Buddhism, Constitutionalism, and the Limits of LawReligious supremacy clauses, like the Buddhism Chapter of Sri Lanka’s constitution, do indicate something important about the ...

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Buddhism,Constitutionalism,andtheLimitsofLaw

ATalkDeliveredby

Dr.BenSchonthal

October5,2015

OsgoodeHallLawSchool,YorkUniversity

OsgoodeColloquiumonLaw,Religion&SocialThought

Introduction

Whenonestartstolookcomparativelyattheconstitutionalregulationof

religionaroundtheworld,onenoticesacuriousthing.Thesecularliberalmodels

thatmostofusassumetobethenorm--oratleastparadigmtowardswhichwe

shouldaspire–haveamuchnarrowerfootprintthanmightbeexpected.Alarge

proportionoftheworld’sconstitutionsarenotsecular,butinsteadgivespecial

statusand/orprotectiontoasinglereligion,usuallythemostpopulousreligion.

AccordingtorecentdatafromthePewForum,45%oftheworld’sbasiclawsareof

thistype.Thatis,virtuallyoneoutofeverytwoconstitutionsintheworldtoday

recognizesafavoredreligion.

Yet,ubiquitydoesn’tcountformuchamonglawscholars.Formanyofus

whostudylawinuniversities,andformostofthosewhoengageininternational

legaladvocacywork,religiouslypreferentialconstitutionshaveabadname.This

badnamecomesfromanassumptionabouthowthesesortsofconstitutionswork:

weassumethat,bygivingspecialstatustoaparticularreligion,theseconstitutions

giveunambiguouslegalandinstitutionaladvantagestothefollowersofthat

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religion.Weassumethatprivilegingagivenreligioninlawworkstoenhancethe

security,solidarityandwellbeingofthatreligioustraditioninlife.

Thislineofthinkingcanbeseenwithparticularviminliberalcriticismsof

SriLanka’sconstitution.ChapterTwoofSriLanka’sconstitutiongivestoBuddhism

the“foremostplace”andobligatesthestateto“protectandfoster”theinstitutions,

practicesandteachingsoftheBuddha,collectivelyreferredtoastheSāsana.Since

thecreationoftheseconstitutionalprovisionsin1972,avarietyofcritics—from

non-Buddhistpoliticians,toliberalsecularists,tosocialists,tointernationalhuman

rightgroups—haveidentifiedthischapterofSriLanka’sconstitutionasbothproof

of-andperpetratorof-religiousmajoritarianismontheisland.

Thereissometruthtothis.Religioussupremacyclauses,liketheBuddhism

ChapterofSriLanka’sconstitution,doindicatesomethingimportantaboutthe

relationshipbetweenconstitutionallawandreligiousmajoritarianism.Tomany

readers,theysuggesttheideathatthereisahierarchyofreligions.Moreover,these

clausesshowtracesoftheprocessofconstitution-writing:theconstitutionsofSri

LankaorMalaysia–or,forthatmatter,Iceland1–aremarkedbythesentimentsof

politicalelitesatthetimesoftheircreation.Thesesentimentsincludeconvictions

thatthemajorityreligionshouldbespeciallyprivileged.

However,constitutions—likeBuddhists—havemultiplelives.Theyhavea

pre-enactmentlifeasthecarefullywordedproductofelitepoliticalnegotiation;and

apost-enactmentlifeasacollectionofrulesandprinciplesthatarethoughttoguide

1TheEvangelicalLutheranChurchshallbetheStateChurchinIcelandand,assuch,itshallbesupportedandprotectedbytheState.Thismaybeamendedbylaw.(Art.62)

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acountry’ssharedpoliticalfuture.Theyhaveasocietallife,inwhichconstitutional

languagefunctionsaspartpopulardiscourse,andalegallife,inwhichconstitutional

clausesfunctionastechnicalinstrumentsinofficialprocessesoflitigationand

regulation.Constitutionallawfunctionsdifferentlyinthesedifferentlives.

Thistalkexploresonetellingmomentinthepost-enactment,legallifeofSri

Lanka’sBuddhismChapter.Ithighlightsasurprisingchasmbetweenthesimple

meaningoftheseclausesandtheiractualeffectswhenusedinthecontextof

litigation.Itrevealsanunexpecteddisconnectbetweenthepre-enactment,societal

desiresthatgaverisetoSriLanka’sBuddhismChapterandthepost-enactment,legal

outcomeswhichtheChapterhasenabled.

ThosewholobbiedforspecialprotectionsforBuddhisminSriLanka’s

Constitutiondidsointoorder“tomakeLanka’sBuddhistpeopleintoastrongand

unifiedbody(eksatprabalaāyatanayak)onceagain”-aftercenturiesofcolonialism.

