An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – … What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis 1 An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – miklos.rosta@uni-corvinus.hu
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What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis1
An introductory essay
Miklós Rosta – miklos.rosta@uni-corvinus.hu
Corvinus University of Budapest
April, 2011
Introduction
In this current study I’m offering a recommendation for the development of a model
that could provide us with an answer to the following question: which factors influence the
successful introduction of the reforms related to the New Public Management (NPM)
movement? The question is relevant, since the East-Central European countries have just
embarked on transforming their public administrations according to the NPM during the past
years.
The introduction of the management techniques associated with the New Public
Management movement has been on the agenda since the 80s in the developed capitalist
countries. Numerous developed capitalist democracies have been successfully utilizing these
techniques, although in certain countries they only rhetorically connected to the NPM, still the
depth and the width of the reforms exhibit significant differences even in the case of the
Western European countries.2 (Goldfinch - Wallis [2009]), (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg
[2007]) While in the case of the developed countries the literature reports numerous
successes, for the countries of the periphery the introduction of the NPM instruments in most
cases ended with failure.3 It is not surprising that the experts are discouraging developing
1 The preparation of this paper was supported by the TÁMOP 4.2.1. framework-contract, in the research project called „ Knowledge based economy in Hungary, the conditions of the strengthening the motivation to innovate and increasing the R+D performance”. The author thanks Prof. Dr. András Blahó, Prof. Dr. Prof. Balázs Hámori, Prof. Dr. Katalin Szabó and Dr. László Tóth and Zsolt Horváth for their helpful suggestions and comments on the draft of the paper. 2 The scientific literature of the NPM is characterized by the hegemony of authors with an Anglo-Saxon focus, who have decisively analyzed and considered as exemplary the practices of the Anglo-Saxon countries. It follows that they consider numerous NPM reforms taking place in continental Europe as unsuccessful, since they differ from the “ideal-typical” versions. 3 Many studies have been published about the results of the attempted reforms taking place in the developing countries. See, for instance: about the environmental reasons for failures of the developing countries: (Polidano [1999]) study, or about the NPM reforms of the public administration of the African countries, see: (Balogun
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countries from applying NPM. (Lapsley [2009]), (Williams [2000]), (Hughes [2008]),
(Dunleavy – Margetts – Bastow – Tinkler [2005]) In reality, the question is: what caused that
certain states have been successful, while other countries had failed to transform their public
administration in accordance with the NPM guidelines?
Some of those studies detailing the failures of NPM reforms stem from the bias of the
authors: professionals who question the achievements of the movement think of it as if it had
a well defined system of objectives, and that there are normatively described paths and
instruments helping to obtain these objectives. However, in reality this is not the case. The
beauty of the NPM is exactly that the movement means more of an approach with which the
efficiency of public administration can be increased. According to (Pollitt – van Thiel –
Homburg [2007], p. 2.), the NPM is nothing else than a shopping center, where the
governments and the experts of countries can select management instruments closest to their
taste4. The question is for who, what and when it is practical to “purchase”, and how should
the “purchased” instruments be mixed, so that the results would turn out favorably. According
to the model described in the current study, this fundamentally depends on the environment,
on the institutional system.
In this study I introduce an institutional model that – according to my hypothesis – is
able to answer the question of why the NPM movement is successful in certain countries and
why it is most of the time unsuccessful in others. The model could provide an answer to the
question of what institutional factors the success of the introduction of the NPM reform
depends on, and also what are the reasons behind the failed attempts of the past. If with the
help of the model we can identify those factors, which determine the success of the
introduction of the NPM techniques, then it would enable us to provide recommendations on
those groups of management instruments, which could be introduced successfully in a given
[2003]). The NPM reform of South Africa has been analyzed extensively in the literature. (Cameron [2009]) published an interesting paper about this. Finally, there is an illuminating paper about the transformation of the local public administration system in Malawi: (Tambulasi [2009]). The Public Management Review had dealt with the relationship between the developing countries and the NPM in an entire issue (Volume 3, Issue 3 of 2001). 4 „From this point of view, therefore, variation might be explained as ‘selective shopping’ from a varied and
somewhat contradictory shop (the NPM).” (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg [2007], p. 2.)
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country. Also, we could call attention to those NPM techniques that in an event of being
introduced could even lead to opposite results to the objectives.5
Briefly about the New Public Management
The New Public Management, or as it is found in numerous studies the “new
managerilism”, has evolved as a reform movement and as a scientific school during the late
1970s and early 1980s primarily in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Hood [1991]), (Barzelay
[2001]). The movement has set out on its conquering path with the prime ministerial term of
Margaret Thatcher commencing in 1979 and with the presidential term of Ronald Reagan
commencing in 1980, so the initial steps can be linked to the conservative, neo-liberal
economic movement (Mascarenhas [1993], p. 319.); (Deakin – Walsh [1996]); (Pollitt
[1993]).6
The main objective of the scientific and political movement associated with the new
NPM was to transform the traditional public administration in order to develop a more
efficient, more adaptive and because of that a more effective operation. According to the
supporters of the NPM, market coordination – in the decisive majority of the cases – is more
capable of an effective allocation than bureaucratic coordination.
5 The recommended model has numerous limits. Because of the difficulties associated with data collection and modeling, and also the methodological weaknesses of the statistical instruments in economics, the model employs significant simplifications. The author is aware of that besides the application of the modeling technique the preparation of case studies is indispensible for answering the above questions. The preparation of case studies is a good complement to the statistical analysis, because it requires another type of scientific approach. Because of the volume restrictions I dispense with the detailed introduction of the weaknesses of the described model. Now, I just call attention to the fact that the model can only provide theoretical recommendations on the certain techniques related to the NPM movement (for instance, the introduction of PPP or performance-based wages), since currently we do not have sufficient amount of data to prepare an analysis that could ensure a valid assessment. Therefore, we can only forecast the success on the aggregate level and not on the levels of the given techniques. 6 “The New Right” and neo-liberalism as a school of economic policy has been standing in the crossfire during the past years. See, for instance: (Stilwell [2009]) paper, in which he interprets the numerous problems of the global economy as the effect of The New Right, namely the neoliberal economic policy. For details on neo-liberalism and on the neoliberal state, see: (Harvey [2005]). About Margaret Thatcher’s prime ministerial performance, I recommend to the interested Reader two chapters of (Evans [2001], pp. 53-78.). However, some authors do not link the NPM to the new right and to the neoconservative – neoliberal economic policy. For more details on the theoretical background of the NPM in economics, see: (Gruening [2001]).
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„Thus co-ordination may be achieved by hierarchy, network or market (Kaufmann,
Majone and Ostrom, 1986; Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell, 1991). The
main thrust of NPM reforms has been, de facto, that market and network forms of co-
ordination – especially market forms – should wherever possible be substituted for
hierarchical co-ordination.” (Pollitt - Bouckaert [2000], p. 80.)7
It follows that according to the advocates of the NPM, the reduction in government
spending and the raising of the quality standards of public services can be achieved through
the strengthening of market coordination and competition. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the
advocates of the NPM wished to actualize these abstract ideas into practice through
suggesting a stronger presence of market coordination in the organizations of the public
sphere, while putting special emphasis on the stronger application of the management
techniques of actors of the private sphere. The acceptance of the primacy of market
coordination, and at the same time the demand for the rolling back of bureaucratic
coordination in the field of public services, signals that the foundations of NPM in economics
is linked to Hayek and Mises – namely to the new Austrian school – and to “a rage of
influential new right thinkers” (Dunleavy [1986], p. 15.) namely to the representatives of
public choice theory, so among others to Buchanan, Tullock, Betton and Niskanen.8
Aside from formulating abstract objectives, the advocates of the NPM had diversified
expectations and they attempted to actualize these through a diversified toolkit. According to
(Hood [1991], p. 3.) the NPM can be linked to four “administrative megatrends”:
“(i) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public
spending and staffing (Dunsire and Hood 1989);
(ii) the shift toward privatization and quasi-privatization and away from core
government institutions, with renewed emphasis on 'subsidiarity' in service provision
(cf. Hood and Schuppert 1988; Dunleavy 1989).
7 According to (Pollitt – Bouckart [2000], pp. 93-94.), countries most committed to market coordination are: United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and in some cases Finland and Sweden. The authors call this group of countries: “marketizers”. 8 We can read an intriguing analysis of Mises’ and Niskanen’s bureaucracy theory in: (Carnis [2009]). (Larbi [1999]) and (Gruening [2001]) provide an excellent overview of the political economic basis of the NPM. The foundations of public choice theories and their link to the NPM and to the privatizational processes associated with that are summarized by (Dunleavy [1986]) and (Cuervo – Villalonga [2000]).
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(iii) the development of automation, particularly in information technology, in the
production and distribution of public services; and
(iv) the development of a more international agenda, increasingly focused on general
issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and intergovernmental
cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual country specialisms in public
administration.” (Hood [1991], p. 3.)
During the realization of the aforementioned objectives by Hood, the countries of the
centre applied various management techniques, which are summarized by (Schedler – Proeller
[2002], p. 165.) in the following table.
Table 1.
