Water Entitlement Issues in South Punjab

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ENTITLEMENT ISSUES OF IRRIGATION WATER

IN SOUTH PUNJAB

AmjAd NAzeer

Damaan Development organization (DDO)

September 2012

(Islamabad)

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Content: Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………….………3 I - Introduction and objectives of the research…………………………………………………….8 Rationale for the baseline study………………………………………………………………....8 The Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………...9 Scope of the study and sampling……………………………………………………………….....9 Indicators to assess the situation……………………………………………………….……….10 Theoretical framework…………………………………………………………………..…………..11 II – Historical context………………………………………………………………………………….13 III - The present state of irrigation and agriculture in Pakistan……………...………………..18 IV – Unpacking the Problems on ground….………….…………………………………………...21 Bureaucratic Lanes and Alleys……………………………………………………….………….21 Distribution, Warabandi and Insufficiency……………………………………………….…….28 Waste and waterlogging…………………………………………………………………………..35 Water theft……………………………………………………………………………………………36 Vows of tenants and tailenders…………………………………………………………………..42 Conflicts around distribution and access……………………………………………...………44 Water Charges, Abyana or Moamla…………………………………………………..…………46 Using the used water……………………………………………………………………..………..48 National Water Policy and irrigation water…………………………………………………….48 Women farmers and entitlement to water…………………………………………….………..50 Water users associations…………………………………………………………….……...……51 V – Much needed reforms in policy and practices…………………………………………..…..53 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………….58 Annexure I………………………………………………………………………………...…………….60 Annexure II………………………………………………………………………………...……………62 Annexure III……………………………………………………………………………………………..64 Annexure IV……………………………………………………………………………………………

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Executive Summary

Primary research in three districts of South Punjab i.e. Khanewal, Lodhran and Vehari form the

basis of water entitlement issues and analysis in this study. Where appropriate, however,

secondary literature has also been corroborated to validate data on ground.

By and large, authoritarian state control is evident in the distribution and management of canal

water. Like the rest of the province an extensive network of canals, rajbahs and watercourses

operates in South Punjab. But irrigation water despite being a vital commodity is transferred as

concession or obligation not as users’ or farmers’ right. Availability, access and distribution is

highly skewed and inequitable between head-end and tail-end, big and small and rich and poor

farmers. Insufficiency and shortfall is compensated by pumping groundwater that is salinizing

and water logging huge tracts of land. Pesticides and fertilizers further poison ground water

adding to deficit productivity.

Traces of colonial maneuverability and instrumentality still dominate the system and the purpose

of food security and poverty reduction is lost somewhere in the mist of bureaucratic oppression

and monotony. Any shifts or modifications made through time are also identified and

appreciated.

To approach realities on ground, I have employed anthropological approach that ‘water is a total

social phenomenon that cuts and connects people’. Its technical handling and engineering

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solutions fail to promote irrigation and agriculture. Unfortunately, similar attitudes constitute

rules of the game the sector. Information, observation, illustrations and my analysis are placed

in this framework.

Most conflicts circle around tampering the outlets. Department claims of having standard outlets

whit fact flies back straight to its’ face. Tampering, mostly done by powerful landlords, is very

common. Farmers situated at the head reaches usually consume three fourth of available water.

Add tempering and outright theft, some of the tail-enders simply do not receive water or far less

than their allocation. Department officials are usually part to it or at least know. Although the

scarcity of the resource cannot be challenged but many a conflicts emerge from official

mismanagement.

The very mechanism of time, rotation and who will get what amount of water and when that

appears so perfect on paper causes conflicts amongst individual farmers and communities

across the region. Legal and bureaucratic measures fail to arbitrate or do justice. Farmers and

communities use conflicts as a mechanism to seize power in their own hands especially the big

land lords. A range of conflicts between institutions, individuals, communities, clans and

brotheris are seen and heard in the field. Either limited or inadequate system of resolving

conflicts exists with the department. Being multidimensional and complicated, conflicts are

difficult for official system to resolve or arbitrate as the relevant department work virtually in

isolation.

While drawing an analysis, I have also underscored the relevant clauses of the Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Right (ESCR), indicated in its General Comment 15 by the

Committee on the Economic, Social and Agriculture Rights. It clearly delineates irrigations water

as a right of the farmer and stressed the symbiotic relationship of water, ecological balance,

food security and future needs of the rapidly growing population and rural poverty. In case of

Pakistan it is far more significant as its’ populations is growing phenomenally. So is the pace of

poverty and two thirds of its people lives in farmlands.

Water, like any other commodity, is scarce and getting scarcer. Insufficiency, inequity and

uncertainty are strategic issues to deal with. Quantity and quality both are a matter of concern.

Productivity is rapidly falling. Environmental and ecological balance is fatally affected. Using

less to produce more asks for elaborate planning. Effective management and provision is not

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possible unless concerned departments work together. Users and rural communities, their

attitudes and priorities need to be taken into account while planning and policy formulation.

Meant to introduce sustainable use of all sources, National Water Policy 2002 realizes the

problems and challenges of water sector. Under increasing economic and food needs it

acknowledges the problems of shortage, depletion, misuse, theft, contamination, salinity and

mismanagement. It does realize the changing notions of water, the need for comprehensive

planning, institutional framework and the need for strategic action. Despite certain merits, the

policy does not cater for the needs of small and the tail-end farmers and has yet not been

effectively materialized.

Broad spectrum of water sector needs to be integrated with far reaching institutional reforms.

Indigenous varieties of seeds and traditional crops need to be reintroduced that need less water

and can survive with a limited amount of water Allocation of water is too technical and straight

that needs revision for equitable distribution with socially rationality. Irrigation department needs

restructuring – including water cess, rotation, operations and maintenance (O&M) cost and

regulatory mechanism to effectively carry out its’ role. To curb down flood irrigation technique,

small irrigation schemes like check dams, infiltrations galleries, delay action dams, diversion

weirs and others need to be brought into practice.

