Wedin autá tà ísa - Phaedo

αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα and the Argument at "Phaedo" 74b7-c5Author(s): Michael V. WedinReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1977), pp. 191-205Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182017 .Accessed: 05/04/2012 10:23

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ocusx Ira and the Argumentat Phaedo 74b 7-cS MICHAEL V. WEDIN

At Phaedo 74 b 7-c 5 Plato provides a crisp but tricky argument for the non-identity of forms with sensible particulars. Although it occurs only as a small part of an extensive argument for the

celebrated thesis that knowledge is recollection, recent commentary on the part approaches in quantity and surpasses in controversy that devoted to the main argument.' This paper offers an interpretation of Phaedo 74 b 7-c 5 which is completely novel and avoids a number of difficulties facing its competitors.

The passage itself is deceptive in its brevity: Do not then (T 1) equal stones and sticks sometimes [?vL'Wr], while remaining the same, appear on the one hand to be equal but on the other hand to be unequal [TC ,w tam cacouVE'Tt, 'ry

Certainly. But, now (T2) have the equals themselves [oit>o& rm' 'a}cx ever seemed to you [o] unequal; or (T 2 a) equality [~ Eao'ri] in- equality? No, never [oua etcor'0o], Socrates. Therefore, (T 3) they are not the same, these equal things [riJol r' tax] and the-equal-itself [mu',6 T0 'aov].

What is troublesome about the passage is more easily said than solved. On the one hand, Plato seems to want an argument that proceeds straightforwardly from the principle of identity:

1. All sensible equals sometimes have a certain property P. 2. The-equal-itself never has P.

Therefore, 3. The-equal-itself is different from any sensible equal.

On the other hand, this obviously valid argument is not the one Plato actually gives. For in view of T 2 and T 2 a the argument must be cast as follows:

1'. All sensible equals sometimes have P. 2'. (i) The equals themselves never have P & (ii) Equality never

seems to be inequality. I This is evident from the bibliography listed at the end of the paper. I shall give references by author's name and page number only, including where neces- sary an opus number in brackets.

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From 1' and 2' is said to follow 3'. The-equal-itself is different from any sensible equal.

While 3' is clearly the desired conclusion, how it is gotten is any- thing but transparent. Indeed, as it stands, argument (1')-(3') is in- valid unless (i) or (ii) has an interpretation making it valid. Since (1') and (i) share at least the predicate P, suppose we start there.

Commentary has been extremely generous here. The oldest sug- gestion is Olympiodorus' that "mu'o' O'C tacx" refers not to the form the- equal-itself [oT*6 0' tCao] but to the several thoughts or mental rep- resentations of the form in various persons' minds.2 Presumably, Olympiodorus reasoned that the form could appear sometimes equal, sometimes not, only if its mental representation could vary from mind to mind or occasion to occasion of thought. Thus (i) is held to deny this by saying that such mental representations [the auo' xx taa] are all the same [tax. Unfortunately, the suggestion makes nonsense of T 2 which requires that the equals themselves at no time appear unequal to even one person. This is clearly the impact of "GoL" at 74 c 1.3

Besides this how could Phaedo possibly report on the equality of his and, say, Socrates' mental representation of the form? For these reasons at least the ancient interpretation must be abandoned.

A second suggestion is that Plato understands by "ax&r& 'Ta ocx" the so-called intermediates or mathematical equals.4 Apart from the risk of even attributing such a doctrine to Plato, the suggestion fails completely to advance the argument. For it now proves, at most, the difference of sensible from mathematical equals or requires that the form 'oro T6 '0aov be a mathematical entity. But the latter contradicts the very doctrine that inspired the suggestion, namely, that the mathematical entities comprise an intermediate class between sen- sible particulars and forms. Moreover, it would be inappropriate for Plato to here introduce a peculiarly mathematical notion of equality, for the argument is part of a larger proof concerning the general

