Bayhaqi Truth and Lies
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TRUTHS AND LIES:
IRONY AND INTRIGUE IN TARlKH-I BAYHAQl
by
Soheila Amirsoleimani
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Near Eastern Studies)
in The University of Michigan 1995
Doctoral Committee:
Professor James Stewart-Robinson, Chair Professor James A. Bellamy Assistant Professor Michael D. Bonner Professor H. Don Cameron Professor Rudi P. Lindner
UMI Number: 9527577
Copyright 1995 by Amirsoleimani, Soheila
All eights reserved.
OMI Microform 9527577 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Professor Gemot Windfuhr for his support and encourage
ment throughout the course of my studies at Michigan. This dissertation has received
great benefit from his constructive criticisms. Deep gratitude goes to the members of
my committee for their support and understanding. I would like to thank my chairman,
Professor James Stewart-Robinson, who has always been supportive, understanding, and
gentle. He has given of his time liberally, and has patiently advised and listened. Seeing
him in the course of these past years has brought the gift of warmth which one cannot
capture in words. I had the good fortune of studying Arabic with Professor James Bel
lamy. Though I will remain a novice in the field of Arabic studies, I hope to carry with
me the rigor that I came to know in his classes. Professor Don Cameron has shown sup
port and patience, and I have greatly benefited from his advice. Professor Rudi Lindner
has always been kind and supportive both throughout the course of my examinations and
in the dissertation stage. Professor Michael Bonner has always found time to read and
comment on my work, which has improved as a result of his criticisms.
I would also like to thank the Near Eastern Studies Department, the Center for
Middle Eastern and North African Studies, the Center for the Education of Women,
and The Fellowships Office. I specifically would like to thank Mrs. Valerie Eaglin at
the Center for the Education of Women, and Mrs. Mary Jarrett and Mrs. Sandra Miller
at the Fellowships Office. Thanks are also due to Dr. Jonathan Rodgers and Mr. John
Downey at the Harlan Hatcher Library. They have both been most helpful in the course
of my research.
Dr. John Kolars, now in Santa Fe, New Mexico, was always encouraging, support
ive, and kind in the course of my graduate studies at Michigan. I appreciate the kindness
of both Didar Akar and Harry Weeks who have known just the right words to say to a
weary dissertation writer in the last stage of her work. A special thanks goes to Harry
who has patiently watched over all the sultans and the amirs. His calm presence and his
good cheer have been a source of comfort and encouragement in the last month. And
many thanks and a big hug go to my friend and buddy Nuha Khoury who has done all
the shopping and cooking for the past month. She has been a true friend and Vemullah.
I would like to thank my parents, Maman and Aqshandi, and my sisters, Susan and
Sepideh, whose love and support I always carry with me. This dissertation is dedicated
to them.
Finally, I would like to thank five people whose lives and works have especially
inspired me. I have had many teachers throughout my life who have taught me many
things. I remember them affectionately and will hand to others their lessons and mine.
My mother has always been and will always be my foremost teacher. I have always
watched and admired her strength, belief, perseverance, and hope, all in the face of
adversity. I have only begun following her example. Never will a daughter reach the
heights climbed by her mother.
Charles Kaplan inspired me in the course of my undergraduate studies at North-
ridge. He taught with conviction and rigor. And he instilled in me the love of a language
and literature not my own.
Two of my teachers are men whom time and place have separated from me. Abu
al-Fazl BayhaqT and Kenneth Burke. I know both of them from their works. They have
left behind that trace of eternity that can only emenate from the lives of those who seek
wisdom and understanding earnestly. It is understanding that they teach, its virtues and
rewards.
And my living teacher, my master (ustad), K. Allin Luther. It is his teaching, his
work, and most importantly, his example that has taught and inspired me in the past
years. We have sat in classrooms, in his office facing the blue or grey patch of the sky
above the trees, and in his study at home. And we have read stories, from the past of a
land that we both love. We have listened to the voices of this past, to Mawlavl, Nizami,
BayhaqT. We have listened to “the beauty of their inflections.” And we have sought the
wisdom of silence from this past.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION......................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................. iii
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. ‘ALl QARfB AND ASIGHTIGIN GHAZI 28
III. THE FIRST ATTEMPT AGAINSTTHE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH 66
IV. THE SECOND ATTEMPT AGAINSTTHE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH 84
V. ARYARUQ, YUSUF, SUBASHl,‘ ALl DA YAH, BIGTUGHDI 119
VI. CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 146
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
v
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Abu al-Fazl BayhaqT (385-470/995-1077), a Khurasanian scribe of the Ghaz-
navids, wrote a history of this Perso-Islamic dynasty (388-582/994-1186) in his work re
ferred to as Tarlkh-i BayhaqT (450/1058). The Ghaznavids ruled in an area now compris
ing eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and northern India. With the loss of the greater Khurasan
to the nomadic Saljuqs in 431/1040, the empire was reduced to parts of Afghanistan and
northern India, chiefly the Panjab. The downfall of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan also di
vides the period of the first three kings from those of the later ones. BayhaqT himself
epitomized the history of the Ghaznavids in terms of “principal” (asl), versus “minor”
(far‘). For BayhaqT it is the principal territories of Khurasan and Jibal, but especially
Khurasan, as opposed to the minor territories in India. He wrote his history of the Ghaz
navids, all of which has been lost save the volume studied here, after approximately 29
years had passed from the loss of Khurasan.1
The Turkish Ghaznavids succeeded the eastern Iranian dynasty of the Samanids
(204-395/819-1005) in ruling Khurasan. From their Samanid masters the Ghaznavids
inherited the manners of kings and the means of statecraft. One of the means of state
craft was the chancery bureau (dlvan-i rasa’il). By the time of the Ghaznavid kings the
chancery practices of the land of Iran had long been established. After the Arab inva
sions (21/642) it was the ex-Sasanian scribes (dablran) who had continued these tra
ditions, first in Middle Iranian PahlavT and later in Arabic.2 And under the ‘Abbasids
(132-656/749-1258) the scribes held high status, some becoming viziers. Indeed, in the
3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries the clothes of scribes symbolized their professional iden
tity.3
The scribes trained in the crafts of various administrative branches, with the most
skilled writers specifically responsible for official correspondence.4 Under the first
2
Ghaznavid amir, Mahmud, the language of official correspondence changed from Ara
bic to Persian.5 It is in Tarlkh-i BayhaqT that some of the earliest examples of Persian
correspondence have survived.
The scribes learned the art of composition (insha’) by gaining a mastery of rhetoric
(balaghat). They attempted to persuade rulers and statesmen, by using rhetorical devices
like metaphor (istParah), hyperbole (mubalaghah), and allusion (isharah). With orders
from rulers, the scribes would prepare drafts of letters (sawad), which the chancery min
ister would then read. He would make changes, or accept the draft as it was. Once he
approved the document, a fair copy (bayad naql) would be drawn.6 The art of the secre
tary (a’ln-i dablrl) was handed down in the Khurasanian scribal class from master (ustad)
to apprentice (shagird).7 And traces of this art have survived in manuals of rhetoric and
exemplary epistle copies.
Abu al-Fazl Muhammad b. al-Husayn BayhaqT belonged to this Khurasanian class
of scribes.8 He was born in the Haris-abad district of Bayhaq, a small town close to
Nishapur, in the year 385/995. The chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan was his master
in the courts of the early Ghaznavids. BayhaqT served in the chancery bureau of five
Ghaznavid rulers. He saw the glory of Ghaznavid power under the first ruler Mahmud
(388-421/998-1030). Then, in the courts of Mahmud’s sons, Muhammad and Mas'ud,
BayhaqT witnessed, as kings and courtiers gained in power, which they later lost. The
scribe fled the scene of defeat under M as‘ud in 431/1040. It was during the reigns of
Farrukhzad and Ibrahim, in the much diminished Ghaznavid state of the later period,
that BayhaqT wrote his works. He composed a manual of rhetoric called ZTnat al-kuttab,
which has not survived. After retiring from official service he wrote his magnum opus,
Tarlkh-i Nasirl (date of completion 450/1059), a history of the Ghaznavid dynasty from
the time of its founder Sabuktigln (366-387/977-997) to the time of Ibrahim (451—
492/1059-1099). With the loss of at least 25 volumes of this work, we have only the
portion on the rule of Mas‘ud, the last monarch of the early Ghaznavids.
M as‘ud followed the thirty-year rule of his father Mahmud after the short rule of
Mahmud’s favorite son Muhammad. In the last months of his life, Mahmud cast aside
the militarily stronger Mas‘ud for the weaker and gentler Muhammad. BayhaqT narrates
3
the ten-year rule of Mas'ud (421-431/1030-1040) as a tale of court intrigues, M as‘ud’s
wine drinking and hunting trips, and the escalating conflict with the Turkmen Saljuqs.
It was Mahmud who had, ironically, prepared the way for the loss of Khurasan, by
allowing the settlements of the nomadic Turkmens in that province. The Turkmen dis
turbances in Khurasan dated back to the time of Mahmud.9 Besides the struggle against
the Turkmen Saljuqs, BayhaqT ascribes other reasons for the loss of Khurasan. Conflict
with the neighboring Qarakhanid rulers of Transoxania and the rebellion of a tributory
ruler in Khvarazm, on the northern borders of Khurasan, played a role in the final Ghaz
navid loss. Both the Qarakhanid leader ‘Alltigln and the rulers of Khvarazm had always
housed the Saljuqs. But by 426/1034-1035, the Turkmen Saljuqs could not find shelter
in either province.10 This was due to a complicated set of events that dated back to the
beginning of M as'ud’s rule.
M as‘ud had promised territories to the Qarakhanid leader ‘Alltigln, in return for
possible military help in the succession conflict. No conflict issued, but ‘Alltigln contin
ued to demand the grant of territories. Therefore, after the Khvarazm! leader Harun re
belled against M as'ud in 425/1033-1034, ‘Alltigln allied himself with the former. With
the death of ‘AlTtigTn in 426/1034—1035, his sons attempted to attack Ghaznavid ter
ritories, along with Harun. But M as'ud stopped this plan by ordering Harun’s murder
(426/1034-1035).
It was at this point that the Saljuqs came to Khurasan (426/1034-1035) from
Khvarazm. The disturbed atmosphere in that province forced the Saljuqs to leave. But
they were also unwelcome in Transoxania, since, unlike ‘AlTtigTn, his sons did not main
tain good relations with the Turkmen Saljuqs.11
The struggle against the Saljuqs and the troubles with the Qarakhanid and Khva-
razmT rulers contributed to the loss of Khurasan. In addition, the diminished power of
the Ghaznavid forces, due to intrigues against military leaders, also played a role in this
loss.
Approach
In this study I will analyze these stories of intrigue in Tarlkh-i BayhaqT. Despite
much interest in BayhaqT as a historian and the relatively large number of studies of
4
The History, no one has attempted a close analysis of the text. I will discuss The History
from a rhetorical perspective, specifically, analyzing the trope of irony.
Literary devices were recommended in manuals of rhetoric to poets as well as
to scribes.12 In his manual of rhetoric called Asrar al-balaghah, JurjanI (d. 471/1078—
1079) calls attention to the merits of rhetoric for understanding. He asserts, “Knowledge
first entered the human mind through the senses and the natural disposition (tiba4) and
only afterwards by thought and reflection. The first kind of knowledge is, therefore, as
sociated with the mind by a closer relationship and earlier claims than the second one.” 13
JurjanI connects the art of language, be it in poems or works of prose, with the first kind
of knowledge, arrived at through the senses. He, thus, recommends the use of rhetoric
for what it teaches, and not only for how it adorns. It is through rhetoric that one gains
an understanding of that which is unfamiliar, by likening or contrasting it to what one
has come to know. BayhaqT displays knowledge of rhetoric in this larger sense, contain
ing both its means and their persuasive qualities for understanding.
Verbal irony, classically defined as the art of saying one thing and meaning an
other, is recommended by rhetoricians, who call it by such terms as, ai-iltifat, al-kifayat
wa al-ta4rid, and al-kalam al-muhtamil bi-al-ma‘nayayn al-diddayn.14
But in The History of BayhaqT, irony does not arise as a result of conflicting or
disharmonious meanings in discourse alone. It also arises when one views the action of
the story proceeding without the full knowledge of the characters involved. While dra
matic irony is, thus, created, it is irony in history, which involves matters of prophecy
and prediction, that especially characterizes The History. It is the “eternal” stance of
someone who gazes at past events, lost cities, men and women drawn to the close of
their lives, or entrusted to their graves that invites meanings, beyond sought or imposed
boundaries of human lives.
The overarching attitude assumed and advised is the stance of eternity, sub specie
aeternitatis. Yet, it is not an ironic stance by which the ironist assumes a superior attitude
towards others. Rather, it is humble irony, wherein the ironist seeks a fundamental kin
ship with friends and foes alike.15 It is the attitude of a man who has drawn close to the
end of his life, one who is, thus, searching for meanings of that which he has witnessed
and shared. He takes pleasure in telling lived and read stories of the past, “in history for
its own sake.” 16 And as he tells the stories of predecessors and contemporaries, he re
flects. He draws the lessons that he has learned. And to those who will come after him,
he hands these lessons, these letters of the past.
As he remembers the stories of the past, be it the past of Mas’ud’s ten-year history
or other times and places encountered in books, BayhaqT contemplates the meaning of
these stories. Remembrance of Mas’ud’s court brings back other remembrances, images,
and stories. It is the analogical chain of remembrance to remembrance, image to image,
and story to story that orders the narrative.
Intrigue (hTlah) is one of the recurring themes in the narrative. In narrating the
stories of intrigue under Mas'ud, BayhaqT recalls yet other such stories in which “in
triguing” is the main action of the narrative. HTlah is ingrained in the very texture of
The History, most widely as an action. Thus appear verbal compounds such as hTlah
sakhtan (to fashion intrigue), hTlah kardan (to cause intrigue), lata’if al-hTyal bi-kar avar-
dan (to use means of intrigue), dar hTlat uftadan (to fall into intrigue), dar hTlat dast zadan
(to have a hand in intrigue). There are yet other terms, used in the same way as hTlah,
which abound in the text. These include tazrib, talbTs, fisad, zarq, afsOn, makr, charbak,
tatmT1, ifti’al, ‘ishvah, shu’badah, ghurur, ghadr, nayrang, tadbTr, fitnah, tamvTh, ighra1,
ta'rTz, and finally, farTb. Other than the five verbal compounds with the word hTlah, eigh
teen other verbs, meaning to intrigue, also appear in The History.17 This modus operan-
di is used for various ends. People intrigue so as to avoid a possibly embarrassing situa
tion. They intrigue against others, enemies, with results ranging from arrest and exile to
torture and execution. And at times, they intrigue to save a man’s reputation, or life.
I have divided the stories of intrigue by studying the attitude that BayhaqT assumes
towards them. It is the consequence of intrigue that determines his attitude. It ranges
from humorous, to dispassionate and at times disdainful, and finally, to one of approval.
BayhaqT assumes an amused attitude towards intrigue when no one suffers unnecessarily
as a result of it. But in most of the stories of intrigue, where men are defamed, impris
oned, or put to death in consequence of others’ plots, BayhaqT observes disdainfully. Yet,
when the use of intrigue has a good result, like the saving of a man’s life or the preven
tion of unjust acts, then, BayhaqT approves of it.
6
In this study, I will analyze the second category of intrigue. One can epitomize
the intrigue in three of these stories, using the metaphors of food (nan), wine (sharab),
and hunt (shikar). In the other stories, it is the use of letters (namah) that connects these
narratives of intrigue. It is the belief in understanding the past through its own self
describing means that has motivated this interpretive approach.18 The numerous letters
in The History have received the attention of almost all BayhaqT scholars, many of whom
have remarked on letters and their significance for understanding the text. The epistolary
nature of The History, considered against Bayhaql’s scribal tradition, has led at least one
scholar to regard TarTkh-i BayhaqT an extended intelligence report (insha’).19
All seven stories of intrigue are about plots against military leaders of M as‘ud’s
court. In these stories, the intrigue is unfolded in its entirety, from its inception to its
end. Intriguers conceive and carry out ruses against men who, knowingly or unknow
ingly, approach their fate of arrest and exile.
In three stories of intrigue it is anger that motivates the intriguer. One can explain
the motive of anger in terms of two historical tropes: one, the conflict over the succes
sion, and the other, the struggle against the Saljuqs. In the remaining four stories, the
motive is envy. It is courtiers that intrigue against their enemies. In the courts of the
early Ghaznavid rulers, envy of other men resulted in rivalries. And these rivalries them
selves nurtured envy.
The Succession Conflict
Mahmud favored the weaker Muhammad and mistrusted the stronger M as‘ud.20
But he moved the succession to Muhammad only at the end of his life. With the death
of Mahmud, the Ghaznavid courtiers, headed by the commmander-in-chief ‘AIT QarTb,
called Muhammad to the throne. Mas'ud, who was in faraway Isfahan, learned about this
through letters. He was encouraged to seize the throne by letters from his aunt, Hurrah-
yi KhuttalT, and so he set out for Khurasan. While he was in Ray, he received promises
of allegiance from the very courtiers who had enthroned Muhammad, even as they ac
companied the latter. On the road to fight Mas‘ud, the same courtiers deposed and ar
rested Muhammad in TagTnabad, then joined Mas‘ud in Herat.
7
The ten-year rule of M as'ud culminated in a disastrous defeat by the Saljuqs in
431/1039-1040. The dispirited Mas‘ud then left for India, fearing an enemy attack on his
capital Ghazna. It was on this journey that his ghulams revolted and raised Muhammad
to the throne. Muhammad, who was reportedly blind, abdicated in favor of his son
Ahmad, and M as‘ud was killed in 432/1040-1041.21
The stories of two hats, set at the beginning and at the end of this ten-year history,
evoke the irony of conflict between the two brothers. In the first story, it is Muhammad’s
hat which seems to have symbolized doom for the courtiers. Unaware that courtiers
had alleged loyalty to M as‘ud, Muhammad set out to deal with his brother’s challenge,
but instead, was arrested by the courtiers in Taglnabad. On the night before this arrest,
Muhammad’s hat had fallen from his head, and many had interpreted this as a bad omen.
In the second story, it is M as'ud’s loss of his hat that symbolizes his fateful end. While
imprisoned after the revolt of his ghulams, Mas‘ud was visited by two of his brother’s
sons, ‘Abd al-Rahlm and ‘Abd al-Rahman. ‘Abd al-Rahman threw his uncle’s headgear
on the ground, while his more compassionate brother put it back on the deposed king’s
head. Later, in seeking revenge for his father, Mawdud rewarded ‘Abd al-Rahlm for this
kind gesture, while killing ‘Abd al-Rahman and the others responsible for the revolt.22
The Struggle Against the Saljuqs
One can distinguish three periods in the struggle against the Saljuqs. The first pe
riod comprised the first half of M as‘ud’s reign (421^125/1030-1034), with no real bat
tles. BayhaqT reports of Turkmen disturbances in this period, but only after the Ghaz
navid capture of their leaders in 422/1030-1031.23 With news of the Saljuqs’ intentions
to avenge their leaders, M as‘ud sent troops to closely examine the Turkmen affairs in
424/1032-1033. Later in that year when he received the news of Turkmen disturbances
in Ray, the amir ordered their capture as well.24 By 425/1033-1034 M as‘ud received
news of more disturbances in Khurasan.25
The second half of M as‘ud’s reign was especially marked by the struggle against
the Saljuqs. One can distinguish two periods in the second half. In the years 426-
429/1034-1038 the Ghaznavids fought in two pitched battles against the Saljuqs. In the
year 426/1034-1035 Mas‘ud sent off troops to fight the Saljuqs in a pitched battle for the
8
first time. This was his response to the Saljuqs’ request for the territories of Nasa and
Faravah. The Saljuqs defeated the Ghaznavid troops, and consequently, the sultan was
forced to grant them not only Nasa and Faravah, but also, Dahistan 26
After the defeat of 426/1034-1035, with the exception of hunting trips Mas'ud
stayed away from Khurasan altogether for the next three years.27 Turkmen distur
bances continued there in the year 427/1035-1036, and the Saljuqs were emboldened
to ask the sultan for Marv, Sarakhs, and Bavard at the beginning of 428/1036-1037.28
Later in this year, the Ghaznavid vizier’s strong show of force against the Saljuqs around
Herat resulted in the Turkmen Saljuqs retreating to Nasa and Faravah.29 At the end of
428/1036-1037, M as'ud put an even greater distance between himself and the troubles in
Khurasan by conducting a ghazv in India.30
After his victory at HansI in 429/1037-1038, Mas'ud ordered the army leader
SubashI to fight the Saljuqs in a second battle. As with BigtughdT in 426/1034-1035,
SubashI was also defeated. By the end of this middle period, the Saljuqs assumed a re
spectful attitude towards the conventions of rule. In the aftermath of the 426/1034-1035
defeat, the sultan had not only granted territories to the Saljuqs, but also sent them the
Ghaznavid insignia as well as ceremonial attire and hats. The messenger’s report that the
Saljuqs had made fun of these formalities, and stepped on the hats contrasts sharply with
the later Saljuq compliance with the conventions of rule in the year 429/1037-1038.31
Finally, M as'ud came to Khurasan and personally fought the Turkmen Saljuqs
only in the last two years of his rule. But by this time, the Saljuqs fought more fervently
than they had done before. While M as'ud’s army leaders had initiated the battles of
426/1034-1035 and 429/1037-1038, it was the Saljuqs who began and continued the
fight in 430/1038-1039.25
They did so in spite of the Ghaznavids’ moderate successes in the battles of ‘All-
abad and Talkhab.32 After the battle of Talkhab, M as'ud rode to Sarakhs, where in see
ing the Saljuq forces, he was dismayed. In the two-day conflict between the two forces,
in which the Saljuq leaders and M as'ud did not participate, the tired and hungry Ghaz
navid troops fared worse. Thus, when the vizier suggested sending a messenger to the
Saljuqs, and pretending to negotiate a truce without the sultan’s knowledge, M as'ud ac
9
cepted. The Saljuqs seem to have played along with the vizier’s scheme. But according
to the messenger’s report, they already had ideas of rulership.33
In the last year of his rule, Mas'ud went from place to place in pursuit of the
Turkmen Saljuqs, searching all the while for fodder, before he and his people were
put to flight in the battle of Dandanqan. By the time of this battle, the Ghaznavid sol
diers had engaged in unsuccessful pursuits, which only resulted in fatiguing them and
their mounts. Though both armies suffered from lack of food and fodder, the nomadic
Saljuqs, used to the harshness of steppe life, withstood the adverse conditions better than
M as'ud’s troops. By the time of the decisive battle of Dandanqan on the 9th of Ramadan
of the year 431/30th of May of 1040, the two armies had pitched battles as well as en
gaged in numerous skirmishes.
By the time the two sides faced each other in the decisive battle of Dandanqan in
431/1039-1040, they were both suffering from exhaustion, thirst, and hunger. On a hot
day on the ninth of Ramadan of 431/1039-1040, it was the lack of water which caused
the final Ghaznavid defeat.34 Once Mas'ud ordered the troops to move towards the only
pool, they broke ranks, and many disheartened soldiers joined their comrades who had
earlier defected to the Saljuqs. Mas'ud and his loyal nobles and courtiers, fatigued and
disheveled, made their way back to the distant capital. They were greeted by the confi
dants of the noblewomen of Ghazna, who clothed and consoled them.35
BayhaqT speaks of an embarrassed Mas'ud in returning to the capital.36 After
receiving the news of yet another defeat around Balkh, M as'ud gave way to fear. Hav
ing lost Khurasan, his economic center and the scene of destruction for most of his rule,
M as'ud fled Ghazna, in fear of a Saljuq attack. The Saljuqs did not invade Ghazna, but
remained in Khurasan for a long time to come.
Envy
Rivalries existed among courtiers of all three early Ghaznavid rulers. And in
trigues resulted in some cases. Under Mahmud the two recorded instances of intrigue
were conducted by military leaders against viziers. Under M as'ud military leaders were
the object of intrigues, by both civilian and military courtiers. The commander-in-chief
‘All QarTb was the instigator of two known intrigues under Mahmud. First it was against
10
the vizier Asfara’TnT. And then, in alliance with others, ‘All Qarlb intrigued against the
second vizier Ahmad Hasan MaymandT. The sultan imprisoned both viziers, and it was
only under Mas'ud that Ahmad Hasan returned to the court.37
Rivalries in the court of Muhammad centered around the choice of ruler. Men like
‘AIT QarTb and Mahmud’s brother Yusuf who honored the wishes of the late sultan by
enthroning Muhammad were pitted against courtiers such as Bu Sahl Zawzani and the
military leader GhazT who supported Mas'ud. Bu Sahl Zawzani fled Ghazna, and GhazT
announced M as'ud’s arrival in Khurasan.38 Under Muhammad, the only known instance
of intrigue is the arrest of the sultan himself. The very courtiers who had pledged loyalty
to Muhammad earlier arrested him in TagTnabad.39
It was in the court of Mas'ud that the alliances and animosities of the first two
courts, especially that of Mahmud, were played out, at times leading to new circles of
friends and foes. Not all animosities culminated in intrigue. And intrigues did not all
end in imprisonments. The jealousies of other scribes towards the chief secretary Bu
Nasr Mushkan remained harmless.40 Similarly, neither intrigue against the Khvarazm
shah Altuntash succeeded in imprisonment. Unlike the arrest of military courtiers, the
arrest and execution of Mahmud’s last vizier Hasanak, a fierce enemy of Mas'ud, did not
follow feigned cordiality before a plot of intrigue.41
The factionalism in M as'ud’s court was between the men of the old order and the
newly-risen group. In this court, old enemies like the vizier Ahmad Hasan and the mil
itary leader Khvarazmshah Altuntash were both Mahmudlyan, men of the old order.
The new group, Mas'udiyan, men who rose in status in the court of Mas'ud, comprised
courtiers like Zawzani and military leaders like Aryaruq and GhazT. Members of the old
guard, men like ‘AIT Dayah, BigtughdT, and BilgatigTn were contemptuous of this new
circle at court. They intrigued against the men of the new order, just as did the sultan
and his people, against the men of the old.42
TarTkh-i BayhaqT
Six editions of TarTkh-i BayhaqT have so far been published, the most annotated
among them being the 1350/1971 edition by ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz.43 With the loss of
most of the History, only volumes five through nine and a chapter on Khvarazm remain,
11
comprising 945 pages in the 1350/1971 edition. Chancery letters and official messages
abound in The History. Other than stories of M as'ud’s time, BayhaqT narrates anec
dotes about Mahmud and his father Sabuktigln. Also mentioned are stories of Sasanian,
Umayyad (41-132/661-750), ‘Abbasid (132-656/749-1258), Tahirid (205-59/821-73),
Saffarid (253-900/867-1495), and Samanid (204-395/819-1005) rulers and viziers.
BayhaqT also encloses Persian and Arabic poems of earlier and contemporary poets.
While poems of predecessors are by well-known poets like RudakT and al-MutanabbT, the
author encloses the poems of lesser known contemporaries, one of whom, Bu HanTfah
AskafT, was his own friend. Other than stories and poems, The History also includes ser
mons on kingship, ethics, and the transience of this world.
Three types of headings exist in The History: volume, chronology, and topic. In
the absence of knowledge about the transmission of TarTkh-i BayhaqT, one cannot de
termine if all the headings were, in fact, by the author, or if some were inserted by later
scribes. The text includes the remainder of volume five (year 421/1030) and entire vol
umes six (421-422/1030-1031), seven (422-424/1030-1033), and nine (430-432/1038-
1041), and the chapter on Khvarazm. Volume eight (424-429/1032-1038) has gaps in
the beginning and the middle, concerning the years 424/1032-1033 and 425/1033-1034.
The volume on Khvarazm includes events relating to its conquest at the time of Mahmud
(408/1017-1018), and those leading to its loss at the time of Mas'ud (426/1034-1035).
The pace of the narrative is much slower in the first three volumes (five, six, and seven),
containing the events of the first four years of rule.44 BayhaqT relates the last six years
of M as'ud’s reign in a more hasty manner (volumes eight and nine). Volume six (421—
422/1030-1031) stands out as the one in which the narrative pace is slowest. Indeed, this
volume contains the largest number of stories of earlier times.
The chronology of the ten-year rule is maintained. But stories, letters, and po
ems of this period remind BayhaqT of earlier times and places. All the volumes con
tain accounts from earlier periods. BayhaqT narrates these as he relates the narrative of
M as'ud’s rule in the years 421—432/1030—1041. The account of the year 427/1035-1036
is the only one without any such stories. It is also the shortest year-entry in the whole
work. Indeed, the accounts for the three-year period 427^129/1035-1038, between the
first two defeats by the Saljuqs, are the briefest in the text. These were the years spent
12
chiefly in drinking and hunting by the sultan, notwithstanding, or perhaps because of the
Saljuq threat. The accounts for the first two years of rule, 421-422/1030-1031 (num
ber of pages, 180 and 200), and the year of the final defeat, 431/1039-1040 (number of
pages, 92) are the longest.
Not all the stories in the text have headings. Among the stories analyzed in this
study, four narratives, (the intrigues against Aryaruq, GhazT, Yusuf, and the second at
tempt against Altuntash) have headings, while the others do not. A linear characteriza
tion of the text, based on the three types of headings, does not prove beneficial. Rather,
its narrative form invites that one view The History analogically. BayhaqT takes the
reader from story to story, remembering the past of M as'ud’s history. This reminds the
author of stories of even earlier times and places. After these stories, BayhaqT again re
sumes the narrative of M as'ud’s history, while at times also advising future generations.
Other Texts
One can divide other texts containing information on M as'ud’s history into near
contemporary and later works. The work by 'UtbT, TarTkh-i YamTnT (death of author
427/1036 or 431/1039-1040), is devoted to the reign of Mahmud.45 It is useful for
this study by providing information about the earlier service of military men like the
Khvarazmshah Altuntash. In another near contemporary history, TarTkh-i STstan
(448/1056), a local history of STstan, the succession conflict and the struggle against the
Saljuqs are briefly mentioned.46 Zayn al-akhbar ( dedicated to the fifth Ghaznavid sul
tan ‘Abd al-RashTd, 441-444/1050-1053), a general history of Iran, also contains infor
mation on M as'ud’s history.47 Among these three sources, Tarlkh-i GardTzT contains the
most detailed accounts on Mas'ud.
The later historians, like their earlier counterparts, relate the history of M as'ud
mostly in terms of the succession conflict and the struggle against the Saljuqs. The only
historical work which contains stories of court intrigue in Mahmud’s time is the much
later TarTkh-i nigaristan (908/1502-1503).48 The local history of Bayhaq, TarTkh-i
Bayhaq (dates of the author, 490-565/1097-1170) contains less information on the po
litical history of Mas'ud than other 6th-7th/l2th-13th century sources.49 The Saljuq
history Rahat al-sudur va ayat al-surur (begun in 599/1202-1203), based on the Saljuq-
13
namah of Nishapuri, provides much detail about the struggle against the Saljuqs.50 The
Arabic Saljuq source, Akhbar al-dawlah al-Saljuqlyyah (622/1225) is another impor
tant source for the history of this struggle.51 In his general history of Islamic lands,
al-Kamil fi al-tarlkh, Ibn al-Athlr (555-630/1160-1234) relates much information about
the ten-year rule of Mas‘ud.52 In his general history of Iran Tabaqat-i Nasirl Juzjani
(658/1259-1260) mostly relates information on the succession conflict and the struggle
against Saljuqs, though not with as much detail as the previous source.53 The work of
al-‘lbrl (Bar Hebraeus) (d. 664-1286), Mukhtasar al-duwal also contains a notice about
the conflict between the two brothers.54
Among the works of the next century, the work of Shabankara’I (d. 759/1358),
Majma* al-ansab, a general history of Iran, but particularly a history of Fars and the
Shabankara’T Kurds, merits attention for its fullness of detail.55 Other 8th/14th century
texts, like Ja m i‘ al-tavarlkh (717/1317-1318), TarTkh-i guzldah (730/1329-1330), and
al-Bidayah wa al-nihayah (/1301-1370) are mainly devoted to the conflict between the
two Ghaznavid brothers.56 Tarlkh-i khayrat (858/1454), with entries on the conflict be
tween the brothers, is the least detailed of the 9th/15th century sources.57 Faslh KhvafI
reports the details of the first conflict in his Mujmal-i FasThT (845/1441-1442).58 But
the author also relates some information on Mahmud’s first two viziers. The general his
tory of Mirkhvand (837-903/1433-1498), Rawdat al-safa, based on the Saljuq-namah,
provides the most detailed account on the succession conflict and the struggle against the
Saljuqs.59
In the 10th/16th century Khvandmlr discusses the succession conflict in his Khula-
sat al-akhbar fT bayan al-athar (904/1498-1499).60 The later 10th/16th and 1 lth/17th
century sources are by Indian historians, who in writing histories of India have inevitably
included the Ghaznavids. The most detailed of these accounts are Tarlkh-i alfl (1000/
1591-1592) and Gulshan-i Ibrahim! (1018/1609— 1610).61 In the 13th/19th century, an
other Indian historian, Harshakah Ray, included the first conflict between the Ghaznavid
brothers in his Majma* al-akhbar (1220/1805-1806).62
Among the sources falling within the genre of andarz, advice literature, Nizam
al-Mulk’s Slyasat-namah (author’s dates, 408-485/1018-1092) and the later Vasaya-yi
Nizam al-Mulk TusI (9th/l 5th century) respectively include information on the conflict
14
between the brothers, and the intrigues against Mahmud’s viziers.63 Three biographies
of viziers include entries on the viziers of the Ghaznavids, and thus, stories of intrigue.
But Athar al-vuzara’ (883/1478), with inclusion of stories about the vizier Maymandi
and his letter of conditions during M as'ud’s rule, is more comprehensive than the earlier
Nasa’im al-ashar (725/1324-1325) and the later Dastur al-vuzara’ (914/1508-1509).64
In his collection of stories, Javami' al-hikayat va lavami' al-rivayat (630/1232-1233),
‘AwfT also includes tales of Mahmud’s disfavor towards courtiers and M as'ud’s seizure
of gifts.65
Scholarship
The work of Sa'Td NafTsT, Dar pTramun-i TarTkh-i BayhaqT (2 vs., Tehran: 1342/
1963) is invaluable for Ghaznavid studies. NafisT has collected some lost parts of The
History in addition to any information on the dynasty found in other sources. The works
of three historians of the Ghaznavids merit close attention. The Life and Times of
Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Cambridge: 1931) by Muhammad Nazim contains much in
formation on this period of Ghaznavid history, especially MahmOd’s Indian raids. The
foremost historian of the Ghaznavids, Clifford E. Bosworth has studied the reigns of both
the early amirs and the later ones in his works (The Ghaznavids: their empire in Afghan
istan and Eastern Iran, 994—1040, Edinburgh: 1963; The Later Ghaznavids: splendour
and decay, 1040-1186, New York: 1977). Bosworth has followed Bayhaql’s epitomiz
ing motif of principal ( ‘asl) versus minor (far'), in distinguishing the reigns of the early
Ghaznavids from those of the later ones after the loss of Khurasan. In The Ghaznavids
Bosworth has closely examined the many aspects of life in Khurasan. And he has noted
the main historical themes of this period, in studying the reign of Mas'ud. Another histo
rian, Rudolf Gelpke, has discussed the first three years of M as'ud’s rule (Sultan M as'ud I.
von Gazna: Die drei ersten Jahre seiner Herrschaft 421-/1030-424/1033, Munich: 1957).
Concentrating on the politics of the court, Gelpke has read The History very closely.
Other than for its richness of information on the Ghaznavids, Tarlkh-i BayhaqT
has also received the attention of scholars for its literary and historiographical qualities.
Malik al-Shu‘ara Bahar, in his classic work on Persian prose (Sabk-shinasT ya tarikh-i
tatavvur-i nasr-i FarsT, v.2, Tehran: 1337/1958, pp. 66-87) is the precursor of this group
15
of scholars. Bahar especially calls attention to the simple yet complex diction of the text.
Also mentioned are Arabic borrowings, use of analogy, and rhetorical techniques. Like
Bahar, Minovi has pointed out the detailed descriptions in the text (“The Persian histo
rian BayhaqT,” Historians of the Middle East, ed. P. Holt and B. Lewis, London: 1962,
pp. 138-140). Minovi calls attention to the fact that BayhaqT collected documents for his
work, while in the courts of the Ghaznavid kings. Though speaking of BayhaqT as a fair-
minded historian, Minovi considers the author inaccurate in his stories of earlier periods,
in contrast to those of his own time. In his work, La langue des plus anciens monuments
de la prose persane (Paris: 1963, pp. 76-78), Lazard distinguishes The History from ear
lier examples of Persian prose due to its use of Arabic. He explains this by hypothesiz
ing that perhaps the scribes of The History introduced Arabic words into the text. Both
the diction and style of The History, as well as BayhaqT’s secretarial manner of compo
sition attract the attention of Lazard, who takes note of the many official documents con
tained in the text. NafTsT has also pointed out the complexity of The History’s language,
but he has also referred to it as archaic (El, II, 1:1130).
Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT (Meshed: 1971) is the only collection of articles on The
History. Five articles merit special attention for the purposes of this study. IslamT
Nadushan and Bahr al-‘UlumT have remarked on The History as a work of advice, andarz
(IslamT Nadushan, “Jahan-bTnT-yi Abu al-Fazl BayhaqT,” pp. 1-38; Bahr al-‘UlumT,
“TarTkh-i BayhaqT ya a’Tnah-ya ‘ibrat,” pp. 53-67). Nadushan defines BayhaqT’s world
view in light of the court and its influences, similar motifs of thought between BayhaqT
and FirdawsT, and BayhaqT’s character traits. Mas’ud’s court, believes Nadushan, with
its betrayals, imprisonments, and deaths bore lessons for BayhaqT, lessons leading to re
flection and caution. The perceived similarities between BayhaqT and FirdawsT include
the expressed wish of both authors for ending their works, their belief in wisdom, the
transience of the world, fate, and inevitable consequences of actions. Both authors de
voted a long time to writing their works, and were afraid of not finishing them before
dying. Nadushan predicates his opinion about shared ideas between the two authors on
BayhaqT’s familiarity with the Khuday-namah of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ and similar values of
the times. BayhaqT is characterized as tempered but humorless in his prose style, and yet
optimistic and congenial towards others. Nadushan remarks on how BayhaqT always re
16
members the good qualities and service of others. The critic ends with a statement on the
poetic nature of Bayhaql’s prose and thought. It is this poetic essence in The History that
has led other scholars to characterize it as one of the most eloquent samples of Persian
prose. But Nadushan is the only who has called attention to it.
