Existentialism is an Environmentalism Sartre and … · Existentialism is an Environmentalism: Sartre and Wilderness Sean S. Gould "Others, who try to prove their existence

ExistentialismisanEnvironmentalism:SartreandWilderness

SeanS.Gould

"Others,whotrytoprovetheirexistenceisnecessary,whenman'sappearanceonearthis

merelycontingent,Iwillcallbastards."‐Jean‐PaulSartre

Despite,orperhapsinpartduetoitsimperfections,ExistentialismisaHumanism

standsasapowerfulintroductiontowards20thC.existentialistthought.Inthelecture,

Sartredescribesthehumanconditioninprimarilynegativeterms;individualslackan

internalessencebeyondwhatiscreatedbytheircommitmentswhilenothingintheworld

speaksastoguideone'schoices.OneofSartre'sgoalsforthelecturewastoconnectthese

negativeclaimswithhispositiveadvocacyofcommittedresponsibilityforone'sactions.

Particularly,headvocatesahumanistprojectofpromotingpeople'sabilitytomakefree

decisionsandtorealizethemselvesthroughthepursuitofgoalsthatreachbeyondtheir

ownselves.i

TheaimofthispaperistoinitiateareadingofSartreanexistentialismforthe

environmentalist.Ultimately,thispapersuggeststhatanon‐anthropocentric

conservationistthemecanbefoundinSartre'sdescriptionofthehumanconditionandhis

advocacyofwillingfreedom.Byencounteringreasonsforwhycommitmenttofreedom

matters,whilealsodenyingthepossibilityofantecedentstructureofvaluerequiredto

justifyaspecialethicalstatusofhumans,anenvironmentalistreadingofExistentialismisa

HumanismcanmodifySartre'spositiontowardtheconclusionthattheavoidanceofself‐

deceptionrequiresaconcernforenvironmentalstewardshipandtheconservationof

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wildlifeandwildlandsthroughexercisingarestrainednon‐impositionofourwilluponthe

freedomofothers,humanandnon‐humanalike.

ThereisverylittleworkrelatingtheideasofJean‐PaulSartretoenvironmentalism

andconservationism.Anditisperhapsunderstandablethatthosecompelledbyglacier

lilies,whitepine,andwolvesmightoverlooktheParisianurbanitewhoseprimary

examplestendtofocusuponwaitingforabsentfriendsinbarsandcafes.Althoughthere

areexceptivepassageswithinSartre'swork‐whichthispaperwillhighlight‐Sartre's

writingtendstofocusuponanthropocentricandhumanistconcerns.Anditwouldbea

misrepresentationofSartretoreadhimasanaturalfitforenvironmentalism;forexample,

hisemphasisuponhumansubjectivitycouldeasilyirritatethemorenaturalistically

mindedconservationist.However,Sartre'sphenomenologicalmethodologyalsorecognizes

thefundamentalstatusof"theenvironment"anditsirreduciblysubjectindependent

dimensionasafundamentalcomponentofthehumancondition.Thisparticular

environmentalistreadingofSartrewillbeginonthiscommonground.

ExistencePrecedesEssence

Sartreclaimsthatthecogitoisthesolepointofdeparturefortheviewsexpressedin

ExistentialismisaHumanism(EH).iiPhenomenologyandabroadlyCartesianmethodology

formthestartingpointsformostofSartre'sinitialwork,althoughSartre'sconclusions

radicallydivergefromthoseofDescartes,especiallyregardingthepossibilityofaclear

distinctionbetweenmindandworldandtheexistenceofadeity."Existentialism,"Sartre

writes,"ismerelyanattempttodrawalloftheconclusionsinferredbyaconsistently

atheisticpointofview."iiiAndso,itisimportanttodistinguishbetweenDescartes’

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conclusionandthebroadlyCartesianmethodologyemployedbySartre.Specifically,

Sartre'stworemarksonthehumanconditionandtheethicalimplicationsheattemptsto

drawfromhisobservationsgrowfromaphenomenologicalanalysisofchoice.

