Western Strategies From 1945 to Our Days (Testo)

WESTERN STRATEGIES FROM 1945 TO OUR DAYS

By VADM (ret.) Ferdinando SANFELICE di MONTEFORTE

1

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

Some basics about Strategy

CHAPTER TWO

Western post- WWII Strategies

CHAPTER THREE

Cold War and NATO. Massive Retaliation

CHAPTER FOUR

Confrontation in Central Europe

CHAPTER FIVE

Indirect Approaches: Encirclement and Peripheral Strategies

CHAPTER SIX

The Strategy of Peace Operations

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATO and European Union Concepts

CHAPTER EIGHT

2

The Islamic Galaxy and its Strategies

CHAPTER NINE

The “BRIC” and the Strategy of Competition

3

CHAPTER ONE

SOME BASICS ABOUT STRATEGY

Introduction

Before discussing the strategies pursued by the Western nations since the end of

World War II and their evolution with time, a few basic concepts about Strategy, its

essence and its elements are required, in order to provide the theoretical framework

which will allow to understand why the Western leaders succeeded or failed, when

they acted in pursuance of their political aims.

The term “Strategy” comes from the Greek word “στράτηγέιν”, whose meaning is,

according to a dictionary, “to command”, but also “to use a stratagem, a deception”1.

It can be noted, therefore, that the two concepts - “command” and “deception” -

have been tied together since the beginning, in order to show that “asymmetry” is

the best way to success in any situation of conflict, which is characterized by the

existence of two or more opposed wills.

The path toward the attainment of a strategic aim is in fact seldom symmetrical or

straightforward, as it implies most often the adoption of tricks and of other ruses, in

order to keep the enemy in the dark about our real intent, and also to induce him to

commit the fatal mistake, which will hinder the achievement of his aims and allow

1 ROCCI. Vocabolario Greco-Italiano. Soc. Ed. Dante Alighieri, pg. 1712.

4

us to gain the upper hand in the contest. Conflict is in fact a game where both

contenders commit a number of mistakes, and success is achieved by the party able

to exploit its opponent’s blunders.

The essence of Strategy

Which is the essence of Strategy? Originally, it was only related to military activity,

thus being dubbed as “The Art of War” and – at least in the Western countries - was

not a subject for any book. As one scholar - JOMINI - said, “it always existed, and was

the same under Caesar as well as under Napoleon. This art, though, confined as it

was inside the brains of the great leaders, had never been laid down in any written

treaty”2, while in Eastern countries, like China and India, treaties about strategy were

written already 400 years before Christ. These writers, as those in Europe and in

Japan who wrote on this subject after the XVI century, have tried to explain how and

why the great leaders were able, in the past as nowadays, to defeat their enemies.

Thanks to the growing number of these treaties, Strategy slowly underwent a

transformation, thus becoming an empirical science, based as it is upon the clever

observation of events. Like all disciplines of the same kind, as Medicine, Strategy will

never provide an unquestionable response to every doubt, but is rather a sort of

guidance, a methodology for a correct thinking, in order to achieve success.

2 A.H. JOMINI. Précis de l’Art de la Guerre. Ed. Ivrea, 1994. pg. 5.

5

Strategic scholars have been heavily influenced by the prevailing culture in their

homeland and by the spirit of their times. The Chinese school of thought, for

instance, is coherent with Confucianism, while the Western scholars during the XIX

century looked at Strategy from a different perspective that we do nowadays. This

has produced a variety of considerations and doctrines, which allow those who

know all of them both to chose among a wide score of options, and to understand

the way opponents think strategically.

All schools of thought consider that the main character, in the drama of strategic

action, is always the Genius, that kind of person capable of upsetting the enemy’s

plans, thanks to his insight. The “Genius of War”, though, has always been difficult to

find beforehand, and this makes Strategy different from what happens in other fields

of human activity: a great painter and the ablest surgeon are known with relative

ease, from their previous works, while the strategist is put to test only in the decisive

moment, thus governments must bet on the leader they appoint, without having a

minimum of proof about his capability to succeed.

Even worse, should a genius be identified, it is not sure that he/she will keep

his/her natural gift with time. Take NAPOLEON, for instance: his downfall was in fact

due to a most serious strategic mistake. As a scholar noted: “He, the great master of

6

concentration, proceeded to divide his forces between the two extremes of Europe

(Spain and Russia). The results are known to all”3.

Due to these reasons, many strategic thinkers felt that there was the need to

follow other roads, to find the person able to achieve strategic success.

MACHIAVELLI, for instance, noted that “Where nature is absent, application

obviates”4, and CLAUSEWITZ was even more radical, in describing how to select a

military leader “experience and observation will both tell us that it is the inquiring

rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized

approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose

to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our

country”5.

From these quotations, it is clear that the preferable choice, as an operational

leader, is not a pretended genius, while a serious, capable and experienced person is

favored, being more reliable, when big issues are at stake. This person, therefore,

needs some conceptual support, to gain the required knowledge and wisdom, as

he/she will have to rely on his/her brains.

3 A.T. MAHAN. The influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. Ed. Samson Low, 1894. Vol II, page 402.

4 N. MACHIAVELLI. I Sette Libri dell’Arte della Guerra. Ed. Le Monnier, 1929, Book I, page 17.

5 C. von CLAUSEWITZ. On War. Princeton University Press, 1976, page 112.

7

Strategic Science is therefore needed mainly to provide the operational leader –

but also the politicians - with enough knowledge and culture, as well as with a broad

guidance, to help him avoiding the most blatant mistakes, and to have his nation’s

forces handled in the best way, by the individual chosen by the Head of State.

Not by chance, Strategy was defined as the Science of the Normal Case; “from the

careful collection of the past events it is clear that certain lines of conduct normally

tend to produce certain effects. Every case will assuredly depart from the normal to

a greater or a lesser extent, and it is equally certain that the greatest successes in

war have been the boldest departures from the normal. But for the most part they

have been departures made with open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the

accidents of the case a just reason for the departure”6.

However, while the roots of Strategic Theory are clearly planted in the military

ground, due to centuries of treaties dealing with war-fighting aspects, before starting

to find a comprehensive definition, we must acknowledge that the term Strategy is

increasingly used in our times as a “Methodology” also in areas of human activity

which have little to do with the traditional “Art of War”.

In fact, it is now widely accepted, first of all, that weapons have never been the

only mean used in conflicts, but most often economic, cultural, media and

diplomatic tools have played a decisive role. When these tools are used in a benign 6 J. CORBETT. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Ed. Brassey, 1988, page 9.

8

way, they are considered to be part of the so-called “Soft Power”, with the

“MARSHALL Plan”, conceived by the US government in the early 1950’s, being its

most relevant example.

Quite naturally, the economic tool can also be used in an adversarial way, to wear

the opponent until he will be weak enough to either be defeated in the field or

forced to come to terms; the same considerations apply to culture, a tool most

difficult to use, but extremely powerful, as it can influence populations in depth.

In the XIX century, for instance, the Italian Opera was a tool used to stir the

independence aspirations of the population, when the Italian peninsula was divided

among several small States. In more recent times, in the 1960’s, the French

President, general DE GAULLE, visited Canada and stirred the same kind of feelings

among the French-speaking community, through a speech whose final phrase, “Vive

le Québec libre” (Hail to the free Quebec) became known worldwide.

In fact, he was reaping the dividends of a careful cultural strategy which had kept

for more than one century that part of the Canadian people close to the French

language and culture, thus being able to resist the increasing predominance of the

English community and its culture. The result is visible even in our days, as

everything printed in Canada, from official documents to commercial leaflets, is

rigorously bi-lingual.

9

Another powerful instance of cultural strategy is “Bolliwood”, a tool used by the

Indian government to keep the large communities of Indian migrants, settled all

around the world, close to their original culture. As another reminder of the

importance of a cultural strategy, we must recall the term “Clash of Civilizations”,

increasingly used in our days, to hint at the influence of culture over the masses.

Culture, in fact, can have an impact on the social structure of another country, by

providing instances of a different social order. The Western pressure on Human

Rights is the best possible example of such a cultural campaign, affecting in depth

traditions and laws in other parts of the world, which had remained unquestioned

for centuries.

One caveat, though, is required at this stage: with the advent of globalization,

both the economic and the cultural tools have partly spun out of direct control by

our governments. The CEOs of firms like Exxon, BP, Microsoft, IBM, Google, etc. can

start economic wars among them, without involving any government, and their

relevance is so great that they are now dealing directly with foreign Heads of State.

As far as cultural strategies are concerned, you might also be aware that the Third

World is flooded by TV programs coming from our countries, not produced nor

sponsored by our governments, which threaten the traditional societies in that part

of the world, thus causing strong reactions by those governments and religious

10

leaders, who label quite disparagingly this phenomenon as a product of “Coca Cola

Civilization”.

From all these considerations, it is easy to understand why scholars have

gradually developed the concept of “Grand Strategy”, also known as

“Comprehensive Approach” or – to be more precise – “General Strategy”. These

terms indicate the need, by the statesman, to use all means and capabilities

available to him in a coherent and coordinated way, in order to gain the upper hand

on an adversarial nation.

Finally, it would be naïve to believe that Strategy is something to be used only in

time of war, because forces, money, diplomacy and media are continuously available

to political leaders: taking into account that not all situations of conflict among

States must inevitably degenerate into an open war, Strategy is therefore an

essential instrument of State action on a daily basis, and must provide a number of

tools, to cover all possible options. This is true especially in our times, when it seems

that we stand in a grey zone, halfway between war and peace.

Summing up, Strategy is essentially a methodology, a way to structure the

thought framing any governmental action, and helping to take a long-term view, in

order to trace the complicated path toward the attainment of our aims, especially

because we must never forget that we are in presence of an opposition by others, in

most cases. As a methodology, which has been perfected in centuries of study on

11

war, Strategy can be therefore the most useful instrument for those decision-makers

acting in any domain. In fact, as any other, strategic “theory is at least a scheme, a

program to register, classify and organize data and knowledge. Even if has not the

capability to predict, it can have, at least, an organizing value and a role to enable

close and inquiring scrutiny of what is at stake”7.

From all that, Strategy has been recently defined as the science “having as its

object the rational correlation between ends, (ways) and means in a situation of

competition between two (or more) actors, whose intended outcome is to impose

one’s will upon the others”8. You should note that this definition of Strategy

emphasizes the dynamic confrontation between two or more actors, opposed one to

the other: this means that, when action starts, there will be moves and

countermoves, so that the original plan of each will be inevitably subject to several

changes, as action develops.

On this subject, MOLTKE - the winner of the 1870-71 war against France - used to

say that the nest plan does not last more than 15 minutes after the first clash

between the opposed Armies, and this is true in any domain. The important thing is

to remind that any strategic plan is only a good way to think in depth at a problem

7 H. COUTAU-BÉGARIE. Traité de Stratégie. Ed. Economica, 2006, pag. 258.

8 A. CORNELI. L’Arte di Vincere. Ed. Guida, 1992, pg. 5.

12

and its implications, so that, when the need to update it arises under the pressure of

circumstances, these changes of route will be carried out while having always in

mind the aim, i.e. the ultimate reason of the struggle.

There are some, scholars, though, who argue against this widened application of

Strategy, by considering that it is proper to speak about it at governmental level,

only when, among other means and tools, “the actual use (strategy of action) or the

threat of use (deterrence) of force”9 are envisaged. Unfortunately, the use of the

term is so widespread that any attempt to limit its use is bound to failure.

The Elements of Strategy

In any strategic decision process, the factors influencing the plans we conceive

have to be taken into account, since the beginning. They can be classified as material

factors, which are tangible and measurable, as fire, mass, numbers, money,

commerce, demography, space, speed and time, and immaterial or moral factors,

which can be further divided in two categories: positive – such as courage, gallantry,

daring, motivation – and negative factors – fear, hatred, revenge. It is always

dangerous to underestimate them, as compared to the previous ones, because they

might cause unpleasant surprises: in fact, hatred and revenge, in particular, are long

lasting feelings among our and our opponents’ populations, whose traditions,

costumes, culture and ways of thought must be known by us.9 H. COUTAU-BÉGARIE. Op. cit. pg. 86.

13

Strategy, too, does not take place in laboratory, as it is a praxeology (science of

praxis, i.e. action). It requires therefore a careful examination of the environment

where each operation takes place. The land, the sea, the space and the air, as well as

virtual environments, like the cyber dimension, are capable of influencing the

outcome of a conflict if they are not taken into account, as they impose difficulties

and challenges, but also offer many opportunities.

Mind you, in a strategic perspective you must look at whole regions, as you

should consider the whole area where the operation takes place. With modern

means, the width of these areas is becoming increasingly greater, so that sometimes

entire continents are involved in a struggle.

In any operation, the key material elements are – first of all – the availability of

the required force, which is the product of the nation’s wealth and population, and

the main base, where the source and the nucleus of the force itself lay. There are,

then, the lines of communication, which connect the base to the operating area:

they are the most sensitive aspect, as the more they are stretched, the more they

become vulnerable.

Through them, all reinforcements and supplies flow, and they are, should the

need arise, the best possible line of retreat. Not by chance it was said that

“communications, in the full meaning of the term, dominate war”10. Last but not 10 A. T. MAHAN. Naval Strategy. Ed. Samson Low, Marston & C. 1911, page 255.

14

least comes the operation area, where it is convenient to establish a forward base, in

order to avoid weakening the main force, as time elapses.

The most important immaterial factor of any operation is the consensus by the

public opinion, whose emotional involvement is the fundamental aspect: the

amount of public opinion’s capability to accept losses and to withstand the

hardships, which occur from time to time, is in fact the driving element for success.

Take for instance WWI: nobody argued neither about the huge expenses nor

about the enormous amount of human losses, as the fundamental reasons of the

struggle were fully shared by the public at large. Operations overseas, instead, like

many other acts of foreign politics, enjoy a lukewarm support, in the best of cases,

and consequently each loss stirs a debate, which can become increasingly

embittered, should a stalemate occur and no progress be visible.

The most relevant kinds of action, in Strategy are:

- Offensive, whereby we attack our enemy. Even if the offensive is deemed to be

preferable, at first sight, it must be considered that it implies a superior force, and

has the inconvenience that, especially on land, while more progress is achieved, the

offensive gradually loses strength, as wider territories have to be controlled, and the

rear of the advancing army becomes vulnerable to sudden flanking attacks.

15

This self-weakening process is not linear, thus having led some scholars to

consider that any Offensive reaches, sooner or later, the so-called “Culminating

Point”, beyond which defeat becomes highly probable. The examples of NAPOLEON

and Germany in their Russian invasions are telling on this point. Also, offensive

operations impose a significant consumption of forces, as time elapses. Time

therefore is the greatest enemy of any offensive operation.

- Defense is deemed to be, on land, the stronger form of action, as the forces are

well positioned in a place of their choice, and their scope is to gain time, by delaying

the progress of the opponent. Anyhow, to be effective, defense must not try to cover

all points, lest it will lead to spread the forces too thin, thus becoming uniformly

weak at every point. A similar situation occurs at sea and in the air, where the points

and the assets to be protected are too numerous, thus imposing to disseminate

defensive forces everywhere. Therefore, in these domains defense is considered a

weaker kind of activity.

Another problem with defense is that – when carried on too passively – it hinders

the moral of the troops, if they are kept idle, waiting for the clash with the

opponent. Those who retain the initiative are in the opposite situation, as it is easier

to motivate the men and women, by showing them the positive aspects of conquest.

- Blockade is a way to shut the opponent forces in their base, by placing adequate

assets outside them, able to beat the enemy in detail, should he attempt a sortie.

16

The blockade extended to all commercial hubs (harbors, airports, etc.) is better

known as Embargo, and it has the scope of cutting off enemy trade, especially by

sea, either at its points of departure or at its arrival, thus causing other nations’

economic collapse, with time. This kind of action might be total – any good carried

on board is blocked – or selective, focused on some specific merchandize or on the

so called “Contraband of War”. This action has been widely used in the past, as

during the American Civil War, but has also been applied recently, for instance during

the crisis of former Yugoslavia.

- Denial is the action of the weak, who does not control the environment, and the

only possibility is to cause some attrition on the opponent, through raids against

either his weak points or to disrupt his activities. This action takes place mostly at

sea, the German submarines in both World Wars being a good instance, but it is also

practiced in the air, through the use of land-based anti-air missiles. Guerrilla also can

be considered a form of denial, as it hinders the free movements of the foreign

forces, when operating overseas.

- Intervention is the act of participating to an already ongoing struggle, by joining

one between two opposed parties. Normally, it is most convenient, as it upsets the

existing balance, provided the intervention is carried out in the right moment and

with adequate forces. The choice of the moment, though, is more difficult than it

might seem at first glance: the most relevant instance is Rumania, who joined the

17

French and Britons in 1916, during WWI, when they were barely able to contain the

German offensives in Flanders, thus being incapable to provide support to their new

ally, who was therefore easily defeated.

- Invasion is the occupation of some territory of an enemy nation. As it is often

unpopular, there must be a number of convincing reasons, to justify it in front of the

world public opinion, as in the case of Iraq in 2003. It differs from Intervention as, by

definition, an invasion occurs when a significant part of the population of the

invaded territory is still loyal to her government.

In our days, both “Intervention” and “Invasion” are increasingly carried on

through coalitions or alliances, to show that they are the product of a wide

international consensus toward redressing a difficult situation. However, there is a

difference between a coalition – which is established at the last moment, thus

lacking cohesion and interoperability among the forces – and an alliance, which

normally has had the time to establish a common operating framework, thus being

more effective.

Principles and Methods

Like all sciences, Strategy relies upon principles, i.e. these broad and “general

rules which tend to avoid being subjected to your opponents’ will and to ensure your

superiority in the selected point, through a quick and determined action”11; their

11 H. COUTAU-BÉGARIE. Traité de Stratégie. Ed. Economica, 2006, pag. 288.18

importance stems from the fact that, according to the most part of scholars, “it is

impossible to depart from them without danger, and their application, instead, has

been rewarded almost always by success”12.

Their defects, according to some, are both that “when you apply a principle, you

might be forced to depart from another, and there is no principle without

exceptions”13, and also that an unquestioned compliance to them – i.e. to consider

them as laws not to be departed from - hinders the required freedom of action by

those who take any initiative. Therefore, even if they must not tie the hands of the

leader, principles are, in any case, an useful reminder –a sort of check-list – to be

used when planning and conducting an operation, so that the decision-makers are

aware of the possible risks inherent in their disregard.

These principles are, according to a wide consensus among the scholars, the

following:

- Initiative: as long as you wait, the opponent will do whatever he wants, while if

you act, he will be compelled to switch to a reactive mode, thus losing the possibility

of acting freely. In the past, this principle was understood as encouraging the

12 A. H. JOMINI. Op. cit. pag. 14.

13 B. BRODIE. A Guide to Naval Strategy. Princeton Univ. Press, 1944, pag. 11.

19

offensive, while also a retreat might be a convenient initiative to through the

opponent off balance, when enough space is available;

- Safety and Security: all your movements must be protected, and what you have

in mind should never be known to you opponents. As a scholar said “where there is

no strategic security there is a strategic surprise”14;

- Economy of Forces and Concentration: your assets must not be wasted and must

be used in a concentrated way, all against the weak point of your opponent. Most

importantly, focus has to be kept on your objective: Concentration of Thought and

Purpose, as MAHAN said, is even more important than the concentration of your

means;

- Activity: forces must be kept active, and it should be considered that when their

speed is high, the effect (Impulse) is similar to what can be otherwise achieved by a

large mass, moving slowly;

- Preservation of Force: when you are not actually employing your force, you

must keep it proficient, numerous, well equipped and maintained. In case of

difficulty, it is better reducing our forces than keeping them in a status of disrepair.

These principles are determined through the use of one or more Methods, who

also provide an approach to study all strategic problems. The first and most widely

14 F. FOCH. Des Principes de la Guerre. Ed. Economica, 2007, page 201.

20

used method relies on the study of History, as many lessons can be drawn from past

experience in war and peace. History is also useful to provide instances to clarify and

enrich the explanation of Strategy.

Even if history is written by the winners, so it might sometimes distort facts and

events, thus requiring double checks, at least this method is useful because it

highlights those approaches which seldom succeeded; as MAHAN said once, “defeat

cries aloud for explanation, while to victory, as well as charity, many sins are

forgiven”.

The second method is Geographical, as the impact of geography is always to be

considered when planning your action. Geography, in fact, exerts a significant

influence on human beings: political boundaries, morphology of regions, natural

resources, demography, climate, are all aspects capable of forcing either mass

migrations or containing the ambitions of a State: for this reason geo-strategy was

developed first in countries like Italy and Germany, whose past expansions were

blocked by the geographical features of the region where they are placed.

Then comes the Realistic Method, also known as Method of the Material, which

studies the effects of modern weapons and means on strategic action. It developed

first in France, at the end of the XIX century, as a way to solve the dilemma of how to

counter Great Britain, whose predominant sea power was difficult to beat

symmetrically, by building an adequate fleet. Apart from the exaggerations of this

21

school of thought, which led to the construction of a huge number of small, fast

attack boats, this method is useful as it reminds the importance of numbers and

speed, as well as the need to keep a technological advantage on the opponents.

The Prospective Method, which projects our view twenty or thirty years in the

future, to forecast the friendly and adversarial environments where our means will

have to act, is another one. This is often coupled with the Scientific Method, which

relies on logic, as well as on the advanced computer games, to provide the

probability of occurrence of an array of situations. These two methods are used

nowadays especially to plan for the development of resources and military forces,

but also for strategic analysis of word trends; in the economic domain they allow

attempting a long term forecast, thus giving an idea on how markets might be in the

future.

Last but not least comes the Philosophical Method, which attempts to understand

in depth the root causes of the elements influencing war, thus favoring reflection

and thought of the profound aspects of human activity. Albeit it has proven difficult

to use operationally, this method is a good theoretical support to Strategy, as no

leader should avoid reflecting, from time to time, on the great collective impulses of

mankind, which are often a powerful driver of collective stances.

The Pillars

22

The structure of Strategic Science, like it happens to all other disciplines, must be

based on some pillars, defining its essence. In our case, Strategy can be summarized

by the following equation, conceived years ago by the US general Maxwell TAYLOR:

Strategy = ends x ways x means

It is worth highlighting that in essence this equation shows that, should one pillar

be equal to zero, there is no Strategy at all, as it happens to a stool deprived of one

leg.

Among them, first come the Ends - what you want to achieve and why - to be

kept in mind at any moment of your action. As far as State action is concerned, Ends

can be divided in two parts. Above all there is the End, i.e. the Political Aim (Zweck

in German, as indicated by CLAUSEWITZ), the deep/root reason for one State’s

initiative, which has to be determined by the top political level.

The second and lower part of the Ends – as it depends from the former - is the

Objective (Ziel in German), which is the materialization of the Political Aim, once

translated in concrete goals. As too often the Aim is vague, thus allowing the

executive level an excessive degree of freedom of action, the likelihood of tensions

between the politicians and the executives is highly probable. This dynamic can only

be resolved through what is known as the “Unequal dialogue”, where the politician

listens to the difficulties raised by the executives, and decides only then.

23

As a scholar says, “more than one group of revolutionary leaders, from

Bolsheviks Commissars of 1919 to Iranian Mullah, over a half century later, willy nilly,

turned to officer experts whom they may not have trusted, but whose services they

required”15. Basically, each interlocutor should know and respect the constraints

influencing the thought of the other.

On the contrary, the UN found themselves in a difficult situation in the years

1990’s when they decided to carry out Peace Enforcing actions, without taking care

of having adequate military experts. Therefore, without appropriate means,

structures and tactics, but delegating all decision to a political representative in the

area of crisis, the results were bitterly disappointing, as expected. Only in 1999,

thanks to the Brahimi Report, the UN Security Council understood the need to adopt

approaches and arrange structures which were able to introduce coherence with

the available means.

As another author says, referring to Great Britain in the XVIII century. “The

several conditions were thus weighted, and were harmonized into a common action,

to which all contributed their utmost influence in mutual support. The desirability of

the result fix our eyes upon the fact that in our country it will never be attained

through one man, but only by the cooperation of the several. Those several will be

statesmen, military men and naval men; and, in order that their cooperation may be

15 A. COHEN Supreme Command. Ed. Anchor Books, 2002, page 263

24

adequate, each must understand the conditions by which the others are

controlled”16.

Summing up, the most common cause of defeat is the confusion of roles,

between the political leaders and the executive level. Each must perform his duty, as

collaboration among the two is not only the practical realization of the aims –

something only possible to those who know the tool - but also a much needed

feedback, when it comes out that the aim is over-ambitious, thus requiring to be

downsized. Also, victory is something which goes well beyond military success: there

are in history several instances of nations’ defeats due to a successful military battle.

When speaking of Aims, it must be understood that, in Strategy, they are not

focused only on complete destruction of the enemy, through a struggle to the last

man. They are instead most varied, as they range from annihilation of the enemy to

the opposite extremes, like reaching the conditions for an honorable compromise or

waiting until situations change and offer better opportunities for action. They can

therefore be divided between Unlimited Aims – total defeat of the enemy – and

Limited Aims, which are, by the way, the most frequent case: most often it is

impossible to gain a total victory, due either to the insufficiency of means, or

because this aim would imply an effort disproportionate to the goal itself, thus being

not cost-effective.

16 A.T. MAHAN. Naval Strategy, pages 19-20.

25

The second pillar of Strategy is the Ways, better known as Approaches, i.e. the

kind of action chosen, in order to achieve the Ends identified by the political

leadership. There are, of course, numerous and widely varied Approaches available

to leaders, ranging from virtual use of force (prevention, naval diplomacy/suasion –

which includes also humanitarian relief – show of force to exert pressure,

deterrence, economic action) to an actual use of force, which might be limited, or be

more comprehensive, as in the cases of intervention and invasion.

Usually, there are two main categories, the Direct Approaches, aimed at fighting

straightforwardly the enemy, in order to destroy his force, and the Indirect

Approaches, whose scope is to sap the strength of the opponent with time, through

actions not aimed directly at his force. A good instance is the Allied decision, in 1943,

to avoid a landing in France, as the German army were too powerful, but invading

Italy instead, thus gaining control of the Mediterranean sea, while forcing Germans

to guard all the coasts they held, for fear of an invasion. Also financing freedom

fighters, transnational terrorist groups or communities devoted to piracy is an

indirect approach, presently used against the Western countries, to avoid being

fingered out as enemies and be subject of retaliations.

Approaches are, in fact like a painter’s palette, a toolbox, as each among them

must be used appropriately; the problem is that humans, when they act, tend to fall

in love with some of them, and to discard others, regardless of the situation. A

26

Spanish proverb says, on this subject “When you have a hammer in your hand,

everything resembles a nail”. Unfortunately, a hammer is seldom useful to fix an

electric circuit; therefore, only by knowing each among the Approaches in depth, it

will be possible to use them appropriately, thus achieving the aims of the political

leadership.

The third pillar is the Means, the material element which allows to put in practice

what has been decided. In many countries, the build-up of appropriate means has

been an activity often underestimated by the political leaders when there was time,

with the result of incurring in bitter defeats. The two opposite instances are, on one

extreme, the neglect of the US Navy in the early XIX century, by the Congress, with

the result that whenever a dispute occurred with France and Great Britain, the US

were forced to heed and forget the Monroe Doctrine; at the other extreme there is

the US decision to provide more forces than planned, for the Allied landing in

Normandy, forces which proved vital to overcome the German reaction.

The Means, in fact, cannot be improvised, as they require years to be developed

and used effectively. This problem, which is common to the military and to industry

– think at how many years are needed to develop a new model of car - is the subject

of Force Planning. Its three most used methods are: one based on the assessment

of the strength and the kind of actions your enemy (or a competitor) is expected to

do, and therefore defines the set of means which will better neutralize and defeat

27

him, or even discourage him from pursuing aggressive aims. This method was used

during the Cold War, as there was a known enemy – the Soviet Union – and all

efforts were spent to contain him.

When there is not a well defined threat, others methods are needed, as the

method of Force Planning based on “Operational Scenarios”: a spectrum of possible

future scenarios – normally not related to real world politics - is envisaged, taking

care that their geographic aspects bear some resemblance to real situations. Then

the type and amount of forces able to cope with these contingencies are

determined, with the help of computer assisted simulation, thus establishing a

coherent set of resources required.

This method is useful in multi-national organizations, during periods of

uncertainty, when it is prudent not to assign to any existing State the role of the

potential rogue; the inconvenience is that those preparing the computer simulations

have a significant role, as how a scenario is configured might in some cases influence

and distort the output.

The third method is based on the kind of “Missions” to be performed by the

forces. In order to determine their amount and features, some situations are

envisaged for each mission, based on previous experience; also in this case

computer simulation will provide the required output. This sort of planning is

normally preferred by single nations, where there is less sensitivity about which

28

opponent might be considered in the planning, and the missions of the

Administration branches are defined by law.

Also this system has some inconveniences, as it tends to privilege the routine

activities, thus helping to create an instrument (a set of means) which has little

flexibility to cope with unforeseen situation - crises - so that there is the need to

complement it with some simulation about the international scenarios.

When speaking of Means, it is important to note that no planning is performed in

a vacuum: a set of means already exists, and no State has enough resources to scrap

them and build a completely different set anew. So any planning exercise will have to

reach compromises, between what is needed and what is available.

Also, no means can survive for long without support. Logistics, a term deriving

from the French language (“Logis” is a term for military lodging) is therefore

paramount, as it is the branch of Strategy which takes care of maintenance and

supplies. An American definition says that “Logistics is not everything, but

everything is nothing without Logistics”.

About the three pillars, taken together, an aspect has to be highlighted, i.e. that

they interact, thus having to be coherent among them: while it is evident that

without means nobody can act, and that greater ambitions imply more robust forces

– means therefore influence the attainment of the objectives – it is less immediate

to note that the Ways influence the attainment of the political aim. For instance, a 29

limited aim requires the use of limited force and vice versa, lest the reaction might

be overwhelming.

A historical instance will help consolidate these concepts.

The Bible and Strategy

Looking well inside the Bible, it is possible to understand that strategic thinking

was not uncommon, even in these times: in fact, Strategy was born in the Orient, as

the civilizations were more developed and thus more complex relations existed

among the various stakeholders, kingdoms, potentates or tribes. Two instances are

worth being highlighted, as they will be relevant to our course.

First of all comes the metaphor of the “Tower of Babel”. The effect of the building

constructed against the will of our Lord was that humans lost the capability to speak

the same language and understand each other. Mind you, in ancient Palestine the

numerous tribes and nations belonged to different ethnic groups - many among

them being settlers left behind after the invasion by a foreign population – thus they

spoke different languages, reasoned differently had their own priorities. Summing

up, Palestine was a miniature version of a multi-polar world.

As there were too many actors in that limited space, the Super-Power of the

moment – be it Babylon, Egypt of Rome – decided to weed the area from time to

30

time, when the struggles became too serious, by deporting some among the

populations away (the Israelis were not the only victims of that policy).

In order to remain there, the Israelis had therefore to know other languages,

traditions and mindsets, whenever they wanted to establish positive relations with

their neighbors, or they needed to assess what they were plotting against them: only

a knowledge in depth of the others, in fact, was the factor allowing Israelis to either

prevail over their neighbors by violent means or to live in peace with them.

When resorting to violence, the Israelis fought in their own way: they “do not

fight for their faith, they do it to survive. This means that war is a sacred action, with

its ideology and specific rites, unlike other wars of that era, whereby the religious

aspect was only an incidental factor” 17. Having to cope with a difficult situation, it

was logical for the Israelis to give such an importance to war, as it was a struggle for

life.

In fact, “generally speaking, Israel strategy and tactics correspond to the situation

of the weak against the strong, of the less numerous against the many. This

situation has come up again with the re-constitution of the State of Israel in 1948.

The age-old teachings have not been lost, especially the care for the psychological

level of their own fighters, the detailed knowledge of the terrain and (most

17 Da A. CORNELI. Op. cit. pag. 29.

31

importantly) of the enemy”18. The only way to compensate inferiority in numbers

was to possess greater capabilities, and this was the constant worry of the Israeli

leaders.

If you read the pages on the fall of Jericho, you will also be impressed by the fact

that modern Israel might not have completely abandoned the temptation of sticking

to the concept of total war, most similar to this event, when the Israelis, after having

conquered it, “devoted to extermination everything existing in the town: men and

women, children and elderly, even cattle, sheep and donkeys, all were killed by

sword”19.

The fall of Jericho is therefore a good practical example of how Israelis, like any

other nation, are influenced by their traditions, their history and by the conditions of

the environment where they operate: extermination of their enemies was the only

way to gain essential space, ages ago, in overpopulated Palestine, and somehow the

same temptation exists in our days, as the Palestinian population grows at a quicker

pace than the Israelis. This shows the strength of Israel, but also its weakness, as

there are too many willing to see it disappearing from the Middle East, who are

waiting for the favorable moment to impart a fatal blow.

18 A CORNELI. Op. cit. pag. 30.

19 A. CORNELI. Op. cit. pg. 34.

32

Conclusions

To conclude, some remarks are worth being summarized. First, Strategy is a

useful guide for the decision-makers, provided that each respects the role of the

other actors. Too often top leaders, responsible for political decision, like to be

involved in the technical details, and conversely too many managers and generals

tend to invade the field of politics, in their action. In both cases, as experience tells,

the result is defeat.

The second remark is that no strategic theory, and no planning is completely free

and neutral, as they are influenced by two factors. One is the spirit of the times, in

German “Zeitgeist”; for instance, the scholars looked at strategic problems with a

different eye than those of our times, and the same will happen in the future. It

would therefore be a mistake to read a classic of Strategy outside its historical

context. The other factor is that –as it was mentioned earlier - in each civilization

ethics, traditions, philosophy are often different from others, and they influence the

strategic thought more than it is apparent. Also in this case, books on Strategy

written in different parts of the world must be read after having gained a sufficient

knowledge on the civilization they represent, lest they might be grossly misread.

Knowledge of others, be they allies, enemies or friends, is therefore essential: if you

don’t know their roots, their traditions and their history, as well as the conditions

affecting their behavior, any strategic plan will be flawed, and defeat might follow.

33

CHAPTER TWO

WESTERN POST- WORLD WAR II STRATEGIES

The uneasy friendship: USA and USSR

The process of defining a strategy to “win the peace”, once having gained victory in

the war against the Axis, took place in Washington, more than in other allied

capitals, already while the conflict was ongoing. Since the beginning, it became clear

that this process would somehow imply a significant departure from neutralist

conceptions, unchallenged in the USA before the drama of Pearl Harbor.

Until that moment, the US had intended to “use its technological maturity not in

pursuit of world power or to provide increased leisure or social security, but to

expand the level of private consumption”20. The white population of the USA, in fact,

was composed mostly by immigrants who had fled a war-torn Europe, while the

blacks had been captured and deported mostly on board of European vessels, to

work as slaves; both looked therefore at their new country as the territory of peace

and new opportunities, while still nurturing deep suspicion – many generations later

- toward the Old Continent, which had been the cause of sufferings for their

ancestors.

20 W. W. ROSTOW. The United States in the World Arena. Harper & Brothers, 1960, page 8

34

The “standard practice” had therefore been, since the US independence, to keep a

detached attitude towards the endless struggles taking place among European

powers, taking care of minimizing their impact on the nation’s vital interests –

maritime commerce and MONROE Doctrine being the most historically relevant -

without taking sides as much as possible.

US Congress refusal to keep the nation in a prominent role, after WWI, which

materialized both in her withdrawal from the League of Nations and in the

“Neutrality Law”, had been coherent with this longstanding attitude. The outcome,

however, was disappointing, as the new international structure, designed by

President WILSON to keep peace, became in fact utterly unable to perform its role,

due to the profound dissent among Europeans, while the USA found that their

economy was not waterproof, as the repercussions of any crisis were significant on

both sides of the Ocean.

The situation, though, had drastically changed since December 1941, with the US

being dragged into the struggle, and almost all national leaders, from President

ROOSEVELT to Secretaries HULL and STIMSON, as well as the public opinion, were

now convinced that the US “rejection of the League of Nations (in 1920 had been) a

historical error and now looked to participation in an international organization for

peace after the war”21.

21 Ibid. page 46

35

All of them understood also that this new approach implied a number of

commitments and engagements to an unprecedented scale, and were ready to

accept the burdens inherent in the US position as one among the key world leader.

There was, in this predicament, also the consideration that such a strategy would

have allowed the US industry, whose wartime production rate was relevant, to find

markets in Europe and Asia, where to place the excess of production, as the nations

of those continents were prostrated after the bitter struggle which had taken place

in their territories.

The second factor taken into account was the assessment made already in 1942

that: “the successful termination of the war will find a world profoundly changed in

respect of relative national military strengths. After the defeat of Japan, the United

States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude.

This is due in each case to a combination of geographical position and extent” 22. The

planners were in short looking at a bi-polar world, hoping that the two poles would

not end up being at loggerheads.

For this reason, as President TRUMAN wrote in his memories, “general MARSHALL

and I, in discussing each military phase, agreed that if we were to win the peace

after winning the war, we had to have Russian help”23, to build both the new world

22 P. KENNEDY. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Fontana Press, 1989, pages 459-460.

23 W. W. ROSTOW. Pages 115-116.36

order and an international structure – more effective than the League of Nations –

which would have allowed managing the crises around the world.

Unfortunately, as “it takes two to tango”, the US government did not monitor closely

the moves of their principal ally, to make sure that he shared the same principles

and intents, so to make cooperation possible. It therefore happened that, while the

pragmatic British government actively tried to reach with STALIN a post-war

settlement – according to a realistic power share approach - through a meeting in

Moscow on October 9, 1944, President ROOSEVELT declined to participate and sent

a message of good wishes for the success of the meeting, without bothering further

about it. He was wrong, as in Moscow, CHURCHILL proposed a division of the Balkans

in two zones of respective influence, with the USRR having the 90% of influence in

Rumania and 75% in Bulgaria, UK being predominant in Greece, while Yugoslavia and

Hungary should experience a 50-50 influence between East and West.

This approach by UK was the classic attempt to reach an agreement about respective

areas of influence among contenders, as they had no confidence in STALIN. This

suspicious attitude was known to such a point that – to repeat the semi-jocular

words of President ROOSEVELT – they “were perfectly willing for the United States to

37

have a war with Russia at any time”24, to check its expansionism and to force the

Soviets to remain on the defensive.

The US underlying conception was instead quite different, being focused on allowing

all freed countries to decide on their future through self-determination and

democracy, and did faithfully believe that the USSR would follow the same approach,

by allowing free and fair elections to decide the kind of government. Therefore it

seems strange that nobody in the US government –when informed about the deal -

understood the implications and the risks of what had been done.

In fact, while both UK and US governments intended to keep the two issues of

influence and of the character of the political regime separated, STALIN, instead, was

attempting to take direct political control of the largest possible portion of Eastern

Europe he could, starting from the areas occupied by the Red Army, where

communist regimes had to be put in place: this way he would have created a sort of

belt, a buffer protecting the Russian territory from the risk of a sudden invasion, i.e.

what the Soviet Union lacked in 1941, when USSR suffered the German invasion.

Unfortunately, to have a reliable buffer, the chief requirement was that the nations

involved should be totally loyal to Moscow.

It is fair to say that STALIN did not insist in going much beyond the sphere of

influence he deemed adequate to the security need of his country, as he ordered the 24 W. MILLIS (Ed.) The Forrestal Diaries, The Viking Press, 1951 page 36.

38

Italian communist leader, TOGLIATTI, to participate to coalition governments since

1944; also, when the general elections in 1948 saw the victory of the Christian

Democrats, he prescribed the Italian communists to limit their activity to the quest

for power through democratic means, even if they were armed and willing to start

guerrilla warfare. In Greece, too, STALIN – after having initially backed the local

communists – once the Moscow agreement was reached stopped supporting their

attempt to gain power and did not object when the British landed there a force to

end civil war by defeating communist guerrillas.

STALIN had also another problem: his nation had suffered tremendous human

losses, estimated between 20 and 25 millions, both military and civilians, and had to

show his people that their efforts in the “Great Patriotic War” were bringing

significant rewards, in particular to reverse “the disastrous post-1917 slump in

Russia’s position in Europe”25. In particular, the annexations, immediately carried on

by USSR, first of the Baltic States, and then of significant territories snatched from

Finland, Rumania, East Prussia and Rumania, restored the territorial integrity of

Russia, as it had been under the regime of the Tsars, without any consideration

about their populations’ will, and were intended to show how much the struggle had

been useful.

25 P. KENNEDY. Page 465.

39

He also showed how he understood the spirit of the Moscow agreement by ordering

- through his First Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, VYCINSKY - king MICHAEL of

Rumania, on February 27, 1945, to disband the coalition government he had formed;

the following second of March a communist government took power, backed by the

Red Army, and the king was exiled, as he was too young and popular to be executed.

This was already a powerful instance that a profound divergence of aims existed, but

the case of Poland was even more telling. After several discussions, both at Yalta and

Potsdam, and a sharp exchange of letters between President TRUMAN and STALIN

about the future of that derelict nation and her borders, it had been agreed that a

government of national union would have been empowered in Warsaw, and that the

CURZON line, proposed in 1919 but never sanctioned, would become the nation’s

eastern border, thus depriving Poland of almost 135,000 square kilometers to the

USSR advantage.

The Soviets, however, in the one and a half year following the Potsdam summit, did

not remain idle: “the communists took gradually the power in Poland, until (they

prevailed through) the rigged elections of February 1947; in Autumn 1947,

MICOLAJCZYK (the former head of the exiled Polish government in London), long

since forced to be politically impotent, fled the country, to avoid being arrested”26.

26 Ibid. page 160.

40

The reaction among Western allies was not strong enough, as “while for CHURCHILL

the European balance was at stake in Poland, for the Americans, as HOPKINS

explained to STALIN, Poland was only a symbol”27. The US government, in fact, was

attempting to gain the full support of the Soviet Union for their project of the United

Nations, and did not want to allow any particular issue to interfere with their effort

in that direction.

Poland became therefore a communist country, as the US refused to put pressure on

STALIN, notwithstanding a powerful letter written by CHURCHILL to President

TRUMAN. In fact, as the Red army occupied the territory between the rivers Oder

and Elbe, thus controlling the eastern part of Germany, no military intervention was

possible in Poland, and the minor Western allies had to accept this defeat at face

value.

The reason for this apparent lack of US interest in the post war settlement laid also

in another problem, which hindered any practical implementation by the US of their

“Grand Strategy”. President ROOSEVELT had a peculiar method of ruling: “when he

found that a government office was inadequate to his aims, he rarely tried to reform

it according to the needs, he established instead a new bureau which overtook its

duties or submitted it to the pressure of competition”28.

27 Ibid, page 162.

28 Ibid. page 75.41

The most powerful instance of this policy was that State Department was not used

enough as an instrument for political planning and coordination, in spite of the fact

that a “consultative Commission on post-war foreign policy, including many first rate

personalities and high State Department officials, started its proceedings in February

1942”29. The Pentagon instead had a greater role in post-war planning, as it

controlled the Commanders-in-Chief of the various theaters of war; therefore the

President preferred to speak directly with the military, even bypassing the Service

Secretaries in some occasions. Military planning, though, was dominated by

concerns about the fighting which was still ongoing, so it was influenced too much

by short-term considerations and imperatives.

Another habit of President ROOSEVELT was that, when he had to appoint someone

to positions bearing major responsibilities, including to those related to post-war

foreign politics, he selected persons chosen among the members of several special

organizations which had participated to the war effort, mostly managers. While

these persons were outstanding in their own domain, they lacked the skill and

experience of the diplomats, when dealing with other international actors. This habit

is still present, as many US Ambassadors appointed after US presidential elections

are not State Department officials.