A cost-effective, people-sensitive, eco-friendly and participatory planning and management are

prerequisite for improvement. Part of the O&M and supervisory responsibilities should be

transferred to farmers associations. Tying it up with O&M cost and minimizing waste there lie a

potential to gradually increase abyana. Entirely a market led solution to reduce waste and

enhance efficiency may not work. It may not support the small and medium range farmers.

Transforming water into a tradable commodity might under-privilege or sweep-away poor

farmers. Unable to bear the taxes, they might sell their lands to big landlords and resort to wage

labour. Therefore alternative and multiple way outs are necessary to abstruse.

***

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Acknowledgements

My immense gratitudes are due to Shoaib Aziz, Programme Manager, Damaan Development

Organization for extending every possible support to bring this study to light. Apart from that, I

must convey my thanks to Malik Ashtar, Mohammad Tahseen, Sher Khan Khichhi and Farooq

Khan (Social Organizers, DDO) to facilitate me in data collection data from select tehsils and

villages. All interviews and Focus Group Discussions were conducted with their kind support.

Their own knowledge and experience about the subject was also helpful to understand the issue

better. Last, but not least I must thank to Wahab Ahmed who drove us through to remote and

kachha-pakka areas in the sizzling heat of South Punjab.

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Pakistan Irrigation Map

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I - Introduction and Objectives of the Research

A limited body of knowledge is readily available on ‘water rights’ and ‘water entitlements’ of the

poor and smallholders in South Punjab. Therefore primary and secondary data, including the

sketchy and disorganized information available with the irrigation department and respective

ministry, has been employed to assess the situation. Information regarding water entitlement,

availability, access, provision, monitoring and regulation has been analyzed. The problems of

warabandi (fixed rotation and turns for water), anomalies, irregularities and associated conflicts

and violence are studied with reference to the observations on ground. Besides farmers’

experiences and perceptions, official perspective has also been given a due space.

Rationale for the Baseline Study: Accessibility and entitlement to the required amount of water has got a direct bearing on

agriculture production, quality and pricing. Assumingly, our poor and small farmers, including

women (the very small number of independent women farmers be noted) have skewed and

discriminatory access to water, the research keeps them in the spotlight. The problem gets

compounded by the land-size, seasonality, varying needs in varying times, erratic pattern of

rains and politically driven inequities and distributions. Therefore knowing the exact situation to

proceed for an improved policy and practice reforms is essential to minimize poverty.

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Looking at user charges, its amount and modalities of collection, and customary allocation also

holds sufficient importance in relationship to water-rights determined by the department.

Associated conflicts will also feature in. Structural and institutional injustices, along with the

living and dead traditions will also be looked into as barriers and enablers to the farmers. An

appraisal of disadvantaged groups, like women, poor and powerless smallholders,

sharecroppers and tenants, is also significant for adequate policy recommendations and

lobbying for improvement.

Exploring some sort of social or customary management of conflicts, identifying newly evolved

institutions or associations for management or efficient usability of water will also come into

play. The role of civil society networks or coalitions will also be taken into account to improve

efficiency and production.

Precisely, the baseline study attempts providing us a threshold to begin with. Where does the

main problem lie? Which policy and practice areas to intervene in? What to lobby for and what

sort of policy reforms are must? What recommendations be extended to the Irrigation

department, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Water Management and

legislators in general? What role the user associations and poor farmers themselves can play?

These are a few questions that the study attempts to answer.

The Methodology: Right methodology and instruments of assessment lead a researcher to the problems in a

trustworthy manner, furthering his way to suitable policy recommendations, improvement in

practices and cultivate the outcomes. Multiple means and tools to approach reliable state of the

affairs are used here to point out institutional and structural inadequacies.

Scope of the Study and Sampling: Its’ area of intervention is three districts of South Punjab i.e. Vehari, Khanewal and Lodhran.

The said research identified and sampled in the smallholders, poor and tenant farmers. Some of

the medium range farmers were brought in fold as the number of very small farmers is quite

limited.

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Influential farmers having a privileged access or entitlement (legitimate or otherwise) are also

considered to have a better picture of inadequacies in mind. Generally open ended questions

have been asked to understand the facilities and impediments around. However the questions

about water scheduling, timing, frequency, size of the land, abyana, tawan etc were kept the

closed ended ones. Oral conversation, generating debate and cross questioning remained key

interviewing tool as most of the interviewees were either non- or semi-literate.

Seeking information from local communities, tail-end farmers were selected from three tehsils of

each district. Informal and random conversation with farmers was also organized to cross check

and finalize the locality and sampling of the small, medium-range and tail-end farmers. A

probability sampling method was broadly employed to ascertain that a reliable percentage of

farmers groups, as outlined above, are studied for the convenience to generalize. A pretesting

of the Questionnaire and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was held to assure that right people

are being spoken to. In depth individual interviews were conducted with more than eight small

farmers. Eight Focus Group Discussions and more than 16 individual interviews were conducted

in all. Each FGD comprised on 25-30 farmers, roughly representing a population of 5000 to

10,000. However the population count as such was avoided to maintain a qualitative thrust

rather than quantitative one.

Indicators to Assess the Situation: Different indicators were identified to assess the truth and unearth their relations in-between.

Some of the variables were already determined and others were located in the field according to

the issue under discussion. For instance, size of the land and land tenancy, production amount,

seasonal yield and income were already determined to contact the right group of respondents,

These variable were co-related with the allocated time, turns, quantity and the source of water.

To establish and ensure a logical connection, the suggested one’s and other relevant indicators,

were adopted during the course of research. Cast, class, political power and their relation to the

access to water were brought in consideration there in field.

