispanic voter turnout growth between 2008 and 2024 by age cohort. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of US
Census American Community Survey (ACS) and Catalist turnout and race/ethnicity models.
Where Hispanics Will Most Dominate the Electorate 2024
As noted, Hispanic voter and population growth does not necessarily occur in the same areas where Hispanics already have the
largest populations or largest political communities. On the same note, Hispanic influence in the electorate does not necessarily map
exactly to those states and districts where the sheer Hispanic population is the largest.
Hispanic Population Growth
Below are the states that will have the largest Latino populations in 2024. These states already all have sizable Hispanic populations
indeed, these same states were the top ten most Hispanic states in 2008.
Hispanic Percent of Population in 2024 by State
State Hispanic VAP % in 2008 Hispanic VAP % in 2024
New Mexico 41.5 46.0Texas 32.7 37.1
California 32.1 37.0
Arizona 25.5 31.7
Nevada 21.6 28.4
Florida 19.7 24.5
Colorado 17.2 21.9
New York 15.3 17.0
New Jersey 14.9 17.6
Illinois 13.1 16.5Table 10. States with highest Hispanic voting-age populations in 2024. Source: New Organizing Institute
projections based on US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
However, Hispanic population growth will occur most in states that currently have more modest Latino populations. Table 11below, lists the states that can expect the highest Hispanic population growth relative to their current size.
283,992 259,467
1,122,503
1,768,225
1,549,281
259,824
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
18 to 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 70 and above
Hispanic Voter Growth - 2008 to 2024
New Organizing Institute
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Hispanic Growth in Percent of Population in 2024 by State
State Hispanic VAP % in 2008 Hispanic VAP % in 2024 Percentage Point Growth
Nevada 21.6 28.4 6.9
Arizona 25.5 31.7 6.3
Utah 10.3 15.6 5.2
Rhode Island 9.5 14.5 5.0
California 32.1 37.0 4.9
Connecticut 10.3 15.1 4.8
Florida 19.7 24.5 4.7
Colorado 17.2 21.9 4.7
Oklahoma 6.1 10.7 4.6
Texas 32.7 37.1 4.5
Table 11. States that will experience the highest rates of Hispanic population growth between 2008 and 2024. Source: New
Organizing Institute projections based on US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Population Growth vs. Voter Growth
Based on our model, Table 12 shows the twenty states where Latinos will possess the most raw political influence in 2024. Hispanics
will make up 10% or more of the electorate in ten states and 20% or more in three states.
Projected Hispanic Share of Votes Cast in 2024 by StateState Hispanic % of
All Votes in
2024
Hispanic % of
Dem. Votes in
2024
State Hispanic % of
All Votes in
2024
Hispanic % of
Dem. Votes in
2024
New Mexico 34.6 44.9 Connecticut 9.6 12.4
California 24.6 30.7 Rhode Island 9.3 11.0
Texas 24.4 34.0 Illinois 9.1 11.6
Arizona 17.0 25.2 Massachusetts 6.5 7.5
Nevada 16.6 21.9 Utah 6.1 10.7
Florida 13.5 13.9 Washington 5.5 6.3
New Jersey 12.2 15.5 Idaho 5.4 6.7
Colorado 11.8 17.1 Oregon 5.3 6.5
New York 11.6 14.9 Kansas 4.9 7.4
Hawaii 10.0 11.6 Virginia 4.8 5.9Table 12. States where Hispanics will represent the largest share of the electorate in 2024. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist
partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
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Map 8 displays these results for the states.
Map 8. Percentage of all votes cast in the 2024 Presidential election that will be cast by Hispanics. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis
of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Where Hispanic Growth Will Contribute Most to Democratic Growth
Since Hispanics are a Democratic-leaning voting group, Hispanic voter growth itself will also lead to Democratic growth in many
states. Though these gains are somewhat modest compared to the impact of investment in the Hispanic vote, Democrats can stil
expect to reap the benefits of Hispanics growing share of the electorate (short of, as discussed earlier, a successful opposing
Republican effort to secure high levels of Hispanic support). Our projections show that six states (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona
Nevada, California, and Colorado) will become more than a full percentage point more friendly towards Democratic candidates as a
result of Hispanics growing presence in the electorate alone. Note that these figures do not indicate which states will become more
Democratic on their own; other dynamics such as the aging of the non-Hispanic population will also shift baseline levels of
Democratic support. This particular metric captures the impact of only one factor the Hispanic population growth that will occur
between 2008 and 2024 on Democratic performance in 2024; other factors in our projections also influence Democrats finaprojected performance.
