A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon

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A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon

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1

A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non timber forest products and agro

forestry development in Cameroon

Divine Foundjem TitaJune 18, 2013 ICRAF Yaounde, Cameroon

2

Outline

1. Introduction: problem & research question

2. Theoretical lens and study objectives

3. Method : choice of study sites & products

4. Results

5. Conclusions & policy implications

31.In

trod

uctio

n

Household income

Sustainable development

Forest Agroforestry

Food security

Domestication

Subsistence needs

NTFP AFTP

41.In

trod

uctio

n

1. Longer time lags for trees to reach maturity

2. Appropriate technologies are poorly known

3.. Adverse or no national policies

4. Legal constraints from sister government sectors

Globally, and for Cameroon potential of NTFP and AFTP to

livelihoods and sustainable development are yet to be

exploited

3.. Adverse or no national policies

4. Legal constraints from sister government sectors

Globally, and for Cameroon potential of NTFP and AFTP to

livelihoods and sustainable development are yet to be

exploited

What is the problem?2. Appropriate technologies are poorly known

1. Longer time lags for trees to reach maturity

Call on national governments to device appropriate policies and institutions

5

Main research question

1.In

trod

uctio

n

What formal policies/strategies and regulations currently exist to address NTFP in Cameroon and how do they influence agroforestry development ?

6

Theoretical lens

Neo-institutional economics: multi disciplinary economics, history, sociology, law, business org and political science

2.Th

eore

tical

lens

& st

udy

obje

ctive

s

Economic performance

Formal: policies, strategies, regulations, legislation

Institutions = rules of the game

Informal: norms, culture, values, ethics

7

Theoretical lens operationalised2.

Theo

retic

al le

ns &

stud

y ob

jecti

ves

Effect of formal rules

on market access

Chapter 7 and 8

1994 Forestry Law and 1995 Decree of application

Policy Instruments

Customary laws,

norms ,values , culture

Access to Trees, Land , NTFP, AFTP

Producers perception• secured property rights• incentives to invest in AFTP•increased revenue

Traders access to permits •reduced TCs •reduced corruption,/rent seeking•profits/net margins •self compliance with permits

1974 Land Ordinance /land titles

Government policy on poverty reduction and sustainable exploitation of natural resources including NTFP

National and International Research

National and International N

GO

s

Interaction of formal &informal institutions

Chapter 6

Effect of formal rules

on property rights

Chapter 4 and 5

Outcomes

Outcomes

8

Research objectives

Four main themes:

(i) Appraise existing policies governing AFTP/NTFP sectors

(ii) Assess the effect of existing policy on agroforestry development- farmer perspectives

(iii) Analyse interaction between formal and informal rules regulating land and trees

2.Th

eore

tical

lens

& st

udy

obje

ctive

s

9

Choice of products

3.M

etho

dolo

gy

Gnetum spp: 3518 tons (10.5 m $) sold to Nigeria annually by sea

Ricinodendron heudelotii: annual trade within Cameroon ~ 750,000 $

Irvingia spp: 8.5 m $ annually from one comm forest

Cola spp: annual export estimated at 165,000 $

10

Study sites

3.M

etho

dolo

gy

11

Choice of respondents

3.M

etho

dolo

gy

Producers N= 394

12

• Qualitative content analysis

4.Re

sults

Results objective 1: analysis of existing policies

NTFP

Agriculture

PRSP

GESP

RDSP

PSFE

Forest

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

2

3

3

6

6

7

Number

Polic

y do

cum

ents

Tree planting in general

Domes.../a

groforestr

y

Usfruct

rights

to farm

ers

Economic r

ights

Farmer e

nterpris

es (NTFP)

Research N

TFP/AFTP

Planting materia

ls 01234567 6

54 4 4

3

1

Partial conclusion: Government of Cameroon is committed to include NTFP and AFTP in its economic and sustainable development policy

• Number of policy documents addressing the issue

13

Analysis of policy instruments - legislation

4.Re

sults

• Clear definition of AFTP/NTFP• Ownership and access to resources• Economic and usufruct rights

Analysis focused on

• No distinction between NTFP and AFTP• Permits are required to sell NTFP & indirectly

AFTPWhat did we find

• Disincentive to agroforestry development• Conclusions are based on theory • Farmers’ opinion required

Partial conclusion

14

Results objective 2: effect of existing policies on agroforestry

• Farmers perceptions

4.Re

sults

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%76%

39% 41%

Yes No

AFTP= NTFP

(Yes )

Accept certificate of origin

(Yes )

Will not plant trees

if AFTP = NTFP

Group (yes ) ns ns +ve (**)

Education -ve(**) ns +ve(**)

No of trees planted

ns ns +ve (**)

Experience ns ns -ve (**)

Region of origin (savannah)

-ve(**) -ve(**) ns

15

Partial conclusions

• Low level of awareness and enforcement of law at producers levels – what is its relevance?

• Despite negative attitudes towards policy instruments, a majority will continue to plant trees

• Number that may not plant trees is too large to be neglected

4.Re

sults

16

Results objective 3:land and tree tenure security

4.Re

sults

• Village resident : this is my land sir what are you doing here?

• City man: I am developing the land. Who are you and who says it is your land? • Village resident: I am the owner of this land, i have been farming the land • for the past 30 years

• City man: how did you get the land?