2Olympiodorus, p. 159, 11. 12-15. Wagner, p. 124, adopts the view and at- tributes it to Stallbaum as well. 3 Geddes, p. 57, also notes this difficulty but proceeds to offer an equally dif- ficult interpretation: that "Om&ck TX facx" is plural because "referring to more than one application of the one standard of comparison, atus'r r6 taov." For, now, "oV8eTo" at 74 c 3 is rendered inexplicable. ' Burnet, Notes, p. 56, inspired this suggestion, which Bluck [1], p. 67, n. 3, and Hackforth [2], p. 69, n. 2, adopt, by pointing to Euclid's mention of autr t&

tao in his first general axiom.

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distinction of forms from particulars and the relation of this distinction to the doctrine of recollection. Accordingly, use of the sample form omu,6 ' tcov must suit the general conclusion of the main argument. But this is lost in the appeal to the special notion of mathematical equals.5

A related and prima facie more promising suggestion is that the expression "oaus& ro tam" describes the class of perfectly equal things.6

Je may presume the class to include the so-called mathematical equals as well as anything else falling under the heading "perfectly equal." On the assumption that the form auTotro' TEaov is one such item, (3') would follow from (1') and (2'). However, this suggestion saves validity at the risk of plausibility. For either the supposed class con- tains sensible particulars or not. If the former, then (1') is obviously false. So we are apparently barred from thinking of two rods perfectly equal in height or even perfectly equal in all respects as two (XUt Ca t&ao or perfectly equal things. But then it is unclear what manner of thing these perfect equals are and unlikely that Plato countenanced their existence at all. An interesting and, I believe, so far unnoticed point is that the argument would still go through on this interpretation, if we suppose that the class of perfect equals has but one member, the form aoi,t6 ro' taov. But it is rather unlikely that Plato reasoned in this fashion and, in any event, the possibility is effectively taken up in what has become the received interpretation of (i). So let us turn to it.

The currently accepted interpretation is enviably straightforward. It asserts simply that "a&''ciz ' tsao" refers to the form auTo 6 t aov. Thus, (i) has the form of 2 after all and the argument goes through smoothly. Due lately to Geach7 and modified by Vlastos,8 there are

1$ Brown, p. 32, on the other hand, follows Burnet without commitment to intermediate or mathematical entities, by reading "oc',' r tao& " as "things equal by definition" which in turn designates the-equal-itself. Aside from the question how the form can be equal by definition and yet not be self-predicative (an advantage Brown claims for his view), there is much besides the form that is equal by definition in Euclid's sense and, so, much else that is proven different from sensible equals. This may also have a restrictive effect on the argument, unless we allow that for any form F there is an analogous construction which can be read "things F by definition." * Among the representatives of this view are Doederlein, cited in Archer-Hind, p. 37, and Ross, p. 22. 7 Geach, pp. 269-70. 8 Vlastos, pp. 288-89 and "Additional Note," p. 291.

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earlier anticipations in Heindorf and Archer-Hind.9 While restoring validity to the argument, the suggestion requires explanation how, contrary to appearances, the plural "omuc& o t&ao" is a referrng ex- pression for the individual form mur6 '6 taov. Geach ties usage to theory, arguing that if we construe forms as standards, then (on analogy with the Standard Pound) a relational form such as aiJ6 'r6 taov must consist of two perfectly equal entities. Thus, Plato is held to employ the plural "ocosc T's tam" construction to display just this fact. Left unclear is whether and how a single such entity could serve as standard for equality of height as well as equality of weight, etc., let alone for geometric, arithmetic, and ethical equality. Indeed, on analogy with the Standard Pound, one might expect different standards for each sort of equality. At any rate Geach's theory, however suggestive, has engendered sufficient controversy'0 to make desirable an interpretation of "a&ta& dm tac" free from such doctrinal commitment.