Projected Impact of Hispanic Voter Growth on Democratic Performance in 2024 by StateState Impact of Hispanic Growth on
Democratic Performance
State Impact of Hispanic Growth on
Democratic Performance
Texas 2.2 Kansas 0.6
Arizona 2.1 Rhode Island 0.5
New Mexico 1.9 Hawaii 0.5
Nevada 1.6 New York 0.4
Colorado 1.3 Indiana 0.4
California 1.3 Nebraska 0.4
Utah 0.9 Pennsylvania 0.4
Connecticut 0.7 Oregon 0.4New Jersey 0.6 Wyoming 0.4
Illinois 0.6 Massachusetts 0.3Table 13. States where Hispanic voter growth will most contribute to Democratic performance. Note that this does not correspond directly to
overall trends in states levels of Democratic support. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship model and US census
American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Because our projections account for differing levels of Democratic support among Hispanics in different geographies, areas where
Hispanics will grow most as a percentage of the electorate are not identical to areas where Hispanics will most power Democratic
Projected Percentage of Votes Cast by Hispanics in 2024
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growth. Table 14 shows the thirty Congressional districts, as currently drawn, where Hispanics growing presence in the electorate
will most power progressive gains. Map 9 shows these results for all Congressional districts.
Projected Impact of Hispanic Voter Growth on Democratic Performance in 2024 by CD
District Impact of Hispanic
Growth on Dem
Performance
District Impact of Hispanic
Growth on Dem
Performance
District Impact of Hispanic
Growth on Dem
Performance
CA-47 6.6 TX-11 4.3 CA-22 3.6
CA-20 6.6 CA-18 4.2 TX-15 3.5
NM-02 6.3 NM-01 4.1 TX-21 3.3
CA-21 5.7 TX-19 4.0 CA-45 3.3
TX-28 5.6 NM-03 3.9 CA-41 3.3
CA-44 5.4 CA-19 3.9 CA-39 3.2
TX-23 5.1 CA-42 3.9 CO-03 3.2
AZ-07 5.0 CA-49 3.9 CA-51 3.2
AZ-04 4.5 CO-07 3.7 CA-25 3.1
TX-27 4.5 CA-43 3.7 CA-23 3.1
Table 14. Congressional districts, as currently drawn, where Hispanic voter growth will most lead to Democratic growth in 2024. Note that this
captures the effect of only this factor on Democratic growth and does not indicate which districts will become more Democratic in sum. All
figures in percentage points. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US
Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Map 9. Amount of Democratic growth that will occur from Hispanic population growth between 2008 and 2024 by Congressional district as
currently drawn. Note that this does not correspond directly to overall trends in districts levels of Democratic support. Source: New Organizing
Institute analysis of Catalist partisanship, turnout, and race/ethnicity models and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Growth in Democratic Performance Due to Hispanic Voter Growth
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Summary
Many states and Congressional districts will witness significant political changes from Latino voter growth alone. Ouprojections predict that eleven Congressional districts (as currently drawn) will, in a generic scenario, change hands to
Democrats because of Hispanic voter growth, though in many more districts Hispanic voter growth will put formerly safe
Republican seats within striking distance for Democrats.
Age distribution will fuel Hispanic voter growth. The aging of currently 30-50 year old Hispanics into the 50-70 year old agecohorts will drive nearly two-thirds of Hispanic voter growth in the next two decades. Like Americans as a whole, as
individual Hispanics age they vote more dependably.
Large young Hispanic cohorts will continue to drive future voter growth, though themselves have little immediateimpact. The Hispanic population is and will continue to be heavily skewed towards younger cohorts, though these cohorts
historically low levels of voter turnout will somewhat mute their immediate political impact. Still, when those in these large
cohorts age in future decades they will present the opportunity for greater and more sustained Democratic gains.
Hispanic growth as a percentage of votes cast is different than Hispanic population growth. Five of the top ten states forHispanic voter growth between now and 2024 will not have the largest Hispanic population growth during that time.
Because the age distribution of the Hispanic population is a far greater determinant of political participation than its overal
size, some states with currently burgeoning younger Hispanic populations will likely witness massive increases in Hispanic
voting as these individuals age.