To be more specific the schedule of water, seasonal flow of canal, the availability and access of

water, to whom, how and how far official response and its relationship with their production and

well being were marked out as the key indicators to conclude.

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Theoretical Framework: The explorative sojourn begins by looking into the existing body of literature. It helped me,

organizing and prioritizing specific areas of concern and related issues. Insight and depth of the

problem was sought through expert’s opinion. A sound perusal of official archives as well as

independent studies, books, articles and reports - produced by the local and foreign experts -

are taken into consideration. Historical colonial legacy and its remnants and continuity have

been precisely deemed and build upon. Bibliography and references where appropriate are duly

quoted. An overall state of affairs for the province of Punjab is examined while maintaining a

particular focus on South Punjab. Key facts, figures, rules, maps, schedules and statements are

properly inscribed to substantiate a position. Building upon the primary data, already existing

analysis was co-related and where suitable validated to draw analyses and suggest reforms for

improvement.

Theoretical framework operationalized in this research is off authoritarian state control evident in

several other public spheres. Public goods and services are transferred as concession or

obligation not as users’ or citizens’ rights. Canals and distributaries were spread around as

colonial instrument of political control and maneuverability not to secure food or alleviate poverty

as such. Secondly, it also validates the anthropological approach that ‘water is a total social

phenomenon’. Technical treatment and engineering solutions fail to promote agriculture.

Unfortunately, similar attitudes, rules of the game and bureaucratic style continue in our

irrigations sector. Information collected, observations, illustrations and my analysis validate this

position. Any shifts or modifications made through time are also signified.

While drawing an analysis, I shall also underscore the relevant clauses of the Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Right (ESCR), In its general comment 15, the Committee on the

Economic, Social and Agriculture Rights notes the significance of ensuring reliable access to

water for food security in the words, “Attention should be given to ensuring that disadvantaged

and marginalized farmers, including women farmers, have equitable access to water and water

management systems, including sustainable rain harvesting and irrigation technology. Taking

note of the duty in article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, which provides that a people may not

“be deprived of its means of subsistence”, States parties should ensure that there is adequate

access to water for subsistence farming and for securing the livelihoods of indigenous

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peoples1.” Direly opposed to the right to water as advocated by the said covenant, Pakistan

appears to use irrigation water as an instrument of state control.

***

1 UNHCR (1999) http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf

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II - Historical Context

Indus basin is supposed to be one the oldest agriculture planes that gave birth to ancient

civilizations of prominence in the world. The cultivation pattern it followed was driven by ecology

and natural bent of geography. Archaeological traces from Harrapa to Moenjodaro stand

witness to their ingenuity in water management. Present day southern Punjab was and still is

the heartland of Indus river bed. Antique agriculture technology, wells and wheels used to

harness and distribute water, was simple but well coordinated with nature and people’s

attitudes.

Medieval and pre-colonial state – of whatever rudimentary form it was – did develop agriculture

and irrigation channels, canals and embankments for better cultivation without evolving or

involving heavy machinery and elaborate hydraulic bureaucracy. Precisely, it was the agrarian

communities own initiatives as the state sponsorship was occasional and sporadic. Organized

clans, community elders and local artisans adequately assembled and distributed water.

Inundation canals were the distinguished characteristic of pre-colonial irrigation. Shrinking back

in winter, the Indus would impregnate in summer to hose near-by and distant tracts of lands.

Vast areas of Jhang, Muzzaffargarh, Mianwali, Multan and Derajat, still constituting essential

agriculture districts of south Punjab, were irrigated by inundation canals. For instance, more

than 140 km long and 40 km wide plains of Muzzaffargarh were irrigated by the inundation

canals. Wells and wood-fans (jhallars) were also used to supplement and speed up wavering

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currents of streams. Once the monsoon waves retreated, wetness and moisture would help

growing rabi crops. Despite the state’s imperative to collect and inflate its’ revenue direct

intervention was pretty constrained. The system was supervised by the community and tribal

heads. Expansion and desiltation was done by the clans and cultivators to keep the currents

flow and fulfill their needs for plantation. In other words the entitlement to water was awarded in

reciprocation to digging new canals or clearing the old in dry season. Fishing and pastoral

communities would migrate to areas where water was sufficient in supply. Exchange labour was

instrumentalized for periodical migration and settlements and in harvest. Despite irrigating

millions of hectors of land the inundation canals did not cause waterlogging. The same canals

functioned as drainages in winter. Rains and river run-off were aligned with natural flows

rendering it environment friendly2.

By the end of 19th century the British colonial government commenced a new irrigation structure

to accumulate revenue and deepen their control. Scores of weirs, roots and branch canals were

constructed in a decade or two by diverting river to colonize huge tracts of land. Millions of acres

of arid and semi-arid terrains were brought under cultivation besides legal and bureaucratic

formulations. Prompting migration from east to west and south west Punjab, hundreds of new

villages were set up around newly created canals and distributaries. Warabandi – fixed terms

and time to irrigate one’s fields – in place of mutual consent and cooperation, and chackbandi –

settlement of immigrant villages in the lands of indigenous population - was brought in place.

Warabandi, chackbandi and perennial characteristics of canals fiddled with peasants’ attitudes

to orchestrated new tensions and adjustabilities.

New irrigation pattern was maneuvered to settle down and tame migrant bands and predatory

tribes in upper Sindh and Punjab. Hundreds of acres of lands were allotted to the local and tribal

chiefs faithful to the British raj. Thus a landed aristocracy was created within the local

communities in addition to elaborate irrigation bureaucracy. Unlike social arrangement of

inundation channels, communities were pushed aside and parallel to civil administration

extended bureaucratic structure was installed. High ranking engineers sat on top to govern

multiple circles and sections of canals. Arrogant authoritative engineers gradually developed

personal interests and rent-seeking tendencies along with serving the colonial thirst for revenue

2 Mushtaq Gadi (2003) in The politics of managing water, Edited by Kaisar Bangali, SDPI & Oxfaor University Press, Islamabad.