29 Ibid. page 173.

42

The result was that, in spite of the great ROOSEVELT conceptions, US

implementation policy of the future settlement of Europe was dominated by short

term military and economic considerations, and the major decisions were taken by

the generals and managers, including those related to occupied Germany, without

any questions about what the future could bring about.

The final weakness factor for the US was due to the knowledge by STALIN of some

peculiarities of the American situation, i.e. the deteriorating health of the President

and the domestic pressure for a quick de-mobilization: according to some observers,

it was at Yalta that the Soviets, aware that President ROOSEVELT would soon leave

the stage, and assuming that American troops would withdraw from Europe shortly

after the end of hostilities, decided to push forward to achieve their aims.

In fact, the domestic political pressure to “bring the boys back home” as soon as

possible, especially in a country where elections take place every two years, was

already apparent, and the de-mobilization took place, at least partially, quite soon.

The Red Army, instead, remained at its wartime strength for some years, thus

creating a situation quite dangerous for the European countries, who were therefore

bound to heed, under the veiled threat posed by the Soviets.

In this situation, STALIN tried to go a little beyond what had been granted to him: as

if seizing almost one half of Europe were not enough, he tried to force Turkey to

grant a new Convention of the Straits, with more favorable terms to Moscow: since

43

ages, Russia first and the USSR later had insisted to close the Black Sea to non-littoral

countries, by drastically limiting the passage of foreign warships through the Turkish

Straits.

All attempts, though, had proven unsuccessful, notwithstanding the fact that Turkey

and the Bolsheviks had helped each other during their revolutions between 1918-23,

and that a non aggression pact existed among the two countries since March 16,

1921, when the Treaty of Moscow had been signed, committing also each party to

refrain from subversive activities in the territories of the other.

As the issue had been discussed during the Conference of Yalta, but the other allies

were so unenthusiastic that no conclusion was reached, in order to force the issue,

STALIN started pressuring Turkey in June 1945, few months after the Conference,

“for a revision of the agreements of Montreux, with an indication that they would

like to detach Turkey from the orbit of British influence”30. The proposal also included

a request for some unilateral border adjustments, which were flatly refused by

Ankara.

In Summer 1946, then, STALIN made another move, and denounced the non-

aggression treaty; also, as reported by Secretary FORRESTAL: “the Russians began

making their representations to Turkey on the Dardanelles (again, but) the

appearance of American war vessels in the Mediterranean was followed by the first 30 W. MILLIS (Ed.) The Forrestal Diaries, page 71.

44

amiable utterances of Premier STALIN in late September”31. The issue was therefore

closed, and the USSR gave up the attempt to shut the Black Sea to non-littoral

nations; however, this contention led Turkey to abandon her neutrality status, thus

joining first the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Greece, and later applying for NATO

membership. The pressure by STALIN had achieved the opposite effect!

In Germany, however, it is evident that, while the US political aims were well set, no

objectives had been defined, and no examination of the factors – which could

indicate the feasibility of the aims themselves – was performed, while operations

progressed. The situation which had resulted, in fact, was what Great Britain feared

the most, as the government knew from history that “a Soviet Union which

commanded the territory between the Curzon Line and the (river) Elbe would

immediately succeed to Hitler, the Kaiser, Napoleon and of the long line of those

who, by threatening the European balance of power, threatened British survival”32.

Most importantly, there was not any timely reassessment, once Germany was

defeated, about which allied nation were in consonance with the US aims, and what

goals each of them pursued: the ROOSEVELT Administration, in particular, was

hampered by its unquestioned assumption that USSR would be available to help the

31 Ibid, page 258.

32 W. W. ROSTOW, page 110.

45

USA in the pursuance of their great project of finding a new world order; in fact,

both were against colonial empires and preached “Democracy” but the underlying

ideology was sharply different, and not having spotted how much communist

conceptions were different from those of American Liberalism was a most serious

blunder.

Only in Summer 1946 Washington eventually had to acknowledge that the USSR was

following a different course, less idealistic and more close to the classic “realpolitik”

approach, thus being an unreliable partner to reform the European landscape. This

left the US in an awkward position, with the risk of finding themselves isolated and

without any reliable ally in the old continent, while having to deal with an over-

confident Soviet Union, turned from best friend to worst enemy, at least in the mind

of the top American officials.

They therefore found out that the strategy followed by STALIN had been basically the

attempt to get quickly as many gains and territories as he could snatch in the short

term, within his agreed area of influence and then trying to go slightly beyond it,

being ready to withdraw whenever a firm reaction was apparent, as in the cases of

Greece and Turkey, and became determined to thwart his attempts, as much as

possible, as STALIN attitude indicated his lack of confidence in a possible post-war

collaboration with the Western countries, still seen by him as “capitalist”, thus bound

to oppose the drive toward a widespread communist revolution.

46

Unfortunately, this revision process came slightly late, as it had taken almost two

years to the US Administration to understand that their best partner was trying to

trick them, notwithstanding the alarmed messages by HARRIMAN, the US

Ambassador in Moscow, who had well perceived the approach STALIN was following,

while reassuring his allies during the conferences.

The Europeans

As we have seen, the approach followed by the British government was quite classic,

and the same can be said about France: both nations were trying to tackle the

problems of the post-war order in a conservative way, and in particular they were

both attempting to retain their colonial empires, the main source of their wealth.

This approach was deeply embarrassing for the US, as anti-colonialist feelings were

part of their culture, and sharp debates over this issue had raged between

Republicans and Democrats since the conquest of the Philippines, in 1898. In fact,

the behavior of the US, when they invaded North Africa and kept the French colonial

regime intact, “was something of a shock to those whose view of international

affairs was dominated by the canons of Western liberalism (and saw) that American

weight could even briefly be thrown behind a reactionary status quo, that

expediency could so easily triumph over evident long-run principle”33.

33 W. W. ROSTOW. Page 94.

47

Such a feeling became even stronger when the USA supported and rearmed France

in 1946, thus backing her bid to regain possession of Indochina, which the Vichy

regime had lost in 1941 to Japan, and after the latter’s retreat in 1945 had briefly

become an independent State. Its leader, HO CI MIN had even tried to be received

by the State Department, in order to convince the USA to keep the newborn nation

independent, but nobody in the Department had accepted to receive him.

These two controversial decisions were also due to the UK pressure to have France

restored as a strong military power, thus becoming a possible stalwart against

Russia: that country’s economy was in shatters, after “four years of plundering by

the Germans, followed by months of large scale fighting”34, and was dependent upon

foreign financial aid, something her President, general DE GAULLE, resented but had

to accept. The British hope was that the re-conquered colonies would have restored

French wealth in few years, a delusion which also applied to CHURCHILL forlorn

hopes of doing the same.

Therefore, apart from the loss of the old mandate over Syria and Lebanon, which

had been granted her by the League of Nations, France was helped to regain control

of all her colonies. “To many outside observers, especially the Americans, this

attempt to regain the trappings of first-class power status while so desperately weak

economically – and so dependent upon American financial support – was nothing

34 P. KENNEDY page 471.

48

more than a folie de grandeur”35. Nonetheless, the US government helped this folly

to proceed until its bitter end, in Indochina and later in Algeria.

While France attempted to restore her power with other nations’ help, in UK a

momentous change occurred in late Spring 1945, when the general elections gave

unexpectedly a landslide victory to the Labor Party, and its leader, Clement ATTLEE,

became Prime Minister. His priorities were different, as he wanted “creating a

welfare state, improving domestic standards of living, moving to a mixed economy

and closing the trade gap”36. However, at the same time he had to maintain large

armed forces, both in the face of the Soviet Union behavior and to attempt

controlling the vast colonial empire, shaken by revolts and internecine struggles.

The choice he made was close to what Norman ANGELL had preached in vain just

before WWI. This British intellectual was convinced that “a nation could not advance

its fortunes through warfare. First, a nation that visited devastation on a trading

partner would harm its own prosperity. It would be commercially suicidal to damage

or destroy a foreign market. Second, military conquest would disrupt the

international financial system, with long-lasting repercussions throughout the

globalized world. Third, any attempt to exact a large indemnity from a defeated

35 Ibid. page 472.

36 Ibid. page 474

49

nation would be economically ruinous for both parties. Fourth, it would be

impossible to use naval power to seize a nation’s carrying trade. Fifth, the example of

the smaller, militarily weak European nations showed that, contra MAHAN, the

wealth, prosperity and well-being of a nation depend in no way upon its political

power. Sixth, the British Empire would be better off if it no longer bore the expenses

of defending its overseas possessions”37.

In fact, both World Wars had given proof that at least some among ANGELL

considerations were true, and the UK government, unable to advance at the same

time both his domestic agenda and the efforts to keep an increasingly unruly empire,

decided to transform the latter into a loose community, where the members would

have been self-ruled.

That way 600 million people became independent, even if other 172 remained

under British rule. The present British Commonwealth started taking shape in these

days, thus bringing UK ideologically closer to the USA, even if it ended up as a

second-rate power. How inevitable this process was received a significant

demonstration when, in 1952 the Labor Party lost the elections, and the Tories, led

first by CHURCHILL and later by Anthony EDEN attempted to keep what remained of

the British Empire, with the only result of accelerating its collapse.

37 J. R. HOLMES and T. JOSHIHARA. Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge Series, 2008, page x.

50

The Tories, in fact, were fully aware that American feelings were not favoring this

attempt. In the words of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn LLOYD, “Americans were

loyal and dependable allies but underneath there was in many Americans’ hearts a

dislike of colonialism, a resentment of any authority left to us from the great days of

our empire, and a pleased smile, only half concealed, at seeing us go down”38.

In fact, what had changed, as compared to the years of WWII and its immediate

aftermath, was that the previous help provided by the USA to France, ten years

earlier, to help her vain attempts to keep her colonies, notwithstanding the irritation

by the American public opinion, was unthinkable in the years 1950s. The USA would

not repeat this mistake a second time.

The other European nations were also in deep disarray, with their economies in

shatters, and looked only at improving the living conditions of the population,

fearing the latter’s growing sympathy for the communist ideology. Also the

resentments among each others, originated by the war, were a hindrance to pursue

a collaborative path, notwithstanding the US efforts favoring a united Europe.

In brief, Europe had been virtually canceled from the board of world power, and

risked heeding to Moscow pressures, thus becoming closer to USSR than to the USA.

However, also the European nations were slow in understanding their need to

38 D. NEFF. Warriors at Suez. Simon & Shuster, 1981, NY, page 19.

51

devise a strategy to ensure their unhindered recovery, and they basically tried to

reach their previous status, apart from reacting to the course of events.

The build-up of the new World Order

The great project of the US administration –as well as the main focus of activity of

the State Department consultative commission since 1942 - was, as we have seen, to

build a new international order which could keep peace in the world through the

concerted efforts by all its members, the so-called “Strategy of Structured

International Relations” aimed at improving the overall stability.

It was, this time, an institutionalization “vastly greater in scope than in the past,

dealing with issues of economic stabilization, trade, finance and monetary relations,

as well as political and security relations among the postwar allies”39. Its

comprehensiveness had been the result of a number of pressures, especially within

the USA, in favor of “an international trading system (because it) was central to

American economic and security interests and was also fundamental to the

maintenance of peace”40. The Department of State and its Secretary, Cordell HULL,

were the main supporters of this somehow selfish approach.

39 G. J. EIKENBERRY. After Victory. Princeton University Press, 2001, page163-164.

40 Ibid. page 176.

52

It was also felt by many scholars that “an American hemispheric bloc would not be

sufficient: the United States must have security of markets and raw materials in Asia

and Europe”41. The difference between the classic approaches by other WWII allies,

tending to build exclusive areas of influence, and the US design was therefore that

the latter aimed at co-opting others in sharing the benefits of unhindered trade, at

least in the long term. The first steps of globalization were made in those days

already!

These two schools of thought were merged to become the underlying concept

behind the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), as well as the General Agreement on Tariff

and Trade (GATT), the three pillars of the new economic order designed in

Washington.

It was not, however, a perfect plan, as it did not take into account the desperate

economic conditions of Europe. “The practical flaws in such arrangements were,

first, that the amount of money available was simply insufficient to deal with the

devastation caused by six years of total war; and, secondly, that a laissez faire system

inevitably works to the advantage of the country in the most competitive position –

in this case the undamaged, hyper-productive United States - and to the detriment

of those less well equipped to compete – nations devastated by war. Only the later

41 Ibid. page 179.

53

American perception of the twin dangers of widespread social discontent in Europe

and growing Soviet influence permitted funds to be released for the substantial

industrial re-development of the free world”42. The MARSHALL Plan was therefore

precisely aimed – besides achieving the rearmament of the Europeans - at rebuilding

the economies of the nations of the Old Continent, even if the reconstruction would

have allowed them to become commercial competitors of the USA.

The center stage of US efforts, though, was the build-up of the United Nations. All

allies were involved in the discussions, between October and November 1943, and

the outlines of the project were refined at Dumbarton Oaks, between August and

September 1944. The main US idea was a “continued negotiated accord among the

Big Three”43 major powers, thus naively rejecting from the start the idea that any

possibility of significant disputes might have existed among them. Also, other States

would have had the possibility to vote, according to democratic majority rules,

“although actions arising from such could not override a nation’s sovereignty”44.

The UN structure was, in fact, intended to eliminate “spheres of influence, alliances,

balance (of power) or any other of special arrangements through which, in the

42 P. KENNEDY, pages 463-464.

43 W. W. ROSTOW. Page 125.

44 Ibid.

54

unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their

interests”45, and replacing them by a sort of Directorate, composed by the three

major powers. On this point, the other allied nations paid lip service, as they were

still tied to the classic paradigm of international relations; their efforts were,

therefore to water down, since the beginning, the strength and effectiveness of the

US conceptions, when put in writing on the UN Charter.

Not all members of the US Administration, though, were optimistic. John Foster

DULLES, for instance, noted that “the questions for a viable machinery for world

peace have been perplexing the minds of statesmen for centuries and it was unwise

to assume they would be settled now overnight. He said that his own preference

was to start for the ideal but to have a foundation of hard reality”46. In practice,

DULLES advocated a careful examination of the strategic factors, and a thorough

assessment concerning the other powers’ conceptions and attitude, something

which was made only one year and a half later.

While UK and France, plus China – inserted in the directing group thanks to

American insistence – ceased making objections to the key US proposals, when the

latter gave up any idea of establishing a supra-national role for the UN, the Soviet

45 Ibid. page 126.

46 W. MILLIS (Ed.) The Forrestal Diaries. pages 41-42.

55

Union posed a lot of difficulties until the end of the process, as STALIN wanted

multiple votes for his nation, as well as seeking to minimize the power and influence

of the Assembly, to prevent “the possibility of mobilizing within the UN anti-Soviet

strength outside the Big Three context”47.

The same concern existed about the limitations to the power of veto, “in regard to

discussions of breaches of international good conduct”48, a potential tool against

USSR, as the Soviets’ ruthless process of imposing communist regimes upon all

countries occupied by the Red Army had raised more than an eyebrow. Eventually,

the Soviet representatives withdrew their objections on veto powers at the last

moment, just before the UN Inauguration Conference of San Francisco, and

participated to the ceremony, which they had threatened to boycott, should their

views not be taken into account (i.e. their positions had not been accepted in full!).

All in all, the framework of the UN was established more or less as the USA had

intended, albeit with some compromises, and the struggle of the Soviet Union

continued at a lower level, with the result that some elements of the new

Organization, most notably the Military Staff Committee, were never implemented.

However, non-participation to the new world order would have hindered a big part

47 W. W. ROSTOW. 126.

48 W. MILLIS (Ed.). The Forrestal Diaries, page 67.

56

of the gains achieved, so that USSR wisely decided to keep a relatively low profile on

the UN issue. It is therefore fair to say that simply the fact that the UN still exist and

is capable of quelling at least some of the ongoing struggles is a tribute to American

idealism, patience and determination.

The path toward Cold War

The gradual worsening of US-USSR relations, as a consequence of the latter’s

expansionism, is the founding reason of NATO, accepted by President TRUMAN

when he was eventually forced to revise the pro-Soviet approach followed until that

moment by the Democratic Administration.

It is fair to say that the new President, since he took power after the death of

his predecessor, had already increasingly mixed feelings about Russian attitude, and

the initiatives undertaken by STALIN reinforced his doubts. He was, however,

determined not to break the cooperative relation between the two countries, at

least until the United Nations were established. He therefore continued the policy of

his predecessor, notwithstanding his growing misgivings.

He had in mind, in fact, the message CHURCHILL had addressed to him, on May

12, 1945:

“which will be the situation in one or two years? At that time the American and British

Armies will be de-mobilized, the French will still be far from being organized on a vast scale, while

57

Russia might decide to keep two or three hundred divisions active. An Iron Curtain has fallen in

front of them: we ignore everything happening behind it”49.

We don’t know the reaction of President TRUMAN to this telegram, but the

former British Premier was a tenacious person, and having lost the elections, he was

free from many commitments; one year later he therefore insisted on this subject,

“during his speech in Fulton, on March 5, 1946. In this occasion, he had made a

public plea to the English-speaking people, to have them checking the Soviet

ambitions”50 and reiterated the concept of the Iron Curtain, thus giving it a

worldwide fame.

It was precisely in this year that a strategic planning activity, to take into

account this negative evolution of the political landscape, started at bilateral level,

between UK and USA, whit the aim of defining, from time to time, the military

situation and the forces required, in order to allow that the consequent political

decisions be backed by a concrete element, force, without going beyond the domain

of what was feasible .

On September 3, 1946, Secretary FORRESTAL noted in his diary:

49 NATO. Documentazione. Ed. Notizie NATO, 1977. pg. 12.

50 W. van EEKELEN. Debating European Security. SDU Publishers, The Hague, 1998. pg. 1.

58

“Admiral RAMSEY reported to me today that at the meeting of the JCS with the British Army

and Navy representatives in Washington which took place last Friday (August 30), there was a

general discussion of the question I raised a fortnight ago, namely, what this country and the

British had available with which to meet an emergency should it arise. It developed that no very

definitive plans had been evolved because no one had raised the question. Admiral LEAHY kept

insisting that there should be specific and definite answers, particularly in the way of clear and

precise planning for movements in Europe and for support.

The British agreed that they would send over their top planners from the Army, Navy and Air

Forces and that the meeting should be held in Washington. They were, however, most

apprehensive about security and felt that the meeting should be on an informal basis. The most

important problem would be how to get MCNARNEY’S people (the American occupation troops)

out of Germany and how to support British and Americans in the Trieste area”51,

should a Soviet attack take place.

The American initial assessment is noteworthy, as it shows that they were

considering – in case of withdrawal from Germany in a hurry – to retreat through

Western Austria, occupied by their troops, should a Soviet offensive take place,

while it is equally clear that no retreat was envisaged from the Italian north-eastern

border, where FORRESTAL wanted to examine the feasibility of resisting, in order to

use Italy as the support base in case of withdrawal and, possibly, as a bridgehead for

a counter-offensive.

51 W. MILLIS (Ed.). The Forrestal Diaries. Page 198.

59

Few days before, on August 22, there had also been the visit by Admiral

MITSHER, who was on the verge of taking the Command in Chief of the US Atlantic

Fleet, to London. During a discussion with the First Sea Lord, Admiral CUNNINGHAM,

after his briefing on “the politico-military problems of the Mediterranean and on

how the British tried to manage them, (the British Admiral added that they) were

unable to do so without a substantial help from the USA” and asked “the United

States to deploy (there) a significant number of ships, and aggregate them to the

small British naval force in Malta”52.

Quite naturally, the American Admiral replied that – should this deployment

take place – they would have taken command, as the majority of forces belonged to

the USA; his counterpart had to accept the point. Inevitably, the content of this

meeting was reported to Washington, as well as the reasons of British worries,

where Greece was upset by the civil war and the Soviet Union was pressuring

Ankara, as we have seen.

As if it were not enough, also Yugoslavia was showing an aggressive attitude

toward the Allies in the area of Trieste, and only an American ultimatum, on August

21, 1946, backed by the promise of including Yugoslavia among those benefitting

from the MARSHALL Plan, succeeded to bring TITO back to a more amenable

behavior, while the mass exodus of the Hebrews, all of them being survivors of the

52 E.B. POTTER. Admiral Arleigh Burke. Ed. Random House, NY, 1990. pg. 281-282.

60

German concentration camps, toward Palestine – notwithstanding the British

attempts to stop it – threatened to upset the precarious Middle East balance, thus

creating the conditions for the conflicts we all know.

The US Department of the Navy was quick to draw the conclusions: on

September 30, 1946, a press release – duly cleared with the State Department and

the White House - was issued. It said:

“Units of the American Fleet have been in the Mediterranean and will continue to be there in

the future to (1) support American forces in Europe; (2) carry out American policy and diplomacy,

and (3) for purposes of experience, morale and education of personnel of the Fleet”53. This was

the formal act sanctioning regular US Navy deployments, beyond a single heavy

cruiser - the only ship present until that moment; battleships and aircraft carriers,

which were later assembled in the 6th Fleet, were then stationed in the

Mediterranean, to influence events in the region.

This measure was part of the articulated plan, prepared after the US-UK

informal talks, which also envisaged that “(a) the United Kingdom should furnish

arms to Turkey and Greece. If the British can’t, we (the USA) should give the British

the arms needed to make the transfer; (b) we should extend credits not to exceed

53 W. MILLIS (Ed.). The Forrestal Diaries, page 211.

61

$10 million to Iran for the purchase of arms; (c) no further exceptions to the current

policy will be made unless essential to the national interest”54.

It is worth recalling that Iran was also included in the planning as the Soviet

Union, after having occupied that nation since 1941 – thus gaining access to the

warm waters, essential to get the Western armaments to fight Germany – was

delaying the withdrawal of the Red Army, using all possible excuses; only in 1946

STALIN accepted to order his forces to leave that country, thus removing another

point of contention.

Summing up, in this worst-case planning, the Anglo – Americans had envisaged

the need, should an emergency arise, to establish a bridgehead in the

Mediterranean, ready to start again from that basin, once ready to react. In the

meantime, France – whose border on the Rhine would have become the frontier

between East and West, should the Allies had retreated from Germany – had been

provided with a relevant quantity of armaments, especially tactical aircraft, in order

to be able to withstand a Soviet attack on that front. However, nothing beyond this

kind of informal cooperation was considered at the moment.

This planning was, of course, fully endorsed by President TRUMAN, who

submitted to a united session of the Congress a bill to aid Turkey and Greece, on

March 12, 1947; he went, though, beyond the specific subject, by saying “I believe 54 Ibid. Pg. 216.

62

that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by external pressures. I

believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own

way”55.

His message was a turning point in US policy, as it announced the US intent to

intervene in order to avoid any upsetting of the west Eurasian political balance, due

to the forces threatening that area, albeit through temporary and limited measures.

The Republican minority, in fact, objected to this aid bill by saying that the issue

should be referred to the United Nations, a measure whose effectiveness appeared

rather dubious. Clearly, the United States were not ready yet to undertake any

formal engagement to defend Europe.

After some debate, US Congress authorized a significant amount of funding for

this scope, i.e. “400 million dollars of aid to Greece and Turkey”56. Is was not

sufficient, though, as it was impossible for the USA to hinge on the Mediterranean,

being based on these two countries only, as they were too far advanced in the basin,

but also isolated from occupied Germany. Not surprisingly, Admiral NIMITZ made a

55 W. W. ROSTOW. Page 208.

56 NATO. Documentation, page 17.

63

statement in April 1947, in the days when the Moscow conference on the peace

treaty with Germany failed.

He said that “Italy was a highly important country for the United States, and

everything had to be made to help her recovery and to assist reconstructing her

armed forces”57. The Italian government, on his side, was able to timely sign the

peace treaty, overcoming a violent discussion in Parliament, so that it entered in

force on the following September 15. This was the enabling condition for the military

aid, which started flowing rapidly in the country in the following months, thus

providing the Allies with a suitable staging base.

From the Western European Union to NATO

In that contingency, some European countries had decided meanwhile to take

collectively all possible measures to ensure their defense against the threat of a

Soviet invasion. This had been possible thanks to the MARSHALL Plan, a compromise

between the selfish KENNAN doctrine and the openness of the proposal made by

CLAYTON, who argued that “the United States could not prosper if the world were a

poorhouse”58. Nonetheless, the plan was a promise for a quick economic recovery of

the European nations, who thus became more confident to check the growing

57 W. MILLIS (Ed.). pg. 265.

58 W. W. ROSTOW, page 210.

64

pressure of the Soviet forces, still numerous on the eastern bank of the river Elbe,

and on a war footing.

First of all, a number of European bodies were established, to coordinate the

efforts to improve the economic situation, most notably the European Community of

Carbon and Steel (CECA), which allowed the participating countries to sign

agreements whereby carbon was granted at a reduced prize to those nations who

provided manpower for the mines existing in the areas of northern France, Belgium,

Luxemburg and the Limburg region of the Netherlands.

Then, two more organizations were established, almost at the same time: first,

the Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe (OECE), based in Paris, with

the task of coordinating the distribution of the aids provided by the Marshall Plan.

The second was the Western European Union (WEU), whose scope was to enable

mutual defense, as well as the collective protection of vital interests.

The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg were

the founders, and they invited Italy and Western Germany to join since the outset.

As German rearmament was the only way to achieve a “critical mass” in collective

defense, but France was strongly opposed to it, the way ahead to assuage Paris

concerns was found in a German rearmament within a collective and binding

framework. The treaty of Brussels, signed on March 17, 1948, shortly after the

communist coup in Prague, sanctioned this new structure, which received the formal

65

verbal support from Washington, still reluctant to undertake binding commitments

in Europe, but strongly in favor of an European Federation.

The WEU was in fact the product of the efforts spent by British Foreign Minister

BEVIN. He had spoken about his project of a Western Alliance to Secretary MASHALL

already in December 1947, receiving a rather discouraging response, as his

interlocutor “signaled his interest in the plan but later indicated that the United

States could not presently make any commitments”59. Few months later, BEVIN

insisted, by arguing that “European defense efforts would not be possible without

American assistance”60, always without success.

Immediately, the WEU started pressuring the USA to join the treaty. At first,

American position was that “the President should make a fair statement giving his

blessing to the organization but without formalizing it in a form of a treaty or even a

protocol”61, as “the Western Union nations must display energy and competence in

the perfection of their own plans before (the US) give any indication of the scope or

degree of our support”62. Too many Congressmen and Senators, led by Senator

59 G. J. IKENBERRY, pages 194-195.

60 Ibid.

61 W. MILLIS (Ed.). The Forrestal Diaries, page 422.

62 Ibid. page 434.

66

VANDENBERG, were in fact opposed to a binding US commitment toward Europe, to

allow a prompt positive response.

However, the US leaders had to change their mind, and to become committed

to common European defense, as two major events had occurred in these months.

The first was the communist coup in Prague, on February 24, 1948, whose pro-

Western government, lead by the great personalities of BENEK and MASARYK had

been dramatically toppled: with the Red Army placed both in Czechoslovakia and in

Eastern Austria, the chances for an orderly withdrawal of American troops from

Germany to Italy became slim, as they would have been under a permanent flanking

threat throughout their movements.

The second event which followed shortly was the Soviet decision to interdict

the railway lines and the highways connecting Berlin to the Western Germany

occupation zone, held by the other WWII Allies, on June 24, 1948. While the US

Commander-in-Chief, general CLAY, had proposed to challenge the Soviets, by

escorting the convoys carrying food and oil by a tank division, President TRUMAN

decided instead for an air bridge, which succeeded in avoiding starvation of the

West Berliners; the operation started the day following the blockade, and was

carried on for 462 days, with the Soviets multiplying harassing actions toward the

Western occupation troops in Berlin, but avoiding more aggressive actions.

67

These two events had a powerful effect on US Congress: in the first days of the

Berlin blockade, Senator VANDENBERG presented a resolution under his name, to

declare the US “association with European security efforts”63, which was voted with a

large majority. The Senator hoped that his resolution, in a moment when the US

Administration was increasingly paralyzed by the upcoming Presidential election, as

well as the US decision to prolong the occupation of Germany, were two powerful

enough reassurances for the Europeans, who continued nonetheless to insist for a

stronger US commitment.

In October 1948 the WEU nations agreed to send a formal “request for

negotiations with the United States on a North Atlantic treaty”64. One month later

President TRUMAN was re-elected and could not skip the issue any more, given the

unbearable situation of the Western Europeans, who felt the Soviet pressure and

feared an upheaval by their communist parties, whose consensus among the

population was growing. The basis of NATO were finally laid.

Conclusions

This troubled period has been for the strategists a source of many

considerations, as it was the typical instance of how the Western countries came

63 G. J. IKENBERRY, page 196.

64 Ibid. page 184.

68

close to losing the peace, after having won a terrible war. The causes of this situation

lay in a number of previous blunders, namely:

-Politics without Strategy. The great conceptions of the ROOSEVELT Administration

were not backed by an assessment of the underlying factors, especially as far as the

Soviet Union was concerned. It is fair to say that not only the USA kept being over

reliant on the USSR “good faith”, in spite of all evidence, but also the Labor

government in London woke up quite late on the Soviet threat, notwithstanding – or

due to – CHURCHILL warnings. In short, politics were not backed by a strategic

process whereby the situation was monitored and the required policy adjustments

were performed in an iterative way.

Uncle JOE , as STALIN was called, was simply pursuing his nation’s vital interests:

he had seen the German Army, at the end of WWI, occupying parts of his country,

and wanted to build a “security belt” around Russia. Also, like any good trader, he

tried to go a bit beyond what had already been granted to him, albeit being ready to

withdraw if the opposition were too strong. But he had behaved like that since the

beginning of the alliance with the Anglo – American powers and none among his

Allies, except CHURCHILL, had apparently noticed it – and taken countermeasures –

before Poland and Czechoslovakia fell under Moscow influence.

- Alliance versus Coalition: the USA were drawn into WWII much against their will,

and they brought into it the full strength of their industrial power, their idealism and

69

their attention to the economic aspects. When the moment to re-build the world

controlling structures, they were convinced that their Western Allies would have

fully agreed with the US-sponsored principles and practice, something which is

possible in Alliances, where values and principles are agreed beforehand, while the

same process is not possible for Coalitions. In a certain sense, among the

disappointing responses received, the US were lucky to find at least one ally, ATTLEE,

who shared many of those values, but this was not enough to build the new world

structure.

- The Issue of Interdependence: when the Allies, heavily influenced both by

ROOSEVELT and STALIN, took in Casablanca the decision to accept only the

unconditional surrender from the enemy, they did establish the pre-conditions for a

complete destruction of Europe, as it would have become the battlefield of a

merciless struggle.

Only once having done that, it became clear to the Allies that they had forgotten

what CLAYTON and before him ANGELL had said about the economic

interdependence between winners and losers. As a consequence, the US found

themselves in a dilemma: they either had to support a quick reconstruction, or the

populations would have joined the communist ideology, as they had no more

possessions to defend. Empty stomachs do not digest western liberalism!

70

-Self Determination of the countries, not only those freed from German occupation,

but also those under colonial rule, was a key ideal for the US. However, due to the

strategic landscape which was changing rapidly, military considerations overtook the

political aim to fully apply this paradigm outside Europe and limited the drive of US

and UK troops to the East.

The US, in fact, kept their eyes shut - until it was too late - on Soviet behavior, as the

1945 project of a rapid advance to Berlin and the river Oder was discarded, in favor

of an offensive toward Bavaria, the region where the US military deemed the Nazis

would have attempted their last resistance. Therefore, any hope of influencing the

fate of Poland was lost, already in 1945.

Summing up, the USA did not monitor the developments of the situation, from 1944

to 1948, with a critical eye, as they gave for granted too many things about their

Allies’ behavior. While it was already evident to the Europeans that no hope existed

to establish a “Diarchy” with the Soviet Union, the ROOSEVELT Administration

persisted in this belief until it was quite late.

71

CHAPTER THREE

COLD WAR AND NATO. MASSIVE RETALIATION

The Strategic Framework

The five WEU founding nations (UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and

Luxemburg) were a strange group of partners, as none was militarily powerful,

except Great Britain, all were economically broken and they also were in a difficult

geo strategic situation, as they would have had problems to counter an invasion by

the USSR. The only line where a cohesive defense would have been possible was in

fact the river Rhine, which could be easily outflanked from the south of it, through

Austria, Switzerland, and then Southern Germany – the area of Ulm, where the

springs of the Rhine and of the Danube are.

The inclusion of Italy among the WEU countries allowed therefore gaining

control of one significant portion of the Mediterranean Sea, but also having a better

depth in defense, as the Red Army could not proceed toward the Ulm gap without

risk, while bypassing Italy. However, with that decision another broke country had

been added, so that WEU resembled more to a “union between the blind and the

cripple” rather than being a stalwart, a bastion against the mounting wave of

communism.

72

It is therefore impossible to blame those, from Senator VANDENBERG down to

many US government officials, who suffered from the spleen of the good old times

of neutrality and felt that the United Nations Organization was already the maximum

effort feasible by the USA; however, it was clear that without the unreserved help of

the USSR – something which proved to be less likely day after day - no world order

could be kept. Even worse, should Europe fall under Soviet influence, the USA would

have found themselves constrained into the American continent by a communist

Europe – and a communist Asia as well, due to the ruinous defeats the Kuomintang

was suffering, in its war against MAO.

Given these alternatives, and considering that - should the USA remain only as

an external “Associate” of the WEU - they would have paid for European defense

without having command, also the Republicans became eventually aware that an

Alliance was the only convenient way ahead. Ironically, they fought until the last

moment to water down the collective defense clause – later known as Article 5 – in

order not to make it an automatic provision. Of course they could not foresee that

the only real world enactment of this Article would have occurred 52 years later,

precisely in favor of the USA, when the tragic 9/11 events occurred!

What strategy would have been possible to the newborn North Atlantic Treaty

Association? While diplomats and military leaders were refining the clauses and

debating the various structural issues, an Italian strategist, who had become quite

73

known between the World Wars, thanks to his book, “The Art of Naval Warfare”,

translated in many foreign languages, outlined the possible Western military

strategies to fight the USSR.

In a booklet published in June 1947, titled “The Next World Conflict” this

scholar, retired Admiral Oscar DI GIAMBERARDINO anticipated the substance of all

NATO plans during the following Cold War, as his work was based on a deep geo

strategic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the two opposed blocks, in

case of an open war. Of course, he envisaged a struggle between the Anglo –

Americans and the Soviet Union, as no project for a wider alliance among the

Western countries had materialized so far.

First of all, the author expressed a doubt: “will the two competitors for primacy

(USA and USSR) remain in peace within their respective zones of influence,

attempting tricks and ruses to weaken the opponent, while possibly looking daggers

at each other, or will they sooner or later fight on the ring?”65. As you can note, the

possibility that confrontation between the two blocks would be a “Cold War” – as in

fact it happened – was already something not to be discarded since the outset.

In case of war, however, after having warned against the delusion that the

atomic weapon could shorten the conflict, the author noted that “a Russian –

American war, under a strategic standpoint, is characteristically a struggle between 65 O. di GIAMBERARDINO. Il Prossimo Conflitto Mondiale. Ed. Danesi, 1947. pg. 26.

74

land and sea power, between the immensity of the steppe and the immensity of the

waters. Each contender has a vast space as his strength factor, where the other finds

impossible or at least has great difficulty to penetrate”66.

The first detailed aspect considered by the author was then the historical

interest Russia nurtured for a secure access to the “warm waters” since the times of

the Czars. Due to this interest, in an armed conflict between the two blocs, “Istanbul

represents the fulcrum of capital importance, and the two Western powers (UK and

USA) would suffer already an irreparable defeat should the Turkish Straits pass under

Russian control”67.

To defend them, the essential factor was to keep Greece within the Western

caucus, as a projection base. This statement shows how right was the approach

followed by the Allies, first to quell the civil war in Greece and later to support

Turkey when she was pressured by USSR, but more importantly to consider these

two countries as being interdependent, as far as the strategic aims of the Alliance

were concerned.

66 Ibid. pg. 27.

67 Ibid. pg. 29.

75

However, as the author noted, the race to the Straits was not the only option

available to Russia, to reach the warm waters, even if the difficulties would have

been greater. In fact:

“in Afghanistan a rugged zone, almost impassable, has to be crossed, before reaching the

plains of the Indo river and endanger India. (Much better) is the issue of the Iranian Azerbaijan,

where the Russians have extended their political influence (which is a step) of the clever progress

toward the southern margins of the mountain zone, in order to have an easy military access to

Iraq, namely to the oil rich zone of Mossul, thus blocking the pipelines going to the sea, at Tripoli of

Syria and Haifa ”68.

In fact, Soviet occupation of Iran during WWII, and later the “soft” policies of

USSR toward SADDAM in Iraq and the Ayatollahs in Iran, not to forget the invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979, when all other options were precluded, must be seen in the

context of this Russian imperative; therefore the Western reaction, aimed at

precluding Soviet access to the “Warm Waters” was not illogical, in these cases.

As far as a possible invasion of Europe was concerned, the author foresaw two

offensive axes, one against Italy, “starting from the area of Trieste and from Slovenia

(the so-called Ljubljana gap). Also the occupation of the whole Germany has to be

envisaged, with the possibility of a further advance more to the West” 69. The scope

68 Ibid. pg. 34.

69 Ibid. pg. 36.

76

of this offensive, however, “would be an attempt to move the zone of the main clash

against the Anglo – Americans as far away as possible from Russian territory,

something which would give a significant initial advantage to the Russians, unless

the opponents decide to refuse being lured in a strenuous defense of this area and

attack instead more to the east”70, from the sea, thus outflanking the Soviet

disposition, unbalanced as it would be, and causing its breakdown.

On the Soviet invasion of the Continent, however, the author had one well

founded caveat: “the limited capability by the Bolsheviks to keep and protect the

long lines of communication with the Western countries, once invaded, has to be

taken into account, notwithstanding the (fact that they will carry out an) intensive

exploitation of the local resources, with scant regard to the needs of the

populations”71. The “culminating point” of the Soviet offensive, therefore, would

have remained well distant from the Atlantic beaches, according to the author, and

this would not necessarily happen due to the Western defense only.

Summing up, a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe “is not at all an

offensive operation, as it might seem at first view, being instead a defensive action.

Offensive is carried against the real and principal enemy (USA in this case), not

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

77

against third parties, who might be in doubt whether siding with one or another of

the contenders”72 and, if invaded, would have no alternative than to resist. Of course,

the author was rightly not considering as a decisive factor the possibility for the

Soviets to exploit the conquered European countries – thus finding the resources to

prolong the offensive: in fact, at that time, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, they

were so prostrated that there was little to be pillaged.

Only in the successive decades, after the significant recovery in Europe, this

aspect was in fact taken into account in Soviet planning, and more precisely in the

late ‘70s, when a debate raged between the supporters of a preventive war, to

exploit the riches of the Old Continent, thus solving the disastrous conditions of the

Soviet economy on one side, and those who proposed instead an economic war, as it

was eventually carried on, through steel and maritime cargo dumping, on the other.

Instead, the Soviets could win only “through a land maneuver, aiming at

interdicting Western maritime communications through the Straits, i.e. Gibraltar,

Suez and the Dardanelles, thus shutting inside (the Mediterranean, now transformed

into) an inner sea, the large landing expeditions having entered the basin. Similarly,

with the conquest of Denmark, the Soviet troops could endanger any allied

72 Ibid. pg. 105.

78

expedition which would have penetrated the Baltic, to establish a bridgehead close

to the present western Russian borders”73.

Clearly, Gibraltar could be attacked only “if there had been in Spain a change of

government, with the advent of republicans with communist sympathies”74, a

political issue, which the author decided not to deepen; it is interesting, though,

how much the Western countries, and the USA in particular, took care of keeping

Spain close to our field, throughout the Cold War, first on a bilateral basis,

notwithstanding FRANCO’s dictatorship, and later by accepting her as a NATO

member, after his death.

In Asia, after having noted what we have already seen, regarding the Soviet race

to the warm waters, the author considered that military control of both India and

China would be impossible to the Soviets, “because their influence, even if (both

countries were) conquered by the Bolsheviks, would not significantly affect the

offensive capabilities of the Anglo – Americans, as the Russian territory could not be

violated”75 by an invasion starting from China. It is worth noting, though, that USSR

took great care of keeping India as a close friend, once relations with China had

73 Ibid. pg. 106.

74 Ibid. pg. 71.

75 Ibid. pg. 84.

79

turned to the worse, even if it proved impossible to draw her into a straightforward

alliance.

Last but not least, the author considers the Arctic Ocean, mentioning first of all

the great Soviet interest for that sea, since 1920, as the Arctic Institute of Leningrad

“had organized more than 250 hydrographic and oceanographic expeditions”76. The

author added: “it is highly probable that launching pads for missiles might be placed

there, as they would have numerous and important targets both in America and in

Eurasia”77 through the Polar cap. This was in fact what both the US and Soviets did

with their nuclear submarines, and the Arctic was for decades the silent theater of

an uninterrupted series of actions between submarines of both blocks, fortunately

without bloodshed.

The final assessment of the author over the Soviet possibilities of further

durable expansion is the most far-sighted part of the book:

“at the end of a conflict, the loser should give back all he has acquired during the war.

Therefore all conquests which have no impact neither on the resistance nor on the offensive

capabilities of the main enemy, are purely a loss of time, men and resources, i.e. a waste of forces,

in the very moment when there is all to be gained by keeping them concentrated”78.

76 Ibid. pg. 87.

77 Ibid. pg. 91.

78 Ibid. pg. 85.80

Consequently USSR would have gained little by an expansion in the Old Continent

through an armed invasion, and in fact it used the Red Army more to pressure

Europe than for other purposes.

Anyhow, even if the Soviets had endeavored one among the offensives which

had been outlined, which counter-offensive the Anglo – Americans could have

carried on, according to the author?

Curiously enough, the author had drawn some indications on how the USA

intended to bring forward the preparation for war from a press article, published in

January 1945 by the monthly magazine, “The Readers’ Digest”. These indications,

when read sixty years later, impress for their accuracy, an indication on how it is

always important for Intelligence to work on the so-called “Open Sources”, i.e. the

newspapers of the country which is the object of the research for information.

The article noted that the USA should:

“first of all, avoid surprises, by following step by step the preparation of the potential enemy,

and have above all the best Air Force in the world, from the standpoint of quality of the material

and organization, as well as the strongest Navy. Then (the USA must) have an Army of 2 million

men, but extremely mobile, highly mechanized, able to keep the aggressor in check until the

reserves be collected. Behind these operating forces, (there should be) an industry of armaments

81

able to be immediately reinforced by the potential of the whole American industry, provided it is

conveniently prepared ”79.

Apart from the Army numbers, unrealistic as they were related to war

operations on a continental scale, the USA – thanks to this formidable arsenal –

could “assault the immense Russian territory, closed like a fortress, mainly through

the machines”80, and also the Western counter-offensive, to defeat the possible

Soviet invasion in the West, “would be a formidable naval and air pincer movement,

from the Baltic and the Black Sea, to strangle the Moscow colossus through air

(counter) offensives in the zone of the Urals, thus detaching (Russian) Europe from

(its possessions in) Asia”81.

Summing up, the twin use of strategic bombing and large scale landings was

already seen by the author as the most logical and effective response by the West, to

thwart a Soviet aggression, as in fact it was done throughout the Cold War.