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Traditional and State-of-the-Art Campaign Tactics Do Work Cost-Effectively with
Latinos
Though many political practitioners understand the importance of outreach to Hispanics, there remain some questions about
whether the same campaign tactics progressives have employed to build and maintain majorities with other voting groups would
also prove efficacious with Hispanics.
In the previous section, we showed that the same general principles that apply to conducting analysis of other voters behavior foexample, the finding that for every ten years of age Americans become 9 percentage points likelier to vote apply to Hispanics as
well. In this section, we similarly demonstrate that Hispanics responses to numerous campaign tactics are indistinguishable from the
responses these same tactics have had with the general population. There are no statistically significant differences between how
Hispanics and the general population responded to any of the campaign tactics these studies examine.
Randomized Experiments
We arrive at these findings by reanalyzing the raw data from five randomized experiments and comparing the results of five more
Academics and progressive political practitioners conducted these experiments in recent years to determine the efficacy of various
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) tactics. In these experiments researchers randomly assign voters into treatment and control groups before
elections and canvassed, mailed, or called voters assigned to the treatment group. Just as in medical experiments, researchers then
compare the behavior of the treatment and control groups in the subsequent election that is, their rates of voting.
Since the voters are randomly assigned to their groups before the elections, any large differences between the groups voting rates
in the election can be attributed to the treatment that is, the phone call, canvass, or mail piece. This experimental method
represents the state of the art in evaluating the efficacy of campaign strategies.
Results
For the first five rows of Table 15, below, we reanalyze the original data from experiments conducted over the past several years
with overall sample sizes large enough to include a large number of Hispanics. 21 In these experiments the effects on the genera
public and Hispanics are the most directly comparable since they were conducted within the same political context and with the
exact same procedures and tactics.
For the last three rows in Table 15 we compare the results of three experiments originally aimed to measure the impact of specific
interventions with Hispanics to the results of similar interventions tested in separate experiments reported in Donald Green and
Alan Gerbers Get Out The Vote.
The number in the Effect Among All column in Table 15 refers to the percentage of voters who responded to the tactic that is
the percent of voters who the statistics indicate would not have voted had they not received the tactic under study. The next
column, Effect Among Hispanics, indicates the effect among the subsample of voters in the study who happened to be Hispanics
for the first five experiments.22 For the last three experiments, we report the generally accepted effect of these interventions in the
first column and the effect other researchers have found applying these tactics to Hispanics in the second column.
21 We also reanalyzed some studies where overall effect sizes were small enough that the effect among Hispanics could not be established with a sufficient degree of
statistical certainty given the number of Hispanics included in the sample. In none of these cases were the estimated effects statistically different between Hispanics
and the entire sample.22 Because researchers in each case applied the random assignment procedure to the entire sample including Hispanics beforehand the standard experimental
analysis procedure still yields an accurate estimate for the Hispanic population. We identified Hispanics by matching the vot ers state identification number to
Catalists national database of voters races/ethnicities.
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Results of Voter Contact Experiments Reanalyzed for Treatment Effect Among Hispanic Subjects
Intervention Media Experimenter State Effect Among
All
Effect Among
Hispanics
Cost per
Hispanic Vote
Vote Pledge Mail Analyst
Institute
CO 1.1% 1.5% $33
Vote Pledge
Reminders
Mail Analyst
Institute
CO 4.7% 5.0% $10
Identity Labeling Phone Analyst
Institute
NJ 1.4% 2.2% $23
Social Pressure
(Neighbors)23
Mail Yale MI 8.8% 16.7% $3
Social Pressure
(Abstention)24
Mail Yale MI 5.5% 7.2% $7
Live Call Phone Yale/CSUEB USA/CA 5.1%25 4.6%26 $11
Canvass Canvass Yale/CSUEB USA/CA 4.1%27 4.7%28 $57
Canvass Canvass Yale/CSUEB USA/CA 4.1%
29
4.6%
30
$58
Table 15. Results of GOTV experiments among Hispanics and the general voting public. Sources: Analyst Institute; New Organizing Institute
analysis of data from Donald Green; Melissa Michelson; Donald Green and Alan Gerber's Get Out The Vote.