Generic element categories of NPM
Category Characteristics / objectives Examples Organizational restructuring Delegation of responsibility
Reduction of hierarchy Political and managerial roles
City managers Holding structure
Management instruments Output orientation Entrepreneurship Efficiency
Performance agreements Products Performance-related pay
Budgetary reforms Closer to private sector financial instruments
Cost accounting Balance sheet Profit and loss statements
Participation Involvement of the citizen Neighbourhood councils E-democracy
Customer orientation Quality management
Gain legitimacy in service delivery Re-engineering
One-stop shop Service level agreements E-government
Marketization Privatization
Reduction of public sector Efficiency gains through competition
Contracting out Public – private partnerships
Source: Based on Schedler – Proeller ([2002], p. 165.)9
9 As we can see the formulations of (Hood [1991]) and (Schedler – Proeller [2002]) do not entirely match. This is no accident, since both in practice and in theory there had been significant changes taking place during the 11 years that set apart the births of the two pieces. However, the early works of Hood up until today have been the starting-points of the works dealing with the NPM. (Hood [1991]), (Dunleavy - Hood [1994]), (Hood [1995]).
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The “classic” version of the NPM has been introduced primarily in the Anglo-Saxon
countries: United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, United States of America and Canada.
(Pollitt – Bouckaert [2000]) In continental Europe it was the Netherlands that applied first and
most penetratingly the NPM instruments.10 (Hemerijck - Huiskamp - de Boer [2002]), (Pollitt
– van Thiel – Homburg [2007])
The Scandinavian countries were also open to the application of the NPM instruments;
however, they did not aim to simply copy the instruments that had been successfully
implemented in the Anglo-Saxon countries, rather they employed these management
techniques tailored to their own institutional environments. (Green-Pedersen [2002]), (Lotz
[2006]), (Goldfinch – Wallis [2009]) The objectives were fundamentally the same: they
wished to create a more effective and more efficient public administration, but for this they
significantly altered the previous toolkit of the NPM, they instituted something else and doing
it differently than the Anglo-Saxon countries. The emphasis has shifted from the reduction of
the role of the state to the encouragement of citizen participation, to the inclusion of the
citizens into the decisions pertaining to public affairs and into their executions. The other
Western European counties – France (Cole – Jones [2005]), (Wollmann [2008]) Germany
(Reichard [2003]), (Wollmann [2000]), Italy (Ongaro [2009]), Spain (Barzelay – Gallego
[2010]), (Ongaro [2009]) – have also adapted the NPM toolkit with more or less success,
which means that they have tailored the Anglo-Saxon institutional innovations to their own
informal and formal institutional environments.11
10 Three chapters of the book of (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg [2007]) also analyze the differences between the British and the Dutch reforms: (van Thiel – Pollitt [2007], pp. 52-70.) introduces the differences in the governance of the executive agencies, (Klijn – Edelenbos – Hughes [2007], pp. 71-89.) compare the PPP co-operations, while (Pollitt [2007], pp. 149-164.) examines the differences in the performance indicator systems employed by hospitals. 11 The reforms significantly differed in their depth and width (Bouckaert et al. [2009]). Certain countries, for instance Austria and Denmark, had employed the NPM instruments moderately and only in certain fields. On Denmark for instance see the paper of (Greve [2006]), which introduces the realized NPM reforms in the Danish central public administration, or see the working paper of (Blom-Hansen – Christiansen – Fimreite – Selle [2009]), in which the authors analyze the reform experience of the regional public administration in Denmark and Norway. On Austria, see: the writing of (Promberger – Rauskala – Cecon [2004]) and (Hammarschmid – Meyer [2005]). In the particular countries the reforms took place on various levels of public administration and they affected various fields, so while in France the reforms were carried out on the levels of the central public administration, in Germany the reforms effected mainly the local governments. (Hoffmann-Martinot – Wollmann [2006]).
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The model
The subject of the current study can be only studied through an interdisciplinary
approach. I rely on the findings of economics, especially on the findings of the new
institutional school (North [1990])12, (Williamson [1998]) on the findings of sociology,
primarily on the findings of economic sociology (Granovetter [1990]) and (Nee [2003]), and
the findings on cultural analyses (Hofstede [2008]).
I share (Kornai [1999]) point of view, according to which social processes cannot be
understood by static models, only a historical review can provide adequate information for
understanding the process. The model described in this current study is still static, because of
methodological reasons. However, with improvements it can be made dynamic. During the
development of the model, I set out from (Williamson [1998]) and (Williamson [2000])
works, which position the changes of the specific institutional levels in time, stating that the
informal institutions in the long run (102 and 103 years), the formal institutions in the medium-
term (10 and 102 years) are unchanged, while changes to the factors linked to the government
is possible even in the short run (1 and 10 years).13
12 Other works by Douglass North that are considered as the foundations of the new institutional economics: (North [1984]), (North [1991]). 13 However, for the collection of the data for the model I did not consider the various Williamsonian time frames. The reason is that for a model based on Williamson’s approach it would have been enough to collect data for the informal and formal institutions at a single point of time, for the year of 1980. Still, I did not do that, because the proxy variables linked the informal and formal institutions in my opinion do not have those characteristics that the informal and formal institutions, they change even in the short run.
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Figure 1.
The Economics of Institutions
Source: (Williamson [2000], p. 597.)
Level Frequency Purpose
Embeddedness:
informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms
religion
L1
L2
L3
L4
Institutional environment:
formal rules of the game – esp. property (polity,
judiciary, bureaucracy)
Governance:
play of the game – esp. Contract (aligning
governance structures with transactions)
Resource allocation and employment (prices and
quantities; incentive alignment)
102 to 103
10 to 102
1 to 10
continuous
Often noncalculative; spontaneous […]
Get the institutional environment right.
1st order economizing
Get the governance structures right.
2nd order economizing
Get the marginal conditions right.
3rd order economizing
L3: transaction cost economics
L 4: neoclassical economics / agency theory
L 1: social theory
L 2: economics of property rights / positive
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The first level in Figure 1. contains those factors, which – according to our hypothesis
– fundamentally influence the successful introduction of the NPM reforms. These factors are
often simply considered by the new institutional economists as givens. According to
(Williamson [1998]) those rules belong to here, which might even be unconsciously followed
by the members of the society. (North [1991], p. 97.) has called this block as informal
institutions, and he has included in this category social norms, traditions and customs. In this
block of our model we also employ the concept of culture in terms of Hofstede’s
understanding, since as (Hofstede [2008], p. 35.) writes:
“The culture practically consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.”
According to (North [1991]) the informal institutions have a decisive influence on the
economic process, the explanation of which is primarily attributed to (Granovetter [1990]),
who has contributed to the understanding of the influence of the informal institutions with the
introduction of the concept of embeddedness.14
The second level contains those formal rules that have been termed as formal
institutions by (North [1984]): the system of property rights, the constitution and laws. These
are the formal rules of the game, which gain form and become significant in the social sphere
created by the informal institutions. (North [1984], p. 8.) characterizes the relationship
between the informal and the formal institutions as the following:
„We may say that institutions consist of a set of constraints on behavior in the form of
rules and regulations; a set of procedures to detect deviations from the rules and
regulations; and, finally, a set of moral, ethical behavioral norms which define the
contours and that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are specified
and enforcement is carried out.”(North [1984], p. 8.)
The regulating power of the formal institutions can differ from culture to culture; in
certain societies it is stronger, while in others it is weaker. The contribution of the formal
institutions to regulate the social processes (as formal rules of the game) depends
14 The new institutional school has been dealing with the concept of institutions in details, see: (North [1990]), (Williamson [2000]), (Hodgson [2006]), (Aoki [2005]).
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fundamentally on the informal institutions. There are numerous questions left open in regards
to these relationships and mechanisms, in any case based on research findings it is
unequivocal that these processes are historically determined.15 (Greif – Tabellini [2010]),
(Greif [2006]) The changing of the formal rules of the game is also a slow process, which –
according to (Williamson [1998]) – take place primarily as a result of external factors: civil
wars, economic crises, foreign occupation, collapse of political systems.
For the third and the forth factors, namely for the change of governance and resource
allocation, we can bring up examples even from our own lives. These levels apply to the
current functioning of the system inside the framework marked out by the informal and
formal institutional levels. While the first two levels regulate the content of the actors’
actions, means that the emphasis is on the question what, on these levels the emphasis is on
the question of how. The answer given to the question of how significantly influences the
efficiency of the system, since the regulation of the coordination mechanisms, the
determination of the ratio of the market and bureaucratic coordination take place on these
levels. However, this regulation can neither go against social norms and values in the long
run, nor formal institutional regulations. While the third level refers to governance activity,
the fourth level calls attention to the neoclassical microeconomic foundations of market
coordination. At this level, (Williamson [1998]) determines the criteria for the establishment
of the market equilibrium, which refers to the coordination of prices and quantities. I consider
it important to note that it could appear to the superficial observer that certain government
interventions or some charismatic leader can change the culture of the society in the short run.
In relation to this, it worth to quote the ideas of (Hofstede [2008], pp. 38-43.), according to
whom culture is like an onion. At its core we can find those social values, which are
immensely tenacious, so they barely change over time and at a given time can be considered
as unchangeable. The outer layers of the onion consisting of rituals, heroes, symbols –
collectively termed “practices” by Hofstede – are changes more easily and more often through
time. Even though many politicians claim that they are capable of changing them, even the
practices that provide the outer layer of the cultural values cannot be easily changed during
one political cycle. However, it is a fact that temporarily as a result of a current decision,
certain symbols can increase in strength, their use can become more frequent, but this does
not mean the culture and the values of society are altered.
