When to Worry in the Middle East

8/13/2019 When to Worry in the Middle East

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When to Worry in the Middle astby Jonathan S. Paris

I a recent speech, Martin Indyk, national security advisor for Near East andSouth Asia, stated that the United States should help the people andgovernments of the Middle East to confront this emerging threat [of radicalIslamic fundamentalism], in part by pursuing peace with vigor, in part bycontaining extremism throughout the region, and in part by holding out analternative vision of democratic political development and free market economicdevelopment. It is important to consider the Islamic fundamentalist threat, thear~men~ for acco~o~~g and confronting radical Islam, and the potentialconflict in U.S. policy that might occur by encouraging democracy in the Arabworld on the one hand, and containing radical Islamic ~n~me~~lisrn andpromoting the Arab-Israeli peace process on the other. The Islamic world bringsinto question Washingtons easy assumption that the promotion of democracyis inevitably in the national interests of the United States. In some countries,the risks of democratization may be worthwhile, but, in several Arab countries,where the United States has other vital interests, fast-track democratization mayundermine those interests.The lslamist ppeal

Islamic ~n~en~lism has emerged in several Middle East countriesas a significant social and cultural force, and, most recently, as a politicalmovement. The violent assault by radical Islam&s against state authority canbe distinguished from Islamic fundamentalisms benign form: the health, edu-cation, and welfare aspects of community-oriented activities, and heightenedreligiosity and observances of the strictures of the Koran. While some arguethat the mosque-community service activities provide a legal cover for fundraising

1 Martin Indyk, Address to The Washington Institute for Near Fast Policy, May 18, 1993.

Jonathan S. Paris is a visiting fellow at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies and will be avisiting schoiar at the Yale Law School and the Yale International Security Program.

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PARISand planning of violent activities, resulting in a division of labor scheme fordestroying the state, most observers agree that the degree of militancy emanatingfrom the mosque is proportionate to the shortcomings of the existing governmentin meeting the expectations of its citizens.2 The emerging consensus, therefore,is that Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Arab world tend to be indigenous,homegrown responses to the socioeconomic and political circumstances inthose countries.The ideology of the militant Islamists is well illustrated by the writingsof Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian intellectual who rediscovered Islam after beingrepulsed by Americas materialistic culture while touring the United States inthe early 1950s. Qutb led the Muslim Brotherhoods split in 1954 from Nasserssecular socialist revolution, and, consequently, spent most of his remaining lifewriting and proselytizing in prison, until he was executed in 1966.

Qutb attributes the failures of the Arabs in successive wars and thegrowing poverty, anomie, and disillusionment within Arab societies to theapostasy of Arab leaders who have abandoned Islam. Seduced by Westernpolitical intrigue and culture, Arab leaders have led the people backwards intothe pre-Islamic age of ignorance.3 Qutbs prescription is tukBr or the eliminationof pseudo-Muslim leaders who the Koran says are worse than non-believersand must be killed. Just about anyone who is in power and does not meet theIslamist test of a pure Muslim is seen as illegitimate in the eyes of Islamicfundamentalists. Cleanse society of these false Muslims, and God will be withthe Muslims again. The Islamists take great pride in the Afghan war, where,with God on the side of the true Muslims, the Islamic muj h id i n defeated thatgreat infidel Russia. The current weakness of Arab states, by contrast, can beattributed to their being ruled by apostate Muslims. In formulating a strategyfor meeting the Islam& challenge, remember that the priority of t k f i r is thereplacement of existing nominally Muslim governments with authentic Islamicrule, and only then waging war against the forces of unbelief-Zionism, theGreat Satan, the Christian crusaders, communists, and so forth.*

The Case for ccommodationThose who urge that the Islamists be accommodated offer several

reasons. First, the Islamic revival is not a threat but a healthy grassroots responseto the failure of sclerotic Arab governments to tackle growing socioeconomic2 See Gehad Auda, The Normalization of the Islamic Movement in Egypt, to be published in Martin

E. MaIty and R. Scott Appleby, Accounting for Fundamentalism.s: 7be Dynamiw ofMot.em.en s Chicago, Ill.:University of Chicago Press, 1994).

3 See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medtial Theology and Modem Politics New Haven, Corm.: YaleUniversity Press, 1985), pp. 2%28.