It is worth highlighting the only wrong forecast made by the author; as we will

see, later NATO planning would envisage the northern “pincer movement” as a

landing in Norway, not in the Baltic, a basin too narrow and too close to the sources

79 Ibid. pg. 49.

80 Ibid. pg. 51.

81 Ibid. pg. 76.

82

of Soviet military power, to be an useful area for a massive landing, at least in the

initial stages of a conflict. Norway, though, was still neutral in 1947, thus she could

not be taken into account by the author.

The last part of the book is devoted to the pros and cons of using the atomic

weapon, and the author said that “it can be deemed that no use of the atomic bomb

be made, thanks to a mutual unwritten agreement, as it happened for the use of

gas, during WWII”82. The balance of terror, which characterized the following

decades, had therefore already been taken into account by the farsighted author.

The Strategy of Containment

We have seen in the previous chapter, during the first post-war years, that “American

policy continued to be one of reaction and reluctance, as Europeans sought a closer

relationship”83 with them. In fact, “ it was not until the Berlin crisis in June 1948 that

American officials began to favor some sort of loose defense association with

Western Europe. The Western Union formally requested negotiations with the

United States on a North Atlantic treaty in October 1948”84.

82 Ibid. pg. 98.

83 G.J. IKENBERRY. After Victory. Princeton Univ. Press, 2001. pg. 184.

84 Ibid.

83

We also know that the treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, while

the ratification process was concluded, indeed in a record time, the following August

24, by all signatory nations. Few days later the first session of the Atlantic Council

took place; among the other decisions two bodies were established, the Defense

Committee at Ministerial level, and the Military Committee, in order to proceed with

the development of coordinated defense plans.

The work was centered on the practical implementation and on the adaptation

of the “Containment Doctrine”, which originally was a “grand strategy, designed to

advance American security interests”85, with the MARSHALL Plan having a key role in

it. NATO, in fact, was not a purely military alliance, since the beginning, as the

economic and financial clauses of the Washington Treaty show. Naturally, the

military strategic aspects will be highlighted during this course more than the others,

as they were not developed. NATO is considered to be a military alliance also due to

these omissions.

Which were the main features of the “Containment Doctrine”? As Senator

KENNEDY had noted, in a speech:

“known as the policy of containment, this strategy of peace was based on two monopolies

we then enjoyed. One was the monopoly in the power to export capital and technical assistance to

Europe and to underdeveloped countries. The second monopoly we enjoyed subdivided in two

85 Ibid. pg. 172.

84

parts. We enjoyed the monopoly in nuclear weapons and in the capacity to deliver them to a

target. The original strategy of NATO was cast in the mold of this twin fact. It assumed that an

alliance of land forces in Western Europe could be formed with sufficient strength to contain any

probing operation the Communists might launch to test the West’s will to resist. On the other

hand, any prospective full-scale attack by Communist arms would be deterred of broken up by the

United States Strategic Air Command, carrying nuclear bombs. Though the land components of the

NATO forces never reached their originally scheduled levels, and though the political composition

of the forces in being became unbalanced, the strategic conception had enough material vitality to

it to preserve the independence of Western Europe”86.

Looking at the geographic map, it can be noted that NATO territory in Europe, at

least initially, included a series of isolated enclaves, apart from the limited portion of

the continent embracing France, Italy and Benelux, the only area having a

geographic continuity. As Germany was an occupied territory, Norway and Denmark,

as well as Greece and Turkey (who joined NATO in 1952) were in fact like islands,

each facing an enemy or neutral territory and needing special help through the sea,

in case of aggression, with the consequent risk of seeing their requests turned down,

should these isolated areas be attacked simultaneously.

Also Iceland was part of the Alliance, as it was an essential base to sustain and

protect the transatlantic convoys for the “Reinforcement and Resupply”, as done

86 J. F. KENNEDY. The Strategy of Peace. Harper &Brothers, NY, 1960, pages 4-5.

85

during WWII, and as it also was the center where the fight against the Soviet

submarines - transiting from Murmansk to the Atlantic ocean - was directed.

Iceland was therefore pivotal to the Alliance, in spite of the facts that she

needed air defense from other Allies and she had no military forces, apart from Law

Enforcement Agencies. It is worth noting that one among them, the Coast Guard,

was quite unusually engaged for decades in the “Cod Wars” from 1958 to 1973, to

chase away British fishing vessels from her waters, until Iceland threatened to leave

NATO, thus compelling the other members to convince UK to give up the struggle.

The only member not suffering from a direct Soviet threat was Portugal, whose

role, though, was to be the safest terminal of the transatlantic resupply, plus having

the Azores and Madeira islands – all wonderful bases for the anti-submarine struggle

in central Atlantic and to allow refueling of convoys and their escorts.

Going back to the first NATO Strategic concept, few months were sufficient to

define the containment strategy in all details. In fact, “the Defense Committee met in

Paris on December 1, 1949, and agreed a strategic doctrine for the integrated

defense of the NATO zone”87. The process, though, had not been painless, as the first

version had been circulated on the previous October 19; a second version, taking

into account the comments by all member nations, was submitted one month later,

87 L’Alleanza Atlantica. Storia, struttura, attività. Servizio Informazioni della NATO, Bruxelles, 1989, pg. 34.

86

on November 19. This version, after some “minor amendments”88, became the

“Revised Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area”, on the

following December 1, as a Defense Committee document, with the identification

number DC 6/1.

The document included, in the front page, a short preamble, whereby the Allied

pledged that:

“-they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples,

founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;

-they seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area;

-they are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and

security.

For the purpose of, first, preventing war, and, second, insuring in the event of war the effective

application of the military and industrial strength of the Treaty nations in a common defense, the military

means available to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty must be effectively coordinated”89.

The last phrase laid the premises for establishing a permanent NATO military

structure, which was not considered at the beginning, but was required and still

exists, and has become with time the real strength factor of the Alliance.

88 MC 3/2, dated November 28, 1949.

89 DC 6/1, page 2.

87

The military measures to undertake, according to the Concept, were the

following, in sequence:

“-insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all

types of weapons, without exception. This is primarily a U.S. responsibility assisted as practicable

by other nations;

-arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy offensives against North Atlantic Treaty

powers by all means available, including air, naval, land and psychological operations. Initially, the

hard core of ground forces will come from the European nations. Other nations will give aid with

the least possible delay and in accordance with overall plans;

-neutralize as soon as practicable enemy air operations against North Atlantic Treaty powers.

In this undertaking the European nations should initially provide the bulk of the tactical air support

and air defense; other nations aiding with the least possible delay in accordance with overall plans;

-secure and control sea and air lines of communication, and ports and harbors, essential to

the implementation of common defense plans. The defense and control of sea and air LOC’s will be

performed through common cooperation in accordance with each nation’s capabilities and agreed

responsibilities. In this regard it is recognized that the United States and United Kingdom will be

primarily responsible for the organization and control of ocean lines of communication. Other

nations will secure and maintain their own harbor defenses and coastal LOC’s and participate in

the organization and control of vital LOC’s to their territories as may be indicated in overall plans;

-secure, maintain and defend such main support areas, air bases, naval bases and other

facilities as are essential to the successful accomplishment of the basic undertaking. These

88

undertakings will be a responsibility of the nations having sovereignty over these essential bases,

areas and facilities, aided as necessary and to the extent set forth in collective defense plans;

-mobilize and expand the overall power of the Treaty nations in accordance with their

planned contribution to later offensive operations designed to maintain security of the North

Atlantic Treaty area”90.

As you can see, the TRUMAN Doctrine had been transformed into practical

objectives and intents, and a sort of division of tasks had been agreed among the

Allies, an issue which would become the subject of endless debates, in the following

decades.

In practice, apart from the two “flanks”, to be used for a counter-offensive,

NATO considered Germany both as the area where the nuclear bombs would be

dropped, to check a Soviet offensive, and as the terrain where to maneuver advance

forces, in case of attack, with the Fulda Gap being the essential point for a battle to

bring the enemy advance to a halt, before the Soviets could reach the river Rhine,

which was still the main defense line.

The Rhine did not allow a real defense in depth, as the strategic space available

between this river and the sea was quite limited; therefore, during the Council

meeting of September 18, 1950, “discussions focused on how to defend the NATO

area from an aggression similar to what had happened in Korea, and it was

90 Ibid. pages 5-6.

89

acknowledged that in Europe a Forward Strategy should be adopted, i.e. to envisage

the resistance to an aggression as far eastward as possible, thus ensuring the

defense of all Allied European countries”91.

The basis of this debate over the “Forward Strategy” was a document issued by

the Military Committee, MC 14 dated March 28, 1950, whereby the following

specific indications were provided, among others, to the Regional Planning Groups:

“-hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible;

-organize the Western Mediterranean lines of communication (both) between North Africa

and France, in support of Western European (land) operations, and in support of the campaign in

Italy;

-plan for the expeditious reinforcement of regions which might be attacked;

-support and prepare for, as appropriate, the execution of strategic air offensive operations

assisted by other nations as practicable”92.

The political reasons for this approach are clear, even if that way the Council

sanctioned the repetition of the fatal mistake committed by the Anglo – French

forces in 1940, when they were moved in mass toward the border between Belgium

91 L’Alleanza Atlantica. Storia, struttura, attività. page 36.

92 MC 14 dated March 28, 1950, pages 11-12.

90

and Germany, instead of waiting the arrival of the enemy behind the defensive

positions prepared beforehand.

Reinforcements to the land front, in Central Europe, would come both from

French Africa and from Canada and the USA, as it had happened during both World

Wars. In Italy, the Gorizia Gap had the role of forward defensive line, in case of an

attack on the South end of the front, with the idea of a gradual retreat, exploiting

the rivers of the region, in order to progressively reduce the offensive drive of the

enemy, until his eventual check on the line of the river Piave, as in 1917.

The worsening of the Yugoslav – Russian relations, however, offered the

possibility to hinge more forward, along the Ljubljana Gap, to such an extent that

“on September 21, 1951, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)

ordered that Italy should be defended along the Isonzo river, i.e. partly in Yugoslavia.

Responding to the clearly expressed U.S. desire, according to Western sources, the

Yugoslav military command undertook an informal (unwritten) obligation to defend

the Ljubljana gap and the approaches to Klagenfurt, Villach, Trieste and Gorizia” 93,

instead of retreating toward Montenegro, as many, included the Austrian

93 A. BEBLER. “The U.S. Strategy and Yugoslavia’s Security”, from “American and Yugoslav view of the 1990s”, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Center for North American Studies, Belgrade 1990, page 177.

91

Ambassador in USA, GRÜBER, estimated, on the basis of the Serbian precedent of

191694.

Only a slight trace has been left in official documents of such an agreement -

which apparently included also an eastward movement of the US land forces based

in Italy in support of the Yugoslavs – as the possibility to envisage the so-called

“cross-border operations” was mentioned, albeit only when ordered by the Council.

The Allied Armies relied, naturally, on maritime lines of communication,

through the Atlantic Ocean and Western Mediterranean, and these lines had to be

defended at any cost, lest a quick collapse of the defense on land would occur. The

naval battle forces, Americans in their majority, would instead provide coverage of

the most exposed flanks, notably Northern Norway and the area of the Turkish

Straits, without losing sight of the situation in Greece, while preparing for a counter-

offensive.

As we have seen, the Strategic Air Force (USA) would intervene to check the

Soviets offensive, even through the threat of using the atomic bomb, while the

Tactical Allied Air Force would have cooperated to destroy the enemy land forces. It

was necessary, though, to progress from the concepts to the plans, and therefore

the so-called “Medium Term Plan” was prepared by the Military Committee, as a

development of MC 14, bearing the same date, a sign that both documents had 94 Vds. A. TARCHIANI. “I Tormenti di un Ambasciatore”. Ed. Rubbettino, 2006. pg. 91.

92

been prepared simultaneously, with the risk that a possible dissent on the former

paper could block also the latter.

As it can happen in these cases, coherence is often an “optional” and this was

confirmed also this time. The Plan was in fact more aggressive than the Concept, as

it envisaged that:

“The overall strategic aim of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, should be drawn into war, is,

in collaboration with their Allies, to destroy by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia the will and

capabilities of the USSR and her satellites to wage war. In the Far East the strategic policy will be

defensive. After the outbreak of the hostilities, operations will fall into four main phases:

- PHASE 1: D-Day to the stabilization of initial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation of the

Allied air offensive.

- PHASE 2: Stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to allied initiation of major offensive

operations.

- PHASE 3: Allied initiation of major offensive operations until Soviet capitulation is obtained.

- PHASE 4: Final Achievement of Allied War Objectives”95.

Such a plan went well beyond the defensive prescriptions of the Concept, and it

required the Allies to field, by 1954, an impressive multi-dimensional array of assets,

as follows:

95 DC 13, dated March 28, 1950, pages 10-11.

93

-Naval Forces: 2 battleships, 29 cruisers, 12 fleet carriers, 19 escort carriers, 920

ocean escorts, 107 submarines, 2382 sea based and 882 land based aircraft, plus

1227 smaller units for coastal escort or minesweeping;

-Land Forces: 18 and 2/3 armored divisions, 71 and ½ infantry divisions, plus

1/3 airborne division, with the caveat that these totals “did not include what

required for the Inner Defense Zone;

-Air Forces: 7084 interceptors, 556 fighter-bombers, 364 reconnaissance and

672 transport aircraft”96.

It became apparent soon that both this advanced defense plan, and the costs of

the politico-military structure which was being established, were overambitious. The

issue was formally raised on September 20, 1950, at the end of the Ministerial

meeting in Ottawa, where Defense, Finance, Economy and Foreign Affairs Ministers

were present. They had to acknowledge that:

“The Allied military requirements implied from the member States financial contributions

vastly superior to what they declared being able to offer. In addition to that, the effectiveness of

the defense efforts was hindered by a number of disadvantage factors: raise of prices, inflation

risks, upsetting of the balance of payments, difficulties in sharing raw materials”97.

96 Ibid. Appendix A.

97 NATO. Documentation, page 34.

94

In short, the Ministers had to acknowledge that the strategic objective

established initially, i.e. that “the military strength of the participating nations should

be developed without endangering economic recovery and the attainment of

economic stability, which constitute an essential element of their security”98 would

have been a wishful thinking, should the requests of the NATO military be endorsed

and be put in practice. The fight for resources between NATO and the nations started

already at that time, and it continues nowadays.

In fact, at that time “the twelve founding member States of NATO had in Europe

less than 20 (active) divisions, insufficient equipments for the reserves, less than

1000 operating aircraft (many of them built during WWII, thus being obsolete),

about 20 airports, not all adequate for jets and placed in advanced and vulnerable

zones. The situation of naval forces was no better: in fact, several warships had been

decommissioned, placed in mothball or converted to become civilian transports”99.

The political reason behind the Forward Strategy in the German front was that

a large portion of American, French and British land forces were already deployed in

Western Germany, as occupation troops. They were transferred therefore under

NATO command, under the Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in order to have

98 MC 3/2 dated November 28, 1949, page 22.

99 NATO Documentation. Page 247.

95

a first line of defense closer to the eastern rim of those parts Germany under

occupation by Western forces.

Notwithstanding this provision, the land forces were still insufficient, as

compared to the 95 Soviet divisions which, according to the allied estimates, were

deployed on the European front, where they remained until 1975. Also, as the USSR

was building a huge number of submarines, reaching the maximum of 350, the allied

naval forces would have faced tremendous difficulties, in order to keep the

transatlantic lines of communication open.

As the disproportion between ambitions and resources was too great, it was

decided to establish a Temporary Committee of the Atlantic Council (known from the

acronym of TCC), to “determine whether the military authorities asked for too much

or the governments were not offering enough”100. The TCC, after almost one year

work, proposed at the Lisbon Summit, on February 25, 1952, force goals reaching

“50 divisions, 4000 aircraft and powerful naval forces”101, without further

elaborations on the latter aspect.

The discussions within the Alliance continued, also to take into account the

extension of the Southern Flank, following the admission of Greece and Turkey as

100 Ibid. page 34-35.

101 Ibid. page 37.

96

NATO members, a decision whose political value was offset by increased

commitments, and were concluded by the approval of a new “NATO Strategic

Guidance”102, on December 9, 1952, not without difficulties, due to conflicting views

among the Allies.

Among the objections, there was also one advanced by Italy – usually very silent

– who opposed an assessment which said that: “Yugoslavia, even if not herself first

attacked, will probably participate in hostilities against the Soviet Block”103.

A footnote, whereby it was said that “the Italian Military Representative is of

the opinion that in the event of general war, it is probable that Yugoslavia, if not

attacked, would try, initially at least, to remain neutral. If attacked, she will

participate in hostilities against the Soviet Block”104, solved the situation, as the

statement in the document could have brought the Allies to stop supporting Italy on

the thorny and painful issue of the Free Territory of Trieste.

Summing up, the new document reinforced the predominance of the defensive

approach, by delegating the offensive to the Air Forces, besides

102 MC 14/1 dated December 9, 1952.

103 Ibid. Pg. 8.

104 Ibid. Footnote at page 8.

97

“taking such other offensive action against the enemy as is possible”105.

As far as naval forces were concerned, only the three powers who had won

WWII, i.e. USA, UK and France would keep naval battle and landing forces, while the

other countries were requested to reconfigure their Navies to perform auxiliary

escort and minesweeping functions, as many Soviet submarines existed and mines

were supposed to be laid in large quantities by the Russian fleet. The US naval aids,

in terms of leased assets and funding, followed this approach to the letter, to the

point of denying even the lease of a small aircraft carrier, requested by the Italian

Navy.

It was clear, though, that even if the proposed force levels would be reached

(but they were not!) the defense of the German front would be precarious, in the

best of cases. In fact, “considering the clear inferiority of NATO conventional forces in

Europe, the only possible strategy, in case of any attack against NATO territory

appeared to be the immediate response through the use of the whole American

nuclear potential. This led to the strategic doctrine known as Massive Nuclear

Retaliation”106.

In short, it:

105 Ibid. pg. 13.

106 NATO Documentation. page 121.

98

“envisaged, in case of even a minor aggression in Europe, to unleash the reaction of the

American nuclear forces, up to the extreme consequences. However, the American monopoly

became soon a quasi-monopoly, as during the same year 1949 the Soviet Union had detonated her

first nuclear bomb, even if she appeared not to have the vectors to launch it, at least for some

time. A doctrine, to be effective, must be credible. So, as time elapsed, the Europeans started to

ask themselves whether this doctrine were credible. Therefore the criterion of Forward Defense

took shape, and it became for decades one among the characterizing elements of the NATO

strategic doctrine. However, to carry on the forward defense, troops are needed”107, and we

have seen that they were insufficient.

The only quick way to achieve sufficient levels of conventional force, thus raising

the nuclear threshold, was to allow an albeit limited form of rearmament to

Western Germany. We have seen that also WEU had reached the same conclusion,

but no action had been carried on, due to the financial difficulties of all WEU

members and the strong reluctance of France. Therefore, on September 26, 1950, as

“a forward strategy implied the defense on German territory, (the Council) decided

to study the problem of the political and military participation of the Federal

Republic of Germany”108 to collective defense.

107 “Conference in the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance” Speech by Adm. Micali Baratelli “The Security Sstem developed by NATO”.

108 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 36.

99

In order to take into account the French worries about the German

rearmament, it was initially envisaged to allow it within a well defined institutional

framework, which appeared to be the rising European Defense Community (CED)

where “the reconstituted (German) battalions would be incorporated and diluted in

composite (multi-national) European divisions ”109. This solution, however, was

considered inadequate by France, whose Parliament refused ratification of the CED

treaty, thus surprising all those who had brushed off these worries.

As this solution had failed, the only option left was to invite Western Germany

within NATO, and this happened with general consensus on May 5, 1955, at the cost

of terminating the residual collaboration with the Soviet Union on the occupation of

this country, even if it was – as a consequence of the Berlin blockade – only a ritual

without practical effects.

Among all members, Denmark enjoyed the most significant advantages: her

strategic situation had in fact greatly improved, because she was not isolated any

more from the rest of the allied area. More importantly, the first main line of

defense against a possible attack had moved forward from the Rhine to the river

Elbe. The general situation of NATO, from a defensive standpoint, improved too,

thanks to the greater depth of the disposition.

109 “Conference in the occasiono f the 30th anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance. Speech by Adm. Micali Baratelli.

100

In this context, thanks to the strengthening of Allied capabilities to face a

possible invasion from the East after the accession of Germany, a new Strategic

Concept was approved; quite unusually its title was “The Most Effective Pattern of

NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years”110. In the document emphasis was

devoted to two new aspects, with more clarity as compared to the past:

-first, “enactment of a forward strategy, as one among the primary objectives

of the Alliance”111;

-then, a new subdivision of the possible hostilities in a sequence of two phases,

with a “relatively short initial phase, whereby there would be an intense atomic

exchange, and a following phase, including operations whose duration cannot be

determined, and at a lower degree of intensity”112.

Both aspects. i.e. the new “Forward Strategy” and the “Atomic Exchange”, were

later confirmed some years later, in the following Strategic Concept113 which

introduced only few changes. In the meantime, however, while all eyes were set at

110 MC 48/1 dated September 26, 1955.

111 Ibid. Page 2.

112 Ibid. Page 7.

113 MC 48/2, dated May 23, 1957.

101

Central Europe, France had suffered a bitter defeat in Indochina and was waging a

bitter counter-insurgency war in Algeria. As if it were not enough, the new ruler of

Egypt, colonel NASSER, after having succeeded in convincing the British occupation

forces to withdraw from the nation, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal.

This huge infrastructure had been inaugurated on November 17, 1869, thanks

to the efforts of a retired French diplomat, Ferdinand DE LESSEPS, and an Italian

engineer, Luigi NEGRELLI; its initial owner was the “Compagnie Universelle du Canal

Maritime de Suez” – which still exists. DE LESSEPS, who had the majority of the

shares, when negotiating the Egyptian concession for the endeavor, had agreed to

award 44% of the company stocks, plus “a 15 percent royalty on net profits” 114 to the

ruler of Egypt, the Khedive ISMAIL.

As the Egyptian public debt was huge, first ISMAIL sold his shares to the British

government in 1975, and later had to accept that his nation’s economy be placed

under “Dual Control” by France and Great Britain, to guarantee the debt’s

repayment; as the financial situation did not improve, in 1880 the new Khedive,

TEWFIK, sold even the remaining royalties “to a French group for twenty-two million

francs”115.

114 D. NEFF. Warriors at Suez. Simon & Shuster, NY, 1981, page 17.

115 Ibid.

102

Among the Egyptian population, nationalist feeling were stirred by this

“profligate surrendering of rights to the canal’s profits and the humiliating loss of

economic sovereignty”116. The consequent revolt, led by Army colonel Ahmed ARABI,

in 1881, prompted a British intervention, one year later, to keep control of the Canal,

which had become for UK the key connection with the British possessions in Asia.

The UK forces had “vowed they would withdraw as soon as the state of the

country, and the organization of the proper means for the maintenance of the

khedive’s authority, will admit of it”117, but remained there for 70 years, thus keeping

a sort of protectorate over Egypt. When a military coup overthrew the last khedive,

FAROUK, in 1952, the new leader, general NEGUIB – soon replaced by colonel

NASSER – negotiated a withdrawal agreement with the British government, signed

by the latter on October 19, 1954.

The new regime met soon with Westerns disapproval, over the difficult relations

with Israel, often ending up in skirmishes, raids and fighting, as NASSER was

inevitably a paladin of Arab resurrection; when the Western countries refused to

finance the Aswan Dam, and the USSR Ambassador hinted that his nation could

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid, page 18.

103

provide the funding, NASSER decided to nationalize the Canal, and staged a perfect

plan to get hold of its infrastructures and operations.

He was aware, in particular, that he could not breach “the 1888 convention of

Constantinople that guaranteed free passage through the canal”118; for the rest,

NASSER knew that an act of nationalization, if carried along the well-established

procedures, customary in the Western countries, would be perfectly legal.

The day chosen was the fourth anniversary of the coup against FAROUK, July 26,

1956, and the takeover would be carried out while NASSER was making a public

speech in Alexandria. The operation succeeded, without firing a single shot, and

both Great Britain and France were taken by surprise by this action, which caused an

upheaval both among their politicians and public opinions, even if it had to be

acknowledged that the action was perfectly legal.

The best expression of which was the underlying problem behind this

generalized anger, shared by the majorities and oppositions in the two countries

concerned was, as CHURCHILL said, “we can’t have that malicious swine sitting

across our communications”119, as both UK and France depended heavily on canal-

shipped oil.

118 Ibid. page 283.

119 Ibid. page 277.

104

In the USA, instead, President EISENHOWER took the matter quite calmly, and

his only worry was to alert the 6th Fleet to be ready for an evacuation of US

nationals, should the situation deteriorate. Once done that, he wrote to both

governments in London and Paris to “urge calm consideration of the affair and to

discourage impulsive armed action”120, as he feared any further deterioration of the

already difficult situation in the Middle East. As the following events proved, it was a

vain attempt, because hot tempers in both capitals had reached the breaking point.

At first, the only retaliation was to freeze Egyptian assets, and to have the tolls

paid to banks in Britain and France, so that Egypt could not have access to his new

revenues. In the meantime, though, both governments started preparations for a

military expedition, and soon they invited Israel to join. The British Prime Minister,

EDEN, was particularly angry and determined to get once again hold of the Canal,

regardless of the consequences.

On August 16, the London Conference among the signatories of the

Constantinople Convention opened. Egypt, although invited, decided not to

participate. NASSER was now stronger, as he had been able to replace the Franco –

British employees and pilots within one month, and 766 ships had safely crossed the

Canal with Egyptian assistance. Also, he did not need to be there, as both India and

the USSR were strongly supporting the Egyptian claims.

120 Ibid. page 280.

105

The establishment of an International commission, proposed to “help” Egypt

operating the Canal, was approved by a vote of 18 against 4, but this agreement was

not compulsory for Egypt, and NASSER took no notice of the proceedings. The

conference, though, had apparently achieved what President EISENHOWER

intended, i.e. to gain time and to calm war passions, or at least this was what he felt.

When, instead, he got news of unmistakable preparations for war by the two

countries concerned, he wrote a polite but firm letter to EDEN, saying that “from this

point onward our views on this situation diverge. I must tell you frankly that

American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force”121.

From this moment on, the US government attempted any ruse to gain time, in

order to have the invasion postponed indefinitely, but he did not succeed, as his

allies were extremely irrational and determined to get revenge for the slight NASSER

had inflicted to them. The two Prime Ministers had ordered an amphibious

expedition to retake the Canal, without asking themselves which consequences such

an operation would bear either for the situation in the Middle East – where the few

pro-Western Arab countries were increasingly embarrassed – or for the whole world

balance, because the USSR would certainly had exploited the opportunity, as she

did.

121 Ibid. page 301.

106

On the military plan, too, even if the designated commander of the French

contingent, general BEAUFRE, was a respected strategist, nobody dared to tell the

political leaders how serious would be the force implications of attempting to retain

and defend the Canal, once conquered, against the will of a population of almost 60

million inhabitants, but growing ceaselessly.

In fact, a raid could succeed, as it did, but once the troops would be spread

along the 100 miles of the Canal, they would become vulnerable to sudden attacks,

whose intensity might have been limited, if taken one by one, but which would

cause in the long term such an attrition to force an ignominious withdrawal, as it had

already happened in Indochina. Notwithstanding both the absence of any strategic

planning, and the American opposition, the preparations for the expedition

continued, in utmost secrecy.

In the meantime, a number of events were showing that the Warsaw Pact was

not solid as it seemed. First came the Polish upheaval, with the advent of GOMULKA

to power, a theorist of a sovereign Poland, albeit within the communist system. On

October 25, then, Soviet troops invaded Hungary, where the population had

attacked some government buildings, following the plea by the new Prime Minister

NAGY, to grant independence from the USSR and a democratic government.

Before it were possible to exploit the evident weakness of the Soviet Block,

however, President EISENHOWER received reports about the Israeli mobilization, as

107

well as information on the fact that a Franco – British force had been assembled in

Malta. Notwithstanding his engagement in the election campaign, he tried in vain to

stop the war, in order not to spoil the effect of the Hungarian emergency, but the

Israeli attack started on October 29, followed on November 1 by Franco – British air

raids, intended to wipe out Egyptian air power. These raids had been delayed, as 15

US planes were lined up on the airport of Cairo, to evacuate American citizens, and

no attack was carried out until they took off.

What seriously upset President EISENHOWER was that no prior notification had

been made, neither by the Israeli government nor by the British Premier; even

worse, the latter had given orders to his Ministers not to receive the US Ambassador,

until the ultimatum were issued, in spite of the US pressures to avoid the invasion of

the Canal.

In these hectic days, the Opposition, led by the Secretary of the Labor Party,

GAITSKELL, tried to get from the government a statement about his intentions, as he

had reached the conclusion that any attempt to invade the Canal zone would have

been a serious blunder. Convinced by the evasive replies received in Parliament that

the invasion would take place, GAITSKELL – rather upset - eventually declared, rather

prophetically: “it is the view of the Opposition that the government has committed

an act of disastrous folly whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years

108

because it will have done irreparable damage to the prestige and reputation of our

country”122.

The UN met in emergency and issued a plea to stop the fighting, while the

public opinions in the world forgot all about the slaughter which was taking place in

Hungary; notwithstanding that, on November 5 the Franco – British task force

carried out the invasion of the Canal, first through air drops and the following

morning another landing from the sea.

The USSR Premier BULGANIN, rightly feeling that his country’s prestige had

been redeemed by the attack on the Suez Canal, threatened to launch missiles

against London and Paris; meanwhile the UN decided to launch a peace enforcing

mission, and it became clear that the two major powers would have participated.

This meant that Soviet forces would be based on the banks along the Canal! Indeed,

some suspicious air movements had already been spotted, and the fear of Soviet

“volunteers” joining forces with the Egyptians was a hair rising prospect.

In order to fend off this danger, Washington froze any funding aimed at Great

Britain, thus causing the pound and gold reserves to fall below the threshold which

could sustain the exchange rates. There was no alternative to save the economy,

especially after Washington declared that any loan would be subject to the condition

of a withdrawal. With “Britain universally condemned, the Canal in ruins, oil cut off, 122 Ibid. page 384.

109

NASSER stronger and the British pound growing weaker at a precipitous rate”123,

EDEN gave up and called his French colleague, MOLLET, convincing him about the

need to withdraw, notwithstanding his strong objections.

The Anglo-French force re-embarked and the invasion ended without glory, with

a huge loss of face for the two powers, while Israel was able to inflict a bruising

defeat to the Egyptian Army. Quite naturally, Egypt opted to sign an agreement with

the Soviet Union, whose Navy found a convenient base in Alexandria, for some years

to come, thus endangering the whole southern flank of NATO.

Conclusions

The newborn Alliance had, since the beginning, a serious problem in fulfilling

its mandate, due to the weakness of the majority of the member States, a situation

where there was one provider of security – the USA – and several consumers, i.e. the

European member States. In addition, two colonialist powers in decay, France and

United Kingdom, were pursuing their vain attempts to rescue the leftovers of their

empires, even at the expenses of NATO, thus undermining its credibility and further

weakening its strategic posture.

It was substantially an unbalanced pact, whose only advantage was – to repeat

a phrase of Lord ISMAY – “to keep the USA in, Russia out and Germany down”. Most

123 Ibid. page 410.

110

conveniently, the chosen battlefield was precisely the latter nation, whose northern

plains could not be defended from a massive Soviet tank attack through

conventional weapons. The Germans, though, had been guilty of genocides,

cruelties and many other misfits during WWII, so it was considered “reasonable” to

nuke them, in order to safeguard Western values. We will see that this approach will

change, proportionally with the growth of the German importance for the Allied

cohesion and defense.

The other character of NATO was the division of roles: the three major winning

powers kept, as long as possible, the monopoly of the offensive forces, while the

others had subsidiary roles, as they should provide “cannon fodder”, keep the seas

and the air “clean” from the enemy, sweeping mines, etc.

The enemy, though, was not stupid and had his own strategy. The Red Army had

a precise role, to exert conventional deterrence on the Europeans, on the eastern

rim of the Iron Curtain, while the main aim of USSR was to weaken the “Capitalist

Powers” by exploiting their dependence on raw materials, thus fostering anti-

colonialist feelings among the populations of Africa and Asia. On this subject, USSR

and the USA had the same loath for colonialism, their first aspect on which they

agreed.

NATO was therefore too feeble to allow itself to be further weakened by

internal dissent over a number of detailed issues, but the internal cohesion of the

111

Warsaw Pact was not greater. As Senator KENNEDY recommended, it was important

to exploit these weaknesses, by promising financial aid to the “Satellite Countries” of

the USSR, thus allaying the danger of an invasion. This approach proved to be

effective, and the upheavals in Poland and Hungary were most important to

convince Moscow that any offensive could not count on the unrestricted support of

its satellite countries.

While NATO planning was gradually reaching maturity, thus prompting some

among the Soviet satellites to review their position, both to soften the iron rule of

communisms and to avoid being involved in a hopeless struggle, unfortunately the

British and French attempts to save the biggest jewel of their colonial empires, the

Suez Canal, prevented any attempt to exploit Warsaw Pact weaknesses and drew the

world close to a nuclear war, in 1956.

The consequence of the Suez invasion was dramatic: it caused not only the loss

of any consensus among the West by Arab countries, already rancorous for twenty

years of French and British “protectorate”, between 1919 and 1945, but also gave

the USSR what she had sought for centuries, namely to gain a long sought foothold

in the Mediterranean, with the excuse of supporting Egypt: from Alexandria, the

Soviet Squadron (SOVMEDRON) threatened for years NATO sea lines of

communication going from Gibraltar to Greece and Turkey.

112

The first phase of NATO life was therefore marked by a sound strategic defeat,

as the presence of the SOVMEDRON weakened the essence itself of the allied

strategy, namely the possibility of freely using the seas to contain the communist

behemoth and to strike back from the flanks.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Introduction

The tragic events of 1956 had weakened the prestige of both leading nations

within the opposed Blocks, especially because they had demonstrated how unruly

their “minor allies” were, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. While the two

opponents were visibly less cohesive than expected, NATO strategy, in particular, had

greatly suffered from the serious worsening of Western relations with the Arab

world.

However, the growing number of clashes, both in Asia and Africa, had shown

the insufficiency of the strategy of “Massive Retaliation”. As it was not enough, in

1957 another significant change had occurred, since the Soviets had launched the

113

first satellite, named “Sputnik”, thus demonstrating their capability to respond to a

nuclear strike, and to inflict mass destructions to Western countries.

In these years, therefore, a serious attempt to reconsider and update the

nuclear strategy was carried on, first in the USA and then in NATO. These efforts had

started during the last years of the EISENHOWER Administration, but bore their

fruits only after President KENNEDY took office, in 1960. As we will see, though, the

issue was so sensitive for the Allies that a number of disputes arose, with the final

result of a serious “schism” within the Alliance.

Another problem, the most serious consequence of the Suez blunder, was the

presence of Warsaw Pact forces in the most exposed flank of the Alliance, the

Mediterranean, whose importance was threefold: first, control of this sea basin was

needed to allow US forces an orderly retreat from Central Europe, in case of a Soviet

overwhelming land attack, second, freedom of action in the Mediterranean was

essential to sustain the land fronts in the three peninsulas of the basin, i.e. Italy,

Greece and Anatolia, and third, the basin was paramount to allow a counter-

offensive from the South against the core of the Soviet industrial power, thus forcing

them to remain on a defensive posture.

Also the Northern Flank of the Alliance had been the object of a special care,

since the years 1950s, as possession of Northern Norway by the Soviets would have

given them free access to the Atlantic, but also the flank was a key to allow an

114

offensive against the bulk of the Soviet naval power, which was in fact based in the

White Sea, between Murmansk and Severomorsk, and could be hit only from

Norway and from the neighboring Arctic sea. When the Soviets acquired the

capability to launch missiles from submarines, the importance of Northern Norway

became even greater, as a reliable staging base for NATO counter-offensive.

NATO Nuclear Strategy

In these years, both “Superpowers” were enjoying the monopoly of nuclear

weapons, which entitled them to keep a dominant stance within their respective

zones of influence: therefore, they had a common interest to avoid their Partners

developing this kind of capability, while a balance of force existed between them,

known as “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD), a powerful reason to avoid any

direct attack.

The doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” was therefore overcome by events in such

a situation, even if it enjoyed the formal consensus by the NATO countries, as it

provided them with the excuse of avoiding the ambitious and expensive efforts to

acquire significant conventional capabilities requested by NATO; under the nuclear

umbrella, notwithstanding its loss of credibility, the European nations were able to

restore their economies and to improve their populations’ quality of life.

115

Suspicions among European governments and public opinions were, though,

widespread. Doubts on the US willingness to go beyond the “Nuclear Threshold”,

should a Soviet attack take place, existed, as the continental USA would have been

exposed to a nuclear counter-strike, given the new situation. In few words, the fears

were that the USA could tell them “please heed for a while to Soviet dominance: as

soon as possible we will come back to free you”!

Other governments, especially Western Germany, knew that nuclear weapons

would have been used on their territory. They were therefore careful to establish

good relations with the Soviet Union, and the German “Ostpolitik”, carried on by

Chancellor BRANDT was only the most prominent instance of this approach.

As if it were not enough, the missile platforms – initially placed on land, thus

being vulnerable to a surprise attack – multiplied and became diversified, thanks to

the building of nuclear submarines. All NATO nations started therefore pressing

Washington to accept delegating to the Alliance, not the USA, the dramatic decision

about when and how a nuclear strike had to be launched, to check a possible

breaking of the European land front by the Soviets.

Within the USA, too, there were dissenting voices among the Services, as the

strategy of “Massive Retaliation” – which “took realistic account of the fact that

(NATO) could never match Communist manpower on the ground while exploiting

116

(US) superiority in the air”124 – had no inherent flexibility, apart from giving the top

priority to Air Force financial needs, to such an extent that she got 46% of the

budget.

It was a strategy which, according to some, tried to shun “fighting dirty, costly

wars with Communist masses on the ground. It was a way to meet manpower with

mechanical power. Its apparent cheapness gave rise to the slogan More Bang for the

Buck”125. While the Navy was in a comfortable budget position, thanks to her

worldwide mission and commitments, the Army was the real victim.

According to the US doctrine, in fact, the Army’s main task was only what was

named “Limited War”, supposedly taking place outside Europe, thus not requiring

highly technological systems; she got therefore the remainders of the budget and

was unable to modernize her forces, which had to remain quite numerous, due to

the permanent deployments in Korea and Central Europe, two theaters of war which

required instead modern weaponry.

It was also arguable that “Limited War” could be fought on the cheap, as many

nations around the world had acquired modern Soviet weapons: the warnings made,

since 1954, by some widely respected writers, as George F. KENNAN, who argued

that “the day of total war have passed. From now on limited military operations are

124 M. D. TAYLOR. The Uncertain Trumpet. Harper & Brothers, 1959, page 102.

125 Ibid. page 13.117

the only ones which could conceivably serve any coherent purpose”126, were not

sufficient to allow the modernization of the US Army: the EISENHOWER

Administration kept Massive Retaliation as an integral part of her political program,

the so-called New Look, until the end, thus refusing to invest in a more balanced

military instrument, and continuing to favor an endless growth of the Air Force

nuclear strike capabilities. The nuclear arms race was therefore becoming a problem,

as the Soviets responded in kind to any increase of the US arsenal of these deadly

weapons.

It was only when Senator John F. KENNEDY won the 1960 presidential elections

that the opportunity arose to review the existing strategy. It is worth recalling that

some years before, the incoming President had demonstrated some skepticism

toward a massive, all-out Soviet attack, by stating that “an alliance of land forces in

Western Europe could be formed with sufficient strength to contain any probing

operation the Communists might launch to test the West’s will to resist”127. He was

hinting, in fact, to the low probability of a direct confrontation on German soil.

Therefore, once he had survived the first Cuban crisis, KENNEDY decided to put

an end to the nuclear arms race, since it might have caused an Armageddon, and as

a prerequisite, he appointed in 1961 “a Committee, chaired by Dean ACHESON, to

review NATO political and military planning. The recommendations of the

126 Ibid. page 26.

127 J. F. KENNEDY. The Strategy of Peace, pages 4-5.118

Committee were to privilege the conventional strategy and defense in Europe, at

the expenses of the nuclear”128 retaliation.

In few words, the new doctrine of Flexible Response was based on the belief

that “a credible forward strategy capable of assuring the Germans a quick reaction to

a violation of their frontiers required strong conventional forces east of the Rhine. If

the conventional defense failed, there would be thousands of relatively low-yield

tactical nuclear weapons ready for use and behind them the vast strategic nuclear

power of the United States committed to the defense of NATO”129.

In fact, the balance of conventional forces between the two opposed Block in

Central Europe was more favorable as in the past, and it appeared to the USA that an

additional effort by the European allies could allow a credible conventional defense,

thus raising the so much feared “Nuclear Threshold”.

It became clear since the outset, though, that the new strategy would have

been difficult for the European to agree upon, as it imposed a heavy financial burden

on them, and also a sit gave rise to the objection that “the Americans wanted the

Europeans to provide the cannon fodder for a conventional war which would create

no risks for the Americans homeland”130.

128 G. GIORGERINI. Aspetti Marittimi della Guerra Fredda. Supplement to Rivista Marittima, luglio 2001, pg. 113.

129 M. D. TAYLOR. Swords and Plowshares. Da Capo Press, 1972, page 282.

130 Ibid.119

The first objections came from France, whose Chief of Defense (CHOD), general

AILLERET, “argued that the Soviets would never make a move across a frontier unless

they were going all the way and, hence, only a trip-wire of forces would be needed

at the frontier to verify that enemy forces regardless of size had crossed into NATO

territory. He conceded (though) the need for a reserve of divisions capable of

blocking the advancing heads of enemy columns while the main bodies behind them

were being destroyed by nuclear weapons”131.

Also Western “Germany aired her disagreement, by stating that any decrease of

credibility of nuclear deterrent would enhance the risk of a possible Soviet invasion.

Then NATO Secretary General, Dirk STIKKER, proposed the transfer of the US nuclear

arsenal existing in Europe under the operational control of the Alliance, which would

have established an adequate multinational organization to employ this

deterrent”132.

STIKKER was in fact reviving a proposal, forwarded in 1959 by Robert BOWIE, a

State Department consultant, who had suggested “a project of an allied surface fleet

armed with POLARIS missiles”133. This idea was intending to avoid the proliferation of

a number of independent national nuclear arsenals, as France and Great Britain

131 Ibid. page 285.

132 G. GIORGERINI, page 113.

133 Ibid.

120

were keen to do, and “became known as the Multilateral Force (MLF). The plans

envisaged a fleet of 25 merchant vessels, armed with a total of 200 POLARIS A-3

missiles. Each vessel would have had a crew of (about) 200, taken from at least three

allied Navies”134.

To understand the widespread feelings among the Allies, who wanted to have a

greater weight in the decision to use nuclear warheads, it is significant to recall the

Italian Navy project, who developed a gunpowder propelled system to launch

ballistic missiles, and installed it on board of the cruiser Garibaldi, during its mid-life

overhaul; the system was successfully tested during the cruiser’s missile trials in US

waters.

The Italian Navy was in fact attempting to give the nation a stronger voice in the

nuclear decision-making process, in order to avoid finding herself in the

uncomfortable position of Germany. However, dissents among the Allies blocked the

MLF initiative; as an alternate solution, also to placate Great Britain for the deletion

of the joint US-British air-to-surface SKYBOLT missile, Washington offered London to

sell some POLARIS missiles for the nuclear submarines which the Royal Navy

intended to build, “provided they would be available to NATO, in addition to the

134 Ibid.

121

MLF, besides being used, in an extreme case, for the defense of the British national

interests”135.