However,contrarytotheexpectationsdrafters–andcritics–thesespecial

protectionsforBuddhismhavenotsimplysupportedorenabledBuddhist

hegemonyontheisland.Althoughlitigantshave,attimes,attemptedtousethe

BuddhismChaptertojustifyspecialtreatmentfortheisland’sreligiousmajority,a

moreconsequentiallegacyoftheBuddhismChapterhasbeenitspolemicaluseby

certainBuddhiststodefendthereligionagainstotherBuddhists.

Thus,ratherthansimplyconsolidating“Buddhistinterests,”constitutional

protectionsforBuddhismhave,inmanycases,authorizedsplitsamongBuddhists.

ThesesplitshavedividedoneBuddhistorganizationagainstanother,onemonastic

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fraternity(nikāya)againstanother,andhaveevendividedtrusteesandincumbent

monkswithinasingleBuddhisttemple.

ThestakesofthisargumentextendwellbeyondtheshoresofSriLanka.A

closelookattheSriLankancasenotonlyforcesustorethinktheworkdoneby

religioussupremacyclauses,italsoforcesustorethinktheessentialdifference

betweenso-calledsecularconstitutionsandreligiouslypreferentialones.Couldit

bethatwhenitcomestoreligion,modernconstitutionalismasaform—asasetof

institutionsandpractices—ismoredeterminativethanthecontentandsubstanceof

thatform?Inotherwords,isitpossiblethat(asrecentcriticsofsecularismremind

us)justasafullyreligiouslyneutralconstitutionisimpossible,sotooisafully

religiouspreferentialconstitution?

ThesequestionsandthisargumenthangonmyreadingofaparticularSri

Lankancourtcase,oneheardrecentlyintheisland’sAppellateandSupremeCourts.

ThecaseinvolvedtheratherbanalquestionofwhetheroneBuddhistmonkshould

getadrivinglicense.Yet,asIhopetoshow,thiscaseprovidesauseful(andIhope

intriguing)frameforthinkingcloselyaboutonewayinwhichreligioussupremacy

clausesliketheBuddhismchapterworkontheground.

Factsofthecase

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InMay2004,aBuddhistmonk,VenParagodaWimalawansaThero,chief

incumbentoftwosmalltemples,appliedforaDrivingLicenseinaColomboofficeof

theCommissionerofMotorTraffic(CMT).Wimalawansaexplainedthatherequired

alicensesothathecouldmoreefficientlycarryouthisregularweeklyduties,which

involvedmorethanjustpreaching(baṇa)andreceivingalms(dāna)–the

traditionaldutiesofBuddhistmonks.LikemanyothermonksinSriLanka,

Wimalawansaalsoservedinavarietyofotherroles.Hewasanassistantprinciple

andlectureratacollege15kmaway.Heservedasdeputysecretaryofaregional

Buddhistorganization.AndhealsotaughtatavarietyofBuddhistreligiousschools

inthearea(dahampasal).

Wimalawansa’spetitionmadeclearthat,whilehehadusedpublic

transportationinthepast,buthefounditextremelydifficult.Ofparticular

frustrationwasthefactthat,asamonk,hewasrequiredtobeatthetempleforhis

onlymealoftheday,which,accordingtomonasticlaw,orVinaya,hadtobe

consumedbeforemidday.Thistime-sensitivepracticeoftenclashedwithlate-

runninganderraticbusschedules.

Takingmattersintohisownhands,Wimalawansahadbeguntotakestepsto

startdriving.Heattendeddrivingclassesandtriedtoacquireacar.2InJune2004,

hemetwithanofficeroftheCommissionofMotorTraffic(CMT)tofilehis

applicationforadrivinglicense.However,hewasrebuffed.Monkscouldnotbe

2Inhispetition,theTheraexplainedthathehadtoldthethen-PrincipaloftheMoratuwaVidyalayaabouthisplans,whoapproachedtwoseparatedeputyCommissionersofMotorTrafficonhisbehalf:oneindicatedthatBuddhistmonkswerenoteligiblefordrivers’licenses,theotherindicatedthatlicensingwouldbepossibleprovidedtheTherareceivedaletterfromtheBuddhaSasanaMinistry.Onhearingthisnews,theTherawrotealettertotheMinistryandmetwiththesecretary.However,theSecretaryexplainedthathehadnopowerinthismatter.

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issuedwithdrivinglicenses,hewastold,onaccountofthegovernment’s

constitutionalobligationstoprotectBuddhism.

WimalawansathenfiledawritpetitionaskingtheCourtofAppealstocompel

theofficertoissuethelicense.Aten-yearcourtcasefollowed.

WhichRules?WhoseBuddhism?