15 About the difference between the informal and the formal institutions, see: (Redmond [2005])
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When combining the cultural concept of (Hofstede [2008]) with (Williamson [1998])
institutional economics, we need to keep in mind that “embeddedness” is considered by
Williamson as the first level, while it means the most inner core of Hofstede’s cultural onion,
namely the values. (Hofstede [2008], p. 43.) make a distinction between the various levels of
culture: national level; regional, ethnic, religious, lingual affiliation level; gender level;
generation level; social class level; and in the case of employees the organizational level.
Hofstede assigns the national, the gender and the cultural levels to the first level of
Williamson’s model.
The uniqueness of the NPM reforms stems from that changes generated by them
designate cultural changes. The undeclared aim of the NPM movement is the attitude change
in the public sphere, namely the alteration of the organizational culture of the public sector.16
However, the organizational structure can be changed even in the short run, and this is not
only stated by Hofstede, but by experts of change management and proven by successful
practical examples. It follows that the organizational culture is not located in the first level of
the Williamson’s model, more like it is connected on the third level.17
The described model, based on which I wish to examine the possibility of a successful
introduction of the NPM reforms, is quite simple, static, all together it contains two
explanatory and one result blocks. Because of simplification, I do not indicate separately the
interaction between the various blocks in Figure 2., since the main direction of causality
according to my hypothesis is unequivocally goes from block 1. through 2 to the explanatory
variable. All this, however, does not mean that during the statistical analysis we would not
shed light on the interactions; it only means that during the depiction of the model I consider
it sufficient to highlight the main cause and effect relationships.18
16 (Shein [1983], 1-2. old) define organizational culture as: “the pattern of basic assumptions which a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” 17 Here, I would like to refer to (Luhmann [2006]) social system theory, according to which a social system is predominantly defined by its environment. This current study examines exactly that whether the bureaucratic public administration – which we can consider as one independent system – can be changed successfully by the influence of an external reform, if the reform does not fit into the environment of the system, which I define here as the shell surrounding the system. (Luhmann [2006], p. 38.] in fact has a more radical assertion: “…a system is the difference between system and environment”. 18 When constructing the model, I was inspired by (Kornai [1993], pp. 380-388.) explanatory theory of the workings of socialism and by the model linked to that.
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Fig
ure
2.
The
cau
sali
ty b
etw
een
the
dete
rmin
ing
fact
ors
of th
e su
cces
sful
intr
oduc
tion
of
the
NP
M
The
aut
hor’
s ow
n di
agra
m
Inform
al institutions
Info
rmal
rul
es o
f th
e ga
me
(nor
ms,
trad
ition
s, h
abit
s)
(Nor
th [
1990
]) a
nd (
Wil
liam
son
[199
8])
Em
bedd
edne
ss
(Gra
nove
tter
[19
90])
, (W
illia
mso
n [1
998]
) an
d (N
ee [
2003
])
Nat
iona
l val
ues
in th
e H
ofst
edei
an s
ense
(H
ofst
ede
[200
8])
Form
al Institutions
For
mal
rul
es o
f th
e ga
me
(con
stit
utio
n, la
ws)
, (N
orth
[19
90])
and
(W
illia
mso
n [1
998]
)
The probability of
the successful
introduction of the
NPM technique
13
In the course of the analysis I have processed data from 31 countries in order to be
able to draw relevant conclusions. Besides 27 European countries I have included Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United State of America. I have complemented the database of
the European countries with the Anglo-Saxon countries, because the NPM reform movement
had developed the earliest and it transformed the public sphere at the most depth and width in
these countries. After reviewing the literature, we can conclude that so far nearly 60 countries
have attempted to introduce the NPM reforms, with significantly differing results.19 All this is
important, because if the model fulfills our hopes, then the database can be further extended,
and by doing so, the reliability of the regression analysis can be further strengthened.
The datasets of the model for the each country come from different time frames, since
the various countries joined the NPM reforms waves at different times. I have set three time
periods for the countries under examination. In the case of the first wave, the beginning of the
NPM reforms is dated back to about the early 1980s. During this period mostly the Anglo-
Saxon countries were the forerunners of the NPM movement, it were the USA, Australia, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand together with the only continental European country of the
Netherlands, who had introduced the reforms. In the case of these countries, I have filled the
model with data from the 1980s and I labeled them as innovators, since it is unequivocal that
the instruments and the underlying approach of the NPM movement had been worked out and
lifted into the public discourse by the experts and politicians of these countries. The next
group – in which the developed Western European countries belong to –, had adopted the
NPM reforms during the 1990s. These countries were labeled as adaptors, since they have not
only schematically instituted the Anglo-Saxon versions of the NPM reforms, but they have
tailored them to their own institutional environment.20 In the case of the adaptor countries I
used data from the 1990s. Finally I analyzed the Central-Eastern- European countries, which I
labeled as imitators.21 They had mostly got to the level of development necessary for the
19 After reviewing the literature, I have found studies about the NPM reforms of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 20 I have included the following countries into the group of adaptors: Finland, Sweden, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Switzerland, Spain. 21 I have included the following countries into the group of imitators: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Croatia.
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implementation of the NPM methodology during the beginning of the new millennium. In
order to catch up the Central-Eastern-European countries are forced to implement the reforms
in a rush, primarily because the public is dissatisfied with pace of development, and also
because the European Union is also expecting imitation instead of adaptation from them. In
the case of the imitators I have worked with the data for year 2000. The logic behind the
various time periods is that the cause must precede the effect. It follows that for instance in
the case of the reform introduced in 1984, we cannot work with the data of the World Value
Survey from 2000; we can only use data from before 1984.
In summary, in the briefly introduced model I searched for an answer to the question
of: what reform should a given country undertake, if we consider its institutional environment
and its historical traditions, or in other words, if we know the country’s characteristic informal
institutions (Block 1.) and the formal institutions (Block 2.).
15
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7. Cameron, R. [2009]: New Public Management Reforms in the South African Public
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University of Cape Town, Department of Political Studies, 28th of April, 2009.
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11. Deakin, N – Walsh, K. [1996]: The enabling state: The role of markets and contracts.
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14. Dunleavy, P. [1986]: Explaining the privatization boom: public choice versus radical
approaches. Public Administration, Vol. 64., No. 1, pp. 13-34.
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21
Pro
xy-v
aria
bles
Info
rmal
inst
itut
ions
The name of the
proxy-variable
Source
Period
Question
A16
5.-
Mos
t pe
ople
can
be
trus
ted
Gen
eral
ly s
peak
ing,
wou
ld y
ou s
ay th
at m
ost p
eopl
e ca
n be
trus
ted
or th
at y
ou
can'
t be
too
care
ful i
n de
alin
g w
ith
peop
le?
E08
5.-
Con
fide
nce:
Ju
stic
e S
yste
m
Ple
ase
look
at t
his
card
and
tell
me,
for
eac
h it
em li
sted
, how
muc
h co
nfid
ence
yo
u ha
ve in
them
, is
it a
gre
at d
eal,
quit
e a
lot,
not v
ery
muc
h or
non
e at
all
?
E07
6.-
Con
fide
nce:
T
he C
ivil
Ser
vice
s P
leas
e lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd a
nd te
ll m
e, f
or e
ach
item
list
ed, h
ow m
uch
conf
iden
ce
you
have
in th
em, i
s it
a g
reat
dea
l, qu
ite
a lo
t, no
t ver
y m
uch
or n
one
at a
ll?
Trust
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E07
5.-
Con
fide
nce:
P
arli
amen
t P
leas
e lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd a
nd te
ll m
e, f
or e
ach
item
list
ed, h
ow m
uch
conf
iden
ce
you
have
in th
em, i
s it
a g
reat
dea
l, qu
ite
a lo
t, no
t ver
y m
uch
or n
one
at a
ll
A00
8.-
Fee
ling
of
happ
ines
s T
akin
g al
l thi
ngs
toge
ther
, wou
ld y
ou s
ay y
ou a
re…
A17
0.-
Sat
isfa
ctio
n w
ith
your
life
A
ll th
ings
con
side
red,
how
sat
isfi
ed a
re y
ou w
ith
your
life
as
a w
hole
thes
e da
ys?
Optimistic /
Pessimistic -
Happy / Sad
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
C00
6.-
Sat
isfa
ctio
n w
ith
fina
ncia
l si
tuat
ion
of
hous
ehol
d
How
sat
isfi
ed a
re y
ou w
ith
the
fina
ncia
l sit
uati
on o
f yo
ur h
ouse
hold
?
22
C03
3.-
Job
sati
sfac
tion
O
vera
ll, h
ow s
atis
fied
or
diss
atis
fied
are
you
wit
h yo
ur jo
b?
C05
9.-
Fai
rnes
s:
One
sec
reta
ry is
pa
id m
ore
Imag
ine
two
secr
etar
ies,
of
the
sam
e ag
e, d
oing
pra
ctic
ally
the
sam
e jo
b. O
ne
find
s ou
t tha
t the
oth
er e
arns
$50
a w
eek
mor
e th
an s
he d
oes.
The
bet
ter
paid
se
cret
ary,
how
ever
, is
quic
ker,
mor
e ef
fici
ent a
nd m
ore
reli
able
at h
er jo
b. I
n yo
ur o
pini
on, i
s it
fai
r or
not
fai
r th
at o
ne s
ecre
tary
is p
aid
mor
e th
an th
e ot
her?
Fairness
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E
035.
