DPP Newsletter March2009

8/7/2019 DPP Newsletter March2009

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- 1 -Please no te tha t a rtic les in this publica tion should not b e used as direc t quotat ion unless with the explicit

pe rmission from the ed itor.

*A MONTHLY NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,

DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY, TAIWAN

Highlight of DPP Events in March

The DPP on CECA/ECFA: 3 NOs &4 SHOULDs

DPP Survey on CECA

2009 Taiwans Accession to WHO and WHATwo differentapproaches and what we are paying for what?

DPP Chairperson Dr. Tsai Ing-wens first visit to Japan

Coming up in April!

2nd phase of the Taiwan Citizen Conference on National Affairs:

ECFA: A Bridge or a Dead-End? - A Comprehensive Analysis of the Ma

Administrations Cross-Strait Policies

When?April 11th, 2009

Where? International Conference Room, National Central Library

Themes: The conference will focus on three policy perspectives: economy and trade (Session 1:On the Road to the One-China Market?), national security and stability in Asia-Pacific region(Session 2: On the path to the unification and the Chinese hegemony?), and social impacts andsystem reform (Session 3: Is China the only remedy for Taiwans economy?).

For a detailed agenda and list of speakers and commentators: www.dpp.org.tw, or contact theDPP Department of International Affairs ([email protected], +886-2-23929989 ext. 306)

Progress

Democracy &ARCH2009


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Highlights of DPP events in March

March 4 The DPP Central Standing Committee invited Hung Tsai-lung, associate research fellowfrom Taiwan Institute of Economic Research to present his research on CECA (ECFA)and Chien-Yuan Tseng from Taiwan Friends of Tibet to brief re: current situation in Tibet.

March 7 Dr. Tsai attended the commemoration for Lei Chen, one of the pioneers of Taiwans

democratic movement and conference on Lei Chen, Role of the Opposition Party andSocial Movements

March 9 The DPP weekly policy meeting () continued discussing the issue ofCECA (ECFA)

March 10 The DPP mayors and county magistrates issued a joint statement responding to thecentral governments special budget proposal for the Expansion of Investment inInfrastructure Construction.

March 11 The DPP Central Standing Committee met and discussed the issue of CECA (ECFA):1. Signing the CECA (ECFA) should be authorized through a referendum;2. Reviewing the current Cross-strait policy-making system: government practice, legalframework, ratification process, and referendum law.

March 11 Dr. Tsai met with representatives from civic groups to exchange views on socialmovements and social reforms

March 12 The DPP Survey Center released its latest public survey on CECA (ECFA).

March 13 DPP press conference on CECA (ECFA): the 3 NOs and the 4 Shoulds

March 14& 16

March 14th

is the 4th

anniversary of Chinas passage on the Anti-Secession Law.This year, the DPP joined the efforts of the Tibetans in exile, calling for peace, freedom,human rights and democracy. The DPP also joined a peaceful rally held by TaiwanFriends of Tibet () on March 16.

March15-17

Dr. Tsais first visit to Japan as the DPP Chairperson

March 16 The DPP launched a blog campaign at www.wretch.cc/blog/supervisor09, calling forsupervising government spending on public construction in its economic stimuluspackage, which has been criticized as economically inefficient and failing to address theneeds of the countrys development.

March 18 The DPP Central Executive passed the resolution on Taiwan first, Buy locallycalling for having government procurement, while not violating the WTO rules,meeting the three Firsts: Green First, Locally-bought First, andTaiwan-made First.

March 19,20 etc

Dr. Tsai and Spokesperson Cheng Wen-tsang called for more transparency and acomprehensive industrial risk assessment concerning CECA

March 22 Dr. Tsai met with more than 100 representatives from womens rights NGOs in Kaohsiungon womens participation in politics and the possible impact of CECA (ECFA) fromwomens perspectives.

March 23 The DPP weekly policy meeting () continued discussing the issue ofTaiwans 2009 participation in WHO and WHA

March 25 The press conference by Dr. Tsai, former VP Annette Lu, former Premier Yu Shyi-kun ,

former Minister of Interior Affairs Lee Yi-yang and the DPP party caucus whip KurChien-ming, pointed out that the KMT governments suppression and politicalcleansing on the opposition leaders still continued, and there is seriousdiscrimination and bias in the judiciarys investigation, prosecution and legalproceedings re.Special Fee Cases. Investigation on 97 Special Fee cases againstKMT members, including Vincent Hsiao, Lian Chan, Wu Poh-hsiung, LiuChao-shiuan etc, has almost stopped.