Ingeneralterms,theeventsofWimalawansacasemirrorthoseofmanylegal

contests:itbeganwithaparticularunresolvedgrievance;whichwasthenchanneled

throughthecourts,wherelawyers,judgesandlitigantsconstruedargumentsfor

andagainstthatgrievanceintermsofbroaderabstract,legalprinciples.What

distinguishesWimalawansa’scaseforourpurposesisthearrayofpartiesandissues

thatbecameinvolved.OntheonesidewasaBuddhistmonksupportedbyroughly

15othermonksciting,amongotherthings,thestate’sconstitutionalobligationsto

Buddhismtoarguethatheshouldbegrantedadrivinglicense.Ontheotherside

weregovernmentadministratorsandotherBuddhistmonksinvokingthesame

constitutionalobligationstoarguethatWimalawansashouldnotbeissuedwitha

drivinglicense.

Beforemovingtoconsiderthesearguments,itshouldbenotedthat

competinginterpretationsofBuddhismandpropermonasticcomportmentare

certainlynothingnewinSriLanka.Debatesaboutwhatmonksshouldand

shouldn’tdohavealonghistoryontheisland,aswellasinotherpartsofthe

Buddhistworld.AvarietyofPaliandSinhalasourcesprovidedetailedaccountsof

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historicalcontroversies(vādaya)overhowthemonksoughttoact,dress,eat,

preach,etc.Inthetwentiethcentury,monksandlayBuddhistsbegantoargue

regularlyabouttheappropriatenessofmonksengagingin“worldly”(laukika)

practices,suchaspropitiatingdeities,teachinginpublicschools,practicing

Ayurvedicmedicineanddoingastrology.Asopposedto“other-wordly”lōkōttara

practicesassociatedwithpursuingabetterrebirthand,ultimately,nibbāna.

Thisidealoftheserene,cloistered,apoliticalmonkstrivingquietlyfor

nibbānaisfamiliartomanyofus.However,itdidnotgounchallengedbymonksin

SriLanka.Sporadically,throughoutthetwentiethcenturyinfluentialandvocal

groupsofmonksspokeoutagainstwhattheysawasattemptstousethisidealto

limittheinfluenceofmonksonsociety.Inoneparticularlywellknownepisodein

the1940s,monksfromoneoftheisland’slargestmonasticcolleges,Vidyalankara

Pirivena,publiclychallengedtheisland’smostpowerfulpolitician,D.S.Senanayake,

indemandingrecognitionofmonks’righttoparticipateinpolitics.3Sincethattime,

largepartsoftheSriLankanmonkhoodhaveassertedtheirrightstoparticipate

fullyinmanyspheresofsociety:fromeducation,tosocialwork,tobeingmembers

ofparliament.

InSriLankatheseongoingdebatesoverpropermonasticconducthavea

certainqualityofun-resolvabilitytothem--onethat(inpart)stemsfromthefact

3OnFebruary2,1946,thisgroupdraftedapublicdeclaration,calledthe“DeclarationoftheVidyalankaraPirivena,”whichblamed“invadersfromtheWest,whobelongedtoanalienfaith”forpopularizingtheideathattheaffairsofthesanghaandtheaffairsofthenationshouldbekeptdistinct.Rejectingtheideathatmonksshouldstayalooffrompolitics,thedocumentinsisted,“We,therefore,declarethatitisnothingbutfittingforbhikkhustoidentifythemselveswithactivitiesconducivetothewelfareofourpeople—whethertheseactivitiesbelabeledpoliticsornot—aslongastheydonotconstituteanimpedimenttothereligiouslifeofabhikkhu.”Rahula,"AppendixII:TheVidyalankaraDeclaration"(1974).

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thatthereisnosingle,universallyacceptedmonastichierarchyontheisland.

Buddhologistswillnotfindthissurprising.Untilrecently,throughoutmostpolities

inSouthandSoutheastAsia,theBuddhistmonkhoodlackedsinglewell-defined

monasticinstitutions,whichclaimedundisputedauthorityoverBuddhism.The

ecclesiasticalhierarchiesthatoneseestodayintheBuddhistworld—e.g.thelama

systemforGelugpamonksinTibetorthecouncilofgreatmonks

(mahatherasamkorn)inThailand—areofrelativelyrecentorigins,andemerged

fromhistoriesinwhichtheprojectofcentralizingBuddhistmonasticauthority

alwaysinvolvedactsofcoercionandcontrolbyrulers--andwerealwayscontested.