4 Authors conversation with Harold Rhode, January 21, 1993.

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Middle Eastproblems. This view dismisses the militant Islamists as marginal and on thefringes of a predominantly cultural and religious movement5

A second school acknowledges that Islamists pose a political threat toArab regimes, but allows that the regimes can keep the Islam&s on the defensivenot through repression, but by co-opting the more moderate Islam&s into thepolitical system. The legalization of the Muslim Brotherhood under MubaraksEgypt has, at least until recently, splintered the fundamentalist movement. InJordan, King Husayn has adroitly bowed to public disaffection by changingministers and engaging the Muslim Brotherhood in parliamentary electionswhere their electoral success may not pose a threat to Hashemite legitimacy.The advantage of co-optation is that by empowering the I&mists, albeit withinlimits, they are made more accountable to the electorate and are not merely amagnet for the protest vote.Those who advocate fast-track democratization would go further byallowing all political factions, including the formerly suppressed leftists, tocompete for legislative and executive power. The victor would then be able toclaim true popular legitimacy, and the peoples frustration at the corruption,injustice, and economic failures of the incumbent regime would at last bevented. If the Islam&s win at the ballot box, as happened in Algeria in December1991 this school of thought would have allowed the I.&mists to rule Algeriain the sanguine view that popular constraints, such as the need to be re-elected,would inject a dose of pragmatism and moderation in the Islamist program.A non-interventionist school of accommodation, directed in particularat policy makers in the West, argues that even if Arab states ultimately succumbto the Islam&s, the triumph of the Islamists does not pose a threat to Westerninterests, No amount of outside economic aid or political engineering can abatethe tensions within Arab society between the intellectual inquisitiveness of Arabmodernists, who creatively reinterpret the Koran, and the prevailing orthodoxysresistance to tampering with the word of God since the decision of Sunnireligious authorities in the tenth century to close the door to interpretation.According to the non-interventionist view, there are three reasons whythis civil war within Arab society should not threaten the West. First, the Islamists,even if victorious, do not share the modem approach that fosters innovationand technological success, which is the major buttress of state power. Secondly,the fundamentalist groups, if triumphant, are likely to fragment at the top, asin Afghanistan today. And thirdly, as may be happening within Iran in thepost-Khomeini era, the population will ultimately tire of Islamic rigidity andlose their zeal for militancy. Since Islamic unity is a mirage, the Islamists cannotunite into a pan-Islamic hegemony that might dominate the Persian Gulf orwage .Jihad against Israel.

5 See John Esposito, The Islamic threat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 ?92), pp 22, 164.6 See Muhammad Shahrur, Al Kitab Wal Koran (The Book and The Koran), reviewed in irhelkorwmist

June 5, 193.

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Non-interventionists try to minimize Islamic fundamentalism as muchas possible. An activist U.S. policy, they warn, will not defeat fundamentalismbut will accelerate it by turning a simmering civil war between Muslim secularistsand fundamentalists into a clash between the West and Islam. Beseiged byanother Western crusade, the Islam&s will gain support from those in the Arabworld who are susceptible to the conspiratorial view that the West is the rootcause of their problems, and who detest the West more than they fear thetyranny of an Islamist regime. It should be remembered, however, that thepredicted ill-effects of a confrontationalist policy have failed to materialize inthe past. In the autumn of 1990 non-interventionists warned that a strident U.S.confrontation with Saddam would turn an inter-Arab territorial dispute into aneruption of the Arab masses against the West. In fact, Saddam continues toremain isolated and bereft of meaningful Arab support as a result of unrelentingWestern confrontation. The question underlying the current debate betweenaccommodation and confrontation is whether Western confrontation is morelikely to accelerate or contain the Islamic surge.

The Case for ConfrontationSamuel Huntington implies the futility of Western accommodation ofIslamic civilization when he writes that

Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality,liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state,often have little resonance in Islamic [and several other1 cultures, Western effortsto propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against human rights imperialismand a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religiousfundamentalism by the younger generation in non-western cultures.