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and political power. In other words, complicated irrigation machinery was put up in place of

commune-driven environment-friendly irrigation management. Quite naturally, traditional

communities resisted warabandi and chackbandi in early 20th century against the strict

bureaucratic control, shortfall of supply and loss of their historical rights over water (Ibid).

Contrary to the ‘civilization project’ as the colonial architects would claim about canalization,

pre-modern categories of caste and brotheris were not only preserved rather institutionalized

and sedimented with extra powers. The irrigation technologies restructured as well as created

another layer of ruling class upon the people already living there3. These castes and tribal

identities are still important in central and South Punjab. More or less the same idea of this

territory being a ‘waste land even a desert without having an expansive and modern irrigation

system’ is still projected by the World Bank and post colonial technocrats now. Economic

growth, industry, so much so the development of metropolitan towns like Multan, Faisalabad

and Lahore are credited to the development of Indus Basin Water System (IBWS).

Meticulously drawing the geo-political and legal analysis of the text of ‘Canal and Drainage Act

1873’, Danish Mustafa (2008) concludes that the purpose of the law was not to facilitate the

users but to strengthen political hegemony of the state in the Indus Basin. Clear overlaps are

seen between the state instruments and canal legislation. The legal rights, for instance, are

heavily tilted towards the governmental control than towards efficient and equitable provision of

water to the farmers. Quoting Blomley (1994) and Chouinard (1994), he argues that “the law

meant to perpetuate and legitimize exploitative and oppressive geographies of social power.

Water law and the state apparatus are inextricably linked in the process of production and

reproduction of socio-spatial patterns of access to resources and the empowerment of certain

social agents in the process.” Despite some legislative efforts for change the law, more or less,

functions in Pakistan with the same tone and tenor.

Clause 8 of the said law was amended in 1952 by the post independence government that dealt

with the marginal compensations to the farmers in case of land degradation, stoppage of supply,

flooding, damage to the water course or any other harm in this connection. Similar provisions in

Clause 9, 10 and 13, setting forth procedures for damage claims, were also repealed by the

3 Mubashir Rizvi (2012) Joy in the wilderness: Millenial irrigation and colonial infrastructure as gift.

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same government in some later amendments. Section 13 even mentioned the time-span for

compensations to be paid to the affectees and that too was changed. Only clause 11 is still out

there indicating abatement of land rent - If leased from the government – upon stoppage of

supply but once again withholding the right to increase back once the supply is reinstated.

Section 32 lays down the authority of the Irrigation Department to hold back water without

explaining why, when and how long the Divisional Canal Officer can stop the supply of water. It

is the prerogative of the state, under the same section, to grant water and hold back not a right

of the user. The clause actually truncates the possibility of farmers using water as their rights.

The permission needs to be renewed from season to season. Technically, it can be withdrawn

too. Of course a complete discontinuation is rarely practiced but the department is authorized to

vary amount of supply from season to season (Ibid).

On the other count the same powers compel farmers to bribe the departmental officials to

secure better supplies. It also prohibits farmers to sublet or sale water save a part of land is

rented out where water supply will naturally go to the tenant but it is excessively the powerful

landlords. Sub-section 32 strictly denies farmers to transform the long-term use of water into a

permanent right to water reinforcing strict governmental control. Hundreds of thousands of

villagers are just water users not the right holders. Discontinuation of supply is rarely to clear silt

or manage deficiency but random and usually to seek bribe4.

Outside Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) the users cannot challenge its

decisions save in a civil court and that too only questions the procedure adopted, not its’

rationality, justification or effect. Almost absolute judicial and executive authority vests with the

department. The right to adjudicate conflicts between individual water users also lies at the

hands of irrigation bureaucracy.

***

4 Danish Mustaf (2008?) Colonial law, contemporary water issues in Pakistan, Department of Geography, University of South Florida, 140 7th Ave South, St Petersburg, USA,

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II - The Present State of Irrigation and Agriculture:

To quell the probability of a peasant revolt and subdue the massive demand for land reforms in

1960s, the so called ‘green revolution’ was introduced in the country. The fashion swept all third

world countries that time. Once again Punjab including south Punjab, happen to be the hub of

the proposed agrarian shift. Hiding the real purpose of integrating local produce to the world

market, the transformation favoured new and water intensive seeds and crop varieties subsiding

indigenous methods and locally suitable yield. Water-hungry and pests-naive high yield varieties

(HYVs) changed the aura of sowing, harvesting and watering the plants. Indigenous seedling

and cropping cycle was swiftly replaced by the vicious circle of capital and corporate greed.

Agro-industry boomed to devour the ‘bumper harvest’ at the cost of food security and sustained

livelihood. The remaining equilibrium with nature and ability of Indus waters was destroyed by

the so to speak miraculous moves in agriculture.

Off all the provinces, Punjab’s agriculture heavily depends on main canals and its’ distributaries.

Above 80% of its water is employed for irrigation purpose and 20% is allocated for domestic and

commercial use. With 60% of its’ population living in rural areas, agriculture in Punjab is said to

make sizeable contribution to the country’s GDP. It engages 44% of the rural labour directly or

indirectly including the rural urban seasonal commuters for industrial labour. Punjab is assumed

18

to be the largest cereal and grocery producing province of the country5. At times, it is prided as

food basket of the country as well.

Canal irrigation bears the responsibility of providing 90% food need of Pakistan. In total the

country’s canals stretch out to 56,000 km, with 12 link canals and 44 command areas or sub-

systems, 3 reservoirs, 19 barrages and 107,000 watercourses spreading over 1.6 million km.