The submarines, once completed, were assigned to NATO – and they still are –

and as a way to show her gratitude, Great Britain accepted to “assign SACEUR (also)

the V-bomber force”136, in occasion of the Council session held in Ottawa, on May 24,

1963, with the “aim of achieving a satisfactory balance between nuclear and

conventional armaments. (In addition, the session) decided to continue studying the

interdependent problems of that strategy, of its force requirements and of the

resources needed to implement them”137.

France had received the same offer by the USA, but refused it and built her own

nuclear “Force de Frappe”, under her exclusive national control, and decided to

withdraw from the NATO military chain of command, to safeguard autonomy of

decision about the use of her nuclear deterrent. It was said that President DE

GAULLE, when he was first briefed on the “Force de Frappe”, whose size would

inevitably have remained limited, as compared to the Soviet nuclear arsenal, he

interrupted the briefer, and said “We will snatch an arm from him”, meaning that the

135 Ibid.

136 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 64.

137 Ibid.

122

aggressor could completely destroy France, but would receive significant damages,

thus being reluctant to act against that nation.

However, the French rationale for a nuclear strike capability was not limited to

what was called “Dissuasion from the weak to the powerful”: some years later, the

1972 White Book of Defense specified that France would use her nuclear deterrent

“in case of a violation of her homeland”, without specifying the enemy: as she had

been invaded three times by Germany, since 1870, it was clear why she wanted to

retain exclusive authority to react against any violation of her territory.

The decision taken in Ottawa kept the substance of the ACHESON commission,

as well as the core of the MLF project; however, the premature death of President

KENNEDY caused the interruption of its maritime version. Some years later

provisions were made to equip dual role fighter-bombers of a number of allied

nations with tactical nuclear weapons, thus giving the Allies a stronger voice in the

decisional chain, at least in a more limited domain.

NATO quickly established two organizations, to deal with the new instrument:

the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), open to all member nations, and the

Nuclear Planning Group, including initially 7 nations – thus being under the purview

of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) – and later expanded, so that it is now the

only entity responsible for debating the nuclear issues, independently from other

bodies.

123

In the meantime, the JOHNSON Administration pursued the path set forth by

KENNEDY, in the quest for a form of nuclear disarmament, in agreement with the

USSR. This was the major result of the second crisis of Cuba, an event which had

brought the two Blocks on the verge of a nuclear Armageddon. This process, which

has continued throughout the following decades – and is still ongoing – showed that

another common interest between the two Superpowers existed, in addition to the

shared unwillingness to provide their allies with strategic nuclear capabilities.

This led Washington to chose a line of conduit in nuclear matters, composed by

two elements, i.e. “Disarmament” and “Flexible Response”. As Senator KENNEDY had

remarked, some time before,

“neither the US nor the USSR wants a nuclear war. Neither wants to set the fire that may extinguish

civilization as we know it before its own flames are finally extinguished – the war that would leave not one

Rome intact but two Carthages destroyed – and would at the very least set back by a generation or more

the efforts in both nations to make economic, social and cultural progress”138. There was therefore

hope to strike a deal on disarmament between the two Superpowers, and the

JOHNSON Administration started this process on this assumption, which proved to

be correct.

In undertaking this endeavor, which is still ongoing with ups and downs, the US

Administration was aware about the known paradox of disarmament; as past

138 J. F. KENNEDY. Op. cit. pg. 32.

124

experience had demonstrated, even in the most successful case of the Washington

Treaty of 1922, “rearmament can be stabilizing, while disarmament might be de-

stabilizing”139, often due to the hidden objectives which prompt such an initiative.

For instance, the US proposals for a naval disarmament in 1918-20, hid, not

completely though, the US determination not to “submit to a policy which would

force them to sit supinely with fetters on their hands, and permit Great Britain to be

the bully of the world (as) Great Britain has threatened our interests oftener and

more seriously than all the other nations of the earth combined”140.

Only the pressing economic stringencies of Great Britain, first among them her

heavy war debt toward the United States, forced London to accept, albeit unhappily,

the American aspiration toward naval parity. The fact is that such a dispute, with UK

unwilling to heed her supremacy at sea, had brought the two nations on the verge of

a break of diplomatic relations; in addition, as the Washington Treaty had

disappointed France, who had lost her naval superiority over Italy, also these two

nations broke their recent friendship: these precedents were therefore well present

in European minds, when the JOHNSON Administration forwarded her proposals on

nuclear disarmament, or at least on a regime of armaments control.

139 C. JEAN. Manuale di Studi Strategici. Ed. Franco Angeli, 2004. pg. 41.

140 H. & M. SPROUT. Toward a New Order of Sea Power. Princeton Univ. Press, 1943. pg. 77.

125

As feared, the first step caused the most serious disruptions. “The US-UK-USSR

agreement on the partial ban of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in the space and

under the sea surface, signed at the Kremlin on August 5”141 , 1963, was the last

straw for France – who deemed the treaty being intended to thwart the

development of her nuclear capability – and therefore severed her ties with NATO

military structure and the Defense Planning Committee, on one side, while the

process spoiled the friendship between China and Russia, for the same reasons.

Shortly later, all NATO allies signed the non-proliferation treaty without objections.

Both treaties, negotiated between the Superpowers without serious hiccups,

were the demonstration that both the USA and USSR had some common interests,

namely to retain their status among the other nations of their respective Blocks,

with the role of exclusive providers of the ultimate life insurance against external

dangers. All in all, the USA were less damaged, in pursuing their interests, that the

USSR, who lost a major partner, and experienced several border clashes with China

in the following years.

In the meantime, the JOHNSON Administration had committed the fatal blunder

of directly engaging US forces in the Vietnamese quagmire; notwithstanding that,

relations between USA and USSR remained such as it was possible to continue

negotiating further nuclear reductions, with NATO member countries – except

141 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 64.

126

France - supporting each step. The conceptual sanction was provided on December

12, 1967, when “in the Defense Planning Committee (where France was absent) the

Ministers approved a new strategic doctrine, which adapted NATO strategy to the

most recent political, military and technological developments, (and was) based on

an elastic and balanced set of responses, both conventional and nuclear, at all level

of an aggression threat”142.

This concept, first of all, acknowledged that “within Europe, the Soviet leaders

appear in recent years to have followed a more cautious line. Outside Europe,

wherever they can do so without military risks to the Soviet Union, the Soviet

leaders actively exploit every opportunity to build up positions from which to

threaten NATO in the event of hostilities; this is especially true in Africa, Latin

America and the Middle East”143.

This statement belatedly acknowledged the existence and the effectiveness of

the Soviet “Peripheral Strategy” (which we will discuss in the next chapter) even if

no intent existed, at that time, to use NATO forces in areas well outside the Alliance

perimeter, as defined by the Atlantic Treaty. More interestingly, for the first time

aggressions against NATO territory were assessed as improbable, even if “the

142 Ibid. pg. 72.

143 MC 14/3 dated January 16, 1968, page 4.

127

possibility of hostilities arising by accident, or from miscalculation, which could

escalate to greater intensity, could not be ruled out”144.

Three well distinct albeit not necessarily separate situation, i.e. peace, tension

and war were considered, and NATO commands were tasked to prepare action plans

for each of them. The strategy of “Flexible Response” was confirmed, even if its

scope was changed. As a former SACEUR, general ROGERS, explained years later – “it

intended to deter from war, and in case of dissuasion failure, to use Alliance military

forces in such a way as to bring the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion, with a

minimum of military and civilian casualties, and without losing territory of NATO

nations”145.

In short, NATO strategy envisaged now a “flexibility of reaction, which negated

the enemy to forecast with sufficient reliability the type, the intensity and the place

of NATO reaction, thus leaving him in the incertitude, as far as the risks to be

incurred were concerned”146. What is most relevant, the first step to enable the

Alliance to intervene directly during the so-called “Period of Tension” had already

144 Ibid. Pg. 8.

145 NOTIZIE NATO. Dicembre 1984, pg. 183.

146 “Conferenza sui 30 anni di Alleanza Atlantica”. Intervento dell’AMM. Micali Baratelli.

128

been accomplished some years earlier, even before the 1969 NATO Strategic Concept

was approved, to reinforce NATO periphery, thus preventing crises from escalating.

Already in 1961, in fact, the ACE Mobile Force - Air (AMF-A) had been

established. It was the first multinational force of the Alliance, including initially 4

fighter-bomber Squadrons; later, also a land component was added, so that AMF as

a whole could perform the task of “demonstrating NATO solidarity and common

intent in any threatened zone”147, especially on the Flanks (Norway and the

Mediterranean).

In later years, the number of this kind of forces was significantly increased, by

adding two naval standing forces, thus completing the set of tools which should have

enabled NATO to prevent crises from spinning out of control, by sending political

signals about NATO determination to back up any member under pressure by the

Soviets, through a timely deployment of these forces.

President KENNEDY vision had triumphed, even at the expenses of the security

imperatives of the European allies, who had felt protected, so far, by the “nuclear

umbrella”, and were seeing it shrinking notably. De facto, the general feeling was

that the relationship between the two Blocks had become a competition, more than

an armed confrontation, and therefore the risks were lower than in the past.

147 L’Alleanza Atlantica. Pg. 60.

129

This assessment, in fact, was not totally accurate, as the two Blocks came closer

to an all-out war than expected: only after the implosion of the Soviet Union it was

possible to learn that the Soviet military leadership had proposed a preventive

attack against Europe, in order to avoid the imminent economic collapse of the USSR

by exploiting the wealth of Western Europe, as NAPOLEON and HITLER had done.

For few days, the much feared Third World War was more than a possibility,

something our leaders had discounted too lightly at that time. Tom CLANCY novel,

“Red Storm Rising”, which described such a struggle, was therefore not a pure

fictional book!

Fortunately this proposal was rejected by Soviet leaders in favor of an economic

warfare, based on steel dumping and an artificial sharp decrease of maritime cargo

fares, two measures which violated the basic principles of this kind of war, as they

caused huge financial losses to the Soviet Union: in fact, as NAPOLEON had

experienced, much to his dismay, economic warfare can be carried on indefinitely

only as long as there are financial gains, otherwise it brings about the economic ruin

of the nation waging it beyond her possibilities.

These measures, of course, caused a number of problems to the Western

Countries: cities relying on steel mills for their economy, like Pittsburg, went

bankrupt, with a host of unemployed people, and many western ship owners, to

avoid failure, transferred their vessels under the so-called “Flags of Convenience”,

130

thus freeing themselves from a number of taxes. However, the inherent resilience

and flexibility of Western economies was able to find a way out rather quickly, by

focusing on high quality steel and through a diversification of production, as well as

by building more capable merchant vessels, so that this Soviet attempt failed.

In addition to the economic warfare, in order to gain further leverage on

Western European nations, in 1979 Moscow threatened to deploy, along the

western frontier of the Warsaw Pact, intermediate range theater missiles, known as

SS-20. This move was intended to offset the reduction of land forces on the Elbe

river, due to the increasing Soviet commitments in Afghanistan, but was seen as a

direct threat by the Alliance: the North Atlantic Council was therefore led to approve

the so-called “Double Decision”, i.e. to deploy modern nuclear missiles, the Pershing

II and the Cruise, while proposing at the same time further measures for armament

control.

NATO reaction could now base its power on a “Triad of Forces: strategic

nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional”148. As it became evident that the Soviet

move had backfired, and the weakening of the Red Army became visible, NATO

strategy evolved further, to become more aggressive, thanks to the introduction of a

new approach, the FOFA.

The Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) on the Red Army148 NOTIZIE NATO. Dicembre 1984, pg. 183.

131

The shift from a hot contest to an indirect approach had led the Soviets to

adopt the approaches of the “Peripheral Strategy” and the “Economic Warfare”, to

foster the expansion of Communism against Western capitalist countries, as they

had realized the growing economic interdependence between East and West. As a

consequence, the “Nuclear Threshold” became increasingly higher in the following

years, and had become a sort of “Life Insurance” capable of keeping at bay the

hotheads on both sides. The risk of having some “Hawks” proposing a sudden attack

against the enemy was not, anyhow, a remote possibility, as we have seen.

In addition to that, according to Intelligence reports, it seemed that the Soviet

Union had modified the disposition of her air-land forces, by increasing their

numbers and deploying them in depth; therefore only the first echelon was

stationed in Eastern Europe, while the main body remained in several Soviet

districts.

There were three reasons for this notable change of posture. The first was due

to the geographical configuration of the operational theater in Germany, which was

rightly considered by the Soviets to be a sort of funnel, as “the width of the front can

allow only a limited number of Warsaw Pact battalions side by side, thus forcing the

others to lag behind, out of enemy contact, to keep a position as second echelon”149.

149 NOTIZIE NATO. Dicembre 1984, pg. 187.

132

This consideration was not a new finding, as it had a general validity, and

explains why there were, in the contemporary era, no massive attacks from the East

to the West of Europe – the barbaric invasions which caused the fall of the Roman

Empire were small in size, as compared to the Armies of the last three centuries.

The second rationale for this deployment in depth – something NATO refused to

acknowledge openly - was that the Red Army numbers in Europe were in fact

dwindling, due to Soviet growing commitments both in Afghanistan, which absorbed

a maximum of 200.000 troops, and along the frontier with China, in particular in the

area of the rivers Amur and Ussuri; the additional consequence of these

commitments was that the battalions deployed in front of NATO were not crack

troops any more, rather being either new formed units of raw recruits or battalions

needing some respite, after a tour of duty in these war zones.

Last but not least, the Soviets had the need to sustain the Red Army troops at

the expenses of the host countries, as NAPOLEON had done, due to their economic

troubles; of course, this policy had to be pursued with moderation, as the amount of

troops per single Warsaw Pact member had to be properly dimensioned, lest an

excessive economic burden for the host nation would have caused social unrest.

Therefore, Soviet forces were spread evenly throughout the Warsaw Pact territory,

thus losing the possibility of being quickly concentrated, in case of need.

133

Against all evidence, though, NATO took the formal position of assessing that

the new Soviet disposition was a growing threat, and decided to examine how to

react. De facto, this was a way to bring additional pressure to bear on USSR, thus

limiting Soviet capability to further strengthen her force posture in both Asiatic

fronts, through reductions in Europe, much to the relief of the Afghans and China.

Therefore, the debate about the importance of conventional forces resumed,

and NATO pressed the North Atlantic Council to undertake a further effort to

modernize and strengthen these forces. This debate had as its basis a study,

forwarded in 1982, which declared a seemingly “growing numeric superiority of

Warsaw Pact forces, with special emphasis on total numbers, on long range theater

missiles (LRINF), submarines, aircraft and tanks”150.

The other hidden reason for such a declared unbalance was, in fact, the

reduction of US and Canadian forces in Europe, to such an extent that, always in

1982, SACEUR had to reassure the European allies by forwarding a rapid

reinforcement plan, whose intent was to insure a timely deployment of forces from

the other side of the Atlantic, in case of crisis. It is worth noting that the presence of

US and Canadian troops on European soil had always had a great political

significance, both as a sign of solidarity and because of the recurrent European

150 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 123.

134

paranoia, as the European allies were concerned to become the only ones suffering

from the brunt of a possible Soviet offensive (the “Cannon Fodder” syndrome).

Notwithstanding all measures and proposals, nations did not pay much

attention to the issue, as they knew the situation. The balance of forces remained

therefore unfavorable to NATO, at least on paper; a further report confirmed this

situation, even if it had to acknowledge that not all Soviet forces would have been

available without delay, as nations had noted how NATO had inserted in the

numbers also the Red Army troops in Asia!

When this trick was exposed and acknowledged, the Defense Planning

Committee (DPC) tasked SACEUR to revise the existing plans, in order to take this

factor into account. The consequent “Long Term Planning Directive for the attack to

Follow-on forces (FOFA)”151 was forwarded and approved on November 1984 by the

Committee, thus becoming the new Defense Concept of the Alliance.

As general ROGERS, who was SACEUR at that time, wrote later, the FOFA

concept had been already envisaged in 1979,

“to reduce at an acceptable level, through the use of conventional weapons, the amount of enemy

forces able to reach our main defensive positions. Originally, our efforts were concentrated on the

improvements to our existing potential of air interdiction and on the Warsaw Pact second echelon forces;

while we were finalizing our doctrine, we noted that the Warsaw Pact, during exercise ZAPAD ’81, had

151 Also known as “Second Echelon” forces.

135

experimented Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG), a fact indicating the revival – as part of the Soviet

doctrine - of the idea of “Mobile Groups”, used (by the USSR) during WWII. As a consequence of this

development, at SHAPE we started naming as Follow-On Forces all Warsaw Pact troops beyond those at

direct contact with us”152.

What worried the Alliance was – more than the possibility of a succession of

wave attacks, which had been a severe challenge for NATO capability to resist for a

long time – the existence of these OMG, as they were formed by special troops, able

to penetrate in depth, behind the lines of resistance, thus attacking “commands,

nuclear weapons launching systems and logistic support infrastructures”153.

However, the widely publicized FOFA had also the objective to send a strong

political signal, as it warned the Warsaw Pact that NATO reaction would concentrate

on the territories of the so-called “Satellite Countries” – not any more on German

soil – so that they would have suffered from massive devastations. This perspective,

therefore, further reduced the already limited enthusiasm of these nations toward

their alliance with the Soviet Union.

The Conventional Defense Improvement

152 NOTIZIE NATO. Dicembre 1984, pg. 184.

153 Ibid.

136

While the discussions on FOFA were ongoing, the Council had to face the US

growing irritation toward their European allies, who had not taken care – according

to Washington – to keep their forces at the level required to face the threat, and

they seemed to rely too much on US military might, thus preventing a reduction of

US forces in Europe, within levels compatible with post-Vietnam budget cuts.

The issue was quite controversial, as the most recent estimates on the Soviet

potential were clearly unrealistic, but it was also true, as general ROGERS said, that

“our lack of capability to support our forces on the field, in terms of manpower,

ammunitions and stores beyond a limited period, has forced SHAPE to rely, for NATO

defense, on a nuclear response”154.

In fact, SACEUR had noted that, while modernizing the military instrument, all

European nations had “saved” on the amount of missiles, ammunitions and spare

parts needed for the new armaments, thus not providing their troops and units with

the required 30 days firing and support capability, as NATO regulations prescribed.

The danger of this omission was promptly dubbed as “structural disarmament”,

i.e. a process whereby “the growing procurement cost of armaments and defense

forces causes a reduction of available units and therefore a reduction of military

capabilities”155. In fact, quality and numbers have always been two opposing factors,

154 “Occidente”. N˚ 1-1984, pg. 15.

155 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 148.137

but the Europeans preferred to procure more systems – thus benefitting their

defense industries – than to acquire a smaller number of them, together with the

amount of ammunition and spare parts required.

In order to fend off this dangerous trend, as well as to express the general

dissatisfaction of the US Congress, Senator NUNN proposed an amendment to the

US Defense budget where it was “postulated a more direct connection between the

continued deployment of US forces in Europe at their present level and the common

perception, within the Alliance, of the collective commitment for a credible

conventional defense”156. The NATO project which was therefore approved, to ally

the tension among allies, was named “Conventional Defense Improvement”, and

called for new weapons and capabilities, but also for a stricter connection between

the new systems and their supports.

It is fair to say that this amendment was nothing else than the most recent

episode of the long lasting US struggle to avoid that the other allies continued to

consider NATO as a system to “wage war at a cheap price”157, if not at others’

expenses. Since many years, in fact, the USA had pressed, through NATO, the other

nations to devote the 3% of their GNP to Defense, without any relevant success, and

156 Ibid.

157 R. DAVELUY. L’Esprit de la Guerre Navale. Ed. Berger Lévrault, 1909, pg. 48.

138

as they were now in a difficult financial situation, they were less prone to shut both

eyes on this protracted omission by the other members of the Alliance.

However, this emphasis on the capability upgrade of the European allied forces

had also a commercial aspect, as a large part of the required technology should have

been purchased in the USA. As it happens often, though, the strong US pressure had

unforeseen results: in fact, it brought about, as a reaction, a revival of European

cooperative projects, whose advantage was to keep the expenditures within their

countries, to increase the employment levels and to limit the costs of the technical

support, as well as of the spare parts.

It can be said, therefore, that the initiative for Conventional Defense

Improvement became the main incentive to develop the European Defense industry,

much beyond what had been expected by Washington. As we will see, this industry

would perform a significant role to foster the European Security and Defense Policy,

a permanent danger for NATO survival.

Conclusions

All along the river Elbe, which market the border between the two Blocks, a

dispute for influence over Europe was ongoing, albeit in a new form: the United

States and the Soviet Union were in fact extremely attentive to keep a military

posture on this front, albeit to perform a number of roles other than war.

139

The United States felt compelled to protect Western Europe, as it was their

principal market, besides being politically relatively close to the US system of

government: should this part of the Old Continent fall under Communist influence,

the United States would have found them secluded in the Americas, where their

predominance was already starting to be challenged.

To avoid being repelled from Europe, though, the USA had to provide the

“Nuclear Umbrella”, as the European governments could not fight at the same time

Communism – and they could do that only through a sharp increase of the quality of

life of their populations – and the Red Army.

Doubtless, the USA were slightly embarrassed at the idea of destroying the

whole Northern Hemisphere only because their allies wanted to wage war at a

cheap price; on the other hand, the latter were doubtful that Washington would

have put in practice these extreme measures, only because the Red Army was

picking bit of territory here and there, as they had done in Czechoslovakia.

These crossed misgivings, coupled with the acknowledgment that Moscow was

playing a different strategic game, was the origin of the strategy of “Flexible

Response” which ended up being like a chameleon, as it changed its main features

with time.

At first, it relied on the tactical nuclear warheads, as an interim step between

the conventional defense along the border and the nuclear Armageddon. Western 140

Germany was of course aware that this first exchange would have taken place on her

soil, as the plains in its northern part could not be defended except through a strong

and cohesive set of air-land forces – which did not exist!

During this period, the growing economic interdependence between the two

Blocks generated the hope that the threat posed by the Red Army was more a way

to exert political pressure than an actual promise of invasion. By feeling so, the

Europeans did not bring their military instruments to the size required to achieve a

satisfactory balance of forces in that theater, much to the disappointment of the

USA.

This neglect caused a change of approach by the USA, who decided to

transform “Flexible Response” into something vaguer, so to force the European allies

to participate more to common defense; this change was also a way to acknowledge

that both Blocks were finding a way to coexist, and even if their relations could

deteriorate, this would not happen overnight. This explains the meaning of the

introduction of a phase of “Tension” in NATO planning.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union was becoming painfully aware that her

“Satellites” were increasingly dissatisfied: after the Hungarian revolution, also

Prague attempted to detach itself from Moscow, in 1967, while Rumania showed

dangerous signs of the same trend; the Red Army therefore changed its role, to

become more an instrument to keep the “Communist Order” than a threat to the

141

“Capitalist Countries”, thus losing part of its effectiveness. The Soviet leadership was

so conscious of this situation that repelled all suggestions to wage a “preventive

attack” on Europe, to offset the increasing financial distress of the USSR.

The growing border problems in Asia, as well as the failed attempt to control

Afghanistan – the only possible way to get closer to the “Warm Seas” – further

reduced the Soviet capabilities on the Western Front, thus prompting a third

transformation of the strategy of “Flexible Response” which became more offensive,

as it relied on FOFA – a way to put more pressure on the “Satellites”.

Behind that, the main problem of the USSR was that her economic power was

insufficient to support Moscow’s global drive toward world domination; the

imprudent attempt to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, just outside the door of the

USA, ended in a loss of prestige, as Moscow had not considered that the island was

beyond her supporting range.

However, the Cuban crisis allowed a common interest between the

Superpowers to emerge, as none wanted to reach the Armageddon stage, only for

the sake of defending their ideologies and their friends. Nuclear disarmament was

therefore initiated, much to the irritation of their respective allies: while France

withdrew only from the military side of the Alliance, thus keeping some connections

with the rest of NATO nations, China severed her ties with Moscow, a move which

led the USA, in 1972, to recover from Vietnam failure, by establishing a commercial

142

and industrial relationship with Peking, another instance of the old say “The enemy

of my enemy is my friend”.

The competition between the two Blocks was not limited, though, to Central

Europe, as it had a global dimension. Outside Europe, a contest for influence was

developing since the years 1950s. This was the underlying reason behind the drive to

foster US capabilities for “Limited War”. Korea – a forgotten war which caused more

US casualties than any other engagement after WWII - had been the first step, and

its lessons took some time to be learnt. More was to follow, and this will be the

subject of the next chapter.

143

CHAPTER FIVE

INDIRECT APPROACHES: ENCIRCLEMENT AND PERIPHERAL STRATEGIES

A new Strategic Landscape

As a demonstration that strategy is essentially asymmetric, both Blocks did not

limit their activity along the “Iron Curtain”, but carried out a number of initiatives –

not all successfully – to exploit what they saw as the weak point of the enemy,

especially near the outer rims of their enemy’s zone of influence.

The Korean war, in fact, had been the first instance of this trend, but after its

end a more subtle approach was followed by the Soviet Union, much before the

Cuban blunder. Following STALIN death, the new Soviet leader, KHRUSHCHEV, had

proposed the USA a new policy, aptly named “Pacific Coexistence”. He had

summarized this course of action, during his visit to the USA, by saying: “I have seen

how the slaves of capitalism live, and they live pretty well. The slaves of Communism

live pretty well too, and let’s live the way we want to live”158.

Besides shaking hands with his counterpart, President EISENHOWER, and

banging his shoe on the desk, during the General Assembly of the United Nations,

this apparently picturesque Chairman of the USSR Communist Party had in fact

expressed a most realistic strategic assessment. He had been the first to

158 J. F. KENNEDY. Op. cit. Footnote at page 8.

144

acknowledge that there were too many common interests between the two

Superpowers, to continue pursuing the old course of a tough confrontation with the

Western nations.

To him, therefore, a threat of a frontal attack in Central Europe made no sense,

while he became convinced that a high number of pinpricks, properly aimed, and

limited provocations, all below the nuclear threshold, could be advantageous to the

USSR, as she could hit the Western Powers in their sensitive points – for instance, by

fostering revolutions in the countries where strategic raw materials existed – thus

weakening them, slowly but steadily.

The resulting approach was named “Peripheral Strategy”, as we have seen, and

was identified among the Western countries with some delay, as all eyes were fixed

on the Elbe. This Soviet change of course, however, was nothing else than a modern

version of the classic British “Indirect Approach” , adopted years before during the

Casablanca Summit in 1943, against Germany. This had been also defined by LIDDELL

HART in the 1950s, as a “Strategy of Limited Aim”, a way ahead to be practiced

when a frontal clash has scarce chances of success, or when competition replaces

confrontation, as indeed it was the case.

In fact, according to this strategist, a government

“may desire to wait until the balance of force can be changed by intervention

of allies or by the transfer of forces from another theater. It may desire to wait, or

145

even to limit its military effort permanently, while economic or naval action decides

the issue. It may calculate that the overthrow of the enemy’s military power is a task

definitely beyond its capacity, or not worth the effort – and that the object of its war

policy can be assured by seizing territory which it can either retain or use as

bargaining counters when peace is negotiated”159.

The Soviet variant of this theory was to multiply the number of “Wars of

National Liberation” in Africa and Asia, all fostered, encouraged or sponsored by the

USSR. Limited conflicts in Congo, Algeria, Middle East and Indochina therefore

marked international relations during this period, and they all responded to the aim

of sapping the foundations of the Western economic power, heavily dependent from

raw materials provided at a cheap price by the under-developed world, whose

populations the Kremlin intended to rise against the “Imperialists”.

On the opposite side, the Western countries, through NATO, conceived a

permanent threat of aggression to the USSR through the so-called “Flanks”, in the

Mediterranean (Southern Flank), as well as in the Arctic sea and Northern Norway

(Northern Flank), very much like what had been anticipated in 1947 by admiral DI

GIAMBERARDINO, to threaten permanently the core of Soviet power.

The main defect of this strategy was its lack of flexibility, as it was more a way to

contain the enemy than to bring him to the table of negotiations; we have seen how

159 B. LIDDELL HART. Strategy. Frederick Praeger, NY, 1954, page 334.146

the Western blunders imperiled its effectiveness, especially in the Mediterranean,

which was an area where too many weaknesses were present.

The Mediterranean

Until 1956, the Mediterranean had been a NATO lake, as the Soviets could

deploy their forces only through the circuitous route from Northern Russia, through

the North Cape and Gibraltar; given the weakness of their surface naval forces, only

submarines would be able to reach the basin, so the threat was minimal.

The Arab – Israeli conflict, as well as the misjudged Suez expedition had

provided the opportunity for the Soviet Union to bring her Peripheral Strategy closer

to the heart of Europe, i.e. within what has always been its “soft belly”, the

Mediterranean sea, which provided easy access to the Old Continent from the south,

and the disruption of any movement of forces through that sea, be it either for

defensive or offensive purposes, thus causing NATO to assume a defensive posture,

instead of threatening the industrial heart of the USSR, around the Urals.

After Egypt and Syria became Soviet allies, the Soviet Navy developed an ocean-

going surface naval force, which was ready just in time for the “Six Days War”. The

availability of Alexandria, as a forward base, allowed the Soviet Navy to deploy in the

Mediterranean “a growing number of units, reaching the maximum of two cruisers,

fifteen destroyers and twelve submarines, during mid October”160 of that year. Also

160 A. TANI. Guerra Fredda sui Sette Mari. Supplemento alla Rivista Marittima, luglio 2001, pg. 216.147

NATO – and most notably the USA – had done the same, so that the basin became

an area of confrontation between the two opposed fleets.

The Soviet units were placed under the orders of an Admiral, commanding the

“V Eskadra” (Fifth Fleet), and where based both in Tartus, Syria, but mostly in the big

naval base of Alexandria, whose infrastructures permitted docking, repair and

overhaul. Also, when moving around the basin, the Soviet units used frequently

some anchorages in the international waters off the Gulf of Hammamet in Tunisia

and the southern part of the Peloponnesus.

While this was happening, on October 21, 1967, the Israeli destroyer “Eilath”,

an old ship from WWII vintage, was sunk in unusual circumstances, while patrolling

the waters off Port Said. The unit had in fact been “hit by three anti-ship Stix

missiles, launched in two salvos by fast patrol boats, belonging to the Soviet-built

Komar class, which had been transferred by USSR to the Egyptian Navy. The launch

was carried out with Soviet assistance, from inside the harbor”161.

Even if the destroyer was an easy target, as it patrolled that area with the

steadiness of a policeman, thus having a predictable behavior, and it was an obsolete

unit, no better demonstration could be given of the new Soviet naval power, as there

were no similar weapons within the Western countries: the very existence of these

161 Ibid. pg. 220.

148

missiles posed therefore a new threat to the freedom of movement of US and NATO

aircraft carriers battle groups, which had been so far the dominators of the seas. It

was a rude awakening for the Alliance, whose naval construction and weapons

development efforts had been limited to the war against submarines, until that

moment.

A number of countermeasures were therefore studied and implemented in a

hurry by NATO, to minimize the new threat posed by the permanent presence of the

Soviet fleet, whose weapons were particularly dangerous: also a reinforcement of

the submarine surveillance systems was decided, and it was additionally agreed that

the Soviet ships armed with missiles had to be continuously “shadowed” when at

sea.

As these provisions implied a pattern of closer and more frequent contacts

among opposed units, often at short range and with risk of escalatory incidents, a

new regulatory framework had to be established. This led to the introduction of the

so-called “Rules of Engagement – ROE”, a list of pre-defined actions, which were

allowed or forbidden by the political authorities, according to the situation, either

when the mission started or in case of emergency, upon request by the military

commands. Of course, the battle groups had special ROEs, allowing in some cases

even the reaction to the so-called “Hostile Intent”, something close to the Soviet

approach of “Preemptive Defense”.

149

Two were in fact the approaches proposed within NATO, when the moment came to

write down a list of ROEs: the first known as “Positivist” tended to explicitly mention

the actions “permitted” while excluding any different actions, while the second

focused on “prohibiting” some initiatives, but allowed any other one. Clearly, the

military leaders favored the second approach, in the name of the principle of

“Freedom of Action” – as if it had to be applied against the politicians, instead of the

enemy – while it was quite an anathema for the political world. Therefore many

attempts of drafting this second kind of ROE were made, but they were never

endorsed by the NAC.

It is useful to anticipate that the end of the Cold War and the new era of “Crisis

Support Operations” found in the ROE an useful tool to keep political control on the

forces, as the main character of these operations was the use of limited violence: the

ROE system was therefore extended to all Services, thus becoming a Joint directive,

MC 362. You don’t need an expert eye to see, from the formulas adopted in each

ROE, that the effort to replace the naval jargon with a more joint language has not

completely erased the “traces of salt” in it.

Going back to the post-1956 period of the Cold War, the introduction of the

ROEs was not the only effort made by NATO to cope with the new, unfavorable

situation. Many new weapons were developed in a hurry, from anti-ship missiles to

point defense weapons – able to kill an incoming missile. Also new detection

150

systems to track and hunt submarines were developed, thus achieving significant

improvements against the modern Soviet submarines. Inevitably, some time was

needed, thus leaving for some time the Western naval forces vulnerable to the new

threat.

As for NATO sea power was its main strength against the Soviet continental

power, the simple fact that command of the sea was no more undisputed led the

governments to provide funds and engineers for a huge cooperative effort, with the

result that, few years later, the weapons on board of Western ships were by far

superior to those developed by the Soviets, who tried in vain to keep pace with their

enemies.

However, the alarm was great, and the NATO Strategic Concept issued in 1969

reflected this concern, by saying that “control of the Mediterranean Sea is essential

to permit Allied naval forces to make use of their intrinsic flexibility”162, especially

because the basin was “the medium whereby an important part of the trade of

Europe with the rest of the world is affected and the supporting potential of North

America is transported to Southern Europe” 163.

162 MC 48/3 dated May 6, 1969, page 12.

163 Ibid.

151

Quite naturally, the Concept concluded, “control of this area provides the only

means by which three major land components in the Southern Region (Italy, Greece

and Turkey) can be mutually supporting ”164. This meant that NATO would have to

fight tooth and nail to preserve it, against the new threat posed by the

SOVMEDRON.

This issue was not kept secret, behind the cloak of classified documents, but

was also raised publicly, as Admiral SMALL, then Commander in Chief Southern

Europe wrote an alarmed article on a review, assessing that “NATO capability to

control the Mediterranean Sea was at risk. (In fact) defense in the Southern Region

was concentrated on three points: Northern Italy, whose industrial centers were

threatened by attacks; the Balkan front, where Bulgaria was facing Greece and

Turkish Trace, and finally Eastern Turkey. Our plans were based, so far, on the

assumption of our maritime superiority in the entire Mediterranean”165.

Consequently, in case of an even temporary or partial loss of NATO sea power,

should a sudden attack be made by the V ESKADRA, these three fronts would be

isolated, with no possibility of reinforcements, which could come only through the

sea.

164 Ibid.

165 “Occidente”. N˚ 1-1984. pg. 17.

152

The issue was so serious that even NATO Council was involved, as the recipient

of a document, the “Report on the future tasks of the Alliance”, prepared by the

Belgian minister HARMEL, who included, among the key tasks for the Alliance, the

“defense of the region exposed (to an attack), in particular the Mediterranean,

where the events on the Middle East have led to an expansion of the Soviet

activities”166.

Thanks to the Soviet naval forces, however, the NATO Command of the

Mediterranean gradually developed also those “capabilities to control vast sea

spaces”, similar to what was already done for the Allied airspace, which resulted

essential after the end of the Cold War, and especially nowadays.

This capability consisted in a disposition of maritime surveillance, named

“Eagle Eye”, based upon regular patrols by anti-submarine aircraft, whose findings

were integrated by the locating reports sent by allied ships, whenever an unforeseen

encounter of Soviet ships occurred. On top of all that, there were intelligence

information and electronic intercepts. Ashore, an operating room collected and

evaluated all information, like the pebbles of a mosaic, thus achieving a coherent

situational picture.

In the meantime, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had spoiled the détente

process, and the North Atlantic Council, took into account the renewed situation of 166 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 73.

153

tension and decided to send twice, first from Reykjavik, in June 1968 and then from

Paris, the following November 16, a stern warning to the Soviets. The message said

that “any Soviet intervention which might impact, directly or indirectly, on the

situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean, would provoke an international crisis,

with significant consequences”167. In fact, beyond the invasion of that unfortunate

country, “Soviet penetration, in the form of an increasingly massive naval presence,

was a potential threat against the Southern Flank of the Alliance”168.

In order to show the allied cohesion and determination, in 1969 the Council

approved the “Mediterranean Naval On Call Force (NAVOCFORMED), which had

been already endorsed, in principle, during the previous month of January”169. This

force included one escort unit from each Allied littoral country, plus another one

provided by the USA and UK respectively; apart from contingencies, the force would

assemble twice per year, to perform during one month the classic activities of

“suasion”, also known as “naval diplomacy”, in peacetime, while in case of tension it

would be activated until the end of mission. Only after the Cold War this force

became standing, i.e. operating throughout the year.

167 L’Alleanza Atlantica, pg. 74.

168 Ibid. pg. 81.

169 Ibid.

154

Ten years of tension elapsed, until the Mediterranean situation improved

significantly, due to the worsening of relations between the USSR and Egypt, which

shifted allegiance by signing the Camp David agreements; as a consequence, the

Soviet ships were deprived of the base of Alexandria, a fact causing insuperable

logistic difficulties, notwithstanding their transfer to Tartus, a port unable to offer

the same amount of supporting infrastructures. The Kremlin was therefore

compelled to progressively reduce the size of the force, until its full withdrawal, due

to the crisis of 1989.

The Northern Flank

Since 1952, the defense against an invasion coming from the Kola Peninsula,

through the eastern salient of Northern Norway, known as Finn-mark, had been

assigned to the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT), which was – at that

time – the main coordinator of all NATO naval operations.

The NATO Supreme Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) had issued a document,

known as the Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS), which outlined five

naval campaigns for NATO. Beyond the Norwegian Sea campaign “the other four

were the Atlantic, the Shallow Seas, the Mediterranean Lifelines and Eastern

Mediterranean. All were interdependent with each other and with operations

ashore”170.170 E. GROVE. Battle for the Fiǿrds. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1991. pg. 8.

155

The Norwegian Sea campaign enjoyed the top priority, and it envisaged, like

what was foreseen for the land and air forces, the “Forward Strategy”, even before it

had become a general NATO approach. The tool to carry it out was the “Striking Fleet

Atlantic”, including aircraft carriers and Amphibious Groups, mostly American, to be

integrated by British forces and by escorts provided by other Allies.

The aim of the maritime version of the Forward Strategy was to “keep

neutralized the most dangerous concentration of Soviet maritime power, the

Northern Fleet. This required Anglo-American maritime power to be available for

forward defense of this area including possible reinforcement ashore”171 in favor of

land forces, which were instead under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR).

“To demonstrate a capacity both to defend Norway and to threaten the Soviet

Navy in its bases, NATO's very first major Atlantic exercise in 1952, Main Brace,

consisted of carrier operations off Vest-fjord. At the Exercise press conference, it was

emphasized that NATO needed to be able to operate off Northern Norway and that

her maritime exercises could not be restricted to small areas. No less than four

American and two British fleet carriers were deployed for Main Brace together with

171 Ibid.

156

three light carriers. Amphibious landings were carried out – albeit in Denmark rather

than Norway”172, in order to avoid provoking the Soviets too openly.

On this subject, the NATO Secretary General, Lord ISMAY, made a statement in

1954, saying that “the Striking Fleet would undertake offensive and support

operations rather than direct defense of Atlantic trade routes”173. When the strategy

of Flexible Response was adopted, also SACLANT Forward Strategy was updated,

thus attributing greater emphasis both to conventional capabilities and to those

related to crisis management, as it had been done for the Mediterranean.

Always within the crisis management context, we have seen that SACEUR had

been authorized to establish two multinational units, first the Allied Air Mobile Force

(AMF – A) in 1961, also its land equivalent, AMF – L; their task was to quickly deploy

in any area where an aggression was threatened, in order to exert a dissuasive

action, by showing that all NATO nations were ready and willing to react, in

accordance with the provisions of Article 5 on collective defense. It is worth

highlighting that AMF – L, in particular, was supposed to deploy on the threatened

flanks, i.e. in Turkey and, more frequently, in Norway.

172 Ibid. pg. 9.

173 Ibid.

157

Also SACLANT, to comply with the requirements in time of tension, had “called

for a new concept, to improve the Alliance's ability to respond quickly and

collectively at sea in a crisis, by evolving the concept of Maritime Contingency Forces

to be drawn at short notice from assets earmarked to the Alliance in peacetime to

support SACLANT's contingency plans at an early point in a crisis. As part of this

process the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) was born at the beginning of 1968

as a multinational standing force under NATO command”174. One escort was provided

by each participating nation, thus having an average of ten sips, whose national

balance proved Alliance's solidarity.

Meanwhile, the new NATO Secretary General , Manlio BROSIO, had asked

SACLANT to prepare a new study on Alliance Maritime Strategy. The report was

forwarded in 1969 and envisaged that “in (time of) crisis, Maritime Contingency

Forces would be mobilized to provide a controlled response and to deter further

escalation. If, however, deterrence failed, Western maritime forces would be used to

contain and destroy Soviet submarines as far forward as possible while strike carriers

would support the land and amphibious operations ashore, especially on the

flanks”175.

174 Ibid. pg. 12.

175 Ibid. pg. 14.

158

Unfortunately for Norway, the line chosen to contain and destroy the Soviet

submarines was not chosen very much forward, as it ran from Greenland to Iceland

and from there to Great Britain, the so-called GIUK Gap. Therefore, Norway found

herself on the wrong side of the line, outside the anti-submarine defense perimeter,

thus finding its numerous merchant fleet exposed to the full brunt of enemy

submarine attacks; geography, though, offered no alternative, as the waters in the

northernmost area, around Bear Island, suffered from a turbulent confluence of

warm and cold currents, which blinded submarine detection systems.

The discontent of Norway, but most notably the impressive growth of the Soviet

Fleet, with the coincident decline of NATO strength at sea – Great Britain had

announced that her carriers would be paid off within 1978, while the US numbers of

carriers was dwindling, as a consequence of the economic disarray following

Vietnam war - led in 1977 the NATO Ministers of Defense to request “a major

reassessment of the Alliance's position at sea. There was a feeling that NATO's naval

concepts were both ill-defined and too reactive. Western maritime strategy seemed

in danger of becoming fixated with the Maginot Line of the (GIUK) gap”176.

In 1978, therefore, successive SACLANTs, Admirals Ike KIDD and Harry TRAIN,

“stressed the need for a balanced response to Soviet naval forces in the Eastern

Atlantic (EASTLANT) area and for NATO to be prepared and have the will to take full

176 Ibid. pg. 18.

159

advantage of warning time and early action, to place our striking force in position to

deter the enemy combat fleet”177.

On this basis, the three Strategic Commands178 prepared together a new

Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS), which was submitted and approved

by the North Atlantic Council in 1980. Now, SACLANT was responsible for only three

out of the five naval campaigns, while SACEUR became the leader of both

Mediterranean campaigns, for the sake of the unity of command in that area.

The most important aspect of this concept, though, were its three operational

principles “first, Containment, keeping the Soviet fleet from reaching the open ocean

either undetected in tension or unopposed in war; second, Defense in Depth, being

ready to fight the Soviets at the forward edge of the NATO area, along their exit

routes, and in defense of the Allied war and merchant shipping; third – and most

important – Keeping the Initiative”179.