Whenthephenomenologicallensisutilizedforintrospectivereflection,Sartre

arrivestothepreclusionofanypre‐consciousmentalfeaturethatcansimultaneouslyallow

forboththesubjectiveappearanceofachoicetoappear,assuch,whilstalsoproviding

definitiveguidanceforanygivendecision.Thus,thefirstexistentialistobservationonthe

humanconditionismerelythatnothinginourmindmakesourdecisionsforus.Forthe

purposeofclarifyingSartre'sadvocacytowardsfreedomwillingfreedom,reflective

phenomenologyshouldbeseenasdealingwithwhatSartrecharacterizesas"despair,"the

preconditionthatinquiry‐conductedunderaCartesianmethodology‐limititselfto

"reckoningonlywiththosethingsthatdependonourwill,oronthesetofprobabilitiesthat

enableaction."ivWhilesociobiologyandotherscienceshavetaughtusthattherearecertain

pre‐consciousaspectsofeveryindividualthatinfluenceone'sthoughts,feelings,and

actionsinwayswedonotcontrol,theseinfluencesareirrelevanttoquestionsaboutthe

phenomenologyofchoice.

InTheTranscendenceoftheEgo,Sartrearguesforhistransparencyofconsciousness

claim,thatitisimpossible,viaintrospection,toencounteranyaspectofconsciousnessthat

couldpotentiallyformabasisoffreelywilledpersonalitythatinclinesapersontowards

anygivenpatternofthought,feeling,orbehavior.vIfwereflectonourconsciousexperience

ofanythingandattempttoabstractawaywhateveritisweareconsciousofthenweareleft

withnothing,accordingtoSartre.Consciousness,andeverythingweencounterupon

seriousreflection,isdependentuponourselvesasfirstencounteringtherawmaterialsfor

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intentionalobjectsasexistingintheworld.UnlikeDescartes,Sartre'sinquirydoesnotlead

toadisembodieddualism,butratherwhatMarkRowlandshascharacterizedasa"radical

reversalofidealism."viAccordingtoSartre,introspectionshowsthatourmindsare

constitutedbyoursurroundings.

Evensomethingascentraltochoiceas"thewill"isforSartre,andencounteredin

theworld.Thewilltowardscertainactionsappeartousastheluringpossibilitiesand

demandsofsituations.Wedonotseewithinourselves,forinstance,awilltosavePierre,

butratherseePierreashaving‐to‐be‐helped.Weencounterourownwillandouradopted

reasonsintheformofenvironmentalaffordances.Inhispubliclecture,Sartretakesthe

transparencyclaimasmoreorlessgiven,andpresentsitasastartingpointfor

existentialismingeneral,asencapsulatedbytheslogan,"existenceprecedesessence."vii

WithinapplicationofaCartesianmethodology,Sartreclaimsthat"Existentialism"

expressesthedoctrinethat"everytruthandeveryactionimplyanenvironmentanda

humansubjectivity."viiiWhileendorsingtheestablishmentofanintrinsicconnection

subjectivityandenvironment,anenvironmentalistreaderisstillwarrantedasviewing

Sartre'sclaimasbeingfromaveryuncommonground.Fortunately,thereisstillspace

withinexistentialismtocriticizeSartre'slimitedfocusonhumansubjectivity.

Initially,thecogitoonlyprovidesonewithadisclosureofsubjectivity,butdoesnot

providethemeansforthe"human"qualification.InBeingandNothingness,Sartreattempts

toaddresspotentialproblemswithsolipicisminhissectionon"theLook,"towhichSartre

vaguelyrefersinEHasthecogito'sdisclosureofothers.ixTobrieflyexplain,Sartreclaims

thatournaturalreactiontothegazeofothersistoexperiencecertainnon‐solipicistic

assumingemotions,suchasshame,whichwenaturallyactupon.Therefore,forallpractical

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purposes,wearecompelledtoactin,andperceivetheworld,asthoughweshareitwith

othersubjects.However,theenvironmentalisthasroomtoarguethat"thelook"can

equallybeusedtodescribeourencounterwithnon‐humansubjectivity.Moreover,because

ofSartre's"radicalreversalofidealism"itseemsmostconsistenttoconfessthatwefind

nothingwithinourownconsciousexperiencetoserveasgroundsfortheexceptionalismof

human,versusnon‐human,sentience.ThequestionliesbeyondthescopeofCartesian

methodologyandthecertitudewithwhichSartreaimstogroundhisclaims.