• Village resident: My father gave it to me

• City man: And how did your father get the land?

• Village resident: I don’t know, what I know is that he planted that tree and he owns this land unfortunately Mr. Tom who could testify died last year

• City man: Sorry my friend, this land was given to me by father who got it from his father who fought the Meta people and seized the land from them during the German colonial period

• City man continues: I am now on retirement and have come to the village to develop my land.

And then the conflict begins, who owns the land based on formal law and by custom?

(adopted from Bromely 1989. P 220)

17

Farmers perception of land and tenure security as factors of agroforestry development

4.Re

sults

Formal rules

• Ownership of land is sanctioned by a title deed

• Land with no deed = National land

• Trees on land with no title deed belongs to the state

Informal rules

• First occupant owns the land

• Tree planting symbolises ownership

Which of the two

• Guarantee security over land and trees ?

• Favours agroforestry?

• Role of cultural differences?

184.Re

sults

16%

84%

Farmers’ attitudes towards land titles

No ( Negative )Yes ( Positive)

North West

West Centre South East%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

29% 27%

6%17% 21%

Preferences for formal or customary systems

Customary system Formal system

41% 59%

Belief of ownership (Individual)

Positive attitude towards land titles

Preference for customary systems

Land conflict(yes )

+ve(*) +ve(***) -ve(*)

Form of leadership (forest)

+ve(**) ns -ve(**)

Population density

+ve(**) ns ns

Nor

th W

est

Wes

tCe

ntre

Sout

hEa

stTo

tal

Region of orgin of village

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Government

Community/chiefs

Individuals

Farmer’s perception of ownership

19

Tenure security & tree planting

4.Re

sults Government Community

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

45

4

55

96

Tenure security based on fear of eviction

No yes

Disincentive to agroforestry ?

Fear of eviction: yes = 3%

Land availability: yes = 23%

20

Partial conclusions• Farmers have positive attitude towards land titles however,• Where customs are intact = customary tenure is more

preferred• Where there have been cases of land conflict = title deed is

preferred • Fear of eviction not a threat to tree planting, land

availability may be the problem• Current customary systems guarantees security and favours

tree planting • Study supports evolutionary land rights theory • The state needs to protect existing customary ownership

and rights with simplified procedures to obtain land titles

4.Re

sults

21

General conclusions and policy implications

• Specific strategy/ program are needed to develop, guide and implement agroforestry strategies

• Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation should make the distinction between AFTP and NTFP e.g certificates of origin

• Customary rights to land needs to be protected e.g by simplifying access to land titles

5.Co

nclu

sion

s &

pol

icy

impl

icati

ons

22

Further research: getting the institutions right

How do we design optimal and efficient formal institutions and institutional arrangements to:

- manage land and trees, - that will also protect, consolidate - and correct existing customary systems?

5.Co

nclu

sion

s &

pol

icy

impl

icati

ons

23

Thank you for listening

24

Results objective 4: market access

• Traders’ possession of permits & informal taxes – 70 traders operate illegally

4.Re

sults

Prefer to rent permit (illegal) and pay informal taxes

If Perceived

TCs Bribe = No

permit +Rents >

25

Estimated costs borne by farmer groups

4.Re

sults

Process assessed Case study group

Number of steps to compile files 10

Time to process file (days ) About 98

Amount of money to process file About 1.3 million FCFA (1$= 500FCFA)

Duration to monitor files in the capital city 4 years

Cost to monitor files 12, 130,000 FCFA

264.Re

sults

Rents Bribe 212

MillionFCFA

1.7% annual turn

over

Government

Economic operators

Police and Forestry

0% 20% 40% 60%

9%

37%

54%Partial conclusions• Permit system : characterised by high TCs encourage rent seeking and unofficial taxes (bribes)

• Decision not to comply is a rational choice by traders to overcome TCs

27

Options to motivate compliance based on choice experiment Attributes Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 NoneDecentralised/centralised simplified/complicated

Joint or individual

Transferability of permit

Duration of permit

1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years

Regeneration tax

20 FCFA 5 FCFA 10 FCFA 20 FCFA

Choose one □ □ □ □ □X

4.Re

sults

28

Results from choice experiment

4.Re

sults

Attribute Change Implicit willingness to pay

Complicated to simplified 22.00

Single to joint 9.80

No transfer to traders based transfer 8.80

No transfer to government based transfer

6.80

Increase in duration of permit by one year

5.60

29

General conclusions and policy implications

• Specific strategy/ program are needed to develop, guide and implement agroforestry strategies

• Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation should make the distinction between AFTP and NTFP e.g certificates of origin

• Customary rights to land needs to be protected e.g by simplifying access to land titles

• Reduce TCs e.g simplify access to NTFP permits

• Reduce rent seeking and unofficial taxes in the governance of permits

5.Co

nclu

sion

s &

pol

icy

impl

icati

ons

30

Further research: getting the institutions right

• Producers level: – How do we design optimal and efficient formal

institutions and institutional arrangements to manage land and trees, that will also consolidate and correct existing customary systems?

• Traders level: – What are the most appropriate reforms to improve

the regulatory mechanisms governing permits and to reduce corruption and rent seeking

5.Co

nclu

sion

s &

pol

icy

impl

icati

ons

31

Thank you for listening

32

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