March 25 The DPP Central Standing Committee invited Professor Yan Jiann-fa to present hisevaluation of Taiwans 2009 accession to the WHA.

March 26 The DPP press conference on responding to the media uncovered that the centralgovernment and Taipei City government use public resources to help the KMTcandidate for Taipei Ta-an legislator by-election. Dr. Tsai expressed her grave


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concern and called for Central Election Committee Central Election Commissionsaction on necessary investigation and intervention.

March 28 The DPP lost the by-election for Taipei Ta-an legislator. But the DPP support rate isnearly 40%- the highest (in this district) in the past seven elections.

March 29 The DPP launched a demonstration on the issue of Graduates unemployment. The jobmarket today is extremely difficult for recent graduates. Today, graduation from collegeusually means the beginning of unemployment. The campaign was launched to call for

the government to take this issue seriously.

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THE DPP ON CECA/ECFA:

3 NOs & 4 SHOULDs

The DPP is not opposed to normalizing economic and trade relations with China.

However, normalization has to be done under the framework of an internationalagreement and must not hurt Taiwans sovereignty. If we have to further

liberalize our economic relations with China, the government must conduct

in-depth comprehensive assessment, careful planning and most importantly, seek

public consensus.

The DPP has been listening to the peoples voice and knows that the society feels

anxious about what the Ma administration has been doing. If the Ma government

does not explain clearly nor follow policy-making process in a transparent anddemocratic manner, the society is placed at the risk of further division. It will

have a grave impact on Taiwans democratic system and might radicalize the

society for which the ruling party must be held accountable.

For various reasons elaborated below, we continue to have unanswered questions on ECFA:

1. What is the political price?

3 NOs :

No to One-China Principle;

No to black-box negotiations;

No to unemployment;

4 Shoulds :

Government should allowindustries (esp. traditionalindustries and SMEs) to participatein the discussion;

Government should communicatewith the public and help societyunderstand what the CECA

(EFCA) is;

There should be debates and talksbetween the ruling and oppositionparties, and 4. Whether to sign theCECA (ECFA) should be decidedby a referendum.


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With Hus Six Pointsproposition still the

guiding principle forChinas policy on Taiwan,

for such a majoreconomic arrangement

like a CECA, the Taiwangovernment needs to tell

its people what is thepolitical price made for

this deal.

The legislature was not informed prior to the previous four agreements signed with China inNovember 2008.

According to the agreements, they would take effect within 30 days upon signing, with orwithout the Legislative Yuan having the opportunity to review them. As a result, the

Legislature Yuan did not get the chance to review the four agreements; the government saidthese are Executive agreements and therefore, no parliamentary review would be needed.

But who makes the decision that these are executive agreements, especiallywhen these agreements will profoundly affect Taiwan?

This is in violation of basicdemocratic systemic issues.

There is not enoughparticipation by the

Legislative Yuan, the general

public, and even by thecabinet members.

When this economic agreement was first raised by President MaYing-Jeou on July, 2008, it was called the ComprehensiveEconomic Cooperation Arrangement, CECA, which meant thatwhat President Ma had in mind was to have something similar tothe Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, CEPAsigned between Hong Kong and China with Article II Principleclearly stating the principle of one country and two system. Thus,

our first question would be: is there also a one-China frameworkfor the CECA? Secondly, Hu Jintaos Six-Points proposition isstill the guiding principle for Chinas Taiwan policy regardless ofpolicy fields. So, are there political concessions made betweenthe KMT and the CPP and what kinds of political concessionshave been made in order to get China to the negotiation table totalk about these issues? On such a major economicarrangement, the government needs to tell the people what is the political price for making thisdeal.

2. Procedural issues: we are a democracy but where are the transparency,

due-process and checks and balances?

Since the CECA first arrived on the table, the government has remained vague and illusive regarding itscontent. Without any public debate nor a process to inform the public what the agreement is about andhow ECFA will affect the future of Taiwan and its economy, all President Ma said was that there wouldbe an agreement, and at one point he even said this should be signed as soon as possible.