"Abandonment"isthesecondkeyconceptinSartre'sexistentialistaccountofthe

humancondition.SartreaffirmsDostoyevsky'sstatementthat,"IfGoddoesnotexist,

everythingispermissible"anddeniesthepossibilityofencounteringanyhuman‐

independentsourceofvalueorethics.x"Abandonment"istheenvironmentalanalogof

consciousness's"nothingness"andcharacterizestheexperienceonehaswhenreflective

awarenessshowsthatnothingintheworldprovidesameterofvaluethatcoulddetermine

theoutcomeofanygivenchoice.

Whilethisrejectionofnon‐anthropogenicallyencounteredvaluemaychafesome

environmentalists,Sartre'suseof"abandonment"shouldneitherbeunderstoodas

precludingrestraintsuponhumanbehavior,i.e.thateveryactionispossible,norasa

rejectionoftheintrinsicvalueofnatureandthewild.Towardsthefirstpoint,Sartre

emphasizestheimportancethatconstraintsuponactionhaveinhowweperceivethe

world.InBeingandNothingnesshecallstheseconstraintsthe"co‐efficientsofadversity"

thatfacilitateorfrustratetheefficacyofourprojects,oncetheseprojectsareadopted.

Sartrewrites,

Inparticularthecoefficientofadversityinthingscannotbeanargumentagainstourfreedom,foritisbyus­i.e.,bythepreliminarypositingofanend

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‐thatthiscoefficientofadversityarises.Aparticularcrag,whichmanifestsaprofoundresistanceifIwishtodisplaceit,willbe,onthecontrary,avaluableaidifIwanttoclimbuponitinordertoviewthecountryside.Initself‐ifonecanevenimaginewhatacragcanbeinitself‐itisneutral;thatis,itwaitstobeilluminatedbyanendinordertomanifestitselfasadverseorhelpful.xi

Certainenvironmentalconsiderations,representedabovebythecrag,mattertoour

variousprojects.Likewise,mostanthropocentricargumentsfortakingsuchthingsas

climatechangeseriouslylieinthefactthatcertaincausalsystemsproducetruthsthatare

inconvenientforthepursuitofincompatibleprojects.Wecanfreelyadoptthecombined

projectofutilizingcurrentlevelsoffossilfuelconsumptionwhilstalsotryingtopreserve

theclimatestabilityoftheplanet,butthecoefficientsofadversitybroughtaboutbyhow

carbon‐dioxidetrapsheat,doomsuchprojectstofailure.Theenvironmentalexistentialist

canthusclaimthatwhilewearefreetochoosewhatwewill,notaddressingclimatechange

andhopingforasustainablefuturemakesasmuchsenseashopingtosurvivean

unprotectedclimbup"theDiamond"onLongsPeakwhilewearingrollerskates.

Towardthesecondpoint,Sartre'sdiscussionof"abandonment"neednotbereadas

arejectionofthepossibilityofintrinsicvaluewithinnature.Rather,itcanbeunderstoodas

emphasizingtheindeterminaterelationshipfree‐willedagentshavetowardtheencounter

ofanyvalue.InEHSartresays,"evenifGodweretoexist,itwouldmakenodifference,"xii

meaningthatevenifweweretoencountervaluesintheworldwestillindependently

determineourrelationshiptothosevalueseverytimewemakeachoice.Sartre'sinclusion

of"abandonment"aspartofthehumanconditionshouldbequalifiedasmeaningthatthe

onlyvalueswhichmotivationallyinteractwithourworld‐viewarepreciselythosetowhich

webindourselvesthroughactsofcommitment.

