+ Cyclone Nargis & Humanitarian Intervention Jenny & Steve.

+

Cyclone Nargis & Humanitarian Intervention

Jenny & Steve

+Storyline

Introductory video

Cyclone Nargis & humanitarian intervention

R2P+ ??

NGO: an alternative to R2P

+Aung San Suu Kyi @Oxford

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGqlsS6Zseg&feature=

related

Source: BBC

+From Yangoon to Naypyidaw: Problems along the story

Myanmar has been with violation of human rights, ethnic conflicts since its formation in 1948

As of 2011, about 800,000 Muslim refugees coming from Myanmar, most of them reside in borders with Thailand and in South-east Myanmar (http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html)

Under President Thein Sein, Myanmar has improved its freedom (overall) by at least 4 points (http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf) The release of Aung San Suu Kyi NLD managed to secure seats at the parliament

+Cyclone Nargis-1

According to Haacke: Myanmar’s junta, no capacity to respond to the humanitarian

disaster Govt blocking international relief, rejecting the use of foreign

military assets to deliver aids

Myanmar is the first country within SE Asia that has become a target for explicit discussion about applying R2P principle.

R2P: Genocide War crimes Ethnic cleansing Crimes against humanity

+Cyclone Nargis-2

UN Charter Art 39 Dynamics of the post-cyclone situation and R2P? Invocation of the R2P principle and the response to Nargis? International reaction towards Nargis and armed conflict? Implications and conclusions follow from the Myanmar case

in relation to R2P more generally?

+Cyclone Nargis-3

Myanmar’s malign neglect

Pro-R2P Anti-R2P

Bernard Couhner Kevin Rudd

Khalizad (former US ambassador to the UN)

ASEAN member states

Government of USA French Foreign Ministry: Not in the category

Gordon Brown: even without help, UK will interfere

Gareth Evans: true essence of R2P and the suspection from the junta

+Cyclone Nargis – Diplomatic solutions 1

Visas to international staff working for the UN and humanitarian agencies and granting of access to more remote parts of the delta

Agreement to receive an emergency assessment team from the ASEAN

The hosting of EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid

WFP using ten helicopters to ferry supplies from warehouse facilities in Yangon directly to remote locations the delta

ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Response mechanism not fully ratified as of 2005, so help has been on bilateral basis ASEAN + ERAT + Govt of Myanmar relief efforts

+Cyclone Nargis – Diplomatic solution 2

Singapore Foreign Minister, George Yeo: “Many western countries feel that much more should be

done and perhaps it should be forced to them, but I don’t see how this can be done, because if you try to do that, you make the situation worse and will only increase the suffering of the people in Myanmar”

ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting: open a way 7th ASEAN Security Summit:

The responsibility of disaster-hit countries to quickly and effectively bring humanitarian relief

Countries concerned should provide entry for humanitarian relief

Consent and supervision from the affected countries

+Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing Problems

Armed conflict Outflow of refugees, ethnic group vs govt Eastern Myanmar: local govt vs Karen National Union

refugees in northwest Thailand Myanmar: highest IDP rate in SE Asia

In 2006, there was a shared idea of Myanmar potentially being a stumbling block to the international peace 1100 political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi),

outflow of refugees (problems with Thailand), drugs, HIV-AIDS and diseases.

Objection from Russia, China, Congo and Qatar China and Russia argue that Myanmar’s problem is far

from disturbance to the international peace and stability

+Cyclone Nargis and Ongoing Problems

Obstacles of applying RtoP to Myanmar There is no genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes

against humanity which disturb international peace and/or stability

There is no clear picture on problems related to refugees in North-west Thailand and Eastern Myanmar. There is no significant number of victims to be classified as

ethnic cleansing Lack of access to eastern Myanmar

China and the UNSC Ties between Beijing and Naypidaw Russia has always been against the idea of intervention Indonesia has been abstain since Jan 2007 draft resolution on

Myanmar ASEAN does not really agree on intervention

+R2P-Plus?