This is in violation of basic democratic procedures. There is notenough participation by the Legislative Yuan, the general public,and even by the cabinet members. CECA/ECFA is a decisionmade by the top decision-maker, the President, while thecabinet was directed to implement the decision. Without actuallyknowing what the agreement is, with no understanding of the

policy thinking and considerations behind the agreement, theministers are unable to defend the presidents decisioneffectively and there has been poor defense of the policy.

The basic principle of checks-and-balances is missing. Not even the KMT legislators themselves knowwhat a CECA / ECFA is about..

Even if the executive branch allows the legislature to review the agreements, the voice of the oppositionneeds to be taken into account, although the KMT has 3/4 seats at the Legislative Yuan and the DPPhas only 1/4 seats. Let us not forget, though, that the DPP represents more than 40% of the voters.

3. Addressing winners and losers in the trade liberalization process


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When one talks about atrade liberalizationplan, what comes to

mind is not only abouthow much benefit we

would gain. What isequally important, if notmore, is to know whatwe are going to lose.

When one talks about a trade liberalization plan, what comes tomind is not only how much benefit we would gain. What is equallyimportant, if not more, is to know what we are going to lose with theimplementation of the plan.

A responsible government, prior to forming a special trade pact with

another economic partner, especially with such a big economy asChina, would conduct an in-depth economic assessment to tell itspeople what the benefits, the losses, and disadvantages of theeffects of such an agreement are. There should also be publichearings and processes for public debate on the issue before thepolicy-making process. It has to convince the losers of the plan or at least help them survive the impactof the liberalization plan. These processes involve both the economic authorities and political authoritiesin addressing relevant problems that may arise. But, unfortunately, we have not seen thegovernment address this matter at all.

In the CECA / ECFA case of Taiwan, many of the problems that will arise or worsen from the tradeliberalization venture have not been discussed.

A. The government has been ineffective in implementing the safeguard mechanisms embeddedin our laws, such as anti-dumping, safeguard measures, and even rules of origin.. Forinstance, traditional industrial products and lower-end consumer products, such as towels andchopsticks etc, still produced locally but of better quality compared to those made in China are notand will not be effectively protected. With the poor implementation, many products made in Chinaare imported as products of other places; the public is not being protected by the system installedand established by the government to protect the consumers and the industries. Cases, such aspoison toys, pet foods, chopsticks and contaminated milk formula etc, have caused public healthhazards in Taiwan. One of the ten-top Image of China on the DPPs survey last year isBlack-hearted products. And in Kaohsiung city, the city government has forced to have aTaiwan-product only area in the supermarket so that people can feel safe to purchase thefood they need.

B. Issue of exchange: Taiwan has long established a global trade reputation for its manufacturing andquality agriculture goods. In recent years, we have come to recognize that in boththe agriculture andmanufacturing markets, Chinese prices are much more competitive than Taiwan. For example, theKMT politicians have pushed for Taiwans exports of agriculture goods to China which was followedby a whole series of efforts launched to facilitate the process. But the result has been that Chineseagriculture products imported to Taiwan are 5 times the amount of our exports to China.China seems to possess an unlimited capacity to export.

C. Winners and Losers: While those with wealth, technical skills, and the more advanced sectors ofthe economy will benefit from this trade liberalization process with China; the agriculture sector,industries, even the learned professionals are going to suffer from the trade liberalization. People

who are in the middle or lower class, particularly those in the more disadvantaged class of thesociety will suffer more. With the global economic downturn, it is just not good timing to discuss tradeliberalization with China now; there are simply not enough jobs at the moment. The initial impact ofthe trade liberation plan will impact jobs that are already facing unemployment.

Given the geographic proximity between Taiwan and China, low transportation costs, theopenness of Taiwans trade laws and low tariffs, if the market is opened further and tariffs alllifted to zero, the Taiwan market will face major challenges. It is not that we do not want to face theChinese forever. It is about timing and the need to plan through a carefully designed process becausetrade liberalization necessitates economic adjustment. Any trade liberalization process would requireeconomic adjustment. The government needs to ask if it is prepared for carrying-out economicadjustment process.


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It is not that we do not want toface the Chinese forever. It is

about timing. Any tradeliberalization process would

require economic adjustment.

The government needs to ask ifthis is the best time forcarrying-out economic

adjustment process.