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Atthispoint,thereseemstobeacontradictionwithinexistentialistphilosophythat

parallelsmetaethicaldebatesregardingwhethervalueisahumanprojectionorsomesort

ofqualitythatisdisclosedtous.Ononehand,Sartre'sinternalreflectionplacesboth

reasonsandevidenceofthewillasexternaltotheconsciousnessasitappearstous.

However,healsoclaimsthatreasonscannotcompelustowardanyaction.Whilenotgoing

toofardownametaethicaltangent,Sartre'sdiscussionofpossibilitiesprovidesasketchof

ananswer,

Ioperatewithinarealmofpossibilities.Butwecreditsuchpossibilitiesonlytothestrictextentthatouractionencompassesthem.FromthemomentthatthepossibilitiesIamconsideringceasetoberigorouslyengagedbymyaction,Imustnolongertakeinterestinthem...xiii

Toreconcileourindependencefromvaluewiththeclaimthatweencounterreasons

foractionasenvironmentalaffordances,onecouldsaythatwhileweencountersituations

ashavingluringpossibilitiesanddemands,whenchoiceisinvolvedthereisalwaysjust

enoughhesitationanduncertaintytoprovideamoment'squestioningofone'srelationship

totheperceiveddemandsoftheworld.Inthisway,reasonsandvaluesarenotidentifiable

assuchuntiltheyareacteduponwithcommitment.

Toillustratethispoint,consideranopenlandscapeoraruggedmountainside.More

thananyotherarea,duetoitsrelativelackofpre‐designatedsigns,boardwalks,andother

behavioralclues,wildernessareasprovidemoreopportunitiesforspontaneous

explorationthanwecanpursueatatime;newpathsemergetheinstantwechangerouteto

followacertainway.Ourprojectsandtheenvironmentcooperatetoproduceaffordances

whoseexistenceasavalueweeitherchoosetoseeornot.Andagain,asisthecasewith

globalwarming,somechoicespresentdeadends.ReadingSartreasdescribingvalueas

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manifestinendorsedaffordancesenablesonetobeginreconcilingtheissueofwhether

valuesareendorsedorprojectedwithinhisexistentialistphilosophy.

Using"abandonment"todescribethehumanconditionanddeclaringthatvaluesare

disclosedthroughourcommitmenttothemneednotbeunderstoodasclaimingthat

humans,asagroup,arespecialfountainsofinter‐speciesvalue.Sartrecallsthissortof

metaethicalanthropocentricism"absurd,foronlyadogorahorsewouldbeinapositionto

formanoveralljudgmentaboutmananddeclarethatheisamazing,whichanimals

scarcelyseemlikelytodo‐atleastasfarasIknow."xivInfact,Sartreassertsthatthe

worshipofhumanity,asanend,leadstoFascism.xvWiththisnon‐anthropocentric

assurance,wecanjustifiablyreadSartre'semphasisonhumansubjectivityand

abandonmentasfollowingfromhisattempttoremainwithinthelimitsofthecogito,rather

thanfromapotentiallyobjectionableslightingofthenon‐human.BecauseSartreisa

human,hismethodswillbeanthropogenic,butthevaluestowhichexistentialismleadsone

tocommitneednot,themselves,beanthropocentic.BecauseSartreutilizesthecogitoasa

startingpoint,hisgoalisnotcomparativebetweenhumansandanimals;rather,hemerely

seekstoaddressthewayinwhichheandhisintendedhumanaudienceencounter,

internalize,andavowcertainvaluesthroughpractice.

Undertheenvironmentalistreadingpursuedhere,itmakessensetospeakofvalue

foranythingwithwhichitalsomakessensetoassociatewiththehavingofanopportunity.

Inthisway,abroadlySartreanexistentialismtakesasteptowardsenvironmentalethics

thatissomewhatparalleltoPaulTaylor'sbasingrespectfornatureuponrespectfor

centersofautonomouschoice.xviRatherthanview"abandonment"asathreatto

proclaimingthevalueofnatureandwildplaces,environmentalistexistentialistscanutilize

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"abandonment"asablockadeagainstanyargumentsthatattempttoassignanapriori

privilegetomankindandtheirends,wherethesecompetewiththewellbeingofthe

naturalworld.Theexistentialistisfreetorejectanyassumptionthathumanshavean

ethicalrighttoundulyharmecosystemsforthebenefitofman.Whenapersontakessucha

position,theenvironmentalexistentialistcanholdhimorherresponsibleforfreely

adoptingthesevalues.

