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Page 1: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Phil 3318: Philosophy of Phil 3318: Philosophy of ScienceScience

Kuhn-ian Revolutions

Page 2: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

‘‘Real’ Revolutions as Real’ Revolutions as metaphor.metaphor.

• Scientific Revolutions are those ‘non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible one’ (92)

Page 3: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Analogical points:Analogical points:

1. Revolutions are inaugurated by a ‘growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased to adequately meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created’ (92)

Page 4: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

2. (although Kuhn doesn’t number it): Revolutions often seem revolutionary only to those whose paradigms are affected to them.

Page 5: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

3. (numbered 2) Success of a revolution necessitates, in part, the ‘relinquishment of one set of institutions in favor of another, an in the interim, society is not governed by institutions at all.’

Page 6: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Conclusion:Conclusion:

• Well, that seems to be point (3). :– During revolutions, society is divided

into competing camps or parties – one seeking to defend the old, others seeking to replace it with new.

– (There may be competing new camps as well)

– Once that kind of polarization occurs, political recourse fails.

Page 7: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

• The parties are fighting over the legitimacy of institutions by which political decisions can be made – for that very reason, there is no political mechanism for adjudicating between the parties.

• So, the parties must ‘take to the streets’ – appeal to something other than political will (such as God, history, etc) or resort to force.

Page 8: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

• The success of the winner is determined not by political institutions, but by extrapolitical institutions – by the very fact that they replace those institutions by which they legitimize themselves.

Page 9: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Therefore, by analogy…Therefore, by analogy…

• Scientific revolutions gain legitimacy not by factors internal to science, but by extra-scientific methods, such as social factors. And this is precisely because the issue at stake is the legitimacy of factors internal to science.

Page 10: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Revolutions as Gestalt-Revolutions as Gestalt-switchswitch

• Kuhn argues from history (Discovery of Uranus, electrostatic repulsion, Laviosier’s O2 v. Priestley’s dephlogisticated air, etc…) that scientific revolutions shift perception much like the shift in perception of anomalous playing cards, the duck-rabbit or the Necker cube.

• Well, let’s look at the Examples…

Page 11: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

How revolutions morph How revolutions morph into normal scienceinto normal science

• Authority!– As a paradigmatic case is accepted, it

is taught to future scientists as if it had always been the case. There is little or no acknowledgement of the previously existing paradigm, or the crisis that sparked the paradigm shift in the first place.

– Anyone taught about pre-plate tectonic geology lately?

Page 12: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

• Plate tectonics was proposed by Alfred Wegener in 1912.– Evidence: ‘Fit’ of the E coastline of S.

America with W. coastline of Africa.• Similar plant & animal fossils found on

these two coasts• Other ‘unusual’ geological structures

found in both places.

– Mechanism: tidal pressure, centrifugal force.

Page 13: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Why not?Why not?

1. Forces too weak2. Forces would destroy, not

maintain, coastline shapes via erosion

3. Ocean floor would rip apart continents.

(Harold Jeffereys)

Page 14: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Evidence in supportEvidence in support

• 1947: sediment on the Atlantic floor was less than predicted if floor was 4 bill years old (no continental movement).

• 1950’s: magnetic ‘striping’ of rocks in middle of Atlantic crest. (suggested movement, but also expansion of globe)

• 1960’s: Evidence from earthquake analysis of the Pacific that earth was ‘being sucked down’, at the same rate as it was ‘bubbling up’ in the Atlantic.

Page 15: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

RevolutionRevolution

• 1975-1978: mechanism of ‘floating continents’ proposed by Hess and Dietz.– Consistent (based upon) convection theory

of physics [exemplifying interdisciplinary collaboration]

– Suggested vast new research projects– Explained earthquakes and volcanoes in

‘ring of fire’.– Explained ‘island arcs’ and mid-oceanic

ridges.

Page 16: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Points of contact with Points of contact with previous theoriesprevious theories

1. In revolutionary science, auxiliary hypotheses operate to restrict the range of phenomena to be explained (100)

2. The positivistic laws are genuinely incompatible between paradigms (101) [stated as a problem for positivists]

3. Paradigms include not only a cognitive aspect, but a normative one. (109)

Page 17: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

NormativeNormative

2 claims: 1. A paradigm sets not only the

criteria for a consistent theory, but the criteria for doing science.

2. Judgments about previous paradigms are generally made in terms of rightness – i.e. ‘I once saw the moon as a planet, but I was mistaken’. (Ch X)

Page 18: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

CorollariesCorollaries

• Interpretation can only articulate a paradigm – “paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all.” (122)– Why?

Page 19: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Ch XCh X

• Is filled with a whole bunch of what I consider bad philosophy of perception – extrapolating widely from empirical evidence of underdetermined perception.“The duck-rabbit shows that two men

with the same retinal image can see different things”

Page 20: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

PracticalityPracticality

• The dominant model of training new scientists is the textbook. Textbooks truncate history and provide a sanitized story – almost Orwellian in nature – that the things that are true now have always been true, and will always continue to be true.

Page 21: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

EffectsEffects

• Students feel a part of a long-standing tradition The set of problems addressed by contemporary science is viewed as the same set of problems always considered scientific [i.e. Alchemy as competitor to Chemistry]

• Scientific history is seen as a linear process arriving at the present position. (138)

Page 22: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Thus…Thus…

Textbook are tools of a post-revolutionary Orwellian movement to construct ‘normal’ scientists: thinkers who take the contemporary paradigm as all that ever was – both cognitively and normatively.

They are the basis of a ‘normal’ science.

Page 23: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Why would anyone rebel?Why would anyone rebel?

[I.e. test a paradigm]: Same as political – a growing body of evidence that the system just isn’t working. (Matthew Dowd)

Page 24: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Side note (for Kuhn):Side note (for Kuhn):

During revolutionary periods, factors such as ‘elegance’ ‘neatness’ or ‘simplicity’ of a theory have a profound effect on its acceptance (155)

But aesthetic considerations are not enough – there must be a crisis to get the problem started! (158)

Page 25: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

ImplicationsImplications

• Falsification [Popper] is operative during periods of revolutionary science.

• Verificationism [Hempel] (or something like it) is operative during normal science

Page 26: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

• Progressive v Degenerative [although Kuhn doesn’t use these terms] matters for both revolutionary (settling which competitor will win) and normal (new avenues of research suggested).

• And, during revolutionary periods: ANYTHING GOES

Page 27: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

So…So…

• Kuhn agrees with Everyone!

• Happy happy joy joy!.

Page 28: Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions.

Contemporary Examples:Contemporary Examples:

Behaviorism -> Cognitive science?

Neuroscience replacing folk psychology?

Linguistics!

[Note: notice how the ID people have used Kuhn’s rhetoric to try to play the victim]


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