Today,avarietyofmonasticandlaygroupsinSriLankaclaimtheauthority

tointerpretandactofbehalfofBuddhism.Theislandhasthreemajormonastic

fraternities,andnumeroussubfraternities.Thesevariousgroupsaredividedalong

multiplelines.Theseincludestrongallegiancestocertainmonks,particularregional

affiliations,controlofpropertyandevencasteidentities.4

AlsoincompetitionforauthorityoverBuddhismarelayBuddhist

organizationsandgovernmentrepresentatives—thepresident,theCommissionerof

BuddhistAffairs,andothers—whoalso,attimes,seemtospeakonbehalfof

Buddhism.

BuddhismTypeOne:Wimalawansa’sPragmaticBuddhism

4Abeysekara

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OpponentsofWimalawansahadamajorthinggoingforthem:itwouldbe

unusualtoseetoamonkdrivinginSriLanka.AlthoughWimalawansadidoffer

someevidence(anewspaperarticle)ofanotherdrivingmonk,thefactremained

thattodatethisisuncommoninSriLanka.5ButwasthisanathematoBuddhism?

Bothsidesagreedononething:noBuddhisttextorinscriptionssaidanythingabout

motorcars.Wimalawansaconstruedthisasagoodthing.Oneoftheleitmotifsofhis

submissionswasthatBuddhismwasnotastatictradition,butadynamicone

designedtodevelop,changeandaccommodatenewsituations.Inoneofhismost

potentexpressionsofthis,Wimalawansahighlightedawell-knownpassageinthe

MahaparinibbanaSuttawheretheBuddha(onhisdeathbed)instructshischief

discipleAnanda,thatafterhispassing,themonksshouldholdontothemajor

principlesofmonasticlifebutto“abolishthelesserandminorprecepts.”(The

problemisthat,inlasthoursofhislife,theBuddhadidn’tspecifywhichwere

which.)This,Wimalawansainsisted,wasthekey:theBuddhaneverintended

monasticlifetoprogressunchanged,buttomovewithsociety,developingand

adaptingaccordingly;monks’drivingwasjustthatsortofadaptationthatthe

Buddhahadinmind.

Amongthedocumentssubmittedwithhispetitions,Wimalawansaincluded

personalletterthathehadwrittentotheCMTin2004.Inthisonce-private-now-

publicdocument,oneseesveryclearlythisviewofBuddhism.Intheletter,

Wimalawansainsiststhat“therearesomepeoplewhodonotwantmonksmoving

forward(idiriyaṭayanavā)withsociety.Whattheywantistoholdmonksbackin5EvidencewassubmittedthatthatBuddhistmonksdrivecarsinMalayasia,SingaporetheUSandelsewhere.

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the6thcenturywhiletheygointothe21stcentury.”Thesepeople,Wimalawansa

argues,dosointhenameofdefendingculture(saṅskṛtiyak)andtradition

(sampradāyak).Yet,Wimalawansainsists,cultureandtraditionareworldly

(laukika)innatureandoughtnottorestrictordeterminethebehaviorofmonks.

InWimalawansa’sBuddhism,thepurposeofmonasticlifeisnottoconservesome

pastidealbuttoconstantlyguidesocietyaccordingtosupremeotherworldly

(lōkōttara)values.Toholdontosomestatictraditionwouldnotonlybeinimicalto

thisprojectofvirtuousguidance,itwouldalsoinconsistentwiththebasicprinciples

oftheBuddha’steachingitself,thedhamma:

Buddhismteachesprimarilythateverythingisimpermanentandchanging

andthatnothinginthisworld(melova)isinfinite(nitya).[Itteaches]that

witheverymomentallthingsarechanging.[Itteaches]thattheessence

(svabhavas)ofallthingsisbecoming,existingandperishing(naetivīma)…No

[harm]wouldcometoamonkfordrivingavehicle.Noevil(pāpā)would

accrue.There[wouldbe]noviolationoftheVinayarules.

Wimalawansaarguedthatchangedcircumstancesnecessitatedchanged

standardsoforthopraxy.Inthepast,herecollects,monksweresupported

completelybythelaity.Todaythissupporthasdiminished,requiringmonkstoearn

income,performmaintenancearoundthetempleand,insomecases,evencook

theirownfood.Monkslikehimwerenolongersimplyfulltimespecialistsin

dhamma,ritualandself-cultivation;theywereteachers,administrators,even

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occasionalchefs.Theyreluctantlytookonlaukikacommitmentsandthose

commitmentswerenecessarytosustainingtheirlōkōttarapursuits.Drivingacar

wasnotaluxury–therefore-butamuchneededtoolofthenewmonasticlife.