The clash between Islam and the West is not over territory or economicdomination, but over values. The West cannot mollify the Islamic world bypromoting democratic ideals because there is no convergence of values betweenthe two cultures. We are simply talking a different language. If the United Stateswishes to accommodate President Hafiz alAsad of Syria, who does not appearto be a prisoner of the Islamic culture described above, it might offer creditsand remove Syria from the terrorist list in return for Syrian peace with Israel.How does the United States reach out to the militant Islamists who reject thevery carrots, such as economic development, that the United States might offeras an inducement to compromise on other issues?On a policy level, confrontationalists argue that as unstylish and un-democratic as Arab authoritarian governments are today, the Islamist alternativemight be worse, as Khomeinis Islamic revolution was far more problematic

7 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Fore&z Ajizaiq Summer 1993, pp. 4S-41.

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Middle Eastthan the shah of Iran. The United States has warned that Islam&t success at theballot box may result in non-democratic, ideological, authoritarian regimes.Islamist ideologues like Hasan Turabi, head of the National Islamic Front ofSudan, disdain the factionalism of party politics and refuse to accept the corollaryof majority rule, that is, protecting the rights of the minority opposition.8 Behindthe pithy phrase one man, one vote, once,9 real lives and issues are at stake.Do Arab regimes allow the Islam&s to win at the ballot box when Islamistleaders have indicated they will not tolerate political opposition or culturaldiversity, or that Coptic Christians may be persecuted, and women may forfeitthe gains they have made under the benign authoritarian regimes currently inpower?

Do Arab regimes al low the ls lamists to win atthe bal lot box when lslamist leaders haveind icated that they wil l no t tolerate pol i t icalopp osi t ion or cul tural diversi ty?

The confi-ontationalists do not believe the Arab world is ready fordemocracy and would guard against opening up the praetorian system too fasttoo soon without an institutionalized rule of law to safeguard minority rights.They point to Algeria, where the National Liberation Front (FLN)-Benjedidgovernment, facing an unexpectedly severe food riot in 1988 panicked andabruptly legalized political parties. The result was the defeat of the FLN, theunpopular incumbent governing party, by the better organized Islamic NationalFront @IS). Nearly every time there is an election, the fundamentalists win, inpart because the secular oppositions in Arab societies have failed to articulatethe democratic pluralistic alternative. If the Islamists gain power through theballot box, they will have succeeded in taking over the government withouthaving to defeat that bastion of secularism, the army.Democracy has worked in countries that have achieved prior economicdevelopment, industrialization, and an urban middle class, whose private-sectorbehavior stimulates accommodation and compromise so that more can benefitfrom th expanding economic pie. lo Although a few poor countries, like India,Gambia, Mauritius, and Costa Rica have democratized, more economic devel-opment in Algeria, Egypt, and several other Arab countries would increase the

* See Martin Kramer, Islam vs. Democracy, Commentary, January 1993, p. 38; and Hasan Turabislecture, Islam, Democracy, the State and the West, summarized in Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, NO. 3, 1992,pp. 45451.7 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian AfTairs Edward P. Djerijian, Speech atMeridian House, Washington, D.C., June 2, 192; see also Djerijians article, One Man, One Vote, One Tie?Neu Penpctiw s Quartedy Summer 1993, pp. 48-49, for excerpts from his speech.10 See Ian Shapiro, Democratic Innovation: South Africa in Comparative Context, World Poli t ics October1993.

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chances of successful democratization. Also, the political legitimacy of Arabstates is weak, and a rule of law that tolerates loyal political opposition doesnot yet appear, Any winner-take-all election is likely to result in majority rulewithout minority rights, Victory by the Islamists complicates democratizationfurther because of the contradictions between the authoritative law of God,whose word is final, and the desire of an electorate to change its mind throughperiodic exercise of the vote.

Preventing JihadOne of the most powerful arguments for confrontation addresses thetransnational repercussions of pan-Islam. Ironically, state nationalism, which isviewed as antiquated in an era of global trade, and regressive in the formercommunist countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, acts as a stable bulwarkagainst pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism in the Middle East. Just as the Saudisrejected Saddams pan-Arabist appeal and invited the Americans to operatefrom Saudi soil in Desert Storm, one might imagine the Palestinians rejectingthe irredentist goals of greater Islam for nationalist goals that might lead tostatehood. Syrians for the Syrians, Jordanians for the Jordanians, and evenIranians for the Iranians is a surer recipe for regional order because nation-states

act in their own national interests and can be deterred by other nation-states.It is the success ful Islamist movement therevolut ionary author i tar ian mo vement that com esto power through the bal lo t box and thenexpands across state bord ers that would mostdirect ly chal lenge Western interests in there@-on.