Vlastos argues for the unusual form designating role of "muxTa o'c tac" not from the demands of theory but from the facts of Greek usage. Defense of the view is usually two-part: first, the assertion that Plato's argument is valid only if "uwa 'xa tam" names the form the- equal-itself and, second, the marshalling of texts to validate this prima facie unusual use. Before turing to the first part of the defense, I should like to consider, and challenge, its textual credentials.

I do not propose to examine every passage summoned in defense of the view, for it is the general form of the defense that concerns me. What is confirmed in each case is the grammatical fact that Greek permits use of the plural neuter adjective plus article to refer to the corresponding abstract entity. Vlastos, noting that "&xc L &xat," as well as "'r6 8LXOLOv" and "8LxmLocnDv," may refer to the form justice, concludes that "'the equals' then as an alternate for 'the equal' would be good idiomatic usage, and this would be one reason why Plato could slip into it."" But notice that what is defended here is

* See Archer-Hind, p. 37. By Geddes' report, p. 57, Ast seems to have held this view as well. In addition to Geach and Vlastos, its proponents now include Owen, Tarrant, Mills, Rist, Dorter, Haynes, Brentlinger, Crombie, Loriaux, Ackrill, and Verdenius. 10 See, for instance, Owen tl], p. 306, n. 1, and [2], p. 114-15, and Vlastos, p. 289 and "Additional Note," p. 291. Bluck and Rist also counter Geach's theory while Mills is inclined to defend it. 11 Vlastos, p. 289.

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the move from "`a taov" to "TM tac" not, as required, the move from "e-6 taov" or even "m&'6 'r6 taov" to "xc&&co' ta&x." Presumably, how- ever, this is remedied by the observation that if the plural neuter "'r& tam" may refer to the form m6'r '6 taov, so may its intensive "auzoi&

tact." Thus, from the use of "0 'rp L&" (Phaedo 104 a 4, e 5 & 8) and "so& 'ploc" (Phaedo 104 c 1, e 3) to designate the form threeness, Rist argues "if 'r spLo&c' and '"r& spE' are names for one and the same Threeness, there is no reason why '" tsa6,n' and ''v&& r'a tact' should not be the names of the same Equality.'312

This defense of the form-designating role of "r& 'r&c Dac" is, how- ever, subject to challenge. For unless the interchangeability of '"%

taov" and "ovr& s'o tsao" is established, it follows only that " r6 taov" and "a tcac" may name the same form, the-equal-itself. It is certain that the required interchangeability is not shown in Phaedo 104 and equally certain that "roc tacx" does not function in Phaedo 74 a-c as a form designator. In each occurrence there "'%i taoc" refers to sensible equals. Thus, on this point at least, the defense fails. Given the ab- sence in Greek of a singular neuter form for "three", it is unsurprising that ",c s'p(cm" and "soc tact" behave differently,'3 and so, unlikely that Phaedo 104 shows anything more than the interchangeability of "7

La6'rI" and "sno taov." Interestingly enough, the latter occurs fre- quently in Phaedo 74a-c and always as a form designator. Thus, what was presented as good internal evidence for "cus'a 'TX tac" naming the form muo& 'o taov turns out not to be evidence at all. We may then follow Vlastos' account of "'ra" + plural adjective con- structions but deny its extension to "aucr' 'ra' + plural adjective constructions. Indeed, the extension becomes less plausible the more frequent the use of such "sc" constructions. For Plato uses the "ctu'a ca" construction but twice; "cd 'wro'c tac" in the Phaedo and

CUT a' 6TXLotm [v 64.oLm] at Parmenides 129 b 1-2. It is surely implau- sible that such nonstandard Greek be merely a paraphrase of standard Greek. An independent account would be desirable.

Most commentators begin with the Parmenides' "cti' rm, 6sLoca." I shall, however, first offer an interpretation of "a'u r&T t ac" and later argue its extension to "mu'r&c rc& 684Lo." At the start at least, it is safest to assume that, in general, method rather than madness underlies unusual usage. Accordingly, two facts about our passage deserve

12 Rist, pp. 29-30. 18 For this reason plural expressions such as " 'x& r& 8&xox" (Cratylus, 432 a-c) and "ot&r& rhiTva" (Theaetetus, 196 a) are not obviously relevant to the inter- pretation of "fac& e& tz."