BuddhismTwo:HisOpponents’TraditionalBuddhism

ThosewhoopposedWimalawansaofferedadifferentvisionofBuddhism,

onethatdrewarigidlinebetweenthelifestyleofmonksandthatoflaity.Someof

theseopponentsfiledwrittensubmissionsinthecase,includingtheCMTandCBA,

aswellastwoimportantgroupsofseniormonks.Amongthemostassertive,

however,werethedocumentsfiledbythelaytrustees,orDayakaSabha,of

Wimalawansa’sowntemple(although,Wimalawansadeniedthattheywereindeed

bonafidetrustees).

ThecruxofDayakaSabha’spositioncanbeseeninalettertotheMinisterof

BuddhistAffairs,whichtheysubmittedasevidence.Theletterimploresasfollows:

HonorableMinister,theonlyplaceintheentireworldwhereBuddhism

existsinitsuncorrupted(nirmala)formishereonthistinyisland;

[therefore]carehastobetakenbyBuddhists[here]tokeepthisuncorrupted

formofBuddhismforaverylongtime.Itismainlybecauseof

theirrestrainedandcalmdemeanor(saṅsuniriyav)andtheirattractive

behavior(ākarsanīyaaevatumpaevatum)thatBuddhistmonksgainthe

faith(bhaktiya),lovingrespect(gauravādaraya),faithandadmiration

(pahansita)oftheBuddhistpeople.Ifthisultimatebond(uttarītara

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baendīma)betweentheMahasangha(greatcommunityofmonks)andlay

peopleisstrained,thenwithoutadoubtthesupremestatusofBuddhism

wouldtoppleinnotime.IftheMahasanghabegintodrivevehicles,then

thereisariskofthelaypeopleloosingtheconfidence(pahanbava)they

hadforthem.6

InpurposefulanddirectcontrasttoWimalawansa,thetrusteesassertedthatthe

keytoBuddhism’ssurvivalontheislandwasnotitsadaptability,buttheenduring

relationshipsbetweenmonksandlaity.Theserelationshipswere,inturn,basedon

afragilereciprocity:laypeoplepatronizedmonksonlytotheextentthatmonks

wereabletoexudecalmness,equanimityandindifferencetotheworld—qualities

thatwerehardtoembodybehindthewheel.

ThisunderstandingofBuddhismwasalsounderscoredbyagroupofsix

seniorscholar-monkswhointervenedagainstWimalawansa.Intheirletter,they

acknowledgedWimalawansa’sargumentthattherewasnospecificruleagainst

drivingmotorvehicles.However,theycountered,intheabsenceofthisparticular

prohibitiondidnotmeanthatmonasticlifeshouldbeaccommodatedtomodern

technology.Rather,theyargued,oneoughttoconsiderthematterofdriving

licensesinlightofanotherbroadprinciplethatrancentrallythroughtheentire

monasticdisciplinarytradition:theconcernwitheliminatinganynegativepublic

imageofmonksinsociety.Infact,forthem,keepingandmaintainingtherespectof

thelaitywasperhapsthekeyorganizingprincipleofBuddhistmonasticlifeitself!

6R6

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CitizenorBhikkhu?

Ofcourse,Wimalawansa’scasewasnotsimplyamatterofBuddhistlaw.Had

thisbeenthiscase,itmighthavebeenaddressedbyoneoftheisland’smonastic

tribunalsorexecutivecommitteesthatnormallyhearplaintsandmakerulings

aboutmonks’behaviorwithinindividualmonasticfraternities.Theserulingsare

notnormallyenforceablebythestate,unlesstheyinvolvethecontroloftemple

propertyinwhichcasetheinitialmonasticdecisionmaybeappealedorreheardby

civilcourts(happytotalkaboutthis).7

TheWimalawansacasewasdifferent.Itinvolvednotonlyquestions

concerningtheinterpretationofBuddhism,butquestionsconcerningthelinks

betweenBuddhistlawandtheconstitution.WhatwasthelegalstatusofBuddhist

lawandBuddhistmonksontheisland?IfBuddhistauthorityresidedwithmonks—

apointonwhichbothsidesappearedtoagree—whatroledidstateagents(inthis

case,non-monks)haveinenforcingthatauthority?Buddhistmonasticlifeemploys

elaboraterituals,habitsofdressandcodesofconducttodistinguishmonksfrom

laity.SriLankanstatuelawevenmakesitlegaloffenseto“passoneselfoffasa

monk.”Yet,didthestatehavearightorobligationtoenforcethedistinction

betweenmonkandlaitywithinaconstitutionalframeworkthatalsoespoused

equalityunderthelaw?