The original purpose of these experiments was to determine the relative effectiveness of a particular campaign tactic. As can be
plainly seen, these experiments revealed that some tactics were more effective than others. Notably for the somewhat different
purposes of this reports discussion, however, we found that these trends of effectiveness also held for Hispanics: experiments that
were less effective with the general public were also less effective with Hispanics, while experiments that were more effectively
more generally proved more effective with Hispanics.
More importantly, Hispanics responded at least as well to every experiment we reanalyze. In fact, in every experiment we reanalyze
Hispanics appeared to have responded slightly better than most voters to the tactic under study. All results are statistically
significant at conventional levels (p
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Alan Gerbers Get Out The Vote: cost of intervention is assumed to be $0.50 per phone call, $0.50 per mail piece, and $2.67 per
canvass contact.31
The largest results we found were for Gerber, Green, and Larimers canonical 2008 social pressure experiment in which people were
mailed their own and their neighbors voting histories and told that their neighbors were told the same.32 The result we found
among Hispanic voters in their experiment 16.7 percentage points is extremely high. Though the results are still very statistically
significant, due to the relatively small number of Hispanics in the experiment there is a slightly larger margin of error and it is likely
that this is an overestimate of the experiments true effect. However, from the data we can still be 95% confident that the effect of
the treatment was at least 7.4 percentage points among Hispanic voters. Even with this very conservative estimate, at $0.50 pemailing, the data implies that that each additional Hispanic vote would cost campaigns $6.75.
31Donald Green and Alan Gerber, Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout, 2008.
32 The original experiment includes several different treatments. In Table 14 we only analyze the difference between the control group and the most effective
treatment the neighbors treatment in which voters were shown their and their neighbors vote histories.
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Appendix A: Interim Investment Results for States and Congressional Districts
While we use 2024 as a benchmark year to illustrate the long-term potential for Democratic gains from investing in Latino voters
these opportunities are, of course, not limited to the long-term. Both immediate and near-term opportunities exist all over the map
In this appendix we quantify those immediate and near-term opportunities and show how the potential impact on Democratic
performance from investing in Hispanic voters grows over time.
Impact at the State Level
Impact on Democratic Performance of Investment in Hispanic Voters by Presidential Election Year
Name 2012 2016 2020 2024
United States 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7%
Arizona 4.2% 4.5% 4.9% 5.2%
California 5.7% 6.0% 6.4% 6.7%
Colorado 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5%
Connecticut 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.7%
Delaware 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2%
Florida 2.6% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3%
Hawaii 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6%
Idaho 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4%Illinois 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.5%
Indiana 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0%
Kansas 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5%
Maryland 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2%
Massachusetts 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.6%
Nebraska 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1%
Nevada 3.7% 4.1% 4.5% 4.8%
New Jersey 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4%
New Mexico 8.6% 8.9% 9.2% 9.5%
New York 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9%
Oklahoma 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1%
Oregon 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4%Pennsylvania 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1%
Rhode Island 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2%
Texas 6.1% 6.4% 6.8% 7.0%
Utah 1.3% 1.5% 1.8% 1.9%
Virginia 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
Washington 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4%
Wyoming 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4%
Table A1. Impact of investment for select states in terms of improved Democratic performance. Percentages shown
are the point difference between best case and worst case scenarios in each state for each presidential election year.
States shown are those where the impact is one percentage point or higher at some point up to and including 2024.
Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship and turnout models, and
US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
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Map A1. Impact of investment in 2012 in terms of improved Democratic performance. Percentages are the point difference between best
case and worst case scenarios in each state. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanshipand turnout models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Map A2. Impact of investment in 2016 in terms of improved Democratic performance. Percentages are the point difference between best
case and worst case scenarios in each state. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship
and turnout models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2012 by State
Impact of Investment
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2016 by State
Impact of Investment
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Map A3. Impact of investment in 2020 in terms of improved Democratic performance. Percentages are the point difference between best
case and worst case scenarios in each state. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanshipand turnout models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Map A4. Impact of investment in 2024 in terms of improved Democratic performance. Percentages are the point difference between best
case and worst case scenarios in each state. Source: New Organizing Institute analysis of historical election exit polls, Catalist partisanship
and turnout models, and US Census American Community Survey (ACS) data.