TheWilltoFreedom

Bycombininghisviewofconsciousnesswiththeconditionof"abandonment"Sartre

arrivesatbasisfortheconditionhecalls"despair"or"anguish."Thisconditioniscausedby

therecognitionthatalthoughultimatelyunguided,ourchoicesneverthelessexpressa

commitmenttothatwhichischosen.Anditisthrough"despair"thatSartreinitiateshis

Kantianstyleargumentforthenormativeuniversalizabilityofthe"willtofreedom."

"Despair"signifiesthefactthateverytimeweactweprojectourselvesintotheworld,

affirmingsomevalues,rejectingothers,andavowingtoactuponthoseaffirmed,especially

whenwemakedecisionsthatarepivotaltochoosingorownparticularformoflife.Sartre

writes,

Choosingtobethisorthatistoaffirmatthesametimethevalueofwhatwechoose[i.e.projectitbeyondourownsubjectivityasanendforoursubjectiveproject],becausewecanneverchooseevil.If,moreover,existenceprecedesessenceandwewilltoexistatthesametimeaswefashionourimage,thatimageisvalidforallandforourwholeera.Ourresponsibilityisthusmuchgreaterthanwemighthavesupposed,becauseitconcernsallmankind.xvii

Choosingaparticularwayofliferequiresustoproceedasifthereissomethingchoice‐

worthyaboutgoingaboutinsuchandsuchaway.Moreover,becauseourconsciousnessis

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nothingmorethanconsciousnessofsomething,thechoiceisexperiencedasbeing

motivatedbyacommitmenttothevalueofwhatwechoose.

Sartre'sconnectionbetweentheexistentialistslogan,"existenceprecedesessence"

andtheuniversalizingnatureofchoiceisthecruxofhisargumenttowardstheimportance

ofchoosingfreedom,andrequiresclarification.ThepointSartreistryingtogetatisthat

evenwithcarefulandreflectiverelativism,weareforcedto,atleastminimally,experience

ourchoicesasbeingvalidforanyoneelsewhohassufficientlysimilarcircumstancestoour

own.Sartrereferencetothephrase"existenceprecedesessence"isintendedtoremindus

thatgiventhesomewhattransparentnatureofconsciousness,ourconditionbeforeany

choiceis,forthemostpart,generalizable.Individualsituationsvaryenoughtorelativise

certainconsiderations,i.e.awinterexpeditionrequiresonetochooseequipmentdifferent

thanisrequiredtofloattheLochsaRiver.However,inotherconsiderationsweallstart

fromthesameplace;forexample,weareallonrelativelyequalfootingregardingwhether

ornotwechoosetoendorse,toanextentrelativetoourmeans,environmentaland

conservationistconcerns.Nosinglepersonisgivenaparticularessencewhichrelativises

theirpersonaldecisionaboutwhethertoendorseanthropocentricoreco‐centricvaluesin

hisorherownethic.

Byfocusingontherelationshipbetweencommitmentandself‐deception,Sartre

presentsthedemandthatweviewourchoicesaspotentiallyuniversalizableasa

hypothetical,ratherthanacategoricalimperative.Sartresays,"intruth,however,one

shouldalwaysaskoneself,"whatwouldhappenifeveryonedidwhatIamdoing?"Theonly

waytoevadethatdisturbingthoughtisthroughsomekindofbadfaith."xviiiSartre'saccount

of"badfaith"issufficientlydiscussedelsewhere,andforcurrentpurposesonlyneedsa

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cursorydescription.xixInitstwoprimaryforms,iteitherinvolvestakingone'schoicestobe

over‐determinedbyone'sconcretesituation,oroppositely,denyingresponsibilityfor,and

aconnectionto,theconcretesituationapersonhasbecauseofthechoicesonemakes.