7inaccordancewithaspeciallydesignedstatute(calledtheBuddhistTemporalitiesAct)andaspecialstreamofSriLankancaselawcalledBuddhistEcclesiasticalLaw

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Thequestionofwhethermonksareconsideredcitizensforthepurposesof

statelawhasoccupiedBuddhiststhroughouttheworld.Thequestionarisesin

referencetoavarietyofissues.InSriLanka,e.g.,monkswhoarefoundguiltyof

criminaloffensesmustdisrobebeforegoingtoprison.Thatis,theymustre-become

citizensbeforeundergoingpenalsanctions.Fromthe1940stotheearly1970s,

throughmostoftheBuddhistworld(althoughnotSriLanka),Buddhistmonks(and

insomecasesnuns)werebannedfromvoting.8Twocountries—Thailandand

Myanmar—stillenforcethisruletoday.Indesigningtheselaws,politicalelites

positedanecessaryoppositionbetweenthelegalstatusofmonksandthatof

normal,everydaycitizens.

WasWimalawansaamonkoracitizen?Wimalawansa’scasegenerated

opposinganswerstothatquestion.Inhissubmissions,Wimalawansamadeclear

thathisstatusasamonkwasdistinctfrom,butdidnotnullify,hisstatusasacitizen.

Hearguedthatmonkswerebothclericsandcitizensthereforetheyoughtnottobe

deprivedofrightsgiventoothercitizens:

IstatethatIappliedtotheCommissionerofMotorTrafficinthecapacityofa

SriLankancitizenforadrivinglicenseandnotasaBuddhistMonk…I

respectfullystatethatjustbecauseIamamonkIcannotbepreventedfrom

enjoyingmyrightsguaranteedtomebythelegislatureofthiscountry….

8ThesepoliciesremaininplaceinMyanmarandThailandtoday,withreversalshavingoccurredfollowingperiodsofCommunistruleinLaosandCambodia{Larsson2014}.

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InWimalawansa’sview,monksinteractwithstateservicesandstatelawssuchas

theCMTnotasrepresentativesofBuddhismbutascitizenslikeanyoneelse.In

Wimalawansa’sestimation,tobetreatedprimarilyasarepresentativeoftheisland’s

protected,“foremost”religionistobeheldtoanunfair(andextra)standardof

scrutiny.

ThesubmissionsofWimalawansa-andthemonkswhowroteinsupportof

him-putforthaparticularviewofthelinkbetweenmonasticnormsandstatelaw.

Thetwoweredistinct;andmonks,byvirtueoftheirsimultaneousstatusasclerics

andascitizens,weresubjectsofboth.Yet,thejurisdictionswereseparate.State

officials—whowerelaypeople—couldnotclaimauthoritytoenforcemonasticlaw.

Atthesametime,theycouldnotdenymonks’statusandrightsascitizensand

subjectswithinstatelaw.MonasticlawandBuddhistnormswerethereforedoubly

outofboundstogovernmentagents.Ontheonehand,thoseagentshadapositive

dutytoupholdimpartiallyallstatelaws.Ontheotherhand,governmentagentshad

noauthoritytopronounceonBuddhistmonasticlaw.

Wimalawansa’sopponentsconcurredthatstatelawandmonasticlawwere

distinct;yettheyrefusedtheideathatonecouldchoosewhichoneapplied.Monks,

theyinsisted,werealwaysprimarilysubjectsofmonasticlaw.Aletterfromthefour

headmonks(mahānayaka-s)oftheisland’sfourlargestfraternitiesexplainedthis

positionthroughanalogytotheworkofjudgesandlawyers:justasjudgesand

lawyerswereboundbyparticularstringentprofessionalcodesofconductwhichdid

notapplytoordinarycitizens,sotooweremonkssubjecttotheirVinayarules.Or,

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asanothergroupofseniormonksputit:“Thelaukikapath[ofhumanrightslaw]is

onething....Thelōkōttarapath[ofBuddhistmonasticlaw]isanother.”

TheCourt’sDecision

Thecultureofconstitutionallawinvitesargumentation,butitalsolimitsit.

IntheWimalawansacasethoselimitsinvolvedagents(whowouldandwouldnotbe

allowedtoargue),discourse(whatthosepartieswereallowedtoargueabout)and

time(howlongthosepartieswereallowedtoarguefor).Themostimportant

temporallimittotheWimalawansacasewastheeventualjudgmentgiveninMarch

of2014byaunanimoustwo-judgebenchoftheCourtofAppeals.Inthejudgment,

thecourtcamedowndecisivelyandemphaticallyagainstWimalawansa’s

application.Thelogicofjudgmenttoalargeextentunderscoredtheargumentsof

Wimalawansa’sopponents:thecourtagreedthatthestatehadconstitutional

obligationtoprotecttheuncorrupted(nirmala)BuddhismofSriLankaandit

affirmedtheideathatthestateoughttoenforcecertainpartsofmonasticlaw.Asit

relatedtothequestionofmonks’identitiesascitizensversustheiridentitiesas

representativesofBuddhism,thecourtclearlyindicatedthatmonkshaddifferent

civilandlegalobligations,rights,andstatusestothoseoflaypeople.