Ruknl YazdT has classified the knowledge one procures about the chancery bu
reau, including the various types of letters (“Dlvan-i risalat va a’Tn-i dablrl az khilal-i
Tarlkh-i BayhaqT,” pp. 233-272). Riza’T has studied the Mas'udTyan official, and perhaps
the foremost instigator of intrigue, Bu Sahl Zawzani (“Bu Sahl Zawzani dar TarTkh-i
BayhaqT,” pp. 220-232). Finally, K. Allin Luther has called attention to the epistolary
nature of The History in his article on the comparison of BayhaqT and later Saljuq histo
rians (“BayhaqT and the later Saljuq historians: some comparative remarks,” pp. 14-33).
Luther precedes others in recommending a rhetorical approach towards The History, con
sidering writing and speech types of human behavior.
Marilyn R. Waldman’s work, Towards a Theory of Historical Narrative, a Case
Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography (Columbus: 1980) is the only book-length
treatment of The History. Waldman discusses the text, BayhaqT as a writer and historian,
and the place of The History within the Perso-Islamic tradition of historical prose. She
ends her work with a discussion on the value of analyzing The History through speech
act theory. In a similar fashion to Minovi, she proposes that The History is comprised of
historical accounts and interpolations. The “interpolations,” she considers devices which
allow the author to emphasize or expand on narrative themes.66 Waldman notes the
chancery nature of the text, and like SaiTm (“TawjTh-i tamsTl-ha-yi tarikhi-yi BayhaqT,”
in Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT, pp. 333-353), points to the use of analogy in The History.67
In her discussion of the text, she speaks of the slow pace of the narrative in the first four
years of M as'ud’s rule, as opposed to the hastened narrative of the last six years. She re
marks on BayhaqT’s close attention to structure in his composition, and his interest in ob
servation of human speech, emotion, and interaction. She also notes BayhaqT’s interest in
history for its own sake.68
Waldman attributes Bayhaql’s personal and imaginative style to the “Islamic re
naissance” of the 4th-6th/10th-12th centuries, when cultural accomplishments bore the
stamp of individual innovations, The traditions of the Buyid (320-454/932-1062) and
17
the Samanid-Ghaznavid historians within this larger framework provided BayhaqT with
examples for historical writing. She places BayhaqT within the tradition of the secular
historians of the 4th-6th/10th-12th centuries, many of whom wrote about the court.69
These historians offered ethical, rather than theological grounds, for the value of history,
which teaches through examples of the past. Waldman mentions that other traditions of
thought like sufism, Persian dualism, the sharTah, philosophical history, and political
theory seem to have influenced BayhaqT.70
Like Luther, Waldman is also interested in studying The History in ways that
would lead one to reconstruct patterns of thought and behavior. It is this intended goal
that motivates her interest in the text as a historical narrative, one, which allows direct
and indirect viewing of the past, “its images and representations.”71
Stephen Humphreys has mentioned BayhaqT in Islamic History: a Framework
for Inquiry (Princeton: 1991). He has compared BayhaqT with the Egyptian historian
Ibn TaghribirdT. Humphreys calls attention to the moral framework of The History and
BayhaqT’s use of rhetoric, which enshrines the workings of the Ghaznavid political sys
tem. The author remarks on the importance of appearances, despite the cruel reality of
intrigue and its results.72 Julia Scott Meisami has also remarked on the analogical na
ture of The History (“The past in service of the present: two views of history in medieval
Persia,” Poetics Today, 1993, 14:2, pp. 247-275). But in comparing FirdawsT and Bay
haqT, she has differentiated between the Iranian narrative of the former as opposed to
the Islamic one of BayhaqT. Meisami considers the paucity of pre-Islamic narratives in
The History an indication of BayhaqT’s antipathy towards this past.73
Chapters
In chapters two through four, I will analyze irony in the intrigues against ‘AIT
QarTb, GhazT, and Altuntash, using the means of letters. Chapter two comprises the suc
cessful intrigues against the commanders ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT. In chapters three and
four I will discuss the two unsuccessful intrigues against the KhvarazmI ruler Altuntash.
In chapter five, I will study the intrigues against Aryaruq, Yusuf, and the three Mah-
mudlyan military leaders ‘AIT Dayah, SubashI, and Bigtughdl, using the metaphors of
food, wine, and hunt. I will conclude with a discussion of BayhaqT’s ironic stance.
18
Notes to Chapter I
I Tarlkh-i BayhaqI, ed. ‘All Akbar Fayyaz (Meshed: 1350/1971). I will use this edition throughout the study, and will refer to it as The History.
2Roemer, “Insha’,” El, II, v. 3, (Leiden: 1954-), p. 1242; Sellheim and Sourdel, “Katib,” El, II, v. 4, p. 755.
3Sellheim and Sourdel, op.cit., p. 756.
4Bosworth, “Abu ‘Abdallah al-Khwarazml on the technical terms of the secretary’s art,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, v. 12/part 2, (Leiden: 1969), p. 158. Also see the Arabic original in Mafatih al-‘ulum of KhvarazmI (d. 387/997), (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 65-69.
5‘AqTlI, Sayf al-DIn Hajji b. Nizam, Athar al-vuzara’, ed. Mir Jalal al-DTn Husaynl Ar- mavl (Tehran: 1337/1958), p. 153.
6Bosworth, op.cit., pp. 158-164.
7BayhaqT, pp. 283-284.
8Ibn Funduq, Tarlkh-i Bayhaq (Tehran: 1317/1938), pp. 175-178.
9GardTzT, 411; Husaynl, 3; Ibn al-Athlr, 476; JuzjanI, 231. Nazim gives the date as 416/1025-1026. We know of residents of Nasa and Ablvard complaining about Turkmen disturbances in the year 418/1027-1028 (Gardlzl, 415). Also see Nazim, pp. 62-66.
10BayhaqI, p. 77, pp. 563-565, 603-607, 653, and 927-945. It is especially in the chapter on Khvarazm (pp. 927-945) that BayhaqI explains the role of troubles in Khvarazm in the final loss of Khurasan.
II The foremost historian of the Ghaznavids C. E. Bosworth discusses the downfall of Ghaznavid power in Khurasan in his work, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994-1040, (Edinburgh: 1963), pp. 241-268.
12I have studied the Persian manual of rhetoric, Tarjuman al-balaghah (ed. Ahmad Ate§, Istanbul:) and consulted the Arabic manual, Asrar al-balaghah (ed. Hellmut Ritter, Istanbul: 1954). The later Tarjuman al-balaghah (507/1113-1114) is also addressed to both poets and scribes, pp. 7, 14, 20, 27, 31, 36, 38, 75, 88, 89, 91, 108, 111, and 112.
,3I have cited the translation given by Hellmut Ritter. See the English introduction in Asrar al-balaghah, p. 15. For the Arabic original, see pp. 108-109.
In his article, “Islamic rhetoric and the Persian historians: 1000-1300 A.D.,” Luther takes issue with Ritter’s characterization in this introduction that the “Arabs” had no use
19
for the first two branches of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, namely, the deliberative and the judicial. Luther points to the convention of disputes in front of rulers and the admiration held among the literati for spoken eloquence with the aim to persuade, p. 91. It is this use of rhetoric, argumentation with the aim to persuade, that especially interests me in Tarikh-i BayhaqI.
,4RaduyanI, Tarjuman al-balaghah, pp. 79-81, 99, 89-91.
15In the Western tradition, I have found the ideas of Kenneth Burke especially compatible with the goals of this study. He speaks of irony in his four master tropes in A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric of Motives (New York: 1962), pp. 511-517. Burke has inspired several generations of historians and literary critics alike, among them, Hayden White, Wayne Boothe, and Denise Donoghue. Indeed, Hayden White has based the very framework of his study, Metahistory (Baltimore: 1973) on the four tropes discussed by Burke (metaphor, synecdoche, metonomy, and irony). Wayne Boothe has done a study of his own on irony called, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: 1974). And in Ferocious Alphabets (Boston: 1981), Donoghue has contrasted Burke’s approach to language and literature with the approach of the post-modernist critic Derrida.
My readings on irony have led me to a study done on verbal irony in linguistics (Pragmatics, A Reader, ed. Steven Davis, New York: 1991). In their article on irony (pp. 550-564), Don Sperber and Deidre Wilson suggest that the speaker of an ironic statement, instead of using a proposition, mentions it in such a way, “ . . . as to make clear that he rejects it as ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant. For the hearer, understanding such an utterance involves both realizing that it is a case of mention rather than use, and also recognizing the speaker’s attitude to the proposition mentioned,” p. 557.
Other readings on irony have also included a series of studies in psychology, challenging the ideas of Sperber and Wilson (Journal of Experimental Psychology: 1984, pp. 121— 126, 127-129, 130-136). Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig propose a pretense theory of irony, where the ironist pretends innocence, intending the addresses of the irony to discover the pretense, p. 121.
The literature on irony, in the fields of linguistics, psychology, Western analytical philosophy, and literary criticism, is vast. My studies in irony in language and its uses in Western literature have deepened my understanding of irony in general. But it is how irony is created in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI that interests me here. And for that, it is Burke’s ideas about irony in history and the overarching humble irony that best express my understanding of BayhaqT’s ironic stance.
16Waldman, Marilyn R., Towards a Theory of Historical Narrative: a Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography (Columbus: 1980), p. 72.
17Bayhaqi, hilah, hilat, or lata’if al-hiyal, (39, 69, 102, 113, 121, 165, 173, 185, 213, 222, 241, 276^82=284, 298-299, 304, 332, 378, 411, 414, 422^123, 444, 504, 513, 523, 533, 536, 539, 546, 582, 696, 727-728, 746, 822, 839, 841, 921, 934).
20
hllat kardan, (121, 165, 213, 241, 298, 332, 411, 414, 533, 727, 934); hllat sakhtan, (39, i02, 113, 173, 222, 241, 276, 299, 378, 523, 536, 546, 746); lata’if al-hiyal bi-kar avar- dan, (69, 102, 422, 921); dar hllat uftadan, (304); dast dar hllat zadan, (423); dar hllat Istadan, (283).
tazrib, (174, 222, 276, 277, 286, 288, 298, 378, 405, 416, 500, 521, 754, 912); talbls, (129, 174, 277, 405, 517, 561, 718); fisad, (322, 406, 416, 500, 808, 921); zarq, (165, 504, 612, 679, 710, 758); afsun, (182, 297, 607, 743); makr, (234, 504, 582, 778); char- bak, (182, 326); tatml4, (378,402); ifti'al, (165, 539); ‘ishvah, (612, 679); shu'badah, (539); ghurur, (679); ghadr, (778); nayrang, (416); tadblr, (410, 414); fitnah, (322); tamvlh, (129); ighra’, (298); ta‘riz, (276); farib, (58).
Other verbs meaning “to intrigue,” mahzar sakhtan, (27-28); farlftan, (71, 283, 284,325, 622, 756, 934); tadblr sakhtan, (107, 285, 299, 499, 544); surat inghashtan, (173); ta ‘blyah kardan, (325); tadblr kardan, (424, 444, 921); faribanldan, (559, 934); afsun sakhtan, (607); afsun ravan kardan, (743); talbls kardan, (718); surat zisht kardan, (440); tadblr khata pish giriftan, (514); ‘ishvah dadan, (759, 819); surat bastan, (875); ghadr kardan, (875); tazrib kardan, (222, 298, 378); tazrib nigashtan, (276).
18This belief is especially inspired by the works of Roy Mottahedeh. He speaks of selfdescribing means in the preface to his work, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton: 1980).
19Luther, K. Allin, “BayhaqI and the later Saljuq historians: some comparative remarks,” Yadnamah-yi . . . , p. 24.
20Both Nizam al-Mulk and Firishtah report Mahmud’s love for Muhammad (Nizam al-Mulk, 220-221; Firishtah, 388). The author of Tarlkh-i A lfl also tells the story of Mahmud asking his two sons what they would do after his death. While Muhammad reportedly said that he would pray, Mas'ud replied that he would do what Mahmud did to his own brother Isma‘il; that is, usurp the throne (851-852). (For Mahmud’s seizure of the throne, see MIrkhvand, 93-95).
Other than the account of the succession conflict in The History (discussed in Chapter 2), we possess accounts of the conflict in other near contemporary and later texts (Ibn al-Athlr, 398-400; Shabankara’I, 70-76; Mustawfl, 180; al-‘lbrl, 708-709; Gardlzl, 419— 422; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . , 718; MIrkhvand, 126-127; HamadanI, 161— 163; Firishtah, 386-387; Alfl, 859-860; Muqlm Haravl, 277-278; Tarlkh-i Sistan, 610; Faslh KhvafI, 148; Harshakah Ray, 524; Musavl, 682; Ibn al-Kathlr, 975; Haydarl, 485- 487). Details and discrepancies abound in these texts. But from a comparison of these works and The History, the courtiers Yusuf, Hasanak, and ‘All Qarlb seem to have been especially instrumental in the later arrest of Muhammad, just as earlier, they had raised him to the throne. From the text of The History, we know that only Hasanak was put to the gallows, this coming after the arrest of ‘All Qarlb and before that of the prince Yusuf (note the mistaken reports about the deaths of these three men in MIrkhvand, HamadanI, and Alfl). Faslh KhvafI speaks of an oath between the military leaders ‘All Qarlb and
21
Bigtughdl in the presence of the chancery minister Bu Nasr Mushkan. The two reportedly swore to take care of the court and be allies, until a Ghaznavid ruler would ascend the throne.
The conflict at the end of M as'ud’s rule is also treated in other sources (GardlzT, 438- 440; Shabankara’I, 81; MustawfT, 763; al-‘lbrl, 709; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . ., 718-720; MIrkhvand, 130-132; HamadanI, 161-163; Firishtah, 397-398; Alfl, 914- 917; ibn al-Kathlr, 980; Muqlm Haravl, 283-285; Ghaffarl, 642; Musavl, 682; Haydarl, 496-498; BadavunT, 303-307).
21 Most of the sources relate that Muhammad’s son Ahmad killed Mas'ud (MIrkhvand, 130-132; al-'Ibrl, 709; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . , 718-720; Firishtah, 397- 398; Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 496-498). Among this group of sources, three also speak of the sons of ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf as the allies of Ahmad (MIrkhvand, 130-132; Khvandmlr, 718-720; Firishtah, 397-398). Ibn al-Kathlr also attributes the killing of M as'ud to Ahmad, but the author mistakenly calls Yusuf, rather than his son, the ally of Muhammad (Ibn al-Kathlr, 980). Also note the mistaken reports of the author of Tankh-i alfl and Haydarl, who speak of ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf themselves, and not their sons, as the allies of Ahmad against his uncle Mas'ud (Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 496- 497).
Gardlzl reports that the fortress-keeper (kutval) killed Mas'ud, and Muqlm Haravl and BadavunT seem to have taken their information on M as'ud’s death from this earlier source (Gardlzl, 440; BadavunT, 303-307; Muqlm Haravl, 283-285). Al-Husaynl and Shabankara’T report that Muhammad himself killed Mas'ud (Husaynl, 14; Shabankara’T, 81), and HamadanI reports ‘Abd al-Rahlm and ‘Abd al-Rahman as having killed their uncle (HamadanI, 163). This last attribution does not accord with the story of M as'ud’s headgear, and the kindness shown by ‘Abd al-Rahlm. See Bosworth’s The L ater Ghaznavids . . . , pp. 17-20 for M as'ud’s imprisonment and death.
22For the first hat story, see Ibn al-Athlr, 399; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . . 718; HamadanI, 162; Firishtah, 386-387. For the second story, see Ibn al-Athlr, 486; Husaynl, 14; Firishtah, 400; Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 499. I have been unable to find the only source, Riyaz al-siyahah (author, ShirvanT?) that reports this incident as having taken place between Ahmad and ‘Abd al-Rahman (ShirvanT, 763).
23This capture itself came after the Turkmen Saljuqs had joined the troops of Mas'ud, who had expected a succession battle for the throne, BayhaqI, pp. 77, 348.
24ibid„ pp. 474-475, 510-514.
25ibid., p. 558. These concerned disturbances around the KhurasanI towns, Marv, Badghls, and Sarakhs, and Bavard.
The only known instance in which the Ghaznavid ruler took the field in these first five years was the plundering of the Indian temple, Sarsatl. Since this was in the latter part
22
of 424/1032-1033, recorded in one of the lost parts of The History, our knowledge about this victory comes from other sources. Some give the 424/1032-1033 date for this victory, while at least three sources have recorded the year 425/1033-1034. (Sources with the year 424/1032-1033 for this victory, Gardlzl, 427; Muqlm Haravl, 279; BadavunT, 302; Firishtah, 391; Haydarl, 494—495; Harshakah Ray, 524-525; sources with the year 425/1033-1034, Ibn al-Athlr, 433; Alfl 869).
A 424/1032-1033 dinar of Herat with the word fath on top of the reverse field also suggests that it was actually the year 424/1032-1033 in which Mas'ud conquered SarsatT, and that he went to Herat after this conquest (Spink Taisei 31/445. I have also looked at a similar coin from Mr. Steve Album’s stock, now at Tubingen). Yet an even more plausible explanation for the word fath, considering the local nature of Islamic mints, is the show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs around Herat in this year. We do not have any record of the show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs, if it, indeed, occurred. We only have Bayhaql’s report of M as'ud’s intention to disperse the Turkmen Saljuqs from around Herat, (BayhaqI, 512). However, the report of this show of force could have been in one of the lost parts of The History.
26BayhaqI, pp. 611-644. The chain of events which led to the Saljuqs’ request from M as'ud for the grant of territories involved M as'ud’s policy in the tributory of Khvarazm and the Saljuqs’ conflict with the local ruler of land, Shah Malik. For a summary about the nomadic Saljuqs in Khurasan, see Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, pp. 205-226. For the Ghaznavid-Saljuq conflict, see Bosworth, op.cit., pp. 241-249. For the details of the 426/1034-1035 defeat, see BayhaqI, pp. 628-632 and al-Husaynl, pp. 6-12.
27The 427/1035-1036 ANS 000.999.7236 coin of M as'ud is probably from the mint of Marv al-Rud, where Mas'ud went hunting in this year. BayhaqI reports, “And on Thursday, the ninth of Jamadl al-’ula the amir prepared for hunting, and went to the valleys of Marv al-Rud,” p. 651.
28BayhaqI, pp. 660-661.
29For the letter of the vizier to M as'ud about the former’s successes against the Turkmen Saljuqs, see BayhaqI, p.687.
The word fath appears on top of the reverse fields of Nishapuri dinars for the years 428/1036-1037 and 429/1037-1038. One might attribute such a display of victory on coins for the year 429/1037-1038 to M as'ud’s conquest of the Hans! fortress in India (BayhaqI, 703-704). But the appearance of fath on the coins of the year 428/1036- 1037 can best be explained by the strong show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs in Herat. Though the coins for these two years seem not to have been cast from the same dies, another possibility is that they tell of the same victory. Considering the chronology of events, this must have been the vizier’s victory against the Turkmen Saljuqs (The 428/1036-1037 dinars of Nishapur with the word fath on top of the reverse field: ANS 1922.211.89; ANS 1972.288.57; ANS 1968.216.4lOst 1304. I also looked at a similar dinar of Nishapur from Mr. Album’s stock (now in the Tubingen collection;
23
the 429/1037-1038 dinars of Nishapur with the word fath on top of the reverse field:ANS 1947.72.1; ANS 1972.288.58; Sourdel 255. Among the 428/1036-1037 set of coins, I have not seen the photograph of the coin in Ostrup’s catologue. Also, among the 429/1037-1038 set of coins, I have not seen the photograph of the coin in Sourdel’s catologue. Also previously in Mr. Album’s stock, now owned by the Tubingen Museum, are the 428/1036-1037 dinar of Nishapur, Tubingen EH1 B l, and the 429/1037-1038 dinar of Nishapur, Tubingen EH1 B2. But, unfortunately, there are no references to the coins’ inscriptions).
Sourdel has catologued a 427/1035-1036 dinar of Nishapur with the word zafar on top of the obverse field. None of the other 427/1035-1036 dinars of Nishapur that I have come across (ANS 1972.288.56; ANS 1922.211.88; SA’s stock) display the word zafar on top of the obverse field. Also, none of the textual sources refer to overwhelming “victories” against the two foremost enemies of the empire; namely, the sons of the Qarakhanid rebel leader, ‘Alltigln, or the Turkmen Saljuqs, to warrant such a display of victory on coins. BayhaqI reports the troubles that the Turkmen Saljuqs were causing for the people of Khurasan in this year, p. 649. Upon receiving this news from the governor of Khurasan, Mas'ud consulted with his courtiers and decided on sending an army of 10,000 horsemen and 5000 footmen to Khurasan, p. 650. Could the 427/1035- 1036 coins with the word zafar on top of the obverse field be the historical record of this army’s victory against the Turkmen Saljuqs? Or, could Sourdel, as he himself expressed doubts about the correctness of the date, have simply misread 427/1035-1036 for 429/1037-1038?
30BayhaqI, pp. 698-699 and 703-704. M as'ud declared his intention of doing a ghazv to his courtiers towards the end of the year 428/1036-1037. He conquered the HansI fortress on the 20th of RabI' al-awwal in the year 429/1037-1038.
31 For the Saljuqs’ attitude in 426/1034—1035, see BayhaqI, pp. 640-645. In The Ghaznavids, Bosworth discusses the Saljuqs’ attitude in his section on M as'ud’s downfall. Bosworth points out the Saljuqs’ surprise at their own victory in the year 426/1034—1035, and takes note of the fact that at this point, the Saljuq leaders did not yet think of themselves as a united body, p. 242. In negotiations following the Saljuq victory, the three leaders sent three different messengers to M as'ud’s court.
For the details of the 429/1037-1038 defeat, see BayhaqI, pp. 717-720. For the account of the Saljuqs in Nishapur, see pp. 730-733. Also see the section on the attitudes of the people of Nishapur and the Saljuqs in Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, pp. 258-268.
In the year 429/1037-1038, Tughril symbolically assumed power by sitting on M as'ud’s throne in Nishapur. From the text of The History, we know that the battle took place in the ninth month of the year, and that Tughril did not arrive in Nishapur for at least another twenty-two days. Yet the date of a Nishapuri dinar does not accord with this textual chronology of events. It is a 428/1036-1037 dinar bearing Tughril’s name (ANS 1964.23.2). This numismatic vs. textual discord opens the gate to conjecture about Saljuq relations with the people of Nishapur. Unfortunately I have not been able to compare the 428/1036-1037 Nishapuri dinar of Tughril with the 428/1036-1037 di
24
nars of Mas'ud. Did the nobles of Nishapur, as Allin Luther suggested in a conversation about this numismatic vs. textual discord, try to appease the Saljuqs through minting in Tughril’s name? By 428/1036-1037, the Ghaznavids had lost Nasa, Faravah, and Dahistan to the Saljuqs, and had been asked to “grant” the cities of Marv, Sarakhs, and Bavard. We know that after the vizier’s successful show of force in Herat, the Saljuqs mostly retired to Nasa and Faravah for a while. Could the Saljuqs’ close vicinity in Nasa have caused the Nishapuri authorities to mint in Tughril’s name towards the end of this year? I also learned about a 430/1038-1039 dinar of Nishapur with Tughril’s name from Mr. Album.
32BayhaqI, the 426/1034-1035 battle, pp. 625-632; the 429/1037-1038 battle, pp. 707- 720; the ‘All-abad battle, pp. 752-755; the Talkhab battle, see pp. 756-764.
33ibid., pp. 765-781. The Ghaznavid messenger to the Saljuqs reported that despite their expressions of servitude, the Saljuqs had ideas of kingship in mind, p. 778.
34For the battle of Dandanqan and the state of the two forces prior to this battle, see BayhaqI, pp. 826-840.
35ibid., p. 862.
36ibid., p. 863.
37For the intrigues against Asfara’Inl and Ahmad Hasan, see note 1 in chapter two. For the intrigue against Asfara’TnT, see Vasaya . . . , 623-625; ‘Aqlll, 150-152; and GhaffarT, 102-103. Khvandmlr (Dastur al-vuzara’) also speaks of Mahmud’s disfavor towards As- fara’Inl (Khvandmlr, 136-147.
For the intrigue against Ahmad Hasan, see MunshI KirmanI, 40-43; Vasaya . . . , 627- 629; ‘Aqlll, 152-186; and GhaffarT, 104-105. Note that Khvandmlr only relates the animosity of ‘All Qarlb and Altuntash towards Ahmad Hasan, (139-140).
For ‘All Qarlb, GhazI, see chapter 2; for the Khvarazmshah Altuntash and Bu Sahl Za- wzani see chapters 3 and 4. Also for Zawzani see note 42 in chapter 2. And for Aryaruq, Yusuf, and the group of Mahmudlyan (Bilgatigln, Bigtughdl, and ‘All Dayah), see chapters 2 and 5.
Arslan Jazib was the governor of Tus and later commander of Khurasan under Mahmud, (Yamlnl, 197; BayhaqI, 169). This military leader accompanied Mahmud on many military expeditions, (YamTnl, 281-283/286/313).
Bahr al-‘UlumI has also spoken of envy in the court of Mas'ud, and BayhaqT’s warning against this emotion, “TarTkh-i BayhaqT ya a’Tnah-yi ‘ibrat,” p. 55, in Yadnamah-yi. . .
38Bayhaqi, p. 27.
25
39See note 12.
40BayhaqT, op.cit., pp. 178-180.
41ibid., pp. 221-236. For Mahmud’s decision to choose Hasanak as his third vizier, see BayhaqT, 467-468; MunshT KirmanI, 43-44; ‘Aqlll, 186-192; and Khvandmlr, Dastur . . . ,1 4 1 -1 4 4 .
For the Fatimid treatment of the charge against Hasanak of being a Qarmatl, see al- MaqrlzT, Ahmad b. ‘All, Itti‘ad al-hunafa bi-’akhbar al-a’immat al-Fatimlyyln al-khulafa, ed. Muhammad Hilmi Muhammad Ahmad (Cairo: 1390/1971), pp. 137-139 and 214, note 4. Also see Waldman, (168-169).
For the story of Hasanak’s execution, see ShafT‘1 (Yadnamah-yi. . .) , 374-392 and Waldman, 93-94, 101. Waldman also gives a translation of the story, (167-176).
42For this factionalism at the court, see Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, 230-234; Waldman, 180; and Islam! Nadushan (Yadnamah-yi. . . ) , 5.
43ed. W. H. Morley, Bibliotheca Indica, v. 59 (Calcutta: 1862); ed. SaTd NaflsI (Tehran: n.p., 1307/1889-1890) (lithographed edition); ed. SaTd NafisT, 3 vs. (Tehran: 1319— 1332/1940-1953); ed. ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz and Qasim GhanT (Mashhad: 1324/1945); ed. ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz (Mashhad: 1350/1971); Muhammad KhatTb-Rahbar (Tehran: 1368/1988).
44Waldman explains the varied pace of the narrative in terms of BayhaqT’s old age.She considers BayhaqT’s sermon on the death of Farrukhzad to be a turning point in the text, after which the pace of the narrative is especially fast. Nonetheless, she mentions the possibility of the author’s greater interest in the earlier years of M as‘ud’s rule, Towards a Theory . . . , pp. 56-57. She notes the present and past time frames in BayhaqT’s narrative, but she believes that the shift from the past of M as‘ud’s history to the death of Farrukhzad is disruptive, resulting in, “ . . . breaking down the sense of involvement that BayhaqT has tried to build for the reader.” (p. 57) An analogical approach to The History guards against this sense of disruption. For by adopting such an approach, one expects, rather than is surprised, that BayhaqT includes other stories that he remembers, as he narrates M as‘ud’s history.
45JurbazqanT, Tarjumah-yi tarlkh-i YamTnT (‘UtbT), ed. Ja'far Shu'ar (Tehran: 1978).
46anon., TarTkh-i STstan, ed. Malik al-Shu‘ara Bahar (Tehran: 1314/1935).
47GardIzT, Abu SaTd ‘Abd al-Hayy b. Zahhak b. Mahmud, Zayn al-akhbar, ed. ‘Abd al- Hayy HabTbl (Tehran: 1363/1984).
48Kashani, Qazi Ahmad b. Ghaffari, Tarikh-i nigaristan (Tehran:n.d.).
26
49Bayhaqi (Ibn Funduq), Abu al-Hasan ‘All b. Zayd, Tarikh-i Bayhaq, ed. Ahmad Bah- manyar, 2nd ed. (Tehran: 1317/1938).
50RavandT, Muhammad b. ‘All b. Sulayman, Rahat al-sudur va ayat al-surur, ed. Muhammad Iqbal (Lahore: 1921).
51 al-HusaynT, Sadr al-DTn, Akhbar al-dawlah al-Saljuqiyyah, ed. Muhammad Iqbal (Lahore: 1933).
52Ibn al-Athlr, al-Kamil fi al-tarikh, v. 9 (Beirut: 1966).
53JuzjanT, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. ‘Abd al-Hayy Hablbl, 2nd ed. (Kabul: 1342/1963).
54al-‘Ibri (Bar Hebraeus), Mukhtasar al-duwal, in Dar plramun-i Tarikh-i BayhaqT, ed. SaTd NaflsI ( 2 vs., Tehran: 1342/1963), pp. 707-709. Since I did not have access to individual editions of some other texts, I will refer to citations of these works contained in NaflsT’s study. I will refer to this study as Dar plramun.
55Shabankara’I, Muhammad b. ‘All b. Muhammad, Majma* al-ansab fi al-tavarlkh, ed. MTr-Hashim Muhaddis (Tehran: 1346/1967).
56HamadanI, Khvajah Rashid al-DTn Fazl Allah, Fasl-I az Jama* al-tavarTkh, ed. Muhammad Dablr Slyaq (Tehran: 1338/1959).
MustawfT, Hamd Allah, Tarikh-i guzTdah, ed. ‘Abd al-Husayn Nava’T, 2nd ed. (Tehran: 1362/1983).
Ibn al-Kathlr, al-Bidayah wa al-nahayah (Cairo: n.d.).
57MusavT, Fazl Allah, Tarikh-i khayrat, in Dar plramun, pp. 674—686.
58FasIh KhvafT, Mujmal-i Faslhl, in Par plramun, pp. 145-150.
59Mlrkhvand, TarTkh-i rawzat al-safa (Tehran: 1339/1960).Nishapuri,
Zahir al-DTn, Saljuq-namah, ed. Isma’Tl Afshar (Tehran: 1332/1953).
60KhvandmIr, Khulasat al-;ikhbar fT bayan ahval al-akhyar, in Dar plramun, pp. 709-723.
61 Firishtah, Gulshan-i IbrahlmT, in Dar plramun, pp. 318-425.
62Harshakah Ray, Majma* al-akhbar, in Dar plramun, pp. 517-529.
27
63Nizam al-Mulk, Siyar al-Muluk, ed. Hurbert Darke (Tehran: 1962); anon., Vasaya-yi Nizam al-Mulk TusI, in Dar plramun, pp. 622-635.
64‘Aqlll, Sayf al-DTn Hajjl b. Nizam, Athar al-vuzara’, ed. Mir Jalal al-DIn Husaynl Ar- mavl (Tehran: 1337/1958).
MunshT KirmanT, Nasir al-DIn, Nasa’im al-ashar min lata’im al-akhbar, ed. Mir Jalal al- DIn Husaynl Armavl (Tehran: 1364/1985).
Khvandmlr, Ghiyas al-DIn b. Himam al-DTn, Dastur al-vuzara’, ed. Sa'Id NaflsI (Tehran: 1317). '
65‘AwfI, Sadld al-DIn Muhammad, Javami1 al-hikayat va lavami* al-ravayat, ed. Amir Banu and Mazahir Musaffk (Tehran: 1353/1974).
66Waldman, M. R., Towards a Theory . . . (columbus: 1980), pp. 53 and 73.
67ibid., for chancery nature, see pp. 63-64; for analogy, see p. 73.
68ibid., for pace of the narrative, see p. 56; for structure, see pp. 51-53; for human speech, see p. 65; for history for its own sake, see p. 72.
69ibid., pp. 121-129.
70ibid.,p. 132.
71 ibid., p. 115.
72Humphrey, R. Stephen, Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry (Princeton: 1991), pp. 128-147.
73T w o other articles on The History are by Gilbert Lazard and ‘Abbas Mllanl. Gilbert Lazard, “Un mdmorialiste persan du XIe siecle: BeyhaqI,” Etudes de civilization medi-evale (EKe-X IIe siecles) melanges offerts a Edmond-Rene Labande a 1’occasion de son— ■ - w . . . . . .
depart a la retraite et du XXe anniversaire du C.E.S.C.M. (Poitiers: n.d.). In this article Lazard treats the story of intrigue about the courtier Haslrl (the story in The History, pp. 197-212); ‘Abbas Milan!, “Tarlkh dar Tarlkh-i BayhaqI,” IranshinasI, 1994, 5:4, pp. 702- 721.
CHAPTER II
‘ALi QARlB AND ASIGHTIGIN GHAZl
The intrigues against these two men were for different reasons. One can best un
derstand M as'ud’s motivation for his intrigue against the great commander ‘AIT QarTb
in the context of the succession to the throne.1 ‘AIT QarTb headed the courtiers who
called Muhammad to the throne from Guzganan. Whether this had been done as a tem
porary measure of stability, or in compliance with the late amir’s final wishes is un
known. Mas'ud maintained a well-meaning appearance towards ‘AIT QarTb until the
troops reached Herat. ‘AIT expected to be arrested; but in faithful allegiance to the dead
Mahmud, ‘AIT QarTb came to the scene of his own capture.
The initiators of the intrigue against GhazT were men of the old order, the
MahmudTyan.2 They envied men like GhazT, who had gained in status at M as'ud’s
court, overshadowing members of the old guard. GhazT had announced the arrival of the
amir in Khurasan, and Mas'ud seemed grateful for this service. But at least one group
of the MahmudTyan, ‘AIT Dayah, BigtughdT, and BilgatigTn, could not tolerate the rise of
men like GhazT.3
BayhaqT mentions ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT in the course of The History, both before
and after their capture. ‘AIT QarTb pleaded for mercy, expected that M as‘ud would arrest
him, and knowingly came to the scene of his own arrest.4 While this man of the old or
der predicted his own fate, GhazT did not. Before the intrigue, GhazT appears as a strong
military man, a conspirator in the intrigue against ‘AIT QarTb, and finally, as a man un
aware of his coming fate.5 Therefore, the prophecy of the intrigue is made by its victim
in the case of ‘AIT QarTb; whereas with GhazT, it is BayhaqT who tells of the victim’s ap
proaching fate. Having been a party to the intrigue against ‘AIT QarTb, GhazT fell victim
to the intrigue of the MahmudTyan himself. It was this shared destiny of intrigue and ar
rest that made others remember the two jointly.6
28
29
One can characterize both stories in terms of the theme of appearances vs. reali
ties. In both stories, lies about the intrigue appear in letters. But the reality of the arrest
is foretold in monologues. This conflict of appearances vs. realities, the lie of M as'ud’s
good will towards ‘All as opposed to his prediction of the arrest, creates irony. BayhaqI
dramatizes the arrest in a court scene in the first story, and on the banks of the Oxus in
the second.
‘AIT Qarlb
The intrigue against ‘All Qarlb unfolds in three sections of volume five. Not all
of the material deals with the plot. One can summarize the relevant events prior to the
capture as follows: 1) the declaration of allegiance by the courtiers at Taglnabad, and its
acceptance by Mas‘ud while on his way to Herat (letters); 2) Mas'ud seeking to seize
the throne during his brother’s reign (letters); 3) ‘All Qarlb prophesying his own arrest
in Taglnabad (monologue); 4) the meeting of Mas‘ud and ‘All QarTb in Herat (the scene
of intrigue at the court). Considered in terms of the theme of appearances vs. realities,
the story divides into three parts. In the first part, the lies surrounding the intrigue are
in letters that involve the succession conflict and its resolution. In the second part, the
victim of the intrigue predicts his own arrest. And finally, in the court scene ‘All Qarlb is
arrested.
Appearances: Letters
The Courtiers at Taglnabad
The succession conflict and its resolution is the organizing theme among the nu
merous letters which appear in this part. In the remainder of the first section (volume
five), which focuses on the courtiers of Ghazna, specifically on ‘All Qarlb, both the
courtiers and M as'ud explained away Muhammad’s rule to each other, but in different
ways. They did so in letters and for various reasons of their own. The courtiers sought
security by expressing obedience. And Mas'ud asked for loyalty, by guaranteeing his
trust in them. Both letters resonate with irony, with the courtiers assuming an obedient
attitude in their letter, and Mas‘ud seeming to trust these men in his. In the case of the
30
courtiers, this attitude contradicts their earlier allegiance to Muhammad. In the case of
M as'ud, this trust proves false, considering the arrest of ‘All Qarlb.
The letter of the Ghazna courtiers to M as'ud stands at the head of volume five,
parts of which have been lost. Most of the courtiers at Taglnabad were men of the old or
der. So even if they had no cause to worry for having called Muhammad to the throne,
as did ‘All Qarlb, they were still concerned on account of their earlier allegiance to
Muhammad and their service to Mahmud. Therefore, in their letter, they asked for safety
(aman) from Mas'ud, which, all throughout, they masked in various guises. Two things
were important for their request for safety, that they had had no choice but to swear loy
alty to Muhammad earlier, and that their present loyalty was to Mas'ud.
The courtiers began, " . . . [the] obstacles and hindrances [were] removed and be
came nil. Affairs were set right and [the] hearts are obedient and [the] intentions are
right [emphases mine].”7 The obstacle to M as'ud’s accession was Muhammad, and it
was the courtiers who had removed him. The implication that the courtiers held enough
power to unseat a ruler is ironic, given that they assumed an attitude of obedience, which
showed lack of power, in the letter. In the next statement, the use of the present tense re
sults in humorous irony, implying that there was a time in the past when hearts were not
obedient and intentions were not right.
The courtiers then explained Muhammad’s rule, introduced by a passage on qaza,
farman (or hukm), ‘adl, and fazl.8 Qaza, or Divine decree, overrules murad-i adaml,
man’s wishes, and the command to bestow favors or misfortunes is only His. There
fore, God decreed that Muhammad rule for a while, but then commanded (farman) that
M as'ud become the amir. By means of this narrative of the succession conflict, in which
the courtiers resorted to Divine power, they denied their role in the whole affair.
Then they stated, ‘‘And in whatever He does, there is justice [‘adl]. And kingdoms
on the earth go from one [person] to another due to His kindness [fazl].”9 The rela
tion between God’s justice, being all-encompassing, and God’s kindness (fazl), embod
ied here in His granting of kingdoms from one person to another, is a representational
one. For His justice encompasses all that He does; for example, granting kingdoms from
one person to another. This implicitly justifies Muhammad’s rule, and all that it encom
passed, including the courtiers’ allegiance.
