Digital Imaging and Kodak's Strategic Mistake
Post on 08-May-2015
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It is striking how Kodak has sufferedsince the rise of digital imaging.
The stock declined from around 80 dollars to 3 USD in less than ten years. The company employed 140 000 people
in 1988 – today around 20 000.
I have argued before that much of this decline wasinevitable and that Kodak did more than many otherfilm companies in order to meet the digital challenge
(read more here).
But surely, they must have madesome mistakes, right?
Of course they did, everyone does. But since we’ll never know the alternative outcomes it’s difficult
to point out those mistakes.
Nevertheless, I willprovide a few highlyunscientific thoughts
about this issue.
The wild
took place in the
lot of debt.
diversifications that
1980s put Kodak in a
One consequence of
available to fight the
leveraged heydays was that less
resources were
global film war against Fuji.
This in turn implied that the company was
once the revolution financially weaker
came into motion.
But that’s not directly related
to the firm’sdigital
strategy. Kodak’s
attempts at various’hybrid’
cameras mightalso have been
a mistake.
While Kodak investedheavily in
digital development, the company
also sought to launch
products whichwere bothdigital and analogue.
By doing so, the company could sell more film.
And film generated profits.
Historically, Kodak had for many decadesonly developedand launched
new cameras in order to generate
more sales of film.
To some extent it seems that the
company tried to make digital
technology a new way of generating
higher film revenues.
This way of thinkingmay help us to
understand why the CEO Dan Carp madethe following over-
optimistic statementin 2000:
"Kodak is convinced that there been a better time
can change the way people take and use
pictures because and availability are no
has never to
be in the picture business…. Digital
pictures. Suddenly there are no
boundaries to how often you can take
cost
longer issues."
Let’s take a look at the various
hybrid initiativesKodak launchedin the 1990s…
Kodak made huge efforts developing the APS (Advanced Photography System) which theybranded as Advantix and launched in 1996.
The system was essentially a hybrid whichcould transfer film into digital image files.
The Picture CD was launched in 1998 and enabled transfer of images captured with film
to digital image files.
’You’ve got pictures’ was co-developedwith AOL and launched in 1998. This
system gave consumers the opportunityto drop film rolls off and have them
delivered to their AOL email address.
PhotoNet was another initiative that canbe considered similar to
’You’ve got pictures’.
These products and services had in commonthat they sought to increase the value of
using Kodak’s film.
Most of these hybrids faced a sharp declineonce digital imaging started to grow rapidly in the early 2000s and they were launched in the
late 1990s…
It is of coursehard to tellwhether the
revenuesgenerated before
the revolution compensated the R&D money that was poured in
during the 1990s.
And it’s hardto say whetherspending that
money on pure digital
productswould have
been a wiserdecision.
However, it is striking how rapidly the digital imaging market moved away from hybrid products
and removed film consumption. Hasselblad launched a hybrid camera in 2003, soon after that it
became clear that no one wanted a hybrid, but rathera fully digital system and the company got into a lot
of trouble (read more here).
Bearing this in mind, along with all R&D that was spent on hybrid cameras, this might have
been a strategic mistake by Kodak.
If that is the case, it would be a veryunderstandable mistake.
Kodak had been a film company for a century.
It knew film and had made fantastic profits from this for very long.
The decline that took place must have appeared as unreal for a lot of people at Kodak.
Moreover, it was much easier to
regard digital imaging as an add-on,
since Kodak’s existing
resources were related
to capitalizing
on film.
Those resources lost virtually all theirvalue in less than a decade.
Summing up: it might have been a strategic mistake by Kodak to partly
regard digital imaging as a way to leverage upon its film business.
Christian Sandström is a PhD student at Chalmers
University of Technology in Gothenburg, Sweden. He writes and speaks about disruptive innovation and
technological change.
www.christiansandstrom.orgchristian.sandstrom at chalmers.se
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