No~i~tan~g the fragmentary nature of Islamist movements, a successor two could transform Islamic fundamentalism into a revolutionary snowballthat might reach across borders toward a greater Ymrna, or unity throughJihad, much like the Prophet Mohammeds creation of a unified conqueringarmy of Islam in the seventh century. Will a charismatic Sunni Arab fundamentalist,a Nasser with a beard, come along in the next century with a messianic messageand unite the fragmented protest movements into a pan-Islamic political force?While such a leader has not yet emerged-the blind Sunni cleric, Sheikh OmarAbdel Rahman, is no Nasser-the anecdotal evidence suggests that throughoutNorth Africa and the Middle East, the people in the street are becomingpoliticized---or mobilized-by the Islam&s. The Islam&s offer something tobelieve in, something that answers why all the secular isms have failed todeliver, why existing authorities have failed to deliver, why the government

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Middle Eastcannot run schools and hospitals, and find educated university graduatesmeaningful jobs, and control the huge population growth, and, fmally, why theArabs lose war after war to Israel and the Americans.The problem is that the international order emerging in the twenty-firstcentury is vastly different from that of the seventh century. The four-fifths ofthe world that is not Islamic cannot tolerate the violent pursuit of Jihad againstthem by the one-fifth that is Islamic. l1 It is the successful I&mist movement,the revolutionary authoritarian movement that comes to power through theballot box and then expands across state borders, that would most directlychallenge Western interests in the region.

Balancing U.S. InterestsU.S. interests in the Middle East are threefold. First, the United Statesseeks a successful outcome to the peace process, by which Israel and its Arabneighbors would move beyond the current non-war status based on Israelideterrence and toward a collaborative political, social, and economic relationship.In such a full peace, Israel might justify its sacrifice of some strategic advantagesbecause full peace means that it no longer must rely solely on deterrence.The second U.S. interest is the dual containment of Iran and Iraq andthe maintenance of a network of pro-U.S. states in the Persian Gulf to ensureunimpeded Western access to oil. A strong U.S.-Saudi relationship, cementedby the successful precedent of Desert Storm, helps deter Iraq or Iran frompursuing hegemony over the Persian Gulf.A third U.S. interest is expanding the political participation of Arabpeople in their governments so as to increase the political legitimacy and stabilityof Arab states and their capacity to withstand assault by extremist movements.Democratization is a proven method of increasing popular participation andstrengthening the legitimacy of the nation-state. Although the promotion of

democracy by the United States in the Middle East may emanate from idealisticand humanitarian concerns, democracy may also help promote Arab statestability and contain Islamic extremism. l2 A careful balancing of U.S. vital interestsis needed to determine how much risk to take in promoting ballot-box democracyamong Arab countries before the desirable accompanying conditions of politicalliberalism and free market economic development have taken full root.If the choice facing U.S. policy makers was merely between Arabauthoritarian regimes and emerging liberal democratic oppositions, there is littledoubt that the United States would support the latter vigorously, as demonstratedby the State Departments negative reaction to the recent cancellation of electoral

I1 See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 45-48 which suggests an IslamConfucian axis hasformed against the West.

12 See Gerald Seib, Clinton, in Seeking MiddIe East Solution, Should Focus on Too Much Stab y, 7beWall StmetJoumd January 18, 1992.

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PARISresults by the ruling military regime in largely Muslim Nigeria. The militantIslamists are the wild card in the Middle East game. The West must be carefulnot to promote a fast-track ballot-box democratization that may lead to thereplacement of unpleasant dictatorships, who are at least constrained in varyingdegrees by public opinion and the international order, with revolutionaryIslamists, who are committed first to radically remolding public thought, andthen to challenging the regional and international order. In the case of Indonesia,the most populous Muslim country in the world, the failure of its benignauthoritarian regime to democratize more quickly is not as bad as the irreparablesocial, economic, and international harm that might result from its army panickingat the onslaught of populist pressure and resorting to wanton violence similarto the anticommunist bloodbath of the late Sukamo years, A gradual approachto democratization makes even more sense in those areas of the Middle Eastwhere the United States has other vital interests, as in the Arab-Israeli arenaand the Persian Gulf. The pace at which the United States pushes democracydepends on the Arab country in question.