31
The courtiers sought pardon for this earlier allegiance by, first, taking refuge un
der Mahmud’s name, calling Muhammad “a branch from the foundation of the late
Amir. . . . ” So any expressions of enmity towards Muhammad would, “ . . . go back to
the main stem [asl],” meaning Mahmud.10 But as far as the succession of M as'ud was
concerned, he had cause for enmity towards Mahmud, who had chosen Muhammad over
him.
The courtiers also sought pardon by explaining that their allegiance was com
manded by both God and king. It had been fated that Muhammad rule for a while, when
“He had inevitably given commands as kings do. And those that were present from ev
ery group, higher and lower, obeyed those commands with submission and obedience.” 11
So God had legitimized Muhammad, and he had done what kings do. But most impor
tantly, the courtiers had done nothing wrong, since they merely obeyed both God and the
king.
Next, the courtiers turned to the succession of Mas'ud. They stated, “Once his
[Muhammad’s] time had passed, God, may He be exalted and glorified, granted the ser
vants the main branch from the foundation of the state, [the one] who was the true suc
cessor.” 12 This narrative of the succession claim is humorous: so Muhammad was a
branch, though a minor one; but a main branch that had been out of sight was, now, in
view. They legitimized M as'ud’s claim, saying, “And . . . [the Sultan] cast a shadow
over the country, since he was a successor [khalifat], and he was the [one] chosen by
the representative of the Prophet, may peace be upon him [khallfat-i khallfat-i mustafa
‘aliyhl al-salam].”13 Irony arises in considering that it was M as'ud who first wrote
to the 'Abbasid caliph al-Qadir, with the news of his own trip to Khurasan and the re
quest for a treaty and titles. Only then did the politically weak but symbolically powerful
caliph grant M as'ud titles and a treaty regarding Ghaznavid cities.14
More important in relation to the succession of Mas'ud was the courtiers’ preten
sion that his claim was just. They said, “Today, they have inevitably [nachar] come to
wards the righteous [ruler], and have considered his obedience more binding [farlzah-tar]
[emphasis mine].” 15 The implication is that the earlier obedience to Muhammad had
been justified, but that their obedience to M as'ud was even more so. Therefore, all was
well, with no one to be blamed for past actions.
32
They ended the letter with a short note (mulattafah).16 First is a report on
Muhammad’s affairs. The courtiers mentioned the arrest of Muhammad, “ . . . according
to the royal order in the royal handwriting . . . ” 17 M as'ud could always charge them
with earlier disloyalty to himself, but also with later treason against Muhammad. So, it
was important for men who had helped the accession of Muhammad, men like ‘AIT Qarlb
and Yusuf, at least, to deny any responsibility for his arrest.
In the plea of mercy which follows, the courtiers ask that M as'ud consider their
allegiance to Muhammad a transgression, tajavuz. But, as they explained, the alle
giance was in keeping with the wishes of the late amir Mahmud. Therefore, their trans
gression against M as'ud was because of their loyalty to Mahmud. The courtiers veiled
this truth, by stating, " . . . if at that time they chose to calm matters and obeyed the
order of the late Lord, may God be pleased with him, now that a more righteous lord
[khudavand-I haqq-tar] has emerged and his order has arrived, they have fulfilled all the
necessary conditions of servitude and obedience [emphasis mine].” 18 So they had done
nothing wrong in alleging loyalty to Muhammad, who was, after all, “a righteous lord,”
though, according to this false narrative, not as righteous as Mas'ud.
In fourteen days, the courtiers received Mas'Od’s reply.19 The sultan had written
a few lines in his own handwriting, addressing ‘AIT QarTb as the learned leader (hajib-i
fazil) and brother. ‘AIT QarTb had M as'ud’s letter read to all the courtiers and troops.20
Afterwards, he ordered the leaders of the various garrisons to take the troops to their out
posts. He then had the scribe Bu SaTd read a letter in M as'ud’s own handwriting, the
full text of which BayhaqT provides.21
In this letter, Mas'ud both reassured the courtiers and justified his own seizure of
the throne. Though the amir had received written allegiance from the members of the old
guard, they had not yet joined him. So, he had to ensure that they come to Herat, bring
ing Mahmud’s troops. But it was, also, symbolically important to establish his just claim
to the throne. The reassurances would prove false in the case of at least two courtiers,
and the claim was contradictory as presented.
M as'ud reassured the courtiers in this way, “It was and has been determined for
us that at the time [dar an vaqt] when our father the late Amir passed away, and the
lofty Amir [our] brother Abu Ahmad was called to ascend the throne, no other [action]
33
would have been in the best interest of the kingdom [salah-i vaqt-i mulk].”22 The use of
dar an vaqt, at that time, echoes its use in the letter by the courtiers. They had mentioned
the call to Muhammad as a necessity at the time, and M as'ud was implicitly accepting
this narrative of events, and thus, seemingly, excusing the courtiers’ earlier allegiance.
But this narrative was important for Mas'ud as well, who had to fabricate his claim to
succession in the face of this earlier allegiance to Muhammad.
Like the courtiers, Mas'ud used the epistolary convention of third person plu
ral in referring to those who had called Muhammad to the throne. The amir stated,
“baradar Abu Ahmad ra bikhandand, [they called [our] brother Abu Ahmad].”23 The
use of the third person creates a desired ambiguity about those responsible for the call
to Muhammad. And both the courtiers and Mas'ud needed this ambiguity, for their in
dividual purposes. The courtiers needed to throw off the responsibility of having called
Muhammad to Ghazna. And Mas'ud needed to ensure that ‘AIT QarTb would bring the
courtiers, and most importantly, Mahmud’s army to Herat.
M as'ud, then, excused the call to Muhammad by saying that at that time, “We had
conquered a distant and renowned province. And [we] were intending towards Hamadan
and Baghdad, so that there would be no danger from the Daylamites.”24 The conquest
of faraway territories implies that Mas'ud could not come to Ghazna quickly, even if
called. But the fact remained that the courtiers had not called M as'ud as early as he had
probably wished. The discord between his face-saving statement, that he would not have
been able to come, and the reality, that they had not called him early on, seems humor
ous.
The sultan, then, stated that the letter which he sent to Muhammad carried words
of, " . . . condolences, congratulations, and advice [nasThat].”25 The fact that Mas'ud
immediately sent his brother words of congratulations and advice is ironic. Congratulat
ing Muhammad for his accession to the throne implies the admission of his higher status
as king. But advice (nasThat) always suggests a better understanding, and thus, a higher
symbolic position on the part of the one who offers it.
The word nasThat, advice, is the key to the explanation of Muhammad’s mistake
and M as'ud’s success. M as'ud’s advice, as reconstructed from his own reference to it,
34
seems to have been for Muhammad to rule as his representative, khalifat, and to have
sent his brother what he had asked, not named.26
Under those conditions, the amir exclaimed, “We would not have come into con
flict with him at all . . . we would have called the courtiers and army leaders that we
needed and made for Baghdad, so that the land of Muslims would come under the rule
of us two brothers.”27 So, if only Muhammad had accepted the lower status of repre
sentative, when he was already the amir, Mas'ud would have gone to Baghdad and con
quered even more lands. The implied conclusion is that Muhammad had made a mistake
by refusing this generous offer, when in reality, it would have been a lowering of his sta
tus. Even more significant was the suggestion that Mas'ud would have been greater than
imagined, if only given the chance.
Muhammad’s mistake is not stated but implied, and M as'ud’s success is ultimately
attributed to divine decree. The amir said, “But the brother closed the gate of his own
prosperity, and thought that the decisions o f . . . mortals would equal the decree of the
Creator.”28 The latent contradiction in this statement creates irony. If God had decreed
that M as'ud rule, as claimed, then Muhammad had to make the mistake that would result
in M as'ud’s rise.
Mas'ud, also, closed his letter with a short note (mulattafah), which comprises
orders about Muhammad. The amir ordered that the courtiers keep his brother in the
Kuhtlz fortress, without explaining why he could not be sent to Guzganan. As for Herat,
M as'ud wrote that it would be unseemly (zisht) to bring him there, explaining, " . . . we
could not see him in . . . [captivity].”29 In other words, it was not the arrest which
was unseemly, but the fact that M as'ud would have to witness his brother in captivity.
The letter ends with the appointment of Muhammad’s attendant, Bigtigln, as the police
chief of both Taglnabad and Bust, and the mention of a decision in the future regarding
Muhammad.30
Mas‘ud
The second section of volume five focuses on Mas'ud after the news of his father’s
death. The reported events of this section, the events which resulted in the succession
conflict and its resolution, predate those of the previous one. Therefore, in this section,
35
one views how Mas'ud succeeded in seizing the throne, when his father had opposed it
and his brother had already assumed power. Knowledge of opposition to the succession
of M as'ud and his own efforts in seizing the throne shows that the narrative of Mas'ud as
rightful ruler was false. And this falsehood, in many instances, had comic effects. The
letters in this section concern the succession conflict, and the lies that surrounded it.
One can identify a range of attitudes about the fate of the throne in the fifteen let
ters whose contents BayhaqT either refers to or provides.31 The letter of M as'ud’s aunt,
Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, initiated a series of letters which almost all center on the topic of
succession to the throne. M as'ud reacted to the letters that he received in Isfahan and on
his way to Khurasan in letters of his own.
Hurrah-yi KhuttalT sent Mas'ud a letter, encouraging him to seize the throne.32
After the news about the death of Mahmud, she said, " . . . we all remained remorseful,
since [we] had not seen him for a week. And ‘AIT QarTb is in charge of everything.”33
The immediate change of attitude is comical. First she seems sad and sorrowful about
Mahmud’s death, but then, she quickly tends to the business at hand, with the news about
'AIT QarTb.
She mentioned that Muhammad had been called from Guzganan, but then stated, “
. . . [your] brother Muhammad will not be able to perform this big task, and this court
has many enemies.”34 These assessments demonstrate that she was informed about
the political realities of the Ghaznavid court. But they contradict the powerless attitude
that Hurrah-yi KhuttalT displayed next, in appealing to Mas'ud to ascend the throne.
She said, “ . . . we women and the treasures [of the state] have fallen in the desert of
Ghazna.”35
Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, then, falsely called Mas'ud the successor of Mahmud, whereas
in reality, the late amir had moved the succession to Muhammad. She asked Mas'ud not
to concern himself with the territories he had conquered, since “ . . . [he] can conquer
other territories.”36 But as the record of his ten year rule demonstrates, M as'ud would
have more success in losing territories than in increasing the Ghaznavid kingdom.
In letters to the ‘Abbasid caliph and the Kakuyid ruler ‘Ala al-Dawlah, Mas'ud
assumed the attitude that the throne was his. BayhaqT does not provide the text of the
letter to the caliph, but gives a summary of its content when mentioning the caliph’s re-
36
sponse to it. The caliph wrote Mas'ud with condolences about Mahmud’s death, and the
grant of titles and a treaty.37 But Mas'ud himself had asked for these, mentioning that
he was going to Khurasan to assume power. So the caliph approved Mas'ud as the right
ful ruler and granted him territories and a title, with instructions from the latter himself.
Considering the fact that the ‘Abbasid caliph held no real political power at this point, he
was granting what was not his to give. And with Muhammad having already ascended
the throne according to his father’s wish, Mas'ud was asking for a kingdom that, strictly
speaking, was not his either.
Once M as'ud received this politically hollow, but symbolically important sanction,
he believed the truth of his own claim. The letter to ‘Ala al-Dawlah reveals the amir’s
attitude.38 The letter is framed by its objectives, that ‘Ala al-Dawlah should represent
Ghaznavid power in Isfahan, and that there would be an attack in case of his disobedi
ence. Therefore, Mas'ud first spoke to ‘Ala al-Dawlah in a kind and flattering tone, say
ing, " . . . no representative will be more deserving than amir ‘Ala al-Dawlah . . . ”39
But in the end, the amir threatened him with an attack. Mas'ud stated, “If we return [to
Isfahan] with anger, the siege of this place will be in a different way.”40 So, the amir
flattered ‘Ala al-Dawlah with being the best of representatives, but warned that he him
self could be the worst of enemies.
BayhaqT then writes about Mas'ud in Ray, where he received three letters. The au
thor does not give the full text of any of these letters, but mostly summarizes them. First
was a letter of M as'ud’s sworn confidants, saying that the Ghazna courtiers had alleged
loyalty to Muhammad. This news worried Mas'ud, who then wrote to his brother. But
with the letter of the caliph, the amir received the approval that the Ghaznavid courtiers
had denied him.
But then, they secretly wrote Mas'ud, saying, “Muhammad was called to the
throne only as a temporary measure, and [he] does nothing but drink and enjoy him
self.”41 It is ironically humorous to consider these letters jointly. First came the alle
giance to Muhammad, whom the courtiers were, soon afterwards, denouncing to Mas'ud.
And the caliph was declaring M as'ud the rightful ruler when his brother had already as
cended the throne.
37
The Damghan part of BayhaqT’s narrative next relates to intrigue, associated with
Bu Sahl ZawzanI, and letters received, belatedly, from Mahmud.42 In the course of his
trip to Khurasan, M as'ud was joined by Bu Sahl close to Damghan. He was a partisan of
Mas'ud, and thus, had been jailed during Muhammad’s rule.
BayhaqI associates Bu Sahl with secrecy, by first speaking about his private meet
ing with Mas'ud, saying, " . . . [it] lasted from [the time of] the evening prayer til mid
night.”43 This intimates intrigue by Bu Sahl, given that he would incite Mas'ud against
other courtiers the most.
BayhaqI then displays his own disapproval towards Bu Sahl. The author says, “In
the old days, when Amir . . . [Mas'ud] was in Herat, the greatest of his servants was
this man, but he behaved badly towards people. And [he] had a bad temper and was
coarse.”44
The expectation that one has at this point is to learn about an instance where Bu
Sahl caused trouble for others. But instead, the author mentions what he seems to con
sider a lie about Bu Sahl, whom “ . . . [they] slandered . . . in relation to his faith.”45 So
he was not a good-natured man, but then, the fact that others falsely accused him was not
fair either. By referring to these lies about Bu Sahl, the author painstakingly tries to es
tablish that he himself has told the truth about him. For it implies that BayhaqI has not
simply joined others in slandering Bu Sahl, but also defended him against their false ac
cusations.
Next, BayhaqI speaks of letters from Mahmud to the Kakuyid leader and others,
carrying the message that, “ . . . [I] disown my son [Mas'ud].”46 A fast rider brought
these letters to the amir close to Damghan, and Bu Sahl ZawzanI and others advised
M as'ud to publicize the letters. They reasoned, “ . . . people would read these [let
ters] and see what [your] father had planned, as opposed to what God decreed.”47 But
M as'ud objected to this advice, as well as to the advice that he should punish the scribes
who had written the letter, saying, “If at the end of his life [the late Sultan] saw this un
kindness necessary, and he had a purpose for this, one should consider the many things
wherein he had our best interest at heart.”48 The amir had the letters torn and thrown
into the nearby dam.49
38
BayhaqT points out the “morals” of the stories of Bu Sahl and Mahmud’s letters
with the results of ambiguity and irony.50 In talking about Bu Sahl, BayhaqT mentions
that people respected him, whether they liked him or not. The author draws the conclu
sion that “ . . . men should try to make a good name for themselves . . . [which] will not
leave them until they go into the grave.”51 The last statement, “until they go into the
grave,” creates ambiguity. Considered against BayhaqT’s moral maxim that what remains
from a person’s existence is a name, and that one should leave behind a good name, the
statement invites an ironic reading. As though others respected Bu Sahl as long as he
was alive, but once he died they denounced him.
About Mahmfld’s letters, BayhaqT says, “ . . . both the scribes and those to whom
[they] had written were relieved . . . since they realized that [Mas'ud] would not concern
himself with that [affair].”52 M as'ud’s order for the destruction of the letters appears as
a kind act to save a dead father’s good reputation, and to exonerate innocent scribes. Yet
these letters in which Mahmud had explicitly disowned his son could cause trouble for
M as'ud at this point, since he was seeking legitimacy and support.
BayhaqT follows the Damghan narrative with two stories from the time of the ‘Ab-
basid caliph M a’mun. First is the story of Harun al-RashTd’s vizier Fazl RabT'.53 Ac
cording to the wishes of Harun al-RashTd, the vizier sided with the “righteous” caliph
Muhammad, but also denounced Ma’mun who won the succession battle. Fazl RabT' was
deposed though not imprisoned. But men like ‘Abd Allah Tahir interceded with M a’mun
on behalf of Fazl RabT'. Thus, he regained a high status at court, because of his past rep
utation. BayhaqT concludes, “This story came to an end, and when a wise [man] reflects
on this, [he] will know how [great] these men [of affairs] have been.”54
Irony arises in considering three discords in the story. One is over the succession
conflict, which, similar to the Ghaznavid one, ended differently from the way Harun had
wished. Two, one sees Fazl RabT' receive respect and honor, even after having been de
posed. So the official became a symbol of the power, which had been lost in a real polit
ical sense. Finally, one views Fazl RabT', first, at the height of power, but later, content
simply to sit at court. It is the realization, the fear, that one’s life can so easily change,
leading to such different perspectives as that of a vizier and then a court companion that
results in the expectation of ironies of fate.
39
The second story relates to letters in the ‘Abbasid succession conflict.55 When the
two ‘Abbasid brothers were fighting over the caliphate, nobles from the opposing courts
wrote the two secret letters of support. Once he ascended the throne, M a’mun asked
what he should do about the letters. His vizier Hasan ibn Sahl suggested reading them
and throwing out the traitors of both sides from the court. BayhaqT reports that M a’mun
laughed and said, “ . . . then no one will remain from either side and they will go and
join the enemy, leaving us behind.”56 Ma’mun then ordered the letters to be burnt.
In this story and the one about Mas'ud, the rulers received the advice that they
should publicize the letters. But in both stories, they had them destroyed, seemingly out
of concern for the writers. But the letters would disclose matters interfering with the
claim to the throne by the rulers themselves. The humor and realism in comments about
loyalty by M a’mun contrast with the pretense of loyalty in Mas'ud. Especially since he
seems loyal to a father whose expressed sentiment towards him was the opposite.
BayhaqT concludes with a passage on his reasons for including these kinds of sto
ries. These stories embellish history and teach wise men with diligence to use intrigue,
hTlah, so as to raise their status or learn about a branch of knowledge previously un
known to them.57 The connection made between intrigue and knowledge creates irony,
since intrigue involves deception, whereas one usually associates knowledge with truth.
The narrative continues with the report of M as'ud’s letter to GhazT, with orders to
prepare Nishapur for the arrival of the sultan.58 Once in Nishapur and prior to the ar
rival of the caliph’s messenger, Mas'ud assumed the rights of his position.59 He had al
ready ascended the throne in Nishapur.60 But the ceremony in that city, once the mes
senger arrived, shows the symbolic importance of this approval for everyone.61 The
amir then ordered copies of the caliph’s letter and contract to be sent to many cities in
the empire.62
The second section ends in Herat, where, BayhaqT reports, the sultan received daily
letters from the military corps in Ghazna.63 At the end of the first section, the author
depicts the Ghazna courtiers preparing to leave for Herat.64 So the reported events in
this section led to those in the previous one, which BayhaqT closes by saying, “And ev
erything was settled and . . . [the courtiers] departed for H erat. . . ”65 And he ends the
40
second section with Mingitarak presenting their letter to Mas'ud, and the departure of a
messenger to the courtiers.66
Realities
‘AIT Qarlb
In the third section of volume five, BayhaqT narrates ‘AIT QarTb’s prophecy in
TagTnabad and the scene of intrigue in Herat. The author picks up the narrative which he
had left off, so as to relate the situation of Mas'ud at the time of Muhammad’s reign.67
‘AIT QarTb informed the courtiers about M as'ud’s order to leave for Herat, and they pre
pared to leave.68 In a private session before this departure, ‘AIT QarTb confided in the
chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan. In a two-part monologue addressed to Bu Nasr, ‘AIT
QarTb prophesied his own arrest and the factionalism at M as'ud’s court.69
He began his monologue with a nostalgic farewell, saying, “Farewell to you, [my]
dear friend. It has been a long time that we have kept each other company, without one
hurting the other.”70 When Bu Nasr then asked ‘AIT why he spoke so sadly, he reas
sured the Chief Secretary about coming to Herat.71 But ‘AIT then foretold his own fu
ture arrest in a way that would characterize the ten-year court history of M as'ud 72
‘AIT QarTb called the actions of Mas'ud, writing in his own handwriting, addressing
him in familiar ways, and granting ‘AlT’s brother a high position, all acts of deception,
farTb. ‘AIT called these acts “seeds,” saying, “These are all seeds, so that I would fall into
the trap.”73 He named the courtiers who would play a role in his coming arrest, includ
ing ‘AIT Dayah and GhazT. These two men would become the objects of intrigue them
selves, and ‘AIT Dayah would plot against GhazT as well. So while in this intrigue, the
two conspired against ‘AIT QarTb, in less than a year, GhazT himself would become the
victim of ‘AIT Dayah.
‘AIT QarTb explained that he could easily escape with the Ghaznavid treasury and
his troops, and even conquer new territories. He stated, “ . . . with this army, [one] could
seize Kirman and Ahvaz, all the way to Baghdad . . . ”74 But he renounced doing that,
out of loyalty to Mahmud. Mas'ud and his people would not rest easy, and “ . . . the
rulers of the surrounding territories would consider my lord Mahmud [responsible for]
. . . [the discord in the house of Ghazna] . . . ”75
41
‘AIT here assumed the pose of a hero, one who could easily evade his tragic fate,
but would not because of loyalty. The prediction of the arrest and ‘All’s submissive at
titude make the victim more powerful than his intriguers. He knew what would hap
pen to him, and he accepted it, despite the ability to reverse his fate. So, it is as though
he allowed the intriguers to carry out their plot, being aware of their actions and mo
tives regarding him. In contrast, the intriguers appear unaware, and thus, less powerful.
They seem unaware of the fact that they would succeed in capturing ‘AIT, not because of
their great mastery at intrigue, but because of the nobility that prevented him from escap
ing. So, he was the victim of his own principles, while they were, also, the object of his
irony.
‘AIT continued this pose as a hero, expressing that he was ready to be sacrificed.
He said, “I wish that [they] would imprison me somewhere . . . ”76 But he contrasted his
own assumed nobility, with the baseness of the intriguers, stating “But I know that these
helpless [men] would not allow this prince to let me live, since they will be scared. And
. . . [this Amir] will covet my wealth, and make himself infamous [badnam].”77 The
contrast drawn is between nobility on the part of ‘AIT, manifest in his willingness to be
sacrificed, and baseness in the intriguers, especially Mas'ud, who appears as greedy for
wealth and unconcerned about his reputation.
The awareness of his own flaws makes ‘AIT QarTb a tragic figure, and the irony of
his fate, foreboding.78 He regretted his role in the succession conflict. Other courtiers
had distanced themselves from the decision to bring Muhammad, and called him “ ‘AIT,
the king-maker.”79 He ended this part of his monologue with a restatement of his de
cision to go to Herat, despite his premonitions. He said, “It will be as God, may His
mention be exalted, has willed. I have accepted [my] fate, and I will not choose infamy
[badnamT] under any conditions.”80 This contrasts with the last passage about the in
triguers, especially Mas‘ud. The amir would make himself infamous by plotting against
‘AIT, while he refused to lose his own good name, even in the face of arrest and exile.
By speaking of his loyalty in this way, ‘AIT QarTb elevated his own status while he con
demned the intriguers even more.
At this point, Bu Nasr replied, “May [God] grant [you] . . . the great Hajib a long
life! [There] will be nothing but favors and kindness. Once [I] get to Herat, what should
42
I do if the subject comes up?”81 ‘All Qarlb showed his last glimmer of hope for safety,
but he immediately discounted this possibility, saying, “ . . . I am certain that [it will not
come up] until I am in their clutches.”82 In his first two statements, Bu Nasr consoled
‘AIT. But the question that the chief secretary then raised shows that he knew there might
be a plot, which he was offering to help prevent.
‘AIT QarTb closed his monologue by predicting the future factionalism at the court,
where, “ . . . the MahmudTyan will be like traitors and strangers among [the men of the
new order] . . . ”83 He called M as'ud’s shame, sharm, the only hope that men like him
self and Bu Nasr had that might keep the amir from plotting against them. Otherwise, he
said, “ . . . you will [ailj . i . ’84 He then wept, embraced Bu Nasr, and left.
BayhaqT ends this scene by calling attention to this story as a tragedy, and to the
irony of the victim’s tragic vision. The author states, “I, Bu al-Fazl, would say that men
like ‘AIT are rare. And the fact that he spoke to my master in this way was as though he
had seen and knew what would happen to him.”85
Appearances vs. Realities
‘AIT QarTb vs. Mas‘ud
In the court scene BayhaqT recreates ‘AIT QarTb’s arrest. In the passage before this
scene, the author says, “ . . . [‘AIT QarTb] treated everyone kindly and smiled ironically—
and I never saw him laugh, but only smile. Such a hardened man he was— deep in
thought, as though he knew what would happen.”86 On Wednesday the third of Dhu al-
Qa'dah of 421/1030, when ‘AIT QarTb arrived in Herat, Mas'ud held court in the ‘AdnanT
Garden. The niceties of court ceremony and M as'ud’s kind words play against earlier
foreshadowings and details of the scene—details that gain in significance after viewing
the arrest.
I will discuss the scene in three parts based on the departures of the Khvarazmshah,
‘AIT QarTb, and his brother MingTtarak. ‘AIT QarTb and his people entered the court from
one entrance, and the Khvarazmshah Altuntash from another.87 This is significant, since
by leaving the court from the same door from which he had entered, the Khvarazmshah
did not witness the arrest, and was told about it only later. The scene continues with the
43
ceremonies of court seating, ‘AIT QarTb kissing the ground three times, and his offerings
of a ring and one thousand dinars to Mas'ud.
With the Khvarazmshah AltOntash on his right and ‘All QarTb on his left, Mas'ud
spoke kindly to the latter. ‘AIT responded as though he had been reassured, and the
Khvarazmshah implicitly advised against the intrigue, yet to come. This advice on be
half of the victim of intrigue relates to all men of the old order, including Altuntash him
self. He said, “The servant ‘AIT suffered much, so no trouble arose . . . And though there
are many worthy servants who have come [with the Lord] or will come to serve, a few
elder statesmen are here who spent years in the service of sultan Mahmud. If you see
fit, they should be kept [rather than] turned into enemies. For the treasure of a state is
its elders.”88 M as‘ud’s response to this advice is ironic. He said, “The Khvarazmshah’s
words are like those of [our] father . . . we listen to them with contentment and accept
his kind advice.”89 Mas'ud spoke the truth. He honored neither Mahmud’s will on the
fate of the Ghaznavid kingship, nor the Khvarazmshah’s advice on the fate of ‘AIT QarTb.
BayhaqT closes this part of the scene with the Khvarazmshah’s departure from the
same door he had entered.90 ‘AIT QarTb also attempted to leave, but the sultan motioned
to him to stay. Next, Mas'ud asked ‘AIT about the affairs of Muhammad and his treasury.
‘AIT responded in the presence of a few courtiers, including his own brother MingTtarak.
M as‘ud then ordered, “[Now] return and rest [a while], because many decisions [tadbTr]
and matters need your attention.”91
‘AIT QarTb rose, kissed the ground, and left from the same door he had entered.
M as‘ud’s last statement to ‘AIT is ironic. Considering that he would be arrested soon,
there were no matters that could possibly need his attention. The use of the word tadbTr,
decision or advice, also creates irony. If one interprets tadbTr as intrigue, implied in
some other instances of its use in The History, then the statement becomes partially true.
There was an intrigue that involved ‘AIT. But rather than being by him, it was against
him.
In the third part of the scene, with MingTtarak still in the court, M as'ud sent out,
first ‘Abdus and then Tahir with messages for ‘AIT.92 Tahir returned with ‘AlT’s sup
posed replies. And then MingTtarak asked the sultan for permission to host a gathering
for ‘AIT. M as'ud granted his permission, after which MingTtarak left cheerfully.
44
The victim of irony here was MingTtarak, considering his earnest and unsuspecting
attitude in the face of both his own and ‘All’s arrest. The court scene ends with an ironic
statement before the report of the arrest. BayhaqI says, “And what gathering would
[MingTtarak] host? . . . they had [already] captured ‘AIT. And that message which Tahir
brought back about the troops and Makran was a lie.”93 The author then continues with
a terse report about the earlier plunder of ‘AlT’s belongings by GhazT, and the arrest of
MingTtarak. BayhaqT ends the story of ‘AIT QarTb and his brother with the Arabic state
ment, “wa kana akhar al-‘ahd bi-hima; [And that was the end of their time].”94
Ghazi
The three MahmudTyan who plotted against Aryaruq and GhazT knew that the
amir would be reluctant to arrest GhazT. GhazT had announced the arrival of M as'ud in
Khurasan. And the amir had spoken of this service with gratitude. Therefore, the men of
the old order had to do three things to secure GhazT’s imprisonment and exile. First was
the arrest of Aryaruq which was accomplished 95 Then, they falsely led GhazT to be
lieve that M as'ud would soon arrest him.96 Even after GhazT’s escape and the capture,
the MahmudTyan realized that M as‘0d might still pardon him. It was for this reason that
they continued slandering GhazT to the amir.97 Mas'ud finally succumbed to their plots,
and exiled GhazT.
A summary of this story of intrigue is as follows: 1) commentary; 2) the lie of in
trigue (transmitters and letters); 3) the escape (the Oxus); 4) the arrest (the banks of the
Oxus and the Garden of Muhammad); 5) the order of exile. The story comprises a com
mentary and a two-part narrative. In his commentary, BayhaqT discusses why the plot
succeeded, establishing a confidence with his readers. This confidential narrator-reader
relationship resembles that of the ironist to the ironologist.98 In both cases, there is a
joined confidence against a victim. Between a narrator and his reader, this victim is the
character or group of characters in the narrative, and between an ironist and the one who
perceives his use of irony, that is, the ironologist, this is against anyone on whom the
ironic meaning is lost.
In the first part of the narrative, the lies surrounding the intrigue are transmitted
through letters. In the second part, one sees GhazT escape and be arrested. While under
45
arrest in the palace, GhazT hoped for a pardon, and the intriguers schemed so this would
not happen. Irony arises in viewing the victim’s hope and the intriguers’ fear, with the
knowledge of the final exile that the reader, the ironologist, shares with BayhaqT, the iro
nist.
Realities: Commentary
The author first establishes his own trustworthiness as a narrator, a narrative con
vention which is not uncommon with BayhaqT. As though posing the rhetorical question,
“why should I lie,” he states that all those involved in the story had passed away, and
their quarrels had, thus, been postponed til Judgement D ay ." By doing this, BayhaqT
associates himself with his readers, against those involved in the story, who had become
“victims” of the irony of death.
He gives three reasons for the arrest, the tenacity of the intriguers, imprudent acts
on GhazT’s part, and finally, Fate, from which there is no escape. GhazT became afraid
after Aryaruq’s capture and stopped drinking wine. But the MahmudTyan continued their
deceptions and lies about GhazT. BayhaqT states, “ . . . the Amir’s heart filled [with ran
cor], but [he] showed kingly forebearance.” 100
Appearances
TVansmittors and Letters
The MahmudTyan transmitted the lie of arrest through two women, who seem to
have been unaware of the plot. Thus, they were victims and intriguers at once, having
been deceived by the MahmudTyan to transmit the lie of arrest to GhazT. The author
speaks about the noblewoman as the widow of Hasan Mihran and the daughter of Bu al-
Fazl BustT, only referring to her as hurrah (noblewoman). This hurrah was the godmother
of a servant woman in GhazT’s harem, and as BayhaqT states, “She had a nice handwrit
ing and wrote Persian very well.” 101 This statement gains an ironic significance, given
that the means of the intrigue was letters. Deception through letters is, therefore, associ
ated with the veil of apparent beauty, handwriting, and the reality of words, which in this
cas^ conveyed a lie.
46
BayhaqT does not name the ones who transmitted the lie to the hurrah, out of seem
ingly good-hearted advice, saying, “The Amir will arrest poor GhazT. [It] is getting close
and will be on such a night.” 102 In return, the hurrah informed the servant woman, who
disclosed this to GhazT. She said, “Take care of your affairs as long as [you] are free, so
that [they] will not unexpectedly capture [you] like Aryaruq.” 103 Irony arises in con
sidering that, in the end, it was because GhazT acted on this advice and fled that he was
captured by surprise.
The distraught GhazT asked the servant woman to call in the hurrah, who answered
that she was afraid to meet, and would write letters instead. BayhaqT does not include
the contents of any of these letters. He points to this noblewoman as a victim of in
trigue, in a confidential statement to his readers. He states, “ . . . the MahmudTyan were
skilled in such things. How could this [hurrah] woman know? Therefore, fate did as it
pleased.” 104 The final chain of transmission about the lie of the arrest was on the night
before the supposed capture. The intriguers, remaining unnamed, told this lie to the no
blewoman, who transmitted it to the servant girl through a letter, and she to GhazT.105
Appearances vs. Realities
Escape and Arrest
This part on the escape, the struggle, and the arrest comprises three scenes. In the
first scene, BayhaqT focuses on GhazT, who became afraid when he read the letter. Bay
haqT says, “Fire fell inside GhazT, because others had [also] scared him.” 106 So he de
cided to escape. But in order not to arouse suspicion, he pretended that the sultan was
sending him on an important assignment. Therefore, GhazT used intrigue himself, in an
attempt to evade the rumored arrest.
The escape brought GhazT and his small entourage of ghulams and five slave girls
to a two-way road, one towards Khurasan, and the other towards the Oxus. BayhaqT nar
rates, “ . . . like a stupified [man, GhazT] remained motionless.” 107 He asked his people
which direction to take. And they all showed their loyalty and trust towards him by de
ferring to him. Then, they swore, “ . . . if [they] come to capture us, we will wage battle,
[sacrificing our lives if needed].” 108 This statement is humorously ironic, considering
that this small group of ghulams could not, and did not, withstand the Ghaznavid forces.
47
GhazT fled to the Oxus. But once he had passed the river, he regretted his deci
sion, saying, “[I] made a mistake since [I] came to the land of the enemies .” 109 This
is in ironic contrast to the expression of trust that his people had shown. So, they trusted
his judgement when he himself did not. He stated, “[I] will become very infamous be
cause here is an enemy of Mahmud’s state such as ‘Alltigln.” 110 Just as GhazT decided
to go to Khvarazm and ask Altuntash to intercede on his behalf, M as'ud’s troops came
into view, and as BayhaqT describes, “GhazT became very surprised.” 111 Irony arises
in considering that GhazT expressed fear of disrepute, for having entered the land of an
enemy of the dead king Mahmud, rather than the reigning Mas‘Qd. Another ground for
irony is that Mas'Gd’s troops arrived, just as GhazT had hit upon a possible solution to his
dilemma.
While fear, regret, and surprise characterize the mood of the first scene, in the
second scene the mood changes from a confused panic to calm at the end. BayhaqT be
gins and ends the next scene in the court. The banks of the Oxus are the location of the
struggle in the middle of this scene. He begins, “Next day when [we] went to the court,
[there] was a big confusion and the troops were leaving one after another.” 112 M as’ud
had his confidant ‘AbdGs carry a message to GhazT, along with his ring and a note of safe
passage in his own handwriting. The sultan said, “Your enemies carried out [their plot],
but [you] can still make amends. Return, so that [they] won’t succeed . . . [we] will treat
you as [you] had been [treated before].” 113 Mas'Gd’s message contains both truths and
lies. The pardon seems to have been an actual possibility. But given one’s knowledge of
the order of exile, the promise to treat GhazT as before is really a lie.
In the middle part of this scene BayhaqT focuses on the struggle between the
MahmudTyan troops and those of GhazT. The MahmudTyan had sent out choice military
troops, secretly instructed to kill GhazT if possible.114 BayhaqT mentions that GhazT at
tempted to escape, and was injured in the course of the struggle.115 Once ‘Abdus ar
rived and ended the struggle, he scolded the troops, saying, “ . . . [you] did not have
an order to fight. Why did you . . . ? [You] should have waited . . . until another order
would reach [you].” 116 It was as though Mas'ud, and vicariously his confidant, were
defending GhazT against his enemies, when, ultimately, it was M as'ud who held the
power to imprison or pardon him.
48
‘Abdus went towards GhazT who, as BayhaqT describes, “ . . . was sorrowfully
standing on top of [a hill].”117 The imagery of high ground is ironic, given GhazT’s
fallen status. But especially because it recalls the same imagery in the story of Aryaruq,
where one views the intriguers plotting atop a high ground. It is as though the Mah
mudTyan reversed their own lowered status by bringing down GhazT. And lost power
on the parts of both the antagonists and their victim was in ironic contrast to their sur
roundings. The irony of self-entrapment is epitomized in the question that ‘Abdus asked,
“ . . . what demon possessed you, so that [you] made yourself the prey of enemies?” 118
‘Abdus’s statement rings with irony: there were enemies who plotted against GhazT, and
he did play into their hands. In reply, GhazT fell to the ground, cried, and said, “It was
fate and [they] frightened [me].” 119
Back at the court, Mas'ud received a message from ‘Abdus, along with GhazT’s
shield, after which, “ . . . [the Amir] quieted down.” 120 M as‘ud then asked the courtiers
to leave, and retired to his private chambers himself.
In the third scene BayhaqT discloses the events at court and before the exile. GhazT
returned with the troops, and stayed in the Muhammadi palace. M as‘ud sent him plates
of food and words of comfort, and had court physicians treat his injured knee. In con
trast to these kind acts towards GhazT in the court, one thousand foot soldiers surrounded
the palace without his knowledge. This part of the scene ends with the statement that,
“ ‘Abdus returned after the female servants had lain down with [GhazT].” 121
On the day after the arrest, the sultan addressed his courtiers, saying, “GhazT is
an upright and capable man. He was not at fault since [they] frightened him. [One]
can resolve this situation, and whoever intrigued [like] this will be punished.” 122 The
courtiers expressed their agreement with Mas'ud, as though they could do otherwise.
What creates humorous irony is that the three intriguers were most likely at court on
that day, confirming GhazT’s innocence along with everyone else. Also, men like Ahmad
Hasan and Bu Nasr were much too astute to believe that Mas‘ud would actually do
what he promised. Thus, the image created of at least two groups of courtiers is that of
masked intriguers and observers.
49
BayhaqT then writes, “When ‘Abdus told GhazT about [all] this, he became very
happy.” 123 This earnest attitude on the part of GhazT seems foolish, in the face of the
preceding arrests and the intrigues that were yet to come.