Out of which Punjab comprises on 14 barrages, 23,184 miles of canals commanding over 21

million acres of land, 24 networks of canals with a length of 34,500 km, 2 siphons across rivers,

holding a capacity of 100,000 cusecs of water in all. Interlink canals are supposed to divert

western rivers to the eastern one’s – diverted to Indians under Indus Basin Treaty (IBT)

controlling the barrage supplies. Channelized by barrages and head regulators, main and link

canals receive waters from rivers and distribute it to irrigation fields via 58,000 minors flowing

through extensive networks of water courses6. About 18000 km drainage in addition, flushes out

agriculture effluents into the sea. By and large 60% of the command area falls in Punjab

province with 70% of the irrigated fields of the whole country. Roughly south Punjab should

comprise almost 40% of that.

Average canal diversion in the country is around 105 MAF (million acre feet) with 42 MAF

groundwater extraction and the total irrigation area standing around 36 million acres. Official

estimates claim the potential of bringing 22 million acres of additional land under irrigation. The

system is known to be the largest contiguous irrigation system in the world. Official experts

claim that since 1960s to 2000s the availability of irrigation water has increased from 65 MAF to

135 MAF, almost doubling its capacity in 5 decades. Agriculture growth that our policy makers

keep stressing non-stop, needs at least 2-3% percent extra water every year.

In Arif Hassan’s (2003) words: “ Before the present plans were made in the last one hundred

years irrigation, water supply, and drainage system, however Inadequate or antiquated already

existed. The new systems were (and still are) purely engineering solutions subservient to

5 Unfortunately it is very difficult to find segregated data for south Punjab and in certain cases Punjab as well. Therefore the national and provincial data along with the available information for south Punjab is randomly presented.

6 Irrigation Department, Punjab (2012) See: http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/introduction.aspx

19

sophisticated theories and standards. As such they have proved to be incompatible with the

social and economic conditions of the beneficiaries and also with the economic and managerial

constraints of the government institutions that are supposed to maintain and operate

them”….Due to the factors mentioned above, water plans have caused, and continue to cause,

serious ecological damage, environmental degradation and social fragmentations and alienation

even where they bring about economic benefits. They are also not sustainable in purely

management terms since they require huge funds for operation and maintenance, which are

simply not available.”

Contrary to the pictures of water management painted above, water to Anthropologists needs to

be critically examined as an integrated system not as a fragmented sector managed or

controlled by a bureaucratic set up. In Marcel Mauss’s (2002?) views, water is total social

phenomenon that cuts across all domains of life. It builds and breaks social relation. Traditional

communities perceived it as a symbiotic element of their lives – inseparable from any sphere of

social, political and economic activity.

Minors and distributaries, created by our irrigations system unify less and divide clans and

communities more than ever. Water courses and shares are not awarded on the basis of

technical justice, as claims the department, but in line with historical and political support or

opposition. Structurally unjust and inequitable, commands and circles have been and still are

created with allegiance to power. How cum all the big landlords are located at the head reaches

or in the middle while all the poor and smallholders sit on tail ends. They are allocated special

outlets and water courses. Some of the landlords receive water not only from minors but gulp up

branch canals too.

Distribution of water hinges around the key

outlet from minors, locally known as moga –

taking water down to farms where tampering

gets common and department frequently

maneuvers things for or against certain

farmers.

20

Water politics at farm level begins and ends at minor and mogas. Nakkas (field outlets) are a

technically fixed holes meant to spread water into the fields farmers.

***

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IV – Unpacking the Problems on Ground

Bureaucratic Lanes and Alleys:

In people’s perception and experiences Irrigation Bureaucracy is far stronger than the provincial

government itself. Powerful engineers know that ministers keep coming and going while they

are there to stay for several decades. The perception was directly or indirectly shared by several

farmers in the Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) conducted at more than 6 or 7 tehsils of

Lodhran, Vehari and Khanewal. “Sometimes, Minister for Food and Agriculture”, said one of the

farmers in Vehari, “has to request an appointment to the Secretary Irrigation. He happens to be

such a powerful guy”. They know, that ministers are seasonal hardly surviving even for a single

term in power.

Reflections of Focus Group Discussions in Vehari and Khanewal

22

Apart from availability and accessibility of water, approaching the department is no less than a

Herculean task. Circles and command areas are spread over hundreds of kilometers. Travelling

long distances just to lodge a complaint takes at least one full day on top of the travel and food

expenses, it may incur. For instance the Xen dealing with the supply, stoppage, shortage, theft

or other relevant issues of Lodhran sits at the Thinggi Head Quarter in Vehari District. Some of

the Xens for Vehari are appointed in Pakpattan and others in Multan. People are rarely informed

of the frequent transfers happening in the field. I could easily assess that from appointment and

transfer boards displayed behind the key officers whom I visited. Average stay time of an Xen,

SDO or Divisional Officer rarely exceeds a couple of years. In case of a claim, dispute, damage

or request for an outlet, the complainants have to explain the whole story again to the

incumbent. At times files start rolling back. With the difference of attitudes and tendencies the

same case gets different treatment from different officials. Non literate and poor farmers cannot

think of travelling and approaching a high ranking official. It is also difficult for relatively well off

farmers too because they have to visit the office several times to get a problem solved.

“Whenever an SDO, or overseer moves to another area, straight on he will survey mogas,

minors, and nakkas and will raise number of objections on their size or condition. “This is too big

or oversized or its length or measure is more than the approved size”, will be his usual

objection. Things settle down in a day or so, after an underhand deal is struck with individual

farmers corresponding to the size of land or the strength of the land landlord. “Pilferage and

misappropriation is absolutely in the knowledge of the whole department”. These comments

were made by several participants of the group discussion in the Khanewal tehsil.