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special attention. The first concerns Plato's language and the second the dual nature of the argument's second premise (2'). By my count 74 a 9-75 d 5 contains nine occurrences of "rop 'aov" and six occurrences of "ocui6 x'o taov." 74 a 11-12 makes clear that the expressions are interchangeable; so the form aoci'o Z6 taov is mentioned on at least fifteen occasions. At least eight times "-co' toaa" or a variant occurs, each time in reference to sensible equals. In this light, one remarkable fact about the passage is the appearance once, and once only, of "atu'aoc Iratam" and "' laor," at 74 c 1 in the argument's second prem- ise. Notice incidentally that if Plato thought "xoc& 'TM tacx" well- suited to emphasize the relational nature of the form ur'o '6 taov, it is puzzling that he uses it with almost zero frequency and then not at 74 a where he is at pains to make absolutely clear that he is talking about the form the-equal-itself but at 74 c 1 in the argument. Since the argument does not depend on whether the form is conceived as a relational entity, why introduce a premise asserting this? Further, if "7 la6'n-" is also a form-designating expression, then one of (i) or (ii) is redundant (assuming, what is not obvious, that "'La6Tr-*" and

"ta" are interchangeable predicates). Although not affecting the argument's validity, this considerably tarnishes its elegance. (2') then, is conspicuously deliberate in formulation and, accordingly, it would be desirable to show (i) and (ii) working independently in the argument.

Since (2') obviously must be read in connection with the first prem- ise, let us begin there. Clear enough is that Plato wants to assert in (T 1) something which holds for particulars but not forms. But exactly what is not clear. First, the Greek "XxFo Fidv ta(cx 'rF ' oi" is ambiguous. Read with "aot," it suggests that sensible equals seem to one person equal, to another unequal; read with "''gLvaoCt," that sensible equals seem equal in one respect but not in another or, pos- sibly, equal to one thing but not to another. Combining these with decision on the scope of "sometimes" ["vt'ors"] at 74 b 8 yields the following as possible first premises.

1.1 If x & y are sensible equals, then (a) x & y remain the same & (b) sometimes x & y seem equal in

point of F but unequal in point of G.

1.1' If x & y are sensible equals, then (a) x & y remain the same & (b.1) sometimes x & y seem

equal in point of F & (b.2) sometimes x & y seem un-

equal in point of G. 196

1.2 If x & y are sensible equals, then (a) x & y remain the same & (b.3) sometimes x & y seem [to z]

equal in point of F but [to u] unequal in point of F.

1.2' If x & y are sensible equals, then (a) x & y remain the same & (b.4) sometimes x & y seem [to z]

equal in point of F & (b.5) sometimes x & y seem [to u3

unequal in point of F.

1.3 If x & y are sensible equals, then & (a) x & y remain the same & (b.6) sometimes x & y seem equal

to one thing but unequal to another.

1.3' If x & y are sensible equals, then (a) x & y remain the same & (b.7) sometimes x & y seem equal

to one thing & (b.8) sometimes x & y seem equal

to another thing.