Mas'ud sent GhazT a message with the court physicians and received one in return.
In his message, the sultan comforted GhazT, openly expressing that, “ . . . [they] plotted
this against you.” 124 But it is the reasons Mas'ud gave for the house arrest that relate to
him. He said, “The intention is so that [you] would be close to us, the physicians would
treat you with care and attention, and this injury would be healed.” 125 One can ascribe
one of two intentions to Mas'ud, one, the amir intended to pardon GhazT, circumstances
permitting; two, Mas'ud worried that GhazT, though injured and unarmed, might pro
voke others to an uprising against the court. So the amir guarded against this with a false
promise. In either case, whether Mas'ud was in earnest or lying, his statements ring with
irony, considering his soon-to-follow order of exile. In the former case, this is due to the
fate of exile, against his earlier intention of pardon. And in the latter, the irony is in the
discord between his words and actions.
The attitude of GhazT was still earnest at this point. When he heard this message,
he kissed the ground just as he was sitting, wept, and prayed.126 He indirectly pleaded
his own innocence, by ascribing fault to the intriguers. He said, “[They] plotted [this
against] me, [and] therefore such a [grave] mistake resulted.” 127 So the plea for inno
cence was also an admission of foolishness. In other words, “they entrapped me, and I
played right into their hands.”
GhazT, then, spoke of actions by himself and Mas'ud, first abstractly, and then in
concrete terms. In the general statement about actions of subjects and rulers, GhazT ex
claimed, “Servants err while lords forgive.” 128 But Mas'ud had not forgiven anyone be
fore, and was not about to do so with GhazT. He ended his message with an indirect plea
for mercy, saying, “I cannot express enough regret. The Lord will do that which befits
his eminence.” 129 This indirect plea for mercy implies a following statement that, “And
I hope this will be a pardon.”
BayhaqT speaks of the intriguers’ reaction to this turn of events, leading the reader
to expect the final exile. Once they learned about the exchange between M as'ud and
GhazT, they feared that Mas'ud would grant a pardon. The author states, " . . . [they]
50
intrigued [again] so that which had resulted [had befallen/uftadah] would not be lost
[would not rise/bar-nakhTzad].” 130 Irony arises in consequence of attributing two ref
erents to the passive participle uftadah. One could interpret the use of this word, mean
ing fallen, to refer to the intrigue as well as to GhazT himself, whose injured knee pre
vented him from standing. GhazT’s people were pleased with this turn of events. BayhaqT
ends this part with the report of their reaction, saying, “ . . . in two [or] three days, [they]
came out of their hiding places and, went [to see GhazT].” 131 The image of these men
and women stealthily coming out of their places, and going to see GhazT provides comic
relief.
Exile
The second part begins with the statement, “[I] will not prolong the story more
than this.” 132 BayhaqT, again, attributes the amir’s decision to exile GhazT to the Mah-
mudTyan’s continuous intrigues, GhazT’s own mistakes, and fate. The author explains, “
. . . the Amir . . . realized that this matter was beyond repair.” 133
He called in ‘Abdus, who carried the news of this decision back to GhazT. Mas'ud
first expressed frustration at the whole affair, saying, “[It] is impossible to make a whole
world revolt for the sake of one person who has committed a treason like this.” 134 So,
in contrast to the earlier defense of GhazT at court, Mas'ud was, now, siding with the in
triguers against him.
M as'ud gave GhazT false hopes of future release, by referring to the exile as a tem
porary condition, so he could return after, “ . . . this bad name will have left you . . . ” 135
But that never happened. Instead, GhazT gained an even worse reputation later, by at
tempting to escape from prison.136 Except for two women servants, the amir took away
all of GhazT’s ghulams and possessions. Two women had helped in the plot, so it seems
ironically befitting that two other women should have then comforted GhazT in his im
prisonment. M as'ud also ordered spies to watch over GhazT, so that, “ . . . no action or
word of this man [GhazT] remains unknown.” 137
Earlier, GhazT had indirectly expressed his hope for a pardon, saying, “Servants err
while lords forgive.” But once ‘Abdus told him about the decision, GhazT realized that
all he could do was submit to his fate of arrest. He said, “The best interests of servants
51
is in what lords command.” 138 He expressed that ‘Abdus accept him in friendship, and
in spite of assurances that things were better than imagined, GhazT exclaimed, “I am not
a child, and [I] know that [I] will not see . . . [you] after today.” 139 This is the first time
in the story that one sees GhazT assessing his own situation accurately. Yet by this point,
it was too late to correct mistakes, like drinking excessively and escaping on the basis of
a rumored piece of information. By this point, GhazT, the victim of intrigue and irony,
predicted the irony of his own fateful end. ‘Abdus promised loyalty, accepted GhazT, and
in a gesture of both sympathy and farewell, embraced him.
BayhaqT reports that Mas'ud became upset, when ‘Abdus told him about all this.
The amir said, “This man is innocent. [Only] God, may He be exalted and glorified,
could protect servants, but [one] should not allow any harm to come to [GhazT]. [We]
entrust him to you; look after his affairs.” 140 With these expressions of concern, M as‘ud
seems as helpless as GhazT actually was to reverse the situation. The amir then ordered
lavish preparations for the imprisonment, but also that they take away GhazT at night,
so that people would not see the departure.141 In other words, M as'ud feared that
people would see the situation for what it was. But he hoped that the victim himself
would not do that, being made comfortable with food and women. BayhaqT concludes,
“ . . . [they] took away GhazT, and that was the end of his time [kana akhar al-‘ahd bihT],
since . . . [GhazT] was not seen either.” 142
Sermons
BayhaqT ends both stories of intrigue with a sermon. These two share the same,
basic pattern of other sermons in The History.143 He advises living wisely, by adopting
the virtues of frugality and kindness. For by doing this, one remains unattached to the
vanishing riches of this world. And since all that remains from a person’s life is a name,
it is through acts of kindness and gentleness that a good name is left behind. The ser
mons on ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT share these elements. And like the other sermons, they
also contain a part in which BayhaqT ponders the individual meanings of these men’s
lives. But the different lessons drawn in the two cases demonstrate the contrasting at
titude of the ironist towards the victims of irony. BayhaqT points to the tragic aspect of
‘AIT Qarib’s fate, and to ‘AIT as a tragic victim. But the author portrays GhazT as a fool,
52
by emphasizing the ironic comedy of his earlier arrogance and his unawareness almost to
the end.
In the case of ‘All Qarlb, it is the meaning of his capture that BayhaqT examines.
Both in the beginning and at the end of the sermon, he refers to its fatefulness. First,
the author compares the fate of ‘AIT QarTb to that of the Khurasanian military leader Bu
Muslim, saying, “ . . . [it] seems as though [they] took [‘AIT] by fate, like Bu Muslim and
others, as it is manifest in books.”144 The analogy with a great Khurasan! leader like Bu
Muslim raises the status of ‘AIT QarTb to that of a tragic hero.
BayhaqT then offers the charge of disloyalty made against ‘AIT QarTb. But the au
thor neither confirms nor dismisses this charge. Rather, he excuses himself from making
judgments by saying, “I have nothing to do with that, and composing [sukhan randan]
is my task.” 145 He speaks of the Day of Judgment when all secrets, razha, will be re
vealed. One can associate the word razha, secrets, with intrigue. Therefore, on that
day, intrigues, like this one, will be revealed. BayhaqT also repeats the courtiers’ charge
against ‘AIT, stating, “ . . . [they] said, ‘what business was it of his [‘AlT’s] to place and
displace rulers?’ ” 146 With ‘AIT captured, they could lay the blame for the succession
conflict on him. This way they could absolve themselves of their earlier allegiance to
Muhammad, by scapegoating ‘AIT QarTb. The sermon ends with Persian and Arabic
statements on inescapable fate, which did as it pleased.147
In the sermon on GhazT, BayhaqT invites attention to GhazT’s lack of foresight and
wisdom. As though using GhazT as an example, BayhaqT advises one on how to live,
first by maxims, and then a story. He states, “Wise is the man who is not deceived by
favors and gifts from the world, and is aware of its [inevitable] reclaims . . . ” 148 One
can relate this general statement to GhazT by saying, “GhazT was both deceived and un
aware, and therefore, unwise and foolish.” The author then expresses that one should
live by doing good deeds, and not wishing everything for oneself. It is to illustrate this
last maxim that the scribe narrates a satirical story about a man called Zibraqan. The
legendary Zibraqan was a man who, despite his considerable wealth, never offered gifts
or favors to anyone. Rather, he himself ate sumptuously and dressed lavishly. The poet
Hutay’ah composed a line of poetry about Zibraqan, saying, “Give up your noble deeds,
do not go seeking them/but remain [in your place], for you are the one [who should]
53
clothe and feed [others].” 149 When the miserly Zibraqan was told by his companions
that the poem was a piece of satire, he sought justice at the court of the caliph ‘Umar
ibn al-Khattab. Once called to the court, Hutay’ah protested that a poet should judge Zi-
braqan’s grievance. Therefore, the caliph called in Hassan b. Thabit, who after hearing
the bayt, exclaimed, “Oh the Commander of the Faithful, [Hutay’ah] has not ridiculed,
but defecated on [Zibraqan].” 150
BayhaqT closes the story with the report of ‘Umar’s smile at this interpretation.
He then draws the conclusion that, “ . . . [it] has been four hundred and some years that
[they] write and read this [bayt], and now I wrote [it] again. So that, perhaps, someone
might read this and [it] be of use. For [only] a good name is remembered.” 151 The
comic irony that arises has to do with two things. Not only was Zibraqan unaware of
how others perceived him, but he was also ignorant about their actions regarding him.
This was exactly the same with GhazT. And that was the comic irony of his fate.
Had he been more aware, GhazT could have possibly saved himself. Instead, he
was entrapped since he did not discern how others perceived him. In viewing a victim of
ignorance like GhazT, the association BayhaqT earlier made between knowledge and in
trigue gains justification. The knowledge that GhazT lacked but badly needed was about
intrigue, and it was partly due to this that he was arrested.
54
Notes to Chapter II
1 According to Nizami ‘Aruzl, ‘All QarTb was present in a gathering with sultan Mahmud and his favorite ghulam Ayyaz. In this majlis, Mahmud especially fastened his gaze on the locks of Ayyaz’s hair. The amir was then so love-crazed by the beauty of the hair that he ordered the slave to cut it. ‘All Qarlb turned to the poet Unsurl at this point, and asked him to compose a few lines of poetry for the melancholy amir; Chahar Maqalah (Tehran: 1909), pp. 34-36.
Other stories about ‘All QarTb relate to his intrigues against the first two viziers of Mahmud and the succession conflict between his sons. Mahmud himself was suspicious of his viziers, especially Asfara’ml, who had royal tastes in ghulams and objets d ’art.The vizier hid a favorite ghulam from Mahmud, who suspected this action. The sultan was subsequently enraged upon discovery (Nasa’im, 39^40; Yazdl KirmanI, 39-47; KhvandmTr [Dastur al-vuzara’], 136-139; Mustawfl, 179; FasTh Khvafi 146; Firishtah, 379). The author of Nasa’im al-ashar and Firishtah ascribe the deposing of the vizier to this incident, while KhvandmTr cautions that some historians relate the removal to this. Shabankari’T does not speak of any intrigues, but attributes much wealth to the vizier.The author also reports unjust policies by Asfara’Inl in the provinces (52). ‘AqTlI, the author of Vasaya, and Ghaffarl relate the story of the intrigue against Asfara’InT in detail (‘AqTlI, 150-152; Vasaya, 623-625; Ghaffarl, 102-103). None of the authors mentions the reasons for this animosity. ‘AIT QarTb clandestinely placed a precious dagger and wine cup acquired on an Indian raid in the vizier’s residence. The military leader then told Mahmud about the vizier’s “hidden treasures.” And thereafter followed M ahmud’s rage and the imprisonment of the vizier.
‘AIT QarTb also intrigued against Mahmud’s second vizier Ahmad Hasan Maymandl. ‘AqTlI, the author of Vasaya, and Ghaffarl tell the unsuccessful story of this intrigue ( ‘AqTlI, 152-186; Vasaya, 627-629; KhvandmTr [Dastur], 168; Ghaffarl, 104-105). Away from the capital, the vizier had purchased and sent precious winter coats to his household in Ghazna. When ‘AIT QarTb and the Khvarazmshah Altuntash learned about this through their spies, they ordered that the merchant be brought back to the court. Upon learning this, possibly through his own spies, Ahmad Hasan appealed to his own ally in the court, Mahmud’s wife Mahd Chagal. She reassured the vizier that she would help defuse the intrigue. And indeed, when the merchant was brought to the court, she expressed outrage to Mahmud that “her” gifts through a messenger merchant had been displayed in such fashion at court. Mahmud apologized to his wife, while the intriguing courtiers bemoaned this loss. Other enemies of Ahmad Hasan in the court of Mahmud included the third vizier Hasanak, the courtier Haslrl, and Mahmud’s sister Hurrah-yi Khuttali. Despite the efforts of the commander Arslan Jazib, the prince Mas‘ud, and the chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan, Mahmud eventually deposed and imprisoned Ahmad Hasan. Yet the amir did so with the reassurance that no harm would come to his boyhood classmate. Ahmad Hasan was released and brought back from his Indian exile once M as‘ud seized the throne. The revenge that the vizier then sought unsuccessfully against Haslrl and his son can best be understood within the context of the earlier Mahmudiyan intrigues (BayhaqT, 197-212/also see Lazard’s article about this story).
55
The last story relating to ‘All QarTb involves his role in the succession conflict. At least six sources other than Tarikh-i BayhaqT mention him as the main courtier responsible for calling Muhammad to the throne (KhvafT, 148; GardTzT, 419-422; BadavunT, 30—31; KhvandmTr, FT bayan . . . /7 18; Firishtah, 386-387; Muqlm HaravT, 277-278). As for the arrest of Muhammad in TagTnabad, Fasih KhvafT and HamadanT attribute this action to ‘AIT QarTb and Mahmud’s brother Yusuf (KhvafT, 148; HamadanT, 161-163). But other authors also name Hasanak (MTrkhvand, 126-127; HusaynT RazT, 485-487; Firishtah, 386-387; AlfT, 859-860).
Four sources also incorrectly speak of Mas'ud ordering the execution of ‘AIT QarTb upon succession to the throne (MTrkhvand, 126-127; KhvandmTr, 718; AlfT, 859-860; HamadanT, 161-163). Fasih KhvafT is the only historian who speaks of an allegiance between ‘AIT QarTb and the military leader Bigtughdi, after Mahmud’s death. The two courtiers swore to remain allies and protect the court until the resolution of succession to the throne. HusaynT RazT and the author of TarTkh-i alfT mistakenly attribute the allies of Ahmad in killing M as'ud at GTrT to have been ‘AIT QarTb and Yusuf, rather than their sons (HusaynT RazT, 496-498; AlfT, 914-917). But another group of historians correctly ascribe Ahmad’s allies to have been the sons of ‘AIT QarTb and Yusuf (KhvandmTr, FT bayan . . . /7 18—720; Firishtah, 397-398; MTrkhvand, 130-131).
2‘UtbT mentions AsightigTn GhazT in the account of one of Mahmud’s raids in India, but does not give the date for this conquest, p. 293. Nazim gives the date of 395/1004-1005 for this raid, p. 99.
3Firishtah mentions ‘AIT Dayah in two contexts (396-397). In the succession conflict, the author relates that in a rebellion against Muhammad, the general Ayyaz, along with ghulams and ‘AIT Dayah left Ghazna towards Bust. Muhammad sent troops after them. Yet the group of MahmudT military men joined Mas'ud in Nishapur. The author also reports the arrest of ‘AIT Dayah after the Dandanqan defeat in 431/1039-1040. MuqTm HaravT also cites this arrest (283-285). BilgatigTn is not mentioned in any sources other than The History. But BigtughdT attracted the attention of later historians in the context of the struggle against the Saljuqs (JuzjanT, 16; AlfT, 893-895; Firishtah, 392-393; MuqTm HaravT, 280) and his later arrest (Firishtah, 396-397; MuqTm HaravT, 284). Only the author of TarTkh-i STstan took note of his service in that province (the 15th of 422/14 January 1031) (363).
4In the letter of the TagTnabad nobles, it was especially ‘AIT QarTb who was pleading for mercy (1-4). ‘AIT QarTb spoke of his coming demise in a monologue addressed to Bu Nasr Mushkan (58-60), and then left TagTnabad to join M as'ud in Herat (61-62).
5GhazT appears as a strong military man in four instances: in the letter of Mas'ud, where the leader was asked to prepare Nishapur for the new sultan’s arrival (39-40), the greeting of M as'ud in Nishapur (40-42), in preparations for receiving the messenger of the caliph (49-51), and in letters sent to Qadir Khan and Altuntash (93 & 105). In the letter to Altuntash after the first unsucessful attempt of intrigue, one of the justifications offered for sending people after the KhvarazmT leader was the need for advice in the ap
56
pointment of officials, one of whom was GhazT. In his letter of reply Altuntash spoke approvingly of this choice, despite the courtiers’ displeasure, as the letter implied (106). GhazT was the army leader in charge of ‘AIT QarTb’s possessions and people (66 & 68). The unaware state of the Commander-in-Chief did not continue long before he fell prey to the ruses of MahmudTyan (71, 168-169, 172-174).
6They were remembered in the narrative of the second plot against Altuntash. In inciting M as‘ud for the necessity of a ruse against Altuntash, the military head and Mas'udTyan courtier Bu Sahl ZawzanT used the fallen leaders as examples. He argued that these strong military men whose power had jeapardized Mas‘ud were no longer a threat, and that only Altuntash remained to be captured (402). Ironically, upon discovering the attempt of intrigue against himself, Altuntash also mentioned the fallen leaders to his adju- dant and advisor Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad (423).
7BayhaqT, The History, p. 1.
8Divine attributes, see sifat, MacDonald, El, I, v. 4., p. 406.
9BayhaqT. op.cit., p. 2.
I0ibid.
11 ibid.
12ibid.
13ibid.
l4ibid., p. 18.
15ibid.
16See RuknT YazdT’s article (Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT), where he discusses different types of letters in the Ghaznavid chancery, pp. 233-272.
17BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 3.
18ibid.
19ibid., p. 6.
20ibid., pp. 6-7.
21 ibid., pp. 8-9. ft is clear from the text that ‘AIT had not spoken of this letter to the troops. But they had been present for the reading of what seems to have been a more general letter, addressed to both the troops and the courtiers.
57
22ibid„ p. 8.
23 ibid.
24ibid.
25ibid. M as'ud sent the letter with an ‘AlavT messenger.
26ibid., BayhaqT refers to this “advice” both in the section on the affairs of M as'ud during Muhammad’s rule and in the letter to Qadir Khan (pp. 18 and 91).
27ibid., p. 8.
28ibid.
2^ibid.
30Mas‘ud stated that he would make this decision upon arrival in Herat, ibid., pp. 8-9.
31 From the name of this noblewoman, Bosworth surmises that she married a ruler of Khuttalan (The Ghaznavids/237). During the rule of Mahmud, his sister was in the circle of intriguers, including ‘AIT QarTb, that was hostile towards the vizier MaymandT (‘AqTlT, 152-187). With the exception of this letter, BayhaqT speaks of Hurrah-yi Khut- talT in five other occasions. The commander BigtigTn brought the noblewomen, including Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, from Ghazna to Balkh in 421/1030-1031 (BayhaqT, 87). BayhaqT relates her affection for one of Mahmud’s special servants, NushtigTn, in the story of M as'ud’s pleasure-house (BayhaqT, 146). NushtigTn was both the servant of Mahmud and the spy of M as'ud (also see Waldman on M as'ud’s pleasure-house/164-166). The actions of Hurrah-yi KhuttalT in the other remembrances by BayhaqT mark various stages in M as'ud’s personal and political history. At the dawn of his sultanate when he arrived in Ghazna, M as'ud was greeted by sumptuous dishes, sent by his aunt (BayhaqT, 334). In tattered clothes back from the Dandanqan defeat, the sultan was again cared for and comforted by the noblewomen of Ghazna (BayhaqT, 862). And when, in fear of the Saljuqs, he decided to flee Ghazna and take his women and treasures with him, the women of the court echoed his fears to others, and faithfully followed (BayhaqT, 895).
32ibid., pp. 13-14.
33ibid., p. 13.
34ibid.
35ibid.
36ibid., p. 14.
58
37ibid., p. 18.
38ibid., pp. 16-17.
39ibid., p. 16.
40ibid., p. 17.
41 ibid., p. 19., BayhaqT names the courtiers who had written to Mas'ud: Amir Yusuf,‘All QarTb, Bu Sahl Hamdavl, ‘All Mlka’Il, Bu ‘AIT Kutval. I will talk about M as'ud’s uncle Yusuf in the context of the intrigue against him (chapter 5). Hamdavl is mentioned in The History in many instances. He was suggested for the position of the vizier after the ruse against Ahmad Hasan in the court of Mahmud (468). Hamdavl was, in fact, the vizier of Muhammad during his short rule (196). During the rule of Mas'ud, the courtier both aspired to the position of the vizier and was suggested for it (108/899). Only in the very beginning of the sultanate did he assume the air of a vizier. But in M as'ud’s rule, Hamdavl was suggested as a second vizier after the death of the first vizier Ahmad Hasan. Indeed, it was in the scene of this consultation that the earlier one of Mahmud’s court was remembered (467-468). It was after the Dandanqan defeat and before the flight to India that Mas'ud himself suggested Hamdavl for the office of the vizierate.But it was for the vizierate of the Saljuqs. When the courtiers vainly tried to dissuade M as'ud from his decision to leave, the sultan reassured them of their future safety by exclaiming, “If the enemies come here, Bui Qasim Kaslr has gold, [he] can offer [it] and become the head of the military. Bu Sahl Hamdavl also has gold and will attain vizierate.” (899) In M as'ud’s reign, Hamdavl held positions as the head of the intelligent office (196) and the adjudant and advisor to the military leader Tash Farrash in Ray (499- 507). M as'ud appointed Hamdavl to the second position, after the first appointed advisor to Ray engaged more in merrymaking than in governing (468). Hamdavl was present in the gathering before Hasanak was executed. He was, also suggested as the military head twice. The first time it was Ahmad Hasan who, assuming an attitude of disinterestedness in the position of the vizier, suggested this to Bu Sahl Zawzanl. In fact, Ahmad Hasan also mentioned that Bu Sahl himself should become M as'ud’s vizier (183). It is, indeed, ironic that the second suggestion for the military head, also by Ahmad Hasan, came after Bu Sahl Zawzanl was deposed from this very position and imprisoned, once his intrigue against Altuntash failed (429). Hamdavl engaged in two intrigues, one against the tax collector of Pushang, Muzaffar Tahir, resulting in the latter’s hanging (563). The other attempted intrigue was against the governor of Khurasan SurT. Hamdavl merely spoke ill of SurT to the sultan, who was always receptive to such provocations (816).But Bu Sahl Hamdavl himself had been the object of such ill talk, by the second vizier Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad (813). All the other instances where BayhaqT speaks of Hamdavl are informed by two motifs, one, the struggle against the Saljuqs (574/715—716/721— 722/725/805/813/815-816/882/895, and the other, which is not treated in this study, the Ghaznavid suzerainty in Ray and subsequent troubles with the Kakuyids 655/668- 669/684/706-709/901).
BayhaqT speaks of both Abu al-Muzaffar ‘AIT MTka’Tl and his two sons. In the reign of Mahmud and upon his suggestion, ‘AIT MTka’Tl treated the family of Tabbanlyan kindly
59
(264). In the reign of Mas'ud, this affluent courtier entertained people, including the amir, in wine parties (197/320). His son Muzaffar, the ra’Ts of Ghazna, greeted M as'ud in Parvan, when the latter was returning to the capital to seize the throne (322). Muzaffar died in 427/ (649). ‘AIT MTka’Tl’s other son Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Husayn b. MTka’Tl was taken prisoner by the Saljuqs in their struggle against the Ghaznavids (806). ‘AIT MTka’Tl was also engaged in the preparations and the reception for the messenger of the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Qa’im in 423/1031-1032 (379-380/383-385/387). Later in that year, the Ghaz- navid courtier headed the pilgrimmage to Mecca and was robed by Mas'ud before departure (455/459). BayhaqT mentions ‘AIT MTka’Tl in relation to the ChaganTyan ruler under Ghaznavid suzerainty, but the reference remains unclear (646/see Fayyaz’s footnote 2).
The colonel (sarhang) Bu ‘AIT Kutval, the keeper of Ghazna fortress, is mentioned in various contexts. He remained in Ghazna and sent news of M as'ud’s victory over Muhammad to other cities (5). The colonel was also the official responsible for sending Muhammad to Mulatan (84). In a letter to the Qarakhanid ruler Qadir Khan, the victorious M as‘ud named Bu ‘AIT Kutval, among other military men who had supported the sultan (94/96). The colonel was put in charge of three arrested leaders in the first two years of M as'ud’s reign (MingTtarak, Aryaruq, GhazT) (109/295/307). And the intrigue against yet three other military leaders in the last year of the reign was, in fact, in his fortress (872-873). In keeping with the Ghaznavid rituals of service, in 422/1030-1031, Bu ‘AIT went to greet M as'ud in his seizure of the throne as far away as Shajkav (333) (see Fallah Rastigar’s article in Yadnamah . . . on the rituals of the court/412-467). In 425/1033-1034, the colonel both hosted the king, and was once left with the prince Sa‘Td in charge of Ghazna (526/557). Bu ‘AIT was, again, left in charge of affairs in Ghazna with the prince in 427/1035-1036 (658). BayhaqT also recalls Bu ‘AIT in relation to the building of M as‘ud’s palace in this year (652). In the next year, M as'ud was the guest of the colonel in the fortress (686), and in 429/1037-1038, Bu ‘AIT had the snowy roads cleared for Mas'Qd’s return from the HansT conquest (704). When the sultan finally left Ghazna for Khurasan to fight the Turkmen in 430/1038-1039, he left prince Sa’Td at the head of the government in the capital (736). And before departure, prince Sa’Td and several courtiers, among them Bu ‘AIT, were robed (736/see the article on Ghaznavid court rituals in Yadnamah . . .) . After the temporary truce with the Turkmen Saljuqs in that year, M as'ud sent a letter to the colonel, asking for weapons of battle suited for the desert, horses and camels, and gold and clothes (782). In the aftermath of the Dandanqan defeat, when M as'ud and his people made their way back to Ghazna through Ghur, Bu ‘AIT, again, sent them provisions (862). The last two entries on the colonel concern his military campaign in Khalj in the year 432/1040-1041 (892). Bu ‘AIT victoriously returned from this campaign, and came to the court on Monday the first of RabT‘ al-Awwal 432/1040-1041.
42BayhaqT devotes the section before the Damghan narrative to the affairs of Ray, pp. 19-27. Since I have not included the affairs of Ray in this study, I have precluded it from my discussion here. Yet it is interesting to note that Mas'ud used the motif of principal versus minor territories, first introduced by Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, both in meetings with his own courtiers and the nobles of Ray (19/21).
60
In sources other than The History, Zawzanl is mentioned only in the context of M as'ud’s sultanate. Shabankara’T speaks of the courtier’s evil nature and relates an admixture of the two plots of intrigue against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash (73/79-80). AwfT has references to the role of Bu Sahl in seizing gifts given during Muhammad’s time, the ruses against Altuntash, and Bu Sahl’s discharge in 423/1031-1032 (87-89). ‘AqTlI speaks of Zawzanl as the vizier of M as'ud before the arrival of Maymandl from India. In this context, the author also notes the ruse against Altuntash, and finally the discharge of Bu Sahl (192-193). A courtier of M as'ud at the time of his father and a fugitive during Muhammad’s rule, Zawzanl rose to the position of the head of the military department in the sultanate of Mas'ud. Other than the two ruses against Altuntash, Bu Sahl was also responsible for the repossession of gifts given by Muhammad (336-340). The courtier was imprisoned after the second ruse (chapter 4). But he was then released and joined the court as a companion to the king (561/613). BayhaqT narrates yet another intrigue of Bu Sahl against the tax collector of Pushang, Muzaffar Tahir, and M as'ud’s anger in the aftermath of this man’s execution (561). Even more interestingly, the author refers to a later intrigue o f Bu Sahl during Mawdud’s time, this one against the first messenger of truce to the Saljuqs, Bu Nasr Slnl (640). After the death of the chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan in 431/1039-1040, M as'ud chose Bu Sahl as the head of the chancery (800). But in the later years of the struggle against the Saljuqs, one notes changed relations between Bu Sahl and men of the old order. Bu Sahl, like Bu Nasr Mushkan and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad, witnessed the decline of an order they had all known, an order to which they all belonged, notwithstanding their conflicting claims to the rungs of its hierarchy. But with the rise of Saljuq power in the face of M as'ud’s inaction til 430/1038-1039 and fear after Dandanqan, men like ‘Abd al-Samad and Zawzanl spoke in union to the sultan (872). They would timidly advise that he thwart the Saljuq menace to Khurasan and the Ghaznavid order (870). And they would despair as they viewed life, their lives, unalterably changed by the loss of Khurasan (820). After Dandanqan Zawzanl was one of the courtiers who became the object of the King’s anger. Bu Sahl was sent away to Bust on the third of Zi al-Hajjah of 431/1039-1040. (Also see Riza’T’s article on Bu Sahl Zawzanl in Yadnamah . . . , pp. 220-232). I will discuss the relationship between Zawzanl and the scribe BayhaqT in the last chapter of this study (in The History, 801).
43BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 27.
44ibid.
45ibid.
46ibid., pp. 28-29, The messenger who presented the letters to M as'ud from the dead sultan also carried congratulatory messages, treausures, and robes of honor for the Isfahan conquest.
47ibid., p. 30.
48ibid.
61
49ibid.
50ibid., p. 31., MinovT has noted the contrast between BayhaqI’s reliability in reporting events of his period of history, as opposed to those of earlier times (Holt & Louise/138- 140). For the purposes of this study, focused on the Ghaznavid loss of Khurasan, I have confined myself to discussing these “legendary” stories as they relate to the loss of Khurasan narrative.
5'ibid.
52ibid.
53ibid., pp. 31-37.
54ibid., p. 37.
55ibid., pp. 37-39.
56ibid., p. 38.
57ibid., p. 39, BayhaqT also speaks here of the importance of one’s efforts in attaining success.
58ibid.
59ibid., pp. 41-42.
60ibid., p. 41.
61ibid., pp. 50-53, in the passages before this, both the coming of M as’ud and the messenger of the caliph al-Qadir, as well as news about Ray are given (40-50).
62ibid., p. 53.
63ibid., pp. 54-55.
64ibid., p. 11.
65 ibid.
66ibid., pp. 55-56.
67ibid., pp. 11-56.
68ibid., pp. 57-58.
62
69ibid„ pp. 58-60.
70ibid., p. 58.
7'ibid.
72‘AIT QarTb spoke of zishtT, unseemliness; badnamT, infamy, and hTlah, intrigue, in the assessment of his own predicament.
73ibid., p. 58.
74ibid., p. 59.
75ibid.
76ibid.
77ibid.
78ibid., pp. 59-60.
79ibid., p. 60.
80ibid.
8'ibid.
82ibid., ‘AIT QarTb at first turned down this kind offer by Bu Nasr, most likely because it would bespeak of the military leader’s suspicion in M as'ud’s eyes.
83ibid.
84ibid.
85ibid.
86ibid., p. 62.
87ibid., p. 63.
88ibid., pp. 63-64.
89ibid., p. 64.
90ibid.
63
91 ibid., p. 65.
92ibid., p. 65.
" ib id ., p. 66.
" ib id .
95ibid., pp. 282-298.
% ibid„ p. 299.
97ibid., p. 304.
98ibid., p. 298.
" ib id .
100ibid., p. 299.
101 ibid.
102ibid.
103ibid., p. 300.
104ibid.
105ibid.
106ibid.
,07ibid.
108ibid.
109ibid., p. 301.
1,0ibid.
111 ibid.
112ibid.
113ibid., BayhaqT also relates that Mas'ud uttered binding oaths.
64
14ibid.
,5ibid„ pp. 301-302.
16ibid., p. 302.
I7ibid.
18ibid. In the story of Aryaruq, it is the three intriguers of the old guard that are associ- ited with the image of high ground, p. 285.ated
19ibid.
20ibid., p. 303.
21 ibid.
22ibid.
23ibid., p. 304.
24ibid.
25ibid.
26ibid.
27ibid.
28ibid.
29ibid.
30ibid.
31 ibid.
32ibid.
33ibid.
34ibid., p. 305.
35ibid.
36ibid., pp. 546-547
65
' 37ibid.
138ibid.
' 39ibid., p. 306.
,40ibid.
141 ibid., pp. 306-307, M as'ud ordered large plates of food, one thousand dinars and twenty thousand dirhems, a special place in the fortress of KuhtTz, and three Indian ghulams in the service of GhazT. The amir assigned three hundred horsemen, two hundred foot soldiers, and a forerunner to transport GhazT.
I42ibid., p. 307.
,430 ther than the stories of ‘AIT QarTb and Aryaruq and GhazT, BayhaqT includes four other sermons in The History. These follow the death of four men. One is after the execution of sultan Mahmud’s last vizier and the bitter enemy of Mas'ud, Hasanak MTka’Tl (234-246). Another one is after the death of the Khvarazmshah Altuntash (448). The next one follows the entry on the death of the Ghaznavid ruler Farrukhzad, in whose reign BayhaqT composed The History (480-497). In remembering the death of his master and mentor Bu Nasr Mushkan, BayhaqT contemplates the life of Bu Nasr fondly and in sadness (795-802). I will discuss the sermons in the final chapter of this study.
144ibid., p. 68.
145ibid.
146ibid.
147ibid.
I48ibid„ 158. p. 68, in the Persian statement Bayhaqi exclaims, “Since the life o f . . . [‘AIT QarTb] had to end this way, how could [he] have opposed Fate?” The Arabic statement ends the story, “May God keep us from ominous fate.”
149ibid., Marilyn Waldman has translated the second hemistich as, “just sit down, for you are the well-garbed glutton.” But both descriptive adjectives used for Zibraqan are in the active form, ta’im and kasT, (Waldman, 113). Ibn al-‘AdTm mentions a Himad b. al- Zibraqan who had been alleged with heresy, zindiqT (Bughyat. . . /706). Also, al-KutubT narrates the same story in his entry on Hutay’ah (Faw at. . . 1211) .
150BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 68.
15'ibid.
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST ATTEMPT AGAINST THE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH
Mahmud conquered Khvarazm from the Ma’munids in the year 408/1017-1018.1
The rulership of this northern province and the title of Khvarazmshah was then granted
to Altuntash al-hajib Abu SaTd, one of the most important figures in Ghaznavid military
history.2 Altuntash had been a Turkish slave. Having served under Sabuktigln, he had
risen to the highest military rank, that of the great hajib. The Khvarazmshah accompa
nied Mahmud on many military campaigns, and finally died, fighting ‘AlItigTn on behalf
of M as‘ud in the year 423/1031-32.3
After the death of Altuntash, his son HarOn was appointed as the ruler of Khva
razm. Yet despite favors and the rulership of Khvarazm, HarOn only ruled as a repre
sentative for M as'ud’s son SaTd. It was SaTd who received the title of Khvarazmshah.4
Harun revolted against Mas'ud in the year 426/1034-35. BayhaqT does not directly ex
plain the rebellion in terms of suspicions due to the earlier intrigue against Altuntash, or
disappointment at not receiving the title of Khvarazmshah. But the author regards the
loss of Khvarazm significant in the final Ghaznavid defeat by the Saljuqs.5 He implies
a causal chain, from the intrigues against Altuntash through the loss of Khvarazm to the
loss of Khurasan.6 In statements about the revolt, the author takes account of conflicts
between Harun and his advisor ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the son of M as'ud’s second vizier. Bay
haqT also speaks of suspicions towards the Ghaznavid court after the death of Harun’s
brother SittT.7
Rudolf Gelpke considers that the appointment of Harun as only a representa
tive contributed to his revolt in 426/1034-35.8 One can only conjecture about this or
other possible grounds for the revolt. The history of intrigues against Harun’s father
Altuntash would seem to have played a role. Bosworth also mentions the withheld title
and the unascertained circumstances of SittT’s death as contributing factors in the loss
66
67
of Khvarazm.9 In the larger context of his study, Bosworth also takes note of intrigues
in M as'ud’s court, and their effects on the political and military losses for the Ghaz-
navids.10
M as'ud engaged in two intrigues against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash. They both
failed. The first attempt to bring down Altuntash followed the plot against ‘All QarTb
in 421/1030. The second attempt was made in the year 423/1031-32, before Altuntash
died fighting ‘Alltigln on behalf of Mas'ud. In both instances, the men of the new order
motivated the amir, appealing to his jealousy of the wealth and power of a great military
leader like Altuntash.
In the next two chapters, I will discuss the two narratives by focusing on how
Altuntash escaped the intrigue, while Mas'Od entrapped himself. The irony lies in the
reversal of the action and character roles between the intriguer and his “victim.” The two
plots against Altuntash did not succeed, and Mas'ud untruthfully denied them in letters.
The intriguer had assumed the attitude of power over his victim, by plotting to capture
him off guard. But when the wise (khiradmand) “victim” evaded the plot, the intriguer
was symbolically forced into a weaker position, in order to regain the former’s loyalty.
Irony in history (irony of fate) arises when one considers the intrigues against
Altuntash in light of his role in three preceding affairs. The first of these is the intrigues
by Altuntash himself, against Ahmad Hasan Maymandl in the court of Mahmud. In
these intrigues, Altuntash conspired with ‘All QarTb, yet another victim of intrigue un
der Mas'ud. The two courtiers failed in one of their reported ruses against MaymandT.
But they finally succeeded in overturning the favorable opinion of Mahmud against his
second vizier.11 It is especially in relation to the second plot against Altuntash that his
own intrigues become ironic, since MaymandT, whom Mas'ud had called back from im
prisonment, admonished the amir for this plot.12
Another ground is Altuntash’s support for M as'ud in the succession conflict. Ac
cording to M as'ud himself, the Khvarazmshah used intrigue (lata’if al-hTyal) to ensure
the amir’s accession to the throne.13 This loyalty, however motivated, did not guaran
tee the reward of safety for the Khvarazmshah. The final ground for irony is the attempt
of Altuntash to prevent the intrigue against 'AIT QarTb. Not only was this attempt unsuc
68
cessful, but the fact that the one undertaking it was himself close to becoming a victim of
intrigue suggests irony.