A relatively small farmer of Lodhran, Malik Akhtar, spent two years commuting Qutubpur to

follow up his application for the approval of a new nakka in his lands. “I requested patwari

(revenue officer) irrigation”, Malik Akhtar told me. After his signature, took the file for verification

of an SDO based at Thinggi. “Come again this or that date, they would say each time. I kept

visiting accordingly. Finally the file reached to the relevant Xen at least in one and half year. He

signed but then asked me to come back and collect it after one and half month. I told him that I

am an army officer and cannot come back again and again. My leaves are limited. He said that

is the only way out, if you are interested to get your job done”. I said, “Just write it down on my

file”. He refused to do so, offered me a cup of tea and approved the request. On my fourth visit,

23

he told me to be silent for 45 days. Finally, I got the additional nakka created. My neighboring

lanlord complained in Qurubpur but found that the nakka was approved 45 days earlier and

nothing could be done at this point. Actually, I just paid Rs.500 to the reader of SDO and in

Qutubpur I gave Rs.2000 to the clerk of an Xen. “The department, Malik Akhtar said, “knows

both the problems and their solutions too”. But they do not want to solve problems. In fact, it is

the problems that add to their powers. Why would they obliterate them.

The story of a relatively prosperous farmer from Malcy speaks volumes about bureaucratic

control and games underhand. Chaudhary Nazir, the resident of Chack-169 WB owns 100 acres

of land. Sometimes back in 2001, he got a new moga created from Sadhnai-Malcy link canal. By

2006 the moga was closed down. “A moga cannot be carved out of a branch canal; secondly, it

is the 2nd moga within 25 acres, while rules only one in within that size of the land. Both acts are

a breach of law,” was the reason presented by the department. “Everything was done with

department’s approval. Check your record please,” argued the farmer. Respective application

and approval was then deliberately misplaced”, alleges Mr. Nazeer. Obviously the moga was, at

the first place, created by bribing and/or influencing an official whose name he did not disclose.

The same moga was closed in 2002 in response to a complaint but opened again with the

support of a PML(Q) MPA in 2005 and closed back next year. Filling in several forms, spending

enough amount of money and repeatedly commuting Thinggi he got the moga recreated after

five years but in a tricky manner this time. Locals say that he approached Chief Minister for the

purpose. A pipe was passed under the branch canal to approach a rajbah across. In a way,

departmental procedure was fulfilled and at least one rule was abided by, the other of not

allowing 2nd moga within 25 acres was clearly bypassed. But now rajbah’s level is lower than the

moga and water flows to the Chaudhary’s land only if the rajbah spills over. The case illustrates

several contradictions and this is how things move on in the department.

Case Study7: Shaukat Ali Parwaz’s Struggle for the Approval of Pakka Moga: Chack No. 360 WB, UC # 34, Tehsil Dunyapur, District Lodhran: “I am Shaukat Ali Parwaz. I

live in Chack # 360 WB, Tehsil Dunyapur. I own a small piece of land about 5 acre that I

cultivate myself. Despite entitlement, I was unable to receive water from Neeli Bar Canal. Big

land lords of the area are Mian Abdul Aziz and Mian Sharif. The latter owns 550 acres of land.

7 The case study was documented by Malik Ashtar (S.O Damaan) and the author.

24

Diagonally crossing his land, he got two pakka water courses constructed from his own

expenses. For my own square of land (33 – 21/22), I also applied for a pakka moga (outlet) to

SDO through respective tehsildar. When Patwari came to see the site, neighboring landlords

out-rightly opposed the proposal. “Only one moga per twenty five acres is allowed,” they argued.

While the fact is that two mogas are common in 25 acres of land. In case of Mian Sharif there

are 4 mogas in each of his 25 acres.

Anyway the case went back to the SDO. Along with my father we went to see the respective

SDO, while Mian Sharif was also there. Over there, Mian Sharif opposed my application in the

presence of SDO. “If it is illegal, how cum you install 4 in a square?,” I questioned. Listening

that, the SDO’s face went pale. Obviously they were constructed with his approval. Arguing

over, we even exchanged blows. “Not in my office. Go and fight out there. Otherwise, I will not

approve your moga,” said the SDO. Coming outside, I repeated the same argument. You have

got 4 mogas per square, all are illegal. Your water course is also un-approved. I will bulldoze it

in the evening. He went away. In the evening, he sent me a message to reconcile.

Anyway, determined, I approach the patwari again and paid Rs.6000 to him and Rs.2000 to the

department’s clerk in bribe. Submitted my application in Irrigation Department agai at Bangla

Qutubpur. Got the sketch and report of the moga approved from Thinggi (Vehari). It cost me Rs.

17000 to get a legal moga approved. I then waited for 41 days – the duration to appeal against -

and then created the moga myself placing a wooden log there. Except numberdar, Fazal Elahi

every one threatened to beat me up. I disappeared from the site. The people of Mian Sharif,

Mian Aziz and some other stakeholders threatened me and my family members. They also

approached patwari. “I have got a copy of the approved moga”, replied patwari. It is perfectly

legal. “It is over two months that his moga is approved”. They heard in answer in response to

the complaint made at Head Office. Finally, everyone went calm and I got my moga operational.

The present case8 of Moza Khanewal, Moga No. 12809 presents another aspect of

departmental ineffectiveness and lethargy. Moza Khanewal Kohna is situated 3 Kms away from

main Khanewal town.

8 The Case Study was documented with the support of Tahseen Raza (S.O. Damaan) and the author.

25

The area falls in the irrigation and

administrative area of Multan Division.

Traditionally the whole area was dominated by

agricultural activities. With gradual increase of

construction demands, other businesses

propped up where brick-killin factories were

one prominent venture.

Around 7 years back Zamurud Hussain

Landlord and Imdad Hussain Arayen set up

brickkilin industry in partnership wiht another

man.