Limited applicability of current global demand (particularly in addressing ‘natural catastrophe’) + suspicion that it could be a tool of Western neo-imperialists ---- R2P-Plus

Focuses on preventive aspect of R2P + Removes the capacity for aggression or armed interference (Omission of reactive element)

Responsive pillar (R2P) > Preventive pillar (R2P-Plus)

“benign preventive pillar”

+Addressing the problem of Natural catastrophe – R2P-plus

R2P R2P-Plus

Strictly focuses on mass atrocity crimes

Concentrate on natural catastrophes + conflict situations arguable of lighter scale, covers situations of human suffering

Possible military intervention Non-coercive , Non- aggressive

Responsive pillar Preventive pillar

+ASEAN – Crisis management

Relative success of ASEAN in crisis management

1. ASEAN’s involvement in the 1979 Vietnam-Cambodian War

2. Indonesia’s request for a peacekeeping force led by ASEAN in the East Timor conflict in 1999

3. Recent inroads made by ASEAN and the Chinese govt in persuading the Myanmar junta to allow humanitarian organizations greater access to the disaster-stricken areas following Cyclone Nargis

+R2P-Plus for ASEAN: Prospects and Challenges

R2P-Plus fits strongly with strategic interests of ASEAN states and their traditional ASEAN way of interaction which revolves around diplomacy and minimal interference in each other’s domestic affairs

Non-coercive methods -> response to humanitarian problems + preserve core national interests of member states

R2P-Plus within ASEAN Security community ( to foster regional integration)

5 strategic priorities for SC

1. Political development

2. Norms-setting

3. Confict prevention

4. Conflict resolution

5. post-conflict peace building

+ essential conditions of conflict prevention – 1. Early warning Capability ASEAN ->utilize the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly (APA)

network

To establish a regional network of NGOs, think-tanks, academics -> prevent a crisis from escalating

Strategic partners : China, South Korea, Australia, India -> help to develop effective domestic early warning capability through technical assistance

+2. Preventive Toolbox

Could be composed of representative form gov. , academia, civil society and expertise

Monitoring role (Investigation of specific human rights situations that could potentially trigger crisis)

ASEAN envoys could be dispatched to mediate and monitor under ASEAN Troika

Goal : to resolve conflicts through regional cooperation if possible

Natural catastrophe – Disaster response mechanism ( ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment (ERAT), ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, Advisory group, UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Non-govt. organizations

+3. Generating Political Will

ASEAN and interested parties to convince states and affected state of the need to act

Strong leadership

Need to impress upon ASEAN states that ‘security of one’s neighbors impact its own’

3 most recent crisis in ASEAN

- 1. The Saffron Revolution 2. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar 3. Thai-Cambodian border dispute

: how the national interests of individual states are intertwined with the region and being shaped by external forces

- ‘regional neighbors will naturally intervene in the affected state’s affairs’ but the question is “how, when and to what ultimate end those regional interventions will occur” ‘

+Characteristics of ASEAN and ASEAN Charter

ASEAN charter (2007) : preserve traditional and conservative norms and consensus

HLTF (High Level Task Force)

1. Composed only of 10 people from ASEAN member states

2. Only 9-10 months to draft ASEAN Charter

3. NGOS -> didn’t have access to the draft before it was presented to and signed by the leaders during the 13th summit in Singapore

4. Public : no opportunity to debate the document

+Criticisms

Fails to put people at the center, much less empowered them

Lacks role of citizens and civil society organization in regional community building

Adopt “ASEAN WAY” : “rule-based organization and remain just that’s”

+Consensual Decision Making

Article 20:

- Decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus (provide each member state with veto power)

- Consensus is needed in order to make non-consensus decision and for these to be valid

- No sanctions (not even have provisions for suspension of members)

+ASEAN’s Traditional consensus approach

1. Thai Prime Minister Thanksin Shinawatra’s treat to walk out of ASEAN Summit in 2005

: If the violence in Southern Thailand was raised

2. Prime Minister of Myanmar’s opposition to the planned briefing, on the situation after the military junta’s crackdown against protesting Buddihist monks

Traditional norms of state sovereignty and non-interference

- Promotion of R2P difficult

+Regional Human Rights Body

Myanmar and Vietnam opposed to the creation of a human rights body

: Premium on State sovereignty and non-interference

Compromise : all members agreed to include a second paragraph under Article 14

‘operate in accordance the terms of reference to be determined at a later stage by the foreign ministers

High Level Panel (HLP) created in July 2008

+What kind of regional human rights body should be created

Member states with HR Commission

Member states without HR commission

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand

Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam

Monitoring and enforcement capacity

Only an advisory function + focus on “promotion” rather than protection of human rights

+NGO: an alternative to R2P?