BayhaqI tells the intrigue after ‘AIT QarTb’s arrest in the course of his narrative of
the year 421/1030. Therefore, between the first part of the story (the messages of the
Khvarazmshah and those of the two intermediaries) and the other parts, the text contains
other unrelated accounts.14
The Khvarazmshah suspected a plot against himself, and asked two courtiers to
speak on his behalf. M as‘ud thus gave him permission to leave, but retracted it, with
pressures from the intriguing M as‘udlyan. By then, Altuntash had already left for
Khvarazm. He refused to return, and excused his refusal on several grounds. Subse
quently, M as‘ud admitted the intrigue to his chief secretary, and sought to secure Altun-
tash’s continued loyalty by means of a letter.
One can epitomize the intrigue in terms of three attitudes and actions by the pro
tagonists. The Khvarazmshah suspected the plot, left once he received an order, and
refused to return. M as'ud permitted the leave, sent a messenger after Altuntash with
the retraction of the earlier order, and later denied the plot. What creates irony is that
it was actions by the Khvarazmshah, the “victim,” that prompted the ones by Mas'ud,
the intriguer in the story. It was the suspicion, the departure, and the refusal to return by
Altuntash that led to reactions by Mas'ud and others.
The Khvarazmshah Altuntash suspected M as'ud and his partisans of plotting
against him. Altuntash sought the mediation of two courtiers of the old order, Bu al-
Hasan ‘Aqlll and the chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan.15 The Khvarazmshah had
come to Herat with presents for Mas'ud, and had spoken on behalf of ‘AIT Qarib.16
After ‘AlT’s arrest, which Mas'Qd justified in a message to Altuntash, he worried for his
own safety. He accompanied the sultan to Paryab at his request, and in both Herat and
Paryab, he sought the support of Bu al-Hasan ‘AqTlT and Bu Nasr Mushkan.
The Khvarazmshah asked for this support in a secret message, conveyed by his
chamberlain M as‘adT. Altuntash entreated the two courtiers to use intrigue (lata’if
al-hTyal), so he could return to Khvarazm quickly. He expressed anger at ‘AIT QarTb’s
arrest, and predicted similar ends for other members of the old guard.17
69
The reply by ‘AqllT is ironic on two grounds. First is that he was worried about
himself at this point. He promised that he would speak on behalf of the Khvarazmshah,
but only after expressing fears of his own, saying, “Oh Mas'adT! leave me to myself, be
cause the Sultan considers me one of the Pidarlyan [partisans of Mahmud] as well.” 18
The mistrust that one thus associates with ‘AqllT based on this statement of fear is contra
dicted next. He predicted that M as‘ud would, in the end, speak to the men of the old or
der, after conspiracies with the Mas‘OdTyan. ‘AqllT explained, " . . . since . . . [this Amir]
has known and tested . . . [the Mahmudiyan] through time.” 19
‘AqllT and Bu Nasr displayed contrasting attitudes towards the request by Altun
tash. ‘AqllT’s expression of his own fear tells that the courtier considered the request a
burden. But Bu Nasr thanked the Khvarazmshah, and by doing this, implicitly acknowl
edged his higher position in the Ghaznavid hierarchy. The chief secretary said, “ . . . I
accept [this task] with honor.”20 As BayhaqT reports, the Khvarazmshah calmed down
with these replies, but, “ . . . especially with that of Bu Nasr Mushkan . . . ”21 This
statement gains an ironic significance, considered against expressions of support. ‘AqllT
later expressed his support unconditionally, while Bu Nasr cautiously promised his. The
earnest attitude of ‘AqllT appears comical, in contrast to the prudent behavior of Bu Nasr.
Both courtiers then predicated their promise of support on M as'ud’s good opinion
of them. In the case of ‘AqllT, his overconfidence in his own good standing contradicts
the earlier expression of fear, creating irony. He stated, “ . . . it has been determined for
the Sultan that my motive behind what I say is nothing other than what is best [for the
State].”22 In contrast, Bu Nasr gave proof of M as'ud’s favorable attitude towards him
in statements about the sultan’s behavior. After speaking of M as‘ud’s kindness towards
him, Bu Nasr said, “ . . . [I] heard from confidants that [the Amir] has not allowed any
one to speak [badly] of me.”23
The two courtiers assumed opposite attitudes in promising their support to the
Khvarazmshah. ‘Aqlll’s promise of unconditional support rings with humorous irony,
given his earlier attitude of fear and disconcern. He said, “ . . . today I will undertake
this [task], so the Khvarazmshah would return to the friends’ favor.”24 In contrast to
‘AqllT, Bu Nasr promised that he would speak on behalf of Altuntash only if M as‘ud
70
would ask for advice. Bu Nasr stated. “If [the Amir] speaks [to me] and asks for any ad
vice, I will first bring up the topic of the Khvarazmshah, so he will return to favor.”25
Closing remarks in both messages result in irony. ‘AqTlI repeated his earlier pre
diction of future advice from members of the old guard, after plots by the men of the
new order. He referred to the partisans of M as'ud as “this newly-risen group,” who held
the reins of power.26 But the courtier continued, “In the end, this Amir will speak about
these matters with [the] Pidarlyan, since he has known and tested them through time.”27
Bu Nasr advised that they bring up the subject of Altuntash in the guise of per
mission for his retirement, and not disclose his wish to leave. In other words, the chief
secretary suggested deception to evade a possible plot. He said, " . . . [they should say]
th a t . . . [the Khvarazmshah’s] wish is to repent from military [service], and retire to the
shrine of the late amir. That an offspring of the Lord should be [appointed] as Khva
razmshah, so that a l l . . . [of Altuntash’s] children and people would serve that noble-
born child.”28 Once presented with such a plan, Mas'ud and his partisans would not
capture Altuntash, but return him to his province. Bu Nasr reasoned, " . . . [they] know
that [a] border [like Khvarazm] would not be maintained, were it not for . . . [the Khva
razmshah’s] great [ability].”29
It is ironic to suggest the same means as that of the intriguers to evade their pos
sible plot. But more interestingly, the form this suggestion took became true. After the
death of Altuntash, it was, indeed, a son of M as'ud who became Khvarazmshah, with
Harun only as his representative. Bu Nasr was also prophetically correct that Altuntash
was mainly responsible for the Ghaznavids’ stronghold in Khvarazm, given the Ghaz-
navid loss of this province after his death.
Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT and Bu Nasr spoke on the Khvarazmshah’s behalf on the way
to Paryab. BayhaqT relates the Khvarazmshah’s condition first on his own authority,
and then on the authority of Bu Nasr. BayhaqT inevitably draws a less detailed pic
ture of events, given that he was not a witness himself. On BayhaqI’s authority, Bu al-
Hasan ‘AqllT brought up the topic of the Khvarazmshah several times. M as'ud responded
kindly, and stated that he should return to Khvarazm. Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT informed the
Khvarazmshah, and also, Bu Nasr told Mas'adT.30
71
But the detailed narrative by the chief secretary contradicts this account. Bu Nasr
reported that despite the amir’s seemingly favorable attitude towards the Khvarazmshah,
they had incited M as'ud to capture him. The chief secretary stated, “ . . . the Amir
[unwillingly] alluded to this in a private session . . . on the way [to Paryab].”31 Bu
Nasr and ‘AqllT advised M as'ud against any plot of intrigue. They objected, “ . . . [the
Khvarazmshah] is an obedient subject and has many offsprings, notables, servants,
and followers. [He] has not acted in a way, for which [he] should deserve . . . disfavor
. . ”32
The sultan’s response to this creates humorous ambiguity. On the one hand, it
seems that this counsel was effective for at least a short while, given M as'ud’s kind
words and actions. But with the hindsight of the attempted plot, one can interpret all that
the amir did and said, regarding the Khvarazmshah, as insincere and false.
Mas'ud agreed with the two courtiers, stating that he had punished the person who
had spoken badly of Altuntash. The sultan vowed, “ . . . and . . . from now on no one
will dare to mention him, except with kindness.”33 It is as though by this statement, the
amir wished to show proof of his own innocence to shrewd men like Bu Nasr and ‘AqTlT.
Once in Paryab, M as'ud granted Altuntash his robe, and permitted his leave. The
Khvarazmshah left in the early morning on the next day, but without a customary final
request for permission. In a secret message to Bu Nasr, Altuntash, again, spoke of his
suspicion of Mas'ud. The Khvarazmshah stated, " . . . [by] tomorrow night when [they]
will be informed, we will have left. I will not ask for another permission until I leave,
because I see the order not right [kazh].”34 He pointed out that the amir was merciful,
generous, and noble, but that he listened to bad counsel. In other words, Mas'ud had
many good qualities, though not sound judgement. Altuntash characterized the men of
the new order as “standing viziers.”35 He then said, “[They] will ruin this upright affair
[kar-i rast-nahadah].”36
Altuntash again asked for mediation, despite misgivings that there would be sus
picion towards his supporters as well. He said, " . . . I am leaving, and [I] do not know
what will become of you. For here, [there] is no good foundation.”37 He asked that Bu
Nasr look after his welfare, as in the past, though he might not be secure either.38 The
Khvarazmshah closed his message in this way, " . . . the order [nizam] that reigned has
72
dissolved, and things have changed. But [we] will see what will happen.”39 Bu Nasr
ended this part of his narrative with the expression of his own concern. Thus, while all
throughout Bu Nasr had provided solace for Altuntash, in the end, the chief secretary
was made to worry on his own account.
M as'ud and his partisans attempted to capture the Khvarazmshah, once they learn
ed that he had left for Khvarazm. When the news of his unceremonious departure ar
rived, they dispatched ‘Abdus after him. But it was not the departure that prompted the
intrigue. On the night before the departure, the Mas'OdTyan had been plotting against the
Khvarazmshah. Bu Nasr stated, “ . . . at night [they] had prevailed on the Amir . . . that
Altuntash should be captured and this opportunity should not be lost. Then, they re
ceived the news that he had gone ten to twelve farsang towards his own province.”40
The image is that of the intriguers plotting away, while their victim had already escaped.
This defies the expectation that the victim “recognize” his plight. Instead, the recognition
is by the intriguers, who realized that their victim had escaped.
‘Abdus brought Altuntash the sultan’s message to return. The Khvarazmshah re
fused, and by doing this evaded the plot of intrigue. Instead, he sent back ‘Abdus with
a message explaining his refusal. This turn of events is, indeed, comical. It is as though
the intriguer, the more powerful protagonist, were requesting that his victim return, so
the intriguer would capture him. But the victim’s refusal upset this plan.
Both messages contain reasons— for the request to return on M as'ud’s part, and
for the refusal to return on the Khvarazmshah’s. Irony arises as a result of the disparity
between the real reasons for the request and the refusal, and those stated. M as‘ud asked
that the Khvarazmshah return, so he would be captured. But the reasons the amir gave
were a few things in need of discussion, and some honors that the Khvarazmshah had not
yet received. ‘Abdus concluded the message in this way, “ . . . we had given an order to
leave and [he] left, and those matters remain [unfinished].”41
The Khvarazmshah refused to return because he did not want to risk being ar
rested. But he explained his refusal by resorting to rules of conduct and duties of service.
He first restated that, “The order was for me to leave, and according to the kingly order,
I left.”42 The implication here is, “I did what you told me to do.” One reason for his
refusal to return was that it would be unseemly, zisht. After stating what remained unfin
73
ished could be completed by letters, he spoke of a letter about unrest by Turkmen tribes.
Altuntash closed the message with another reason for his refusal. He remarked, “[There]
might be unexpected trouble [in Khvarazm] because of my absence.”43 Considering the
attempted arrest, this trouble could have been the overthrow of Altuntash himself. The
Khvarazmshah then rewarded ‘Abdus, so that the latter would represent him well, and
offer his excuse.44
Once he returned to the camp, ‘Abdus disclosed what had happened. Conse
quently, Bu Nasr reported, “ . . . [it] was known th a t . . . [Altuntash] was very fright
ened.”45 It was only then that Mas'ud admitted the intrigue. Bu Nasr related this ad
mission, but first he mentioned the amir’s anger towards the Mas'udTyan. These men
had accused the courtiers of the old order, men like Bu Nasr Mushkan and Bu al-Hasan
‘AqllT, of treason, and charged, “ . . . these Pidarlyan [partisans of Mahmud] will not al
low any wish [by this Amir] to come true, or any fortune to be gained . . . ”46 But with
the failure of the plot and the fear of adverse consequences, Mas'ud was angry at his
own partisans, despite their expressions of loyalty. The image of self-entanglement in
this instance evokes irony.
In a private session with the chief secretary, Mas'ud repeatedly said that the Khva
razmshah had become suspicious, while Bu Nasr Mushkan asked the sultan’s reasons
for saying this. M as'ud finally admitted the intrigue in response to these inquiries. The
image of Mas'ud, concerned and yet unwilling to admit the intrigue, and the shrewd Bu
Nasr pretending ignorance, is comical.
The dialogue centers on the loyalty of Altuntash. And it ends with the decision to
write him a letter, asking for his continued allegiance. This is highly ironic. Through
out the intrigue it was Altuntash’s loyalty that had been at issue. But in the end, it was
M as'ud who testified to his own loyalty and trust, in order to regain this allegiance,
feared lost. After assertions by Mas'ud that the Khvarazmshah had become suspicious,
Bu Nasr defended him, saying, " . . . he is a very wise and obedient man, and [he] re
ceived many favors from the Sultan. [He] gave ample thanks in our [presence].”47 This
statement by Bu Nasr is only partially true, given that the Khvarazmshah also expressed
his suspicions towards Mas'ud, especially to the chief secretary. The amir repeated his
worry, which led Bu Nasr to ask, " . . . what is the reason?”48 BayhaqT reports the ad
74
missions to the intrigue only indirectly. He only quotes M as’ud’s opening statement,
that, “These [people] will not let anything stay on the right course [qa‘idah-yi rast].”49
In his reply Bu Nasr recalled his earlier warning about the men of the new or
der, related the advice of the Khvarazmshah on the way to Paryab, and testified to his
loyalty.50 The chief secretary closed his remarks with the question, “Has the Sultan
heard anything else?”51 The form that this question takes, if the sultan had heard any
thing rather than done anything himself, creates irony. Bu Nasr most likely suspected
the intrigue all along, but asked about it in a way that wouldn’t endanger him. BayhaqT
reports M as’ud’s admission only indirectly, saying, “[The Amir] completely revealed
what had happened, and what they had incited him to do.”52 Bu Nasr again swore to
the Khvarazmshah’s loyalty.
Finally, M as’ud stated the need to win over Altuntash by means of a letter. It were
to be a letter, the sultan exclaimed, “ . . . [that we] would sign, and in which [we] would
write a few lines in our own handwriting.”53 Once Bu Nasr had found out what the let
ter should contain, he remarked, “I know how the letter should be written.”54
Letters
In both plots against Altuntash, M as’ud explained away the intrigues in letters.
Considering this attitude of non-admission, the main purpose of the letters was to guar
antee the Khvarazmshah’s continued loyalty. The two letters share similarities in rhetor
ical patterns, though the letter sent after the more elaborate second attempt is, under
standably, longer and more complex. The letters contain two parts. M as’ud spoke about
the Khvarazmshah and himself in the first part, as opposed to enviers, intriguers, in
the second. Whereas in the two intrigues, Mas’ud joined forces with enviers of the
Khvarazmshah, in these explanations about these failed attempts, the amir figuratively
changed sides. It was as though he and Altuntash faced not each other, but together
faced those who were envious of them.
The first letter begins with Altuntash’s services to the sultan, the sultan’s inten
tions towards the Khvarazmshah, and a revised narrative of the intrigue. After the cus
tomary salutations, Mas’ud immediately compared the Khvarazmshah to the late amir
Mahmud. M as’ud said, ” . . . in our heart [we] find the learned Hajib, Uncle Khvarazm-
75
shah Altuntash in place [jay-gah] of our father, the late Amir.”55 This symbolic eleva
tion of the Khvarazmshah through a comparison with Mahmud is comical, since Mas'ud
seems to have disregarded the advice of both elders.
The sultan then called attention to Altuntash’s services in the reigns of Mahmud
and Muhammad, including the use of intrigue (lata’if al-hlyal) on behalf of M as'ud.56
He ended with a statement on the loyalty and friendship of Altuntash, saying, ‘‘[One]
can [only] imagine the high regard that someone like this has for friendship and obedi
ence.”57 The conclusion drawn would be that a person like the Khvarazmshah would
not forsake friends, or disobey rulers. It is implied that Mas'ud was both a ruler and a
friend, which would help guarantee Altuntash’s loyalty on two fronts.
Mas'ud characterized his own actions mostly in terms of good intentions. Irony
arises in considering that it was shrewd to speak about intentions, given that one can
make any claims about things which are veiled. It is actions that one might not be able to
disclaim, given enough evidence. But intentions, or in other words attitude, can always
be disputed.
The sultan promised future favors, saying, “ . . . [one] can know how committed
we are to honoring [Altuntash], granting [him] territories, raising his offspring in sta
tus, and giving them titles.”58 Mas'ud explained his past actions, also, in terms of in
tentions. The call to service in Herat was so that Altuntash, “ . . . would see us,” said the
amir, ‘‘and receive the reward of his own good actions.”59 “The good action” had been
the use of intrigue, to guarantee the succession of Mas'ud. He also used this means. Yet
in his case, it was not for, but against Altuntash.
M as'ud offered two reasons for having wished that Altuntash accompany him to
Balkh, to consult him in state affairs, and to honor him more suitably.60 The amir re
stated the very reasons that Altuntash had given for his refusal to return, concluding,
“ . . . [we] gave an order [for Altuntash] to leave.”61 Mimicking the Khvarazmshah
like this has a mocking effect. In the case of Altuntash, the intention of stating these
reasons was to evade the intrigue. But in the case of Mas'ud, faced as he was with a
fait accompli, it was to regain a loyalty that he himself had almost lost, by approving an
action (the leave) that had already been completed.
76
The passage that follows this statement is a narrative of the intrigue. M as'ud ex
plained sending ‘Abdus after Altuntash in this way; “ . . . [‘Abdus] conveyed our profuse
regard for [the Khvarazmshah], and mentioned that [there] are a few other matters to dis
cuss with [the leader]. . . ”62 The sultan reiterated the refusal to return, but lied about
his own attitude in the aftermath of the refusal. He stated, “We found the opinion of the
Hajib sound in this matter.”63
In the second part of the letter, Mas'ud mentioned hasidan-i dawlat, those envi
ous in the state, and advised that Altuntash should remain loyal. The sultan charged the
envious men with lying, without specifying the nature of their lies. He stated, “But one
thing pains us and [we] fear, lest the envious men in the state . . . have related lies. [We]
do not know if what [we] have intuited is true.”64 The reference to the envious men is
concise and indirect. It is only in the next statement that one can connect these unnamed
people to the Khvarazmshah, the very object of this appeal. “But,” continued Mas'ud,
“[we] find [it] necessary to do our utmost in all that will bring comfort and peace of
mind to . . . [the Khvarazmshah].”65
The sultan ended the letter with orders about what Altuntash should do. The use
of the modal bayad, meaning both must and should, creates an ambiguous tone of a com
manding, and yet respectful attitude by Mas'ud. Considering the amir’s loss of symbolic
power as a result of the intrigue, this respectful attitude is comically suitable. Mas'ud
advised that the Khvarazmshah should listen to the messenger, reply as requested, and
most importantly, that he should confide in the Ghaznavid ruler. He ended by saying,
“ . . . [Altuntash] should speak openly about matters, since [we] regard his opinion
very highly . . . ”66 Both the advice and the reason given for it are lies. The truth was
that Altuntash could not speak openly. And the plot proves that M as'ud did not regard
Altuntash as a kind advisor, but a threat.
Mas'ud guaranteed the authenticity of the letter by writing a few lines in his own
handwriting. The letter ends with the Arabic phrase, “wa-llah al-mu'In li-qada’
huquqi-hi.”67
BayhaqT speaks of two messages by Altuntash, after receiving this letter, one to
Mas'ud, and the other, to Bu Nasr. Irony arises in the contrast between the veiled men
77
tion of the intrigue in the message to Mas'ud, as opposed to its candid assessment to Bu
Nasr.
One can characterize the message to Mas'ud as an advice letter (andarz). Altuntash
first offered advice on specific matters that Mas'ud had sought, regarding Qadir Khan,
‘Alltigln, Ahmad Hasan, and Ghazl. One cannot disregard the irony of fate, concerning
Ahmad Hasan. He had been arrested and imprisoned by Mahmud, due to the intrigues
of Altuntash, among others. And Mas'ud was, then, asking for the opinion of Altuntash,
himself the object of an attempted intrigue, concerning his old enemy, soon to become an
ally. The Khvarazmshah refrained from giving any advice about Ahmad Hasan, referring
to the old animosity.68
Altuntash then epitomized the past, present, and the future of the Ghaznavid state
in a more general piece of advice. He first repeated that the sultan himself had asked for
advice, and spoke of his wisdom. By doing this, the Khvarazmshah assumed a humble
attitude, despite the symbolically higher status of someone who gives advice.69
The thread that runs through his characterization of the Ghaznavid state is the
word qa'idah, order. Altuntash spoke of Mahmud as the founder of the state, saying,
“ . . . the late Amir enjoyed a long life. He established the government and the order
[qa'idah] of the state, solid and erect [as they have been], [entrusted it] to the Lord,
and departed.”70 The advice that followed anticipates all the subsequent intrigues at
Mas'Od’s court, especially the second attempt against Altuntash himself. He warned,
“If the Amir sees fit, no one should have the audacity and the impudence to upset the or
der [qa'idah] o f . . . [the state].”71 The prophecy of future unrest informed this advice.
Altuntash forewarned, “ . . . lest the order [qa'idah] of all things would be overturned.”72
So, while Mahmud had put things in order by establishing the state, there was fear that
Mas'ud would upset this order, causing its loss.
In a message to Bu Nasr, Altuntash spoke of unnamed enemies and M as'ud to
gether, in contrast to how M as'ud had separated the two in his letter. The Khvarazmshah
faulted unnamed enemies with the intrigue, while mentioning favors by M as'ud to
wards himself.73 The resolution of the attempted intrigue was due to Bu Nasr, after
which, " . . . I was more relieved.”74 About unnamed enemies, however, Altuntash
78
warned, “That group [of Pisarlyan] will not let anything . . . remain on the right course
[qa‘idah-yi rast].”75
In the last part of the message, Altuntash absolved Mas'ud from blame, while
placing it with enemies, “bad amuzan,” bad teachers.76 Through this description of
events, the victim was “saving” Mas'ud. But the description is also unflattering. Despite
his portrayal as a kind ruler, M as'ud still appears as a poor judge of character.
In the middle of this communique, Altuntash expressed his suspicion and loyalty
at once. He swore off coming to the court in the future, but stated that he would remain
loyal to Mas'ud. This loyalty was a promise of help, if such help were needed in send
ing troops or fighting enemies in person.77 Hence, though there was loyalty, there was
no trust. The expression of loyalty implies how Altuntash would behave, while the sus
picion makes clear his attitude about Mas'ud. And it is the discord between the two that
creates irony.
The story ends with closures by the two narrators. Bu Nasr regretted having dis
closed this message to the amir, which he did not keep confidential. BayhaqT briefly
refers to the second attempt of intrigue, but ends by saying, “[That story] will be told in
its place.”78
Altuntash acted wisely, considering the final outcome of the intrigue. And Mas'ud
acted foolishly. The contrast between the wisdom displayed by Altuntash and the un-
foresightedness of Mas'ud creates irony. It was an unplanned intrigue, with the amir first
giving an order of leave which he then tried to take back.
He first denied the intrigue, both through words and symbolic actions, such as
granting robes. He realized he had missed his chance to capture Altuntash, and tried to
reverse this turn of events. But when the intrigue failed, the amir panicked. At that point,
his attitude changed, from a seeming kindness masking envious greed, to one of regret
and benevolence. And in this newly assumed attitude, due to the reversal of the action,
lies the comedy.
79
Notes to Chapter III
BayhaqT, 925; ‘UtbT, 376; GardlzT, 396. Ibn al-Athlr has recorded this conquest in the entry for the year 407/1016-1017 (ibn al-Athlr, 265).
2‘UtbT provides valuable information on Altuntash for his service under Mahmud. Altuntash accompanied Mahmud on many of his military campaigns, and fought fervently in the Ghaznavid army (‘UtbT, 188, 223, 286, 293, 313) (also see ibn al-AthTr, 213).Also mentioned are Altuntash’s service in arresting and bringing to the court the ruler of Gharchistan Shah Shar ( ‘UtbT, 328-329). In helping Qabus b. VushmgTr against Ilak Khan, Mahmud sent Altuntash with 10,000 horse men (‘UtbT, 227). BayhaqT notes that the Khvarazmshah was left with 1500 horse men in the province of Khvarazm, after the conquest of that province (BayhaqT, 926). For the role of the Khvarazmshah in the intrigue against Ahmad Hasan MaymandT, Mahmud’s second vizier and M as‘ud’s first, see note 1 in chapter 2. Nizam al-Mulk gives the text of a letter by Ahmad Hasan to the Khvarazmshah, in which the vizier denied the former’s request for increased funds (Nizam al-Mulk, 299-300). Also see Barthold’s article on Altuntash (El, 322-323). Barthold speaks of the Khvarazmshah’s energy and foresight in administering the affairs of Khvarazm against the neighboring Turkish tribes. But Barthold points out that the Khvarazmshah’s wise measures secured his own rule, rather than that of the Ghaznavid suzerains. Also mentioned is the suspicion of both Mahmud and Mas‘ud towards the Khvarazmshah (also see Bosworth, 238). Tolstov has pointed out that Altuntash, as predecessor governors of Khvarazm, identified with the local interests of the province (Tolstov, 291). Barthold speaks of attempted plots under both amirs against Altuntash. Yet I have not come across any mention of such an attempt under Mahmud.
3For the battle against ‘AlTtigTn and the subsequent injury and death of Altuntash, see BayhaqT pp. 436-451.
4BayhaqT, p. 453.
5For the account of the revolt and Harun’s subsequent murder see, pp. 563 and 607. For BayhaqT’s narrative account of the causal chain of events, see pp. 927-945.
6ibid., p. 403.
7ibid., pp. 517-518, see Fayyaz’s note about the mysterious circumstances of Sitti’s death. The beginning of the account is, now lost.
8Gelpke, p. 140.
9Bosworth (The Ghaznavids . . .) , p. 238.
10ibid„ pp. 230-234.
80
1 'Ahmad Hasan MaymandT was Mahmud’s second vizier, and M as'ud’s first. He held the vizierate for 13 years under Mahmud, and was then deposed and imprisoned in India. MaymandT died in 424/1032-1033, after less than three years of service in M as'ud’s court (‘AqllT, 152-186; Khvandmlr, Dastur . . . , 139-140; MunshT KirmanT, 40-43).
12BayhaqT, pp. 181-195, 409.
13From the text of The History, it appears that Altuntash was with M as'ud during his campaign in Isfahan and Ray. When the amir received the letter of his aunt, he called the courtiers for consultation, including the Khvarazmshah (BayhaqT, 14). Ironically, the reference to the use of intrigue by Altuntash was in the letter where M as'ud explained away the first attempt of intrigue, p. 102.
l4The other accounts are, respectively and according to Fayyaz’s sub-headings, the condition of GhazT, calling Ahmad Hasan, appointment of Bu Nasr Mushkan to the chancery, Bu Nasr’s advice to Mas'ud, past mistakes ( ‘AlTtigln, the Turkmen Saljuqs), Muhammad’s condition (BayhaqT’s heading), letter to Qadir Khan, pp. 71-96.
,5The author of Athar al-vuzara’ mentions the courtier Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT in entries on Mahmud’s second and third viziers. MaymandT mentions ‘AqTlT as one of his detractors in the court of Mahmud, asking Bu Nasr to speak to ‘AqTlT on behalf of the vizier. When he was deposed, 'AqTlT was one of the courtiers suggested for vizierate. But Mahmud did not favor ‘AqTlT, considering him provincial and uncultured ( ‘AqTlT, 157-158; 190-191).
Other than The History, the most detailed source on Bu Nasr Mushkan, the chief secretary in the courts of the first three Ghaznavid rulers, is Athar al-vuzara’. In this manual on viziers, parts of a work by Bu Nasr, called Maqamat-i Bu Nasr Mushkan, now lost, has been preserved (‘AqTlT, 152-186).
l6BayhaqT, pp. 63-64.
17ibid„ p. 69.
18ibid.
19ibid., p. 70.
20ibid.
2'ibid.
22ibid., pp. 69-70.
23ibid., p. 70.
24ibid.
81
25ibid.
26ibid.
27ibid.
28ibid.
29ibid.
30ibid., p. 97.
3'ibid.
32ibid. The two courtiers further reasoned that the safeguard of a border like Khvarazm depended on the Khvarazmshah.
33ibid.
34ibid., p. 98.
35ibid.
36ibid.
37ibid., p. 99.
38ibid.
39ibid.
40ibid.
4 'ibid.
42ibid.
43ibid.
44ibid., Bu Nasr also told of the Khvarazmshah riding away with ‘Abdus, and speaking to him privately.
45ibid„ p. 100.
46ibid.
82
47ibid.
48ibid.
49ibid.
50ibid., pp. 100-101.
51 ibid., p. 101.
52ibid.
53ibid.
54ibid.
55ibid., p. 102.
56ibid.
57ibid., p. 103.
58ibid.
59ibid.
60M as‘ud mentioned the conflict with ‘AlTtigln and correspondance with the friendly Qarakhanid leader Qadir Khan as the state affairs in need of discussion.
61 ibid., the amir explained that he granted the leave for fear of troubles in Khvarazm.
62ibid., p. 104.
63ibid., Altuntash’s hasty leave and subsequent refusal to return was due to his suspicion of a plot, pp. 98-99.
64ibid., p. 104.
65ibid.
66ibid„ p. 105.
67ibid.
68ibid., p. 106.
83
69ibid„ p. 107.
70ibid., nahadan means both to establish and to entrust.
71 ibid.
72ibid., Bu Nasr reports that Mas'ud liked the reply by the Khvarazmshah.
73ibid.
74ibid.
75ibid.
76ibid.
77ibid., the message ended with the statement, " . . . until this affair will be known.”
78ibid., p. 108.
CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND ATTEMPT AGAINST THE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH
M as'ud attempted a second plot of intrigue against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash in
the year 423/1031-32. Ironically, the Khvarazmshah died fighting ‘Alltigln on the sul
tan’s behalf shortly after this attempt.1 The narrative of the second attempt is one of
the most striking examples of irony in The History. M as'ud and two courtiers intrigued
against Altuntash. The plot did not succeed. But the two courtiers suffered the fates of
imprisonment and murder. The one who had initially sought the arrest and murder of
Altuntash, Bu Sahl ZawzanI, was imprisoned in the end. And Qa’id Malanjuq, the mil
itary commander in charge of killing the Khvarazmshah, was murdered. The one ulti
mately responsible for the intrigue, that is, Sultan Mas'ud, denied his own role in yet an
other letter to the Khvarazmshah, this time containing even more honors for the latter’s
continued loyalty.
In this chapter, I will discuss the intrigue, the letter, and finally, the end of the
story. Irony arises in consequence of the reversal of the action, and the visible sacrifice
of the intriguer turned victim. The Khvarazmshah was honored and respected, instead of
arrested or killed. And Bu Sahl was scapegoated, in the need for easing the tension of
a failed plot. Also ironic is the fact that Mas'ud wrote letters both in intriguing against
Altuntash and denying the plot, whereas he learned the truth about how Altuntash dis
covered and evaded the plot in an oral message.
BayhaqT narrates this second plot also on the authority of Bu Nasr. In this elabo
rate story of intrigue, Bu Sahl and Mas'ud attempted the arrest and murder of Altuntash
through Malanjuq, a subordinate commander and a fierce enemy of the Khvarazmshah.
But the chamberlain of Altuntash gained knowledge of the plot, and warned him in
a code letter to Khvarazm. When the vizier and others learned about the code letter
84
85
through spies, they interrogated the chamberlain. M as'ud denied the plot, and punished a
courtier who had supposedly spread this lie.
But then an official letter arrived, telling of the accidental death of Malanjuq in
the Khvarazm! court. Mas'ud confessed only then, and sought the help of his vizier and
chief secretary. Once they found out the real circumstances of MalanjOq’s death, Ahmad
Hasan suggested that Bu Sahl be sacrificed.
I will first discuss BayhaqT’s introduction to the story, and then analyze the intrigue
in terms of its consequences: interrogation, sacrifice, murder, reprimand, and finally im
prisonment.
BayhaqT begins the story with the characterization of the plot by Bu Sahl, followed
by commentaries about the loss of Khvarazm. It is both foreboding and satirical to view
the projected outcomes of the plot, against the hindsight of its failure. BO Sahl convinced
the amir that, “The Khvarazmshah AltOntash is not upright, and [one] should have cap
tured him in Shaburqan. When [he] left, he was suspicious.”2 Bu Sahl then pointed
out that strong military men like ‘All QarTb, Aryaruq, and GhazI had all fallen, and that
only the Khvarazmshah remained, whose demise would increase the status and wealth
of the kingship. Bu Sahl said, “If [one] removes . . . [AltOntash] from office and has a
trusted [servant] of the Lord seated there, a great kingship and many treasures and troops
will be gained.”3 M as'ud was convinced at that point, asking, “What is the solution?”4
The plan of intrigue then offered depended on three things: its secrecy, a hostile military
leader raised against the Khvarazmshah, and the very symbol of M as'ud’s approval, his
handwriting. The plot of intrigue would succeed, said BO Sahl, “ . . . i f . . . [it] remains
hidden.”5 Qa’id MalanjOq would be best to bring down AltOntash, since, as BO Sahl put
it, " . . . [MalanjOq] is thirsty for the Khvarazmshah’s blood.”6 And the amir’s handwrit
ing would gain the trust of MalanjOq, who would be the only one with knowledge of the
plot.7 Mas'Od agreed to this plan and wrote the letter.
BayhaqT achieves irony by following this plan of intrigue with a commentary
about BO Sahl. Both commentaries center on the effect of the intrigue on the loss of
Khvarazm. In the first one, the chief secretary Bu Nasr pointed to Zawzam’s thoughtless
ness in believing that the plot would remain a secret. The outcome was the loss of the
Khvarazmshah. Bu Nasr then stated, " . . . [BO Sahl did not think that] in alertness and
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dexterity [there] is no one like [the Khvarazmshah, and that one] could not overthrow
him so easily. The whole world would revolt.”8
The author also includes his own thoughts on the consequences of the intrigue. He
attributes the loss of Khurasan to the troubles in Khvarazm, saying, “After the decree of
God, may He be glorified and exalted, [one] must know that Khurasan was lost on ac
count of Khvarazm.”9 BayhaqT also remembers the Khvarazmshah’s advisor/adjudant,
Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad, another shrewd and wise man of affairs. The commentary ends
with the promise that, “All these will be mentioned in their [appropriate] places [bah
ja-yi khud].” 10
The exposure of the intrigue was due to the code letter of the Khvarazmshah’s
chamberlain Bu Muhammad M as‘adl. Bu Nasr related, “Once this letter in the sul
tan’s handwriting was sent off, the Amir told that secret to [his confidant] ‘Abdus.” 11
‘Abdus, in turn, told this secret to his friend Bu al-Fath Hataml. And HatamT related it
to M as‘adl, the Khvarazmshah’s chamberlain. After sending the KhvarazmI court a let
ter about the plot, Mas'adT sent the code letter in confirmation of what he had previously
written. Once the Ghaznavid spies confiscated this code letter, M as‘adl was called to the
court and interrogated.
The humor in this passage lies in the fact that everyone involved seems to have ex
pected confidentiality, while no one seems to have kept matters confidential. Irony arises
in considering that Mas‘ud was responsible for the disclosure of the plot himself.
He asked the vizier to call Mas‘ad! to the court. Both the vizier and Bu Nasr were
present at this interrogation, while the sultan, ‘Abdus, and Bu Sahl were not. Bu Nasr
related, “ . . . [they] asked about the code letter.” 12 M as‘adl justified his own action
indirectly, by stating the terms of his appointment as the Khvarazmshah’s chamberlain.
He named both the sultan and Bu Nasr as his guarantors, saying, “ . . . [the] Lord knows
that no wrongdoing would come from me, and khvajah Bu Nasr can vouch [for] me.” 13
M as'adI then mentioned “an important matter” which made it necessary to write the code
letter. When they asked what it was, Mas‘adl refused to answer. Bu Nasr then narrated,
“ [They] said ‘you must answer since [it is only due to] the high esteem of your master
that this question is in this way. Otherwise [we] would question [you] differently.’ ” 14
M as‘adl asked for and received a guarantee of safety, after which, “[The Chamber
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lain] related that affair which [he said] ‘[I] heard from Bu al-Fath Hatami and he from
‘Abdus.’ ” 15
BayhaqT then focuses on the vizier Ahmad Hasan, in presenting the solution to this
turn of events. The vizier predicted the scapegoating of Bu al-Fath Hatami, despite the
hunch that he had innocently said what he had heard. It is the private conversations of
the vizier with the chief secretary that reveal the former’s suspicions about the truth of
the plot. Yet both Ahmad Hasan and Bu Nasr continued with the pretense that Hatami
had lied about the intrigue.
After M as'adi’s confession, Ahmad Hasan turned to the chief secretary and an
grily said, “[Do you] see what [they] are doing?” 16 The vizier then asked Mas'adT if he
had already written Altuntash, to which the chamberlain replied, “[I] have written and
[I] sent this [code letter] as the confirmation of that.”17 At this point, the vizier restated
M as'adl’s terms of appointment, thus excusing the writing of the code letter. But Ahmad
Hasan assumed an attitude of disbelief towards the intrigue. He said, “But [one] must
punish Bu al-Fath Hatami, since [he] has told a lie [durugh].” 18
But in his private conversation with Bu Nasr, Ahmad Hasan contradicted this state
ment. All three parts of the monologue imply that the vizier suspected the plot. Bu Nasr
continued the narrative with the vizier’s message to the sultan. After stating that Ahmad
Hasan spoke to him confidentially, pushldah, the chief secretary related the vizier’s mes
sage that, “Tell the Sultan not to reveal this secret to ‘Abdus and Bu Sahl ZawzanI, un
til [we see] what happens.” 19 Ahmad Hasan then proposed that Mas‘adl write to the
Khvarazmshah that, “ . . . what had been written before was false.”20
Finally, the vizier evaluated the solution and predicted the outcome of the disclo
sure. He considered this solution to be the best course of action at the time, though they
still had to wait for the Khvarazm! response. The vizier predicted two sets of outcomes
for the disclosure of the intrigue. First was the sacrifice of Bu al-Fath Hatami, which
would allow the pretense of the lie to be maintained. Ahmad Hasan stated, “ . . . the Sul
tan will not continue with this affair, and will sacrifize H atam i. . . ”21 The monologue
ends with the prediction of a worse outcome, that, “ . . . this thing will not remain a se
cret, and a big misfortune will rise.”22 As predicted, all the consequences of the intrigue
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were misfortunes, the murder of Malanjuq, the imprisonment of Bu Sahl, and finally, the
very loss of Khvarazm.