Khalla in Khanewal where water is taken for brick mortar

They began to dig earth from their own 12 acres land nearby. After years of mining, the land

turned into a massive ditch, that they leveled and began cultivating. By ploughing out soil,

western side of the water course turned weaker. Now, whenever they need water, they just take

a brick out and use it either for their land or for clay to make bricks, sometimes out of their turn

as well.

In response to the complaint conveyed by DDO in favour of those who suffered, the SDO said,

“It is their share of water and they are free to utilize whatever manner they wish to. So far as

stealing water form others share is concerned, it was never reported. We take actions only if a

breach of rule is reported”. The farmers, it was discovered were even not familiar with the

complaint registering mechanisms.

An influential farmer from Malcy (whose name is kept confidential here) told me about the

attempt he made to get his share of water increased from 30 to 50 cusecs about two years ago.

“I approached an MPA of PML–N (name kept confidential) known to me in person and put up

the request to influence Chief Secretary of the Divisional Circle for to increase his share of

water. He urged me to visit his office in Lahore. The farmer, along with a couple of his family

elders, visited him in Lahore as advised by the MPA. Over there, he regretted saying that “all

changes in the water share are banned for the next 5 years. “My apologies, I would have not

caused you inconvenience had I known it earlier”.

26

“My misfortune otherwise there are some farmers, whom I personally know of having got their

share increased through political influence” the farmer said. Very clear the share of water is

changed through political influence other than bribery.

Case Study9: M. Shafique’s Struggle for School’s Water District Lodhran, Chack 358/WB, Tehsil Dunyapur: Neeli Bar, a perennial canal, supplies water to Tehsil Dunyapur,

where the Government Girls School, we are talking about, is situated. Comprising on 22 Kanal

with 3 Kanals covered, the school was constructed as a primary school in 1954. It was

promoted to the Middle in 1972, to Higher in 1987 and to Higher Secondary School level in

2007. For decades the school purchased tubewell water for its plantation that was expensive

and unhelpful for trees and greenery. Anyway, we had few trees and green patches with several

empty spaces in it. For sufficient plants and flowers, better environment and to make its’ look

better it surely needed canal water.

Muhammad Shafique, the School Head Clerk began his struggle to receive canal water in late

2000s. I began requesting neighboring landlords to proportionally contribute from their share of

water to the school where their own girls can study in a better environment. But all refused. One

of them even said, “there are no paddy fields in school that will die out without water”.

Contacting Ziladar, he advised me to fetch several people to him randomly to develop a

collective application on their behalf. I kept fetching more than 20 people turn by turn on my own

bike. The Ziladar would keep seeking individual signature. At some point, a man named Israr

Ahmad, who already disagreed with the idea entered in and while putting his signature on, he

picked up the application and tore it up into pieces. Further on he kept persuading others to not

to provide water to the school.

Now I went to Qutabpur and met an Xen of the area. Convinces, he promised to help me. He

said, just provide me an application and give me some time. After a couple of months or so, he

gave me a call and disclosed the approval of school water. Keep it a top secret for one year in

the area, otherwise you will lose it. I failed to understand it but kept my lips tight. After year I

approached him back. He handed me over a ‘schedule’ explaining school’s turns for water.

They fixed a nakka (outlet) and School began receiving water. He then explained me that share

holders can challenge some one share of water for multiple periods within to court to seek stay

9 The Case Study was documented by Malik Ashtar (S.O, DDO) and the Author.

27

order or even declare it illegal. But after a year, the term for petitioning gets over and the act no

longer remains challengeable. By keeping it confidential for a year we saved it from being

challenged in the court. Now, it is the school’s unquestionable right.

We can see how the loopholes are at times disclosed by representatives of the department

when they want to help someone. In case they turn against someone, or they are not interested

in doing something, numbers of rules are there to serve. No matter how genuine is the case, it is

the department’s discretion too as arbitrariness reigns supreme in the presence of customs and

legalities. It is the bureaucracy that decides how to deal with an issue.

“Was the system ever better?,” I asked from a small group of old and retired farmers in

Borewala tehsil. “It used to be much better in 1960s and 1970s but began worsening in 1980s.

Water shortage, frequency and amount of theft increased during 1980s and then continued

unabated. “The colonial water system, justified an Xen in vehari, was not designed to fulfill the

excessive demand rising with the passage of time. It was planned to satisfy limited water

allowances say around one third or half the cropping intensity that we have got now. The

system also holds limited capacity to be expanded. Uneven land, conveyance losses and

antique irrigation practices are making the system further inefficient in provision and supply,” He

answered”. In other words, it is the excessive demand not mismanagement that is causing

problems in his opinion.

A group of farmers fed from Eastern Neeli Bar claimed of having dug and cleared 12 kilometer

of rajbah on their own without any support from the departmental. “We paid Rs.100 per acre to

the department and received water from the Link Canal not from the Western Neeli Bar. We

desire water to be provided to us from Western Neeli Bar as it is closer by and flows better. But

officials of the Western Bar do not provide us a single drop of water,” said the participants. We

do not know, why? Department simply says, “you are not entitled to Western Bar’s waters”.

Several farmers fail to understand the compulsion of receiving water from a particular minor or

moga even if another moga or minor is closer or convenient to irrigate from. Applications over

applications are submitted without success. Given the complicated bureaucratic procedures,

shifting a source is no less than a daunting task. In case another farmer or a family is opposed

to it, then you forget it.

28

Farmers land size, land use, localities, minors, watercourses, cropping needs and patterns are

are rapidly changing but the outlets and their locations are set in stone. An orchard usually has

double the allocation than grains or grocery fields. Many farmers outstripped orchards and now

grow cotton, wheat or sugarcane; their water share is still the same in papers. Others grow fruit

plants and secure double the share of water. Once done they remove fruit plants and start

growing any other crop in vogue. Ridiculous but such practices are not uncommon. When

irrigated lands are converted into residential colonies, they need to reschedule water distribution

and divide it to the neighboring lands. “We have no idea what happens to that water,” the

farmers say.