Sartre'srejectionthatpeoplehaveinternalessences,whichwouldberequiredtopre‐

determinehowonemakeschoices,iswhyheconcludesthatanychoiceunderthe

assumptionofprivilegedcircumstancescanonlyoccuralongsideselfdeception,or"bad

faith."

Atfirst,aconservationistreaderofSartremightbecompelledtoimaginethe

hypocrisyofanoutdoor‐lovingrealestatedeveloperprovidesanexampleofSartre'sclaim.

Forcertainly,oneimagines,ifeveryoneinstigatedsub‐urbansprawlthenourfreewilled

landswoulddisappearinshortorder,andwhoisthedevelopertoassumetheprivilegeto

drawprofitfromclosinguplandwhencertainlyeveryonecannotdoso?Thislineof

thinking,however,wouldforceonetowardsreadingabsurditiesintotheexistentialist

position.Nothingwedo,technicallyspeaking,canbesimultaneouslydonebyeveryoneelse

inthesameplaceandatthetime.Justaswecannotallbuildourownsubdivisions,wealso

cannotallenjoythesolitudeofthewildernesstogether.Yetthereisnothingwrongwith

enjoyingthesolitudeprovidedbycertainlandscapes.Afterall,manyofussometimes

sympathizewithSartre'scharacterwhenheproclaims,"hellisotherpeople."

TomakethemostsenseoutofSartre'sposition,itseemsbesttofollowJonathan

Webber'ssuggestionthatwereadSartreasprimarilyconcernedwiththechoiceswemake

towardtheadoptionofcertaincharactertraitsandvalues.xxValuesandvirtuesarenot

limitedresourcesforwhichwecompete.Thisrestrictionofthesenseinwhichweought

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readSartre'srequirementofgeneralizabilityfollowsSartre'sownpathinhighlightinghow

theforemostgeneralizableprojectisthepromotionoffreedom.

Theanguishedthoughtthatourdecisionscommitustothevalueofwhatischosen

bringsSartretohishumanisticconclusionthatself‐consistencydemandsthatourchoices

reflectanendorsementandpromotionofpeople'sabilitytomakefreechoicesandpursue

projectsbeyondthemselves,apositionSartrecalls"willingfreedom."xxiAccordingto

Sartre,anyadopteddispositiontowardsactionthatdoesnotinvolveacommitmentto

freedomforoneselfandothersisonlyrationallypossibleifapersonhidesfromhimselfthe

existentialistaspectsofthehumancondition.Towillaprojectthatundulydeniesthe

abilityofotherstomakechoiceswhilemakingfreechoicesoneselfistodeceiveoneself

intothinkingthat,antecedenttothechoice,thereissomethingspecialaboutoneselfthat

warrantstheprivilege.Buttoassumethisprivilegeistoendorse“badfaith.”However,this

alsomeansthattoretainconsistencywithacknowledgementofabandonment,

contradictingthewilltofreedomcannotbejudgedonethicalgrounds;itcanonlybe

describedasan"intellectualerror"andasself‐deception.xxii

Willingfreedom,forSartre,entailsthatweallowothersopportunitytoexercise

theirfreedomofchoiceinaconcretemannerthroughourownpursuitofspecificconcrete

situationswhichaffordothersthispossibility.GivenSartre'sphenomenological

conclusions,"freedom"isanemptyconceptwithoutaconcretesituationtoprovidethe

environmentalaffordancesaboutwhichchoicescanbemade.Avowalstowardfreedom

cannotonlybetowardstheabstractnotion,butmusthavesituationalimport.xxiii

Furthermore,to"promote"freedomintheabstractwhilenottakingconcretestepswould

beanexampleofthesecondformof"badfaith,"thatofnottakingresponsibilityforone's

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concretesituationandassumingone'ssocalled"innerwill"isun‐diminishedbyone's

concreteinactivity.