- In
com
e eq
uali
ty
Now
I'd
like
you
to te
ll m
e yo
ur v
iew
s on
var
ious
issu
es. H
ow w
ould
you
pla
ce
your
vie
ws
on th
is s
cale
? 1
mea
ns y
ou a
gree
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
ca
n ch
oose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
A)
Inco
mes
sho
uld
be m
ade
mor
e eq
ual
The
re s
houl
d be
gre
ater
ince
ntiv
es f
or in
divi
dual
eff
ort.
A03
5.-
Impo
rtan
t ch
ild
qual
itie
s:
tole
ranc
e an
d re
spec
t for
oth
er
peop
le
Her
e is
a li
st o
f qu
alit
ies
whi
ch c
hild
ren
can
be e
ncou
rage
d to
lear
n at
hom
e.
Whi
ch, i
f an
y, d
o yo
u co
nsid
er to
be
espe
cial
ly im
port
ant?
Ple
ase
choo
se u
p to
fi
ve.
A12
5.-
Nei
ghbo
urs:
Peo
ple
of a
dif
fere
nt r
ace
On
this
list
are
var
ious
gro
ups
of p
eopl
e. C
ould
you
ple
ase
sort
out
any
that
yo
u w
ould
not
like
to h
ave
as n
eigh
bour
s?
A12
9.-
Nei
ghbo
urs:
Im
mig
rant
s/fo
reig
n w
orke
rs
On
this
list
are
var
ious
gro
ups
of p
eopl
e. C
ould
you
ple
ase
sort
out
any
that
yo
u w
ould
not
like
to h
ave
as n
eigh
bour
s?
Tolerance
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
F11
8.-
Just
ifia
ble:
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
23
hom
osex
uali
ty
card
. Hom
osex
uali
ty.
F12
0.-
Just
ifia
ble:
ab
orti
on
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Abo
rtio
n.
E00
3.-
Aim
s of
re
spon
dent
: fir
st
choi
ce
If y
ou h
ad to
cho
ose,
whi
ch o
ne o
f th
e th
ings
on
this
car
d w
ould
you
say
is
mos
t im
port
ant?
Mai
ntai
ning
ord
er in
the
nati
on; G
ivin
g pe
ople
mor
e to
say
in
impo
rtan
t;go
vern
men
t dec
isio
ns; F
ight
ing
risi
ng p
rice
s; P
rote
ctin
g fr
eedo
m o
f sp
eech
The role of the
state
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E
037.
- G
over
nmen
t re
spon
sibi
lity
Now
I'd
like
you
to te
ll m
e yo
ur v
iew
s on
var
ious
issu
es. H
ow w
ould
you
pla
ce
your
vie
ws
on th
is s
cale
? 1
mea
ns y
ou a
gree
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
ca
n ch
oose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
Ind
ivid
uals
sho
uld
take
mor
e re
spon
sibi
lity
pro
vidi
ng f
or th
emse
lves
- T
he s
tate
sho
uld
take
mor
e re
spon
sibi
lity
to e
nsur
e th
at e
very
one
is p
rovi
ded
for.
E03
6.-
Pri
vate
vs
stat
e ow
ners
hip
of
busi
ness
Now
I'd
like
you
to te
ll m
e yo
ur v
iew
s on
var
ious
issu
es. H
ow w
ould
you
pla
ce
your
vie
ws
on th
is s
cale
? 1
mea
ns y
ou a
gree
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
ca
n ch
oose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
Pri
vate
ow
ners
hip
of b
usin
ess
and
indu
stry
sh
ould
be
incr
ease
d -
Gov
ernm
ent o
wne
rshi
p of
bus
ines
s an
d in
dust
ry s
houl
d be
incr
ease
d
Bureaucratic
coordination /
market
coordination
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E03
9.-
Com
peti
tion
go
od o
r ha
rmfu
l
Now
I'd
like
you
to te
ll m
e yo
ur v
iew
s on
var
ious
issu
es. H
ow w
ould
you
pla
ce
your
vie
ws
on th
is s
cale
? 1
mea
ns y
ou a
gree
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
ca
n ch
oose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
Com
peti
tion
is g
ood.
It s
tim
ulat
es p
eopl
e to
wor
k ha
rd a
nd d
evel
op n
ew id
eas.
- C
ompe
titi
on is
har
mfu
l. It
bri
ngs
out t
he
wor
st in
peo
ple
24
C06
0.-
How
bu
sine
ss a
nd
indu
stry
sho
uld
be
man
aged
The
re is
a lo
t of
disc
ussi
on a
bout
how
bus
ines
s an
d in
dust
ry s
houl
d be
m
anag
ed. W
hich
of
thes
e fo
ur s
tate
men
ts c
omes
clo
sest
to y
our
opin
ion?
A02
9.-
Impo
rtan
t ch
ild
qual
itie
s:
inde
pend
ence
Her
e is
a li
st o
f qu
alit
ies
whi
ch c
hild
ren
can
be e
ncou
rage
d to
lear
n at
hom
e.
Whi
ch, i
f an
y, d
o yo
u co
nsid
er to
be
espe
cial
ly im
port
ant?
Ple
ase
choo
se u
p to
fi
ve.
A04
2.-
Impo
rtan
t ch
ild
qual
itie
s:
obed
ienc
e
Her
e is
a li
st o
f qu
alit
ies
whi
ch c
hild
ren
can
be e
ncou
rage
d to
lear
n at
hom
e.
Whi
ch, i
f an
y, d
o yo
u co
nsid
er to
be
espe
cial
ly im
port
ant?
Ple
ase
choo
se u
p to
fi
ve.
C06
1.-
Fol
low
ing
inst
ruct
ions
at w
ork
Peo
ple
have
dif
fere
nt id
eas
abou
t fol
low
ing
inst
ruct
ions
at w
ork.
Som
e sa
y th
at
one
shou
ld f
ollo
w in
stru
ctio
ns o
f on
e's
supe
rior
s ev
en w
hen
one
does
not
ful
ly
agre
e w
ith
them
. Oth
ers
say
that
one
sho
uld
foll
ow o
ne's
sup
erio
r's in
stru
ctio
ns
only
whe
n on
e is
con
vinc
ed th
at th
ey a
re r
ight
. Wit
h w
hich
of
thes
e tw
o op
inio
ns d
o yo
u ag
ree?
Obedience (Power
distance)
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E01
8.-
Fut
ure
chan
ges:
Gre
ater
re
spec
t for
au
thor
ity
Her
e is
a li
st o
f va
riou
s ch
ange
s in
our
way
of
life
that
mig
ht t
ake
plac
e in
the
near
fut
ure.
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
one
, if
it w
ere
to h
appe
n w
heth
er y
ou th
ink
it w
ould
be
a go
od th
ing,
a b
ad th
ing,
or
don'
t you
min
d?
Taking
responsibility / not
taking
responsibility
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
A03
2.-
Impo
rtan
t ch
ild
qual
itie
s:
feel
ing
of
resp
onsi
bili
ty
Her
e is
a li
st o
f qu
alit
ies
whi
ch c
hild
ren
can
be e
ncou
rage
d to
lear
n at
hom
e.
Whi
ch, i
f an
y, d
o yo
u co
nsid
er to
be
espe
cial
ly im
port
ant?
Ple
ase
choo
se u
p to
fi
ve.
25
A17
3.-
How
muc
h fr
eedo
m o
f ch
oice
an
d co
ntro
l
Som
e pe
ople
fee
l the
y ha
ve c
ompl
etel
y fr
ee c
hoic
e an
d co
ntro
l ove
r th
eir
live
s,
and
othe
r pe
ople
fee
l tha
t wha
t the
y do
has
no
real
eff
ect o
n w
hat h
appe
ns to
th
em. P
leas
e us
e th
e sc
ale
to in
dica
te h
ow m
uch
free
dom
of
choi
ce a
nd c
ontr
ol
you
feel
you
hav
e ov
er th
e w
ay y
our
life
turn
s ou
t. External factors /
internal factors
determinate the
life
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
C
034.
- F
reed
om
deci
sion
taki
ng in
jo
b
How
fre
e ar
e yo
u to
mak
e de
cisi
ons
in y
our
job?
Ple
ase
use
this
car
d to
in
dica
te h
ow m
uch
deci
sion
-mak
ing
free
dom
you
fee
l you
hav
e.
E01
7.-
Fut
ure
chan
ges:
Mor
e em
phas
is o
n in
divi
dual
Individualistic /
Collectivistic
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E
032.
- F
reed
om o
r eq
uali
ty
Whi
ch o
f th
ese
two
stat
emen
ts c
omes
clo
sest
to y
our
own
opin
ion?
A. I
fin
d th
at b
oth
free
dom
and
equ
alit
y ar
e im
port
ant.
But
if I
wer
e to
cho
ose
one
or th
e ot
her,
I w
ould
con
side
r pe
rson
al f
reed
om m
ore
impo
rtan
t, th
at is
, eve
ryon
e ca
n li
ve in
fre
edom
and
dev
elop
wit
hout
hin
dera
nce.
B. C
erta
inly
bot
h fr
eedo
m
and
equa
lity
are
impo
rtan
t. B
ut if
I w
ere
to c
hoos
e on
e or
the
othe
r, I
wou
ld
cons
ider
equ
alit
y m
ore
impo
rtan
t, th
at is
, tha
t nob
ody
is u
nder
priv
ileg
ed a
nd
that
soc
ial c
lass
dif
fere
nces
are
not
so
stro
ng.
C01
2.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: n
ot to
o m
uch
pres
sure
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
Risk taking / risk
avoidance
(Uncertainty
avoidance)
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
C
013.