Kuwait and YemenKuwait, while part of the Gulf, has little impact on the Arab-Israeli

arena, and any democratically elected Kuwaiti government will seek to continueits strategic alliance with the United States against Iraq and Iran, for obviousreasons. Yemens remoteness from the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict makesits election a relatively risk-free proposition, except for the remote possibilitythat an extremist Yemen would be able to undermine its larger northernneighbor, Saudi Arabia. U.S. support for deepening ballot-box democracy inthese nations therefore seems merited.

Also remote from both Israel and the Gulf, Algerias democratizationefforts may deserve U.S. support under our test. A military coup in December1991 prevented the FIS Islam&s from taking power despite their electoralsuccess, This had the unhappy result of leaving in power the same ossifiedFIN vanguard which came to power in the 1950s liberation from France. Bereftof an infusion of new blood and less popular than ever as a result of decadesof failed social and economic policies, it is hard to see how the current regimewill ever gain long-term stability, although the armys ability to maintain powerthrough force is not in doubt in the short term.Apart from French and, to a lesser extent, Spanish fear of massiverefugee flows in the event that the Islam&s take power, Algerias geographicsignificance leaves open the possibility that a FIS takeover might snowball intoa pan-Islamic Jihad that undermines all of North Africa. While the symbolismof a fundamentalist victory will resonate beyond Algerias borders, the FIS will560 I Orbis


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Middle Eastbe under pressure to govern and to enact programs that win the approval ofthe electorate. If the FIS disappoints the Algerian people, it may be difficult fortheir Islamist sympathizers abroad to mobilize support based on the Algerianexample, much less take over a larger country such as Egypt.

Perestroik a first glasnos t and democ racy latermigh t be a prescr ipt ion for order ly change in theMiddle East.

On the other hand, one can argue the Algerian elections were premature.Algiers might have been wiser to follow the Indonesian model, develop itsagricultural exports and private-sector economy and control its populationgrowth frst before democratizing. The 65 percent voter turnout in Algeriaselection in 1990, which is quite meagre for a first-time election, was followedby a 1 2 million drop-off in voters in the second election in late 1991, suggestingthat many Algerians are more concerned with the mundane aspects of food,jobs, and housing than with the Islamist program.13 Perestroika first, glasnostand democracy later, might be a prescription for orderly change in the MiddleEast.

Egypt and JordanBoth Egypt and Jordan are integral to the peace process, and are furthestalong in the Islamic world in terms of acceptance of Israel. Egypt is also theleader of the Arab world and a buttress to the moderate, pro-U.S. orientationof the Persian Gulf States. These strategic interests weigh heavily in favor ofU.S. support for the Sadat-Mubarak presidential system in Egypt and the

Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan. As is the case with Saudi Arabia, any looseningof these fragile systems through democratization may pose unacceptably highrisks to U.S. interests.While fast-track democratization in Egypt and Jordan may undermineU.S. interests, all-out repression is not the answer either, because the effect isto blur the qualitative difference between authoritarian regimes that are ordinaryand those that are ideological. Critics of Mubarak will write, It cannot get anyworse, when, as the shahs story sadly showed, it can get much worse. TheUnited States should urge its two Arab allies to adopt a flexible carrot andstick approach toward the I&mists and the population at large. The test forchoosing confrontation or accommodation is whether the chosen tactic resultsin increased or reduced militancy against the state.

I3 Ricvdo Rene Iaremont, at a Yale Center for International and Area Studies Conversation, April 261993.

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Egypt appears to be under greater pressure from the Islam&s than doesJordan at this time. The Egyptian governments strategy should be to keep theIslam&s on the defensive and turn public opinion against the militants, whoserecent nail-bomb explosions have outraged average Egyptians. By analogy tothe recent U.S. retaliatory bombing of Iraq after the Bush assassination attempt,any proof of a Sudanese Islamic National Front connection to the recentconspiracy in New York to assassinate Mubarak and the Egyptian U.N. secretarygeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali would provide Egypt with cause under theself-defense provision of U.N. Charter Article 51 to retaliate (for example, atHasan Turabis next pan-Islam conference in Khartoum), although Egypt maychoose not to do so.