BO Nasr took Ahmad Hasan’s message to Mas’ud who faulted Hatami for lying,
just as the vizier had predicted. The amir was so astonished at first that he could not
speak. The imagery of surprise is comical, considering that Mas'ud was responsible for
both the plot and its disclosure.
He sent back a message to the vizier, containing both an order and the denial of
the intrigue. The order was, “[One] should say whatever is appropriate regarding this
matter;” in other words, it would be up to the vizier to find a solution for the troubles
at hand.23 Mas'ud then scapegoated Bu al-Fath Hatami. Calling the news of the in
trigue “a lie (durOgh),” the amir explained, " . . . [there] is animosity between Bu Sahl
and ‘Abdus, and this dog [Hatami] has come up with such a deceit, and has fashioned a
falsehood like this.”24
Once the vizier received this message, he consoled Mas'adI, who wrote two code
letters to the Khvarazmshah, saying, “What had been written [before] had been a ruse,
which Bu al-Fath attempted between two nobles who were not on good terms with each
other. As a result, Hatami received a punishment and [they] took away the informa
tion ministry of Balkh which [they] had given him.”25 Therefore, the plot against the
Khvarazmshah was denied through the lie about a fabricated plot, also unsuccessful, with
its instigator becoming his own victim.
The section ends with the report of the sacrifice of Bu al-Fath Hatami. Bu Nasr ex
plained that, " . . . [they] flogged Bu al-Fath five hundred times, and took back the infor
mation [ministry] of Balkh which [they] had given him.”26 By the end of this section,
where one has witnessed the sacrifice of Hatami, the narrative tension is resolved. It is
as though M as'adl’s letters and the report of Hataml’s punishment have together proved
the falsehood of the intrigue. It is the pretense of no intrigue which is suggested, and the
sacrifice of a victim which is necessitated.
But in the very next scene, suspicions expressed about the plot contradict this ap
parent sense of calm. Suspicions by the vizier and denials by Mas'ud recall a similar
exchange between the chief secretary and the amir, right before the first attempt against
Altuntash.27 This echoing of the past adds to the comedy of the vizier attempting to un
89
mask Mas'ud, who falsely insisted that the plot was a lie. This suspicion and denial ex
change causes irony, especially since it comes right before the news of Malanjuq’s mur
der.
The exchange between Ahmad Hasan and the amir was through messages. The
messenger was Bu Nasr, in whom the vizier first confided. The words of Ahmad Hasan
to his confidant are open and direct expressions about the intrigue, conveying a sincere
attitude of anger and surprise. Ahmad Hasan began, “Did [you] see what [they] did? . . .
And that is Altuntash, not the black demon [dlv], and [someone] like Ahmad ‘Abd al-
Samad [is] with him. How could this be fair to them?”28
The vizier then echoed an earlier statement about future troubles, but immedi
ately retracted it, based on past knowledge of Altuntash. Ahmad Hasan remarked, “But
the Turk is wise and has become old. [He] will not want to make himself infamous
. . . ”29 Therefore, the guarantee that no troubles would rise was not due to the wisdom
of the amir, but that of his victim. The vizier ended his confidential talk to Bu Nasr with
the mention of an ironic twist. With the past animosity between Altuntash and Ahmad
Hasan, the latter astonishingly pointed out how he might be considered responsible for
the plot. As though asking Bu Nasr to bear witness to his innocence, the vizier then said,
“ . . . I myself am quite removed from these matters as [you] see.”30
In the message to the amir, Ahmad Hasan also pointed to the intrigue, but this time
indirectly and with caution. The vizier told the chief secretary to ask Mas'ud, “At all
events, something has happened unbeknownst to me. If the Lord sees [fit] inform me,
so that which is necessary . . . will be done.”31
Bu Nasr delivered the message to Mas'ud, who angrily repeated a more detailed
version of the denial story. The contrast between this expression of anger and that of
the vizier creates irony. Ahmad Hasan became angry because the amir had attempted
a plot against a loyal servant like Altuntash. But Mas'ud was enraged because this plot
had been exposed.
M as'ud began his message with a categorical denial of the intrigue. He said,
“Nothing of the kind has happened over which [one] should worry.”32 His retelling of
the denial story, as though to prove his own innocence to the vizier, is childlike and hu
morous. The chain of transmitters remained the same. M as'ud lied that, “Bu Sahl was
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only telling us that Altuntash was easily lost in Shaburqan, [and] I yelled at him. ‘Abdus
has gone and told Hatami that, ‘This Bu Sahl will not refrain from deceit.’ Hatami has
made a big to do about this. Therefore, he got what he deserved and received a punish
ment.”33 Bu Nasr’s incredulous attitude about this story is evident in his ironic charac
terization of things. He said, “ . . . this is sim ple,. . . [one] can rectify this, if [emphasis
mine] nothing else has happened.”34 This conditional statement implies that, “Some
thing else has happened.”
Bu Nasr conveyed this message to Ahmad Hasan, who also maintained an incred
ulous attitude towards M as'ud’s denial. The vizier exclaimed, “Oh Bu Nasr, [something]
has gone on and [it] has gone on secretly. [They] kept it from us. And [you] will see
what will develop as a result of this.”35 Bu Nasr closed this part of his narrative by say
ing, “Then [I] returned.”36
Similar to his behavior in the first attempt, Mas'ud only admitted the intrigue when
he realized that it had failed miserably, with consequences beyond his control. In this
story, this was after the news of MalanjOq’s murder. The amir confessed to his chief
secretary, and sought the advice of the vizier, this after just having denied the intrigue
to them both. First came the confession scene with Bu Nasr, followed with the private
meeting with both the chief secretary and the vizier.
BayhaqT portrays Bu Nasr sitting with Mas'ud, when the letter carrying the news
of the murder arrived. Once he read the letter, the sultan became angry. But when Bu
Nasr attempted to leave, M as‘ud motioned to the chief secretary to stay. After the depar
ture of the attendants and companions, the amir threw the letter to Bu Nasr.
In this letter, the postmaster of Khvarazm, ‘Abd Allah Hatami, told of Malanjuq’s
death, but falsified its circumstances. The death is explained as an accident, due to
Malanjuq’s insolent behavior at the KhvarazmI court. The postmaster made no mention
of the secret letter to Malanjuq, but enclosed a memo that intimates his knowledge of the
intrigue. ‘Abd Allah wrote, “ . . . [the Khvarazmshah] has used caution . . . so no trouble
should rise. Accordingly, [they] brought Malanjuq’s scribe and . . . son to the divan and
arrested [them ]. . . ”37
After Bu Nasr finished reading the letter, the sultan asked him what might hap
pen. So, the one ultimately responsible for the plot was asking what its failure meant,
91
just as earlier he had inquired how it would succeed. Bu Nasr outlined the epistolary
consequences of the intrigue, even though, initially, he stated, “[I] cannot divine the un
known.”38
First he spoke of the unlikelihood of an accidental death in the Khvarazm! court,
saying, “ . . . the Khvarazmshah is a very wise, noble, and self-restrained ma n . . . . No
one has the audacity to . . . raise trouble in his presence, let alone that a leader like Qa’id
[Malanjuq] should get killed by mistake.”39 Bu Nasr then drew the conclusion that,
“ . . . [there] must be something behind this.”40
The chief secretary implied that this letter was a false testimony of what had hap
pened, by saying, “ . . . the Postmaster cannot, in appearance, write anything other than
by their approval and dictation.”41 But the conditions of his appointment obliged the
postmaster to reveal the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s death. So Bu Nasr reasoned,
“Until the secret letter [of ‘Abd Allah Hatami] arrives, [one] cannot know [the truth of]
this event.”42 Therefore, a secret letter would be the means for revealing the conditions
surrounding the failed plot, attempted through a secret letter, and disclosed through an
other secret letter.
It was at this point that M as'ud confessed to Bu Nasr. The confessional tone that
the sultan assumed is ironic, considering his earlier denials. He said, “How long can
[I] hide [this] from you . . . Bu Nasr?”43 Instead of repeating the story of intrigue on
M as'ud’s authority, Bu Nasr quoted the sultan as saying, “Bu Sahl incited us to [do] this
and that, and [there] is a letter in our handwriting [saying] such and such.”44
Next, Mas'ud expressed what might have happened at the Khvarazm! court, and
worried about the exposure of his own role in the plot. He said, “Once the letter of the
Chamberlain arrived, [they] must have killed Qa’id and made up this excuse.”45 It then
becomes clear that the sultan confessed, only once he realized that the failure might have
much worse consequences. He explained, " . . . my worry is not due to Qa’id’s murder,
but [it] is because that letter in our handwriting should not fall into their hands.”46 In
other words, it was not the murder of one of the conspirators that concerned M as'ud,
but how he would be able to deny his own role in the intrigue. The private session ended
with M as'ud’s standard question after botched plots of intrigue. The amir asked, “What
is the solution?”47 And Bu Nasr replied that only the vizier would know.
92
In the next scene BayhaqT dramatizes the session in which the sultan, Bu Nasr,
and Ahmad Hasan were present. M as'ud confessed to the vizier, after he had read the
postmaster’s letter, unknowingly saying that the matter could be resolved. In his narra
tive, Bu Nasr summarized the confession, which M as’ud ended by saying, “ . . . now the
worry is due [to the fact that] the letter should not fall into Altuntash’s hands.”48
The vizier advised M as'ud about the situation, but only after first scolding him
about what he had done. The words of Ahmad Hasan to the amir evoke the imagery of
a father disciplining a child, or a teacher punishing a student. Ahmad Hasan first evoked
fear in Mas'ud, but in the end offered advice. The vizier repeated M as'ud’s worry that
the letter had fallen in Altuntash’s hands, and then added, “The Khvarazmshah is lost.”49
The intensity of fear increases even more with the statement that, “[I] wish no other trou
ble would arise.”50
Ahmad Hasan then completely changed his tone by saying, “But [I] know that
[trouble] will not [rise].”51 He gave two reasons for this reassurance. The first was that
the Khvarazmshah would realize that others had instigated the intrigue. The vizier stated,
“ . . . the Turk is old and wise. [He] knows that [they] have incited the Lord . . . ”52
Ahmad Hasan then offered himself as a scapegoat. He based this on his past animosity
with Altuntash, saying, " . . . relations between Altuntash and me have never been good,
and at any event, [he] will consider this my doing.”53 Irony arises in considering both
reasons for this reassurance. In the first one, it is, again, the alertness of the victim that
the vizier mentioned. He then assumed the pose of a victim himself, who, though inno
cent, was willing to be sacrifized for Mas'ud.
Ahmad Hasan symbolically absolved Mas'ud from responsibility for the intrigue,
by saying, “Bu Sahl did not do right, and did not honor the favors of the Lord, with this
wrong advice which he gave.”54 This statement afforded the needed appearance of
M as'ud as righteous ruler, one who did not commit injustice or do wrong.
The only thing for which Ahmad Hasan scolded M as'ud was that he had not in
formed the vizier about the intrigue. He said, " . . . I do not know what the reason has
been for hiding this from me.”55 Then, the vizier spoke regretfully of advice he would
have given, if only told about the intrigue. The conclusion drawn about the vizier’s at
93
titude is that M as'ud was more wrong in not consulting Ahmad Hasan, than intriguing
against Altuntash.
M as‘ud’s response to this scolding implies the admission of wrongdoing. He said,
“What is done is done,” and then asked, “What is the solution now?”56 One can para
phrase this as, “I know I have made a mistake, but what should I do now to correct it.”57
This implied admission of guilt prepares the way for the advice of the vizier. He
advised that they write a letter to the postmaster in which, “ . . . [one] should not make
this affair of Qa’id [seem too] important.”58 Ahmad Hasan warned against writing to
the Khvarazmshah, until learning about the real circumstances of the murder. And then,
the vizier stated, “ . . . [we] will deliberate in accordance with what we read.”59
Ahmad Hasan ended his monologue with a remark which initiated an exchange be
tween the sultan and Bu Nasr. The vizier mentioned the fact that Bu al-Fath had revealed
the plot on account of his brother, the postmaster in Khvarazm.60 The sultan then re
membered that, in Mahmud’s court, Bu al-Fath used to secretly write about chancery
matters to his father, then in M as'ud’s service in Herat. When Bu Nasr expressed his
regretful ignorance about this news, M as'ud asked what the chief secretary would have
done then. He said, “[I] would have ordered [that they] take him by the collar and throw
him out of the divan, because a disloyal scribe is of no use.”61 This recollection about
Bu al-Fath HatamI serves as a closure to the account of his sacrifice. He was punished
for, seemingly, having told a lie. But then it becomes clear that, though not a liar, he was
in the habit of revealing official secrets. Thus, the punishment he received earlier gains
justification at this point in the story, but for a different reason. The scene ends with the
departure of the vizier and Bu Nasr.
With the plot thus acknowledged by Mas'ud, there were more sacrifices. The amir
reprimanded both Bu Sahl and ‘Abdus. But the contrast between the attribution of their
faults creates irony. To Bu Sahl, M as‘ud said, “Until when [will there be] these bad
counsels of yours? If you speak to me about anything other than the [military] from
now on, [I] will have [them] wring your neck.”62 M as'ud also reprimanded his confi
dant ‘Abdus, but for having disclosed the amir’s secret. The ironic meaning that emerges
in considering these faults is that Bu Sahl was wrong in advising intrigue. But it would
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have been best if ‘Abdus had not disclosed that there was a plot, so it would have suc
ceeded.63
This part of the narrative ends with a statement which characterizes this intrigue
as a political and moral coup for the members of the old guard. Bu Nasr said, “ . . . the
Amir was very preoccupied after this, and would speak about matters [only] to me and
khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]. The air of [self-importance which] these people had assumed
disappeared, as it was determined that whatever [they] say and think is wrong.”64
This is the mid-point in the story. The confession by M as'ud resolves the narrative
tension in the first part. And the conclusion drawn by Bu Nasr establishes the higher sta
tus of the Mahmudlyan. The reversal of the intrigue comes next, with knowledge about
the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s death.
The postmaster at the KhvarazmI court sent news of what had really happened
through a traveller. Bu Nasr narrated, “One day [I] was a t . . . home [when they] said, ‘A
traveller is at the door [who] says, “[I] have an important matter to [discuss].” ’ ”65 The
traveller asked to meet with Bu Nasr privately, then took out a small letter from the top
of his cane, which he gave to Bu Nasr. The image of a letter placed in a cane conveys
the secret nature of the message.
The secret message of ‘Abd Allah HatamI follows the narrative pattern in the first
part of the story, where there was an intrigue, a lie, and then, the truth. M as'ud plotted,
then lied about it, and finally told the truth. ‘Abd Allah first mentioned how he had used
intrigue to send this message. Next, he said that the letter sent before was by the order
of the Khvarazmshah and false. In the oral message that the traveller then conveyed, Bu
Nasr learned the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s murder, that is, the truth.
‘Abd Allah began, “[I] have planned and plotted [hllat-ha kardah-am] and given
this traveller a sum of money and guaranteed that [he] will receive . . . [another] sum at
the court, so that [he] took on this danger and came.”66 The next statement about the
previous letter is ironic. The Khvarazmshah and his advisor had rewarded ‘Abd Allah,
giving him silver and clothes. But then he said, “ . . . if [I] had written otherwise, there
would have been fear for [my] life.”67 In other words, they had rewarded him to lie, but
they were ready to kill him if he were to tell the truth.
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The truth was that Malanjuq had held a dinner party, where he had openly com
plained about the Khvarazmshah and his advisor that, “ . . . Altuntash and Ahmad are
for themselves, their children, and their ghulams. [There] will be an end to this . . . ”68
The next day at the court, the Khvarazmshah confronted Malanjuq, saying, “Hadn’t [you]
found meat and sweets that [you] devoured me and my advisor?”69 The statement is
ironic, given that it was the Khvarazmshah that, in the end, “devoured” Malanjuq.
‘Abd Allah reported that Malanjuq gave a harsh answer, after which, “The
Khvarazmshah laughed and looked at Ahmad.”70 When the two met privately, Altuntash
mentioned “the kingly airs” Malanjuq had assumed. It was Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad who
planned and carried out the murder. At a weekly Friday gathering at his house, he or
dered Malanjuq killed and his body paraded around the city.71 Therefore, the one who
had hoped to overthrow the Khvarazmshah was, literally, thrown to the ground himself.
The report, then, of an interrogation and a confiscation mirrors those in the Ghaz-
navid court. But in the KhvarazmI court, they took place after the disclosure of the in
trigue. Whereas in the Ghaznavid court, it was the confiscation of the code letter by
M as‘adl and his interrogation which made the disclosure known.
At the KhvarazmI court, they interrogated Malanjuq’s scribe, who finally con
fessed and gave them the secret letter from Mas'ud. The message ended with the report
of conditions at the KhvarazmI court, where “At the time of the Friday prayer, [they] pro
nounced the sermon as before. . . . [though they have] started buying more ghulams and
mounts . . . ”72
Bu Nasr wrote down this message and took it to Mas'ud, who after reading it gave
a start and said, “[One] should seal this until tomorrow when khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]
comes [to the court].”73 Malanjuq’s murder is one of the ways in which the intrigue was
reversed. The imprisonment of Bu Sahl, the very instigator of the plot, is the more im
portant one. The vizier advised the imprisonment of Bu Sahl, and M as'ud and his confi
dants used intrigue to arrest him. He was, then, taken away and imprisoned.74
In this part, also, the narrative comprises an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The in
trigue is the advice by Ahmad Hasan, followed by the false pretense of calm right before
Bu Sahl’s arrest. The truth is the reality of the imprisonment, after the appearance of Bu
Sahl’s good standing.
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On the day after the message arrived, Mas'ud met privately with the vizier and the
chief secretary. The amir agreed to the advice by the vizier, even before he had offered
it. Ahmad Hasan provoked fear in Mas'ud, saying, “ . . . this is the consequence of an
unconsidered action. [One] should regard Altuntash [lost] . . . and [I] wish no [other]
problem would rise, like an alliance with ‘Alltigln . . . ”75
The next statement by Bu Nasr is ironic. He discounted the possibility of an upris
ing, on account of Altuntash’s loyalty to Mahmud. This loyalty to Mahmud was, indeed,
one of the reasons why M as'ud viewed the Khvarazmshah with suspicion. But at this
point, Bu Nasr mentioned it to comfort the amir. He replied, “What should [I] do with
my own handwriting that [they] hold as proof? And if [they] use [it] as evidence, how
could [I] deny [it]?”76
Ahmad Hasan, then, intimated a solution, an intrigue (tadblr), while characterizing
its “good” consequences. He said, " . . . there is one thing tha t . . . can slightly ease this
situation in time. And [there] is an alternative for this [meaning, the removal of Bu Sahl
from office], though [it] would be painful for the Lord. But [there] is no alternative for
Altuntash and that large border.”77
The affection of M as'ud for Bu Sahl is exaggerated here, leading the amir to state,
“If [I] have to sacrifice a dear child, [I] would, so this matter w i l l . . . be resolved . . . ”78
This willingness for a much bigger sacrifice symbolically sanctions the smaller sacri
fice of Bu Sahl, suggested by the vizier. He said, " . . . once . . . [Bu Sahl] is arrested,
this guilt [gunah] will be attributed only to him.”79 In other words, the admission of Bu
Sahl’s guilt would mean the innocence of Mas'ud.
The monologue ends in a way that implies a political and moral coup for the
vizier, against the amir. Ahmad Hasan mentioned writing two letters to Altuntash. The
letter from Mas'ud would remove suspicions by the Khvarazmshah, who, still, would not
come to the court, but, at least, would not ally himself with an enemy like ‘Alltigln.80
But, more importantly, the vizier could advise the Khvarazmshah in a letter of his own.
Ahmad Hasan said, " . . . [I] could put a mirror in front of . . . [him] . . . , [he] will listen
to . . . [me] and [this] thing will be settled.”81
Mas'ud immediately agreed to this scheme, and the vizier left with the chief sec
retary. The confidential statement of the vizier to Bu Nasr shows a sense of vindication,
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that advice by men of the new order like Bu Sahl would only have bad consequences.
The vizier said, “This Lord came to a recognition now, when [it] is very late. But [it] is
still fortunate, so that from now on, [nothing] like this would occur.”82
Bu Sahl was arrested and sent away to a fortress on the next day. This reversal of
intrigue came after the false pretense that things were normal at the court. The narrative
of this day, with no reported dialogues, reflects the very tenor of this day’s activities.
On this day, Ahmad Hasan, Bu Sahl, and Bu Nasr sat in their divans. And once
he had ordered the seizure of Bu Sahl’s wealth, Mas’ud sent word to the vizier, saying,
“The Khvajah [must] finish that man’s affairs.”83 What creates irony is the image of Bu
Sahl, who, unknowingly, must have heard this message, since he was sitting in his divan.
Ahmad Hasan then asked for troop counts. So, Bu Sahl was busy counting troops
while the troops had already seized his belongings, and arrested his people. With a fi
nal order from the amir, Ahmad Hasan had Bu Sahl arrested. The narrative of the arrest
ends with a statement which signifies the reversal of the intrigue. Bu Nasr remarked,
“[They] took Bu Sahl to the fortress and chained [him]. And that evil deed . . . echoed
in his head.”84
Letters
The day after this arrest Mas’ud met privately with the vizier and the chief secre
tary. The statement made by the amir epitomizes where matters stood at this point. He
said, “Bu Sahl’s story is finished and [it] was for the best, since the man would not let
anything good happen . . . what should [one] do now?”85 The plot having failed, it was
time to explain it. So it was time to turn to the vizier and his solutions, his intrigues. The
vizier mentioned four letters to Altuntash, two would be from the KhvarazmI chamber-
lain M as’adI, and the other two from himself and M as’Od. In these four letters, they fal
sified the plot against the Khvarazmshah.
There was a lie about the relationship of Mas’adl’s letters to each other. In his of
ficial letter, M as’adI was, supposedly, conveying information about the intrigue with the
court’s approval. While in his code letter, he was telling the “truth” about what had hap
pened. In the first letter, the reason given for the arrest of Bu Sahl was both plots against
Altuntash. In other words, Bu Sahl was, belatedly, charged with the first attempt as well.
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M as'adl wrote, “ . . . Bu Sahl has committed and still commits treasons regarding the
state, to the extent that he plotted against a noble elder like the Khvarazmshah, when he
first came to the court. So, he had to return [to Khvarazm] with misgivings.”86 In this
way, only Bu Sahl received blame for the first attempt, which afforded M as'ud and other
conspirators an absolution from their guilt. The second attempt also remains vague in
this letter, with no direct mention of how Bu Sahl had plotted against Altuntash.
It was the code letter by M as‘adl that would contain the supposed circumstances
of the plot, which, in reality, were fabrications about Bu Sahl’s guilt, as opposed to
M as'ud’s innocence. The lies that the vizier, thus, made up had to do with both the amir
and Bu Sahl, but also with letters and wine. Ahmad Hasan falsified, “ . . . Bu Sahl had
found an opportunity when wine had overpowered [daryaftah bud] the Lord, written a
letter, on which a note was scribed in the King’s handwriting, and sent it to Khvarazm.
The next day when the Lord had thought about this and wanted the letter back, . . . [Bu
Sahl] swore that he, also, had thought about it, and realized that [it] was wrong. So
[he] had torn it up. Once [it] was known that [Bu Sahl] had lied, [the Amir] punished
him.”87
The images of wine and letters epitomize this false narrative of events. The im
age of wine is associated with Mas'ud, who seems symbolically weakened for having
made an error in judgement. This is because of the effects of wine, which “overpow
ers” (daryaftan) its victims. Whereas Bu Sahl, though the victim of his own plot, appears
shrewd and wily, and thus, in terms of practical knowledge, more powerful than Mas'ud.
Bu Sahl’s mode of behavior, intriguing, is closely associated with letters. He is supposed
to have written a letter, had Mas'ud inscribe it, and lied about having torn it up. And the
news of Bu Sahl’s, supposedly, single-handed plot was, again, in a letter, this one from
the chamberlain Mas'adl.
The vizier suggested that M as'adl send this code letter the next day. Ahmad
Hasan, also, advised that they send letters from himself and Mas'ud. In the letter from
Mas'ud, Bu Nasr, " . . . [would] win over . . . [Altuntash’s] heart [daryaftah ayad].”88
The use of the verb daryaftan, to overpower or win over, creates irony. In the previous
false narrative, overpowering, intriguing, is by means of wine, associated with Mas'ud,
who appears as its victim. In this instance, however, the means of overpowering, letters,
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was associated not with a victim, but an intriguer. Bu Nasr would write letters, intrigue,
so as to gain the trust and loyalty of Altuntash.
The narrative of this private meeting, like those of the attempted plot and the se
cret message of ‘Abd Allah, comprises an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The intrigue was
the vizier’s advice, followed by the lies in suggested letters. Then came the truth of how
Altuntash would react to these lies, in a statement by Ahmad Hasan. He said, “Although
all these are intrigues [nayrang] and will not be lost on . . . shrewd and crafty [men like
Altutash and ‘Abd al-Sam ad],. . . at least an [apparent] calm would follow. Therefore,
[Altuntash] would be relieved.”89
The amir promised, “Khvajah [Ahmad Hasan] should know that after this, every
thing that will be done, concerning the state, the treasury, and decisions [tadblr] will be
with his knowledge.”90 Decisions (solutions), or intrigues, in this case as well as in the
first atttempt against Altuntash, had followed failed plots. So, it was Mas'ud who had al
ways intrigued and failed, and it was Ahmad Hasan who had schemed in order to save
the amir.
The meeting ended in a way that symbolizes the shared confidence between Mas
'ud and his two top officials. The vizier kissed the ground, wept, and advised that
Mas'ud value the elders of the state, who, “ . . . are better than a thousand young men.”91
Mas'ud then called Ahmad Hasan near to himself, and embraced the vizier. Bu Nasr
added, “[The Amir] also spoke kindly to me.”92 This final piece of advice, intrigue, was
a plea for men like the vizier and the chief secretary. They were experienced in matters
of intrigue, as opposed to men like Bu Sahl, who ended up becoming their own victims.
BayhaqI then gives the text of the letter from Mas'ud. This letter, like the one after
the first attempt, is also divided into two parts. The amir spoke of himself and Altuntash
in the first part, as opposed to enviers in the state, in this case BO Sahl ZawzanI, in the
second.
Mas'ud began by comparing Altuntash to Mahmud, saying, “The learned Hajib,
Uncle Khvarazmshah, may God prolong his life, is in place of our father today, and he is
the most important foundation of the state [emphasis mine].”93 An effect of this sym
bolic elevation of the Khvarazmshah is, inevitably, the lowered status of Mas'ud.
100
What follows is a moral elevation of Altuntash, who, “ . . . has shown honesty, sin
cerity, and faith, concerning all matters.”94 The mention of these good traits implies
a contrasting set of traits that were M as'ud’s own. The amir then spoke of two pieces
of advice by Altuntash, as proof for his good traits. One, to the courtiers at the time of
Mahmud’s death, was in support of M as’ud as successor. And the other was to the sul
tan after his accession. Irony arises in considering that the first piece of advice had been
to ‘All QarTb and others to support M as'ud over Muhammad; whereas in the second one,
the Khvarazmshah had spoken on behalf of ‘All, after M as'ud’s accession to the throne.
The first passage centers on Altuntash as a good and honest man. Next is that
being good and honest means rewards, both in this world and the next. Mas’ud ended
this passage with the optative statement, “May he always live and may no one hear of
his loss.”95 The reward (naslb) that Mas'ud himself had intended for Altuntash was
arrest, and it had been due to another letter, the first code letter of Mas'adl, that the
Khvarazmshah did not lose his life.
M as'ud then mentioned that he was embarrassed, because unlike Altuntash who
had shown good faith and loyalty, “ . . . [there] has not been a just reward from us,
but rather, enemies and slanderers, young men [who are] unthoughtful and inexperi
enced have done things [that are] despicable . . . ”96 What creates irony is that the con
trast between Altuntash and Mas'ud is distorted. Good faith and loyalty on the part of
Altuntash did, actually, meet with its opposite in the amir, bad intentions and mistrust.
But the contrast stated here only charges M as'ud with neglect, in not having rewarded
the Khvarazmshah deservedly.
M as'ud ended this part with the promise of future rewards. But first, he appealed
to Altuntash on the basis of his own wisdom. Considering that the amir could not com
pletely deny his own role in the plot, given the evidence of his handwriting, it was best
to appeal his case by resorting to others, including the victim. His wisdom guaranteed
that the Khvarazmshah, " . . . would look at what is primary [asl], and not concern him
self with something secondary [far'] . . . ”97 The term asl echoes an earlier mention in
the first letter of The History. In that letter, an appeal for safety by Ghazna courtiers,
they had excused their prior allegiance to Muhammad by calling him, “a branch from
the main [asl] tree of the late Amir [Mahmud].”98 In this appeal, also, the association
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between Mahmud and that which is primary, a$l, would best guarantee Altuntash’s con
tinued loyalty, with M as'ud symbolically lowered as far*.
Next the amir, explicitly, mentioned Mahmud as his guarantor, saying, “I f . . . [the
Khvarazmshah] is concerned over matters that others have told him about, or things that
they have shown him, he should think of the late Amir . . . , and not about what enviers
and slanderers present [nahand] to him.”99 This mirrors the false narrative of the in
trigue, where the matter Bu Sahl had told Mas'ud was the plot against Altuntash, and
the thing shown was the letter to Malanjuq. But now, the amir was advising Altuntash
to disregard this letter, whose very existence is implied in the advice.
Mas'Od, then, restated his confidence in Altuntash’s own wisdom, saying, " . . .
[the Khvarazmshah] has wisdom, discernment, perception, and good judgement, so that
[others] cannot prevail on him that easily.” 100 So, Altuntash would withstand the influ
ence of others, given his wisdom, when Mas'ud had not done this himself.
He ended this part with a wish and a promise. The wish was that God would re
ward Altuntash fairly. This was in contrast to the amir, who had tried but failed to do the
opposite. The promise was that, " . . . if something has happened to cast an aspersion on
his rank or to pain him [in any way], it would be amended [daryaftah shavad].” 101 Ear
lier uses of the verb daryaftan indicate intrigue. First it was in relation to wine, which
had, supposedly, overpowered Mas'ud, and then, in relation to letters, through which Bu
Nasr would win over Altuntash. In this passage, the promise is to make up for pains and
worries that the plot might have caused. And since Mas'ud could not deny the plot, but
only minimize his own role, in other words, lie, daryaftan implies intrigue once again.
In the second part of the letter, the amir spoke about Bu Sahl. In this description
of events at the Ghaznavid court, Bu Sahl gains an even higher status as an intriguer than
he had actually earned. In this part, Mas'ud explained his own actions in regards to Bu
Sahl, first, for his appointment as a courtier, and then, for his dismissal and imprison
ment.
The amir explained that Bu Sahl joined the court since, “He had served us for a
long time, and had suffered because of his affection for us, having been imprisoned in
the Ghazna fortress.” 102 Bu Sahl would, also, be imprisoned after this failed plot. But
102
this time, it was due to orders from Mas'ud. When in the past, it had been on account of
him.
Bu Sahl joined the court because, " . . . [it] seemed [nimud] to us then that he was
the most well-meaning and the kindest of servants.”103 The use of the verb nimudan, to
seem, implies that M as'ud considered his own past judgement of Bu Sahl to have been
wrong. But it also allows an ironic reading of the statement, with M as'ud as victim. For
it implies that he had not been discerning enough to differentiate between how people
appear, seem to be, and what they are really like.
Finally, Bu Sahl joined the court since when the amir first assumed power,
“[There] was no one with us from the elders of the state . . . to offer any advice [tadblr]
” 104 Thg implication is that if the members of the old guard had actually been with
Mas'ud, they would have advised the dismissal or arrest of Bu Sahl. So in this instance,
one can consider the word tadblr to mean intrigue. And the intrigue, or advice, would
have been against BO Sahl.
M as'ud spoke of the dismissal and imprisonment of Bu Sahl in terms of faction
alism and intrigue. Bu Sahl gained in power at court, and the Mahmudlyan became,
“ . . . broken-hearted and u p se t. . . ” 105 This narrative of events, that the members
of the old guard disliked the rise of Bu Sahl is accurate. But this account implies that
M as'ud’s sympathies lay with the former rather than with Bu Sahl, when, in reality, it
had been just the opposite.
Bu Sahl gained in power to such extent that, " . . . he even aspired to the vizier-
ate.” 106 But the amir, wisely, chose Ahmad Hasan. M as'ud said, " . . . [we] ended
. . . [his] long suffering, and adorned the vizierate with his excellence . . . ” 107 The im
plicit mention of the earlier exile of Ahmad Hasan is clever. The Khvarazmshah, along
with ‘All Qarlb, had been the main intriguer against the vizier.108 So the reminder about
the intrigue by Altuntash made it impossible for him to assume the moral high ground.
For he himself had not been above intrigue and deceit.
M as'ud next turned to his second reason for the dismissal and imprisonment of Bu
Sahl. The amir had appointed him as the military head, so that, " . . . our court would be
free of his intrigues and lies [tasahhub va tabassut] . . . ” 109 This is comical. It is un
103
clear why if, indeed, Bu Sahl was as knavish as depicted, M as‘ud not only kept him in
the court, but even granted him the high position of military head.
Bu Sahl had continued his deceit. The amir said, “[He] would slander the masters
of the sword, and fabricate lies [talbls mTsakht] about them, as he has done now about
the hajib Altuntash, having incited Qa’id Malanjuq, and made a big to do about him. [Bu
Sahl] has asked that we should change our good opinion of the Hajib, who is, truly, in
place of our father and uncle.”110
This is a relatively open admission of the role of Bu Sahl in the intrigue, but a lie
about Mas'ud. There was asking by Bu Sahl, but not about the amir changing his opin
ion about Altuntash, since he seems to have already viewed him with suspicion, mistrust,
and envy. So M as'ud had been ready for a plot, when one was offered by Bu Sahl. In
this passage, M as'ud again compared the Khvarazmshah with Mahmud, but also with his
uncle Yusuf. Despite the apparent respect and affection, the amir had reasons for hatred
of all three. He had plotted and failed twice against Altuntash, been denied the succes
sion by Mahmud, and his uncle Yusuf had, at first, sworn loyalty to Muhammad.
Mas'ud, then, mentioned his decision to dismiss and imprison Bu Sahl, saying,
“When . . . his heinous crimes became apparent [zahir] to us, [we] ordered that [they]
take away the ministry of military affairs from him, and imprison him somewhere . . .
” *11 The use of zahir gashtan, to become apparent, recalls the earlier use of a similar
verb, nimudan, to seem or appear, where Mas'ud had said, " . . . [it] seemed to us . . . [in
the beginning of our rule] th a t . . . [Bu Sahl] was the most well-meaning and the kindest
of servants. . . ”*12 So first he had seemed the most well-meaning of servants, but later,
it became apparent that he was the most deceitful. What this implies about M as'ud is un
flattering and humorous. He lacked insight to such an extent that he was so wide of the
mark in his estimation of a top official.
The amir symbolically held up Bu Sahl as the victim of the intrigue, by saying,
“ . . . [his dismissal and arrest] was so that other impudent servants would be punished
by his example, and take heed.”113 The implication is that there actually were other
servants who were plotting and scheming, as Bu Sahl had done. But once they saw
what happened to him they stopped. So, Mas'ud lacked the power to control his own
104
courtiers. And they stopped their schemes only for fear of reprisal. These implied con
clusions put both the amir and his court in an unfavorable light.
M as'ud concluded the letter with a the promise of rewards and an appeal for loy
alty. First he spoke of titles and honors he had already given to Altuntash’s son at the
Ghaznavid court, saying, " . . . S ittI. . . is the best person for . . . [hajabl], for his [lin
eage, being] the son of a father [like the Khvarazmshah], [his] nobility, and excellence
. . . ” ' 14 But this SittI would later die under mysterious circumstances in the Ghaz
navid court. And the other son of Altuntash, Harun, would be killed, after the failure of
his rebellion against the court.115 So, being the son of Altuntash as well as being the
Khvarazmshah himself, met with reprisals, and not rewards.
The amir also promised Altuntash future rewards, stating, “ . . . from now on
[they] will be unending [payvastah], so that all the hatred and suspicion that this gos-
sipmonger [Bu Sahl] has caused will be eliminated.” 116 It is unclear who held these
feelings, which allows that they may be attributed to Mas'ud himself. This establishes
a motive for him as a suspect, in an intrigue which he had thus far denied.
M as'ud closed the letter with the appeal for Altuntash’s loyalty. He mentioned that
Ahmad Hasan would, also, write the Khvarazmshah, and explain matters more openly.
Finally, the amir said, “ . . . [the Khvarazmshah should tru s t. . . [what the Vizier says],
and be [even] more sincere than before . . . ” *17 Given that this plot had much worse
consequences than the first one, there was need for more effort by Altuntash to put mat
ters to rest.
Closures
There are four closures to the story, the first one by the narrator Bu Nasr. He said,
“This letter was written, and the confidant of the vizierate went [to Khvarazm] and came
back. [There] was an apparent [zahir] calm, and no serious trouble occurred at the time
[dar vaqt].” 118 The word zahir, apparent, implies that there was trouble, but it was un
der the surface at the time. One can thus conclude that Bu Nasr related this story to Bay-
haql after the rebellion of Harun. Considered against this shared knowledge between Bu
Nasr and BayhaqI, and subsequently his readers, the closure resonates with irony.
105
The closure by Bu Nasr ends another three-part set in the narrative, comprising an
intrigue, a lie, and the truth. One can call this commentary by Bu Nasr the truth about
the effects of the letter. It was true that it brought calm and prevented an uprising. But
the calm was on the surface, and trouble lay just ahead. One can also characterize the
advice by the vizier as the intrigue that preceded this statement of truth. And the letter
itself was a lie, a fabrication about M as'ud’s role in the intrigue.
The next three closures are by BayhaqT himself. In the first one, the author points
to the irony of the intrigue against Altuntash, by mentioning that he later died fight
ing ‘Alltigln on behalf of Mas'ud. Intrigue played a role in the KhvarazmI victory over
‘Alltigln. For, the advisor of the Khvarazmshah Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad kept the news of
his death a secret, until he had “used intrigue [lata’if al-hlyal] to return [the troops] back
to Khvarazm.”119 This connection made between intrigue and ‘Abd al-Samad is impor
tant, given that the next closure contains mention of other intrigues by Altuntash and his
advisor.