(1.3) or (1.3'), essentially the interpretation offered by Murphy,14 has the disadvantage of requiring (i) to assert that the equals them- selves never seem unequal to anything and so, presumably, equal to everything.'5 Since this surely cannot be what Plato intends in (i) no matter what oicz& t& taoc are, the interpretation must be discarded. Attention to the scope of "sometimes" is crucial to (1.2) and (1.2').16 (1.2) is tenable only if z and u are different, otherwise it is a contradic- tion. (1.2'), on the other hand, labors under no such restriction: Two rods may sometimes seem equal to me, sometimes not, but not sometimes both. Thus, in point of generality, (1.2') is preferable. It is further recommended as the more natural counter to (i)'s assertion that the equals themselves never seem unequal to even one person. Strictly, (1.2) would require (i) to mention pairs, at least, of persons. Decision between (1.2') and (1.1) or (1.1')17 is less straightforward. 14 Murphy, p. 111, n. 1. 16 MiUs' attempt, [2], p. 51 ff., to neutralize the objection, due originally to Hackforth [1], p. 159, does not seem to me successful. 16 The (1.2)-(1.2') distinction is unappreciated by most of the view's proponents, among whom are Geddes, p. 57; Burnet, Notes, p. 56; Brentlinger, p. 127; Wagner, p. 124; Dorter, pp. 203-207. Mills holds that it is the usual inter- pretation but thinks Murphy's can also be made acceptable. 17 Haynes and Owen [1], p. 306, n. 2, favor (1.1) or (1.1'). A similar interpretation was suggested to Mills by C. Garton.

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Nonetheless, (a) more naturally accompanies (b. 4) and (b. 5) because of suggesting that someone might reasonably explain the differing appearances of x and y by supposing them to have changed. The supposition is quite appropriate where apparent change in one and the same property is concerned. It is, however, curiously irrelevant where something appears equal in one respect but not in another. Moreover, the dative "aor" at 74 c 1 fits best with (1.2') and suggests, quite appropriately, that the first premise and thus the argument turns solely on the perceptual status of x & y.18 (1.2') is then an empirically tinged premise. We may take it to claim that, either in fact or in principle, (b. 4) and (b. 5) hold for any pair of sensible, that is perceptible, equals. Thus, (1.2') is true just because x & y are sensible entities.

This last point also provides the clue to interpretation of "axu' Ta'

tam" in (i). Suppose someone confronted with a case satisfying (b. 4) and (b. 5). One likely response is that one or both members of the specimen pair have changed so as to be no longer equal. (a) is thus included by Plato to rule out this rather obvious possibility. But con- sider another and less obvious response. Ortcutt, say, may reply that x & y have not changed, that is, have not gained or lost any properties but that a certain property had by one or the other has itself changed. Thus the sometimes differing appearances of x & y would not be due merely to the fact that they are sensible entities but to peculiar behavior on the part of their properties. I suggest that (i) means to rule out this possibility. "a)ro& sa 'ao" is accordingly to be read in (i): "The prop- erties themselves that are equal never seem unequal to anyone." The intensive formulation can now be explained straightforwardly as directing attention to what about x and y seems equal (since they themselves are different) and the plural by the fact that judged equal are two properties, a property in x and a property in y. If x and y appear equal in height, say 5'10", then the height property in x

"8 Owen [1], p. 306, n. 2, objects that, despite grammatical considerations, (1.2') would turn on relativity of perceptions. Lurking here, presumably, is the objection that, so read, the first premise is limited by its dependence on certain facts of perception. To my mind this recommends (1.2') since it figures in an argument directed explicitly to the distinction between items which can be perceived and items which cannot. Qualms about limitation are relieved by giving "sometimes" a modal force and construing it as "possibly." I am in sympathy with Dorter's criticism that (1.1) - (1.1') does not reflect the main argument's concern to deny that the form the-equal-itself cannot be wholly empirical.

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(being 5'10" tall) will seem equal to that in y (also, being 5'10" tall). When, without changing, they appear unequal in height, no one thinks that the property being 5'10" tall has become another property, say, being 5'7" tall. Rather, one of x or y simply appears to have a dif- ferent height property. Thus the sometimes unequal appearance of sensible equals is due not to metaphysical mischief but simply to their status as sensible items.