Inaparticularlystrongflourish,thejudgewrotethat:“aBuddhistMonk

cannotdoandshouldbeprohibitedfromdoinganyandeveryact,donebyalayman,

inhisdailyroutinelife.”9Andthat,“thelifeofaBuddhistMonkinitspureform,is

incompatiblewithlaylife.”

9p.27ofthedecision

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Thecourt’sjudgmentmayhaveprovidedatemporalendpointtomatter;but

italsogeneratednewlinesoftension.Onereasonforthisisthat,indecidingthe

matter,thecourt,bynecessity,exerciseditsownauthoritytospeakforBuddhism.

Inlegitimatinghisjudgment,JusticeGooneratne(writingforthecourt)assertedhis

owninterpretationsofBuddhisttexts,normsandideas.

Intheend,therefore,thejudgmentofthecourtembodiedapositionthat

neithermonasticpartyendorsed:thatofstateagentsspeakingonbehalfof

Buddhism;ofpowerfullaukikavoicesactingastheinterpretersanddefendersofthe

requirementsofalōkōttaralife.

Conclusion

JacquesMaritain,oneofthearchitectsoftheUniversalDeclarationofHuman

Rights,famouslyquippedthatthedraftersofthedeclarationagreedonitscontents,

butonlyontheconditionthatnooneaskedthemaboutwhytheyagreed.Thatis,

Declarationdrafterscouldagreeonabstractprinciplesbutnotonthemeaningof,or

rationalebehind,thoseprinciples.Thesamecouldbesaidaboutdraftersof

religioussupremacyclausesinmostpartsoftheworld:thosewhoincorporate

specialprotectionsforreligionintoconstitutionsseethisasagoodthing,evenif

theydidn'tallagreeonwhatitistheyareprotecting.

Fromoneperspectivethisisnothingnew.Lawdoesthisallthetime:people

disagreeaboutthemeaningsoffreedom,equality,neutralityandavarietyofothers

primaryconstitutionalgoods.Judgesandlegislaturesinterpretthemeaningof

thosetermsovertime,tosuitthetimes.Theinevitableambiguityoflanguageis,in

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manycases,managedorlimitedthroughthehermeneuticaldisciplineofstaredecisis

and/ortheguidelinessetbytheinterpretationssectionsoflaws.

However,whenitcomestoreligioussupremacyclauses,theproblemisnot

simplyoneofambiguity.Moreprecisewordingorinterpretationswillnotresolve

theissue.Thereisaconundrumattheheartofreligioussupremacyclausesin

constitutions.Ontheonehand,theseclausesclaimtosecuretheprotectionand

primacyofparticularreligion-whichistosayaparticularsetofinstitutions,

authorities,textsandpractices.Yetitdoessothroughmechanismsthatperformthe

primacyofanothersetofinstitutions,authorities,textsandpractices,thoseofstate-

legalauthority.State-legalauthoritythereforealwaysprojectsitselfsimultaneously

thearbiterandviolatorofreligiousauthority.Theinstitutionsandpracticesof

constitutionallawcanneverfullyhandoffresponsibilityforreligiontoreligion.

Thus,inevitabledisputesoverreligiousorthodoxyendupsimultaneously(also

becoming)disputesoverreligiousautonomy.

ThisconundrumbothinitiatedandconcludedtheWimalawansacase.

Wimalawansatreatedtheideaofagovernmentofficial(alayperson)pronouncing

ontheorthodoxyofhis(amonk’s)actionsasanattackonBuddhistautonomyand

authority.Similarly,seniormonkswhoopposedWimalawansamayhavereceiveda

favorablerulingbytheAppellateCourt;buttheverylogicandinterpretivelicense

showninthatrulingultimatelyunderminedtheirclaimsofindependenceand

authorityoverBuddhism.10

10comment:relevanceincourt?

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WhatHusseinAgramasaysof“seculardoctrine”onecouldsayanalogously

fordoctrinesofreligioussupremacy:justas“secularpower”continuouslyprovokes

andentanglesuswiththeveryquestionsofdefinitionitclaimstoresolve(namely,

questionsofthelinebetweenreligionandpolitics)sotoodoreligiouslypreferential

constitutionalordersprovokeandentangleuswithquestionstheyclaimtoresolve:

questionsabouttheconditionsof—andpossibilitiesfor—theprimacyofBuddhism

orotherreligions.Putdifferently,theveryconstitutionalclausesusedtosignala

particularreligioussupremacybydrafters,providetheconditionsunderwhichthat

termsofthatsupremacymaybeconstantlyquestionedandfoughtover.