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2020 by State
Impact of Investment
Improved Dem Performance Due to Investment in Hispanic Voters in 2024 by State
Impact of Investment
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Impact at the Congressional Level
Impact on Dem Performance of Investment in Hispanic Voters by Presidential Election Year
CD 2012 2016 2020 2024 CD 2012 2016 2020 2024
AZ-01 3.1% 3.6% 4.0% 4.3% AZ-02 3.3% 3.9% 4.4% 4.8%
AZ-03 2.4% 2.9% 3.3% 3.7% AZ-04 10.7% 12.4% 13.9% 15.1%
AZ-05 2.5% 3.0% 3.4% 3.7% AZ-06 3.3% 3.8% 4.2% 4.6%
AZ-07 10.7% 11.3% 11.9% 12.4% AZ-08 3.4% 3.8% 4.2% 4.5%AR-03 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% CA-01 3.3% 3.8% 4.1% 4.5%
CA-02 2.8% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% CA-03 2.8% 3.2% 3.4% 3.7%
CA-04 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 2.5% CA-05 4.5% 5.1% 5.6% 6.0%
CA-06 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% CA-07 4.4% 4.8% 5.2% 5.6%
CA-08 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% CA-09 1.6% 1.9% 2.2% 2.4%
CA-10 3.4% 3.8% 4.2% 4.6% CA-11 4.3% 4.7% 5.0% 5.3%
CA-12 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 4.4% CA-13 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 5.3%
CA-14 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% CA-15 3.8% 4.0% 4.3% 4.6%
CA-16 6.5% 7.1% 7.7% 8.2% CA-17 7.0% 7.7% 8.3% 8.8%
CA-18 9.8% 10.8% 11.7% 12.4% CA-19 6.1% 6.8% 7.4% 7.9%
CA-20 13.6% 14.2% 14.6% 14.7% CA-21 8.8% 9.8% 10.8% 11.6%
CA-22 4.9% 5.6% 6.1% 6.6% CA-23 7.1% 7.6% 8.0% 8.4%CA-24 4.4% 4.8% 5.2% 5.6% CA-25 6.3% 7.1% 7.8% 8.4%
CA-26 5.9% 6.5% 7.1% 7.6% CA-27 7.9% 8.6% 9.4% 10.1%
CA-28 8.7% 9.5% 10.3% 11.0% CA-29 6.0% 6.4% 6.9% 7.2%
CA-30 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6% CA-31 11.7% 12.5% 13.3% 14.0%
CA-32 15.0% 15.9% 16.8% 17.6% CA-33 3.8% 4.1% 4.4% 4.6%
CA-34 15.0% 16.0% 16.9% 17.7% CA-35 6.0% 6.9% 7.8% 8.8%
CA-36 5.2% 5.5% 5.7% 5.9% CA-37 7.2% 7.9% 8.7% 9.3%
CA-38 15.9% 16.8% 17.8% 18.7% CA-39 13.7% 14.9% 16.0% 17.0%
CA-40 5.8% 6.4% 7.0% 7.5% CA-41 5.5% 6.2% 6.8% 7.3%
CA-42 6.3% 7.0% 7.7% 8.2% CA-43 12.9% 14.2% 15.3% 16.1%
CA-44 7.6% 8.6% 9.3% 9.8% CA-45 6.6% 7.1% 7.6% 8.0%
CA-46 2.9% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% CA-47 13.5% 15.0% 16.2% 17.1%
CA-48 2.7% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4% CA-49 5.9% 6.6% 7.2% 7.6%
CA-50 2.9% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% CA-51 13.2% 14.1% 15.0% 15.6%
CA-52 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.8% CA-53 4.4% 4.7% 4.9% 5.0%
CO-01 3.6% 4.1% 4.4% 4.8% CO-02 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 3.6%
CO-03 4.2% 4.7% 5.0% 5.3% CO-04 2.5% 2.9% 3.3% 3.5%
CO-05 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% CO-06 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 2.2%
CO-07 4.0% 4.9% 5.6% 6.2% CT-01 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.5%
CT-02 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% CT-03 2.0% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1%
CT-04 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.4% CT-05 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0%
FL-03 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% FL-04 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2%
FL-05 1.6% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% FL-06 1.3% 1.7% 1.9% 2.2%FL-07 1.8% 2.1% 2.4% 2.7% FL-08 4.7% 5.4% 5.9% 6.3%
FL-09 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% FL-10 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5%
FL-11 3.0% 3.4% 3.7% 4.0% FL-12 2.9% 3.5% 4.1% 4.6%
FL-13 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% FL-14 1.6% 2.1% 2.6% 3.0%
FL-15 3.7% 4.4% 5.1% 5.6% FL-16 1.7% 2.1% 2.4% 2.7%
FL-17 3.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.3% FL-18 9.7% 10.2% 10.9% 11.6%
FL-19 2.1% 2.6% 3.0% 3.4% FL-20 4.1% 4.7% 5.2% 5.6%
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CD 2012 2016 2020 2024 CD 2012 2016 2020 2024
FL-21 12.9% 14.6% 17.0% 19.7% FL-22 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.5%
FL-23 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% FL-24 3.0% 3.4% 3.7% 4.0%
FL-25 12.8% 14.0% 15.2% 16.3% GA-07 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4%
GA-11 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% HI-01 1.8% 2.4% 2.9% 3.4%
HI-02 2.5% 3.1% 3.6% 4.1% ID-01 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
ID-02 1.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.8% IL-01 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2%
IL-02 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% IL-03 4.9% 5.6% 6.4% 7.3%IL-04 11.0% 11.7% 12.5% 13.3% IL-05 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 5.3%