For the adjustment, the government needs to get people out of sectors losing competitiveness to sectorswith greater economic competitiveness. Is this the besttiming for economic adjustment? The DPP is addressing theissue in substantive terms, i.e., as a trade liberalizationprocess. Does the government have comprehensive plansto carry-out the economic adjustment needed in a tradeliberalization process? Does the government have

intentions to carry-out safeguard measures for productsectors that will suffer because of imports from China? Wehave only received messages from the government that itwants a CECA / ECFA urgently, and only sees the benefitsof the trade agreement. We are concerned despite theknowledge of benefits, but the government needs to think of broader issues of how jobs will be ensuredduring hard times and how the economy will make the structural adjustments needed.

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DPP Survey Concerning the Signing of a CECA/EFCA

DPP Survey Center (March 10-11, 2009)

1. Of those interviewed, 44.7% had some knowledge of what a CECA/ECFA is, while 44.1% did not.

11.2% of interviewees had never heard of it.

2. 56.8% of those interviewed did not agree with the belief that if Taiwan does not strengthen its

economic cooperation with China, its economy will be excluded from global trade relations. 37.6%

believed that this scenario would happen if Taiwan and China failed to sign an economic

agreement.

3. 48.8% agreed with the statement that if Taiwan advances its economic cooperation with China,

then it will make the Taiwanese economy over-reliant on China and will hurt Taiwans sovereignty

in the long run. 43.0% did not agree with this statement. It is interesting to note that among those

interviewed who placed themselves in the pan-green camp, 77.0% agreed with the statement. And

among those who considered themselves independents, 51% agreed with the statement. 32.0% ofthose who affiliated themselves with the pan-blue camp agreed with this statement, while 63.0%

did not.

4. 70.7% of those interviewed were worried that if Taiwan furthers economic cooperation with China,

it will lead to a flooding of the Taiwan market by Chinese manufactured and agricultural products,

which will beat Taiwans traditional industries as well as increase the unemployment rate. 27.4%

were not worried about this outcome happening.

5. 78.2% agreed that cross-strait negotiations like signing a CECA/ECFA should be made once the

ruling party has reached a consensus with the opposition party. 17.8% did not agree with this view.

6. Regarding the CECA/ECFA, 89.2% agree that the policy should be fully discussed and overseenby the Legislative Yuan, while 6.7% did not agree. Among the pan-blue supporters, 88.0%

believed that the government should hold discussions with the Legislative Yuan before signing a

CECA/ECFA.

7. Of those interviewed, 63.8% thought that the CECA/ECFA would have an impact on Taiwans

sovereignty, and that it should ultimately be decided through a referendum. 32.3% did not agree

with this assessment.

8. 53.6% of those polled did not have confidence in the ability of the current government to defend

Taiwanese interests during cross-strait negotiations, while 41.3% felt confident with the

governments ability.

9. 80.2% opposed signing a cross-strait agreement under the One-China Principle. Only 13.3%

accept the One-China Principle as a pre-requisite for the signing of any cross-strait agreement.

Most people from both camps, as well as independents, share the same attitude against signing

any agreement under the One-China Principle.

10. 81.7% believed that adequate management is necessary for economic and trade co-operations

between Taiwan and China. And 12.8% felt that co-operation should be completely liberalized.

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principle, is still valid within the WHO. Based on this MOU, China can modify or withdraw its offer atany time upon its own request.

*2005 MOU between the WHO and the Chinese government

A classified MOU was signed between the Chinese government and the WHO Secretariat in July 2005in response to the rising international support for Taiwans meaningful participation in WHO in early

2005.

The MOU states:1. For those medical and public health experts from Taiwan who intend to attend WHO events orconferences, five-week notice is required and their applications have to be agreed by the Ministry ofHealth of Peoples Republic of China. Meanwhile, the experts shall participate in their personal capacityand shall under the level of director-general in their institutions or agencies, and they have to bereferred to as experts from Taiwan, China in all conference materials;

2. If there is a major breakout/epidemic in Taiwan, whether it is critical/major will have to be identifiedby Chinas MOH, and whether the WHO should provide Taiwan any medical assistance will have to beagreed by Chinas MOD.

The content of the MOU was never uncovered until 2007.The DPP administration never recognized this MOU.

2. Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the World Health Assembly states that the Director-Generalmay invite

1) States having made application for membership,2) territories on whose behalf application for associate membership has been made, and3) states which have signed but not accepted the Constitution

to send observers to sessions of the Health Assembly.

This raises great doubts about what condition China and the KMT will agree on and adopt in theirbackroom negotiations on Taiwans qualification for WHA observer status. Even though the Maadministration has repeatedly promised that Taiwans sovereignty will not be sacrificed, qualification 1seems not likely to be accepted by China while Taiwan does not meet qualification 3. Qualification 2will not be accepted by a majority of the Taiwanese people.

(B) Price of Taiwans international space:The Ma administrations only talk to China strategy has the side-effect of exclusion- i.e. othercountries/members involvement is now excluded from the process. This gives China leverage to claimthat Taiwans participation in WHO/WHA (or in any other organization) is an issue only between Taiwan

and China and other countries should not interfere. This is where our worry comes in: Taiwansinternational participation is being domesticated by China.

(C) Price of Taiwans democracy:The China issue is always sensitive and controversial in Taiwan. The secret diplomacy between Chinaand the Ma administration has deeply hurt and violated the democratic principles of transparency,accountability and checks and balances, and resulted in great anxiety among our people.

(D) Price of solidarity and stability within Taiwans society:The observed rising of anxiety and tensions in Taiwans society have made Taiwanese people lessconfident and feel less secure about their future. Social division and conflict are rising as well. If the Magovernment continues to fail to address this problem, it could significantly impact the solidarity andstability of Taiwans society


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In conclusion..

The DPPs Approach and the KMTs Approach to

Taiwans Accession to International Organizations

The DPP The KMTRights Taiwan has its own right to

participate in any internationalorganization and does not needpermission from any otherstate.

Shares Chinas mentality that China has asay in Taiwans participation in theinternational organizations.

Approach Multilateral International support and

collective efforts

Bilateral Secret diplomacy

Defined the issue Taiwans accession to IOs is aninternational issue.

Taiwans accession to IOs is an issuebetween China and Taiwan.

Accomplishments WTO full membership -enjoying all rights and duties

given in the WTO rules.

Temporary observer status in WHA- no rights given to substantively engage

in the organization- status can be canceled anytime.

Internationaleffects

More international friends; More international

awareness; Opportunity of building

consensus, mutual trustand working relations withother states

Falling into the trap ofdomesticating the issue: its abusiness only between Taiwan andChina;

Causing confusion in Taiwansinternational image and stands on itssovereignty;

Self-suppressed Taiwansinternational space.

Domestic effects People feel more confident and

safe for their future and feel thesense of responsibility ofglobal citizens, because theworld is friendly, supportiveand listening, and they canmake changes andcontributions.

People feel anxiety for their future and

helpless because everything has to relyon and listen to China and the possibleloss of the leverage to make decisions forTaiwans future status; people also feeltension because of the alarming signs ofgrowing public anger, social conflicts anddivisions.

DPPs Four-Points on WHA

The DPP Central Standing Committee passed and announced the following resolution regarding

the issue of Taiwans possible participation in the WHA:

1. The DPP rejects the Memorandum of Understanding that the Chinese government signed withthe WHA Secretariat. This document has never been made public and submerges Taiwan statusunder that of China, with Taiwan being considered China Taiwan. The DPP rejected this in thepast and we reject it again now.

2. The DPP objects to information from the WHA regarding epidemics and other related healthinformation being forwarded to Taiwan after the Chinese government gives its approval.

3. The DPP does not accept a situation where China annually controls whether or not Taiwanparticipates in WHA activities.


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4. The DPP does not accept China being considered the sovereign state to apply for Taiwansparticipation and having Taiwan become an associate member of either the World HealthOrganization or the World Health Assembly. This marginalizes Taiwan and its sovereignty,subsuming Taiwans sovereignty under that of Chinas. It severely undermines Taiwan'ssovereignty.

The DPP spokesperson, Cheng Wen-tsang, said that the DPP Party Caucus in the Legislative Yuan willuse this resolution as guideline to oversee governments action and performance.

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Dr. Tsais first official visit to Japan as the DPP Chair

On March 15-17, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen paid her first official visit as the DPP Chairperson to Japan.

As a new DPP face to Japan, along with the longstanding friendship between Japan and the DPP

administration and the rising anxieties within Japanese society over Mas policy shifts toward China, Dr.Tsais visit drew great media attention as well as a warm welcome from Japanese political leaders andpolicy makers across party lines.