Letmebeclear,theparticularcontoursoftheWimalawansadebatewerenot

generatedbecauseoflaw.Asstatedabove,debatesoverBuddhism—itsnature,

orthodoxinterpretationsandproperstructureofauthority—havebeenvisibleinSri

Lankaforcenturies.

However,whilethetermsofthedebatepre-existlegalaction,theframework

oflegalactionisnotsimplyarehashingofthedebate.Theformatofmost

constitutionallegalaction—inwhichpetitionersfaceoffagainstrespondentsinan

agonisticstruggleoverremediesusingabstractconstitutionalprinciples—amplifies

therigidityofdisputesandthefirmsuplinesofopposition.Participantsinthe

Wimalawansacaselinedup,bynecessity,forWimalawansa’svisionofBuddhismor

againstit.Oncethemotorsoflegalactionbeganrevving,eachsidegrippedmore

tightlytotheirvisionandengagedinapoint-counterpointmethodicalrejectionof

theother’sposition,aprocessthatquicklyerodedorobscuredpreviouslyexisting

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terrainsofcompromiseorcoordination,suchaslitigants’sharedcommitmentto

protectingmonasticautonomy.

Thecontextoflegalactionisalsouniqueinthat,unlikedebatesthattake

placeinnewspapersorparliament,litigation(particularlyconstitutionallitigation)

isespeciallypoorlysuitedforacknowledgingthevarioussocial,economicand

politicaldimensionsofBuddhistmonasticism–dimensionswhichplayedacentral

roleinthiscase.Wimalawansa’sactionswere,inmanyways,aprotestagainst

economicandsocialinequalityinthesangha.Wealthy,seniormonksdidnotneed

todrivecars,Wtoldme,becausetheyallhavechauffeurs.Moreover,theylivedin

theprime,centrally-locatedtemples.Bycontrast,helivedinarelativelypoor

templeontheoutskirtsofColombo,wherehestruggledtocopewiththerapidly

risingcostoflivinganddiminishinglaysupport.WImalawansa’sactionswere,in

thisframeofreference,notonlyaboutdrivingbutabouthisfeelingsofalienation

andinjusticevis-à-vistheisland’smonasticelites.ThesedefiningfeaturesofW’s

situation,however,weresiftedoutofthediscussionsthroughtheprocessof

constitutionalanalysis--andtransmutedintobroad,abstract,generalclaimsabout

whatBuddhismisandhowthestateoughttoprotectit.

Myconclusionshere—totheextentthattheymakesense—extendandlink

argumentsthathavebeenmadewithinwiththedomainsofcriticallegalstudiesand

recentscholarshiponsecularism.ScholarssuchasStuartScheingold,MaryAnn

Glendonandothershavehighlightedthedisruptiveandevencorrosiveeffectsof

Americanrightsdiscourseandlitigationonsocialstabilityandcooperation.

HusseinAgrama,whoIreferredtoabove,hascharacterizedseculardoctrineasa

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regimeofendlessnormativeprovocation—provocationsthatprovideanexcusefor

expandingtheambitofstateauthority.Inotherwords,theproblemsthatlaw

generates,itsolvesbyrecoursetomorelaw.

Tolinkthesetwoargumentsistomakeanevenmorecontroversial

argumentabouttherelationshipbetweenconstitutionallawandreligion,onewhich

Imakeinmybook:morethansimplyamplifydisagreementandprovoke

contestation,constitutionalprivilegesforreligionmayevenhaveatendencyto

generatetheiropposites.Thesolutionsbecometheproblem.Icallthisprocess

pyrrhicconstitutionalism.

WhenitcomestoconstitutionallawinSriLanka,politicians“victory”in

introducingspecialprotectionsforBuddhismintotheconstitution,havebeen

pyrrhicvictories.Inmultiplecases,includingthisone,constitutionalprotectionsfor

BuddhismhaveproducedundesirableconsequencesforBuddhists--boththe

winnersandthelosersoflitigation!!Buddhistsupremacyclauseshavecontributed

tothefracturingofsolidarityamongBuddhistgroupsandtotheunderminingof

monasticauthority.IntheprocessoffosteringBuddhism,constitutionalagentshave

transformedlong-standing,ambientdifferencesofopinionsamongmonksinto

public,high-profile,high-stakes,agonisticconflictsoverBuddhistorthodoxyand

orthopraxy.FavoringBuddhisminlawhasprovokedandintensifiedmanyofthe

problemsitwasmeanttoresolve.Ratherthan“mak[ing][Sri]Lanka’sBuddhist

peopleintoastrongandunifiedbody(eksatprabalaāyatanayak)onceagain”

Buddhistconstitutionalsupremacyhasconfirmedtheimpossibilityofsodoing.

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