After the death of Ahmad Hasan and Altuntash, ‘Abd al-Samad became M as'ud’s
second vizier, and told BayhaqT about his own role in the murder of Malanjuq.120 ‘Abd
al-Samad began his narrative with the mention of a routine by Altuntash, saying, “In the
beginning when I became the advisor of the Khvarazmshah, he decided on a routine, so
that every day, I would go to see him alone, sit, and be there for a few hours . . . Whether
[there] was something of importance or not, [Altuntash] would meet with me privately,
and ask ‘What did [you] do last night? What did you eat? How did you sleep?’ . . . ” 121
‘Abd al-Samad had found this routine strange. But one day something important and
requiring secrecy had come up. And they had taken care of it in their private meeting,
without anyone’s knowledge. So he concluded, “[I] told myself, ‘How wrong I have
been!” ’122
It was in one of these daily private meetings that Altuntash and ‘Abd al-Samad
had, first, discussed the intrigue, discovered through the code letter of Mas‘adT. Altuntash
had cried, saying, “Damn these bad teachers! [They] arrested someone like ‘All Qarlb
who had no equals and [men] like GhazI and Aryaruq . . . Now [they] have intrigued like
this [dast dar chinln hllat-ha zadand]. . . . [But] even if [they] do this a thousand times, I
will not ruin my good name [nam-i nlk] . . . ” 123
106
Altuntash had suggested that they arrest Malanjuq, but ‘Abd al-Samad had said, “
. . . [one] should cut the head [of someone] who assumes the airs of Khvarazmshah, for a
king like M as'ud . . . ” 124 The advisor, then, had asked Altuntash to leave matters up to
him, and arranged the murder o f Malanjuq at his own house. Once he had found out, the
Khvarazmshah had asked what ‘Abd al-Samad would tell the court. And he had replied,
“[I] have [already] taken care of that [tadblr-i an kardam],” referring to the official letter
of ‘Abd Allah HatamT.125
There are two intrigues in this story, one by Altuntash, and the other by ‘Abd al-
Samad. The first intrigue by Altuntash, the daily private meetings, had allowed the two
to discuss matters secretly. And it was partly due to this routine that the Khvarazmshah
was able to escape the plot by Mas'ud. ‘Abd al-Samad had also intrigued, first against
Malanjuq, and then, in explaining matters to the Ghaznavid court. The reply that he
gave Altuntash, when asked how he would explain matters to the court intimates the
use of intrigue. ‘Abd al-Samad had said, “[I have [already] taken care of that [problem]
[tadblr-i an kardam].” 126 So he had found a solution (tadblr), the solution being a lie.
This new piece of information about how Malanjuq was really killed, by contrast,
reveals that the story of the intrigue had not been completely true. So, it is by knowing
the truth about the intrigue, the story by ‘Abd al-Samad, that the earlier story becomes
less than true, in other words, false. And this, again, allows that one epitomize three
parts in the narrative as an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The intrigue was the very plot
against Altuntash, the lie, the narrative by Bu Nasr. And the truth was the story by ‘Abd
al-Samad.
The last closure is a story about the Sassanian vizier Buzurgmihr.127 BayhaqT
narrates that Buzurgmihr converted from Zoroastrianism to Christianity, for which the
Sassanian king Nushlrva Kasra had him first imprisoned, and then killed. This nar
rative is the story of Buzurgmihr’s imprisonment, and is ironic in light of its ending.
BayhaqT closes the story by saying, “ . . . [Buzurgmihr] went to Paradise and Kasra to
Hell.” 128 Throughout the imprisonment, their conditions had been the opposite. It was
Buzurgmihr who had been the victim, and his victimizer, the intriguer, the ironist, had
been Kasra. But he had, then, become the victim of his own deeds, suffering even worse
consequences than Buzurgmihr. So, what happened to them in the end, one having been
107
damned and the other saved, was the truth about who they were. And this belied Kasra’s
high status as king, in contrast to the fate of imprisonment and execution by Buzurgmihr.
There are other “lies” and “truths” in this story, whose contrast lead to irony.
Thus, religions become false, in light of other more true faiths. Kings seem like liars in
comparison with God, the true King. The body is thus false in contrast to the soul, as
women are to men, darkness to light, and ignorance to knowledge.
The author begins the story by saying, “[I] read that when the wise Buzurgmihr
turned away from the religion of Zoroastrians, which had been a faulty religion, and
accepted the religion of the prophet Jesus . . . , he advised his [religious] brothers, say
ing, ‘[I] have read in books that at the end of time, a prophet will come whose name is
Muhammad . . . You should advise your children . . . [to believe in him], so that [you
will go to] Paradise.’ ” 129 Therefore, Buzurgmihr had realized the truth of Christianity
as opposed to the falsehood of Zoroastrianism, but also anticipated Islam as the most true
religion of all. And it was BayhaqT who bore witness to this, given his Islamic perspec
tive.
The author then relates that they took this news about Buzurgmihr to Kasra, who
ordered his arrest. But the day before this arrest, the wisemen and philosophers of Pars
went to see Buzurgmihr. And they asked for advice. They stated, “ . . . [you] gave us
fruits of your knowledge, so [we] became wise. [You] were our bright star, who showed
us the right path. [You] were our joyous spring, from which we drank. [You] were our
prairie, full of harvest, from which [we] obtained.” 130 They followed these statements
of what Buzurgmihr had done for them, by saying, “The King holds you in anger and
[they] are taking you away . . . ” 131 Irony arises as a result of an implied contradiction
between these good deeds by Buzurgmihr and the anger of Kasra. A direct statement
of the passage would be, “This is what you have done, whereas this is what the King is
doing to you.” So, it is as though Kasra had Buzurgmihr arrested because of his good
deeds.
Buzurgmihr then advised these men. One can epitomize this advice, also, in terms
of the contrast between lies and truths. Lies or misdeeds are things which Buzurgmihr
warned against, and truths are associated with such things as goodness, honesty, and
a good disposition. He began, “Know God, may He be exalted and glorified,. . . and
108
be assured that [He] sees your good and evil deeds . . . ” 132 He warned against saying
and doing evil, and counseled the men to “ . . . say [what is] good and do that [which is]
righteous . . . ” 133
He pointed to the “lie” of Life in contrast to the “truth” of Death, saying, “Know
that death is the house of life. Though [you] might live a long time, that is where [you]
will go.” 134 So, the advice is that one should live with awareness of his coming death,
as though it is death that will give meaning to the life that one has lived.
Another advice is that one should tell the truth, rast, and not lie. Buzurgmihr
stated, “Tell the truth for [it] illuminates the face ,. . . and refrain from lying, since even
if a liar gives truthful testimony, [people] will not accept [it].” 135 He warned the men
against women, who, “ . . . take possession of all favors and ruin homes.” 136
Buzurgmihr spoke of a good disposition as “the greatest of God’s favors.” In
contrast, an ill-natured person is always in pain, as others are because of him. He said,
“A good-tempered person has both this world and . . . [the next], and he is admired in
both.” 137 He ended this advice by drawing a contrast between the virtues of work and
its futility in the face of death. He asked that the men not put their trust solely in hope,
so that, “ . . . [you] would stop working.” 138 But right after this he said, “And those
who built cities, villages, houses, and wells, and bemoaned the sorrows of this world left
all this behind, and these things were ruined.” 139
On the day after this advice, they took the vizier to the king. In the scene between
Kasra and Buzurgmihr, the former is associated with political power, whereas the power
of Buzurgmihr is symbolic, at once both intellectual and spiritual. Throughout his mono
logue, Kasra asked that Buzurgmihr return to Zoroastrianism and the court. First was a
reminder of all the favors and ranks that he had received. Kasra said, “[You] reached the
rank of vizier, and the decisions [tadblr] of our kingdom were by you.” 140 Buzurgmihr
had given up many things, like the vizierate, for becoming a Christian in a Zoroastrian
land. So, this part of Kasra’s appeal was to arouse temptation for worldly things like the
vizierate.
But the king, next, threatened Buzurgmihr, saying, “Was your goal to make the
country revolt against me? . . . [I] will have you killed in such a way that no sinner has
[ever] been killed . . . ” 141 Kasra then completely changed his tone, this time entreat-
109
ing his vizier to repent. Kasra stated, “ . . . [it] would be a shame to kill a wiseman like
you. And [there] is no one such as you.” 142 So, the shame was not that it was Kasra
who would have Buzurgmihr killed, but that Buzurgmihr would be killed. Therefore, the
cause for shame was not the murder itself, but the murder of a man who could not be re
placed.
Buzurgmihr refused to repent. He remained defiant, despite reminders of his past
rewards and the threat of future punishment. He said, “Since I came from darkness to
light, I will not go back to darkness . . . ” 143 The moral coup by the vizier against the
king is in his last statement. Buzurgmihr stated, “ . . . the Judge to whom [I] am going
is just, and will not require testimony . . . [He] will take back His mercy from you.” 144
This moral threat is an answer to the threat of murder that Kasra had made.
But unlike the vizier who remained calm in the face of threats, the king was en
raged. BayhaqT says, “Kasra was angered to such an extent that he had never been be
fore.” 145 The king was the one with power over the life of Buzurgmihr. But it was the
vizier who created a rage in Kasra, when he himself remained visibly calm and tranquil.
So, the king was ultimately weak and ineffective, as opposed to Buzurgmihr who was
strong-minded and resolved.
BayhaqT, then, demonstrates the power Buzurgmihr held over Kasra by saying, “
. . . [in imprisonment] one day [they] did not hear . . . [the voice of Buzurgmihr]. When
[they] told K asra,. . . [he] became dejected.” 146 The king ordered that they bring the
family and relatives of Buzurgmihr, so that he might talk. BayhaqT says, “[They] brought
him into the light. [They] found his body strong and his cheeks ruddy.” 147
His good health surprised everyone. He explained, “[I] have made a daily repast
of six things, [from] which [I] eat a little every day, so [I] have remained like this.” 148
He spoke of a daily repast of faith, acceptance, forbearance, shunning of evil, offering of
thanks, and hope.
BayhaqT, again, points to the power Buzurgmihr held over Kasra. When told about
this advice by the vizier, the king said to himself, “How could [one] kill a wise man like
this?” 149 But right after this, the author mentions that Kasra finally had Buzurgmihr
killed and cut into pieces. BayhaqT ends the story by saying, “ . . . [Buzurgmihr] went
to Paradise and Kasra to Hell.” 150
110
One can characterize the whole narrative as comprising an intrigue, a lie, and the
truth. The story of Buzurgmihr tells of truths that follow the lies M as'ud wrote in letters,
and the intrigue that he had planned with Bu Sahl.
Both Marilyn Waldman and Julie Scott Meisami discuss this story in their respec
tive works, arriving at different conclusions. Waldman believes that Nushlrva Kasra is
compared to Mas'ud. She says, “ . . . the shared question is obvious: how does an ab
solute ruler deal with other powerful individuals around him so as to maintain his abso
lutism without denying himself their usefulness?”151 Meisami, on the other hand, con
siders the two sets of rulers and men of affairs, Mas'ud and Nushlrvan, and Bu Sahl Za-
wzanl and Buzurgmihr, to have been juxtaposed against each other. She thinks that Bay
haqT intended to validate the Islamic present, in contrast to the Iranian past. She states,
“The point of this story (which is not found in the Shahnamah) is clear: it contrasts
the pious Buzurgmihr with the devious Bu Sahl, the tyrannical Kisra with the clement
Mas'ud (who later released Bu Sahl). The implication is that it is Islam which makes the
difference . . . ” 152
Both scholars note the significance of analogy. In the reading by Waldman, the
implied parallelism between Nushlrva Kasra and Mas'ud focuses one’s attention on the
latter. Meisami, however, draws attention to Nushlrvan, by treating the story in an ex
clusively Islamic framework. The implication is that BayhaqT has told the story of this
Iranian past, so as to uphold its king for contempt and its righteously converted vizier
for approval. The question that both Waldman and Meisami have implicitly posed, given
their explanations of the story, is this: Why has BayhaqT related this story after the nar
rative of intrigue by Bu Sahl? They have answered this question by pointing to character
analogies, which they have interpreted antithetically.153
I agree with an analogical approach to The History, but I do not believe this al
ways dictates analogies of character, or other narrative elements between stories. It is
the act of remembrance itself which interests me, the chain of thought that successively
links the present of telling the intrigue story to the story of yet another imprisonment, in
an even more distant past, far removed from the one more fully portrayed.
In both stories, kings hold power over the lives of others. But it is the viziers who
symbolize a more important kind of power. Ahmad Hasan corrected the mistake that
I l l
M as'ud had made. And Buzurgmihr symbolized wisdom for Kasra. The power associ
ated with the viziers is the power of knowledge (khirad), and for this the kings turned to
the viziers.
112
Notes to Chapter IV
BayhaqT The History, pp. 430-451.
2ibid., p. 402.
3ibid.
4ibid.
5ibid.
6ibid. ZawzanT considered Malanjuq the right choice also because his troops outnumbered those of the Khvarazmshah.
7ibid., p. 403.
8 ibid.
9ibid.
10ibid.
1 ’ibid.
12ibid., p. 404.
13ibid.
14ibid.
15ibid.
16ibid.
17ibid.
18ibid.
’9ibid.
20ibid., pp. 404—405.
21 ibid., p. 405.
22ibid.
113
23ibid.
24ibid.
25ibid.
26ibid.
27ibid„ p. 97.
28ibid., p. 405.
29ibid., p. 406.
30ibid.
3’ibid.
32ibid.
33ibid.
34ibid.
35ibid.
36ibid.
37ibid., p. 408.
38ibid.
39ibid.
40ibid.
41 ibid.
42ibid.
43ibid.
44ibid.
45ibid.
46ibid.
47ibid.
48ibid., p. 409.
49 ibid.
50ibid.
51 ibid.
52ibid.
53ibid.
54ibid.
55ibid.
56ibid.
57ibid.
58ibid.
59ibid.
60ibid., p. 410.
61 ibid.
62ibid.
63ibid. The use of the past perfect tense in both accounts indicates that Bu Nasr did not witness the scoldings himself, but heard about them from another source.
64ibid.
65ibid.
66ibid., p. 411.
67ibid.
68ibid.
115
69 ibid.
70ibid.
71ibid., p. 412.
72ibid.
73ibid., p. 413.
74M as‘ud later pardoned Bu Sahl. The account of this pardon is not in The History, perhaps because it fell in the early part of the year 424/1032-1033, which has been lost.In the year 425/1033-1034, Bu Sahl had a hand in a plot against the tax collector of Pushang, who was killed as a result, pp. 560-563.
75ibid., p. 413.
76ibid.
77ibid.
78ibid.
79ibid., p. 414.
80ibid.
81 ibid.
82ibid.
83ibid., p. 415.
84ibid.
85ibid.
86ibid., p. 416.
87ibid.
88ibid.
89ibid.
90ibid., p. 417.
116
91 ibid.
92ibid.
93ibid., p. 418.
" ib id .
95ibid.
96ibid.
" ib id ., p. 419.
98ibid., p. 6.
" ib id ., p. 419.
,00ibid.
101ibid.
I02ibid.
103 ibid.
104ibid.
105ibid., p. 420.
106ibid.
107ibid.
108‘AqTlT, 152-186; Vasaya, 627-629; Khvandmlr [Dastur] 168; Ghaffari, 104-105.
109BayhaqI, op.cit., p. 420.
110ibid.
111 ibid., pp. 420-421.
112ibid., p. 419.
113ibid., p. 421.
117
14ibid.
I5ibid., p. 607.
I6ibid., p. 421.
17ibid.
,8ibid.
19ibid„ p. 422.
20ibid., pp. 469-480.
21 ibid., p. 423.
22ibid.
23ibid.
24ibid., p. 424.
25ibid.
26ibid.
27Buzurgmihr is said to have written the advice book, Plruzl-namah, which was trans- ated from Pahlavi into Persian by Avicenna. See bibliography for the full citation.
28BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 428.
29ibid., p. 425.
30ibid.
31 ibid.
32ibid., p. 426.
33ibid.
34ibid.
35ibid.
36ibid.
137ibid.
,38ibid.
139ibid.,pp. 426-427.
140ibid., p. 427.
,4 Iibid.
I42ibid.
l43ibid.
I44ibid.
I45ibid.
I46ibid.
147ibid„ p. 428.
148ibid.
149ibid.
150ibid.
151 Waldman, M.R., Towards a Theory . . . , p. 192.
152Meisami, J.S., “The past in service of the present. . . . ” Poetics Today (14:2) p. 152.
l53Waldman has also noted that the Buzurgmihr story, “coming as it does in the middle of Tarikh-i BayhaqI,” centers The History as a whole, op.cit., p. 191.
CHAPTER V
ARYARUQ, YUSUF, SUBASHl,‘ALf DA YAH, BIGTUGHDl
The intriguers against these military leaders had different motives. In the case of
Aryaruq, a man of the new order and one who had gained in power under M as‘ud, the
men who inititated the intrigue were motivated by envy. These were three members of
the old guard, which had lost power under Mas'ud. But the intriguer in the other two
plots was the amir himself. Against his uncle Yusuf, first supportive of Muhammad and
then one of the courtiers responsible for his arrest, Mas‘ud plotted after the succession
conflict. And against the other military leaders, who had unsuccessfully fought against
the Saljuqs, the sultan intrigued after the Dandanqan defeat in 431/1040.
Food and wine appear in all three stories. In the first story, the victim of intrigue
indulges in these pleasures. In the second story, the suspicious victim refuses them. And
finally, in the last story, the unsuspecting victims partake of them. Only in the first story
is the hunt an overt metaphor for the action of intrigue. In the other two, one can speak
of the entrapment of these men, coming as they did to their own arrest, as the capture af
ter the hunt.1
The scenes of the intrigues were respectively, the court, the desert close to Ghazna,
and finally, the fortress of Ghazna. The three narratives end with statements and stories
which imply ironies of fate.
Aryaruq
Aryaruq was a man of the new order and a close companion of GhazT. Under
Mahmud, Aryaruq had become rebellious in India. And during the rule of Muhammad,
he had refused to come to the court, because of loyalty to Mas‘ud. As BayhaqI narrates,
it was the vizier Ahmad Hasan who brought Aryaruq to the court from India, by means
of intrigue (hllah).2
119
120
His capture and imprisonment are ironic considering his loyalty and trust. It was
out of loyalty to M as‘ud that Aryaruq had refused to return from India earlier. But it was
M as‘ud who then had him arrested. Aryaruq’s trust led him to believe the amir, when he
offered gifts of wine, saying that Aryaruq should drink for whole days and nights. But
in the end, this allowed M as‘ud to capture him easily, which he could not have done if
Aryaruq had been sober and alert.
BayhaqI epitomizes the action of intrigue in metaphorical terms, first as a real
hunt, then as entrapment through food and wine, and finally, as the very capture of
Aryaruq. The three commanders of the old guard planned the intrigue while away at
a hunt. The sultan entrapped Aryaruq and GhazT, by sending them platters of food and
wine. Aryaruq entrapped himself, by drinking excessively. And finally, Mas‘ud captured
Aryaruq, who, in his drunken state, was unable to resist.
The metaphors of food and wine (nan va sharab) are associated with intrigue,
when one views the amir untruthfully deny the coming arrest, and then, secretly approve
it. But BayhaqI depicts the vizier advising against the plot and later Mas'ud justifying it
in scenes where these pleasures are absent.
In the story of Aryaruq, the ironic conflict is the discrepancy between the “lies,”
the deceptions, that surrounded the intrigue, and the truths told in commentaries. Bay
haqI dramatizes the lies in court scenes, and he tells of past and future truths relating to
the intrigue in commentaries. It was Mas‘ud who ultimately decided in favor of the in
trigue. And one views him lie in court scenes. In commentaries, the ironist BayhaqI con
fides in his readers against the victim of intrigue, but at times also against other charac
ters in the narrative.
The three narrative elements that stand out as a result of this metaphorical and
ironic viewing are: the action of intrigue, epitomized in the metaphors of food, wine, and
hunt, the commentary, where BayhaqI tells of truths relating to the intrigue, and the court
scene, where one witnesses M as‘ud lie. Therefore, the narrative divides into four parts,
with each part containing an intrigue, a lie, and the truth.
BayhaqI begins the first three parts with commentaries, and he ends the story with
his last commentary. Thus, one learns of truths about the arrest, before viewing M as‘ud
deny it and then later approve it. In the last part, the author achieves irony by reversing
121
the order of truths and lies. After telling of lies by Mas‘ud following the arrest, BayhaqI
closes the story with an omen, a truth about future outcomes of the intrigue.
In the first commentary, the truths relate to the intriguers and their victims. It was
because of jealousy that Bigtughdl, ‘All Dayah, and Bilgatigln plotted against Aryaruq.
BayhaqI says, “The coming of Aryaruq and GhazI to the court with a few foot soldiers
and shield bearers . . . [was] difficult for the Pidarlyan and Mahmudlyan . . . ”3 The im
age that this description evokes is that of Aryaruq looking self-important and arrogant,
and the intriguers hiding their resentment towards him.
BayhaqI then gives the reasons for the success of the plot, having to do with the
victims’ advisors and wine. In speaking about the advisors/adjudants, the author says,
“ . . . these two courtiers Aryaruq and GhazI did not have anyone who would give them
advice [tadblr]. . . . ”4 The word tadblr here implies intrigue. Aryaruq and GhazI had no
one to teach them about ways of behavior that would conceal, rather than reveal. So they
aroused the jealousy of other courtiers.
Instead, the advisors were, “ . . . obsequious, lowly, and witless . . . who had nei
ther studied [with masters] nor read books.”5 In other words, these advisors could not
advise their masters well, unlike experienced and trained scribes.
This passage further gains in ironic significance, considering that BayhaqI goes on
to explain that these men spied on Aryaruq and GhazI, both for Mas'ud and the three
commanders. The author points to the ironic consequence of the advisors’ disloyalty in
metaphorical terms, saying, “ . . . [these advisors] did not realize that once their mas
ters fall, [they] would be more lowly than [worn, old] sandals, and more humble than
mud.”6
BayhaqI also explains the success of the intrigue in terms of wine. First he states,
“Wine is a great source of trouble, if drunk in excess.”7 His description of the wine par
ties of Aryaruq and GhazI demonstrates the truth of this statement. In these parties, he
says, “ . . . when wine would take hold of [everyone], the Turks would praise these two
commanders and [make fun of the members of the old guard], calling Bilgatigln effem
inate, ‘All Dayah a woman, and . . . Bigtughdl, blind and lame.”8 This passage is hu
morous in itself. But given that the advisors would later report these name callings to the
three commanders, thus adding more fuel to their cause, it is ironically humorous.
122
BayhaqI next reports the plan of intrigue, the hunt. An actual hunt provided the
pretext for a secret meeting where the three commanders plotted against Aryaruq and
GhazI. The author learned about this meeting from the advisor of Bigtughdl, who was
one of the intriguers. Bigtughdl had sent messages to the other two that, “If [one] sees
fit, [they] should ride away on the pretext of a hunt , . . . so as to find a solution [tadblr]
for this thing.”9 BayhaqI learned about this meeting from Bigtughdl’s advisor/adjudant,
most likely after the plots had succeeded. Yet, in this case also there was a betrayal of
confidence, similiar to that of the victims’ advisors.
BayhaqI portrays the intriguers standing atop a hill. The imagery of high ground
is ironic, considering the lower status of the old guard in the court of Mas'ud. After
the three men complained about Aryaruq and GhazI for a while, Bigtughdl pointed to
the irony of their higher status by saying, “The amazing thing is that in the palaces of
Mahmud, [there] was no one lower than these two, and [they] have kissed the ground in
front of me a thousand times. But [they] are both courageous and brave: GhazI being a
bully among bullies, and Aryaruq a jackass among jackasses.” 10 So, the intriguers were
nostalgically remembering their own lost status, while insulting their soon-to-be victims,
as though words could bring about the demise of their enemies. The irony lies in the fact
that it was through words, lies, that the intriguers succeeded in changing M as'ud’s opin
ion of Aryaruq and GhazI.
The other two intriguers suggested that they poison Aryaruq and GhazI, or have
someone kill them. But Bigtughdl objected, saying, " . . . our reputation will be ruined
. . . The solution [tadblr] is for us . . . to pretend friendship and put other people up to
lying . . . about what these two commanders say . . . ” *1 In other words, let them get
themselves.
BayhaqI follows this hunt scene with the effects of these lies on M as'ud who, as
a result, began to dislike Aryaruq more and more. So, one day the amir held a private
meeting with his vizier, asking whether he should have Aryaruq arrested. At first Ahmad
Hasan refused to answer, saying, “If I say anything about these matters, [it] might not
agree with the opinion of the Lord, and [he] would disfavor me.” 12 In other words, “I
cannot tell the truth, for fear of the Lord’s anger.”
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In return, Mas'ud said, “The Khvajah is our representative and the most trusted of
all servants. And inevitably, [one] has to consult with him in these matters, so that he
relates what he knows, and . . . then [we] think about it ourselves . . . ”13 This is a lie,
considering the second plot against Altuntash. The consultation came only after the plot
had failed, when the amir needed a way out of a self-created disaster.
The vizier advised against the arrest of Aryaruq, and ended his advice with a state
ment that rings with irony, considering the future defeat at the hands of the Saljuqs.
Ahmad Hasan warned, “The territories of the Lord have increased, and [one] needs men
of action. The likes of Aryaruq are rare.”14 Mas'ud falsely expressed his agreement
with the vizier, and then said, “[One] should keep this matter a secret until [I] think
about it further.” 15 Or more to the point, “until I capture Aryaruq,” given the later ar
rest.
BayhaqI continues the narrative with his second commentary, stating, “The Mah-
mudlyan did not stop intriguing [tazrib] . . . ” 16 They lied to M as'ud that Aryaruq and
GhazI planned an uprising. Within the historical perspective of the loss of Khurasan,
this charge of disloyalty is ironic. In the long run, the three commanders proved disloyal
themselves. For they helped the Ghaznavid defeat by having a hand in the loss of its mil
itary leaders like Aryaruq and GhazI.
Having told of the intriguers’ lies, BayhaqI then turns to those of Mas'ud, and
thus the court. One day the amir held court with everyone present. Aryaruq and GhazT
had heard rumors about M as'ud disfavoring them. So they came, looking scared and
uncertain. The vizier reassured them, saying, " . . . [these rumors] are untrue and . . .
unfounded . . . ” 17 Ahmad Hasan spoke to M as'ud about this privately. And the amir
then had everyone called back to the court.
Once everyone returned, the musicians played and everyone talked, until M as'ud
motioned for the music to stop and addressed his vizier. The amir said, “[We] hear that a
few people envy . . . [the commanders Aryaruq and GhazI] . . . and worry them [unnec
essarily]. [One] should not concern [himself] with that, [but] trust what we say. Since
we will not listen to anyone’s [malicious] talk about them.”18 The vizier followed this
by saying, " . . . what favor could be more than this that came from the royal tongue?” 19
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Aryaruq and GhazI kissed the ground and the throne, then came back to their seats
and sat, looking cheerful and reassured. And Mas'ud ordered that they bring ceremo
nial robes and swords for the two commanders. He then fastened the robes which the
two wore, and hung the swords around their necks himself. Afterwards everyone left the
court, including Aryaruq and GhazT who mounted their horses and rode away. BayhaqI
ends the scene in this way, “And I, Bui Fazl, was on duty on that day, [I] saw all this and
included it in the journal for this year.”20
What Mas'ud said were lies and what he did was false. He did listen to malicious
talk about Aryaruq and GhazI, and he had no intention of honoring them by giving them
ceremonial robes and swords. Once the two were arrested, M as'ud took everything that
they owned, including these gifts.
BayhaqI continues the narrative by telling of the intrigue against the victims
through wine. The intrigue, or the hunt, from here on was by M as'ud himself. He would
offer or send food and wine to Aryaruq and GhazI, in a seeming gesture of trust and
companionship. And they were much too happy to drink with the amir, or accept his
presents of food and wine.
After the court on this day, Mas'ud sent Aryaruq and GhazI companions, musi
cians, food, and wine, with the message, “[You] returned unfinished from our court.
Drink wine with companions to the music of musicians.”21 The author ends this part
by saying, " . . . the Mahmudlyan became very discouraged with this turn of events.”22
This is the mid-point of the story, where BayhaqI pauses and reflects on the suc
cess of the intrigue, characterized in terms of fate (zamanah). Whereas just in the previ
ous passage, he has mentioned the intriguers’ fear that it would not succeed. He states,
“Neither . . . [the Mahmudlyan], nor others knew that which was hidden. And fate
[zamanah] was voicing [its] song loudly [and clearly]. But no one would listen.”23
The author then relates that Aryaruq and GhazI received the gifts of M as'ud with
gratitude and joy. And once they decided to become drunk, they sent away the com
panions and musicians. BayhaqI narrates, “GhazT went to sleep. But Aryaruq had the
habit that once [he] sat to wine, [he] would drink for three or four days and nights . . . on
this night, [he] drank til morning, given all the gifts and favors that [he] had received
[daryaftah bud].”24
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The use of the verb daryaftan creates irony. In the second attempt against Altun-
tash, this verb is used in two instances where it implies intrigue. One is in the false nar
rative about wine having overtaken the amir, which was a lie. And later it was in relation
to Bu Nasr writing to Altuntash in order to “win over” his heart, which was only possible
by falsely minimizing M as'ud’s role in the intrigue.25 In this instance daryaftan implies
intrigue as well. The gifts and favors that Aryaruq had received were traps so he would
not suspect a plot against himself. Also, with continued gifts of wine, Aryaruq would be
much too drunk to resist arrest, when it came time to capture him.
Mas'ud again held court on the day after. In loyal service to the amir, GhazI came
to the court, looking even more pompous than before and putting on even more airs.
When Mas'ud asked why Aryaruq had not come, GhazI explained, “He is in the habit
of drinking wine for three or four nights and days, especially with yesterday’s favors and
gifts.”26 The amir laughed and replied, “We should drink wine today as well, and [we]
will also send some to Aryaruq.”27
Irony arises in viewing the foolishly trusting attitude of GhazI, as opposed to the
amir’s concealed suspicion and anger. GhazI told the truth and Mas'ud responded falsely
by laughing. It is with the hindsight of the following arrest that one can interpret this
laugh as insincere.
The entrapment of Aryaruq continued, with M as'ud sending him fifty containers
of wine along with the commander’s favorite drinking partner. The amir’s message to
Aryaruq was, “We order you not to come to court, and drink wine [as] is your habit.”28
In other words, the order was for Aryaruq to drink so much that he would help his own
arrest, by becoming practically unconscious.
When he received the gift and the message, Aryaruq kissed the ground and cried.
BayhaqI writes, " . . . Aryaruq . . . had become like a ball, wandering in the garden. [He]
would drink and the musicians would play . . . and [he] would sleep, get up, eat rishtah,
and then drink wine, so [he] had no idea what [he] was doing . . . ”29 Aryaruq continued
like this for two more days. His unthoughtful behavior is pathetically humorous, and his
earnest belief in the sincerity of M as'ud’s actions ironic.
BayhaqI then narrates the capture of Aryaruq. One views the hunt for Aryaruq,
first in the palace garden, then in the victim’s home, and again, in the halls of the court.
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In the palace garden and the court, M as'ud and his people planned the capture and later
arrested Aryaruq. And at home, Aryaruq received the messenger of the sultan with an
invitation to a wine party. Irony arises in considering the sequence of these events. As
M as'ud and his people prepared for the capture, Aryaruq, drunk and unattentive, was get
ting ready to come to the court, where, he thought, he would be offered wine and food.
BayhaqI begins by saying, “The Amir did not hold court the next day . . . [he] had
planned to have Aryaruq captured.’’30 Mas'ud had given orders to the chief secretary
to send his scribes home, since they were evacuating the garden. Bu Nasr did as he was
told, but he left one of his scribes behind in the chancery. BayhaqI narrates, “Everyone
rose and left, except me [emphasis mine].”31 Bu Nasr told his protege Bui Fazl, “Be
alert to observe everything that happens . . . ”32 In the narrative of the arrest, one sees
BayhaqI as the student of irony, looking at the victim with knowledge of his coming ar
rest, when the latter himself was completely unaware.
The messenger who went to Aryaruq with the false invitation stated, “The Sul
tan wishes to drink wine. And people went after the commander-in-chief GhazI so [he]
would come . . . [The Amir] is calling you [as well].”33 Aryaruq first asked to be ex
cused, given that he was completely drunk. But the messenger reasoned, “ . . . not com
ing will be unseemly [zisht] and [people] will misinterpret [it].”34 In persuading the at
tendant of Aryaruq, the messenger was offering a reason which had to do with appear
ances. But going to the court would mean the reality of arrest, which Aryaruq ended up
suffering.
While he was getting ready to go, the messenger convinced the victim’s attendant
that, “[Aryaruq] is going to a wine [party.] Ten shield-bearers and a hundred foot sol
diers would be enough.”35 The success of the plot depended on Aryaruq going to the
court without a large group of soldiers, which was accomplished in this way.
Aryaruq came to the court and two officials seated him in the palisade across from
the chancery. He sat for a second, then rose, saying, “[I] am drunk. [I] cannot stay, [I]
will leave,” to which the Chamberlain said, “[It] would be unseemly to return without or
ders. [We] will inform [the Amir].”36 At this point Aryaruq sat in the hall of the court.
BayhaqI narrates, “I, Bui Fazl, was staring at him.”37 The image of this scene conveys
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the anxiety Bayhaqi must have felt, in viewing the unaware victim who would soon be
arrested.
Aryaruq tried to sober up at this point. Bayhaqi writes, “[He] called Hajjl the wa
ter carrier . . . who put the jar [full of water and ice] in front of him. [Aryaruq] would
dip his hand in [the jar] and take out [pieces] of ice and eat [them].”38 Once the cham
berlain Bigtigln saw this, he said, “Oh brother! This is unseemly. You are a commander!
[You] eat ice in the hall [of the court]? Go to the palisade and do what [you] want!”39
He did as he was told and it was in the palisade that Aryaruq was captured.
Fifty palace colonels, coming from both right and left, took such hold of Aryaruq
that he could hardly move. He cried out to Bigtigln, “Oh [you] unchivalrous [na-javan-
mard] brother! You did this to me?”40 Aryaruq calling Bigtigln “brother” echoes the
latter doing the same. Bigtigln had just done so in the course of his attempt to have
Aryaruq captured. And Aryaruq was then expressing his disbelief and surprise at dis
covering this, captured as he was by the lie of a “brother,” who in reality, was an enemy,
a deceiver.
In reading the narrative of the arrest, one views Aryaruq being stripped of his be
longings, his boots, horse, weapon, ghulams, all having been symbols of his high rank,
which was lost. But the ones who arrested Aryaruq also took away his means of despair
and hope, objects which he could have used to destroy himself, or kept close for the so
lace they offered in his time of need. They took away two knives, hidden in his boots,
and poison in the side of his robe. And they seized a written prayer which he had kept in
the side of his garm ent41
Bayhaqi brings the story of the capture to an end by telling about the ghulams and
the possessions of Aryaruq. The ghulams fought the Ghaznavid troops, both in their
master’s home and in the palace. Mas’ud sent them a message, saying, “Aryaruq was
an ungrateful man and you were in danger with him . . . we are your master. Do not act
childishly and stop fighting, since [it] is obvious how small your number is. [You] will
be killed in an hour, with no benefit to Aryaruq. [But] if [you] act prudently, [we] will
reward [you] and treat [you] well.”42 The ghulams stopped fighting the amir’s troops,
and in a gesture of obedience kissed the ground. The claim by M as’ud that he was their
master seems humorous, since their fighting showed exactly the opposite. Also comical
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is their zealous fight before the surrender, which proved that self-interest was more im
portant to them than their loyalty to Aryaruq.
Aryaruq’s possessions were seized. Bayhaqi exclaims, “ . . . [they] sealed the
doors of [his hom e]. . . [after which it looked] as though [it] had never been a place
[where] men and women [had lived].”43 The author’s own action at this point conveys
a sense of closure about the arrest. Bayhaqi writes, “And I returned and told my master
everything that [I] had seen.”44
Mas’ud held court on the day after this arrest. Afterwards, he met privately with
the vizier and GhazT. GhazI had come to the court, scared and apprehensive, but the amir
falsely led him to believe that he would be safe. Mas’ud stated, “The situation of this
man [Aryaruq] is one thing and the condition of other servants another. . . [he] had re
fused to return from India [despite] our father’s request. . . And khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]
used much intrigue [afsun] so [he] could bring him . . . [I] said [all] this so that the
Commander-in-Chief would not worry about this thing that happened.”45 GhazI kissed
the ground after which he submissively said, “I am a servant and if [the Lord] commands
that [I] be a stable boy instead of this, [I] would be proud . . . ”46
Mas’ud and GhazI were both lying. The amir was lying in speaking of Aryaruq’s
rebellious attitude under Mahmud as the reason for his capture at this point. Also, it was
a lie that the situation of other courtiers, including GhazI, was any different than that of
Aryaruq. They all lived in uncertainty and insecurity, though some less so than others.
But GhazI was lying as well. He was no humble servant of the court, and had not acted
so thus far. Yet fear of future arrest and possibly even murder warranted that he beg for
giveness for his previously self-important and pompous attitude. And that is what he was
doing in this meeting.
After this meeting, Ahmad Hasan called in Bu Nasr and the two consoled GhazT.
In other words, they explained why Aryaruq had to be arrested, as opposed to why GhazT
would not. Bayhaqi writes, “These two nobles said pleasant things until GhazI became
satisfied and returned.”47 The image is that of two shrewd men fooling GhazI into sub
mission towards M as’Od, as though they were convincing a little child to do what they
wanted.
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Bayhaqi ends the story with worries expressed by the vizier and an omen by the
chief secretary. These expressions were the truth about what this arrest really meant.
It meant suspicions by GhazI and future losses to the state and that is what they pre
dicted. Ahmad Hasan said to Bu Nasr, “This Turk [GhazI] became suspicious, since [he]
is smart and alert and things like this will not go over his head . . . GhazI will also be lost
. . . take this from me.”48 Referring to his master as an old wolf, an experienced and
discerning man, Bayhaqi closes with the words of Bu Nasr who said, “ . . . ‘ . [these
courtiers] have become [two] . . . groups [of enemies], the Mahmudlyan and Mas'udlyan,
engaged in their individual rivalries. May God, His mention be exalted, bring a good
outcome.’ ”49
Yusuf
Mas'Od was motivated by anger in the intrigue against his uncle Yusuf. Yusuf
had supported Muhammad as the successor to the throne. But like ‘All Qarlb and a few
other courtiers, he had later arrested Muhammad in Taglnabad, and alleged loyalty to
M as'ud.50
The narrative about Yusuf comprises two parts, the intrigue and a closure. In the
intrigue story, Bayhaqi first offers his observations and then relates the plot and the ar
rest. In the closure, a story about the favorite ghulam of Yusuf who spied on him for
Mas'ud, the author reverses the order. First comes the account of Tughril in the court
of Mahmud, followed by Bayhaql’s commentary about the end Tughril suffered after
Yusuf’s arrest.