It is worth highlighting that the concept endorsed the way, most used in history,

to arrange a strategic defense in depth, whenever the requirement was defense of

one’s homeland, i.e. to start countering the enemy in front of his bases, as it had

been done by Great Britain against NAPOLEON, in order to prevent the much feared 177 Ibid.

178 The third NATO Strategic Command was CINCHAN, responsible for the area around the British Channel.

179 Ibid. pg. 20.

160

landing of French forces in England, during the wars between the two countries from

1793 to 1815.

This rather aggressive approach was further emphasized few years later, in

1986, by the US doctrine of “Forward Deployment, the key to success, (as) in peace it

signified interest and a willingness to stand by allies; in crisis it enhanced deterrence

and controlled escalation and in the event of war it allowed the initiative to be

seized and the enemy to be put on the defensive. Once seized, the initiative was to

be pressed home worldwide, with carrier battle groups rolling up the Soviets on the

flanks and Western attack submarines inflicting attrition on SSBNs”180 .

A forward deployment of the carriers' battle groups, though, would have

exposed them to massive air strikes by the Soviets, who had provided their long

range bombers with stand-off anti-ship missiles. It was decided therefore to have the

carriers operating within the Vest-fjord, whose steep rocky coast protected these

units from missiles. Experiments proved this solution to be effective, to the general

satisfaction, except for the poor commanding officers, who had no margins, when

launching an air strike from their huge ships, especially when steaming from the

entrance to the end of this long but narrow inland water basin.

Meanwhile, at the end of the ears 1980s, the implosion of the Soviet Union

caused the end of the Norwegian Sea campaigns. The Northern Flank was not

180 Ibid. page 23.161

threatened any more, as the Russian ships were forced to rot in harbor for years,

due to lack of funds.

Some comments are worth being made, about the “Flank approach”, which had

already been attempted by Germany during WWII, without decisive success. One

thing is to threaten, thus exerting pressure, and another is to succeed: the

Norwegian Flank campaign did in fact compel the Soviets to guard the northernmost

frontier with significant forces, but in case of war could have only allowed bombing

the main bases of the Soviet Fleet, thus reducing her pressure on the Atlantic lines of

communication. No hope existed to win an offensive campaign, thus conquering the

Kola Peninsula, and NATO was fully aware of this impossibility; in fact, the number of

land forces assigned to this sector did never reach the amount required to take the

initiative on land.

The Soviet Peripheral Strategy

As LIDDELL HART had predicted, any “Strategy of Limited Aim” depended on the

Navy; initially, the Soviet fleet was mostly based on “Sea Denial” assets, i.e.

submarines, whose task was to severe the transatlantic lines of communication,

needed by NATO to ensure the so-called “Reinforcement and Resupply” to the

Central European theater. It was a strategy very similar to what had been attempted

by Germany during both World Wars, a typical approach of a land power willing to

contain and defeat her maritime enemies.

162

However, when the second Cuban crisis ended with a serious loss of prestige for

the USSR, the Kremlin leaders had to acknowledge that their blunder was due to the

fact that “Cuba was beyond the range of support of their conventional forces, and

KENNEDY had called this bluff”181, namely due to the limitations of their naval

instrument.

On this subject, it is revealing what the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign

Affairs grimly told an American official, i.e. that “you Americans will never be able to

do this to us again”182. The USSR leaders decided therefore to develop a “Blue Water

Navy”, and they developed it according to what a Soviet strategist, admiral Sergej

GORSHKOV, was recommending since some years.

In fact, the admiral had started by writing, in his commentary on the German

way to fight the Atlantic campaign during WWII, that “a no smaller error was that of

waging the struggle virtually only with submarines, without backing them up with

other kind of forces, especially aircraft. Because of these errors, the Allies were able

to build up in massive numbers the forces and resources for protection from the

strikes of the submarines and to make good the loss of cargo vessels. Therefore,

although the influence of the struggle for communications on the general course of

the war was considerable, it could not become decisive”183.

181 M. D. TAYLOR. Swords and Plowshares. Da Capo Press, 1972, page 280.

182 E. B. POTTER. Sea Power. A Naval History. US Naval Insitute Press, 1981, page 380.

183 S. G. GORSHKOV. The Sea Power of the State. Pergamon Press, 1979, page 118.163

His remark was even more valid, as the Germans had achieved remarkable

successes, in this campaign, only in the Arctic sea, as they had interdicted effectively

the allied convoys to Murmansk through a coordinated use of submarines and

aircraft, from their Norwegian bases.

Thus “he was determined that his own submarines should be amply supported,

and he assumed that the United States and other NATO powers would similarly

support theirs. He resolved therefore to have weapons in the air and afloat to

destroy surface ships as well as submarines – preferably far from the Soviet

Union”184.

Also, GORSHKOV noted that, during the Cold War period, NATO powers were

heavily relying on sea power, to such an extent that the “World oceans have already

been turned by the imperialists into launching points for highly mobile, covertly

acting, carriers of long-range strategic missiles launched from under water and

always ready for combat”185, not to mention “the aircraft carrier strike formations

(which) deliver nuclear weapons on land targets and assist their land forces”186.

Given this situation, he asked himself: “could the Soviet Union agree with the

age-old dominance on the seas and oceans of the Western maritime powers,

184 E. B. POTTER. Sea Power – A Naval History. Naval Institute Press, 1981. pg. 381.

185 S. D. GORSHKOV, PAGE x.

186 Ibid. page 172.164

especially in conditions when extensive areas of the oceans have become the

launching platforms of nuclear missile weapons? Of course not!”187. For this reason,

he explained, “our country has built a modern fleet and has sent it out into the

ocean to ensure its state interests in order to defend itself reliably from attack from

extensive oceanic directions”188.

The first generation of Soviet surface ships operated close to the US aircraft

carrier battle groups, being visibly ready to undertake a surprise missile strike against

them, as soon as war should break out, and then suffer the enemy reaction until

foundering, as they were in small numbers, or even single ships alone.

For this reason, NATO dubbed them as “first strike units”, dangerous only when

in close contact with her forces; to fend off this threat, the North Atlantic Council

had approved the reaction against a “Hostile Intent”, as we have seen: should a

Soviet unit open the doors of their missile launchers, to strike, she would be liable of

being gunned until impaired or destroyed.

However, besides the attack to “Imperialist” sea lines of communication, and

the defense in depth against the aircraft carrier battle groups, the admiral envisaged

a third task for the Soviet Navy, as he had noted how

187 Ibid. page 178.

188 Ibid. page 180.165

“the imperialist states use their sea power primarily as an instrument of aggressive policy

for subjugating and holding down countries and peoples, as a means of exacerbating the

international situation and unleashing wars and military conflicts in different parts of the

world. (They) view sea power not only as a most crucial means of threatening socialism but

also as a force capable of holding in check their allies in aggressive military blocks and

ensuring in these blocks their dominant position and overriding influence of the American

monopolies”189.

For the admiral, this was but the most recent instance of the fact that “the fleet

has always been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy

in peacetime”190. This was a serious problem for the USSR: Western powers were

using their fleets to “strangle the national liberation movements, keep former

colonies in social and economic dependence, weakening the world socialist system

and capture and hold strategically important areas of the globe”191, and to coerce

the weak states, as it had happened in the case of Cuba.

Therefore, the Soviet Navy should “act as a factor for stabilizing the situation in

different areas of the world, promoting the strengthening of peace and friendship

between the peoples and restraining the aggressive strivings of the imperialist

states”192.

189 Ibid. page 2.

190 Ibid. page 248.

191 Ibid. page 234.

192 Ibid. page 276.166

Summing up, she was needed – to use the words of a US historian - to “serve as

an instrument of state policy, which had as its ultimate aim the achievement of a

universal Communist state through world revolution, (but at the same time she

ought to be capable of) winning friends and discouraging potential enemies.

(Therefore) she had to be strong enough to demonstrate its ability to support wars

of national liberation (besides) thwarting imperialist aggression”193.

The admiral concluded his analysis on Soviet requirements at sea by saying that:

“the sea power of our country is directed at ensuring favorable conditions for

building communism, the intensive expansion of the economic power of the country

and the steady consolidation of its defense capabilities”194. No better statement

could be made to highlight the importance of sea power, in its dual facets of military

and commercial might.

Conclusion

During the Cold War, as we have just seen, the attempts by NATO to overcome the

stalemate on the Central European front had led the Alliance to recur to what had

been preached, in 1947, by admiral DI GIAMBERARDINO, thus using the “Flanks” to

threaten the core of Soviet power.

193 E. B. POTTER, page 381.

194 S. D. GORSHKOV, page 284.167

Also, the naval supremacy of the Western countries – especially the naval might of

the United States – had been instrumental to control the widespread instability

which arose from the “Wars of National Liberation” against the remnants of the

European colonial empires. This was perfectly understood by the Soviet Union, who

became painfully aware of her inability to support these independence movements,

and to encourage the newborn nations to embrace Communism. The crisis of Cuba

had been a sharp reminder of this lack of capability.

Therefore, the USSR recurred to the classic tool of any expansionist power, the Navy,

both to fend off the threat posed against her nation’s might and to influence events

abroad. In admiral GORSHKOV – who had gained a well-deserved fame as a young

leader during WWII - she found the theoretician for such a step.

While the military aspects of the “Peripheral Strategy”, as put in practice by the

Soviet Union, were a success, the same did not happen for the non- military side, as

it ended up to be a massive expenditure of money: too many newborn countries

asked for the USSR help, but very few proved to be reliable partners. The biggest

successes were reaped in Africa, especially in Angola, but also that country betrayed

the Soviets, when the leaders decided to strike a deal with the insurgents, backed by

the West.

The downfall of the Soviet Union can be ascribed – among other things - to the ill-

advised adventure in Afghanistan, where communists took possession of power, by

168

chasing the King, only to find out that the countryside was unwilling to accept the

new form of government. The direct intervention to support the government

resulted in an endless counter-insurgency operation, and even when 200,000

soldiers were deployed, the USSR was unable to stabilize the country.

The same sort of disappointment was experienced by the Western countries in

Indochina, where the USA decided to save a country – South Vietnam - incapable of

defending itself, due to its sharp internal disputes, by waging a counter-insurgency

war on her behalf, meeting with a notable failure. Notwithstanding the massive

deployment of troops, which reached 500,000 military of the three Services, nothing

more than a precarious stalemate was achieved.

In both cases, serious mistakes had been committed in evaluating the situation and

the possibilities of success; it is worth recalling that, as we will see shortly, these

political defeats were mostly due to lack of attention to the key factors affecting any

attempt to control a foreign territory, notwithstanding that ample lessons were

available to be learnt from history. What is worse, also in Iraq and Afghanistan the

Western forces showed that they had not drawn any useful learning from their

previous experience.

It is worth, therefore, to give at least a perfunctory look at the strategic theory,

dealing with this type of operations, to understand why all went wrong and how

improvements might be possible.

169

CHAPTER SIX

THE STRATEGY OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Introduction

Too often human beings, when dealing with difficult situations without being

supported by a significant knowledge of history, feel that their problems are new, so

that no precedents are available, and they must “invent” the approach to be

followed. The result is, most often, that old blunders are repeated time and again,

and unsatisfactory outcomes become most frequent.

Not by chance the study of strategy thrives on mistakes, as they provide plenty of

material to reflect. That’s why MAHAN said, “even failing a court martial, defeat cries

aloud for explanations; whereas success, like charity, covers a multitude of sins”195.

This is the case, in fact, for the “Strategy of Peace Missions”, an issue which has

occupied the front pages of all Western newspapers in the last two decades, as it has

been the most common type of overseas engagement undertaken by Western

countries during the last twenty years.

195 A. T. MAHAN. Naval Strategy, page 384.170

It must be acknowledged that the term “Peace” has been used sometimes to

designate situations quite differing one from the other, ranging from the Soviet

quest for influence after WWII, through their peripheral approach, to the “Peace of

the graveyards”, i.e. the indiscriminate manslaughter of local populations, a misfit

unfortunately widespread also nowadays.

Even if the term “Peace Missions” is recent, we must acknowledge that it is often

used to designate activities aimed at achieving control of a foreign territory, more

commonly labeled as “Stabilization Operations”. This activity is not new at all, to

such an extent that there are in history several precedents, which have been

analyzed by the strategists. Therefore, many books of strategy deal with this domain,

unfortunately mostly unknown to those who are leading these operations in our

days.

Distant precedents

Among all records, those written in the West deal with the operations performed,

since the early XIX century, to control foreign countries. The most relevant instance

was NAPOLEON’s attempt to bring Spain under French direct influence, by placing

his brother, Joseph BONAPARTE on the throne, after having kidnapped the king,

FERNANDO VII “El Deseado” and his father; the exaggerated reaction of the French

troops to a mass demonstration against the abduction of the young crown prince, on

May 2, 1808 in Madrid, led to a first general upheaval of the Spaniards, which left

171

serious doubts, among the population, about the intents of the French occupants.

To understand how mentally ill-prepared the French were to cope with the

Spanish situation and mindset, it is worth recalling an exchange of letters between a

French general, SEBASTIANI, and the respected Spanish politician JOVELLANOS. The

former extolled “the constitutional freedom, the unhindered right to practice one’s

own religion, the removal of those obstacles which had thwarted for centuries the

regeneration of this beautiful country”196 and accused the latter of fighting in favor

of the Inquisition, thus becoming an instrument of the privileged and reactionary

élite. JOVELLANOS replied that he was: “following the saint and just cause of our

Nation, which he had sworn to dedicate his life to. He was fighting for the rights of

his king, his religion and his constitution”197. The two interlocutors, in fact, were

visibly reasoning in different planets, thus being incapable to understand each other.

The French troops, once the brother of NAPOLEON, Joseph, had taken the crown

of Spain, undertook a “classic” military campaign, to defeat the remnants of the

Spanish Army, which had split into different groups of forces, each under a regional

government. All went well until one big French column penetrated into the south of

the country, occupying and pillaging the towns of Cordoba and Jahén; when its lines

of communication with Madrid were interrupted by the guerillas, general DUPONT,

who commanded the column, attempted to retreat through the mountain passes of

196 E. de DIEGO. Espaňa. El Infierno de Napoleòn. Ed. La Esfera de los Libros, 2008, pag. 27.

197 Ibid.172

the Sierra Morena, the shortest way for him to reach the Spanish high plains, where

the capital city of the nation is.

As the Spaniards had taken away all food available in the area where the column

was marching, the French troops found themselves almost starving and without

enough water, so they split into different groups and were defeated at the battle of

Bailén. Once the French had surrendered, the Spanish soldiers inspected the

backpacks of their prisoners and discovered a lot of precious goods, including some

taken from churches, the products of their pillaging. Word spread quickly throughout

the country, and from this moment on the whole of the Spanish population waged a

merciless war against the sacrilegious invaders.

The British government was quick to exploit this situation, and decided to land a

contingent in Portugal, as well as to sustain the insurgency with money and

weapons. These initiatives led to a protracted struggle, which ended, after some ups

and downs, with the withdrawal of the French Army from Spain in 1814. Few years

later a French strategist, JOMINI, wrote several profound remarks on

counterinsurgency in his book, “Précis de l’Art de la Guerre”, based on his personal

experience in this campaign.

Also after the Congress of Vienna, the Western powers, united in the Holy

Alliance, carried out a number of attempts to control conflicts and internecine

struggles, merely through the use of force. These efforts were a mixture between a

173

sincere wish for peace and the intent of keeping a dominant position, in areas

affecting their strategic interests. Needless to say, the results were mixed, in the best

of cases, and led to the loss of territories and eventually caused the fall of the

mighty Austrian Empire, rocked by internal upheavals in its very moment of serious

difficulties, confirmed how short-sighted had been this approach.

Toward the end of the XIX century, the colonial initiatives, undertaken by many

European countries, were apparently more successful: thanks to their modern

weapons, their forces were able to achieve initial control of vast territories,

especially when no form of organized state existed. However, whenever a muscular

approach was adopted, the local populations bred a growing resentment which

never calmed down, until the liberation movements – supported by other nations –

caused the abrupt end of these colonies, almost a century later.

On this subject some notable remarks were put in writing, as in UK by general

CALLWELL, who favored a muscular approach; in addition to the books on this

subject, some recent studies by general CHAILLAND have uncovered the directives

issued by two among the most successful French generals, GALLIENI and LYAUTEY,

when they gained control of Madagascar (1898) and Morocco (1905) respectively,

with few troops and without raising significant oppositions by the populations.

It is also worth highlighting that, since the last decades of the XIX century, the

pressure of the Western public opinions, upset by bloodsheds, has been the chief

174

motivator for Stabilization Operations. The humanitarian drive, therefore, cannot be

totally discounted when dealing with those initiatives undertaken in the past to carry

out peace missions, as it happened in the case of Crete, in 1896, and many times

afterward.

Another relevant instance was the occupation of the Philippines by the United

States. It was the product of the war with Spain, which was declared on April 25,

1898. The following first of May, at 05:41 in the morning, a small US Navy squadron,

led by admiral DEWEY, which had penetrated the previous night in Manila Bay,

destroyed the Spanish ships moored in front of the city.

As no troops in adequate numbers were available to the US to defeat the

numerous Spanish forces, which were entrenched in Manila, the capital town of the

colony, the US admiral asked the leader of the Filipino insurgents, AGUINALDO, to

undertake the siege of the city, apparently promising the independence of the

island, once war was over.

After the fall of Manila, on the following August 12, with the Spanish forces

surrendering to the US, as they did not want to do it with the insurgents, the US

government signed the Paris peace treaty with Spain, which included, among other

clauses, the acquisition of the Philippines for a sum of money, and then submitted it

to Congress for ratification. This process, though, became immediately quite thorny,

as a strong debate divided the Congress in two opposed factions.

175

On one side the Democrats – including President MCKINLEY – felt strongly the

anti-colonialist tradition, and would have preferred to limit their possession to either

a support base for commerce, or possibly also a military installation to project

forces, if needed, toward China. The Republicans, instead, influenced by Theodor

ROOSEVELT, wanted the annexation of the archipelago, whose population was –

according to him – not mature enough for independence.

Given this stalemate, the President found a compromise, which became known

as “Benevolent Assimilation”, whose intent was a sort of “soft cooptation” of the

Filipinos within the USA. This idea proved to be appealing to the majority of

Congress, and the ratification of the treaty took place, albeit thanks to a majority of

only two votes.

The annexation of the Philippines had become a fact, notwithstanding the

reports by the American Consul, Oscar WILLIAMS, who informed Washington that

the locals, under the leadership of AGUINALDO, had already organized a

government. The Consul wrote, in particular, that “from that day to this he has been

uninterruptedly successful in the field and dignified and just as the head of his

government”198, but the US government decided nonetheless to establish a sort of

colonial rule.

Quite naturally, the Filipinos were incensed, as they felt betrayed by those who

198 J. BRADLEY. The Imperial Cruise. Back Bay Books, 2009, page 91.176

had sought their help. In this situation of extreme tension a small incident would

have been enough to light the fire of an upheaval, and this is precisely what

happened, when an American soldier, on the night of February 4, 1899, “surprised

and shot three Filipinos inside the base of Manila”199.

The US government chose to respond through the military solution, forsaking the

initial intent to remain within the realm of a “soft” approach, with the rationale that

no reconstruction was possible before the environment became secure, and started

therefore a full-fledged military campaign against the rebels.

Unfortunately, after some initial successes in the field, most notably the battle of

Novaleta200, one half of the US contingent had to be dispatched in a hurry to China,

as the American contribution to the multinational effort to free the Western

Delegations in Peking, besieged by the revolt of the Boxers. This prolonged the fight

in the archipelago, which lasted until 1902, when AGUINALDO was captured.

However, “the struggle continued until 1911 by some isolated revolutionary groups

who had refused to lay down arms”201.

It had not been a simple affair nor a bloodless matter: according to some sources,

the struggle caused:

“the death of 600.000 Filipinos. The US troops adopted tactics which would have been

199 D. DALTON. The Rough Guide to thePhilippines Ed. Rough Guides, pag.499.

200 J. R. MOSKIN. The Story of the US Marine Corps. Ed. Paddington Press, 1979, pag. 91.

201 V. REYES. Filippine. Ed. Pendragon, 1998, pag. 22.177

used also in Vietnam, as the establishment of strategic villages and the scorched earth, to

pacify the locals. However, to crush the Filipinos was not easy. The US forces,

notwithstanding their superior fire power, were beset by the unending heat, by the torrential

rains and by serious diseases. In March 1899 the Americans were in a stalemate and did

control a territory which did not exceed 40 miles around Manila”202.

Other sources mention instead “4234 Americans dead and one million to three

millions (Filipinos) sent to their early graves”203, i.e. a massacre was committed to

stabilize the archipelago. It is worth saying that the ferocity and determination of the

insurgents was impressive, as they attacked after having taken drugs, and had tied

laces around their arms and legs, so that a single wound would not knock them

down. As a caliber 38 bullet could not stop an assailant, both the US Army and the

Marines adopted the COLT handgun, which later became famous: its caliber 45

round was in fact the only adequate to stop a guerrilla running against a soldier.

The American government, impressed by the violence of the insurrection,

became more attentive to the population needs, thus belatedly starting the process

of “Benevolent Assimilation”, which included a valuable medical system which

reduced the impact of the pandemics of pest and cholera, as well as a capillary

instruction network, which “became the main instrument to spread the American

culture and civilization”204.

202 D. DALTON. Op. cit. pag. 499.

203 J. BRADLEY, page 127.

204 V. REYES. Op. cit. pag 22.178

Also, a popular Assembly was established in 1907, and in 1916 Congress widened

its powers. Eventually, in 1934 President F. D. ROOSEVELT signed the TYDINGS-

MACDUFFIE Act, which declared, starting July 4, 1936, the Commonwealth of the

Philippines , a semi-autonomous government with a new Constitution “which would

remain in force for a transitional period of ten years. In 1946 the Philippines would

become independent”205. A precious book of the US Marines, “Small Wars Manual”

was published in 1940, with all the lessons of that war.

The popularity of the US grew thanks to the much harsher and cruel domination

by Japan, during WWII; in 1946, the US withdrew from the archipelago, keeping the

air-naval base of Subic Bay through a lease contract, until the end of the Vietnam

war. The handover took place in coincidence with the eruption of the volcano

Piñatubo, which caused great losses, apart from destroying a number of aircraft in

the base. Also, until the final departure of the US, young Filipinos could enlist in the

US Services – the most among them joined the Navy - and acquire American

citizenship after some years of service.

The problem of stabilizing foreign territories was neglected by the Europeans

during WWI, due to the heavy commitments and the severe bloodshed of that war,

and the same happened later, due to the inherent weakness of the League of

Nations. The publications where these experiences were laid in writing quickly fell

into oblivion. Only after WWII, when the United Nations (UN) were established, a 205 Ibid. pag. 24.

179

new drive to ensure peace in the world emerged, and was reflected in the UN

Charter; the problem of stabilizing territories became a matter of concern again.

Indeed, this new international structure had been designed to perform an overly

ambitious task, as history has shown.

Peace Missions in our times

In order to fulfill its stabilization mandate, especially in its initial years, the UN

limited its direct involvement to arrange operations of “Interposition”, i.e. it placed

an international contingent of lightly armed troops, offered by member nations – the

Blue Berets - along a disputed border, or within an unstable territory, with the tasks

of patrolling it, thus separating the contenders; the other type of mission was the

“Cease Fire Monitoring”, through a group of observers.

As these troops came often from under-developed countries, the UN paid for

their costs, including troops’ paychecks; many poor nations therefore became even

too ready to offer troops, as to devote troops to the UN was a way to keep a larger

force structure, as compared to what they could financially sustain. The effectiveness

of these forces was, however, inevitably limited, thus forcing in one occasion the UN

Secretary General, U-THANT, to withdraw them from Sinai in 1967, when Egypt

threatened to involve them in its fight against Israel.

In the years 1990s, another UN Secretary General PEREZ DE CUELLAR decided

that the UN should undertake more ambitious missions – known as “Second 180

Generation Peacekeeping”; as the results of the initial experiments were bitterly

disappointing, both in Somalia and Bosnia, the UN, under sharp criticism for these

failures, felt compelled to delegate the task of enforcing some missions, decided by

the UN Security Council, to NATO and/or the EU.

However, if you look at the huge number of peace missions carried out by the

UN, you will be impressed by the fact that – notwithstanding the limited means

available - this Organization has contained or averted quite a number of tragedies

throughout the world, and is doing that even now: it is worth recalling that the UN

are leading an average of twenty peace mission per year, and only those which end

in troubles – a small fraction of the total - make the headlines, thus being visible to

us.

The key strategic aspects

This historical account, as well as these remarks on UN mixed results in its

undertakings, lead to a number of considerations. First, peace missions, when they

succeed, draw little attention from the public, while every failure attracts a lot of

criticism. In fact, when all goes well, and very few events occur, world media stop

looking at what happens, as they are unable - often uninterested - to detect the slow

but steady progress toward a long-lasting stability. Such a situation is well reflected

in an interesting UN statement, which notes that, “the quiet successes of short-term

181

conflict prevention and peacemaking are often politically invisible”206.

This is, indeed, also the case of many other International Organizations: the same

consideration applies in fact to NATO, to the EU and particularly to the OSCE, with

the latter being accused too often of “under-ambition”, notwithstanding its more

than 50 missions carried out, mostly in cooperation with other IOs, without running

into big troubles.

Another point to be made is the issue of “Impartiality”, which ties the hands of

the Blue Berets, also in case of a majority harassing and persecuting a minority,

within a nation or a territory. Normally, this majority is better armed and in most

cases pursuing a strategy of annihilation; any attempt to stop a genocide is a hair-

raising endeavor, which cannot be carried on successfully by lightly armed UN forces,

whose ROEs allow self-defense only, and requires a robust chain of command, which

the UN do not possess, as its Military Staff Committee was never implemented,

albeit being part of the UN Charter. What happened in Somalia and Bosnia was due

to these limitations, and the failure of the UN missions in these areas demonstrated

its inherent limitations.

The increased number of peace operations, since 1945, has also led to a new

political terminology, to classify the various kind of “Peace Missions”. This habit of

“inventing” new terms, unfortunately, has little to do with Strategy, whose jargon is

206 UN. Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, 23 August 2000, Part II, page 1.182

inevitably subject to a rigorous scrutiny, for the sake of precision, while this new

terminology some time hides less commendable goals: the use of the term

“Intervention” instead of “Invasion” is only one instance of this bad habit, which

causes many misperceptions.

As we are dealing with Strategy, thus considering what is effective and what is

counterproductive, in order to avoid repeating always the same mistakes time and

again, it is worth analyzing the key elements of the problem of “Peace Operations”

under this standpoint.

Most strategists acknowledge, above all, that stabilization operations often end

up into a “protracted, thankless, invertebrate war”207. Even worse, they “are

conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and

doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions”208. The

plea of the BRAHIMI Panel, convened by the UN, for “clear, credible and achievable

mandates”209 is therefore to be fully shared, but might remain a forlorn hope, in

most cases.

We should also consider that peace operations are carried on in pursuance of

“Strategies of Limited Aim”. CLAUSEWITZ described them as follows: “once the

influence of the political objective on war is admitted, as it must be, there is no

207 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars. University of Nebraska Press, 1996 (reprint of 1906 edition), page 27.

208 US MARINE CORPS . Small Wars Manual, 1940, page 9.

209 UN. Report of the panel on UN Peace Operations. Part II, page 8.183

stopping it; consequently we must also be willing to wage minimal wars”210. War

without limits is therefore not the only right approach, to pacify a troubled country!

In strategy, as FOCH recommended, we must examine any “operation, starting

from its aim, in its widest sense, (and pose ourselves the question): WHAT IS IT ALL

ABOUT?”211. The core of strategic thinking is in fact to identify the political aim

(Zweck), even before studying the peculiarities of each situation.

In our case, the reply is most simple, as peace missions have the “purpose to

ensure a durable peace”212. Look at the key word, DURABLE, which implies the

finding of a stable and long-lasting settlement in the area concerned. Any action

which does not conform to this scope is counterproductive, no more no less.

But to find a durable settlement, the key aspects of the situation – the factors in

Strategy - must also be found. This is the most difficult part of the strategic work, as

conditions are different from one troubled area to another. In essence, the few

factors which are most relevant must be extracted from numerous and complex

details.

Besides theater-specific peculiarities, there are in fact three key aspects, which

usually become decisive. The first is the local population, the second is time, and

the third consists in the interference by third parties – states or groups of power – 210 C. von CLAUSEWITZ. On War. Princeton University Press, 1989, page 604.

211 F. FOCH. Des Principes de la Guerre. Ed. Economica, 2007, page 14.

212 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars, page 42.184

which can reap significant advantages from a defeat of those engaged in stabilizing

an area overseas, or from their weakening through attrition. Let’s examine them one

by one.

The attitude of the local population will always have a decided effect on this kind

of mission, and its favor is essential for the successful outcome of these missions. On

this subject, the Western countries have accumulated a vast experience throughout

history, mostly due to their repeated mistakes. This almost endless string of blunders

started with NAPOLEON and his vain attempt to subdue Spain, as we have seen, but

continues even now.

After the defeat of the French armies, made inevitable by the vengeful fury of the

Spaniards, a strategist, JOMINI, noted that: “an invasion against an exasperated

population, ready for any sacrifice, which can hope being supported in terms of

manpower and money by a rich neighbor is a thorny endeavor”213, and he added:

“each step is disputed by combats; the Army which has entered in that sort of

country doesn’t possess anything else than the field where she in encamped; her

provisions can be procured only through the sword; her convoys are threatened or

captured everywhere”214.

Under an operational standpoint, when the foreign forces lose the favor of the

population, the difficulties are huge, as the author acknowledged: “All the Mexican 213 A.H. JOMINI. Précis de l’Art de la Guerre. Ed. IVREA, 1994, page 33.

214 Ibid. page 39.185

gold could not be sufficient to provide some information to the French, and those

information which were given were nothing else than baits, in order to make them

fall into traps. No Army, even the strongest, could fight with success against such a

system applied to a great people, except if that Army had so formidable forces as to

strongly occupy all essential points of a country, cover its own communications, and

also keep several active corps, sufficiently powerful to defeat the enemy everywhere

it might show up”215.

He then added, with reference to intelligence: “any combination (of maneuver)

ends up in a disappointment, and when, after the best coordinated movements, the

most rapid and tiring marches, you believe you have reached the end of your efforts

and that you are hitting like a lightning, you find no other trace of your enemy than

the smoke of his (old) bivouacs; like Dom Quixote, you run that way against

windmills, while your adversary attacks your communications, crushes the

detachments you have left behind to protect them, surprises your convoys, your

depots, and wages a war (which ends up being) disastrous, where you necessarily

will succumb in the long term”216, due to attrition.

Needless to say, any degree of adequate military superiority is often impossible

to achieve in operations overseas, especially in large countries, due to the cost of

their deployment, and therefore JOMINI recommended a different approach,

215 Ibid. page 42.

216 Ibid. page 41.186

namely to “deploy before all a mass of forces proportional to the opposition and to

the obstacles which have to be faced; calm down the popular strong feelings with all

possible means; wear them out through the time; deploy a great mix of politics, of

benevolence and severity, (but) most of all a lot of justice”217.

Among what JOMINI said, the bulk of his lesson was not completely lost with

time, among his compatriots; when the French army, during the XIX century,

expanded its nation’s colonial empire, some among its generals were able to pursue

a more balanced approach. Few among us remember general GALLIENI, known only

for having confiscated all taxicabs in Paris, in 1914, thus quickly deploying enough

troops to stop the German offensive on the Marne river.

His major success, though, had been his ability to control Madagascar, in 1898,

with limited troops and without using force in excess. As a modern strategist,

CHAILLAND, notes, he, first of all, “compelled his subordinates to know to the best

possible extent the history, the culture (and) the behavior of the tribes they were

facing”218.

But he did not limit his directives to that, as he told his officers: “we must not

destroy unless in the last extremity, and, even in this case, ruin only to rebuild better.

We have to manage the country and its inhabitants, as they will be our main agents

and collaborators. (In the villages) you have to build immediately a marketplace and 217 Ibid.

218 G. CHALLIAND. Le Nouvel Art de la Guerre. Ed. l’Archipel, 2008, page 81.187

a school”219, the best way to improve quality of life and to spread the Western

culture, as we have seen in the case of the Philippines.

One among the former subordinates of GALLIENI, general LYAUTEY, was later able

to control Morocco, by playing the local chieftains one against the other, but also

using the same approach: he “tried to establish an alliance with the representatives

of the Sultan and took care of doing nothing without having reached an agreement

with them. (Also) economic development took a central role in his strategy”220.

The fact that the names of these two generals are unknown to you,

notwithstanding their achievements, while the failure by the French government to

pursue a similar approach in other areas, as in Algeria and Indochina, are well

known, is a clear instance of the “political invisibility” of successful stabilizations

operations.

Not all other Western nations, though, followed the same approach as GALLLIENI

and LYAUTEY. The British, in particular, were convinced that a tougher stance was

preferable. General CALLWELL, for instance, wrote that in these “Small Wars”, as he

named them, “your first object should be the capture of whatever (the insurgents)

prize most, and the destruction or the deprivation of which will probably bring the

war most rapidly to a conclusion. If the enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism

219 Ibid, page 84.

220 Ibid. pages 92-93.188

or his honor, he can be touched through his pocket”221.

It is worth highlighting that CALLWELL was the “protégé” of lord KITCHENER, thus

feeling the obligation of supporting even the most controversial measures adopted

by that British general during the Boer war, including the “Blockhouse” system, a real

anticipation of the Nazi concentration camps. Political constraints and personal

interests are sometimes hindering a pure strategic approach to problems, and

therefore each book on Strategy cannot be read without knowing the historical

context and the pressures which influenced the writer!

But even this author was aware about the inherent counter-productivity of

excessive force, when applied indiscriminately, as he added: “still, there is a limit to

the amount of license in destruction which is expedient. HOCHE222 achieved success

as much by his happy combination of clemency with firmness, as by his masterly

dispositions in the theater of war. Expeditions to put down revolts are not put in

motion merely to bring about a temporary cessation of hostility. Their purpose is to

ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing and not

the exasperation of the enemy is the end to keep in view”223.

In fact, more recently, “as a wise military leader noted,224 the local populations

221 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars, page 40.

222 HOCHE was the French revolutionary general who pacified the region of Vandée.

223 Ibid. pages 41-42.

224 M. Gen. P. CHIARELLI and Maj. P. R. MICHAELIS. Winning the Peace. The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations. Military Review, July-August 2005.

189

may be divided into three categories that help define the battle-space: opponents,

supporters and fence-sitters. The latter are, of course, the vast majority of the

population, at least initially, and they should always be rightly considered as the

operational centre of gravity. The need to win their support is the main requirement,

in the context of any attempt to undermine terrorism”225, as well as defeating

insurgency.

It must be considered once again that any force deployed overseas to control a

foreign territory will never be as numerous as required to take positive control of the

whole country, due to the cost and the difficulty to keep and rotate contingents far

away from home. Chairman MAO, when he mentioned the problems China faced,

due to the Japanese occupation, said: “the territory invaded by the enemy is very

wide, but as we have as our enemy a small country which does not have adequate

forces, thus many regions are out of his control. (Therefore) the anti-Japanese

partisan war will essentially be carried on through independent operations,

externally to his lines of campaign support”226.

This statement has a general application, and implies – as GALLIENI said – the

active cooperation by the locals, our only and potentially best agents, to track and

defeat the opposition groups. Therefore, any action impacting on the local

population must be carefully weighted, in order to avoid irritating both the

225 F. SANFELICE di MONTEFORTE. Strategy and Peace. Ed. Aracne, 2008, pages 434-435.

226 MAO TSE-TOUNG. Écrits Militaires. Chian Edition, 1964, page 172. 190

supporters and the “fence sitters”, who are indeed the real pivot – the “center of

gravity” – for the success or failure of the mission.

The statement by CALLWELL, that these missions often end up in a “protracted,

thankless, invertebrate war”227, depicts vividly what happens when excessive,

disproportionate force is applied. Mind you, this is not a good reason to avoid

deploying powerful armaments! Their visible presence has already a great overawing

effect, and this is an advantage not to be squandered, by using them too liberally, as

the anger which they might originate, when causing victims among the civilian

population, can increase the mission’s risks of failure.

Summing up – as JOMINI said - the forces deployed must be proportional to the

opposition or, to say better, inversely proportional to the degree of favor by the local

population, not necessarily to the size of the theater of operations: you might note,

also from recent historical instances, the risk of causing a sort of spiral effect, when

excessive force is used, and military leaders ask for more forces when the number of

insurgents grows, notwithstanding that any reinforcement has the effect of

increasing the resentment among the population toward the “Invader”.

In the worst case, when the great majority of the local population has become

hostile, as JOMINI said, “you do not occupy anything except the terrain you have

camped on; beyond the limits of your camp everything is hostile, and multiplies,

227 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars, page 27.191

through thousands of means, the difficulties you encounter at each step”228.

But the greatest weakness factor, in peace missions, very much like any operation

overseas, is time. This is true, indeed, for any offensive or expeditionary operation:

the German general GNEISENAU said: “strategy is the art of exploiting time and

space. I am more covetous of the first, as compared to the second. While I can regain

the space (lost, I will never be able to do the same with) the time lost”229; more

recently, a Taliban chieftain stated: “the Western forces have the watch, we have the

time”. But why time is a weakness factor?

On the side of the foreigners, in every mission overseas, when losses are

experienced and difficulties arise, the public opinions of countries providing the

forces will become uneasy, as they are understandably less prone to accept them, as

compared to similar problems occurring in the defense of their homeland.

Expeditionary forces are deployed in fact to put in practice decisions related to

foreign policy, not to ensure a country’s survival. This difference is felt by the public,

and political leaders must take this into account. Therefore, as time goes on, and the

expected results do not come while the effects of attrition become visible,

restlessness and impatience grow, both within the governments and among the

people.

As far as the opponents are concerned, instead, the situation is precisely the 228 A. H. JOMINI. Précis de l’Art de la Guerre, page 40.

229 F. FOCH. Des Principes de la Guerre, footnote at page 72.192

opposite. Those who have chosen not to flee from the troubled area, thus accepting

to endure the hardships of refugees’ life, feel that they have to defend their home,

their family and their country, and repel the foreigners. To that purpose, they have

plenty of time, indeed they can devote their whole life to this task and can raise the

following generations in the dream of freedom from the occupants.

In doing so, insurgents enjoy another great advantage: as JOMINI noted,

they also “know the narrowest paths and where they lead to; everywhere they find a

relative, a brother, a friend who supports them; the chieftains know the country equally

well, and when they are informed about (their enemy) movements, can undertake the

most effective measures to thwart his project, while (their enemy), deprived of all

information, unable to risk detaching scouts to get them, having no other support than

his bayonets, and no security other than the concentration of his columns, acts like a

blind man”230.

On the contrary, the guerillas can afford to “shun decisive action, and their

tactics, almost of necessity, bring about a protracted, toilsome war”231, to practice a

strategy based on “hit and run” attacks, and – most importantly – avoiding any

decisive encounter; quite clearly, Chairman MAO depicted this approach by saying

“the enemy is advancing, we retreat; the enemy comes to a halt, we harass him; the

enemy is exhausted, we hit him; the enemy withdraws, we chase him”232.

230 A. H. JOMINI. Précis de l’Art de la Guerre, pages 40-41.

231 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars, page 32.

232 MAO TSE-TOUNG. Écrits Militaires. Ed. Popular Republic of China, 1964, page 122.193

As it is impossible to win quickly and return home, foreign forces used to gain

control of a territory must settle for a protracted period, with the risk of spreading

xenophobic feeling among the locals, thus antagonizing them, as they are able, in

the best case, to achieve on their own only a limited degree of control in the area.

The best solution is to attempt to turn the time factor against the opponents.

Historically, the first effective way to achieve this advantage is to quickly improve the

quality of life of the locals, as GALLIENI recommended; the second is to assemble,

train and arm local forces, composed by that part of the population which favors a

stable and peaceful settlement, and is ready to fight to achieve it.

How to quickly improve the quality of life of the local population is not a secret!

In Iraq, the widespread use of the “micro lending” of money has spread wealth

among the population, while in Afghanistan village elders have repeatedly forced the

Taliban, who wanted to plant explosive devices under the pavement, to avoid

destroying the new-built roads and bridges, as they were connecting their villages to

the rest of the country for the first time in their history.

On this subject, it is amazing that our countries are spending huge sums to

develop modern weapons, while reconstruction is carried on with age-old systems,

brick after brick, thus losing precious time. If you think at the impressive housing and

reconstruction capabilities developed by the USA close to the end of WWII

(remember the “Nissen Huts” and the way bridges and airstrips were built in few

194

hours), you might understand how great could be the effect of dramatically

improving the living conditions of the populace in a matter of months, instead of

years, should our nations resume the technological developments initiated in the

1940’s. By not developing further this technology, we risk losing a precious potential

advantage!

Local forces, also, will surely enjoy a higher degree of support from the

population, provided they do not squander such a capital through their misbehavior.

They will get better information, thus being able to contain, repel and eventually

defeat those who oppose stabilization. It is worth highlighting that, should local

forces become effective, their opponents (the so-called “Insurgents”) will become

seriously affected by their own war-weary populace, especially when they commit

significant excesses, thus losing their precious cover and support.

The last recurring factor, in these missions, is the involvement of third parties, i.e.

other countries and power groups in the struggle. For those willing to reduce the

might of the nations engaged in this sort of operations, this is a great opportunity, as

their competitors are bogged down in a sort of quagmire for a long time to come:

remember the expression “invertebrate war”!

The simplest way for a third party to prolong the struggle indefinitely is to

provide soldiers, often dubbed as “freedom fighters” or “volunteers”, and especially

money, weapons and ammunitions. On this aspect, we must remember that even

195

asymmetric fighting by the insurgents requires heavy logistical support, and without

external help all guerillas will most often slow down and become irrelevant, thus

facilitating the mission of the foreign forces.

History is full of related instances: Great Britain did that in Spain against

NAPOLEON, the USA practiced this approach against Japan in China before the

outbreak of WWII, and later against the Soviets in Afghanistan, only to suffer from

the support provided to Viet-cong by the Soviet Union and China; France was

defeated in Algeria and Indochina in the same way. As you might note from these

instances, the strength of nations who were victims of this approach was sometimes

sapped forever.

Indeed, the recourse to the so-called “Proxy Wars”, i.e. to provide support to an

insurgents’ struggle, is becoming increasingly widespread, so that some consider it

the most recent form of war: nowadays many nations, being unwilling to show their

hand for fear of retaliation, use this approach against the Western powers, whose

conventional war-fighting capabilities cannot be matched by them. The same applies

to other forms of violence as piracy, whose effectiveness in damaging the primary

source of Western welfare – commerce - is relevant.

The first way to stem, or at least reduce the flow of supplies, in favor of the

insurgents, or to thwart attacks against vital objectives, is to isolate the troubled

area. This is done mostly through “Maritime Interdiction”, the modern term for the

196

age-old “Embargo”; a similar system, though, has also been practiced both on land,

with some success, in the case of Bosnia, by establishing a cordon around its

administrative borders, as well as in the air, through Operation DENY FLIGHT.

You should consider that the simple existence of controls compels the blockade-

runners to hide weapons and ammunitions under other innocent cargo items to

escape detection, thus reducing the amount of supply per single voyage by roughly

the 80% of what could be carried otherwise; pirates, too, must be very careful to

carry out their attacks well outside the Western warships’ range, lest they will incur

into a strong reaction.