- Im
port
ant
in a
job:
goo
d jo
b se
curi
ty
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
26
E04
5.-
Maj
or
chan
ges
in li
fe
Now
I w
ant t
o as
k yo
u so
me
ques
tion
s ab
out y
our
outl
ook
on li
fe. E
ach
card
I
show
you
has
two
cont
rast
ing
stat
emen
ts o
n it
. Usi
ng th
e sc
ale
list
ed, c
ould
yo
u te
ll m
e w
here
you
wou
ld p
lace
you
r ow
n vi
ew?
1 m
eans
you
agr
ee
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
can
cho
ose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
One
sh
ould
be
caut
ious
abo
ut m
akin
g m
ajor
cha
nges
in li
fe Y
ou w
ill n
ever
ach
ieve
m
uch
unle
ss y
ou a
ct b
oldl
y
E04
6.-
New
and
ol
d id
eas
Now
I w
ant t
o as
k yo
u so
me
ques
tion
s ab
out y
our
outl
ook
on li
fe. E
ach
card
I
show
you
has
two
cont
rast
ing
stat
emen
ts o
n it
. Usi
ng th
e sc
ale
list
ed, c
ould
yo
u te
ll m
e w
here
you
wou
ld p
lace
you
r ow
n vi
ew?
1 m
eans
you
agr
ee
com
plet
ely
wit
h th
e st
atem
ent o
n th
e le
ft, 1
0 m
eans
you
agr
ee c
ompl
etel
y w
ith
the
stat
emen
t on
the
righ
t, or
you
can
cho
ose
any
num
ber
in b
etw
een.
Ide
as
that
hav
e st
ood
the
test
of
tim
e ar
e ge
nera
lly
best
-N
ew id
eas
are
gene
rall
y be
tter
than
old
one
s
C01
2.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: n
ot to
o m
uch
pres
sure
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C01
3.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: g
ood
job
secu
rity
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C01
5.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: g
ood
hour
s
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
Working culture
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
C01
6.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: a
n op
port
unit
y to
use
in
itia
tive
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
27
C01
7.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: g
ener
ous
holi
days
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C01
8.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: th
at y
ou
can
achi
eve
som
ethi
ng
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C01
9.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: a
re
spon
sibl
e jo
b
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C02
0.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: a
job
that
is
inte
rest
ing
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C02
1.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: a
job
that
m
eets
one
´s
abil
itie
s
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C02
4.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: a
use
ful
job
for
soci
ety
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C02
5.-
Impo
rtan
t in
a jo
b: m
eeti
ng
peop
le
Her
e ar
e so
me
aspe
cts
of a
job
that
peo
ple
say
are
impo
rtan
t. P
leas
e lo
ok a
t th
em a
nd te
ll m
e w
hich
one
s yo
u pe
rson
ally
thin
k ar
e im
port
ant i
n a
job?
C06
1.-
Fol
low
ing
inst
ruct
ions
at w
ork
Peo
ple
have
dif
fere
nt id
eas
abou
t fol
low
ing
inst
ruct
ions
at w
ork.
Som
e sa
y th
at
one
shou
ld f
ollo
w in
stru
ctio
ns o
f on
e's
supe
rior
s ev
en w
hen
one
does
not
ful
ly
agre
e w
ith
them
. Oth
ers
say
that
one
sho
uld
foll
ow o
ne's
sup
erio
r's in
stru
ctio
ns
only
whe
n on
e is
con
vinc
ed th
at th
ey a
re r
ight
. Wit
h w
hich
of
thes
e tw
o
28
opin
ions
do
you
agre
e?
Political view (left
- right)
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E03
3.-
Sel
f po
siti
onin
g in
po
liti
cal s
cale
In p
olit
ical
mat
ters
, peo
ple
talk
of
"the
left
" an
d "t
he r
ight
." H
ow w
ould
you
pl
ace
your
vie
ws
on th
is s
cale
, gen
eral
ly s
peak
ing?
D01
8.-
Chi
ld n
eeds
a
hom
e w
ith
fath
er
and
mot
her
If s
omeo
ne s
ays
a ch
ild
need
s a
hom
e w
ith
both
a f
athe
r an
d a
mot
her
to g
row
up
hap
pily
, wou
ld y
ou te
nd to
agr
ee o
r di
sagr
ee?
D01
9.-
A w
oman
ha
s to
hav
e ch
ildr
en to
be
fulf
ille
d
Do
you
thin
k th
at a
wom
an h
as to
hav
e ch
ildr
en in
ord
er to
be
fulf
ille
d or
is
this
not
nec
essa
ry?
D02
2.-
Mar
riag
e is
an
out
-dat
ed
inst
itut
ion
Do
you
agre
e or
dis
agre
e w
ith
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ent?
Mar
riag
e is
an
out-
date
d in
stit
utio
n
Liberal /
Conservative
thinking
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
F12
6.-
Just
ifia
ble:
ta
king
sof
t dru
gs
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Tak
ing
the
drug
mar
ijua
na o
r ha
shis
h.
Religion
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
F02
4.-
Bel
ong
to
reli
giou
s de
nom
inat
ion
Do
you
belo
ng to
a r
elig
ious
den
omin
atio
n?
29
1999
F
034.
- R
elig
ious
pe
rson
In
depe
nden
tly
of w
heth
er y
ou g
o to
chu
rch
or n
ot, w
ould
you
say
you
are
a
reli
giou
s pe
rson
?
F11
4.-
Just
ifia
ble:
cl
aim
ing
gove
rnm
ent
bene
fits
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Cla
imin
g go
vern
men
t ben
efit
s w
hich
you
are
not
ent
itle
d to
F11
5.-
Just
ifia
ble:
av
oidi
ng a
far
e on
pu
blic
tran
spor
t
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Avo
idin
g a
fare
on
publ
ic tr
ansp
ort.
F11
6.-
Just
ifia
ble:
ch
eati
ng o
n ta
xes
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Che
atin
g on
tax
if y
ou h
ave
the
chan
ce.
Rule and norms
breaking
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
F11
7.-
Just
ifia
ble:
so
meo
ne a
ccep
ting
a
brib
e
Ple
ase
tell
me
for
each
of
the
foll
owin
g st
atem
ents
whe
ther
you
thin
k it
can
al
way
s be
just
ifie
d, n
ever
be
just
ifie
d, o
r so
met
hing
in b
etw
een,
usi
ng th
is
card
. Som
eone
acc
epti
ng a
bri
be in
the
cour
se o
f th
eir
duti
es.
Nationalism
s
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y / E
urop
ean
Val
ue S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
G00
6.-
How
pro
ud
of n
atio
nali
ty
How
pro
ud a
re y
ou to
be
…..?
State intervention
in the economy
Inte
rnat
iona
l Soc
ial
Sur
vey
Pro
gram
me
Rol
e of
Gov
ernm
ent
II. 1
990,
Rol
e of
G
over
nmen
t III
. C
uts
in g
over
nmen
t sp
endi
ng
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Cut
s in
30
gove
rnm
ent s
pend
ing
Fin
anci
ng p
roje
cts
to c
reat
e ne
w jo
bs
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Gov
ernm
ent
fina
ncin
g of
pro
ject
s to
cre
ate
new
jobs
Les
s go
vern
men
t re
gula
tion
of
busi
ness
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Les
s go
vern
men
t re
gula
tion
of
busi
ness
Sup
port
indu
stry
to
deve
lop
new
pr
oduc
ts
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Sup
port
for
in
dust
ry to
dev
elop
new
pro
duct
s an
d te
chno
logy
Sup
port
dec
lini
ng
indu
stri
es to
pro
tect
jo
bs
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Sup
port
for
de
clin
ing
indu
stri
es to
pro
tect
jobs
19
96, R
ole
of
Gov
ernm
ent I
V.
2006
Red
ucin
g th
e w
orki
ng w
eek
to
crea
te m
ore
jobs
Her
e ar
e so
me
thin
gs th
e go
vern
men
t mig
ht d
o fo
r th
e ec
onom
y. P
leas
e sh
ow
whi
ch a
ctio
ns y
ou a
re in
fav
our
of a
nd w
hich
you
are
aga
inst
. Red
ucin
g th
e w
orki
ng w
eek
to c
reat
e m
ore
jobs
Pro
vide
a jo
b fo
r ev
eryo
ne
Kee
p pr
ices
une
r co
ntro
l
State
responsibility
Inte
rnat
iona
l Soc
ial
Sur
vey
Pro
gram
me
Rol
e of
Gov
ernm
ent
II. 1
990,
Rol
e of
G
over
nmen
t III
. 19
96, R
ole
of
Gov
ernm
ent I
V.