This change of order effects irony in both cases. In the Yusuf story, Bayhaqi re
lates his observations as statements of fact, in other words, the truth. In contrast, in the
account of the plot and the arrest, the author points to both truths and lies by the in
triguers and their victim. In the Tughril story, Bayhaqi narrates how Yusuf had first
fallen in love with this slave, followed by the account of his fateful end after his master’s
arrest. In light of the betrayal by Tughril, his earlier return of affection for Yusuf seems
false and insincere.
Irony also arises in considering that both Yusuf and the intriguing Tughril suffered
in the end. Yusuf had expected safety for having become loyal to Mas'ud. And Tughril
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had anticipated that he would gain in status for having spied on behalf of the amir. But
neither one realized his expectation.
The story begins with Yusuf in the court of Mahmud. Yusuf would serve at the
court twice a day, and otherwise spend his time drinking wine and playing. Bayhaqi
comments, " . . . under these conditions, and with youth, strength, wealth, and unearned
wishes [coming true], [it] is evident how many experiences [Yusuf] . . . gained.”51 So,
Yusuf learned about the pleasures of court life, but not about how to behave so as not to
endanger himself in the court. Bayhaqi intimates that only Mahmud had guaranteed the
safety of Yusuf, by using a simile (tashblh). The author says, “ . . . amir Mahmud passed
away and [thus] the elephant keeper was [no longer] guarding the elephant. . . ”52
In the court of Muhammad, Yusuf received the position of commander-in-chief,
but he did not acquire much experience there either. Bayhaqi observes, “The duration of
that kingship . . . was very short, so how much experience could . . . [amir Yusuf] have
gained?”53 The implication in both statements about the lack of experience by Yusuf is
that, as a result, he acted imprudently, or foolishly.
Bayhaqi then refers to Yusuf’s role in the arrest of Muhammad, intimating that
M as'ud offered this as reason for the plot against his uncle. The author states,
though [the courtiers who arrested amir Muhammad] did so on behalf of a great king
. . . , kings [usually] accept such devotions at the time, but [they] do not trust people like
this.”54 It seems that courtiers caught in the crossfire of a succession conflict had no
way out, since loyalty to the unsuccessful ruler could mean future arrest by the success
ful one. But even if the courtiers changed loyalties to the “rightful” king, they still risked
arrest for having betrayed their previous masters. It is almost like these men should have
had divine intuition or wisdom not to arouse the kings’ anger.
Bayhaqi follows his statement about kings and courtiers with a story that demon
strates its truth. When the Saffarid ruler Ya'qub Layth set out to conquer Khurasan from
the Tahirid Muhammad b. Tahir b. ‘Abd Allah, many nobles from the latter’s court wrote
to Ya'qub, swearing loyalty. But three elder statesmen from the Tahirid court did not.
When the Saffarid ruler succeeded, he had these three men, who had been arrested,
brought to the court. Ya'qub asked them, “Why didn’t [you] swear loyalty to me as did
your friends?”55
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Once they had received a guarantee that Ya'qub would not hold them in anger,
they replied, “We are old and experienced people and [we] have served the Tahirids for
many years, having received many favors and ranks in their government. Would [it] be
right for us to choose . . . ingratitude and swear loyalty to their enemies, even if [they]
behead [us]?”56 Ya'qub freed these men and honored them in his court. Instead, he or
dered the arrest of those who had earlier written to him, swearing loyalty. Bayhaqi ends
this story by saying, “[I] include anecdotes like this so that slanderers would not criticize
this great king M as'ud . . . since the disposition of kings, their conditions and habits, are
not like those of others and they see what others cannot. . . ”57 But Bayhaqi does not
state what these differences are, which leads to ambiguity and irony regarding his atti
tude towards kings.
Having told about the succession issue, the author next mentions another rea
son why M as'ud held Yusuf in anger, this one having to do with women. Yusuf had
made a gift of two of his daughters to his nephews. But Muhammad’s bride had died
on the night of the wedding, after which Mahmud had given the other daughter, already
promised to Mas'ud, to his favorite son Muhammad. Bayhaqi concludes this account
by saying, " . . . amir Mas'ud was hurt for being insulted like this by his uncle, and
[with the hand o f ] . . . Fate . . . Yusuf fell from the height of power to the pit [of misfor
tune].”58 Thus, Yusuf became the object of M as'ud’s anger the real cause of which had
been the disfavor from Mahmud. It is as though the anger M as'ud could express towards
his uncle released the deeper one that he had towards his father.
Bayhaqi then turns to the plot against Yusuf. Once he ascended the throne, M as'ud
sent his uncle to Qusdar, on the pretext of suppressing an uprising in the nearby Makran.
But in reality, this was because, “ . . . [the Amir] wanted Yusuf to be away from him and
the troops . . . ”59 One could interpret this statement with emphasis on the first part of
the prepositional clause, that Bayhaqi means M as'ud sent Yusuf away so as to allow his
own anger to subside. But the amir most likely sent Yusuf to Qusdar, so that he would be
away from the troops, who might have remained loyal to him as their previous comman
der under Muhammad.
During this absence, Tughril spied on his master. Bayhaqi characterizes Tughril
both as a victim and an intriguer in the plot against Yusuf, saying, “With orders from
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the Sultan, [they] deceived [bifarlftand] . . . [the] hajib [of Yusuf] Tughril to spy on him
. . . [they promised Tughril] a high position [in the court].”60 The plan to have someone
from Yusuf’s own circle as a spy with promises of future gain echoes a similar one in the
Aryaruq story. And Bayhaqi displays the same disapproving attitude towards the disloyal
servant, who in this case was a Turk. The author points to the irony of fate in speaking
about this disloyalty. He states, “ . . . this idiot Turk [Tughril] was fooled [like] this, not
knowing that ingratitude brings misfortune.”61 Tughril had become a spy with the hope
that he would gain in status. But, as Bayhaqi intimates here and will later relate, in the
aftermath of Yusuf’s arrest this did not come true.
The narrative of the intrigue contains truths and lies by both the intriguers and
their victim. In the case of the intriguers, the truths and lies helped guarantee that the
plot would succeed. But in the case of Yusuf, the truths he unknowingly revealed further
entrapped him. And the lies that he told in order to deter a possible plot did not protect
him. Bayhaqi associates Yusuf’s true sentiments towards M as’ud with wine, saying, “At
all times, and mostly during wine [parties], [Yusuf] would complain and speak openly
that, ‘What was this that [we] all did to ourselves,. . . [we] will all be arrested one after
another . . . ’ ”62 Irony arises in considering that wine is associated with truth, but with
the truth of sentiments best having remained concealed, given that they ultimately hurt
Yusuf.
Tughril would disclose what Yusuf said, but also overstate his complaints. Bay-
haql narrates, “Tughril. . . [finally] wrote, ‘Yusuf is planning to go to Turkestan and has
started writing to the [Qarajkhanids.’ So, being motivated by ambition and greed,
the spying intriguer was also lying. In his case, this was so as to speed up the arrest,
since this would, supposedly, mean rewards of wealth and a high rank.
These truths and lies by Tughril would enrage M as‘ud even more. The amir would
then secretly write the men in charge of Yusuf, with the order that, “If [he] decides to go
[anywhere but Ghazna], [one] should not allow [it], but capture [him], and bring [him] to
us, bound [and enchained].”64 These statements reveal the truth of how M as'ud viewed
his uncle; that is, with contempt and mistrust. But to Yusuf himself, the amir would
write kind and affectionate letters, falsely addressing him as, “the exalted Amir, uncle
Yusuf, the father of Ya'qub and the son of Nasir al-DIn.”65
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This pretense of affection by the intriguer met with a similar one from the vic
tim himself. Yusuf would also feign affection towards Mas'ud, writing letters as well
as sending him presents of choice fruits like pomegranates, Persian oranges, and sugar
cane. The mention of these fruits is especially comical, considering that Mas'ud was a
glutton, who could never resist the temptation of food.66 So, it is as though Yusuf, who
must have known about his nephew’s weakness, was fooling Mas'ud like a child by giv
ing him food.
This lying match between the two finally came to an end, with the amir writing his
uncle from Balkh that, “ . . . [you] should leave Qusdar soon, in order to reach Ghazna
along with us, and your rights will, of course, be recognized.”67 One can only interpret
this statement ironically, considering all the scheming and plotting by Mas'ud. The amir
would not recognize any rights for Yusuf, but take away the ones he already had.
Bayhaqi then gives the account of the capture. Yusuf had arrived earlier in Ghazna.
So, when Mas'ud was getting close to the capital, he went to welcome the amir in the
desert close to Ghazna. And it was there that Yusuf was captured. Both M as'ud and
Yusuf masked their true sentiments in meeting each other, with the former appearing
warm and affectionate, and the latter pretending to be genuinely loyal. Bayhaqi says,
“Amir Yusuf dismounted and kissed the ground.. . . and amir Mas'ud asked after him
very warmly [and] with boundless [enthusiasm] . . . , and [as they] rode together, [the
Sultan] would [only] speak to him.”68
Yusuf had gone to welcome M as'ud at night. And by the time the two reached
the camp, it was daytime. At this point, Mas'ud turned to his confidant ‘Abdus and said,
“My uncle has travelled [very] light. Ask [them] to set up a tent [for him] . . . right here
. . . so [he] will be close to us.”69 Thus, servants raised tents and brought out trays full
of drinks and food. And it was then that Yusuf realized what lay ahead. Bayhaqi says, “I
was looking from my own divan, [Yusuf] was not touching any [of the food or drinks],
having sensed something of the abomination [makruh] that [was about to] occur.”70 It is
as though Bayhaqi, in writing about the intrigue later, was remembering his own realiza
tion about the one made by the victim.
Once the servants removed the trays and the courtiers dispersed, M as'ud had Yusuf
captured. The author writes, ‘“Abdus would come and go [between their tents], and
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[they] would l i s t . . . [Yusuf’s] treasons.”71 The intrigue had already succeeded. But
here was M as'ud attempting to prove that he was right to have ordered it. Yusuf was in
M as'ud’s clutches and there was no chance of rebellion, given that only fifty ghulams
had accompanied him on this trip.72 Yet there was a need for justification, this in order
to continue with the appearance, the lie, that the king was fair and just. Therefore, the
amir spoke of treasons by Yusuf.
Bayhaqi ends the arrest scene with ominous words by Yusuf to his betrayer Tugh
ril, saying, “Be happy [you] ingrate! Did [I] raise you and treat you more lovingly than
[my] children for this? So, [you] would do this to me with the intrigue that [you took
part in]? [You] will get what [you] deserve!”73 After this, they put Yusuf on a mount
and took him to the fortress of Sagavand. Bayhaqi states, “And after that [I] did not see
him.”74
The author then narrates the story of Tughril. First is the account of how Yusuf
fell in love with this ghulam. Tughril had been a gift from one of the Qarakhanid noble
women to Mahmud. One day amir Mahmud had given a wine party in the Firuzl garden,
where cupbearers would enter in groups of two. Bayhaqi writes, “This Tughril entered,
wearing a ruby-colored robe, with his partner [wearing] a turqoise . . . [one]. . . Wine
had overtaken [daryaftah bud] amir Yusuf. [So when] he glanced a t . . . [Tughril],. . .
[Yusuf] fell in love.”75 The verb daryaftan, to overtake or overpower, intimates intrigue,
with both wine and love as intriguers and Yusuf as their victim. For Yusuf lost his power
against them both. One had overtaken him and the other would soon cost him his life.76
This love was costly for Yusuf even in this wine party, where Mahmud became an
gry at his brother for staring at his ghulam. But amir Mahmud finally gave Tughril to his
brother, saying, “ . . [I] will give you this ghulam . . . but remember not to make a mis
take like this next time . . . ”77 Yusuf helped Tughril rise in the court, giving him the po
sition of hajibl, and even choosing him a wife from a renowned family.
Bayhaqi then points to the irony of Yusuf’s fateful end, saying, " . . . [I] have al
ready mentioned the punishment [jaza] and suffering [mukafat] of that noble [prince].”78
Irony arises due to the incongruity between the portrayal of Yusuf as a kind patron, and
the use of words like jaza and mukafat, in the mention of what happened to him. One as-
135
sociates these words with wrongdoing, which Yusuf suffered, as though, in consequence
of his kindness and love for Tughril.
Bayhaqi closes the narrative with the fateful end that Tughril suffered. The author
states, “After the arrest of his Lord [Yusuf], [Tughril] received favors and some kind of
a rank from sultan Mas'ud. Yet both by him and most everyone, Tughril was regarded
with contem pt. . . fate [adbar] laid [its hands on] him and [he] died young, his days
[spent] unhappily . . . this is the outcome of ungratefulness.”79 Thus, the gain of wealth
and rank cost Tughril his reputation, his friends, and eventually, his life. By ending the
narrative with a truth about ingratitude, Bayhaqi evokes surprise and fear in his readers.
The surprise is due to the shift of focus from the victim to one of the intriguers, and the
less powerful one at that. It is as though the intrigue story has mostly demonstrated that
an ingrate suffers misfortunes just as much, if not more, than his patron turned victim.
And the fear is that one might become the object of such suffering oneself, if not mindful
of this truth.
SubashI, ‘All Dayah, Bigtughdl
The last intrigue by Mas'ud was against three of his military commanders who had
unsuccessfully fought against the Saljuqs. The three courtiers who participated in this
plot were Bu ‘All Kutval, Suri, and Bu al-Hasan ‘Abd al-Jalll.80 M as'ud left shortly af
ter the plot against the three commanders for India, fearing an enemy attack on his capi
tal. And he was soon killed in the fortress of Girl in the year 432/1040-1041.81
The amir was angry at these men, whom he blamed for the Dandanqan defeat.
And with the loss of revenues from Khurasan, he unleashed his greed on the wealth of
his courtiers, men like SubashI, ‘All Dayah, and Bigtughdl.82 As for the other intriguers
who helped M as'ud in this instance, it is understandable that in the past they might have
begrudged these military commanders their wealth and status in the court. But with the
Dandanqan defeat and the perception that these men were partly, if not wholly, respon
sible for it, there was very little cause for envy. Considering these new realities of the
court, envy on the part of the intriguing courtiers seems absurd and even comical.
M as'ud and his co-conspirators intrigued against SubashI, ‘All Dayah, and Big
tughdl in the fortress of Ghazna. The fortress keeper Bu ‘All had hosted a wine party
136
on the previous night. So the amir and his courtiers had remained in the fortress. After
holding court the next day, M as'ud told everyone, “Do not disperse because [Bu ‘All]
Kutval has prepared something today as well.”83 Indeed, Bu ‘AIT had prepared some
thing, given that he was one of the intriguers.
The three unsuspecting victims were then led to different rooms, where they
waited, supposedly, to be called to the feast. Bayhaqi writes, “And when they had seated
[nishandah amad] [these three men], the foot soldiers, [army] leaders, and the hajiban
. . . left at once to plunder these men’s houses . . . , as planned on [the previous] night
”84 jjjg use Qf {fog verb nishandan, meaning to seat or to arrest, creates irony. For
in the case of these three men, both these meanings are appropriate. They were seated
down in these rooms by M as'ud’s people, not knowing at the time that they would soon
be arrested, just as they were waiting for a non-existent feast.
This is the only story of intrigue where one views Bayhaqi as a participating wit
ness. M as'ud sent Bayhaqi along with Surl to SubashI and ‘All Dayah with messages
of arrest and his reasons for this decision. The messengers to the other victim were the
physician Bu al-‘Ala and ‘Abd al-Jalll. The author says, “The Amir told me, ‘ . . . listen
to [the message] and its reply ,. . . [we] have chosen you as the informant [mushrif]
. . . ’ ”85 So, Surl was conveying the message of arrest, while Bayhaqi was spying on
him.
First the two went to see SubashI. Bayhaqi says, “His belt keeper Hasan was
with him, and when [SubashI] saw Surl, he turned yellow and did not say anything
. . . [but he] spoke kindly to me and I sat down.”86 Here was Surl, the former gover
nor of Khurasan in the company of a low ranking chancery scribe like Bayhaqi. But
the commander SubashI was showing respect and regard for the latter, while ignoring
Surl. It is as though without anyone mentioning it, SubashI sensed that Surl was partly
to be blamed for his coming arrest. But a low ranking scribe like Bui Fazl could be of no
threat to anyone. Therefore, the commander asked Bayhaqi what the message was, when
it was really Surl who was the messenger.
Bayhaqi then says, “Surl took out a long list from inside his robe, in the hand
writing of Bu al-Hasan [‘Abd al-Jalll], [who had] written Subashl’s treasons [khlyanat]
one by one, from the day [they] sent him to fight the Turkmens in Khurasan til this time
137
when the Dandanqan misfortune occurred.”87 Even at this late stage, when Khurasan
had already been lost and the Ghaznavid government weakened both politically and eco
nomically, M as'ud still seems to have had a need for justifying his intrigues, perhaps at
this point more than ever. He could no longer claim to be the powerful ruler of a king
dom he had mostly lost. Therefore, it was even more important, at least, to appear as fair
and just.
In reply to the accusations against him, SubashI defended himself, saying, " . . . at
that time when [I] came to Ghaznln from Herat, the Lord accepted that all the allega
tions . . . [made against me] had been false, and the king [himself] said, ‘[I] will disre
gard [this matter], since it has been a lie [durugh].’ . . . ”88 SubashI further defended
himself against the charge that he had acted disloyalty in Dandanqan, mentioning his
advice against the battle.89 Bayhaqi then reports that Surl spoke to the commander
harshly. And when Surl left the room with Bayhaqi, the former asked, “Did [I] do any
thing wrong in conveying the message,” to which the scribe replied, “[You] did not.”90
The image of Surl is comical. First he spoke to SubashI harshly, as though to
demonstrate his own power, as opposed to the latter’s weakness. But once Surl had left
the room with Bayhaqi, it seems that he feared the scribe would tell on him, saying that
he had overstepped the bounds of his authority as a messenger. And thus, Surl was ask
ing for reassurances from Bayhaqi.
After this, the two went to see ‘All Dayah. He also asked Bayhaqi what the mes
sage was. And again, Surl took out another long list of accusations. Bayhaqi says,
“Surl started reading another long list to him.”91 In reply to these accusations, ‘All
Dayah charged ‘Abd al-Jalll and Surl with treason, saying, “This is [your] doing.”92
‘All Dayah then asked that Bayhaqi carry a message to M as'ud about Surl, that, “ . . .
Khurasan was lost because of this Surl. Indeed, do not let him lay [his] hands on
Ghazna.”93
As Surl and Bayhaqi were returning, the former asked the scribe not to give Mas
'ud this last message. But Bayhaqi refused, saying, “[I] cannot act disloyalty.”94 Yet
he promised that he would convey the message privately, rather than in front of other
courtiers. Again, it was Surl entreating Bayhaqi, the high official seeming weakened in
front of the lowly scribe. Irony arises as a result of this reversal in their viewed status.
138
Also, Surl had gone to the victims to convey the messages of arrest, which one could
characterize as his political coup against them. But the victims had then said damag
ing things about him, causing Surl to fear for his own safety. It is as though his political
coup seemed no longer certain. There was even a symbolic victory against Surl, consid
ering his lowered status in front of Bayhaqi.
When the scribe returned with Surl to where Mas'ud was, the messengers to Big
tughdl had also come back, his reply having been that, “ . . . [he] has no desire for life,
given that [he can no longer] see or walk, or [use his] hands [much].”95 This is ironic.
Bigtughdl had been one of the intriguers in the plot against Aryaruq. In the story of that
intrigue, Bayhaqi mentions that the Turkish ghulams of Aryaruq and GhazI had made fun
of Bigtughdl, calling him, “blind and lame.”96 Yet at this point, when he had become
the victim of a plot himself, Bigtughdl was using “their” terms in describing himself.
The day after these arrests Mas'ud did not hold court. His people were busy
counting the possessions of the victims, whose houses and treasures had been plundered.
Bayhaqi states, “[They] were not finding anything belonging to SubashI, since [they
had] ransacked [his house] twice [before]. But [they] were finding a lot [of wealth that]
belonged to ‘All [Dayah] and Bigtughdl.”97 The cruel reality of plunder dictated that
M as'ud not hold court on that day. For, the essence of court life was the pretense of ci
vility, especially by the amir, which ran contrary to the harshness he had sanctioned.
The story ends with one of the only two instances in which one witnesses Bayhaqi
as an intriguer98 On this day, he took the message of ‘All Dayah to Mas'ud. And with
instructions from the latter, Bayhaqi lied to Surl about the meeting. After he had heard
what ‘All Dayah had said about Surl, M as'ud stated, “[I] know. This is the truth.”99 But
when Surl later asked Bayhaqi, he replied, “The Amir said, ‘Those in adversity say a lot
of nonsense.’ ” 100
The outcome of the intrigues against these five military commanders were losses
to the state. Some of their ghulams later joined the Saljuqs, and on the battlefield in
Dandanqan they encouraged yet others to desert M as'ud.101 But in this government,
greed and anger on the part of the amir and envy on the part of his courtiers usually over
ruled wisdom (khirad). And thus, they all lost in the end, as their victims had done ear
lier.
139
Notes to Chapter V
I For the importance of the themes of wine and hunt, see articles by Ehsan Yarshater and William L. Hanaway, Jr. Yarshater, “The theme of wine-drinking and the concept of the beloved in early Persian poetry,” Studia Islamica, XIII, 1961, pp. 43-53. Hanaway, “The concept of the hunt in Persian literature,” Bulletin of the Boston Museum of Fine Art, LXIX, nos., 355 and 356, 1971, pp. 21 -34
2BayhaqI The History, p. 282.
3ibid., pp. 282-283.
4ibid., p. 283.
5ibid„ pp. 283-284.
6ibid„ p. 283.
7ibid., p. 284.
8ibid., p. 285.
9ibid.
10ibid., p. 286.
II ibid.
12ibid., p. 287.
13ibid.
14ibid., p. 288.
15ibid.
16ibid.
17ibid.
18ibid„ p. 289.
19ibid.
20ibid„ p. 290.
140
21 ibid.
22ibid.
23ibid.
24ibid., p. 291.
25ibid., p. 416.
26ibid., p. 291.
27ibid.
28ibid„ pp. 291-292.
29ibid., p. 292.
30ibid.
3'ibid.
32ibid.
33ibid., p. 293.
34ibid.
35ibid.
36ibid.
37ibid.
3 8 ibid.
39ibid., p. 294.
40ibid.
4 'ibid.
42ibid., pp. 294-295.
43ibid„ p. 295.
141
44ibid., Bayhaqi foreshadows the future murder of Aryaruq in the statement, “ . . . his story came to an end and [I] will mention the end of his affairs and his murder in its place.”
45ibid., pp. 296-297.
46ibid.
47ibid., p. 297.
48ibid.
49ibid., p. 298.
50FasIh KhvafI and HamadanI name ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf as the courtiers who arrested Muhammad in Taglnabad (KhvafI, 148; HamadanI, 161-163). Husaynl RazI and the author of Tarlkh-i alfl mistakenly report Yusuf and ‘All Qarlb, instead of their sons, to have been the allies of Muhammad’s son Ahmad in killing his uncle Mas‘ud (Husaynl, 496- 498; Alfl, 914-917). Also see footnote 1, chapter II.
51 Bayhaqi, op.cit., p. 322.
52ibid.
53ibid., p. 323.
54ibid.
55ibid.
56ibid.
57ibid., p. 324.
58ibid., p. 325.
59ibid.
60ibid., pp. 325-326.
61 ibid., p. 326.
62ibid.
63ibid.
142
64ibid.
65ibid„ p. 327.
66BayhaqI speaks of the love M as'ud had for food, both in his childhood and later on in life. The author relates that in the later part of his rulership, Mas'ud became so heavy that only elephants could carry him while he hunted, ibid., pp. 134, 151, 334, 530.
67ibid„ p. 327.
68ibid„ pp. 327-328.
69ibid„ p. 328.
70ibid.
7’ibid.
72ibid., p. 327.
73ibid., p. 329.
74ibid.
75ibid., p. 330.
76BayhaqT mentions that Yusuf died one year after this arrest, ibid., p. 329.
77ibid„ p. 330.
78ibid., p. 331.
79ibid.
80For a treatment of the courtier Bu ‘All Kutval, see chapter II, footnote 41. Bayhaqi mentions Bu al-Hasan ‘Abd al-Jalll in many instances in The History. He was one of the officials who travelled to India in order to seize Aryaruq’s wealth in that country, p. 296. At the end of his campaign in Gurgan in the year 426/1034-1035, the amir appointed ‘Abd al-Jalll as the advisor/adjudant of the troops left in that province, pp. 609, 616. But Mas'ud then called back the courtier in the next year, p. 647. Bayhaqi mentions ‘Abd al-Jalll’s advice after the battle of Talkhab, that Mas'ud should have chased after the Saljuqs, to have been wise. But it met with the anger of the commander-in-chief and the amir’s apathy, p. 763. ‘Abd al-Jalll attempted to persuade Mas'ud to seize the possessions of Bu Nasr Mushkan, just at the time of the latter’s death, which the amir did not, p. 791. And after Bu Nasr had died, Mas‘ud reproached ‘Abd al-Jalll for his earlier advice, p. 799. Later in the year 431/1039-1040, he became the ra’is of Nishapur,
143
p. 814. ‘Abd al-Jalll was present in the scene of battle in Dandanqan, though earlier he had advised M as‘ud against going to Marv, pp. 819, 835. BayhaqI also intimates that ‘Abd al-Jalll was unskilled in scribal matters. It seems that in one occasion when the courtier had written an official letter, M as‘Gd had chuckled and then asked BayhaqI to rewrite it. Thus, he and the amir had silently made fun of ‘Abd al-Jalll, p. 844. After the Dandanqan defeat, ‘Abd al-Jalll, along with other courtiers, tried to dissuade M as'ud to leave for India. But the amir had become angry and said that they could remain behind and serve in the court, if the Saljuqs did come, p. 899.
Surl was the governor of Khurasan at the time of Mas‘ud, p. 348. BayhaqI mentions him as an oppressive governor who plundered the wealth of Khurasan, sending it to the court of Mas'Od, pp. 359, 530, 531-533. He also took part in an intrigue against the tax collector of Pushang, named Tahir. Tahir died as a result of this intrigue, p. 561. BayhaqI also mentions Surl in relation to the Saljuqs. The Turkmen Saljuqs first wrote to Surl, in asking Mas‘ud for grant of territories in Khurasan, pp. 611-612. But later in a pretense of humility towards Mas'ud, though they had already won the 426/1034-1035 battle, they blamed SOrl for not having presented their request well, thus causing the battle, p. 638. Another mention of Surl is in relation to the 429/1037-1038 battle of Subashl. M as'ud regarded Subashl with suspicion, accusing him of not obeying orders and not fighting hard against the Saljuqs. But Subashl defended himself to the amir, before following his orders and losing to the Saljuqs, by mentioning that Surl and other officials had earlier advised against fighting the Saljuqs in a pitched battle, p. 707. After this unsuccessful battle, Surl had to flee Nishapur and later wrote M as‘ud, reassuring him that that the revenues of Khurasan were safely kept in a fortress, pp. 721-722, 725-727. M as'ud took Surl to the battle of Dandanqan, saying, “ . . . this man should not fall in the hands of enemies, since [he] will make [the whole] world revolt against me,” p. 816.
81 For a discussion about the sources on M as‘ud’s killing, see chapter I, footnote 21.
82SubashI unsuccessfully fought the Saljuqs in the year 429/1037-1038. BayhaqI describes this defeat in detail. The commander also fought in the battle of Talkhab in the year 430/1038-1039, pp. 706-708, 717-719, 758 (other sources that mention this battle, Husaynl, 6-12; Alfl, 891-908; JuzjanI, 249). Ibn Funduq tells a story about Subashl who was a contemporary with his grandfather living in Nishapur. One day they brought news of Turkmen aggressions to the commander. And he ordered the troops to prepare and took along a prayer with him to the battle scene. Before leaving, Ibn Funduq mentions, Subashl asked Ibn Funduq’s grandfather to pray for the troops. But when he left, the religious elder told people, “The sun of this government has set,” p. 274, Tarlkh-i Bayhaq. Ibn Funduq speaks of Subashl as having had 100,000 horsemen and 200 elephants in Khurasan in the year 428/1036-1037, p. 273.
‘All Dayah fought in the Talkhab battle as well, p. 758. Fayyaz records his first name as ‘All ‘Abd Allah in the index, p. 998.
Faslh KhvafI speaks of an allegiance between ‘All Qarlb and Bigtughdl after Mahmud’s death. They alleged to remain allies and protect the court until the resolution of the
144
succession conflict, p. 148. The author of Tarlkh-i STstan speaks of a leader named Bigtughdl as having received the amirate in Sajistan on the fifteenth of Muharram of 422/12th of January of 1030, p. 363. Bigtughdl suffered the first defeat at the hands of the Saljuqs in the year 426/1034-1035, pp. 625-631 (other sources, JuzjanI, 248-249; Firishtah, 392-393, Alfi, 893-895, Muqlm Haravl, 280). BayhaqI only mentions Bigtughdl by name on the battle scene at Dandanqan, also pointing out that he felt slighted by M as‘0d on the night before this decisive battle. Apparently, M as‘ud spoke to his colonels, but not to the commander himself, p. 829.
The arrest of these three leaders is mentioned also by two later Indian historians (Firishtah, 396-397, Muqlm Haravl, 283-285).
83BayhaqI, op.cit., p. 873.
84ibid.
85ibid., p. 874.
86ibid.
87ibid.
88ibid„ p. 875.
89ibid., p. 818. It seems that most of M as'ud’s courtiers advised him against fighting the Saljuqs in Dandanqan.
90ibid., p. 875.
9’ibid.
92ibid„ p. 876.
93ibid.
94ibid.
95ibid.
96ibid., p. 285.
97ibid„ p. 876.
98The other instance relates to BayhaqI’s flight from the scene of battle in Dandanqan, ibid., p. 839.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have studied Tarlkh-i BayhaqI from a rhetorical perspec
tive, using the trope of irony. I have epitomized The History in terms of intrigue and
characterized BayhaqI as an ironist. This study deals with those stories of intrigue in
The History where BayhaqI disapproves of this mode of behavior. The plots of intrigue
discussed here were against military leaders in the court of Mas‘ud.
The imprisonment and exile of these men played a role in the final Ghaznavid
defeat to the Saljuqs. These plots made other courtiers fearful and demoralized, and
also resulted in the loss of the victims’ ghulams. Some of these ghulams deserted to
the Saljuqs. And they fought in the battle of Dandanqan on the ninth of Ramadan of
431/thirtieth of May of 1040, where they asked their comrades in M as'ud’s army to join
them. The Ghaznavids lost Khurasan on this day, and Mas'ud retreated to India the year
after this. He was soon killed by his ghulams.
The loss of Khurasan was devastating to men like BayhaqI. These men had been
born and raised on its soil and they belonged to its scribal class. It was they who were
preserving many of the traditions of Khurasan. And Tarlkh-i BayhaqI is a remembrance
of their past.
For men like BayhaqI and his master Bu Nasr Mushkan the loss of this land meant
the loss of a home which had given them their identity. They had been trained in Khura
san. And they would hand down its scribal traditions, which they had inherited from
their masters to those coming after them. In Tarlkh-i BayhaqI these men appear as hav
ing been most visibly affected over the loss of Khurasan, men like Bu Nasr, who early on
predicted this loss.1 They assessed the realities of M as‘ud’s court with discernment and
sound judgement. The king was much too fond of food and wine to do what had to be
done; that is, protect his kingdom. Instead, he would eat, drink, and hunt. Indeed, later
146
147
on in life, Mas'ud became so heavy due to overeating that he could not ride on horses
while hunting. So he would hunt lions while sitting on the backs of elephants.2
It was the privileges of being a ruler that Mas'ud liked, but not its military duties,
like the protection of Khurasan. In other words, he enjoyed having the appearances that
adorned the life of a Perso-Islamic ruler, but wished to be left alone when it came to the
realities a ruler had to face. Men like Bu Nasr, Ahmad Hasan MaymandT, and Ahmad
Abd al-Samad realized this. They would say what they could so as to motivate Mas'ud
into action. But he would either, first agree and not follow through with decisions to
fight the Saljuqs, or not listen to their advice in the first place.
But there was one kind of advice, tadblr, to which Mas'ud would always listen.
He always listened to advice about plots against his military commanders. And this was
another reality over which men like Bu Nasr despaired. They advised the amir against
these intrigues. And Mas'ud would lie that he agreed with them, while later, he would
follow through with these plots,
One can epitomize the history of M as'ud’s rule in terms of intrigues, lies, in the
court, and the reality of the Saljuqs’ aggressions in Khurasan. These aggressions met
with inaction by the amir in the first part of his rule. And in the second part, when the
Ghaznavid troops did take the field, they were unsuccessful in withstanding the nomadic
Saljuqs.
The lies at court and the truths relating to the loss of Khurasan are enshrined in
the pages of Tarlkh-i BayhaqI. The lies, the intrigues, relate to the events that BayhaqI
witnessed or in which he took part. And the truths are associated with the scribe’s ironic
viewing of what led to the loss of Khurasan. BayhaqI interpreted the events at M as'ud’s
court with the perspective of this loss. And it was this hindsight that threw an ironic light
on these events. It is as though as an old man, he was leaving behind the truth about
what he had experienced, by relating the significance of earlier events.
Being an old man, BayhaqI did not have the anxieties that one suffers in youth.
Thus, it was to the past that he turned, as we all do in old age. And in the past of Mas
'ud’s time and those of other rulers like Kasra Anushlrvan, he sought the meaning of
events. The ironic meanings that arise in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI are closely associated with
this search for meaning. And they are best epitomized in BayhaqTs stance of eternity.
148
Therefore, it is Time, zamanah or ruzigar, that becomes the supreme ironist.3 And the
most significant conflict or disharmony which leads to an ironic meaning is the one exist
ing between life and death.
BayhaqI looked at the lives of his contemporaries, most of whom had died, with
a continual reminder of death. The ironic meaning that arises is in viewing the conflict
between the futility of one’s efforts in the face of death. Therefore, Time enjoys the last
laugh while hopes are vanquished, works undone, joys and sorrows brought to an end,
and lies and truths unveiled.
BayhaqI’s eternal stance leads to a close association of irony with truth. It is as
though in viewing matters ironically, one sees how things really are. In contrast, in
trigues always bespeak of lies. So an ironist like BayhaqI might relate matters that are
false, but then he intimates his ironic attitude towards them, by implying contrasting
truths. It is only through studying Tarlkh-i BayhaqI with attention to his ironic attitude
that one can gain an understanding of his thought.
BayhaqI drew lessons from others’ lives and that of his own, from remembering
the lies they had told and the good deeds they had done. Tarikh-i BayhaqI is a record of
these lessons, it is the scribe’s letter to those who would come after him. There is one
lesson or truth that epitomizes BayhaqT’s worldview. It is his advice (andarz) that one
should be kind and gentle towards others. For all that remains from a person’s life is a
name (nam), and it is only through acts of kindness and gentleness that one leaves be
hind a good name (nam-i nlk).
Yet this does not mean that BayhaqI advises an earnest and trusting attitude to
wards others. On the contrary, if intrigue (hllah) might result in a good outcome, like
saving a man’s life, one should resort to it.4 BayhaqI even approves of intrigue when it
might effect a worldly good such as a high position, but only if this will not mean harm
to others. Therefore, not all lies are wrong, considering the good outcomes that some
might have. Yet ultimately, wisdom (khirad) is associated with the knowledge that this
world is a Lie (dunya-yi farlbandah), in contrast to the world of Truth that will come
next.5
149
The life that one has lived, with all its lies and truths, determines the rewards and
punishments that one will receive. The most valuable reward in this world is a good
name, and the one in the next world is salvation.
I have studied the use of intrigue in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI within the framework of the
loss of Khurasan. The use of intrigue in The History as a whole and a deeper under
standing of BayhaqI as an ironist requires a much more in-depth study. This dissertation
is the stepping stone for this larger project, where I will discuss Tarlkh-i BayhaqI within
the pre-classical tradition of Persian prose (4th—5th/1 Oth— 11th).
Hllah also appears in other works of this period. It also seems to have been a
mode of behavior within the medieval Islamic tradition of thought.6 Thus, a deeper un
derstanding of hllah requires that one place BayhaqI as a thinker both within the Iranian
and the Islamic traditions to which he belonged. I will continue to study the use of in
trigue and irony in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI as a whole, within these two traditions.
150
Notes to Chapter VI
’Before the first Ghaznavid defeat, Bu Nasr told his protege, “Bui Fazl! Khurasan is lost!” And before the Ghaznavids unsuccessfully fought the Saljuqs again in 429/1037- 1038, the chief secretary sorrowfully stated, “[I] wish [I] were dead so [I] would not have to see these things,” BayhaqI, pp. 610 and 710.
2ibid., p. 151.
3Stephen Fairbanks refers to the concept of ruzgar in his dissertation on the Saljuq bu- reacracy, The Tarlkh al-vuzara’: a History of the Saljuq Bureacracy (The University of Michigan Dissertation: 1977).
4BayhaqI tells two stories in detail about the use of intrigue when the good outcome is the saving of a man’s life, pp. 197-212 and 213-221. Lazard has discussed the Hasiri story in an article, mainly relating what the story is about, “Un memorialiste persan du XIe si&cles: BeyhaqI,” Etudes de civilization medievale (IXe-XIIe sikcles) melanges offerts h Edmond-Ren6 Labande & l’occassion de son ddpart h la retraite et du XXe anniversaire du C.E.S.C.M. (Poitiers: n.d.).
5See the sermons in The History, pp. 66-68, 308-310, 234-246, 448, 480-497, 795-802.Also see footnote 143 in Chapter II.
6 Among the pre-classical works of Persian prose consulted are, Tarjumah-yi tafslr-i Tabari, Hudud al-‘alam min al-mashriq il al-maghrib, Hidayat al-muti'allimln fi al-tibb, Ahval va aqval-i Shaykh Abu al-Hasan KharqanI: aqval-i ahl-i tasavvuf darbarah-yi u bi zamlmah-yi muntakhab-i Nur al-‘ulum, Tarlkh-i Bal‘aml: takallumah va tarjumah-yi Tarlkh-i Tabari, see bibliography for complete citations. Also see the article on hlyal byJ. Schacht, in El, II, (1971), pp. 510-513. J
152
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