Since the militant Islam&s have no monopoly on brutality and violence,the secular government might also keep them on the defensive ideologicallyby pointing out to the public the adverse consequences of an Islamist takeover.The historic Egyptian legacy of non-bellicosity and respect for individual diversitywill be smothered by an Islam&t regime which, in avid pursuit of Islamic purity,will seek to root out apostate thinkers, clamp down on the rights of employees,women, and religious minorities and, inevitably, embark on another catastrophicwar against the Zionists to distract the Egyptian public from their misery andloss of freedom. The generation of peace achieved by the Sadat-Mubarakgovernments offers a positive contrast to the record of incessant warfare underKhomeinis Iran and the current Islamist regime in the Sudan. In short, apersuasive vision that secularists can offer is the nightmare that Islamic puritywill bring.l*The carrot lies in providing outlets for popular Egyptian frustration bywidening political participation and improving social and economic opportunities,especially for the newly educated rural university graduates who face classprejudice when seeking employment in Cairo.15 Remember that Egypt, unlikethe rest of the Arab world, was a nation long before it became a modem state,and its people have a more confident national identity. Egypts long-standinginstitutions-its parliament, judiciary, political parties, and even its sixty-five-year-old Muslim Brotherhood movement-provide a safety net underneath aleader about to enter his third term and thirteenth year as president. Given thestrong common interests between the U.S. and Egyptian governments, U.S.support does not hinge on the political survival of any Egyptian individual. IfEgyptian public opinion turns sharply against Mubarak, the system is morelikely to produce a secular replacement than an Islam&t one. A long-termconcern for the United States, in light of Mubaraks refusal to appoint a vice-president who might someday succeed him, coupled with his recent suppressionof the Jamaat Islam& whom the government had tried to co-opt in the 1980sis that any significant erosion of Mubaraks political efficacy and contraction of

I4 See Salman Rush&, The Struggle for the Soul of Islam, The New York Timq July 11, 1993.15 See Mamoun Fandy, The Tensions Behind the Violence in Egypt, A4i&ileEmrtPolicy, Vol. 2, No. 1,

1993, pp. 27-29.

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Middle Eastpolitical participation may result in the future coalescence of Islamic groupsinto a mass movement capable of challenging the secular Egyptian order.

The Islam& have declined in popularity in Jordan in part because ofthe performance of some Islamic ministers, most notably the education minister,whose rigidity so alienated secular Jordanian public opinion as to create ananti-fundamentalist reaction. The Hashemites retain additional Islamic legitimacybased on their claim to be direct descendants of the Prophets cousins. TheUnited States should support King Husayn and his probable successor, CrownPrince Hassan, in their efforts to co-opt and confront the Islam&s and buildpluralistic institutions compatible with the monarchy. Jordans claim to U.S.military and economic assistance is based on a long record of Hashemite politicalmoderation and Jordans geographic indispensability.King Husayn is confident that in the upcoming elections, the currentIslamic bloc of one-third of parliament will be reduced as a result of improvementsin electoral modalities and the ability of non-Islamic parties to attract more votesthrough improved organization. King Husayn even plans to campaign for oneof the secular parties. The risk is that the Islamists might succeed in gaining aparliamentary majority and then pressure King Husayn to accept the public willfor a more accommodating prime minister.Jordan represents another instance of the complexity of carrying onpeace negotiations while pursuing democracy. A successful Israeli accommo-dation of West Bank Palestinians will draw attention to the grievances of thesizeable Palestinian population living under Hashemite rule in the East Bank.Could East Bank Palestinians forge an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhoodto challenge the Hashemite monarchy? Although a bit far-fetched, it would besupremely ironic if a positive outcome of the peace process-the confederationof Jordan and the occupied territories-facilitated Islamist control of the territoriesthrough the back door of Jordan.