However, it should also be acknowledged that, whenever the nations involved in

a stabilization operation withdraw early from these kinds of Stabilization missions,

they normally leave behind a long-lasting mess. The majority of the local population

is armed and trained to use weapons, so they do not resist the temptation of settling

their accounts through the use of force; therefore violence, hatred and revenge

nurture a never-ending internecine struggle, which can last decades, if not

generations.

Spain is the best example, as it was left in 1814 in such a state, and went through

more than one century of instability and violence, not yet completely overcome:

only during the civil war of 1936-39, more than one million people passed away, and

hatred for the massacres is still present. Compared to the Spanish ordeal, Lebanon is

197

a miracle, as its troubles lasted slightly more than twenty years, even if the situation

in that country is, even now, far less than stable.

Another difficulty, related to under-developed nations, is worth being

considered. Most often, these nations have not a real centralized source of

power. As CALLWELL noted, while

“in a civilized country the metropolis is not only the seat of government and of the

legislature, but is also generally the center of communications and the main emporium

of the nation’s commerce, (so that) its occupation means a complete dislocation of the

executive system, the capitals of countries which become the theaters of small war are

rarely of the same importance. In such territories there is little commercial

organization, the chief town generally derives its sole importance from being the

residence of the sovereign and his council, and its capture by a hostile army is in itself

damaging rather to the prestige of the government than injurious to the people at

large”233.

This means that it would be a self-delusion to consider that an occupation of

a capital city, in a stabilization operation, is the only step to be undertaken.

Most often, the need exists to establish connections with the different

communities or tribes around the country, and when needed to control them.

The most relevant instance is provided by the same author, who said, on

this subject:

233 C. E. CALLWELL. Small Wars. University of Nebraska Press, 1996 (re-editon of 1906) page 35.198

“in the last Afghan war Kabul was occupied early in the campaign, after the

overthrow of the troops of YAKUB Khan. But its capture by no means brought about the

downfall of the Afghans as a fighting power, on the contrary it proved to be merely the

commencement of the campaign. The country was in a state of suppressed anarchy, the

tribes scarcely acknowledged the Amir to be their king, and when Kabul fell and the

government, such as it was, ceased to exist, the people generally cared little; but they

bitterly resented the insult to their nation and to their faith which the presence of British

troops in the heart of the country offered”234.

Years later, Chairman MAO made basically the same remarks, with reference to

his fatherland, when he said that “the revolutionary war can succeed, because it

enjoys the support of the countrymen. Thanks to this support, our bases, even if

they have little extension, are a great political force and cause serious difficulties to

the offensives of the enemy. The men of the Red Army came to us during the

agrarian revolution and fight for their own interests”235.

The Communists, in fact, had attempted first to foster mass upheavals in the

towns with scant success, and therefore they were compelled to take refuge in the

countryside; there they found a more favorable environment, because countrymen

felt oppressed by the landowners, and eagerly supported those who promised to

foster their claims for land. Also, the countryside offered ample resources for the

revolutionary forces, in terms of food and manpower.

234 Ibid. pages 35-36.

235 MAO TSE-TOUNG. Écrits Militaires. China Editions, 1964, page 105.199

The same considerations apply to most under-developed nations, where a large

part of the population still depends from agriculture for their living; people residing

in these areas are normally illiterate, traditionalists and xenophobic, they respond

mostly to their local chieftains and priests, and therefore their leaders are a power

factor which could hardly be discounted when launching a stabilization operation.

The difference between them and the population of the town is often relevant, as

the latter have had access to a higher education and normally have more developed

political ideals and possess greater – sometimes elitist – culture. The inhabitants of

the towns are, though, a minority, as compared to the rural population, so that they

are often a secondary factor of success.

Due to these reasons, the Soviets in Afghanistan committed a serious blunder in

paying attention, first of all, to all the towns, where there were more people prone

to embrace socialism, and they discovered only later that the countryside was quite

different, as a problem; they tried to solve this issue by making numerous but short

retaliatory raids against the countryside villages, with the result of exciting the anger

of countrymen, who waged a merciless guerilla.

As it was impossible to control the whole of Afghanistan that way, the Soviets

soon found themselves bogged down in a stalemate, and the result was a growing

unease at home, due to lack of results. After several years, notwithstanding the

deployment of a contingent which included more than 200,000 troops at any time,

200

the domestic pressure for the human losses incurred caused the withdrawal of the

contingent.

It is evident that US forces had not these warnings and these precedents in mind,

when they intervened in Afghanistan against the Taliban. Even worse, when they had

to partially withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, to invade Iraq, they left very little

troops in the southern portion of the country, inhabited by the Pashtun, who eagerly

hosted the Taliban guerrillas; therefore, when NATO decided to occupy the southern

area again, it met with a strong opposition, reacted nervously, and caused this sort

of spiral effect which we have already seen as a negative factor for the successful

outcome of the campaign.

Humanitarian Interference

The humanitarian approach is not new, as it became manifest for the first time

during the Greek war for independence, in 1822-28, when a number of Europeans

sympathizers joined the fighting by the insurgents against the Ottoman oppression,

and pressed their governments to intervene in force to quell the ongoing massacres;

later in this century, the struggle for independence of the ethnic Greeks in Crete,

always against the oppressive Ottoman rule, led the European powers to start a

humanitarian operation in 1896, which led first to an autonomous rule and then to

the annexation of the island by Greece.

This approach has been officially revamped in recent times, in particular during 201

the crisis in former Yugoslavia in 1992, with the support of Western governments. It

was even mentioned by Pope John Paul II in 2000, during the Jubilee:

“peace is a fundamental right of any human being, to be continuously promoted. Often,

this task, as also recent experiences have demonstrated, implies concrete initiatives to

disarm the aggressor. I intend to refer here to the so-called humanitarian interference,

which represents, after the failure of the political efforts and of the non-violent defence

means, the extreme attempt to be made, in order to stop the hand of the unjust

aggressor”236.

Since then, many occasions have risen in which recourse has been made to this

approach, not always with a general concurrence, as was the case in Kosovo. The

dissent was not due to lack of sympathy toward the million and half of people who

had flooded the neighbouring countries, to save their lives; rather it was a sharp

criticism against NATO decision to carry on a strategic bombing campaign against

Serbia, whose leaders were the perpetrators of the massacre. This action, in fact,

was deemed to be incoherent with the scope of the campaign, even if it contributed

to reduce the resistance of Belgrade, and to force it to find a negotiated solution.

On this kind of operation, two considerations are important: first, this kind of

action is not preventive, rather it is one among the corrective measures which are

undertaken when other approaches have failed. Therefore, it applies to a situation

of ongoing conflict between factions, thus being liable of being considered, as a

236 Osservatore Romano, 20-21 November 2000.202

warlike situation, most similar to the classic “Intervention” in a war already ongoing

between two parties. As a consequence, it is rarely an operation where foreign

forces can remain neutral and impartial, but most times it requires a deliberate

stand in favour of the weakest between them, to avoid a either genocide or an

ethnic cleansing.

Second, as several Western governments will participate only in international,

not multi-national frameworks, the question is which international authority is

entitled to acknowledge that such a situation occurs? The role of the UN, as the

natural successor to the League of Nations, could therefore be pivotal, even if some

countries having a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, like Russia, might

prove decisive in checking such a decision-making process, through their veto.

There are also widely diverging views within the strategic community on the issue

of humanitarian interference. On the one hand, those who favour this approach

argue that, whenever Western “governments have drifted away from taking the

fundamental moral principles into account, as the key reference in opting for the use

of decisive force, and they have recurred to even lofty (but selfish) political ideals, as

the chief motivator for the use of force, they enjoy, in the best case, only a

temporary wave of popular support. When they instead keep in the first place the

defence of innocent lives, and their fundamental rights, their populations support

them, also during the inevitable periods of hardship and sufferings, which happen

203

during each military operation”237.

Others, more prudent, note that this approach may, in practice, end up being

“bizarre, for instance as concerns the bombardments carried on by NATO during the

crisis in Kosovo, … [T]he increased acknowledgement of the concept of humanitarian

interference is extending de facto the prerogatives of the UN Security Council, which

is charged to keep peace and international security”238.

In fact, “Humanitarian Interference” always enjoys a great popular support,

especially at the outset, to such an extent that it is the only peacetime mission

where losses are accepted by the public opinions, much more than in other

circumstances; should, however, the population start suspecting that behind this

humanitarian concern there are other, less commendable reasons, popular support

could rapidly wane, and the blame would fall on the leaders who pushed for it.

Also, no such operation will safely be initiated without the “blessing” of the UN,

especially in countries where a government exists, even if it is guilty of massacres,

lest it might incur into deep judiciary troubles. One of the fundamental reasons is

that sovereignty of nations is at stake, and those who do not respect the sovereignty

of others cannot pretend to safeguard their own, in a world where the trend toward

supra-nationality, by International Organisations, is increasing. Therefore,

Humanitarian Interference is potentially a double-edged sword, if not used with 237 F. SANFELICE di MONTEFORTE. Strategy and Peace. Ed. Aracne, 2008, page 421.

238 C. JEAN. Manuale di Studi Strategici. Ed. Franco Angeli, 2004, page 67.204

discretion.

Conclusions

To conclude, strategy plays a major role in shaping peace operations, and the

approaches to be followed, in order to reap success, are well known. Unfortunately,

the recurring blunders made so far have been those of initiating these campaigns

neither with the required approach, nor with the related means: a Spanish proverb

says “If you have a hammer in your hand, everything seems like a nail”. Use of

excessive force must not be a way to avoid thinking hard on how to outsmart the

enemy! No wonder that “Peace Operations” often fail, with dire consequences for

the stability and welfare of the world!

A final remark is due about what happens nowadays in many places around the

world, when foreign troops try to introduce their political or cultural conceptions

through an excessive recourse to the bayonets, thus showing scant respect for local

traditions and customary laws. These traditions and laws are part of these people’s

identity, and therefore should not be openly threatened, as identity is a vital

interest, especially for people living in difficult conditions. They could therefore rise

in their defense, so that all effort spent to ensure a secure environment would be

vane.

Unfortunately, Western countries do not control enough their cultural strategies,

especially the flow of information through INTERNET and the satellite TV. These two 205

media are showing aspects of our way of life, as well as our widespread prejudice

toward the rest of the world which have a potentially revolutionary impact on these

societies, as on one side they cast doubts on the traditional values and the existing

social order, while on the other they show some among the less commendable

aspects of our civilization.

The leaders of these parts of the world have dubbed this kind of portraying of the

West as the “Coca Cola Civilization”, a disparaging term which shows how much they

are alarmed by this cultural penetration. This explains why, for instance, the Taliban

forbade satellite TV in Afghanistan, when they ruled the country; the Chinese

government reasoned quite the same way, when it imposed a sort of censorship on

INTERNET.

Summing up, Western countries should be aware that others perceive them as

willing to upset their social systems, and must be extremely careful, when carrying

“Peace Support Operations”, to respect the majority of their traditions and

customary laws, to avoid any perception by the locals that we intend to impose a

new order on them.

206

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION CONCEPTS

Introduction

Among the main obligations of any collective security organization, the most

important is to define which strategic aims, objectives and approaches will be

followed, in the geopolitical framework she is facing, to deal with threats, risks and

challenges which might involve them collectively, in the short and medium term.

The need to have them agreed by member countries makes this task

complicated and at times daunting, as conflicting vital interests must be reconciled

and a common way ahead must be found, lest the organization itself might either

crumble or become irrelevant. This ends up being the biggest disincentive for

frequent re-drafts, as these few pages impose a herculean effort during months, if

not years, due to the willingness of the member states to insert in it their vital

interests, their vision, and to have their worries taken care of.

More specifically, the scope of this kind of document is to “provide the general

guidance to develop detailed politics and military plans”239, related both to

239 NATO Handbook, 2001. pg. 42.207

operations, and to force planning. It does not need, therefore, to be re-written often,

except when external circumstances impose a fresh approach, or whenever a radical

change of the international balance requires it.

For years NATO, in particular, had kept its Strategic Concepts secret, except for a

communiqué indicating only few essential outlines – little more than the list of what

was envisaged to be done – until Secretary General SOLANA decided, at the end of

the Cold War, that consensus was more important than confidentiality, in a situation

where the “official” enemy was absent. The European Union (EU), since the outset of

the European (now Common) Security and Defense Policy, has followed the same

path, for the same reasons.

That way, Strategic Concepts have become an instrument to convince

Parliaments and public opinions in the member states to provide financial resources

to allow the Organization achieving the intended aims and objectives, apart from

being a statement of intent for third countries, be they friends, neutrals or potential

adversaries. In fact, NATO and EU meet with difficulties in receiving from the

member states both the financial and force contributions, as well as the

acknowledgement of the efforts required, to sustain the operations which might be

needed.

The content of any Strategic Concept is quite standardized, as it must, first of all,

emphasize the political aim of the International Organization; then it includes a brief

208

outline of the strategic landscape, with the challenges, risks and threats. Then the

objectives are explained in detail, as well as the approaches to be considered for

possible adoption (NATO prefers highlighting the tasks).

While nations – when they issue their own - normally add their intended force

programs for the following years, this is never done by the Organizations, which

must develop a force planning process separately, and then invite nations to provide

adequate force contributions. This leads sometimes to significant lack of coherence

between the content of the Strategic Concepts and the outcomes of force planning

processes, thus causing a risk of failure for the Organization concerned.

In order to give an idea of the usual frequency of these documents, it is worth

reminding that NATO had published its last Concept in 1999, before approving a new

one in November 2010, while the CSDP issued it in 2003, and still considers it to be

valid. It is time now to examine them one by one, starting from the 1999 NATO

Strategic Concept.

NATO Strategic Concept, 1999

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept reflected those post Cold War times when the

strategic picture was evolving gradually, without revolutionary discontinuities.

Therefore, it was only an update of the previous document, which was quite good,

albeit being written in a hurry, in 1991, under the impact of the sudden meltdown of

the Warsaw Pact and of the imminent implosion of the Soviet Union, before the 209

crisis in former Yugoslavia developed in all its virulence.

The scope of this “make up” was to sanction the approaches adopted in the

meantime to react to such a radical change of European situation, but it was also an

attempt to achieve some progress in re-defining the Alliance’s identity, as the

“Declared Enemy” had disappeared. In the 1991 Concept, NATO had in fact still

clutch to its collective defense aim, albeit making some limited concession to the

possibility of considering “Out of Area Operations”, as a type of action which had to

remain a type of action subordinated to collective defense, to be kept as NATO top

priority.

Of course, what in 1991 had been a prudent and careful decision, was no more

justified in 1999, as Russian armed forces were in a pitiful state, and no immediate

threat of invasion existed any more. The scope of the 1999 Concept was, therefore,

to reflect the fact that NATO had been involved – almost by accident – in the

management of the steadily worsening instability crises in the Balkans, where the

UN had failed, due to its unrealistically soft approach.

The second aim was the need to create a collaboration network and a security

framework capable of involving and reassuring both the eastern part of Europe – the

former Warsaw Pact countries – and the European neutrals, who had kept

themselves equidistant from the two Blocks, during the Cold War. Quite

understandably, no NATO nation was willing to amend the Treaty, an act which

210

would have decreed the end of the Alliance, in a moment when columnist were

mentioning either the “end of history”, or at least spoke about the need to “reap the

dividends of peace”, both expressions of the desire to end up with significant military

expenditures.

The bloodstained Serbian repression in Kosovo, though, had confirmed that, in

order to ensure peace and stability in Europe, the need existed to possess adequate

capabilities, which could contain the excesses and stabilize the areas of the

continent still underdeveloped, plagued as they had been by so many years of

absolutist and backward rule.

The 1999 Concept, therefore, intended to provide the rationale for these kinds

of military operation, as well as to establish a network of association structures, to

co-opt these countries, by giving them a way to cooperate with NATO in forms

politically acceptable to them, either as members or at least as a partners or

interlocutors.

Few months before, in fact, three countries – Poland, Hungary and Czech - had

already formalized their intention to join the Alliance, and were already completing

their accession programs; other countries were showing the same intent, while

neutrals and those who did not feel ready yet to join the Alliance, had all been

provisionally grouped in the NATO Cooperation Council, to establish a partnership

with the Alliance.

211

However, some member nations, as Turkey and Norway, not to mention the

three aspirant countries, were still clinging to the collective defense clause of the

Treaty, as they were still feeling the heat of the “Russian Bear”, which had

conditioned them for centuries, and had aggressed them quite often.

Instead, the two transatlantic nations, as well as those of Northern Europe,

being apparently free from any threat, were leaning toward a new form of

expeditionary Alliance, to have it ready to protect the collective interests, by acting

far away from its historical area of competence, which had included so far the

Northern Atlantic ocean and the European continent only.

The points which were agreed by all members, without much debate, was the

importance of armaments control, as well as the danger of proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, or to say better its sale on the international market, by some

“crazy splinters” of the former Soviet Empire.

In short, the 1999 concept had to insert the new stabilization requirements and,

most importantly, to merge all these diverging aspirations, even to the cost of

seeming contradictory. It is worth saying that the outcome was rather good, even if

the document was rather backward-looking, as nations had not reflected enough on

the future challenges of the world which was slowly taking shape.

The first part of the text was of course devoted to collective defense, described

as a mean to safeguard freedom and security of all members, besides reaffirming the 212

common values: democracy, human rights and legality. It was however stated that a

major aggression (Large Scale Article 5) was highly improbable, and should therefore

envisaged only in the long term, thus placing a clue to encourage nations to reduce

their stationary “Main Defense Forces” which did still represent the majority of their

military instruments. New structures were also proposed to enable the Alliance to

be effective in the changed context, as an expeditionary Headquarters, the

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

In order to allay the long-standing concerns by the European members, who

had recriminated for decades about their limited influence on NATO decision-

making, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was envisaged, in order to

replace the Western European Union, whose ineffectiveness had been demonstrated

by the Yugoslav crisis.

It is worth saying the US had supported these claims, both in the vain attempt

of preventing a similar structure in the EU context – which would have detracted

resources from the Alliance, as it did – and also out of fear to see the Europeans

undertaking post-colonial operations, a sort of action they were unable and

unwilling to underwrite, besides hoping that Europeans nations would have

increased their contribution of forces, notwithstanding the pressures for

disarmament coming from their public opinions.

The concept highlighted then the importance of a cooperation both with the

213

UN, and with other security architectures, recently established in the European

continent; to this extent, it was acknowledged that “mutually reinforcing

organizations have become a central feature of the security environment”240. It was

said, however, that the “security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of

military and non-military risks, which are multi-directional and often difficult to

predict”241, thus keeping a door open on the possibility of independently deciding

operations, should it be necessary.

After having outlined the main issues facing the Alliance, the Strategic Concept

identified three “Fundamental Security Tasks”:

-“Security: to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-

Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and

commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes;

-Consultation: to serve, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied

consultation on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible

developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination

of their efforts in the fields of common concern;

-Deterrence and Defense: to deter and defend against any threat of aggression

against any NATO member state”242.240 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved on 23 and 24 April 1999, para 14.

241 Ibid. para 20.

242 Ibid. para 10.214

In addition, in order to “enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic

area, (the following actions were envisaged):

-Crisis Management: to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, to

contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis

management, including crisis response operations;

-Partnership: to promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation and dialogue

with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing

transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the

Alliance”243.

Besides indicating the tasks, the concept stated which principles were to be

followed244:

-Continue preparing forces for the whole spectrum of possible missions. It was a

logic recommendation, as the evolution of the geo-strategic landscape was not clear

yet, but it was also an attempt to introduce the concept of distant expeditionary

operations, even if it was acknowledged as a possibility to be examined on a case-by-

case basis.

Quite naturally, the Strategic Commands felt encouraged to push nations to

foster the expeditionary capabilities of the forces, also with the rationale that these

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid. Part IV.215

capabilities would be useful in any situation, from collective defense of NATO

periphery to crisis response; some nations, however, did not heed to this advice, to

the point of increasing their static forces, much to the irritation of NATO commands.

In fact, the key problem of expeditionary forces is that their quality

requirements run against their numbers, as they are quite expensive to establish and

to keep trained. This explains why allied countries most concerned about their

national security were reluctant - and they are even now - to transform the majority

of their forces, especially those liable to be employed for national tasks, by making

them expeditionary, and not only deployable.

-Share evenly roles, risks and responsibilities: this was not only an

encouragement for the US, to keep a significant military presence in Europe,

notwithstanding the US government wished to reduce it drastically, being oblivious

of their advantage as staging bases for power projections in Asia. On the other hand,

this formula was the consequence of US pressures for more financial and force

contributions by the other Allies, who had so far been “security consumers”, as they

had reaped the fruits of the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, and were

willing to repel the US claims to achieve a better “Burden Sharing”;

-Keep the practical arrangements for collective efforts. It was a sort of defense

of the military command structure, which seemed already redundant, as compared

to the possible roles to perform in the future. As the situation was still evolving, it

216

appeared unwise to cut it down sharply, in a single stroke. In fact, this painful

process is already ongoing, with strong dissent by the nations unwilling to lose the

commands placed in their country;

-Confirm the importance of multi-national financing, both for NATO military

budget, and for the allied infrastructure programs, which would have been managed

– as it was stated – with reference to the military requirements of the Alliance,

according to their evolution, on the basis of the changes in the scenario. This

principle, besides answering the criticism by some nations, who wanted returns

comparable to their financial contributions, was a halt to others who had so far used

NATO investments to build up their own national infrastructures, practically at zero

cost;

-Develop ESDI, possibly under WEU political control. This principle, however,

remained unapplied, due to the disbanding of the WEU and the establishment of the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), within the EU, as feared by the USA;

-Continuation of the nuclear-conventional mix of forces, to ensure the credibility

of deterrence, through NATO nuclear strategic and tactical forces, as well as through

an appropriate conventional posture; notwithstanding this predicament, some

nations demonstrated their willingness to have the tactical nuclear weapons

removed from their territories, at least in peacetime, and therefore NATO had to

comply with this request.

217

The Road toward a new NATO Strategic Concept

In order to understand both how the present Strategic Concept took shape, in

accordance with the ongoing world trends and the conceptions of the various actors,

and how the process of the aims, objectives and tasks of the Alliance took shape, it

is worth resuming what happened, since the 1999 concept was approved.

The most traumatic event, which has deeply influenced all subsequent

processes, was undoubtedly the 9/11 tragedy, a product of how incredibly the

rancor nurtured by a part of the Islamic galaxy toward the Western nations was

underestimated; in fact, this rancor existed, notwithstanding the efforts spent by the

Alliance in favor of the Muslim minorities in the Balkans.

This tragedy revived the historical and most dangerous sense of insecurity of

the American people: first of all, the territory of the USA had not been directly

attacked since 1814, apart from few air balloons launched from Japan, during WWII,

which set some fires in the Oregon forests. In addition, especially those who

descend from European immigrants keep in their mind the fact that their ancestors

had fled from a continent beset by endless wars and by social injustice, to seek other

opportunities for a quieter and more secure life, this looking at Europe as a

continent of warmongers.

218

One anecdote is sufficient to highlight this kind of sensitivity: on December 3,

1910, an American captain, the future admiral SIMS, during a visit to London,

declared in his toast to the City Council, during a reception, that “if ever the integrity

of the British Empire should be seriously threatened by an external enemy, they

might count upon the assistance of every man, every ship and every dollar from

their kinsmen across the seas”245.

The speech was published on American newspapers, and stirred a conundrum,

to the extent that, pushed by Congress, President TAFT had to formally reprimand

SIMS; some years later, when SIMS was appointed as commander US naval forces in

Europe, during WWI, TAFT philosophically stated that “the ways of history are

strange. When I was President, I reprimanded an officer for saying exactly what he is

doing now”246. In 1910, Great Britain was still seen by the US public opinion, as the

main enemy, even one century after the last war against that country, in 1812-1814.

It can be easily understood why, after 9/11, as the pressure by the US public

opinion had become strong, the government had no other course of action than to

unleash a revenge. This led to the intervention in Afghanistan and the invasion of

Iraq, two decisions which were not the result of a cool-minded and deep process of

strategic thinking.

While NATO was able to limit its role in Iraq, also thanks to the temporary US 245 E.E. MORISON. Admiral Sims. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1942, pg.279.

246 Ibid. pg. 284.219

preference for coalitions – whose weakness is known – the same was not possible

for Afghanistan, notwithstanding the reluctance by some member countries to start

an all-out war against a significant part of the local population.

Besides that, NATO decided to put in practice the collective defense clause – the

well-known Article 5 – to demonstrate the solidarity toward the United States, an

indication of how unpredictable is the application of a treaty: we have seen, in fact,

that the US Congress had argued against this provision, in 1949, thus depriving it of

automaticity; now, it was declared precisely to support those who had opposed it

before.

Two operations were decided, Eagle Assist – the Allied contribution to US air

defense - and Active Endeavour – the interdiction against the so-called “Al-Qaeda

Navy” in the Mediterranean sea. While the second operation is still ongoing, the first

one gave a huge visibility to NATO to the US public opinion, and for the first time the

Alliance became popular in the United States.

During the same period, first FYROM- Macedonia was the object of a successful

conflict prevention activity by NATO, in 2001, when the local Army had started to

bomb Albanian-speaking villages, and then Kosovo went on fire again, in 2004, and it

took the promise of independence to quiet down the population; in the meantime,

responsibility for the stabilization of Bosnia had been handed over by NATO to the

European Union, as the country was slowly progressing toward a more stable

220

condition, and reconstruction activities, as well as police forces, were needed more

that troops.

The main problem of these events was that it became clear, from the heated

discussions of that period, that some approaches were not shared by all members, a

symptom of the power of these “disinterested emotions, even unreasoning, (which)

may be just the one factor which diplomacy cannot master”247.

This was an indication of the looming danger for any multi-national organization

born for a purpose, defense in our case, and surviving to accomplish something else,

i.e. crisis response: in this sort of activity, different nations have different interests,

and this became apparent in Afghanistan with the problem of the “Caveats”, a

number of limitations about the use of some forces, imposed by some parent

nations to the commanders in the field, thus limiting their freedom of action.

The biggest delusion the US had, during that period, was the hope that

accession of seven new members (two more joined recently) would have made

NATO more amenable to their vital interests; all these nations were – and are, of

course – staunch supporters of an “Article 5 NATO”, thus having little attention to

expeditionary operations, apart from having so many economic troubles that they

could provide little more than a token contribution of forces.

Another internal NATO problem was the competition between the three main

247 A.T. MAHAN. From Sail to Steam. Ed. Harper & Bros. 1907, pg. 86.221

actors, the political “side of the house”, willing to reduce the military influence, the

command structure which was increasingly reluctant to heed to the Military

Committee, as her leaders would have liked to be in direct contact with the

politicians, and the permanent civilian component, which was willing to reduce the

influence of the nations. Needless to say, as the Military Committee represents the

Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), and the latter hold the keys of the forces, as they are the

only ones to know what contributions they can provide to the Alliance, this

internecine struggle has had only the effect of weakening NATO from the inside.

Speaking about Partnerships, while some wished to extend them to friendly

countries in Asia and Oceania, in recent years it was possible only to co-opt some

among the Gulf Cooperation Council member nations; meanwhile, the ties with

some European Partners, most notably the neutrals, have met with a crisis due to

the lack of information the forces provided by these countries received, when

deployed overseas, as in the case of Afghanistan.

Among the already existing Partnerships, during the last decade a special

relationship had been established with Russia, who enjoyed a quasi-member status,

on matters related to terrorism; this relationship, however, quickly ran into troubles,

especially after the US decision to install anti-ballistic missile defense systems in

Europe. Even if these systems were visibly aimed at protecting the US territory from

an Iranian threat, they would have shown the limitations of the Russian technology

222

in that field, so Moscow did not spare efforts to avert this deployment, to such an

extent that the USA eventually decided to postpone it.

The last, but more worrying event which occurred during these years, was the

gradual deterioration of the NATO- EU relationship. The reasons are so serious that

not even the re-entry of France in the NATO military structure has solved them.

As we have seen, it was logical for the former NATO Secretary General to push

in 2009 for a new Strategic Concept, as too many events not contemplated in the

previous document had occurred; the imminence of US elections caused a slight

delay, but the present Secretary General, RASMUSSEN, has taken the issue in his

hands and has succeeded in issuing another Concept, which has been approved in

Lisbon, during the annual NATO Summit, in November 2010.

The most debated issues

During the period apparently lost, due to the delay required to allow the new

US Administration to master NATO issues, a number of “Think Tanks” in NATO

nations have been able to discuss, through ad hoc seminars, which topics their

nations should propose to be inserted in the new document, as well as informing the

public opinions about the future roles and tasks of NATO. The subsequent

appointment of an expert panel, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine

ALBRIGHT, brought these topics to the fore, thus helping the Secretary General in

finalizing his proposals.223

From this flurry of activity, some issues resulted being the most relevant, if not

the most sensitive. First of all, it became apparent the shift in the transatlantic

relation, due to the relative weakening of the USA, a consequence of the

expenditures for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to the economic crisis.

This might have induced some European governments to press for an increase of

their influence, at the expenses of the “Transatlantic Bridge”.

A marginalization of the USA, though, would have been a serious mistake, as

Europe needs the friendship of the USA much more than the opposite. The USA have

a greater attention to research and development, have a more dynamic economy,

and can exert a balancing influence on the divisions which are plaguing Europe since

centuries, notwithstanding the fact that they appear to have ended, while they are

only hidden under a thin layer of sand.

Also, the dwindling defense budgets are an additional reason to stick together,

as Europe does not have the capabilities to act alone, in most cases. No major

operations are therefore possible without the participation of the USA, and the

growing world tensions can allow to forecast quite some years in the future, when

only a united front among the Westerns will be able to manage such a critical

situation.

The New NATO Strategic Concept, 2010

In 2010, once having received the report on the new Strategic Concept by the 224

ALBRIGHT Panel, the NATO Secretary General, Anders FOGH RASMUSSEN, decided to

draft the document on his own, and presented it to the nations for concurrence, in

time for the Lisbon summit, in November 2010.

The document has a limited number of new features, as it confirms the key

points of the previous concept, especially the “Core Tasks and Principles”, which are:

-Collective Defense, also against the “emerging security challenges” as “Energy

Security”, with the specification that Deterrence is still important, but must have a

conventional dimension, in addition to the nuclear capability, which is offered mostly

by the British submarines – permanently assigned to NATO – and by the tactical

fighter-bombers;

-Crisis Management, through use of both political and military tools. Here the

novelty is that a more cautious approach is recommended, as this task has to be

performed “where possible and when necessary”, a sort of disavowal of placing

“boots on the ground” too liberally, as done in the previous years, especially in

Afghanistan;

-Cooperative Security beyond NATO borders, mostly in synergy with other

International Organizations.

The most relevant aspect of this document is the decision to establish a well-

defined role of the Alliance in two areas: “Defense against Cyber Attacks”, where

225

NATO has a well acknowledged expertise since many years, and “Ballistic Missile

Defense”, in the form of an integrated surveillance and reaction network, a sort of

development of another traditional NATO role, performed since the outset, i.e. “Air

Defense”.

Also, the concept reaffirms the need to pay more attention to “technology-

related trends, (which) appear poised to have major global effects that will impact

on NATO military planning and operations”. The cooperative development of new

military technologies has always been a strong aspect of the Alliance, even if it

suffered a stalemate during the last two decades; the Secretary General intends to

re-vitalize this important activity, through an improvement of transatlantic

cooperation.

The last part of the document deals with NATO-EU relation, which should lead

the two organizations to “play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in

supporting international peace and security”. This consideration reflects what Mrs.

ALBRIGHT said, when she was US Secretary of State, about the need for the two

Organizations to avoid the so-called “Three Ds”: Duplications, Divisions and

Discriminations.

Under a more practical aspect, the concept proposes EU to cooperate in four

domains:

-a better exchange of information, “in the spirit of full mutual openness, 226

transparency, complementarity and respect”;

-practical cooperation in operations;

-political consultations to be broadened beyond the existing “Berlin Plus”

framework agreement;

-capability development, “to minimize duplication and maximize cost-

effectiveness.

Summing up, the new NATO Strategic Concept symbolizes the “Crisis Identity”

of the Alliance, as it attempts to consolidate some “niches of excellence”, which

should become the main reason of life for its continuation as an indispensable tool

for Western nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

The European Security Strategy, 2003

After the ratification of the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, which established the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), one among the first actions of the

newborn structure was to issue a Strategic Concept, whose slightly bombastic title,

“A Secure Europe in a Better World” was anyhow a good indication of how EU

intended to achieve its security aim. What is more important, the content was a

good instance on how a “Grand Strategy” document should be written. Its problem,

for those who have followed the EU foreign relations, is that its main principles have

not been followed enough, in the following years, by those responsible for their

227

implementation.

Starting from its structure, the first part is devoted to the analysis of the Global

Challenges, which initiates with the important statement that there is no security

without development, and that – to achieve it – the perverse spiral of conflicts,

insecurity and poverty has to be broken. Then, energetic dependence of Europe, one

among its major vulnerabilities, follows. This way, the document highlights it as a

problem to be solved, instead of mentioning it as a weakness, so to make it an

excuse for EU lack of initiative.

The discussion of the Key Threats follows: they are assessed to be Terrorism,

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, Failed States and Organized Crime.

Nothing new, of course, but these threats are described in a plain and concise

language. The relevant consideration made is that the utmost danger for EU comes

from a combination among two or more threats: this statement is confirmed by

recent history, as Italy defeated terrorism when her government was able to cut the

perverse liaison the Red Brigades had established with Organized Crime.

The third part includes the discussion of the Strategic Objectives; to achieve

them, the Concept states that EU should “think globally and act locally”248, i.e. to act

without losing the general perspective, as each action by one Member State has a

wide-ranging impact on others. The Strategic Objectives deserve to be briefly

248 ESS. A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003. pg. 6.228

outlined, in order to compare them with what we have seen in the equivalent NATO

documentation.

The first objective is, quite logically, “Addressing the Threats”, and it is wisely

stated that “with the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad”249

and that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by

purely military means”250, as they require a well balanced mix of political,

economical, law enforcement and judiciary, as well as military.

This makes this Concept to be the first document where a multi-disciplinary

approach has been emphasized. It is worth noting that, EU is potentially the best

possible Organization to carry it on, due to its ample resources devoted to

international cooperation, even if it has required many years of efforts to reach an

effective synergy among the EU pillars, and still now EU is quite far away from the

mark, mostly due to internal barriers between the Commission – composed of

bureaucrats – and the Secretariat of the ESDP.

The second Strategic Objective is “Building Security in our Neighborhood”, the

indication that only a gradual approach to problems will solve them, a principle too

often misapplied, due to excessive eagerness to act, by the Secretariat. This lack of

patience was evident especially during the initial period, when ESDP had to

demonstrate its readiness and its capability to influence events overseas. 249 Ibid. pg. 7.

250 Ibid.229

The final Objective is “Effective Multilateralism”, an approach also sponsored by

NATO, but even more important for EU, as it has not all military capabilities

required, thus being compelled to work with other, more capable Organizations.

While the relationship between EU and NATO deserves a separate analysis, it is fair

to say that EU has always taken care of acting in concert with both the UN and the

African Union, whenever it had to operate in Africa.

The concluding section of the document is devoted to the implications, i.e. what

has to be done to become able to achieve the agreed objectives. It deserves a

careful reading, even if it is something resembling the “good intents paving hell”, to

use an old Italian say, a sort of “Wish List” whose implementation might often be

misapplied.

The section devoted to these implications makes a plea to EU, as it must be

“More Active” in pursuing its strategic objectives, “More Capable”, even if it is

acknowledged that this will require quite some time, and especially “More

Coherent”, i.e. it must be able to overcome the internal barriers, to act effectively.

Even if there is no trace of the importance of the regional dimension, which is

coming to the fore only now, with the acknowledgement of the need for this

approach especially in maritime matters, as Europe is surrounded by a number of

separate sea basins.

Most interestingly, in 2008, when France took the periodic chairmanship of the 230

EU Council (the “Presidency”, as it is called, lasts six months for each Member State),

her government proposed to re-write the Strategic Concept, as it was already 5 years

old; fortunately, a careful reading was sufficient to note that the EU Security Strategy

was still valid, and as a consequence, only a “Report on the Implementation Status”

was prepared.

The title of this Report was bombastic as usual: “Providing Security in a

Changing World”; apart from this defect, however, also this document is well

written, and deserves a brief summary of its content. The most interesting part is

where it develops a part of the “Global Challenges and Key Threats” which had been

only briefly mentioned in the Strategic Concept, by amplifying the parts devoted to

Cyber Security, Climate Change and Piracy; for the rest it confirms the key directing

lines of the previous document, especially as far as Energy Security – the biggest EU

vulnerability - is concerned.

First, the report considers “Cyber security” to be a “potential new economic,

political and military weapon” and quite rightly so. In fact, a lot of attention is

devoted to this threat, especially as a consequence of the adoption, by many EU

bodies, of commercial hardware, the so-called Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS),

which makes the EU networks vulnerable to intrusions and harassment; under this

standpoint, EU is more vulnerable than NATO.

Also “Climate Change” is considered, for its implications in terms of immigration

231

from areas affected by drought, but mostly for the risk of “disputes over trade

routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible”. The reference is

related to the prospective opening of the “North-East Passage” in the Arctic sea,

along the northern Russian coast, as well as possible disputes over the continental

platform in the deep North, apparently rich in oil and gas.

The problem of oil and gas, in fact, is reaffirmed to be a growing concern for EU,

as they “come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to

stability”. What happens in North Africa in our days confirms the wisdom of this

worry. EU, according to the report, should develop a “policy which combines

external and internal dimensions”, both to stabilize the areas where these products

are, and to rationalize consumption.

The EU participation to Police training in Afghanistan is also mentioned, as the

proof that “Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighborhood”; this

is but a way to sanction what had been done in the previous years, as EU had

launched operations in Congo, Sumatra, apart from acting around the continent. The

same sort of consideration is made about the EU monitoring mission in Georgia, as

the demonstration of “what can be achieved when we act collectively with the

necessary political will”.

Also “Piracy” is mentioned, quite naively, as a “new dimension of organized

crime”; the EU-led operation ATALANTA in the Horn of Africa is considered as a

232

means to “deter piracy off the Somali coast”. No elaboration is made on the fact that

piracy might be something going well beyond a simple local criminal phenomenon;

suspicions exist in fact that Piracy might be a deliberate attempt to disrupt sea trade,

one among the sources of wealth of the Western countries.

Toward the end of the report, the troubled NATO-EU relationship is

mentioned, as it is stated that the two Organizations “have worked well together on

the ground, in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not

advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership with better operational

cooperation and continued work on military capabilities”.

Before concluding, it is worth mentioning the fact that the 2008 Report

highlights the principal European handicap, i.e. its military weakness, in terms which

are sufficiently clear, even if they are slightly clouded in diplomatic jargon. In fact,

the military instruments of the EU Member States are still now largely a supplement

of the US military might, notwithstanding the latter’s visible decline.

The phrasing used is the mention of the fact that “we must continue to

strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-

sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over

key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets and maritime

surveillance”251.

251 Ibid. pg. 10.233

In fact, shortly before the report were issued, a force planning exercise had

taken place within the Secretariat; the method followed was to define five

“Illustrative Scenarios” – as any approach by “Missions” is too controversial in a

multi-national environment. These scenarios were : “Separation of Parties by Force”,

“Stabilization, Reconstruction and Military Cooperation”; “Conflict Prevention”,

“Evacuation Operations” and “Humanitarian Assistance”; thanks to modeling and

simulation programs, which established the type and the amount of forces required,

and the subsequent force offerings by the Member States, the planning exercise was

able to determine European main shortfalls, only a part of which is reflected in the

2008 report, while the others have been addressed only recently by France and

Great Britain, on a bilateral basis.

It is worth noting that no exercise of this kind can allow the politicians to

perceive the importance of the “Forces in Being” in international relations: the “gun

which has not fired yet” has an influence on nations’ attitude much more than it

might be considered at first glance, especially when a government is tempted to

commit a misfit, or to damage others’ interests!

But, as all the concepts explained so far have repeatedly stated, no Organization

will ever be self-sufficient; cooperation among them is therefore essential.

NATO-EU Relations

Unfortunately, from what you have noted about the Strategic Concepts of NATO 234

and EU, it has already become clear to you that a difficult relationship exists

between them, notwithstanding that 21 nations are member of both Organizations.

In fact, the EU decision to develop an independent security and defense dimension

has severed the long-lasting cooperation which existed since the times of the

Western European Union (WEU), which totally relied on NATO command structure

for its operations.

On December 16, 2002, an agreement was signed between the two Secretary

Generals, known as “Berlin Plus”, to provide EU with assured access to NATO

planning and asset capabilities, in case of EU-led crisis management operations

(CMO), as well to ensure a good exchange of classified information, through a

security agreement. Also, the Deputy Supreme Commander, Europe (D-SACEUR) was

designated to become the EU Operational Commander for this kind of operations.

The only problem was that such an “Assured Access” would have depended

upon the agreement of all NATO member countries: this seemed at that time a

secondary problem, until the accession to the EU by two nations who had not

established Partnership relations with the Alliance, i.e. Cyprus and Malta. The first

country, in particular, had an old rancor toward Turkey, due to her invasion in 1974,

and has blocked the process of accession by Ankara to some European bodies;

Turkey, on her side, refuses to allow Cyprus to participate to all joint NATO-EU

meetings at any level.

235

Besides that, France has always insisted on the need for Europe to become

militarily self-sufficient, also as far as command structures were concerned, and

immediately proposed the force planning exercise we have just discussed,

notwithstanding the “Berlin Plus” agreement called for duplication avoidance. Then,

backed by Belgium and Luxemburg, Paris proposed that EU had its own operational

command, to deal with military activities not covered by the agreement, and

continues to press others on this subject, notwithstanding her re-entry into NATO

military structure. On the positive side of this relationship can be placed the

institution of the “NATO-EU Capability Group”, which has eventually started a work

to avoid duplications in development and procurement of military assets.

Therefore, a number of ups and downs have characterized this bi-lateral

relationship during the last years. Fortunately, the risk of duplication is limited by the

21 members of both structures, even if they are dragging their feet on NATO wish to

implement the so-called “Comprehensive Approach”, namely the capability to

provide reconstruction means and funding to improve the situation in the areas

where it operates: these countries, in fact, are already providing EU with huge sums,

for that very purpose, and are unwilling to double their financial contributions to this

scope, only because NATO wants to do the same activities already performed by the

EU.

The difficulties of this relationship are made worse by the internal EU difficulties

236

and weaknesses, which are worth being resumed. This problem, as we have seen,

has been briefly mentioned in the 2008 report, as the need to “strengthen our

internal coherence, through a better institutional coordination and a more strategic

decision-making process”252. The two key EU actors, the Commission – controlled by

bureaucrats - on one side, and the Council – the expression of the nations - on the

other, are in fact frequently at odds; to this problem, the EU Parliament adds

another, as he votes the EU budget, and constantly denies more resources to the

security dimension of the Council, the Secretariat .

This series of internal disputes have reached such a high temperature, that one

of the contestants, the Commission, went to such a point as to sue the Secretariat in

front of the European High Court of Justice! It is evident that – notwithstanding the

new Lisbon Treaty – as long as a feeling of mutual distrust and harsh competition

exists, no “Multi-Functional” approach will be possible, thus no stabilization

operation will be effective!

Another internal EU problem is that the Defense Ministers had no formal

standing until recently, while their Foreign Affairs colleagues were entitled to speak

about military matters; NATO had instead always held separate sessions for the two

groups of Ministers. This situation was so evidently counterproductive – as no force

offerings were made through Foreign Ministers - that a special informal session of

the Council of General Affairs and External Relations (CAGRE) was established for the 252 Relazione sull’attuazione della Strategia Europea in materia di Sicurezza, 11 dicembre 2008, pg.9.