Appropriate at this point is the question whether Plato recognizes such properties as the-height-in-x. The answer is that he does and, rather conveniently, in the Phaedo itself. At 102 d greatness itself [oU,6 'Z6 [Ayeoq] is contrasted with the greatness in us [,r6 ?V 7?tV jigyeloq] and the opposite itself with the opposite in us. Parmenides 130 b adds similarity itself and the similarity in us. So Plato apparently countenances three sorts of entities: forms, particulars, and the imma- nent properties particulars have by participation in forms. Important for us are two points regarding immanent properties. The first is their immutability. A given immanent property I may cease to exist or belong to a given particular but I itself cannot change. Nor can two equal immanent properties themselves change so as to be unequal. The parallel here with our interpretation of (i) is obvious. Merely suppose the incomplete "taoc" of "acu'Tx ra tsaa" satisfied by expressions for immanent properties and read (i) accordingly as "The equal immanent properties themselves never seem unequal to anyone." This is unex- ceptionable Greek as well as an unexceptionable claim.

(ii) is still to be dealt with and the remainder of the argument explained. Earlier I suggested that use of "E ra6'r" at this point only in the entire stretch of dialogue 74 a 9-75 d 5 was conspicuously deliberate and called for an explanation. In particular it was not ob- vious that it designated the form, since that resulted in the redundancy of at least (i) or (ii) on most interpretations. Let us suppose then that "' ta6'sn" designates not the form the-equal-itself but a property corresponding to the form. This property will characterize or be in sets of things, here in oUxx 'so tace or the sets of immanent properties men- tioned in (i). Thus m Eao&sn itself is an immanent property. At this point Ortcutt surfaces, sensing his last chance to stave off the argu- ment's conclusion. He suggests that the explanation of (b. 4) and (b. 5) is neither the status of x and y as sensible entities nor change in the properties themselves alleged to be equal (he has been argued down on this) but rather in what counts as equality. What counted as equality in (b. 4) counts as inequality in (b. 5). It is as if in a given case

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the relation of identity itself has become another relation without change in the relata. But, of course, as before this is inadmissible. (ii) guarantees that a given instance of the property equality can change in its own right no more than a given immanent property. Thus, after all, the only explanation of (b. 4) and (b. 5) is the status of x and y as sensible entities and (i) and (ii) serve to drive that point home.'

A final benefactor of this interpretation is the argument's validity. This is best seen by considering the second of the two promised points regarding immanent properties. Where I is an immanent property of the form I*, x has I if, and only if, x participates in I*. It follows that change in an immanent property itself entails change in the corresponding form.20 Given this, (ii) is a sufficient condition for denying that the form xv's4 r6 taov sometimes seems equal, some- times not. For the form could appear so to someone only if the im- manent property equality could as well. But the latter is ruled out by (ii). Thus, (3') does follow validly from (1'), (2', i), and (2', ii).

Since I have so far considered the argument at Phaedo 74 b 7-c 5 independently of its surroundings, it is appropriate to conclude with some remarks on the relation between this and the main argument concerning recollection. For the partial argument must be consistent with and ought to make some contribution to the main argument's conclusion that inspection of sensible particulars is not sufficient for acquiring knowledge of forms. It is often supposed that 74 b 7-c 5 is an argument for the existence of forms. While this interpretation makes the partial argument's contribution obvious and important, it is ultimately untenable. For the existence of forms is unproblematically

19 While Bluck also interprets "au'xoc ' tax" in terms of the Phaedo's &v iLv properties, he thinks it designates the immanent properties of the form rather than the immanent properties that are themselves equal. But since the im- manent property of the form is (as in (ii) on our interpretation) a single property holding of sets of things, there is not (as (i) requires) a plurality of objects which on no single occasion seem to even one person unequal. In any case, our interpretation gives a better explanation of the distinct but related roles (i) and (ii) play in the argument. 20 This entailment, which is of obvious importance to my thesis, has textual basis at Phaedo 103 b 4-5: ". .. the -opposite-itself [ou&r6 t vocvrtov] could never be opposite to itself, neither the opposite in us [&6v F [LZv] nor the opposite in nature [.L6 &v 'f 9UaeL]." Implied here is that change in a6'r6 'r 1 would follow change in T6 &v i,tZv O. Thus ,if, as here argued, the latter is interchangeable with ocr 'r& 1D, then change in ouw' r6 D would follow change in Ou&C '& O.