Democracy: A Threat to the Peace Process?Few would disagree that the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt, Syria, or Jordan, or the eclipse of the PLO by Hamas in the occupiedterritories, would seriously retard the peace process, The Islamists have madeclear their hostile view of the Camp David Peace Accords and even a two-statesolution.A more controversial hypothesis is that, based on past history andcurrent public opinion in the Middle East, authoritarian rulers can more easilymake peace with Israel than can those incipient democracies that have expanded

political participation, even if the democracy is not dominated by Islam&t parties.The Arab street has consistently demonstrated more antipathy toward Israelthan Arab rulers. Jordans King Abdullah in 1950might have signed a peace16 Authors conversation with Mary Jane Deeb, January 19, 1993

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treaty with the new state of Israel had it not been for populist pressures withinJordan and the Arab world. Instead, he was assassinated.17 In 1991, the Egyptianpublic was far less enthusiastic about the Madrid Peace Conference than themore educated Egyptian elites.l As the process of democratization advancesin the Arab world, criticism of both established regimes and Israel is likely toincrease, especially if the peace process achieves mixed results. The conventionalwisdom that only Arab democracies can make lasting peace with Israel maynot be true on a substantive level, given the elite/street schism toward Israel,nor on a procedural level, in that dictators have wider latitude to reach anagreement with Israel that does not have to be approved beforehand by thevoters. As one of the least democratic Arab leaders and, not accidentally, abitter foe of the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrias Asad also represents one of Israelsbetter prospects for peace.Conversely, a myriad of conflicting Palestinian views ranging from visionsof a Jerusalem-based Palestinian supra-state to hard-headed West Bank prag-matism may suggest that too much democracy inhibits the emergence of aPalestinian consensus that is sufficiently authoritative and coherent to concludean agreement with the Israelis. l9 It is hard to imagine that elections in theoccupied territories will produce such a consensus and give Palestinian nego-tiators more room to reach a compromise with Israel. More likely, electionswill add a layer of symbolic baggage that hampers the ability of the Palestinianleadership to make any less-than-maximal& deal without another referendum.OAn assymetry worth noting is that a fundamentalist triumph in theMiddle East will likely end the peace process, but a successful conclusion ofthe peace process may or may not defeat fundamentalism. In Egypts case, theCamp David agreement with Israel led to a surge of militant Islamic violenceculminating in Sadats assassination in 1981. The conventional wisdom, however,is that a de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict would clear the agenda forArab regimes to focus on the underlying economic and social problems in theirown countries that give rise to fundamentalism.Conclusion

It is not axiomatic that every democratic election in the Arab MiddleEast will result in an Islam& victory, as the recent election in Yemen demonstrates.It is by no means clear that even if the Islam&s win an election, U.S. interestsin containing fundamentalism will fail in the long run. Had the FIS fundamentaliststaken over a very distressed Algerian economy in 1992 heymight have failed17 See Avi Shlaim, 7hePoZiticsofPartition New York: Columbia University Press, 19901, pp. 407,431-436.1s See David Pollock, The Arab Street? Public Opinion in the Arab World, 7be Washington Institute

Policy Papen, No. 32, (1992) p. 58.l9 Authors conversation with Seymour Martin Lipset, Januaq 18, 1993.*o Authors conversation with Shaul Mihal, April 13, 1993.


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Middle Eastby now and discredited Islamist movements elsewhere. By being repressed,the FCIS emains an unaccountable protest movement.

The United States cannot determine beforehand whether democratizationwill lead to a fundamentalist victory, but it can assess the likely collateral impactof democratization on other U.S. interests. In Egypt, fast-track democratizationmight cause so much instability as to interfere with Egypts critical assistanceto the peace process. It may make more sense to soft-pedal democratizationand prod Egypt to strengthen its free-market sector and increase the populationsstake in the system, thereby diminishing the appeal of anti-state I&mistmovements.The road to change from authoritarian regimes to democracies is likelyto be chaotic, and the closer the chaos is to the Arab-Israeli sphere and theGulf, the more troubling the likely ripple effects. Outside the Arab-Israeli andGulf arenas, the primary risk to the United States is that democracy mayunwittingly bring to the forefront a succession of charismatic Islamist leaderswho might catalyze the fragmented pockets of Islamic militancy into a pan-Islamicmovement that would sweep away neighboring secular dictators and monarchiesalike. But such leaders may also emerge through a coup or a popular uprisingagainst a repressive regime. In the absence of a crystal ball, U.S. policy makersmight set a more modest objective of carefully calibrating the pace of democ-ratization in the context of its other goals in the region.

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When to Worry in the Middle East

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