Review on the situation in Myanmar Human rights violation – no freedom of expression Ongoing conflicts, stateless people & refugees Poor public health facility Governance, democracy and civil society problems Economics and livelihoods Education – only 1.3% of GDP for this sector

+Why supporting NGOs?International actor(s)

Interests in Myanmar

Policies Pursued SPDC Relationship w/ Actor(s)

ASEAN and its member states

Regionalization; reputation; counter China’s influence, drugs, etc

Constructive engagement, historical non-interference shifting to quiet urging

Provides legitimacy; Helps SPDC in its desire to avoid undue influence of China

UN Its mandate Humanitarian aid; diplomatic engagement

Depends on specific UN representatives

Japan Counter China’s influence

Large amount of economic assistance

Historically positive relationship

China Cheap energy, geopolitically strategic

Political, economic, and military support

SPDC’s lifeline, intervention and UNSC

India Counter China’s influence in region; cheap energy, c disease/drugs

Economic and military suppport

SPDC 2nd lifeline, helps SPDC in its desire to avoid undue influence of China

US Democracy and freedom promotion

Isolation, sanctions, withdrawal of aid

Strong suspicion towards each other

EU Democracy Sanctions and humanitarian aid

Varies depends on country

Multilateral Institutions (World Bank, ADB, IMF)

Its mandate Large amounts of assistance

Non-existent relationship

+NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination in the field

The importance of strong field-based governance structures with mechanisms to hold NGO LO staff to account is underestimated. Where he NGO LO has a responsibility to local NGOS, governance structures must include them

Recognising the perceived and actual influence of location, source of fudning, and language on effectiveness of NGO coordination

NGO coordination must regularly consult with and anticipate the rapidly changing demands of field-based stakeholders

While a good coordination is necessary … an NGO coordinator should have experience working with different stakeholders

+NGOs in Myanmar – Coordination in the field

Without a commitment to the Principles of Partnership and a means to evaluate whether or not they are being met, lip service to endeavouring to build on local capacity remains just that

Facilitating LNGO participation in the mainstream coordination is not necessarily the only or the most effective way to support local response and/or improve coordination and collaboration

A mutual recognition of the role and relationship between NGO coordination mechanism, HAP and Sphere can result in the benefits of networking, peer-learning and peer-evaluation, and sound technical advice

+What can we do with Myanmar and NGOs?

Increase funding levels

Improving local capacity

Opening up the humanitarian space

Improving reliable data

Changing western donor policies

Donor harmonization

+Myanmar, UN and ASEAN

The three actors

Humanitarian aid should take precedence over political reform

ASEAN and UN should be at the forefront of humanitarian actions in Myanmar

Efforts to extend the TCG’s operations to other crises in Myanmar should be, and remain, completely apolitical

+IF!! Intervetion does happen?

Supreme humanitarian emergency ×

Last resort　×

Proportionality　？

Positive humanitarian outcome　▲

Humanitarian motives　▲・×

Humanitarian justification　？

Legality　×

Selectivity　？

+Main references

“Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the Limits of R2P in SE. Asia” by Caballero – Chang

“The ASEAN Charter and the Promotion of R2P in SE. Asia: Challenges and Constraints” by Noel M. Morada

“Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Need for Practical Assistance” by Jurgen Haacke

“Working Through Ambiguity: International NGOs in Myanmar” by Soubhik Ronnie Saha

+Additional references

Information on Tripartite Core Group: ASEAN-Myanmar-UN http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AR09.pdf http://www.aseansec.org/CN-PR-22TCG-PR.pdf http://unic.un.org/imucms/userfiles/yangon/file/19th_TCG_Press_

Release.pdf

Information on Cyclone Nargis Chronology http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=research/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-

timeline

Breakdown of international actors’ interests

http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2008/brown_elizabeth.pdf

The Case Study 2008-2010: NGOs in Myanmar

http://www.icva.ch/doc00004598.pdf