It is worth noting the quite rare use here of the "ouxtr6 t6 41" formula to designate immanent properties.

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asserted earlier at 74 a 9-b 1 and the intervening speech 74 b 2-7, which concentrates solely on knowledge of forms, gives no cause to think that Plato is suddenly returning to that assertion by way of a sup- porting argument. What 74 b 2-7 does suggest is that the partial argu- ment has something to do with how we get knowledge of forms. In this light I want to try out the following suggestion. Plato is interested not merely in the difference between forms and sensible particulars but in an aspect of that difference which explains why knowledge of forms cannot derive from knowledge of particulars. So regarded the partial argument will fit neatly with the main argument's conclusion that inspection of sensible particulars cannot yield knowledge of forms. Now, obviously, were (3) false, knowledge of forms would be available from inspection of sensible particulars and the thesis of recollection would be unnecessary. It is thus in point for Plato to argue that the form the-equal-itself is different from equal sensible particulars. And the ground of this conclusion consists in just the sort of facts about sensible particulars given in premise (1.2'). Indeed Plato may have supposed that were sensible experience not untrustworthy in this sense, then the sort of knowledge one gets through recollection might be derivable from sensible particulars after all. Having argued against this, he can proceed at 74 c 7-10 to award sensible particulars a quasi- causal role2l in the acquisition of knowledge of forms without threat to their non-empirical status or to the doctrine of recollection. Inspection of sensible particulars can prompt recollection of forms, indeed, without constraint on which sensibles may do the prompting. Thus, inspection of equal or unequal sensibles could prompt recollection of the form the-equal-itself. However, the recollecting, not the inspecting, is responsible for acquisition of knowledge of the form.

The partial argument is, then, obviously at home in the larger argu- ment. Still it is worth asking whether any aspects of my interpretation of Phaedo 74 b 7-c 5 seem implausible in the wider context of the main argument. In particular, I have in mind two reservations that might be directed at my use of the notion of an immanent property in the inter- pretation of (2'). The first is this. The main argument makes clear that forms are the premier objects of knowledge for Plato. Such knowledge is presupposed by so much as the thought that sensible particulars

21 I say sensible particulars are awarded a quasi-causal role because the account of how sensibles prompt recollection of forms involves more than their merely causing such recollection. On this, see Ackrill's suggestive comments in [1].

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'fall short' of the forms they instantiate (74 d 4-75 a 4) and is even held acquired prior to any sensory experience whatever (75 b 4-9). Now presumably one who grasps the partial argument (1') - (3') will also grasp that sensible equals 'fall short' of the form. But, then, runs the reservation, doesn't mention of immanent properties in (2') render forms otiose? Immanent properties, like forms, are immutably what they are and so seem to satisfy Plato's criteria for status as objects of knowledge. Consequently, forms would not be required for knowledge and, thus, introduction of immanent properties seems awkward in an argument which says they are so required. But, of course, immutability is only one criterion objects of knowledge must satisfy. Eternality is another and one which immanent properties flatly fail to satisfy. For they are, to paraphrase Plato, the sort of thing that may withdraw or, more strongly, cease to exist.22 Thus commitment to immutability does not guarantee immanent properties status as objects of knowledge.

The second reservation is whether construing ocCutr a' taoc as equal immanent properties can be squared with the claim that sensible equals 'fall short' of the-equal-itself. One might doubt so on the grounds that where x has the immanent property I, x does not 'fall short' of the corresponding form I* just because the immanent property is as immutable in nature as the form. But the immutability of immanent properties is independent of the question whether particular Is 'fall short' of the form I*. For my interpretation of "ou-t &a taca" requires sameness only of the immanent properties, say I1 and I2, which dif- ferent particulars have by participation in the single form I*. The immanent properties themselves must be of the same grade but need not be of the same grade as the form.23 So on this point also mention