IL-06 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% IL-07 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2%
IL-08 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.7% IL-09 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4%
IL-10 1.7% 2.0% 2.4% 2.8% IL-11 1.4% 1.7% 2.0% 2.2%
IL-13 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% IL-14 2.9% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0%
IL-16 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% IN-01 2.3% 2.6% 2.9% 3.2%
IN-02 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% IN-03 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4%
IA-05 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% KS-01 1.4% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4%
KS-02 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% KS-03 1.2% 1.4% 1.7% 1.9%
KS-04 1.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.8% MD-04 1.2% 1.5% 1.8% 2.0%
MD-05 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% MD-06 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2%
MD-08 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% MA-01 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5%
MA-02 1.5% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% MA-03 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8%
MA-04 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% MA-05 2.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3%
MA-06 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% MA-07 1.2% 1.5% 1.7% 1.9%
MA-08 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% MA-09 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1%
MI-02 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% MI-03 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
MI-13 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% MN-04 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4%
MO-05 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% NE-01 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.1%
NE-02 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% NE-03 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.7%
NV-01 5.4% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5% NV-02 2.8% 3.4% 3.9% 4.4%
NV-03 4.0% 4.6% 5.1% 5.6% NJ-01 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 2.3%
NJ-02 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.8% NJ-03 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%NJ-04 1.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.9% NJ-05 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3%
NJ-06 2.1% 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% NJ-07 2.1% 2.3% 2.6% 2.9%
NJ-08 5.6% 6.2% 6.8% 7.4% NJ-09 5.5% 6.1% 6.6% 7.0%
NJ-10 3.1% 3.6% 4.0% 4.3% NJ-11 1.8% 2.1% 2.5% 2.7%
NJ-12 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% NJ-13 8.9% 9.1% 9.2% 9.1%
NM-01 9.2% 10.0% 10.9% 11.6% NM-02 10.6% 11.6% 12.5% 13.2%
NM-03 8.3% 8.9% 9.4% 9.8% NY-01 1.8% 2.2% 2.5% 2.9%
NY-02 2.6% 2.9% 3.2% 3.6% NY-03 1.6% 1.9% 2.2% 2.6%
NY-04 2.8% 3.4% 4.0% 4.5% NY-05 3.8% 4.3% 4.7% 5.2%
NY-06 2.1% 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% NY-07 6.4% 7.0% 7.6% 8.1%
NY-08 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% NY-09 3.7% 4.3% 4.9% 5.4%
NY-10 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 2.2% NY-11 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.4%NY-12 6.3% 6.4% 6.6% 6.8% NY-13 3.2% 3.7% 4.3% 4.9%
NY-14 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% NY-15 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
NY-16 5.9% 6.3% 6.7% 6.9% NY-17 3.8% 4.5% 5.1% 5.6%
NY-18 3.1% 3.6% 4.1% 4.6% NY-19 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1%
NY-20 0.6% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% NY-21 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4%
NY-22 1.8% 2.2% 2.6% 2.9% NY-23 0.5% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2%
NY-24 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% NY-27 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 1.4%
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CD 2012 2016 2020 2024 CD 2012 2016 2020 2024
NY-28 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% OH-05 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4%
OH-09 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% OH-10 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
OH-13 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% OK-01 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1%
OK-03 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% OK-04 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5%
OK-05 1.0
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