Now,certainlyeveryactioncausessomerestrictions,someco‐effecientsof

adversity,uponotheragents.However,returningtothecragexampleabove,weshould

distinguishbetweenthefreeabilitytochoosesomeprojectandthefreedomofthatproject

fromobstacles.Itispromotingtheformer,apositivefreedomtochoose,through

promotionofconcretemeansthatSartreadvocates.Nevertheless,thisfurtherentails

certainformsofnegativefreedomofspecialrelevancetoconservation,specificallythe

securingforothersafreedomfromourownimpositionuponthem.

ConquerYourselfRatherthantheWorld

InExistentialismisaHumanism,Sartreemphasizeshow"willingfreedom"is

relevanttohumanistsandMarxists,presumablyduetoafreedomtopursueone'sown

capabilitiesandalsoafreedomfromalienationandexploitation.Buttheenvironmentalist

canaskwhatecologicallyrelevantimplicationscanbedrawnfromtheacceptanceof

Sartre'sadvocacyoftheprojectofwillingfreedomonthegroundspresentedinhislecture.

Toinitiatethisinquiry,considerthefollowingenvironmentallypoignantkeypassage:

[N]oGodorgreaterdesigncanbendtheworldanditspossibilitiestomywill.Inthefinalanalysis,whenDescartessaid"Conqueryourselfratherthantheworld,"heactuallymeantthesamething:weshouldactwithouthope.xxiv

Here,"actingwithouthope"bynomeansentailsenvironmentalpessimism.Rather,by

"actingwithouthope,"Sartremeansthatweactuponcertainpossibilitieswithoutpromise

thatourplaceamongthesepossibilitiesisunderwrittenbyaheavenlysystemofvalue.

Furthermore,ratherthanwistfullyhopingforachangeintheaffordancesoftheworld,we

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mustconquerourselvesbysteeringourwilltowardsprojectstowhichwecanfullycommit

withouthypocrisy,suchastheprojectoffreedom.

Anexistentialistwilltowardfreedomandourembeddednessinaworldof

possibilitiesprovidesgroundforanenvironmentalethicintermsofthepreservationof

freedomandpossibilitiesinnature.Certainly,thereareanthropocentricconnections

betweenconservationandhumanfreedom.Thepreservationofbio‐diversity,wildlife,and

thewildplaceswherenaturalhistoryisallowedtoproceedonitsnaturalevolutionary

courseallmustbepreserved,ifnotforhumansurvival,thanatleastinordertoretainthe

possibilityofpeople'shavingthefreechoicetoexplore,learnfrom,andlovethese

phenomenon.Wildernessadvocateshavearguedalongtheselinesforconservationfora

longtimebyemphasizingthelongingsomeofusfeel"fortheunharnessedfreedomofthe

bigoutside"andtheimportanceofpreservingopportunitiestosatiatethisdesire.xxvOr,

movingbeyondpersonalfreedom,onemightciteEdAbbeyandhisrecognitionofthelink

betweenpoliticalfreedomandwilderness.xxvi

Theexistentialistpositionexploredhereaffordsmovingbeyondthese

anthropocentricreasonsbyarguingthattheprecedingofexistenceoveressence,andthe

conditionofabandonmentbothremovethepossibilityofmerelyfocusinguponhuman

freedominourprojectofwillingfreedom.Pursuingfreedombyadoptingself‐restraintand

aprojectofnon‐impositioncanbeextendedbeyondthescopeofhuman‐to‐human

interactions.Interferencewithwildlife,thedestructionoralteringofthelandscape,and

interferencewiththeproceedingsofevolutionareallformsofimpositionthatare

acceptablewhennecessitypushessuchactionsbeyondtherealmofchoice.Wilderness

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areasarerepresentativeoftheconcretesituationsembodyingthisprojectofnon‐

imposition.