237

Defense Ministers, who were also declared members of the board of the European

Defense Agency, the body tasked to develop military capabilities; now, with the

Lisbon treaty, also this anomaly should be completely eliminated.

This issue might sound quite irrelevant to you. Just consider how can two

Organizations speak to each other, if the views on one side are mostly those of the

Foreign Affairs, while the other interlocutor represents the voice of the Defense

establishment: the firsts will underestimate the strategic implications and the

military efforts required in what they propose to do, while the others will inevitably,

if not openly, disparage any attempt to use “Soft Power” instead of the “Big

Hammer”.

The implementation process of the recent Lisbon Treaty – which introduces

wide-ranging EU structural reforms – should define the way to cooperate better, but

this activity will not be easy, as it runs against powers consolidated since many

decades within the EU Commission: when there is a life-and-death dispute, both

sides are not much interested in an appeasement. In any case, no treaty will be able

to compensate for the inherent weaknesses of the Union, whose lack of military

capabilities is the most relevant vulnerability.

In fact, the only two strengths of EU are, first, that it is a giant of “Soft Power”,

even if it is not using it to its maximum effectiveness – the temptation to distribute

money around, like raindrops, without taking care of monitoring results is always

238

great . Unless EU will have also its fair share of a credible “Hard Power”, it will be

unable to influence events. To this scope, the recent London agreements between

France and Great Britain are a first step toward the future European “Smart Power”

– the combination of Soft and Hard – provided some “brains” will be added to the

process!

The other factor which makes EU extremely strong, notwithstanding its

ineffectiveness, is that it is the “Inevitable Future” for all Europeans, if they want to

have a say in world affairs, and to influence events around. Look at the most

reluctant EU member state, Great Britain: since the rescue of the banking systems of

Iceland and Ireland – both owned by UK banks – the British government, which had

won the elections on an anti-EU ticket, has deeply changed its approach, to the point

of signing the London agreement with France.

NATO, instead, has already accomplished its original aim, and is seeking a fair

rationale for its survival, beyond the evident need of it as the privileged seat of the

transatlantic relations: Europe, in fact, needs the USA more than the opposite, even

if in Washington everybody knows that in the Pacific the USA have never found real

friends, only temporary accomplices. Therefore, NATO has still a role to play, to keep

together the Western nations, in the face of two looming dangers: the restless

Islamic Galaxy and the growing newborn powers, the so-called BRIC.

Conclusions

239

From all what has been said, it is possible to note that the apparent double

allegiance of many Western countries, committed to both NATO and EU, is in fact a

product of the end of the Cold War: in a world where instability and multi-polarity

are increasingly becoming the key features, there is a strong possibility for internal

dissent, due to conflicting interests.

This is quite natural, and should not worry anybody, provided some

mechanisms of compensation might be in place. The fact that NATO and EU could

complement each other is not only a slogan; the Europeans need the USA and vice

versa, especially as the tensions against the “Haves” are increasing, among the

“Have Not’s”, regardless of the small detail that some among the latter are rich, but

unable to reach a sufficient degree of cohesion and an equitable distribution of

wealth.

As the Strategic Concepts show, both Organizations pursue the same aims, even

if they often differ in the objectives and – most notably – in the approaches. Also,

there will be many instances where an intervention by NATO could be

counterproductive, while the EU might appear more apt at quelling some

internecine struggles, through its “Soft Power”.

The only venue where the Europeans and the Americans can find honorable

compromises and a common way ahead is therefore NATO, in spite of its limitations

and inconsistencies. Also, NATO is the only structure where both sides of the ocean

240

can operate together, with a common doctrine and training – thus being more

cohesive than a coalition. In fact, most often the obscure work of the military

structures is underestimated, while it has been so far the decisive factor of success

in all “Stabilization Operations” carried on so far, with the notable exception of

Afghanistan, where the risk of a premature withdrawal of the Western countries

might leave behind a real “Wasps Nest”, destabilizing the whole region.

Europe, as we have noted, is Europeans “Inevitable Future”; what is not

inevitable is a progressive split between the two sides of the Atlantic ocean, a

danger for the continued prosperity of the Western world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ISLAMIC GALAXY AND ITS STRATEGIES

Introduction

241

With more than 1.5 billion people, most of them belonging to the Sunni belief, the

Islamic Galaxy is the second largest religion in the world, after Christianity. Until

1918, the majority of Muslim believers were connected to a political entity, the

Ottoman Empire, whose leader, the Sultan of Istanbul, was also the “Great Caliph of

the whole Islam”, thus having a sort of ecumenical power to keep together all Islamic

followers, throughout the world, including those not subject to the Porte.

In fact, a portion of Muslims belonged to different sects, with special emphasis on

the Shiites, still now struggling against the Sunni majority in a merciless war. The

Shiites, in fact, or better the “Schiat Ali”, (the Party of ALI), claimed that only the

family of the Prophet and his legitimate descendants had the exclusive right to tell

the true doctrine, to rule the Islamic community, an intrinsic divine right, which

nobody else could acquire. For the Shiites, both the Caliphs of Baghdad and those of

Damascus were usurpers”253.

The Shiites, in fact, still believe that the last Imam, descending from prophet

Mohammed, and had been defeated and killed in the battle of Karbala in 680 a. D.,

would come back one day, and establish his rule over all the Islamic world. They are

between 120 and 167 millions, according to different estimates, and are steadily

growing. Other sects account for no more than 12 millions followers in total, so that

they have a relatively lower political influence.

253 F. COGNASSO. Storia delle Crociate. Ed. Dall’Oglio, 1967, page 14.242

The Ottoman Empire had been responsible of almost 500 years of war against

Western European nations. After it became progressively weaker, during the XIX

century, some European nations attempted to preserve it, as they considered it an

element of the regional balance of power, while others, like Russia, felt that the only

cure was to snatch from it all useful pieces, until it died.

Then, in 1915, the Porte committed the final mistake, by joining WWI on the side of

the Central Empires; their final defeat in 1918, and the subsequent partition among

a number of States having almost equivalent dimensions, was a provision intended

to get rid of a unified center of Muslim power, an idea whose conception is normally

attributed to the discussions which preceded the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916.

In reality, the first decision to carry on the partition of the Ottoman Empire in zones

of respective influence was the product of the Russian-British agreement of 1907,

where the two nations ostensibly sought “compromises in those sectors where the

interests of the two countries were on a collision course”254, that is in Iran and

Afghanistan, but they also discussed about the future of the rest of South-Western

Asia.

This agreement was “blessed” by the meeting between the tsar NICHOLAS II and the

British Emperor EDWARD VII in Revel, “in June 1908. The subject of their discussions

254 V. RIASANOVSKY. Storia della Russia. Ed. Bompiani, 1984, page 418.243

were kept secret, but the (Turkish) public opinion was shaken by a possible

dismemberment of the Empire”255. As usual, no secret lasts more than few days!

The SIKES-PICOT plan – which underwent later modifications in 1919 – was aimed

rather at assuring Arabs’ help to defeat the Ottoman Empire, by satisfying their

aspiration to regain their independence from the Sultan; the underlying idea was to

establish a number of Arab states, and to keep them under the two powers’

influence, until they should eventually unite themselves in a confederation, a sort of

Arab Union, which now exists only in the form of an International Organization.

The Arabs, in fact, have always loathed the Turks, who had been for centuries, since

the Middle Age, their mercenaries and military leaders, but had exploited the

endemic divisions and struggles among their masters, thus reaching the supreme

power on them. The Turks were in fact considered by the Arabs to be tepid Muslim

believers, with habits which were contrary to the precepts of Koran, thus being not

lofty enough to wage Holy Wars on behalf of the Muslim community, for the

conversion of the whole world population to their faith.

However, as long as the Ottoman Sultans were able to push forward the cause of

Islam, through their penetration in the heart of Europe, the Arabs accepted their

rule, which was not as invasive as it was deemed; once the Porte – how the

government in Istanbul was called – became weak and started losing chunks of her

255 R. MANTRAM. Storia dell’Impero Ottomano. Ed. Argo 1999, page 618.244

Empire, due both to the tsarist pressure and to the Western backing of the Christians

under the Ottoman joke, their allegiance toward the Sultan dwindled, especially

when the modernist Party of the “Young Turks” took power, thus putting an abrupt

end to the Sultan’s attempts to strengthen his religious ecumenical role, to bring

more cohesion among his unruly subjects. From this moment on, little more was

needed to cause the implosion of this once powerful Empire.

The Big Split

The 1908 revolution was the initiative of the “Young Turks”, a group of officers who

had founded the “Committee for Homeland and Freedom”, two years before, to

foster a modernizing reform of the Empire, and had joined forces with the liberals of

another group, the “Committee for Union and Progress”.

In 1907, when an economic crisis caused a number of upheavals in Anatolia, the

young officers rallied the protests, until, on July 22, 1908 the old Sultan HABDUL

HAMID II decided to co-opt them by nominating their most prominent personality,

SAID PASHA, to the place of Grand Vizir, (Prime Minister) and to proclaim again the

Constitution of 1876, which he had suspended. Quite interestingly, in the Arab

provinces the enthusiasm was at least moderate.

The reason for such a lack of enthusiasm was due to the fact that the “Union and

Progress Committee” was a convinced sponsor of a sort of “Westernization” of the

Ottoman culture, based on the separation between Church and State; these 245

reformers were backed by a number of intellectuals who praised the Turkish identity

as being prevalent over Islamic traditions, while the rural population, as well as the

Arabs, backed by the priests, the Ulemas, were in favor of the traditional Islamic

social doctrine, with the consequent refusal of modernity.

The most prominent Theoretician of Turkish nationalism was Ziya GÖKALP, the chief

ideologist of the “Committee for Union and Progress”, who preached a pan-Turkish

ideal, by saying that the Turkish homeland was neither Turkey nor Turkestan, but a

vast territory, the Turan, including both areas. He was also in favor of reviving the

Turkish traditions, customs, arts, language and social conscience of the Turkish

population.

As far as Islam was concerned, GÖKALP was convinced that it was more an ethic

doctrine rather than a religion, so it had to be adapted to changing circumstances,

thus being submitted to the “religion of national identity”. The non-Turkish

populations, considered to be the cause of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire,

should have been abandoned to their destinies. He dubbed them “the dogs of the

Turkish nation”, to better express his contempt for them.

On the opposite side, other intellectuals fostered “Pan-Islamism”, mostly directed

against the Westerns, who were accused of oppressing Muslims through their

colonial rule and had corrupted Islamic culture. This doctrine extolled the fact that

Europeans had copied the scientific culture of Arab Islam, during the Middle Age,

246

and only a purified Islam would bring about a progress of the Muslim nation, as in

the past.

A parallel trend to the “Pan-Islamic” movement was “Arabism”, which initially was

not against the Turks, but preached their union, on a basis of equality. Only when

the “Young Turks” promoted the use of Turkish language and openly considered the

Arabs as an “Inferior race”, Arab identity, opposed to the Turkish predominance, took

shape. During WWI, the British were quick to seize this opportunity and to foster this

sort of fundamentalism, in order to get Arabs’ support.

WWI and the End of the Ottoman Empire

In order to balance the pressing influence of Great Britain and France, who had

imposed a tight control over Ottoman finances, in order to recover their money

leased to the Porte - the majority of her public debt - through the “Capitulations

Regime”, the Ottoman government strengthened its ties with Imperial Germany,

which was seeking to increase its influence over the Ottoman Empire.

Berlin, in order to establish durable ties, resumed, after many years, its program of

military counseling and assistance, which had been interrupted in 1840; as a reward,

Germany received the authorization to build the Istanbul-Baghdad railway, a huge

and ambitious project, as it intended to cross the steep Taurus mountain chains of

Anatolia, then to continue through Syria and, after having connected the oilfields of

Kurdish territories (now Northern Iraq), eventually reach Baghdad, the ancient 247

capital of the Medieval Arab kingdom, whose most celebrated ruler had been the

Caliph HARUN-EL-RASHID, known for having inspired the book “One thousand and

one night”.

However, the new government of the “Young Turks” had to face a number of serious

crises. First Italy inflicted the Porte a serious blow, by conquering Libya; one year

later the Balkans went on fire again. As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire suffered

a bitter defeat in the two wars of 1912-13 against the Balkan nations, thus losing all

territory in Europe, except a narrow strip in Thrace, which Turkey still holds.

In such a situation, when the Sarajevo killing sparked WWI, it was not a surprise that

the Sultan, MOHAMMED V, tried to keep his kingdom out of the struggle,

notwithstanding German insistence and the “Young Turks” willingness to join the

Central Empires. The maximum which had been achieved through these pressures

had been a secret defensive treaty with Germany, signed on August 2, 1914, under

an anti-Russian perspective.

Even when two German ships, the battle cruiser Goeben and the smaller Breslau

sought refuge in the Straits, the Sultan tried to gain time, by incorporating both ships

in his Navy, while a number of Turkish politicians were proposing a reconciliation

with the powers of the “Entente” (Russia, UK and France), which “on their side,

would have been content with an Ottoman neutrality, and were multiplying their

248

initiatives to achieve it”256.

The Sultan decided therefore to proceed cautiously, first by a decree which

canceled the hated Capitulations, and then by withdrawing his decree giving a

special status to the Holy Places of Christianity. But the government was becoming

impatient and - in order to force the hand of the Sultan - it ordered the two German

ships to bomb Odessa, on October 22, once a number of crates full of gold had

arrived from Germany.

After further delays, due to the failure of the German offensive on the river

Marne and the Austrian defeats in the East against Russia, the bombing of Odessa

took place one week later, on the 29th, two days after the closure of the Straits, and

the following November 2 Russia declared war to the Ottoman Empire, followed by

her two partners of the Entente.

The main reason for this decision, which was accepted by the Sultan, was a fear

of a possible Russian invasion in Eastern Anatolia, where already some provinces had

been lost, during the previous wars against the Czar, as well as the desire of revenge

for the huge territories lost all around the Mediterranean sea, from Crete to Libya,

not to mention the islands in the Aegean sea.

War was declared by the Sultan on November 11, followed on the 23rd by the

proclamation of the Holy War, which ordered all Muslims to “rise against the

256 R. MANTRAN (a cura di). Op. cit. pag. 665.249

oppressors’ coalition, which is named Triple Entente, whose national pride has as its

supreme delight the enslavement of thousands of Muslims”257. Quite inevitably, this

proclamation had little effect on the Arabs and on the Palestinians, whose

aspirations for autonomy led them to side by the British, thus helping their Army to

cross the Suez Canal, to take the Sinai peninsula and to proceed for the final

offensive, as soon as reinforcements, taken from the French battlefront, made it

possible.

The Porte quickly found out that she had too many attacks to fend off, as well as

too many internal troubles; Germany tried to help, but she could do little, as also

Austria had shown a serious unforeseen weakness. The result was that the Central

Empires resisted as long as they could, until the final collapse came. The winning

powers had already decided not only to cancel the Ottoman Empire and to replace it

with a number of Arab states, almost equivalent in size, as we have seen, but

decided also, at this stage, to divide Anatolia among three spheres of influence, thus

completely erasing the Turks from the maps.

The latter provision was averted by one among the “Young Turks”, KEMAL Pasha,

later known as Atatürk (Father of the Turks) who mustered all forces available,

signed an alliance with Bolshevik Russia, and was able to crush the Armenians first

and then the Greeks, who had received the Western Anatolia as a war prize, due to

the fact that many compatriots were living there. The result was the partition of 257 Ibid.

250

Armenia between the Soviet Union and Turkey, a mass exodus of more than one

million Greeks toward their country of origin and the proclamation of the Republic of

Turkey.

The leaders of the new nation – under the Chairmanship of KEMAL -

demonstrated how much they had learned from their defeats. First, they signed in

1925 a mutual defense and non interference treaty with the Soviet Union, so that no

propaganda would have been attempted on both sides: Turkey feared in fact the

spreading of Communist doctrines, while Moscow was worried about her Muslim

communities in the Caucasus and Central Asia).

As a second step, Turkey was able to gain support from the League of Nations to

revise the Convention of the Straits, in 1936, so that its clauses were much more in

her favor than before. When WWII erupted, Turkey declared her neutrality, and

when the Soviet Union threatened her, in 1946, she arranged first the Balkan Pact

with Greece and Yugoslavia, and then joined NATO, as we have seen.

Summing up, modern Turkey relies, more than it might be deemed at first glance,

on the Ottoman tradition, at least as a source of past experiences, to be followed or

discarded, according to the degree of success they had. Even the ongoing power

struggle between the laics, who draw inspiration from ATATÜRK, and the Islamic

parties – be they moderate or not – is a legacy of the past, a problem which could be

solved by the Europeans, by accelerating the accession of Turkey to the EU.

251

Ankara, in fact, has two alternatives: she either joins the Westerns’ caucus, even

at the cost of suffering from external interferences, as it happened during the XIX

century, when a number of reforms were imposed on the Porte (the period of

TANZIMAT and the Capitulations), or to chose a path toward an Islamic regime, with

the hope of becoming once again the leader of this Galaxy, provided the Arabs

accept it.

The other laic regimes

Turkey, though, is not the only laic regime in the Muslim galaxy: in fact, the fall of

the Ottoman Empire brought long lasting consequences, especially for the peoples

of South-Western Asia, once administered by the Porte. France and Great Britain, in

fact, had decided to split the region in a number of States, more or less of an

equivalent size, to be administered by them under a mandate of the League of

Nations, until they were ready for self rule.

The only exceptions were Lebanon, established to give a minimum of autonomy

to the Christian population of Syria, and Palestine, placed under direct British

control. This design, developed from the SYKES-PICOT agreement, suffered from the

typical British cartographic approach, the cause of a number of problems, which we

are still suffering from, especially in Asia: the two DURAND lines, which have drawn

the borders of Afghanistan, the MACMAHON line, which separated India from Tibet,

are the most relevant instances, as well as the separation between India and

252

Pakistan, all of them meeting with a stern refusal by the populations concerned.

The form of “Protectorate” imposed to the Arab States had also another

precedent, Egypt, which had been placed under financial control by Great Britain

and France in 1881, and later occupied by London, so that it became a sort of British

colony. A number of personalities in UK were strongly against this new arrangement,

as well against “the expansionist ambitions which it concealed”258.

It is fair to say, though, that a number of supporters of the plan were not guided

by sheer imperialism, but by an utopian and arrogant “reasoning confidence in the

benefits of the British administration (system) as a means to guarantee a higher level

of justice to the population, as compared to what was common and widespread in

the Asian communities”259.

France therefore assumed the administration of Syria and Lebanon. Her request

to have this zone of influence was the fruit of a “coherent political standing, well

rooted in memory. Her claims were as old as the Middle Age, founded as they were

on the Latin kingdoms which the wave of the Crusades had left behind, as relics,

along the coast of the Levant. During the war, the worry that an allied country might

settle in this land was apparently equal to the concern that German invasion of the

homeland might limit the French contribution to the campaign against Turkey in

258 B. LIDDELL HART. Lawrence d’Arabia. Ed. Bompiani, 1984, pag. 271.

259 Ibid. pag. 273.253

Asia”260.

Great Britain, on her part, apart from Palestine, would “assist” three brand new

countries, i.e. Saudi Arabia, where IBN SAUD was nominated king; the major

pretender, in fact, was SHARIF HUSSAIN, the descendant of the ancient dynasty of

the HASCEMITES. but he had proclaimed himself, during the conflict, as the “king of

the Arab people”261, thus causing serious problems to the Allied powers.

He got instead another new State, created by merging the Ottoman provinces of

Baghdad, Basra and Mossul. His brother was given another kingdom as well,

denominated Trans-Jordan, including the inland portion of Palestine, on both sides

of the river Jordan, with Amman as its capital town.

It is needless to say how much this “Administrative Mandate”, sanctioned by the

League of Nations in 1920, angered the Arabs; protests and riots against what was

perceived as an ill-concealed form of colonialism were countless, and can be

considered as the origin of the nationalistic movements, in the 1950s: the leaders of

these revolutions had been involved, years before, in these riots. It is interesting to

note that, the more France and UK repressed these movements, the more their

members found a different way to assert their aspiration for freedom, until the both

powers, too weakened by World War Two, gave up and abandoned these territories,

in the late 1940s. 260 Ibid. pag. 272.

261 Ibid. pag. 102.254

The most serious upheaval had taken place in Iraq, during WWII: in March, 1941,

the new Prime Minister, RASCID ALI, a nationalist who wanted to free his country

from the British not so indirect rule, compelled the Prime Minister, Emir ABDUL ILA

to flee from Baghdad, and asked first the German and Italian help to free the country

from her masters, and then sought the moral support of the grand Mufti of

Jerusalem. The British military and civilian officials retreated with their families in

the air base of HABBANIYA, near Falluja, where they were besieged.

The British government reacted immediately, by diverting significant land and air

forces destined to Malaya and North Africa, thus preventing Germany from sending

adequate reinforcements by air; as the Iraqi troops were not strong enough to

withstand the British forces, the siege to the airbase was lifted on May 7, and on the

following may 30 the nationalist government, as well as the grand Mufti, had to

escape to Iran.

The consequences of this upheaval, though, had been significant, as UK had to

keep, during the following years, enough forces in that country, whose oil production

was essential for the war effort. This unforeseen commitment caused a serious

weakening of the North African and Greek fronts, so that Crete was conquered and

the Italian and German forces started an offensive which snatched Eastern Libya

from British possession; in addition to that, as no forces reached Malaya, where the

troops employed in Iraq were originally destined, few months later the Japanese

255

were able to conquer it with great ease and limited losses.

The precipitous French and British withdrawal from these new States, at the end

of WWII, left behind some rulers who were known to be loyal to their old masters.

Without the support of foreign troops, though, these rulers had little chance of

survival: the first country to revolt was Egypt, whose king, FAROUK, was ousted in

1952 by a group of nationalist officers, whose ideologist was colonel NASSER.

Less successful was a similar attempt in Iran, led by MOSSADEQ, who was ousted

by a UK-US armed intervention; shortly afterwards, France withdrew from Tunisia in

1956, and the chief of the local guerillas, Habib BOURGHIBA, won the elections, as

the head of the liberal-constitutional party Néo Destour.

Two years later, there was a military coup in Iraq which deposed the young king,

and killed him in a most cruel way. The French withdrawal from Algeria, where a

merciless struggle was ongoing since years, waged by the guerillas (Fellagas) against

French counter-insurgency troops, followed shortly thereafter; Libya was the last

country where a military coup took place, in 1969, led by a young major, GADDAFI.

Most notably, even if the new regimes pretended to be democratic, all were led

either by military or by those who had led the insurgency struggle for several

decades, and imposed a totalitarian regime, until our days.

The majority among these governments who had gained power thanks to a

nationalistic agenda, took care of stirring the anti-Western feelings of the 256

population, in the name of the wrongs suffered in the past. They were careful, as a

consequence, to hinder the Western economic interests, by nationalizing the major

assets – as we saw in the case of the Suez Canal. Inevitably, all these governments

had to seek help from the Soviet Union, in order to be backed while they were

continuing to weaken the Western nations, through a number of terrorist attacks in

the 1970s, through the oil embargo of 1972, besides financing European subversive

groups, as IRA in Ireland and ETA in Spain.

Therefore, until few years ago, the Western conventional wisdom considered

these nationalistic regimes as their enemies, notwithstanding the fact that they

tried, like Turkey had done, to keep State separate from the Church; therefore, for

years religious fundamentalist regimes, attempting to impose the Sharia (the

religious law), were considered a preferable solution. This led, for instance, France to

dispatch Ayatollah KHOMEINI to Iran, during the revolution against the Shah; also in

Pakistan a union between the military and religious leaders was encouraged.

This attitude has favored the already existing polarization in the Muslim world,

with the religious regimes, unable and unwilling to improve the living conditions of

the populations, due to their traditionalism, considering the laic governments as

their enemies, and vice versa. As also the religious regimes have started looking at

Western countries as their worst enemies, the laic governments in the Muslim

Galaxy became all of a sudden our natural allies, in the 1980s, in accordance with

257

the say “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, regardless of the fact that – like most

totalitarian governments – they were likely to end up in a bloodbath, once their

“capital” of consensus would be exhausted, as it happens in our days.

Islamic Fundamentalism

The religious hierarchy, in the Muslim world, is in direct contact with the

population, and they perform a number of additional roles, beyond providing

spiritual and moral guidance, like administering local justice and teaching. The Sunni

priests are also the individual interpreters of the Koran, without being steered by a

real Church at a higher level, apart from belonging to schools of thought, the

Madrassas. The Shiites have instead a High Priest (Ayatollah al Ozma) who is the

spiritual guidance of all the faithful. Therefore the priests enjoy high prestige among

the lower classes, which is dangerous to underestimate.

As we have seen, Western nations favored the theocracies of the Islamic world for

some years, with the rationale that they would have ensured a better stability, as

compared to the laic regimes; apart from Iran and Pakistan, also in Afghanistan,

during the Soviet invasion in support of the laic communist elite, Western countries

looked at the fundamentalist component of the guerilla, known as Taliban, as a

partner to be backed and provided them with all possible weapons, including small

surface to air missiles (MANPADS).

In these Cold War times it appeared, in fact, a golden opportunity to force the 258

Red Army into an endless counter-insurgency warfare, thus compelling it to remove

forces away from the Central European front. For the USA, in particular, it was a sort

of revenge, as they had suffered from the same situation in Vietnam, where the

North Vietnamese regime had been supported by Moscow and Peking, during the

struggle.

In addition to that, during the last twenty years, Western nations had intervened

to help the Muslim minorities in the Balkans, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in

Kuwait; this appeared a way not only to stabilize these areas, but also to increase the

favor of the Islamic world toward our countries.

It had not been taken into account, though, that also the fundamentalist regimes

saw the Western civilization as their worst enemy, depicted by them as a materialist

and consumerist society; in fact, our way of life is rightly assessed to have a

disrupting potential for the social structure of their countries, as it questioned the

wisdom and appropriateness of the traditional culture and social order. Not by

chance in the Muslim world our society has been dubbed as “Coca Cola Civilization”.

In Egypt, these trends were represented, and they still are, by the Muslim

Brotherhood, quite known by everybody, especially after the most recent upheaval

in Cairo; one among the most renown philosophers of this stream, TARIQ RAMADAN,

feels he has found the fundamental difference between the Western and the Muslim

cultures, as

259

“the impulse to rebel in Western culture follows directly from the esteem that is

accorded to skepticism and doubt. You begin with skepticism and doubt, and you push

those attitudes one step further, and you arrive at full-scale rebellion. Muslim tradition

does not have those traits. In Islam there is no impulse to rebel. Submission is all.

Submission to God allows Islam to create a unified, moral and satisfying society – at least

potentially, even if the flesh-and-blood Muslims in any given era have forgotten their

religious obligations. Submission is the road to social justice, to a contented soul and to

harmony with the world”262.

This abstract deserves to be analyzed with care, not only under the light of the

recent events, but also to understand the backwardness – and, indeed, the

conservatism - hidden in the Muslim fundamentalism. The Islamic society is in fact

extremely stratified, with only the religious class cutting across the various social

layers, albeit not necessarily being antithetical to the upper classes.

According to fundamentalists, the poor (and women) do not need any

instruction, given the functions they perform, but they must learn submission to

those who command; this explains why the only book whose reading is encouraged,

or at least taught by the priests, is Koran, as its precepts are considered to be all

what human beings need.

A recent comment made by a Western journalist on these trends and on their

genesis, applied to the Taliban, shows clearly the backwardness of fundamentalism:

262 P. BERMAN. Terror and Liberalism. Ed. W. W. Norton & Co., 2003, pag. 27.260

“the Taliban gunmen had grown up as refugees in these diseased camps in Pakistan.

Their first sixteen years of life were passed in blind poverty, deprived of all education and

entertainment, imposing their own deadly punishments, their mothers and sisters kept in

subservience as the men decided how to fight their foreign oppressors on the other side

of the border, their only diversion a detailed and obsessive reading of the Koran – the one

and true path in a world in which no other could be contemplated. The Taliban had

arrived (to power) not to rebuild a country they did not remember, but to rebuild their

refugee camps on a larger scale”263.

Of course, there are some aspects of the Islamic Law, the Sharia, which disturb us

deeply, not only those related with the women condition, decidedly archaic, but also

those cruel punishments, directly drawn from an obscure past. Summing up, Islamic

fundamentalism is strongly traditionalist, even reactionary, and this is its weak point.

No wonder that some social Muslim groups watch with fear the flooding of

information about our way of life, reaching their populations through modern

media, satellite TV or INTERNET for instance, as people might start questioning the

wisdom of the preaching they listen from the Ulemas.

The attempts made in Morocco, and more recently in Turkey, to find a way

toward a “moderate fundamentalism” could bring about a more balanced synthesis

between the laic thought and the Sharia, but it is something still to be seen, as the

risk of populations rising in anger and looking for jobs and a better quality of life, in

263 R. FISK. The Great War for Civilisation. Ed. Harper Perennial, 2006, pag. 31.261

the Western style, is always present, and recent events demonstrate it clearly.

The main problem for the Western nations is that many groups, within the Islamic

Galaxy, are determined to wage a merciless war against the Western nations,

because they see us not only as exerting a corrupting influence on the Muslim

society at large, but also because of their exploitation at a cheap price of the natural

resources the Islamic nations possess.

To wage their war, these groups recur either to a strategy of provocations or to an

indirect strategy, as they do not have the possibility to muster enough resources and

manpower to fight us face to face, given the Western’s technological superiority and

military power; therefore they multiply fleabites, to progressively weaken us, their

enemy, through terrorism, piracy and proxy wars. Let’s examine these approaches

one by one.

The Strategy of Provocation

Many centuries ago, a Chinese strategist, SUN TZU, wrote: “if the enemy

commander has a hot temper, try to irritate him: by simulating your weakness, he

will increase his arrogance”264. This means that when the enemy is psychologically

off balance, he is more prone to commit fatal mistakes, thus facilitating your success.

Provocation is a strategic approach followed often in the Islamic world, and it

consist in hostile actions, normally but not exclusively on a small scale, resembling a

264 SUN TZU. L’Arte della Guerra. Ed. Guida, 1991, page 83.262

slap in the face given by small kids to their parents, when they are reproached. They

know, and are prepared to suffer the reaction by the victims of their act. The most

recent example was what happened in Lebanon in 2006, when the HEZBOLLAH

kidnapped some Israeli soldiers, thus suffering from Israeli retaliation, but also

HAMAS, North Korea and Iran practice this approach, which is quite liable to excite

retaliations.

In fact, Provocation is a desperate move, used to unblock a situation of stalemate,

considered highly unfavorable; it is a sort of Catalytic Use of Force, as the

perpetrator hopes that after his act and the expected reaction, the situation will be

in any case much different as before, and the new balance could be more favorable.

A good example of this strategy is provided by an old film by Peter SELLERS, The

Mouse that Roared, where a small European Grand Duchy, whose economy depends

on the wine sales, declares war against the USA, expecting to be defeated and then

helped in its economic recovery. Of course, a lot of things happen, and the inevitable

happy end takes place at the end, quite differently from what happens in real life.

This is what happened to HEZBOLLAH in 2006, whose territory was severely

bombed, but this led to the UN interposition, thus allowing respite to the

population. Of course, it is easy to criticize this approach, but the fact is that it is

widely practiced, especially by non-state entities or groups within the Muslim world,

by those who want to set a process in motion, regardless of the sufferings they must

263

endure.

These provocations, in fact, are also a way to put the adversary to a test, as he

might also avoid an immediate reprisal, either because the act is below the

“Threshold of Forbearance” – thus not being sufficiently serious to deserve and

justify a response – or because reprisals may be “Asymmetrical”, for instance

economic or financial responses. The latter case, if the response is well chosen, it

might place the offender in a situation of embarrassment.

Terrorism

Until few years ago, terrorism was considered “The New Enemy” par excellence,

by Western nations. Nobody seemed to recall that it is a much consolidated

approach, followed since the 11th century, given some general conditions, and that it

was put in practice almost in all countries around the world. Now, as rhetoric has

subsided a little, time has come to examine it more closely as a means to enact a

strategy.

It is important to note that its inventors were the members of an Islamic secret

sect, the Ashashins, who practiced political murder, thus spreading terror among the

Arab Caliphs and Emirs, during the Middle Age, thus forcing them to make

concessions and to enrich them, in order to be spared and – if possible – to divert

their attention toward their rivals and enemies.

264

The first historical peculiarity of terrorism has always been its elitism. The leaders

of a terrorist group feel that only few extremely selected companions are worthy of

joining the “lofty mission” of killing the tyrant, especially when all attempts to rise

the population against him have failed. This elitism has two facets, though: above all,

recourse to terrorism is made when there are not favorable conditions to wage

guerilla warfare, as the population is divided, and any attempt to establish large

subversive groups might be betrayed. The other facet is the high risk of infiltration of

terrorist groups by Police.

The second peculiarity is the need for resonance: the terrorist act must make the

headlines of all newspapers, lest it will not achieve its results, as the intended aim is

to cause a sudden acceleration of events which will change the national or

international political landscape. What is normally considered as its primary scope,

i.e. to spread fear among the population, is but one instance of the general case.

Therefore, terrorism resemble the “Strategy of Provocation”, and in fact it is a

variant of it.

Quite unusually, the first strategist who laid in writing a number of considerations

on the importance of spreading terror among the masses is an Italian general, Giulio

DOUHET, who wrote: “how can a country work and live under the perennial threat,

being oppressed by the terrible nightmare of its imminent and collective

destruction? (This is not possible) because the air offensive does not materialize

265

only against targets offering the lowest material resistance, but also against those

having the lowest moral resistance”265.

Further on, his reasoning concludes, quite optimistically, that “inevitably a

dissolution must happen, a profound dissolution of the whole (social) structure, and

the moment will quickly come when – in order to escape from anguish – the

populations, moved only by their instinct of self-preservation, will request the end of

the struggle at any condition”266.

During WWII, this theory was widely practiced by all belligerents, albeit with

uneven results: the Britons accepted the destructions with their typical nonchalance

and resilience, Germany dug in, by transferring all its industrial activities

underground, the Italian population left the towns and dispersed itself in the

country, the Japanese withstood heroically the destructions, until the atomic bomb

became the proper rationale to accept the inevitable surrender without face loss,

and to avoid the invasion of their homeland.

What DOUHET had not taken into account, though, was that the only one

widespread reaction to terror is hatred. Another strategist had noted, already in the

1930s, that in fact this “method, which will destroy what it cannot give back, will

leave behind it as a remainder the graves and the ruins to be a no less permanent

265 G. DOUHET. Il Dominio dell’Aria. Ed. Rivisa Aeronautica, 1955, page 23.

266 Ibid. page 66.266

obstacle to the resumption of friendly relations; in other words, Peace”267.

To cause hatred among the masses is therefore a course of action which is

convenient only when the intent is to severe relations with another nation for a long

time, as hatred lasts for generations; there is a consequence, though, the risk of

backlash - the enemy reaction through retaliation - and this is precisely what has

happened after the tragedy of 9/11, against the Taliban.

“Fortunately, the public opinions in the Western world have shown a lot of

courage, and have also been able to avoid, at least in part, directing their hatred

towards the whole of the populations, whose members have committed these

terrible mass slaughters. To be selective, instead of throwing the wrath

indiscriminately upon the whole of the people, when a limited number of

individuals behave like beasts, is the supreme form of civilization, and we can rightly

be proud for that attitude”268.

It is also worth considering that there are two ways to wage terrorism: the most

practiced, the easiest one, is to do it in one’s own country. This simplifies the logistic

problems, and reduces the risk of being caught, as the terrorists operate in their own

environment. To commit acts of terrorism overseas is more difficult, as it requires an

advanced base in a territory where the culprits might be easier to spot as they are

newcomers and - most importantly - communications are needed to ensure the 267 H. RICHMOND. Sea Power in the Modern World. G. Bell & sons, London, 1934, page 206.

268 F. SANFELICE DI MONTEFORTE. Strategy and Peace. Ed. Aracne, 2007, page 38.267

arrival of reinforcements and material.

That’s why the tragedy of 9/11 was followed by a scandal and many

controversies, as the terrorists had been able to settle in the USA and to practice

flight, without raising suspicions strong enough to prompt an investigation by police

authorities. However, since then the alert level among the people, in all Western

countries, has allowed to catch other potential offenders, thus making this form of

attack against the West less remunerative, due to the growth of the “Attrition Rate”,

i.e. the percentage of failures.

Piracy

As a historian observed, “like homicide, piracy is one among the most ancient

human misfits whose records are available. References to piracy coincide with the

first news on voyages and commerce. Human beings had barely started transporting

merchandizes from one place to another, as enterprising individuals did not delay in

appearing, to reap profits by intercepting these merchandizes along their path”269.

A recent definition of piracy, coined by Eric ELLEN of the International Maritime

Bureau (IMB), to “make it easier to report and more identifiable to the industry and

to the public at large, (and) written hastily on the inside of a wrapper of a pack of

cigarettes, is generally now accepted by the international community: an act of

boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any

269 P. GOSSE. Storia della Pirateria. Ed. Odoya, 2008, pag. 17.268

other crime with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that

act”270.

Instead, the formal definition, as stated in the Montego Bay Convention of 1982,

known with the acronym of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea) is more limitative, as it says that “piracy is an illegitimate act of violence or

depredation, committed for private purposes against a ship or against persons or

goods on board, performed in the high seas by private vessels for economic

purposes”271.

Therefore, the so-called animus furandi272 is essential, but there are two more

conditions: the act must take place in the high seas and must come from another

vessel, otherwise it is classified as “armed robbery at sea”. In order to understand

the reasons for these limitations, a brief historical background is needed.

For centuries, piracy had been considered a crime by nations, but no

international convention had been signed on this subject, as piracy had already been

defeated when Western powers started, in the XIX century, multiplying these

Conventions as a means to agree upon what is called “International Law”.

The League of Nations was the first to consider the need for dealing with piracy at

270 J. S. BURNETT. Dangerous Waters. Ed. A Plume Book, 2003, page 159.

271 UNCLOS. Article 101.

272 v. CAFFIO F. – op.cit.; e testo della “Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul Diritto del Mare del 10.12.1982” (nota come Convenzione di Montego Bay) articolo 101.

269

international level, albeit without making much progress, notwithstanding that in

1932 the Harvard Law School had already prepared a project of text on the subject.

It was not, however, a nugatory work, as after WWII the “Second UN Conference on

the Law of the Sea” started from this draft, which influenced Article 15 of the

Geneva Convention of 1958; quite naturally, also UNCLOS has inserted piracy as an

international crime, based on the same document.

The reasons for these delays and hesitations were the significant divergences of

opinion among nations, as some wanted to give piracy an objective meaning –

whoever hijacks a ship is a pirate – while others wanted to differentiate between the

cases of hijacking for political reasons (Maritime Terrorism) and those perpetrated

only for greed; many small nations, too, insisted to limit the crime of piracy to

international waters, in order to avoid providing a justification to foreign warships to

enter their unguarded territorial waters.

However, not only pirates have laid snares against maritime commerce, in history;

there were also the Corsairs, “ authorized to attack and seize ships of an enemy

nation. This authorization, issued in form of a document known as letter of

privateering and retaliation, was originally conferred by the sovereign to allow a

merchant, whose vessel or cargo had been stolen or destroyed, to seek revenge by

attacking the enemy and thus compensate his losses; starting from the XV century,

however, it was exploited by seagoing nations to attack enemy vessels in time of

270

war”273. Privateering was later abolished in 1856, by the Paris Convention and, since

then, war on maritime commerce was waged only by warships, in time of war.

When captured, corsairs were treated as prisoners of war, while pirates were

normally hanged; often, though, pirates became corsairs and vice versa, even if their

sovereigns did not always pardon this kind of “distraction”: Sir Walter RALEIGH, for

instance, was sentenced to death, upon his king’s orders, as he had continued

harassing the Spanish colonies even after UK and Spain had signed a peace treaty.

In our days, piracy has taken once again the headlines, and the reaction by

Western public opinions has forced first the UN to tackle the problem and then our

governments to send some warships, under NATO or EU control, in the area most

crowded by pirates, the Horn of Africa. Other nations too, as Russia, India, China and

Japan have joined forces and are cooperating with the Europeans to contain the

phenomenon. In spite of the UN authorization to attack the pirates nests, no action

of this kind has taken place, as the Western nations want to delegate actions on

Somali soil to the African Union, which has not mustered yet enough forces for this

task.

What is less acceptable is that it took a lot of time before piracy prompted these

interventions, and this delayed reaction has allowed piracy to spread in many areas

of the world. Already in the1980s, according to some reports, “armed attacks on

273 D. CORDINGLY. Storia della Pirateria. Ed. Oscar Mondadori, 2003, pag. xiii.271

merchant ships and yachts reached epidemic proportions in early 1981, with up to

12 ocean-going merchant ships being reported as under attack each day in the West

African area alone”274. Official statistics of the International Maritime Organisation

(IMO) show that the maximum number of attacks per year worldwide took place on

2003 with 450 seizures, while in 2008 – when the UN eventually decided to take

action – they had gone slightly down to 430.

While the waters of the Indian ocean are today the most worrying piracy zone, it

must not be forgotten that the other area where piracy is thriving is in fact the Gulf

of Guinea, whose hinterland is unfortunately characterized by desertification, thus

forcing populations to move toward the coast and to seek ways to become rich as

quickly as possible.

Of course, also local factors are relevant, as the significantly high birth rate and the

abundance of mineral resources, especially oil and gas, which have attracted several

merchant vessels, since the 1970s. Already in these years “in Nigeria up to 40 ships

were queuing at any one time to enter Lagos, which was then incapable of handling

such numbers. These vessels were obvious and easy targets. Pirates went for cargo

rather than cash, breaking open containers to find whatever they could, and there

was a ready market ashore for everything”275.

The recent build-up of the Nigerian Coast Guard has had a positive effect, even if it 274 Captain R. VILLAR. Piracy Today. Conway Maritime Press, 1985, pag. 10.

275 Ibid. pag. 16.272

will take years to eradicate piracy from this vast area: the United States Navy, helped

by other nations navies, has started a program to enhance the reaction capabilities

of all countries in the Gulf. As the attacks are continuing both against vessels and

drilling platforms, Spain, who held the Presidency of the EU during the first semester

of 2010, proposed - without results - an anti-piracy operation in that area. In other

zones, instead, piracy is sharply declining, due to the strong actions undertaken by

littoral States, as China in Southern China sea, and Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia

in the Straits of Malacca.

What worries about the resurgence of piracy in Africa is the ample availability of

means for the pirates, especially in the Horn of Africa: it is not any more an artisanal

endeavor only, with young criminals going to sea on board of small craft directly

from the beaches facing their villages. As the global income of the pirates has

reached an annual amount which is double than the State budget of Puntland, many

groups are now provided with large ships, who station in the most crowded zones of

the Indian ocean, and put rubber boats in the water, ready to attack a passing vessel:

on February 6, 2011, for instance, one of these “Mother Ships” was captured 100

miles off the Indian coast, and on February 9 another vessel has been captured.

These attacks show that now the whole of Indian ocean has become a dangerous

zone.

It would therefore be naïve to discount that piracy in Africa is not politically

273

sponsored, as it hinders international maritime trade, the primary source of wealth

of Western countries. It must be acknowledged that the objective was well chosen,

as now the majority of vessels harbors a “Flag of Convenience”: the Western ship-

owners, to maximize profits, have in fact chosen to inscribe their vessels in the

maritime registries of nations such as Liberia, Panama, Bahamas and the Marshall

Islands.