(The delegation visited the Nikkakon ())

Delegation members, accompanied by two former Ambassadors to Japan: Amb. Lo Fu-Chen and Amb.Ko Se-Kai, included: the DPP LY Caucus Whip Hon. Ker Chien-ming DPP lawmakers Hon. Chiu Yi-ying,Hon. Chen Yin, Hon. Twu Shiing-jer, former DPP lawmaker and special assistant to the chairperson Hon.Hsiao Bi-khim, and Dr. Lin Chen-wei, former Director of the DPP Department of International Affairs.

During this three-day trip, the delegation visited the Nikkakon (), the Liberal Democratic Party,the Democratic Party of Japan, the Peoples New Party, and the new Komeito of Japan and exchangedviews on the current political situations in Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan-Japan relations, the globalfinancial crisis and regional security etc. A Japanese press conference was held before the delegationreturned to Taiwan. Dr. Tsai also delivered a speech on The Current Situation in Taiwan andTaiwan-Japan Relations to overseas Taiwanese in Japan.

In her speech, Dr. Tsai said that although the KMT has been back in power for less than a year, threealarming trends have been observed: a growing gap between the governments policy direction(Sinicization) and Taiwans social consensus (Taiwan identity and Taiwans future can only bedecided by 23 million Taiwanese), a rolling back of Taiwans democracy- back to authoritarian

regime, and a rolling back of Taiwans society- back to a conservative one.

During the DPP administration, we created the most liberal, open, culturally diverse and democraticsociety in Taiwanese history. Though we were not able to change the existing authoritative-basedsystem developed under the 40-year KMTs governance, we made our best effort to ensure the systemwas not violating anyones human rights, Dr. Tsai said.

She stressed that the DPPs ultimate goal is to make Taiwan a free and democratic country with aliberal and culturally-diverse society. Thus, society must be liberalized, human rights must beprotected, culture must be diverse, economy must be autonomic and direct democracy must beensured because it is the most important means to protect Taiwan, Dr. Tsai said.


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Only when there are confident Taiwanese,will there be a stable Taiwan society; onlywhen there is a stable Taiwan society, will

there be a stable Taiwan; and only when thereis a stable Taiwan, will stable Cross-strait

relations be possible; and only when there arestable Cross-strait relations, will there be a

stable Asia Pacific.

Please do not neglectthe costs and riskshidden underneath theissue of stabilizingCross-strait relations

In international politics, Dr. Tsai said, Asia will be the region with the greatest potential for developmentin the next ten years, and it will play a key role in reviving the world economy. Except the urgent need forthe regional economic engines, such as Japan, China and India, to conduct necessary reform in theircountries, the process needs the collective efforts of all the Asian countries and their consensus onactions that should be taken.

What worries us is that the dramatic expansion pushed by Chinese government in its economy could

lead to an unbalanced Asia, i.e. all Asian economies will have to heavily rely on Chinas. We also worryabout the possible roll-back in Asian democracy in this global economic downturn. A developing countrythat is still in the process of democratization is very vulnerable to political instability and economicrecession. We hope that all the Asian countries can work together to safeguard democracy because wefirmly believe that the foundation of the future development of Asia lies in democracy in each Asiancountry. The Pan-Asia we have in mind is a democratic Asia in which every country has an autonomiceconomy and rich and diverse culture, Dr. Tsai said.

Facing this difficult international environment, Taiwan needs more international support- whether thismeans bilateral FTA agreements or support for Taiwan to be included and participate in the Asianeconomic integration process. We hope international society will keep a close eye on what is really goingon in cross-strait developments. Please do not neglect the costs

and risks hidden underneath the issue of stabilizing Cross-straitrelations. Taiwans society is now paying a great political pricebecause of this. Our society is polarizing and people are feelinganxiety and losing confidence in the future. It will likely lead toconflict and a destabilizing of society itself. Only when there areconfident Taiwanese will there be a stable Taiwan society; and onlywhen there is a stable Taiwan society, will there be a stable Taiwan;and only when there is a stable Taiwan, will stable Cross-strait relations be possible; and only whenthere are stable Cross-strait relations, will there be a stable Asia Pacific.

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DPP Newsletter March2009

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DPP Newsletter March2009