Thereareexistentialistgroundsforarguingthatself‐willedanimalsandecosystems

shouldbothbefreetopursuetheformsofpossibilitiesforwhichevolutionhasprepared

them.Andthismeansminimizingthereachofhumaninterferencewiththeunfoldingof

suchpossibilities,exceptininstanceswherehumanpracticeshavebeenaco‐evolutionary

factorforasignificantamountoftime.Thecontinuationofindigenouscommunities’

practices,suchastheharvestingofcamas,Camassiaquamash,inIdaho,orthecontinuation

ofhumaninteractionwithdomesticatedanimalsisnotnecessarilyaformofoutside

interference.Otherwise,imposingone'swilluponalandscapefeature,anecosystem,oran

animalinawaythatgoesagainstitsusualandaccustomedhistoryorformoflifeisan

interferencewithfreedomandexpressionofself‐privilegethatbetrayassumptionsofbad

faith.Suchimpositionsareliterallyfailuresto"conquerourselvesratherthantheworld."

Throughadvocatinga"willtofreedom"andthenecessityofnon‐impositiontoavoid

“badfaith,”existentialismimpliesa"leavenotrace"ethicfornotonlyourpersonal

encounterswithwildernessareas,butalsoforsocietiesinteractionswithourremaining

wildplaces.AccordingtoSartre,"willingfreedom"isaprojectwecanadoptwithoutself‐

deception,conservationislikewiseauniversalizableproject.Infact,theexistentialist

positionadoptedheretakesafirmerposition,allowingonetoaddthatexcusingoneself

fromcontributingtotheprotectionoftheenvironmentresultsinbothformsof“badfaith.”

Thosewhodonotactivelycontribute,withintheirability,toenvironmentalprotection

haveeitherexcusedthemselvesfromtheprojectoffreedomonspuriousreasons,orhave

failedtotakeresponsibilityfortheirconcretesituationontheplanet.

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iSartre,Jean‐Paul.(2007).ExistentialismisaHumanism.CarolMacomber,trans.London:YaleUniversityPress,2007.p52.iiibid.p40.iiiibid.p53.ivibid.p34.vSartre,Jean‐Paul.(1957).TheTranscendenceoftheEgo.transForrestWilliamsandRobertKirkpatrick.NewYork:NoondayPress.viRowlands,M.(2008).Externalism.Chesham:Acumen.pp63‐75.viiSartre,2007.p22.viiiibid.p18.ixSartre,Jean‐Paul.(1966).BeingandNothingness.transHazelT.Barnes.NewYork:WashingtonSquarePress.pp340‐400.Sartre,2007.p41.xSartre2007.pp28‐9.xiSartre1966.p620.xiiSartre2007.p53.xiiiibid.p35.xivibid.p52.xvibid.p52.xviTaylor,P.W.RespectforNature:ATheoryofEnvironmentalEthics.25thAniversaryEdition.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011.p39.xviiSartre2007.p24.xviiiibid.p25.xixWebber,J.(2002).“MotivatedAversion:Non‐TheticAwarenessinBadFaith.”SartreStudiesInternationalvol.8,no.1.Santoni,RonaldE.(1995).BadFaith,GoodFaith,andAuthenticityinSartre’sEarlyPhilosophy.Philidelphia:TempleUniversityPress.Gardiner,Patrick.(1977).“SartreonCharacterandSelf‐Knowledge.”NewLiteraryHistory.Vo.9,No1,Autumn.pp.65‐82.xxWebber,J.(2009).TheExistentialismofJean‐PaulSartre.NewYork:Routledge.p135.xxiSartre2007.pp48‐9.xxiiibid.p47.xxiiiibid.pp48‐9.xxivibid.p35.xxvDilg,W.H(1927).OutdoorAmerica,IzaakWaltonLeague,October1927.citedinForeman,D.(2012).TakeBackConservation.Durango,CO:Raven'sEyePress.p74.xxviForaninterestingdiscussionoffreedomandwilderness,seeTanner,R.J.(2007)."WildernessandtheParadoxofIndividualFreedom."inWatson,Alan;Sproull,Janet;Dean,Liese,comps.Scienceandstewardshiptoprotectandsustainwildernessvalues;eighthWorldWildernessCongresssymposium:September30‐October6,2005;Anchorage,AK.ProceedingsRMRS‐P‐49.FortCollins,CO:US.DepartmentofAgriculture,ForestService,RockyMountainResearchStation.

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