As these countries could not protect the vessels formally belonging to them, the

pirates had no opposition to face, at least initially, and the ship-owners found more

convenient to pay ransom than to invoke help from their parent nations, being

aware of the precedent of 1987, when President REAGAN subordinated the

protection of US-owned oilers, during the war between Iraq and Iran, to their

“Reflagging”.

The main victim of piracy in the Horn of Africa is now Egypt, because the number

of transits through the Suez Canal is seriously dwindling: as the insurance companies

have increased the premiums for vessels entering the Gulf of Aden, bound to the

Red sea, many ship-owners have decided that it was convenient to use the longer

route, off the Cape of Good Hope, and have acquired larger vessels to this scope.

All in all, piracy has become a convenient way to hit the Western nations’

economies, and therefore it is to be considered that the interests of a number of

groups, especially in the Muslim world, are well served by this resurgence of an old

274

criminal activity.

Proxy Wars

The exploitation of ongoing insurgency struggles has already been discussed, in a

previous chapter, and now we have seen how terrorism and piracy serve the same

purpose, i.e. to use somebody else to hit and weaken an enemy without being

caught red-handed.

In the Muslim world, in fact, many young people are available to become

“Volunteers” for the Holy Cause: foreign fighters were found in Chechnya and in

Bosnia, during the wars which plagued these countries, and it is at least prudent to

consider that this form of activity might continue, against the Western nations,

especially as our nations are reluctant to exert strong pressures against the

principals.

We can therefore expect that, should the Western nations be involved in further

operations overseas in Muslim areas, in Asia as well as in Africa, many opposition

fighters might come from all around the Islamic Galaxy, to complicate our tasks. But

the main problem is which relation must the West have with the suspected

principals: the first symptom of our governments’ willingness to take action against

them was evident when the list of “Rogue States” was published, during the

Presidency of George W. BUSH, and Senator MANSFIELD commented that one State

was missing, and he mentioned Saudi Arabia.275

As a scholar has noted, “the Saudis had every reason to look on the United States

with warmth and gratitude – not only for having rescued them from SADDAM, but

for having worked wonders at constructing the worldwide industrial system whose

reliance on oil had made the Saudis rich. And yet, warmth and gratitude seemed to

play a surprisingly modest role in Saudi policies. On the contrary, the Saudi elite

went on subsidizing all kinds of medieval-style Islamic academies around the world,

where the students were instructed to despise the United States, not just passively.

The Saudis, too, according to their government website, paid for Palestinian suicides,

though at the more frugal rate of $5,000 per martyr”276.

A similar discontent is growing among Western nations toward Pakistan. Needless

to say, that nation suffers from endemic problems, as the historical settlers hate the

former Indian Muslims who migrated there in 1948, and have held power over them

since the outset of the new State; also, one half of the Pashtun ethnicity lives

divided from their Afghan similes, since the DURAND line cut the its homeland

between two States, across the ridge of the mountains including the Khyber Pass;

finally, the south-western portion of the country is inhabited by another ethnicity,

the Beluci, who are spread among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Eastern Iran. Pakistan is

therefore a most fragile State.

The appeal of extolling the common religion, as the only way to achieve an

adequate cohesion among all these groups, has always been great, to the extent that 276 P. BERMAN. Page 13.

276

some rulers of the recent past introduced the Sharia, to become the nation’s main

law. The diffidence toward Pakistan has led US Congress to block financial aids

several times, not to mention the embargo on weapons, imposed notwithstanding

Pakistani commitment in the struggle against the Taliban in the mountain region of

Waziristan. Last but not least, the US are not lifting a high import tax on cotton

artifacts, the main production of that country.

Summing up, Western nations are becoming sick and tired of this kind of attrition

warfare waged against them, and are seeking the appropriate measures to check

these not-so-hidden adversaries.

Underlying disputes

The main aspect of the Muslim Galaxy is its inherent lack of cohesiveness, and

the high number of bitter disputes, leading to violent clashes and bombings of rival

ethnicities. A brief recall of the most significant is required, to better understand this

troubled part of the human race.

The most violent clash takes place, since centuries, between the Sunni and Shiite

communities, where they live together, as in Iraq, Lebanon and in the island of

Bahrain. In the latter case, for instance, Saudi Arabia has deployed troops to quell

the Shiite riots against their Sunni ruler, for fear that Iran might exploit the instability

to claim, once again, the island, as it did in 1972. Looking at all numerous bombings

which have plagued Iraq, during the last years, it might be noted that they took 277

place mostly in areas inhabited by Shiites, who therefore suffered a huge number of

casualties.

Finally, Iranian insistence about its nuclear capabilities cannot be considered

separately from the fact that Pakistan – a Sunni country – has already a nuclear

deterrent, and has built a huge port, thanks to Chinese support, at Gwadar, just

beyond the frontier with Iran, in the area inhabited by the Beluchi ethnic group,

settled all around, in Pakistan, in Iran and in the southernmost part of Afghanistan.

As this group of people, after some years of guerrilla, has reached an agreement

with the government of Islamabad, Teheran fear for a penetration of Pakistani in

under-populated Eastern Iran is strong, and it was confirmed by the stern diplomatic

protest against the construction of this port, which has both military and commercial

piers.

Even Anatolia is not free from troubles, as the Kurd problem is always present:

during WWI the Kurds were exploited by the Porte to subdue Armenians, and they

committed so many massacres that they were denied the right to build a nation of

their own, by the winning powers in 1919. Their struggle for independence is still

ongoing, though, and involves Turkey, Iraq as well as Iran, where the Kurds are

settled. The issue is further complicated by the uneasy relations between Turkey and

Iraq, especially after Ankara built a dam on the Euphrates river, thus depriving Iraq of

part of its much indispensable water supply.

278

Conclusions

Given this situation, how can the Western country conceive a “Strategy of

relationships” with the Islamic Galaxy, so rich in oil, with a high elitist culture and a

strong sense of history, so socially stratified, and so profoundly split? Three historical

dangers should be avoided: first comes our indifference, as our public opinions want

oil at a cheap price and no immigrants from that part of the world; then comes the

need to avert implosions, as they send splinters all around the world – as it is

happening in North Africa, Last but not the least, tough direct confrontation are the

worst danger, as it is the only way to unite it and, even in case of our victory, would

humiliate the losers, who will seek revenge for decades.

In spite of what fundamentalists say, the common people in the Muslim countries

see the Western world as a place where quality of life and dignity of individuals are

higher; this is not due to any government’s propaganda, rather to the media,

satellite TV and INTERNET. It is true that most often media send also messages which

are injurious to these populations, thus incensing a lot of Muslims – and

transforming our strong point often in a boomerang - but the simple fact that the

number of those who seek better life conditions to the point of risking a trip by sea,

on board of small boats, is on the rise is a powerful indicator of how we are looked

at.

Our principal weakness is our “Superiority Complex” which led our ancestors to

279

humiliate the Islamic nations, like imposing a supervision of their acts of government

in the past or telling them that they are not versed in the art of “Good Governance”;

this might be true in many cases, and history provides us with a lot of instances, but

it must not be said openly to the concerned leaders, as this might spoil relations

which might be essential to us. Besides, as our public debts show, we are not that

superior to them in good governance!

Another mistake is to fight them violently, each time our key economic interests

are at stake. To foster these interests in the past, thus preserving our wealth, our

nations have sometimes carried out massacres or wrongdoings which have not been

neither forgotten nor forgiven, in that part of the world. In fact, while we say “it’s

history” to imply that issues belonging to the past are not relevant any more, people

in the Islamic Galaxy look at the Crusades as if they had happened yesterday, even if

– as always – their memory is selective, as they underplay the significance of what

they did (and still do) to us!

Focused collaboration projects, in the sectors which these countries want to

develop, in a context of profound substantial respect – but also formal, as they are

extremely attentive to the forms – are the only solution to cool down the

temperature of relations, reduce animosity and co-opt the young generations, who

might become our best allies or our worst enemies. Our problem is that we do not

take enough care of keeping good relations with them, as we are substantially

280

indifferent to their fate.

For instance, European nations are blocking the Egyptian project of flooding the

Depression of Qattara, an initiative which could multiply the cultivable surface of

that nation. At the same time, we all are looking with preoccupation at the revolts

against MUBARAK, as if we bore no responsibility for unemployment and rise of food

prices in Egypt. Similar considerations could be made on other Muslim countries,

where upheavals are on the rise.

Another mistake would be to react irrationally to each provocation, through use

of excessive force: as these actions are often carried out by minority groups, a

selective retaliation or – better – a set of asymmetrical measures would be more

effective to paralyze the perpetrators: there are enough social components, in the

Islamic Galaxy, which are strongly against extremists, to react on our own!

To conclude, in dealing with them, we must remember what a writer has said,

about the difference of habits: “in the West we do have our own customs and

traditions, some of which are perfectly horrible. The world is full of exotic things; but

not every exotic thing is a foreign thing”277. Not all in the Islamic Galaxy is bad and

ridiculous. We must be able to make clear what runs against our morale, like stoning

women, and respect at the same time the other traditions and habits.

More importantly, we must encourage political systems in the Muslim Galaxy to

277 P. BERMAN, page 21.281

evolve peacefully, by being patient toward them, by helping the governments to

spread education and by carrying out an effective aid policy, based on well-defined

development and instruction projects: look for instance the difference between the

upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia – where the level of instruction is higher – on one

side, and those in Libya, where the middle class is smaller: in the latter country the

degree of violence has been incommensurably higher.

Therefore, there is a lot to do, to foster good relations with them, to keep their

internecine differences and hatreds under control, and to establish a good degree of

cooperation. As there will always be some “spoilers” of this process, especially those

dreaming of a Muslim unity of intents, the only remedy is patience, steadiness and

respect with them.

CHAPTER NINE

THE “BRIC” AND THE STRATEGY OF COMPETITION

Introduction

The growing economic difficulties experienced by the USA, by Japan as well as by

282

many European countries have greatly reduced the wealth gap which existed until

few decades ago between them and other countries in the world; the fact that some

among them have been able to improve their economy, so to reach the formers in

terms of GDP, has de facto led again – after more than one century – to a multi-polar

world, as these new actors have started playing the world power game, exactly as

their more experienced similes.

Unfortunately, the fact that these countries have reached our dwindling GDPs

does not mean that they are real powers; rather, they are “would be” lions with clay

feet, hampered by their uneven and fragile growth and plagued by century-old

problems: the risk is that they might attempt to strengthen their internal cohesion

by taking strong and potentially self-destructing initiatives against an “external

enemy”, more or less as Argentina did in 1982.

These countries, which are now considered main actors in world affairs, are

known with the acronym of BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China. A brief summary

of their recent evolution and their strategies is important to understand which are

their aims and which objectives they pursue, in order to allow understanding how to

deal with them, in order to fulfill NATO and EU aims, as indicated in their Strategic

Concepts – which are a fair representation of our collective goals.

A Declining Russia?

During its last years, the Soviet Union tried desperately, with increasingly less 283

success, to keep its “Superpower” status, notwithstanding the deepening crisis of its

economy, due in part to excessive military expenditures, but also because it was

“stagnant and structured for the needs of the 1930s, when steel production was the

measure of economic to power. Also, the Soviets discovered that the revolutionary

movements they had helped gaining power, had simply become weak anti-Western

States, needing economic assistance, (something) the Soviets could not afford to

provide. Therefore, when GORBACHEV took power in March 1985, he faced a failing

foreign politics, as well as a failed economy”278.

The only ways to restore economy, without recurring to war, would have been

Kremlin recourse “to commerce, to credits and to technology, which only the

international system could provide. However, a Soviet foreign policy which

challenged so clearly the interests of economic giants as Japan, United States and

China deepened its isolation”279, until its final collapse came, due to internal dissent,

separatism and her allies’ profound dissatisfaction – indeed deeply rooted anger -

for Moscow overbearing attitude, during the previous decades.

In short, the Soviet Union had pursued an overambitious strategy, as compared to

its available means, and the implosion of Warsaw Pact first and of Soviet State itself

were the logical consequence of this mistake. It took several years, for Russia, to

278 C. RICE. The Evolution of Soviet Grand Strategy. In Grand Strategies in War and Peace, edited by P. KENNEDY. Ed.Yale University Press, 1991, page 160.

279 Ibid.284

reach a sufficient degree of stability, at the price of painful territorial losses and

drastic economic reforms, before it could be able to have normal relations with the

outer world.

Even if, as Professor Condoleeza RICE stated, “a deductive creation is always

dangerous”280, some directing lines and trends of Russian Grand Strategy are

becoming clear, little by little, and it is worth considering them. First, Kremlin leaders

are conscious that Cold War was lost, and wounded pride is a feeling which shows

through all Russian international relations. This a fact to be kept in mind whenever

dealing with them, as they behave still in accordance with what Chairman

BREZNHEV said once, as they do “not allow anyone to speak to Russia in terms of

ultimatum or force”, a phrase which is still influencing the attitude of the Kremlin

toward the outer world.

Russian leaders also know that their military instrument is in shatters – and the

periodical disasters, as the foundering of the submarine Kursk, confirm their pitiful

condition – and they use it with prudence, either for shows of force or to act against

small neighboring States; even that way, the defects of the material are so evident,

so frequent and fully visible, that Western press has problems in avoiding to

emphasize them. The Kremlin is therefore attempting to upgrade it, one component

at a time, and for this reason the Russian leaders seek Western cooperation,

alternatively with NATO and with CSDP, when relations with the former become 280 Ibid. pag. 157.

285

tense.

Russian top priority, though, is to guarantee her population a less “Spartan”

quality of life, and therefore Moscow cannot notably increase military expenditures,

due to the risk of falling again into the same quagmire experienced in the 1980s. The

reason for this policy of re-distribution of wealth is the rapidly dwindling population,

which has fallen from 160 million people to 120; this worrying trend does not show

any sign of abatement, to such an extent that forecasts indicate that in few decades

it might reach 80 million. To reverse this trend, Russia needs Western technology to

exploit the vast resources of its “Deep Freezer”, i.e. Siberia.

This region, though, has already a number of ghost towns, as its population has

the maximum reduction rate; the risk for Moscow is therefore to lose this region, a

vast depository of precious raw materials and gas, to the benefit of its previous

owner, over-populated China, which is encouraging migration there in massive

numbers, to replace the Russian insufficient workforce: recent figures indicate that

in Siberia there are already 7 million Chinese legal immigrants, and an unknown

number of others!

For reasons of pride, Russia initially tried to negotiate with International

Organizations at the same level, as her leaders did not want to be treated as simple

Partners. This has caused difficulties for some time, especially with the EU: for

instance, it proved impossible to arrange a Peace Operation in Trans-Dnistrja, as the

286

Russians wanted a double chain of command, with a Russian general at the same

level as the EU operational commander, something EU could not accept. Only

recently, Russia has accepted to participate as a partner country like all others to an

EU operation in Chad, by sending 4 heavy helicopters.

The official reason for this Russian rapprochement to CSDP, as stated in 2007 by is

Chief of Defense, is the need to learn Peacekeeping rules and procedures, as the

Russian services have only the experience of “classic wars”, without any limitation to

the use of force. The same reason was formally provided for the Russian

participation to NATO Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, in the Mediterranean sea.

In fact, Russian oscillation between NATO and EU/CSDP indicates a strategy of

selective rapprochement to the West, indispensable to allow Russian economic

recovery, very much dependent on Western technology: for instance, without

Western extraction technology, no Siberian gas would reach the markets! Therefore,

when relations with NATO become difficult, due to the excess of rhetoric by Moscow,

she gets closer to EU, in order to avoid find itself cornered.

Western attitude toward Russia is characterized by patience: the topics of dissent

are kept isolated from the general friendly context, and when major cooperation

programs are frozen, due to the heating of the debate, more numerous albeit

smaller projects – which involve young Russian officials - are brought forward.

This recurring problem of rhetoric from Moscow is mostly due to the public 287

opinion’s hyper-sensitivity to many issues, as wounded pride is not widespread only

among the Kremlin leaders, but is rather common also among Russian laymen. The

Western countries, therefore, pay a lot of attention to prevent this lingering feeling

from becoming too strong.

What disturbs most the Western countries are, first, the never-ending habit of

spying also friends, a legacy of the suspicion typical of the old Soviet Union times, as

well as the fear of not being capable to fill the “Technology Gap” with the West, and

second, Russian overbearing way to deal with her former subjects and allies, now

independent countries and NATO members, thus exciting their over-reactions, as

they all have a number of old grievances, due to how Moscow mishandled relations

with them, by keeping them in submission, through use of brute force.

The most interesting feature of present Russia’s strategy is how the leaders

sought to minimize the effects of its loss of military power. They concentrated forces

in areas of primary concern, by stationing the major units of the fleet in the Arctic

region and in the Black sea – apart from a relatively small contingent in the bases of

the Pacific area – and the Army close to the southern areas, where crises are

endemic.

This indicates which are the strategic priorities of that nation: first, the possibility

of further exploiting Arctic sea resources and of using more intensively the North-

Eastern passage are seen by the Kremlin as the sectors which should allow greater

288

wealth and therefore the return to a “Super-power status”. Also, Arctic waters are

essential to “Deterrence” toward the other nations of the northern hemisphere,

even if the nuclear capabilities of Russia are nowadays a small fraction of what

existed in the past.

Also the relevance to Russia of the Black sea has grown, as compared to the past,

because it is the only remaining access to the “warm waters”, where international

maritime trade flows. This area, too, has become key for the distribution to

international markets of fossil fuels, an activity Moscow cannot leave to other

competitors; as it is also the most unstable periphery of the Russian Federation,

naval and land forces are needed both to guarantee commerce and to keep a

position of regional supremacy there, lest other littoral states might take decisions

damaging her interests.

Last but not least, the Pacific arena has not disappeared from the list of priorities,

as Russia needs access to this ocean and intends to be part of the “strategic

equation” of the Far East, where many disputes exist, thus influencing events there.

The underlying tension among the big players, i.e. Japan, China and India, offers

several opportunities to Russia to play the game of intervening in favor of one or the

other, thus gaining from these disputes, should they become harsher than they are

at present.

China. The resurrected Lion

289

When studying China, it is possible to note, like in the case of all nations with a

long and troubled history, that she has to deal with a number of recurring problems

and issues, mostly due to her geography, which exerts a strong influence both on her

standing in the world arena, and on the living conditions of her population,

especially in times of hardships.

The first problem is the temptation of a split or, worse, fragmentation, due to lack

of internal cohesion, often felt by some parts of the population. The last time it has

happened, albeit for short periods, was during the XX century, and it might happen

again, as the various part of China are divided by conflicting interests. The split

during the early Republican period and the later Warlords were not, therefore,

operations carried on in a vacuum, as these initiatives were fulfilling the aspirations

of their fellow citizens, in the region they lived in.

Needless to say, this trend, when manifest, has often been encouraged by

Western nations, with a rationale very close to what MAHAN said that “it is scarcely

desirable that so vast a proportion of mankind as the Chinese constitute should be

animated by but one spirit and moved as a single man. If not a diversity of

governments, at the least a strong antagonism of parties, embodying opposite

conceptions of national policy, is to be hoped, as conducive to the healthful balance

of herself and of other countries”281.

281 A. T. MAHAN. The Problem of Asia. Ed. Little Brown & Co. 1900, page 103.290

Others, instead, see differently this trend, which is showing up in the disputes

between the various parts of China, most notably the recent “Rice War” between

Guangdong – the region of Canton – and Hunan, as “the consequences for China, for

the whole of Asia and for the West itself would be terrifying”282. They consider, in

fact, China as a big stabilizing factor in the troubled Asian scene, as well as a sort of

dam stemming the Islamic wave, and therefore they fear a continent without leading

nation, where all sorts of disputes might arise. Apart from the likelihood of such an

event, there is no doubt that the leaders in Peking know that this risk is real, and are

strongly conditioned by it.

The periphery of China, though, has lived under different regimes and is not that

happy to feel the iron fist of Peking: Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, Sinkiang, Aksai

Chin, Arunachal Pradesh and Taiwan, as well as the small enclaves of Macao and

Hong Kong are quite restless under the centralized Chinese power and they resent

the massive migration of Chinese people from over-populated coastal regions,

carried on or sponsored by the central government to “normalize” their countries.

The second problem, something nobody in the West likes to tackle, is the issue

of China’s “natural borders”, especially – but not exclusively – in the interior. One

thing is worrying, though: the leaders in Peking seem feeling that their nation’s

borders are those which were in force during the Imperial Period, and the same

applies to former China’s vassal states, as Korea, Burma and Indochina, now 282 LIMES 1/95. Editoriale, pag. 8.

291

considered by Peking leaders to be part of their zone of influence. The “Mental

Map” of Chinese leadership, i.e. “the mappable ideas and special consciousness and

sensitivity are a critical variable”283, is quite different from ours, especially as they are

history-minded people!

The third problem is China’s lack of energy resources, in adequate quantities to

foster a higher quality of its populations’ life: this has led Peking to carry on a

number of contentious initiatives, in sea areas where the seabed is rich of oil and

gas, as the creeping militarization of some islands in the Spratley and Paracel

archipelago, claimed also by Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines; the same

applies to the islets of Senkaku/Diaouyutai, considered by Japan as being part of the

Ryu Kyu chain of island – former Chinese possessions snatched away in 1896,

through the Shimonoseki Treaty. The attempts to strengthen China’s foothold in the

interior are precluding, instead, any chance of getting more resources from the

center of the continent.

The fourth problem is the huge population of China, in fact the root cause of this

apparent expansionism; historically, the excess of population can either be placed in

other territories or provided with good living conditions, lest instability and unrest

might weaken the country, as it did during the last 140 years. If you consider that,

even if China’s GDP might equal the US figure, the same amount of wealth will have

to be divided by one point two billion people, versus the 300 millions of US citizens, 283 J. R. HOLMES and T. YOSHIHARA. Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge Series, 2008, page 105.

292

it will be apparent to you that in any case China will be unable to ensure similar

standards of life as in the USA.

What is even more worrying is that, due to birth control policies, in China there is

an excess of 60 million males: this is an additional instability factor, which was

tackled in the past by sending workers overseas, as in the USA, to build the Trans-

American railway, or in France during WWI, and now leads to the migration process

toward Siberia or the inner regions of the country, another recipe for tensions, as we

have seen.

On this subject, some Chinese thinkers “advocated a deliberate move to develop

a robust continental strategy to avoid the pitfall of entanglement to China’s east, (as)

a Eurasian orientation is safer for its foreign policy than a Pacific one, (apart from

preventing) Western countries monopolizing the central Asian energy market with

its huge potential ”284. China, though, is already at odds with the states of the region,

due to its heavy-handed policy toward its minorities, of Central Asian origin, along its

western periphery.

As not all Chinese belong to the same ethnic group, and there is about 20 million

Muslims in the country, especially in Sinkiang, this minority is most irritated by the

“invasion” of Chinese masses from the coast, and recent upheavals have confirmed

this high level of tension. Naturally, as these Muslims belong to the same ethnic

284 J. R. HOLMES and T. YOSHIHARA. Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century. Routledge Series, 2008, page 45.293

groups of some Central Asian states, the latter feel obliged to support their similes

living beyond the border, by providing them with money and weapons. To hope

building pipelines connecting these countries with China would mean for Peking to

forsake its policy of settling as many people in the interior as possible.

All these internal problems explain why China has kept, in the last decades, a

relatively moderate attitude, by attempting to keep almost all the disputes with

neighbors below the threshold of conflict; the war of 1962 with India, the never-

ending tension with Taiwan and the subtle subversion policy toward Nepal and

easternmost India are, though, symptoms that Peking is often skirting the flashpoint

level in its actions, and should her leaders feel strong enough, they might become

imprudent.

The biggest advantage factor for the West is our technology: to get it, China is

compelled to be amicable toward us, lest her development might stop, with serious

risks of an implosion; the same applies to relations with Russia, whose military might

is still superior, as the frontier clashes in the 1970s have shown. Therefore, China is

unlikely to openly challenge neither us nor Moscow, at least in the medium term –

and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization performs this moderating role.

The same does not apply to others, even if the recent talks with India might show

a positive development in the long-lasting struggle between the two nations: India in

fact holds the keys of the maritime trade across the Indian ocean, and her

294

collaboration is essential to ensure the continued economic growth of China.

Nonetheless, a number of issues are outstanding, as bones of contention

between the two countries, both on land – control of the Himalaya and Hindu Kush

mountain chains, the sources of all major Asian rivers – and at sea, mostly in the

Indian ocean through which Persian Gulf oil reaches China. To this subject, Chinese

Defense Minister CHI HAOTIAN has been very clear in denying Indian primacy in that

ocean, by saying that it “is not the ocean of India”285; to ensure a sufficient control in

case of tension, China has implemented a strategy promptly dubbed “The String of

Pearls”, the building at her own expenses of a number of harbors in Pakistan, Burma,

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and in the Maldives, thus surrounding the Indian sub-

continent.

Another area where China has come to terms with the West is Africa, where

Peking initially started a tough competition game, only to suffer from the same

violent reactions by the locals as Western countries have suffered; now China sees

herself as our “good partner” in that continent, and does not try too hard to snatch

positions of privilege, beyond what she has already achieved.

According to the majority of analysts, China pursues four strategic objectives: first

comes the goal of “maintaining at any cost internal stability, thanks to an accelerated

economic development and a growing need for energy, mineral and agricultural

285 G. S. KHURANA, pag. 5.295

resources, including Brazilian soya”286.

The second is the intent to “cooperate, not to compete, with the United States, in

a relationship of mutual respect and avoiding to be seen in a subordinate or servile

position, also to satisfy national pride, to consolidate the power of the Chinese

Communist Party (PCC) and to dissuade the USA, Japan, Russia and India from

exerting pressures to influence Chinese policy, thus forcing Peking to forsake her

interests, her dignity and her objectives”287; to this extent, the huge money reserves

and the significant investments on US public debt are an effective tool.

The third strategic objective is to “support the development of the countries

belonging to the Asia-Pacific system, through treaties of friendship and cooperation

agreements, as well as by establishing free exchange areas, as it is being done with

ASEAN, Chili and Peru”288. It reminds what the Japanese preached during WWII,

about the “Co-prosperity Zone”, a future full of riches for the Asiatic people, once

they would have rid themselves of the Western dominance: instead, Japan imposed

its own rule with an iron fist, enslaving other Asian countries.

“The fourth fundamental strategic interest is reunification with Taiwan, a vital

objective for Chinese pride. China had lost the island to Japan after the 1894-96 war,

had retrieved it at the end of WWII, only to lose it again in 1949, when the remnants

286 C. JEAN. Sviluppo Economico e Strategico della Cina. Ed. FrancoAngeli, 2008, pag. 34.

287 Ibid. pagg. 34-35.

288 Ibid. pag. 35.296

of the Kuomingtang (KMG) army, led by CHIANG KAI-SHEK, withdrew there, after

being defeated in the mainland”289. Taiwan is also considered to be the pivot of the

Chinese “First line of Offshore Defense”, and its possession might strengthen China’s

strategic posture in the Pacific, something Western countries might not wish to

allow.

Summing up, “China’s strategy attempts to keep a balance among the competing

priorities of national economic development, and to support the kind of security

environment which will enable such a development”290. Under this perspective, the

accelerated development of her naval forces, more appropriate for acting in the

lower portion of the spectrum of conflicts, must be seen as Chinese willingness to

protect what has been achieved so far, and to make further progresses, albeit

without “rocking the boat” of international relations too much. However, China’s

statements about her defensive posture are quite worrying, as in the case of her

declared “Inner Defensive Line” which runs along the outer rims of the sea basins all

around that nation: in fact, this line runs across a number of countries, from Japan to

Indonesia, who are not that pleased about it.

Planet India

Among all emerging powers, India is the youngest nation, in spite of her millenary

history and her old and multi-faceted civilization. She was, in fact, dominated by 289 Ibid. pag. 36.

290 OFFICE of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE. Military Power of thePeople’s Republic of China, 2009, pag. 1.297

Muslim dons, the Moghuls, for centuries, then became the object of the French-

British dispute, during the second half of the XVIII century, until the latter prevailed

and controlled the sub-continent for more than one century; at the end of WWII,

she was rushed into independence by an impoverished Great Britain, exhausted by

the war against Germany and willing to free herself from her colonial empire,

marred by numberless riots and upheavals.

Indian freedom was not exempt from another bloodbath, as Independence Day,

August 15, 1947, saw also the partition of the sub-continent in two nations, India

and Pakistan – the latter being a product of the political vision of Ali JINNAH, to

provide the Muslims with their own national identity - with a consequent two-way

mass migrations and a significant number of bloodsheds, whenever two masses of

immigrants came into contact. Notwithstanding this massive flow of people, still now

there are in India as many Muslims as in Pakistan. The difficult relations between the

two countries, which led to three wars a number of minor clashes and an to an area

of permanent confrontation, Kashmir, are the legacy of that troubled period.

Another cause of bitterness between the two countries has been how India was

able to impose in the 1950s her sovereignty on the princedoms, who had Muslim

rulers over Hindu populations. Since the beginning, New Delhi stated that she

“would have managed the issue. The Princes are ours and we will deal with them”291.

It was not a spic and span affair as it had been stated: the Princes who did not heed 291 P. ZIEGLER. Mountbatten. Ed. Harper &Row, 1986, pag. 405.

298

were crushed by sheer military force, as in the case of Hyderabad and Kashmir, with

the latter ending up split between the two nations, while China has occupied the

northernmost portion of this unfortunate territory. Consider that members of the

BHUTTO family had served for centuries as Ministers of the ruler of Junaghadh, in

the Indian state of Gujarat, to understand how the recent past weights a lot in the

bilateral relations between these countries.

Therefore, the so-called “Indian Union” is still an experiment of a nation built on

the ashes of several potentates, which had lasted for centuries. It is a product both

of British pragmatism and of the vision of a high level leading class, whose first

generation had been forged through years of struggle for independence; the pacifist

idealism of Mahatma GHANDI, the most prominent personality of that period, has

still an influence over the general policy of India, even if – as we will see – his legacy

is being sometimes forgotten, when India behaves as a regional power.

The figures are, in fact, appalling: the nation has very few energy resources, thus

depending upon imported oil from the Persian Gulf, a surface of 3.3 million square

kilometers, with a population of more than one billion people, constantly on the rise

at the pace of 1.38% per year, as birth control techniques have had no effect so far:

this means that each year it would be necessary to find jobs for 15 million more

workers!

Due to the low life expectation, still blocked at 24.9 years, versus the 70 years and

299

more of Western populations, one half of Indians has less than 25 years. This is an

advantage, on one side, as young people “are, by definition, more open to

innovation and better apt to insert themselves into the globalization flow, through a

wider vision of the world”292, but it is also true that this is historically a powerful

factor of internal instability.

The miracle of India is that 65% of the population is literate – a huge leap

forward, as compared to the past - and scientific disciplines are well taught, with the

scope of closing the technology gap with the West; Universities have an yearly

output of about one million graduates, notwithstanding that “63% of Indians live

with three dollars per day, while 18% is absolutely poor”293. In spite of the fact that

poverty is widespread, a situation worsened by the social division in castes, there are

few internal upheavals, to such an extent that - excluding eastern India, where

Maoist guerrilla is present - destabilizing attempts by other nations must recur to

foreign agents, as the Mumbai bombing has shown.

Therefore, the great progresses accomplished have not brought yet the country

to a situation which can be considered stable, to such an extent that some have

coined for India the term of “a Big Poor Power, a contradiction in terms (to indicate

that India) does not fit in the classic geo-politic schemes and that prudence is

292 G. LIZZA. Op. cit. pag. 135

293 Ibid. pag. 132, nota 26.300

needed when speaking with optimism about that country’s future”294. The key

advantage factor, however, is provided by the collective qualities of Indian people,

whose patience, resilience and skills are remarkable.

In the domain of international relations, India has been criticized for her “swing

politics” , especially during the Cold War, but it must be said that she has almost

always been careful enough not to exceed the domain of possible, by going beyond

what her military power and domestic resources allowed. Also, her restraint toward

Pakistan – especially after the latter’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities - and her

prudence toward China, even if New Delhi, by hosting the Dalai Lama in her territory,

holds the keys of stability in Tibet, are remarkable improvements.

Her relations with smaller nations have progressed too, after a number of past

mistakes, due to her leaders’ overbearing attitude, which went so far as prompting

New Delhi to ask them to seek Indian help, in case of problems, before doing so with

others; this statement, promptly dubbed as “Indian Monroe Doctrine”, has

encouraged the small nations concerned to take refuge under China’s umbrella, to

the detriment of India.

India’s military power is on the rise, with an army which has learnt both the

bitter lessons of the 1962 war against China and how to control domestic riots

without excesses, a strong air force and a numerous navy – based on a mix of

294 Ibid. pag. 134.301

Russian and Western technology - able to control the sea lanes of commerce in the

Indian ocean.

The ongoing acquisition of nuclear submarines and large aircraft carriers, though,

shows that for New Delhi the potential enemy to be considered first is China: the

militarization of the Andaman and Nicobar islands, which control the access to the

Straits of Malacca and are sufficiently close to carry on air strikes against Southern

China, as well as the deployment of the major fleet units in the Gulf of Bengal,

confirm this assessment.

On the dark side, there is the risk that the well-deserved Indian national pride

and high self-esteem might lead the nation away from her path of peaceful and non-

violent behavior; these feelings exist since the beginning of that country’s life. As

Prime Minister NEHRU wrote, already in 1954, “if you look into the future, and if

nothing goes wrong – wars and similar events – the obvious fourth country in the

world (after USA, the Soviet Union and China) is India”295.

Also, it is worth noting the subtle game which both China and India are playing,

along the mountain borders between the two countries, to control the sources of

the great rivers of Asia. Initially, both nations did recur to force: China attempted first

to occupy the area of Ladakh, in Kashmir and was partially repelled, only to snatch a

portion of Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, more to the East, and to occupy the district of

295 M.B. ZINGER.The Development of Indian Naval Strategy since 1971. In Contemporary Southern Asia, 1993, pag. 1.302

Aksai Chin.

Since then, fleabites, fait accompli and provocations have been used, as a way to

gain relevant positions along the vast mountain area. India has convinced the small

kingdom of Sikkim to join the Union, while China is supporting the Maoist rebellions

in Nepal – which has been successful – and in the easternmost Indian region, Assam;

India, on her part, has hosted the Dalai Lama and his followers, by placing them

close to the border with Tibet, much to the worries of Peking, especially after the

riots of recent years. If you add the growing tension about the Indian ocean, you will

see that the risk of a clash is not that remote, notwithstanding the periodical

meetings between the respective leaders, ending up in friendly gestures.

India knows she cannot match the growing power of China, and is careful not to

let herself being attracted by the attempts of both USA and Russia to keep her as an

ally in the efforts by those two powers to contain the “yellow peril”. In short, India is

a miracle of acrobatics, in how her leaders manage both the complex domestic

problems and the international relations with her not so peaceful neighbors. For

these reasons, she deserves respect, even if it is not the case of betting on her

stability as a nation.

Power play in South America: the rising star of Brazil

Since the end of the XIX century struggles among them, the South American

nations have taken care, as much as possible, of keeping their contentions below the 303

conflict threshold, notwithstanding the numerous territorial disputes still

unresolved. The most recent clash has occurred in the Western portion of the

continent, between Ecuador and Colombia in 2009, but other territories are claimed

by more than one nation, like the Antofagasta strip, once belonging to Bolivia, some

parts of Patagonia claimed by Chile and Argentina and the still disputed border area

between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, following the war of 1865-1868.

The way to ensure balance in the region, adopted by the Western countries and

most notably by the USA, in the last decades, had been to evenly distribute second-

hand military means and assets to the various countries, so to avoid potentially

dangerous unbalances of power. This system had the additional peculiarity of

keeping all of them in a situation of military inferiority toward the West; the fact that

the economies of these nations were not prosperous enough, and all were suffering

from domestic instability, ensured that, until recent times, none among them were

able to purchase modern assets in quantities large enough to give them a sheer

superiority over the others.

Another aspect which is widespread among South American nations is that some

bitterness exists toward Western countries, among the South American rulers,

mostly due to our past exploitation – sometimes excessive - when they were Spanish

or Portuguese colonies. These nations fought for their independence precisely to

free themselves from what they called a “pillaging” of these resources, and are still

304

looking at us with the fear that we might try to do the same now, albeit under new

forms.

Even if there have been recently few but significant disputes and conflicts against

the West, as the “Lobster War” between Brazil and France in the early 1960s, and

most notably the Falkland conflict of 1982, these events have been a sharp reminder

for us about the enthusiastic popular reaction in favor of these struggles, a symptom

of national pride, but they also showed to the leaders of the region how significant

their military and technological inferiority was. Due to these feelings, even fully

justified pressures exerted by Western non-governmental organizations, as the

media campaign to avoid an excessive exploitation of the Amazon forest, are seen

with some irritation in South America.

In recent years, though, this situation of balance has ceased: the steady growth

of Brazilian economy, fostered by the rich offshore oilfields discovered in its Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ), coupled with the serious impoverishment of other countries in

the region, has led Brazil to take a different attitude toward both its neighbors and

the Western countries. Brazil is still the ninth economy in the world, thus remaining

below countries like United Kingdom and Italy, but its relative economic might, as

compared to other South American nations, is significant.

The largest country in the continent and the fifth in the world, having a surface of

8.5 million square kilometers (3,3 million square miles), Brazil is still under-

305

populated, as its population amounts to “only” 191 million people (24 per square

kilometer), but its economy is in bloom, not only due to the production of coffee,

cane sugar and to the abundant offshore oil resources, but also thanks to its

minerals, like coal, uranium and precious stones, the sale of high quality wood and

the technology of vegetable fuels.

Brazil is also strengthening its military posture and is developing since years its

aviation industry, the only existing in South America. Most remarkable too is the

expansion of the Navy – the second after the first naval program of 1905 – through

the acquisition of key naval assets, as the former French aircraft carrier Foch and

modern submarines, both conventional and (possibly) nuclear; in doing so, it

exploits Western eagerness for business in the domain of armaments, in order to

balance our tottering economies.

The difference with the past tradition of cooperation with the West during both

World Wars is that this time Brazil’s naval build-up appears to be aimed against the

West: in fact, it exploits the lessons learned by Argentina during the Falkland

conflict, as all assets being acquired might be more useful against Western navies

than in other roles. More importantly, this trend, which was only a suspicion until

few years ago, has been recently confirmed by an official document, issued by the

government.

Quite recently, in fact, Brazil has issued a “National Defense Strategy” document,

306

on December 18, 2008, where the national objectives are clearly spelled out, and

they are not all wholly favorable to us. According to some analysts, this document

unveils a “strategic doctrine based on the assumption of a deterrent/repressive role

toward a possible invasion at the expenses of Brazil or friendly nations”296. In fact,

the document is quite clear in extolling the importance of reaching a full national

independence and a regional eminence through possession of sensitive

technologies: not by chance, the first strategic objective mentioned is to overcome

the situation of century-old technological dependence from the West, especially in

the fields of space, cybernetics and nuclear energy.

This shows two features of Brazilian strategy: first, all pressures and interferences

from the West are considered a breach of sovereignty and are therefore to be

repelled, at least in the future; second, the intent of Brazil to “protect” its neighbors

shows a desire of acting as the leading regional power, something those who are the

object of this care might not totally welcome. Quite naturally, analysts speak about

this document as a sort of “Brazilian Monroe Doctrine”, and they are probably not

far from the mark.

Also the build-up of a merchant marine, after decades of neglect, is a significant

strategic decision, as it means that Brazil intends to possess all classic components of

sea power. Shortly before leaving office, President LULA stated: “we need to build

transport vessels to reduce the great deficit we have today. Brazil has undertaken to 296 GIORGERINI-NANI. Almanacco Navale 2010. Ed. Stato Maggiore della Marina 2010, pag. 72.

307

recuperate its naval industry”297.

In short, Brazil is already conscious of his leading role in the region, and is taking a

number of measures which are apparently aimed at reducing, if not minimizing,

Western influence in South America, at least in the medium term. It remains to be

seen how the other countries in the region will react, even if their dependence from

its wealth is a powerful factor to have them heeding to its influence.

Conclusions

From this inevitably short account on how the emerging powers of BRIC are acting in

the world arena, one aspect is common to all among them, in particular the wish to

reduce Western predominance. They are not all attempting to cause a split between

USA and Europe, apart from Russia – with a notable lack of success, in this case – but

they are rather keen to minimize the opportunities for Western world to exert too

much influence on them.

However, these nations have in common the fact that – with the notable exception

of China, plagued by different problems – they are not really wealthy nations; they

have achieved great results by improving their economies, but they are not yet able

to compete economically with the West. Also, all of them suffer from serious

shortfalls and domestic troubles, so that they appear as giants with clay feet.

All in all, the decline of the West and the rise of these regional powers is an indicator

297 Dichiarazione riportata dall’Agenzia MISNA, 24 novembre 2010.308

that both the “Bi-polar era” and the “US age” are about to disappear: a new form of

international interplay – the “Multi-polar Play”, most similar to what took place

during the XIX century – among several centers of power has become the key

feature of our times. Therefore, we cannot consider any more only the disputes

between these nations and us, but we must take care of knowing well what happens

among them, as a conflict between “third parties” might endanger our populations’

quality of life and damage our “permanent interests”.

While in South America the widespread feelings are increasingly anti-Western,

and only a rebellion by these nations against Brazil’s predominance might bring us

into play again, as in the late XIX century, in Asia there are all possible pre-conditions

for a number of disputes which might degenerate into enmity and conflicts, among

the three powers in that continent.

Therefore, Asia is the place where tensions might easily degenerate into conflicts

among powers – something which seemed to belong to a distant past. The most

serious among them is the dispute between China and India, both on land – to

control the source of Asia big rivers, (Karakorum, Hindu Kush and Tibet) – and at sea.

The Western countries, on their part, are following a strategy of containment and

appeasement, albeit with some differences among them: the United States have

means and willingness to contain Chinese claims over Taiwan, and are increasingly

worried about the Chinese naval arms race, to the point that they are starting to see

309

India as a possible counterweight to Peking. The risk is that the USA might becoming

tired of being promoters of a policy of appeasement in the area, notwithstanding

their decades of efforts in that sense, through a strategy of structured relations, i.e.

a number of regional organizations, like ASEAN, which are useful to dilute the

tensions.

All other Western countries are much behind, in their strategic thinking, as they

have started to think about Asia again only when they were forced to slowly return

to the Indian ocean, to fight piracy in the Horn of Africa, thus filling in part a

longstanding strategic vacuum. They notice the growing tension and they know they

do not have forces enough to interpose between the contenders, nor to force their

will; they are mostly spectators, ready to participate to those initiatives undertaken

by the USA, whose objectives they share.

This situation, in practice, leaves the USA alone in Asia, to carry on a multi-polar

interplay – something which the US is not accustomed to do – notwithstanding

Washington’s declining power. We cannot forget the remark about regional

conflicts, in the European Security Strategy, that “the most practical way to tackle

the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of

regional conflicts”298. The real issue is that, while conflicts among small nations are

easier to tackle, those between emerging world powers are hair-rising in

comparison.298 ESS 2003. Threats, Risks and Challenges.

310

Needless to say, these problems can be resolved only through a coordinated

effort and a common political will: as the European Security Strategy recalled, “in a

world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity

increasingly depend on an effective multi-lateral system”299: only united we will win,

by spreading stability and security around our territories, along the main highways

of commerce and among new powers, often too prone to use force against

competitors.

299 ESS 2003. Strategic Objectives.311