2006
P
rovi
de h
ealt
h ca
re
for
the
sick
On
the
who
le, d
o yo
u th
ink
it s
houl
d or
sho
uld
not b
e th
e go
vern
men
t's
resp
onsi
bili
ty to
31
Pro
vide
dec
ent
stan
dard
of
livi
ng
for
the
old
Pro
vide
indu
stry
w
ith
the
help
it
need
s to
gro
w
Pro
vide
indu
stry
w
ith
the
help
it
need
s to
gro
w
Red
uce
inco
me
diff
eren
ces
betw
een
rich
and
po
or
Giv
e fi
nanc
ial h
elp
to u
nive
rsit
y st
uden
ts
Pro
vide
dec
ent
hous
ing
for
thos
e w
ho c
an’t
aff
ord
it
Power distance-
index
Individualism
index
Hof
sted
e da
teba
se
Cultures and Organizations 3rd edition 2010
http
://w
ww
.gee
rtho
fste
de.n
l/re
sear
ch--
vsm
/dim
ensi
on-d
ata-
mat
rix.
aspx
32
Masculinity index
Uncertainty
Avoidance index
Long-Term
Orientation index
Indulgence versus
Restraint
Language family
Eur
opea
n C
omm
issi
on
33
Pro
xy-v
aria
ble
For
mal
inst
itut
ions
The name of the proxy-
variable
Source
Period
Question
Belong to labour unions
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y /
Eur
opea
n V
alue
S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
A06
7.-
Bel
ong
to la
bour
uni
ons
Ple
ase
look
car
eful
ly a
t the
fol
low
ing
list
of
volu
ntar
y or
gani
sati
ons
and
acti
viti
es a
nd s
ay…
a)
whi
ch, i
f an
y, d
o yo
u be
long
to?
E02
5.-
Pol
itic
al a
ctio
n: s
igni
ng a
pe
titi
on
Now
I'd
like
you
to lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd. I
'm g
oing
to r
ead
out
som
e di
ffer
ent f
orm
s of
pol
itic
al a
ctio
n th
at p
eopl
e ca
n ta
ke,
and
I'd li
ke y
ou to
tell
me,
for
eac
h on
e, w
heth
er y
ou h
ave
actu
ally
don
e an
y of
thes
e th
ings
, whe
ther
you
mig
ht d
o it
or
wou
ld n
ever
, und
er a
ny c
ircu
mst
ance
s, d
o it
Political participation
Wor
ld V
alue
S
urve
y /
Eur
opea
n V
alue
S
urve
y
WV
S 1
981,
199
0,
1995
, 200
0
EW
S 1
981,
199
0,
1999
E02
6.-
Pol
itic
al a
ctio
n: jo
inin
g in
bo
ycot
ts
Now
I'd
like
you
to lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd. I
'm g
oing
to r
ead
out
som
e di
ffer
ent f
orm
s of
pol
itic
al a
ctio
n th
at p
eopl
e ca
n ta
ke,
and
I'd li
ke y
ou to
tell
me,
for
eac
h on
e, w
heth
er y
ou h
ave
actu
ally
don
e an
y of
thes
e th
ings
, whe
ther
you
mig
ht d
o it
or
wou
ld n
ever
, und
er a
ny c
ircu
mst
ance
s, d
o it
.
34
E02
7.-
Pol
itic
al a
ctio
n: a
tten
ding
la
wfu
l dem
onst
rati
ons
Now
I'd
like
you
to lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd. I
'm g
oing
to r
ead
out
som
e di
ffer
ent f
orm
s of
pol
itic
al a
ctio
n th
at p
eopl
e ca
n ta
ke,
and
I'd li
ke y
ou to
tell
me,
for
eac
h on
e, w
heth
er y
ou h
ave
actu
ally
don
e an
y of
thes
e th
ings
, whe
ther
you
mig
ht d
o it
or
wou
ld n
ever
, und
er a
ny c
ircu
mst
ance
s, d
o it
.
E02
8.-
Pol
itic
al a
ctio
n: jo
inin
g un
offi
cial
str
ikes
Now
I'd
like
you
to lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd. I
'm g
oing
to r
ead
out
som
e di
ffer
ent f
orm
s of
pol
itic
al a
ctio
n th
at p
eopl
e ca
n ta
ke,
and
I'd li
ke y
ou to
tell
me,
for
eac
h on
e, w
heth
er y
ou h
ave
actu
ally
don
e an
y of
thes
e th
ings
, whe
ther
you
mig
ht d
o it
or
wou
ld n
ever
, und
er a
ny c
ircu
mst
ance
s, d
o it
E02
9.-
Pol
itic
al a
ctio
n: o
ccup
ying
bu
ildi
ngs
or f
acto
ries
Now
I'd
like
you
to lo
ok a
t thi
s ca
rd. I
'm g
oing
to r
ead
out
som
e di
ffer
ent f
orm
s of
pol
itic
al a
ctio
n th
at p
eopl
e ca
n ta
ke,
and
I'd li
ke y
ou to
tell
me,
for
eac
h on
e, w
heth
er y
ou h
ave
actu
ally
don
e an
y of
thes
e th
ings
, whe
ther
you
mig
ht d
o it
or
wou
ld n
ever
, und
er a
ny c
ircu
mst
ance
s, d
o it
.
Size of Government
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
(Wor
ld B
ank,
W
orld
D
evel
opm
ent
Indi
cato
rs
(var
ious
issu
es);
1980
, 199
0 an
d 20
00.
Gen
eral
gov
ernm
ent c
onsu
mpt
ion
spen
ding
as
a pe
rcen
tage
of
tota
l co
nsum
ptio
n (I
MF
Int
erna
tion
al
Fin
anci
al S
tati
stic
s) Area 1-A
Data
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is m
easu
red
as g
ener
al g
over
nmen
t co
nsum
ptio
n sp
endi
ng a
s a
perc
enta
ge o
f to
tal c
onsu
mpt
ion.
T
he r
atin
g fo
r th
is c
ompo
nent
is e
qual
to: (
Vm
ax −
Vi)
/ (V
max
− V
min
) m
ulti
plie
d by
10.
The
Vi i
s th
e co
untr
y’s
actu
al g
over
nmen
t con
sum
ptio
n as
a p
ropo
rtio
n of
tota
l co
nsum
ptio
n, w
hile
the
Vm
ax a
nd V
min
wer
e se
t at 4
0 an
d 6,
re
spec
tive
ly. T
he 1
990
data
wer
e us
ed to
der
ive
the
max
imum
an
d m
inim
um v
alue
s fo
r th
is c
ompo
nent
. Cou
ntri
es w
ith
a la
rger
pro
port
ion
of g
over
nmen
t exp
endi
ture
s re
ceiv
ed lo
wer
35
Inte
rnat
iona
l M
onet
ary
Fun
d,
Inte
rnat
iona
l F
inan
cial
S
tati
stic
s (v
ario
us
issu
es);
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
N
atio
nal
Acc
ount
s.)
rati
ngs.
In
cont
rast
, as
the
rati
o ap
proa
ches
the
max
imum
va
lue,
the
rati
o m
oves
tow
ard
zero
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Inte
rnat
iona
l M
onet
ary
Fun
d,
Gov
ernm
ent
Fin
ance
Sta
tist
ics
Yea
rboo
k (v
ario
us y
ears
);
Wor
ld B
ank,
W
orld
D
evel
opm
ent
Indi
cato
rs
(var
ious
issu
es);
In
tern
atio
nal
Mon
etar
y F
und,
In
tern
atio
nal
1980
, 199
0 an
d 20
00.
Tra
nsfe
rs a
nd s
ubsi
dies
as
a pe
rcen
tage
of
GD
P (
IMF
In
tern
atio
nal F
inan
cial
Sta
tist
ics)
Area 1-B
Data
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is m
easu
red
as g
ener
al g
over
nmen
t tra
nsfe
rs
and
subs
idie
s as
a s
hare
of
GD
P. T
he r
atin
g fo
r th
is c
ompo
nent
is
equ
al to
: (V
max
− V
i) /
(Vm
ax −
Vm
in)
mul
tipl
ied
by 1
0.
The
Vi i
s th
e co
untr
y’s
rati
o of
tran
sfer
s an
d su
bsid
ies
to G
DP
, w
hile
the
Vm
ax a
nd V
min
val
ues
are
set a
t 37.
2 an
d 0.
5,
resp
ecti
vely
. The
199
0 da
ta w
ere
used
to d
eriv
e th
e m
axim
um
and
min
imum
val
ues
for
this
com
pone
nt. T
he f
orm
ula
wil
l ge
nera
te lo
wer
rat
ings
for
cou
ntri
es w
ith
larg
er tr
ansf
er
sect
ors.
Whe
n th
e si
ze o
f a
coun
try’
s tr
ansf
er s
ecto
r ap
proa
ches
that
of
the
coun
try
wit
h th
e la
rges
t tra
nsfe
r se
ctor
du
ring
the
1990
ben
chm
ark
year
, the
rat
ing
of th
e co
untr
y w
ill
appr
oach
zer
o.
36
Nat
ions
Nat
iona
l A
ccou
nts
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Inte
rnat
iona
l M
onet
ary
Fun
d,
Gov
ernm
ent
Fin
ance
Sta
tist
ics
Yea
rboo
k (v
ario
us is
sues
);
Wor
ld B
ank,
W
orld
D
evel
opm
ent
Indi
cato
rs
(var
ious
issu
es);
In
tern
atio
nal
Mon
etar
y F
und,
In
tern
atio
nal
Fin
ance
Sta
tist
ics
(var
ious
issu
es);
W
orld
Eco
nom
ic
For
um, G
loba
l C
ompe
titi
vene
ss
Rep
ort (
vari
ous
issu
es);
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
Nat
iona
l A
ccou
nts.
1980
, 199
0 an
d 20
00.
(Sw
itze
rlan
d fr
om th
e ye
ar 2
003;
Est
onia
fr
om th
e ye
ar 2
004;
C
zech
Rep
ubli
c fr
om
the
year
200
3.)