"I 103 a 1-2. 23 In fact, the immutability of immanent particulars is independent of most interpretations given to the notion of 'falling short'. It is, for instance, indepen- dent of Gosling's suggestion, p. 160, that sensible equals 'fall short' because they are not unchanging, eternal, etc. It is also independent of a view suggested by the partial argument, namely, that sensible equals 'fall short' because, unlike the form, they sometimes seem equal and sometimes not. Interpreting "a&6& x'& fat" in terms of immanent particulars is troublesome only if one denies that two particulars may be exactly alike. But this is no disadvantage, since, other things equal, there seems no reason whatever to suppose sensible particulars in- capable of exact similarity in given respects. It is certainly possible that x and y be exactly equal in, say, height or weight. Thus, two things exactly alike relative to a given property might be said to 'fall short' of the form just because their

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of immanent properties in (2') is quite consistent with the substance of the main argument.24

The interpretation here offered of Phaedo 74 b 7-c 5 has, then, the following advantages. It provides a valid argument without sacrifice to the subtlety of Plato's usage, it avoids difficulties facing competing interpretations, it appeals to no doctrines or notions outside of the Phaedo, and it is happily compatible with the main argument of which it is a part.25

Let me close by noting, finally, how my interpretation of "atux& '&

tsaa" fits the occurrence of "ocvc c'T 6p?oLm" at Parmenides 129 b 1-3. Plato there says he would be astonished not if similar things were shown to be dissimilar but if x&Jar&' 6suotc were shown to be Mv66optL. Since this occurs in a stretch of dialogue where Plato also says the same about the form, Mills objects that it would be intolerably odd to construe aioa& T'x 4o6La as anything other than the form. But con-

relevant immanent properties also 'fall short' of the form. On the other hand, we may deny that immanent properties 'fall short' of the form on the grounds that both are nothing other than what they are. So while both the-beautiful- itself and its immanent properties are nothing other than beautiful, beautiful particulars are much else besides. In this way they might be said to 'fall short' of the form, not by having their qualities in some inferior degree. For more on 'falling short' see Gosling and Ackrill [1], pp. 89-91. " The appearance of immanent properties at 74 b 11-c 1 would even be wel- come, if Gulley, pp. 198-99, is correct in holding "&x 'ro6vv kxetvo vvo'aav" at 74 c 6 difficult because its "suggestion of an immediate transition to the world of Forms is inconsistent with everything Plato says elsewhere about how we come to a knowledge of the Forms." Gulley supposes Plato to have assumed, with scanty justification or explanation, that attainment of any conceptual level of apprehension is tantamount to recollection of forms. But Plato's in- clination to accept this equivalence might well be explained (Verdenius, p. 233) by the fact that immanent properties would facilitate just such a direct tran- sition to forms. If so, their mention in the main argument for recollection of forms is hardly cause for concern. 26 The claim that Plato's argument can be given a valid interpretation is subject to the following qualification. It is a well known fact that the principle of non- identity of discernibles may not be used legitimately in certain contexts. In particular it cannot always be used in belief contexts. Since Plato's argument employs an epistemic property ("appearing ..."), is it irreparable after all? I think not. For it is also well known that substitutivity is permissible even in epistemic contexts so long as we restrict ourselves to standard names or neces- sarily true ways of referring to objects. So if Plato thinks of names as standard names, this difficulty could be met. While I would argue that Plato (and Aristotle for that matter) do regard names in this manner, here is not the place to follow the complexities of that argument.

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text only requires some connection between aovt t& 6,uoLa and the avowedly immutable character of forms. Our interpretation provides the connection: Where the immanent properties are vulnerable to change, so are the corresponding forms. Thus, the two occurrences in Plato of the unusual "a'Ta da" + plural neuter adjective construc- tion need not be form designating occurrences, neither for the validity of Plato's argument in the Phaedo nor for the coherence of his exposition in the Parmenides.26

University of California at Davis

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