DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137 CS IN STEEL FACTORIES J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos 6th.

DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTIVE DEVICE FOR THE DETECTION OF 137CS

IN STEEL FACTORIES

J.L. Gutierrez-Villanueva, I. Fuente, J.Quindos, C.Sainz, L.S.Quindos

6th Dresden Symposium

HAZARDS – DETECTION AND MANAGEMENT

September 20 – 24, 2010 Dresden Germany

Where we are …

GRUPO RADÓNFacultad de MedicinaAvda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n39011 SantanderCantabria (SPAIN)e-mail: laruc@unican.esPhone: +34 942 20 22 07

.- FOUNDED IN 1976 AROUND NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS

.- 1976-1982: ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

.- 1982-1985: ALTAMIRA CAVE

.-1985-1989: INHALATION TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, USA

.-1989-TODAY: RADON STUDIES IN SPAIN RADIATION PROTECTION IN STEEL FACTORIES

WHO WE ARE ………...WHO WE ARE ………...

Laboratory validated by Health Protection Agency (HPA, UK) for indoor radon measurements

Laboratory Quality System certified by AENOR (ISO 9001)

RADON GROUP TODAY 11 PEOPLE:

2 Professors 1 Postdoctoral researcher 3 Ph.D. student 5 Laboratory technicians

Relevant instrumentationRelevant instrumentation

• Gamma spectrometry: HPGe, NaI• BERTHOLD Alpha beta counter• Radosys (radon indoors)• Equipments for the measurement of radon “in situ” (soil, air and water): SARAD, Alphaguard• Equipment for X-Ray fluorescence• Radiation monitors

RADIOLOGICAL

PROTECTION IN

STEEL FACTORIES

Radiological Dispersal Device RDD

Courtesy of Sarad GmbH

Classical Threat ScenariosClassical Threat Scenarios

Acquisition of a nuclear weapon Acquisition of nuclear material to construct

a nuclear weapon Acquisition of radioactive material to cause

a radiological hazard (“dirty bomb”)

New Threat Aspects after 9/11:

Terror attacks can be internationally coordinated operations

Time frame for planning an attack can be years Terrorists are willing to commit collective suicide Terrorists are capable of using sophisticated

logistics Non-terrorist threat: orphan sources in steel

factories

LOSS OF CONTROL OVER LOSS OF CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN USARADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN USA

For material licensed under the Atomic Energy Act (1954):

Up to 2 million devices with radioactive sources have been

distributed to 190,000 US licences

300 reports/year of lost/stolen material

(mostly short-lived or small sources)

US has lost control over about 30,000 radioactive sources

(“orphans”)*

*US EPA (1998)

ACERINOX, Cadiz (1998, Spain), ACERINOX, Cadiz (1998, Spain), Cs-137 incident (Cs-137 incident (120 Ci120 Ci))

Day: 30th of May 1998

Time: 00 Z

Day: 30th of May 1998

Time: 06 Z

"SPANISH PROTOCOL FOR COLLABORATION ON THE

RADIATION MONITORING OF METALLIC MATERIALS"

1998

DETECTION OF SOURCES IN STEEL SPANISH FACTORIES (1998-2010)

MAIN STEEL FACTORIES IN SPAINMAIN STEEL FACTORIES IN SPAIN

(nGyh-1)

240

200

160

120

80

40

ORIGIN OF ORPHAN SOURCES

REASONS FOR THE DETECTION

TYPES OF SOURCES

OPEN SOURCES

SOURCES WITH SHIELD EQUIPMENT

DETECTION OF NORM

ARCELOR FACTORY IN SESTAO HARBOUR ARCELOR FACTORY IN SESTAO HARBOUR ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)

ARCELOR FACTORY ENTRANCE OF ARCELOR FACTORY ENTRANCE OF SCRAP IN SESTAO ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)SCRAP IN SESTAO ( BIZKAIA, SPAIN)

RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS IN SPANISH STEEL FACTORIESSPANISH STEEL FACTORIES

.-ACERINOX, 30th of May 1998 -----120 Ci

.-SIDERURGICA SEVILLANA, 7th of December 2001 ----- 2.7 Ci

.-DANIEL GONZALEZ RIESTRA, 11th of Auguts 2003, 210 mCi

.-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 15th of September 2003, 47 mCi

.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2004, 81 mCi

.-ARCELOR ZUMARRAGA, 31st of May 2004, 20 mCi

.-SIDENOR INDUSTRIAL, 24th of March 2007, 40 mCi .-ACERIA COMPACTA DE BISKAIA, 10th of April 2007, 2 mCi

CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192CS-137 SOURCES & Ir-192

Scenario Proposed: Scenario Proposed: Radioactive materials in the Radioactive materials in the

scrapscrap

Cs-137 Am-241 Ra-226 Sr-90 Co-60 Ir-192

METAL PHASE

SLAG PHASE

DUST

SMELTING C0-60

1000 Ci

STEEL(3 cm) + CONCRETE(22 cm)

COBALT-60

1 m 2.000 μSv/h

2 m

700 μSv/h

5 m100 μSv/h

10 m

25 μSv/h

130 Tn

FIRST DEVICE:REDIFASE-SODERCAN-U.CANTABRIA

"IN SITU CS-137 MEASUREMENTSIN STEEL DUST"

CLASSICAL DEVICE

SILO FOR steel DUST

200 TONNES

30-40 tonnes per day

Cleaning: 5 days

Accumulated activity:

1 curie of Cs-137

"IN SITU detection OF CESIUM 137

IN STEEL DUST"

GSW (GLOBAL STEEL WIRE)

"IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 "IN SITU detection of CESIUM 137 in steel dust"in steel dust"

Lower Limit of

Detection:

0.5 Bq/g for a five minutes

counting

NEW DEVICE: In situ detection

NaI NaI

NaI

NaI

Advantages of new system:

• In situ detection of smelting

• Detection Limit ~ 0.1 Bq/g

• In case of accident: Economical

Losses are drastically reduced

System is under developmentWe are open for funding from steel factories (potential patent)

INTERNATIONAL INTERCOMPARISON EXERCISE ON NATURAL RADIATION MEASUREMENTS UNDER FIELD

CONDITIONS

Organized by the Radon Group (University of Cantabria, SPAIN)

SUMMER 2011

Saelices el Chico

(Salamanca, Spain)

www.elradon.comwww.elradon.com

Thank you very much for your attention

Danke Schön

GRUPO RADÓNFacultad de MedicinaAvda. Cardenal Herrera Oria s/n39011 SantanderCantabria (SPAIN)Phone: +34 942 20 22 07e-mail: laruc@unican.es