Gov
ernm
ent e
nter
pris
es a
nd
inve
stm
ent (
IMF
, Gov
ernm
ent
Fin
ance
Sta
tist
ics
Yea
rboo
k)
Area 1-C
Data
Dat
a on
the
num
ber,
com
posi
tion
, and
sha
re o
f ou
tput
sup
plie
d by
Sta
te-O
pera
ted
Ent
erpr
ises
(S
OE
s) a
nd g
over
nmen
t in
vest
men
t as
a sh
are
of to
tal i
nves
tmen
t wer
e us
ed to
co
nstr
uct t
he z
ero-
to-1
0 ra
ting
s. C
ount
ries
wit
h m
ore
gove
rnm
ent e
nter
pris
es a
nd g
over
nmen
t inv
estm
ent r
ecei
ved
low
er r
atin
gs. W
hen
ther
e w
ere
few
SO
Es
and
gove
rnm
ent
inve
stm
ent w
as g
ener
ally
less
than
15%
of
tota
l inv
estm
ent,
coun
trie
s w
ere
give
n a
rati
ng o
f 10
. Whe
n th
ere
wer
e fe
w
SO
Es
othe
r th
an th
ose
invo
lved
in in
dust
ries
whe
re e
cono
mie
s of
sca
le r
educ
e th
e ef
fect
iven
ess
of c
ompe
titi
on (
e.g.
, pow
er
gene
rati
on)
and
gove
rnm
ent i
nves
tmen
t was
bet
wee
n 15
% a
nd
20%
of
the
tota
l, co
untr
ies
rece
ived
a r
atin
g of
8. W
hen
ther
e w
ere,
aga
in, f
ew S
OE
s ot
her
than
thos
e in
volv
ed in
ene
rgy
and
othe
r su
ch in
dust
ries
and
gov
ernm
ent i
nves
tmen
t was
bet
wee
n 20
% a
nd 2
5% o
f th
e to
tal,
coun
trie
s w
ere
rate
d at
7. W
hen
SO
Es
wer
e pr
esen
t in
the
ener
gy, t
rans
port
atio
n, a
nd
com
mun
icat
ion
sect
ors
of th
e ec
onom
y an
d go
vern
men
t in
vest
men
t was
bet
wee
n 25
% a
nd 3
0% 0
of th
e to
tal,
coun
trie
s w
ere
assi
gned
a r
atin
g of
6. W
hen
a su
bsta
ntia
l num
ber
of
SO
Es
oper
ated
in m
any
sect
ors,
incl
udin
g m
anuf
actu
ring
, and
go
vern
men
t inv
estm
ent w
as g
ener
ally
bet
wee
n 30
% a
nd 4
0%
of th
e to
tal,
coun
trie
s re
ceiv
ed a
rat
ing
of 4
. Whe
n nu
mer
ous
SO
Es
oper
ated
in m
any
sect
ors,
incl
udin
g re
tail
sal
es, a
nd
gove
rnm
ent i
nves
tmen
t was
bet
wee
n 40
% a
nd 5
0% o
f th
e to
tal,
coun
trie
s w
ere
rate
d at
2. A
rat
ing
of z
ero
was
ass
igne
d w
hen
the
econ
omy
was
dom
inat
ed b
y S
OE
s an
d go
vern
men
t in
vest
men
t exc
eede
d 50
% o
f to
tal i
nves
tmen
t.
37
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld E
cono
mic
F
orum
, Global
Competitiven
ess
Rep
ort
1995
and
200
0.
(Lat
via,
Lit
huan
ia,
Est
onia
, Slo
veni
a,
Rom
ania
, Cro
atia
fr
om th
e ye
ar 2
001.
)
Judi
cial
inde
pend
ence
(G
loba
l C
ompe
titi
vene
ss R
epor
t) Area 2-
A
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is f
rom
the Global Competitiven
ess Rep
ort
’s
surv
ey q
uest
ion:
“Is
the
judi
ciar
y in
you
r co
untr
y in
depe
nden
t fr
om p
olit
ical
infl
uenc
es o
f m
embe
rs o
f go
vern
men
t, ci
tize
ns,
or f
irm
s? N
o—he
avil
y in
flue
nced
(=
1)
or Y
es—
enti
rely
in
depe
nden
t (=
7).
” T
he q
uest
ion’
s w
ordi
ng h
as v
arie
d sl
ight
ly
over
the
year
s. A
ll v
aria
bles
fro
m th
e Global Competitve
ness
Rep
ort w
ere
conv
erte
d fr
om th
e or
igin
al 1
-to-
7 sc
ale
to a
0-t
o-10
sca
le u
sing
this
for
mul
a: EFW
i = (
(GCR
i − 1
) ⁄ 6
) ×
10.
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld E
cono
mic
F
orum
, Global
Competitiven
ess
Rep
ort (
vari
ous
issu
es
1995
and
200
0.
Impa
rtia
l cou
rts
(Glo
bal
Com
peti
tive
ness
Rep
ort)
Area 2-
B
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is f
rom
the Global Competitiven
ess Rep
ort
’s
surv
ey q
uest
ion:
“T
he le
gal f
ram
ewor
k in
you
r co
untr
y fo
r pr
ivat
e bu
sine
sses
to s
ettl
e di
sput
es a
nd c
hall
enge
the
lega
lity
of
gov
ernm
ent a
ctio
ns a
nd/o
r re
gula
tion
s is
inef
fici
ent a
nd
subj
ect t
o m
anip
ulat
ion
(= 1
) or
is e
ffic
ient
and
fol
low
s a
clea
r,
neut
ral p
roce
ss (
= 7
).”
The
que
stio
n’s
wor
ding
has
var
ied
slig
htly
ove
r th
e ye
ars.
v N
ote
The
“R
ule
of L
aw”
rati
ngs
from
th
e W
orld
Ban
k’s Gove
rnance
Indicators P
roje
ct h
ave
been
us
ed to
fil
l in
omit
ted
coun
trie
s in
the
prim
ary
data
sou
rce
sinc
e 19
95.
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld E
cono
mic
F
orum
, Global
Competitiven
ess
Rep
ort (
vari
ous
issu
es)
1995
and
200
0.
(Cro
atia
fro
m th
e ye
ar
2001
.)
Pro
tect
ion
of p
rope
rty
righ
ts
(Glo
bal C
ompe
titi
vene
ss R
epor
t)
Area 2-C
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is f
rom
the Global Competitiven
ess Rep
ort
’s
surv
ey q
uest
ion:
“P
rope
rty
righ
ts, i
nclu
ding
ove
r fi
nanc
ial
asse
ts a
re p
oorl
y de
fine
d an
d no
t pro
tect
ed b
y la
w (
= 1
) or
are
cl
earl
y de
fine
d an
d w
ell p
rote
cted
by
law
(=
7).
”
Rule of Law
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
1995
and
200
0.
Inte
grit
y of
the
lega
l sys
tem
(I
nter
nati
onal
Cou
ntry
Ris
k T
his
com
pone
nt is
bas
ed o
n th
e Intern
ational Country Risk
Guide’
s P
olit
ical
Ris
k C
ompo
nent
I f
or L
aw a
nd O
rder
: “T
wo
38
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
PR
S G
roup
, Intern
ational
Country Risk
Guide
(var
ious
is
sues
)
Gui
de) Area 2-E
m
easu
res
com
pris
ing
one
risk
com
pone
nt. E
ach
sub-
com
pone
nt e
qual
s ha
lf o
f th
e to
tal.
The
‘la
w’
sub-
com
pone
nt
asse
sses
the
stre
ngth
and
impa
rtia
lity
of
the
lega
l sys
tem
, and
th
e ‘o
rder
’ su
b-co
mpo
nent
ass
esse
s po
pula
r ob
serv
ance
of
the
law
.”
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld B
ank,
Doing Business
(var
ious
issu
es)
All
dat
a fr
om th
e ye
ar
2005
.
Leg
al e
nfor
cem
ent o
f co
ntra
cts
(Wor
ld B
ank’
s D
oing
Bus
ines
s)
Area 2-F
Thi
s co
mpo
nent
is b
ased
on
the
Wor
ld B
ank’
s Doing Business
esti
mat
es f
or th
e ti
me
and
mon
ey r
equi
red
to c
olle
ct a
cle
ar-c
ut
debt
. The
deb
t is
assu
med
to e
qual
200
% o
f th
e co
untr
y’s
per-
capi
ta in
com
e w
here
the
plai
ntif
f ha
s co
mpl
ied
wit
h th
e co
ntra
ct a
nd ju
dici
al ju
dgm
ent i
s re
nder
ed in
his
fav
or. Z
ero-
to-1
0 ra
ting
s w
ere
cons
truc
ted
for
(1)
the
tim
e co
st (
mea
sure
d in
num
ber
of c
alen
dar
days
req
uire
d fr
om th
e m
omen
t the
la
wsu
it is
fil
ed u
ntil
pay
men
t) a
nd (
2) th
e m
onet
ary
cost
of
the
case
(m
easu
red
as a
per
cent
age
of th
e de
bt).
The
se tw
o ra
ting
s w
ere
then
ave
rage
d to
arr
ive
at th
e fi
nal r
atin
g fo
r th
is s
ub-
com
pone
nt. T
he f
orm
ula
used
to c
alcu
late
the
zero
-to-
10
rati
ngs
was
: (V
max
− V
i) /
(Vm
ax −
Vm
in)
mul
tipl
ied
by 1
0.
Vi r
epre
sent
s th
e ti
me
or m
oney
cos
t val
ue. T
he v
alue
s fo
r V
max
and
Vm
in w
ere
set a
t 725
day
s an
d 82
.3%
(1.
5 st
anda
rd
devi
atio
ns a
bove
ave
rage
) an
d 62
day
s (1
.5 s
tand
ard
devi
atio
ns
belo
w a
vera
ge)
and
0%, r
espe
ctiv
ely.
Cou
ntri
es w
ith
valu
es
outs
ide
of th
e V
max
and
Vm
in r
ange
rec
eive
d ra
ting
s of
eit
her
zero
or
ten
acco
rdin
gly.
Regulation of Credit, Labor,
and Business
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
1990
and
200
0
Aus
tral
ia,
Net
herl
ands
, New
Z
eala
nd, U
nite
d
Hir
ing
and
firi
ng r
egul
atio
ns
(Glo
bal C
ompe
titi
vene
ss R
epor
t)
Area 5-B(ii)
Thi
s su
b-co
mpo
nent
is b
ased
on
the Global Competitiven
ess
Rep
ort
’s q
uest
ion:
“T
he h
irin
g an
d fi
ring
of
wor
kers
is
impe
ded
by r
egul
atio
ns (
= 1
) or
fle
xibl
y de
term
ined
by
empl
oyer
s (=
7).
” T
he q
uest
ion’
s w
ordi
ng h
as v
arie
d sl
ight
ly
39
Wor
ld B
ank,
Doing Business
(var
ious
issu
es)
Kin
gdom
and
US
A a
re
from
199
0 ov
er th
e ye
ars.
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld B
ank,
Doing Business
(var
ious
issu
es)
1980
, 199
0 an
d 20
00
Cro
atia
is f
rom
200
1.
Cen
tral
ized
col
lect
ive
barg
aini
ng
(Glo
bal C
ompe
titi
vene
ss R
epor
t)
Area 5-B(iii)
Thi
s su
b-co
mpo
nent
is b
ased
on
the Global Competitiven
ess
Rep
ort
’s q
uest
ion:
“W
ages
in y
our
coun
try
are
set b
y a
cent
rali
zed
barg
aini
ng p
roce
ss (
= 1
) or
up
to e
ach
indi
vidu
al
com
pany
(=
7).
” T
he q
uest
ion’
s w
ordi
ng h
as v
arie
d sl
ight
ly
over
the
year
s.
Eco
nom
ic
Fre
edom
of
the
Wor
ld –
Fra
ser
Inst
itut
e
Wor
ld B
ank,
Doing Business
(var
ious
issu
es)
1990
and
200
0
Aus
tral
ia,
Net
herl
ands
, New
Z
eala
nd, U
nite
d K
ingd
om a
nd U
SA
are
fr
om 1
990
Pri
ce c
ontr
ols
(Int
erna
tion
al
Inst
itut
e fo
r M
anag
emen
t D
evel
opm
ent’
s W
orld
C
ompe
titi
vene
ss Y
earb
ook)
Area
5-C
(i)
The
mor
e w
ides
prea
d th
e us
e of
pri
ce c
ontr
ols,
the
low
er th
e ra
ting
. The
sur
vey
data
of
the
Inte
rnat
iona
l Ins
titu
te f
or
Man
agem
ent D
evel
opm
ent’
s (I
MD
) World C
ompetitiven
ess
Yea
rbook
(var
ious
edi
tion
s) w
ere
used
to r
ate
the
46 c
ount
ries
(m
ostl
y de
velo
ped
econ
omie
s) c
over
ed b
y th
is r
epor
t. F
or
othe
r co
untr
ies,
oth
er s
ourc
es w
ere
used
to c
ateg
oriz
e co
untr
ies.
Cou
ntri
es w
ere
give
n a
rati
ng o
f 10
if n
o pr
ice
cont
rols
or
mar
keti
ng b
oard
s w
ere
pres
ent.
Whe
n pr
ice
cont
rols
wer
e li
mit
ed to
indu
stri
es w
here
eco
nom
ies
of s
cale
m
ay r
educ
e th
e ef
fect
iven
ess
of c
ompe
titi
on (
e.g.
, pow
er
gene
rati
on),
a c
ount
ry w
as g
iven
a r
atin
g of
8. W
hen
pric
e co
ntro
ls w
ere
appl
ied
in o
nly
a fe
w o
ther
indu
stri
es, s
uch
as
agri
cult
ure,
a c
ount
ry w
as g
iven
a r
atin
g of
6. W
hen
pric
e co
ntro
ls w
ere
levi
ed o
n en
ergy
, agr
icul
ture
, and
man
y ot
her
stap
le p
rodu
cts
that
are
wid
ely
purc
hase
d by
hou
se-h
olds
, a
rati
ng o
f 4
was
giv
en. W
hen
pric
e co
ntro
ls a
ppli
ed to
a
sign
ific
ant n
umbe
r of
pro
duct
s in
bot
h ag
ricu
ltur
e an
d m
anuf
actu
ring
, the
rat
ing
was
2. A
rat
ing
of z
ero
was
giv
en
whe
n th
ere
was
wid
espr
ead
use
of p
rice
con
trol
s th
roug
hout
40
vari
ous
sect
ors
of th
e ec
onom
y.
The name of the proxy-variable
Source
Coordination Index
Kne
ll, M
. - S
rhol
ec, M
. [20
05]:
Em
ergi
ng V
arie
ties
of
Cap
ital
ism
in C
entr
al a
nd E
aste
rn E
urop
e.
Wor
king
Pap
er. V
ersi
on o
f 19
Sep
tem
ber
2005
, Con
fere
nce
Pai
sley
Uni
vers
ity,
23-
24th
of
Sep
tem
ber,
200
5.
Legal system
Sie
ms,
M. M
. [20
06]:
Leg
al O
rigi
ns: R
econ
cili
ng L
aw &
Fin
ance
and
Com
para
tive
Law
. Cen
tre
for
Bus
ines
s R
esea
rch,
Uni
vers
ity
Of
Cam
brid
ge W
orki
ng P
aper
No.
32.
Uni
vers
ity
of C
ambr
idge
, T
rum
ping
ton
Str
eet,
Cam
brid
ge, C
B2
1AG
Mar
kus
Tep
e, K
arin
Got
tsch
all,
and
Ber
nhar
d K
itte
l [20
10]:
A s
truc
tura
l fit
bet
wee
n st
ates
and
m
arke
ts?
Pub
lic
adm
inis
trat
ion
regi
mes
and
mar
ket e
cono
my
mod
els
in th
e OECD. Socio-
Eco
nomic Rev
iew
Vol
. 8.,
No.
4.,
pp. 6
53-6
84
Min
orit
y go
vern
men
t (si
ngle
par
ty o
r co
alit
ion)
Coa
liti
on
Gre
at-c
oali
tion
Type of government
One
-par
ty in
maj
orit
y
Con
serv
ativ
e
Lib
eral
The political
ideology of the
government at the
beginning of the
given decade
Soc
ial d
emoc
rat
The political
Con
serv
ativ
e
http
://w
ww
.ele
ctio
ns.o
rg.n
z/el
ecti
ons/
syst
em-o
f-go
vern
men
t.htm
l
Eur
opea
n E
lect
ion
Dat
abas
e (h
ttp:
//w
ww
.nsd
.uib
.no/
euro
pean
_ele
ctio
n_da
taba
se/i
ndex
.htm
l)
Lij
phar
t, A
. [19
94]:
Dem
ocra
cies
: For
ms,
per
form
ance
, and
con
stit
utio
nal e
ngin
eeri
ng. E
urop
ean
Jour
nal o
f P
olit
ical
Res
earc
h, V
ol. 2
5., N
o. 1
., pp
. 1-1
7.
ww
w.ip
u.or
g
Fáb
ián,
Gy.
- K
ovác
s, L
. I. [
2004
]: P
arla
men
ti v
álas
ztás
ok a
z E
uróp
ai U
nió
orsz
ágai
ban
(194
5-20
02).
Osi
ris
Kia
dó, B
udap
est
Ber
g, C
. - C
arli
ne, P
. - K
aufm
ann,
B. -
Lei
nen,
J. -
Wal
lis,
D. (
eds.
) [2
008]
: The
Ini
tiat
ive
for
Eur
ope
Han
dboo
k 20
08. T
he G
uide
to tr
ansn
atio
nal d
emoc
racy
in E
urop
e. T
he I
niti
ativ
e &
R
efer
endu
m I
nsti
tute
Eur
ope,
Bru
xell
es
41
Lib
eral
ideology of the
government in the
given decade
(1980/90, 1990/2000,
2000/2010)
Soc
ial d
emoc
rat
Fir
st p
ast t
he p
ost
Tw
o-R
ound
Sys
tem
Lis
t Pro
port
iona
l Rep
rese
ntat
ion
Electoral system
Mix
ed M
embe
r P
ropo
rtio
nal S
yste
m
One
cha
mbe
r Type of parliament
Tw
o ch
ambe
r
Bot
h lo
cal a
nd n
atio
nal
Onl
y lo
cal
Onl
y na
tion
al
Possibilities to hold
a referendum
Not
pos
sibl
e at
any
leve
l
Participation in the election (%) (quality of dem
ocracy)
Percentage of women in Parliament
http
://e
lect
ionr
esou
rces
.org
/
Vat
ter,
A. [
2009
]: L
ijph
art e
xpan
ded:
thre
e di
men
sion
s of
dem
ocra
cy in
adv
ance
d O
EC
D
coun
trie
s? Euro
pea
n Politica
l Scien
ce Rev
iew
, Vol
. 1.,
No.
1.,
pp.1
25–1
54.
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