“Departmental rules and regulations are all in English language and so runs most of the

correspondence. It is difficult for uneducated farmers to understand things in there and proceed

accordingly,” said a school teacher in Borewala. “If we translate it in Urdu, it can make some

difference. The farmers need to know about the complaint mechanism, the fine over theft, their

shares, schedules and applications process for new outlets etc. “Part of the problem will be

resolved by understanding the laws better,” he added.

Distribution, Warabandi System and Insufficiency:

Wara or warabandi is the term – universally used all over South Punjab – which one listens

excessively while talking to farmers or interacting with representatives of the department. Wara

stands for the ‘turn’ while ‘bandi’ means something fixed. Hence warabandi means fixed term

cycle of turns or rotations. Warabandi, its’ regulation and associated problems are the best

example of design equity and its’ failure as well. Theoretically, seven to ten days rotational cycle

with fixed amount of time according to one’s schedule and size of land, supplies water to the

farmers. The chain of turns in an area is technically known as schedule.

29

Katcha system, i.e. internal or flexible

arrangement of turns is also observed in

some of the villages in the target area. It

stands for a chain of rotation agreed but not

formally recognized by the department.

Small farmers and tenants also talk about

having some informal exchange of water in

between but not that frequently.

With changing water needs, collusion and

system flaws it is neither foolproof nor

efficient. Where its’ inflexibility tries to

impose mechanical justice in distribution,

Moga – the water outlet from a minor or rajbah

it also poses a barrier too. In case a crop needs water every third day, as I was told, a farmer is

rarely entitled to have it every third day. No surprise that sometimes it is available when it is not

required for a crop. The gap is fulfilled by using or purchasing tubewell water. When it is, short a

farmer cannot supplement it, save through groundwater, and when abundant he is unable to sell

the surplus supply. During my interaction, many farmers in south Punjab complained of not

receiving water when they need it or having it amply available when not required. Designed for

fair distribution, warabandi fails to deliver justice with the poor and small farmers. Water ends,

before reaching out to the poor tail-enders. The cycle turned people so egoistic and self

possessive that farmers essentially use it on their own turn even if they don’t need it.

Schedule, rotation and design equity is readily compromised when structures are amended in

collusion with an influential or a politically powerful landlord. Shrewd farmers also tinker and

violate fixed term rotations. Time and again during all my individual interviews and collective

discussions, I kept hearing complaints of mogas or nakkas being tampered. Speeding up one’s

supply or trespassing one’s scheduled time is also common. Even the distance of one’s land

from the minor or the branch canal makes a huge difference in supply time and quantity.

Variable flows also make the quantities variable. To sum up, even minor changes in design or

time make a big difference in the quantity of water one receives.

Case Study on the Problems of Warabandi: Muhammad Nawaz, a small farmer of Tehsil

Borewala told that, Days are specified for different farmers or families. Let us say my turn falls

30

on the first Monday of each month and the same rajbah/canal is closed on that particular day. I

will then have to wait for that day for the whole month. In case I complain to the department,

they say it is out of our control as it is done province wise and we cannot affect changes.

Absence of water when we need it poses serious challenges to a farmer. In that case either we

wait for the rain or purchase ground water. Its price is exorbitantly high. However, we are not

facing any problem of water theft.

An Xen in Vehari said. “Three of our rivers i.e. Ravi, Satluj and Bias have been diverted to India.

Sources of Sindh and Chanab are being dammed by our hostile neighbor i.e. India. Mangla and

Tarbela are heavily silted depleting the supplies. In Birtish period, not only the amount of water

was regulated rather, how much water will a farmer use and for which crop, was also dictated by

the government. Now people are growing crops consuming water more than average. People

demand more than their share to bring maximum of their land under cultivation. This much

water was never available in the system. It is not the result of mismanagement rather the

system is burdened beyond its capacity”. He and a couple of other officials in Lodhran and

Khanewal categorically refused the unequal distribution, stealth, favouritism or bribery to choke

or release less or more water to one or another landlord or a family. However, the line losses

and wastage in flow was accepted across board.

A Draftsman from Lodhran argued that actually availability, not provision, is the main constrain.

Say, Dunyapur tehsil has got an area of 650,000 acres. The department can hardly provide

water to 400,000 acres in general. There are 60 rajbahs or small canals in the area but cannot

fulfill the demands of hundreds of thousands of farmers in the area. The Malacy canal flows

through Head Trimmun that is supposed to run from mid April to mid October but it hardly flows

for a couple of months or so. Those whose wara is supposed to be every week, what can he do

if water flows with fits and starts skipping a week, sometimes two. Actually canals suffer from

severe shortage of supply. Alternatively the farmers have to purchase water at the rate of

Rs.1200/hour. Let us say Talib Husain and Haji Yasin made a complaint of poor supply in my

presence, what the department can do to quash their thirst for water. In another case, the

Khanewal Canal has a capacity of 3000 cusecs while it hardly receives1000 to 1400 cusecs of

water, less than half of its allocation. The Malcy Canal has a capacity of 11000 cusecs and it

receives 7000 – 8000 cusecs max. Unequal distribution, theft and pilferage aside, how to deal

with the shortage?

31

Most farmers say, “more than half of their requirement is fulfilled by groundwater which is

brackish and expensive.” Let us say the farmers of Dera Ahmad Din, Tehsil Malcy, Chack 171,

told: There were 19 mogas to feed their lands from the Canal 1L-10-L that receives water from

Thinggi Canal. Its’ officially allocated share of water is 35 cusecs but it hardly flows close to 30

Cusecs. People also claim of having paid Rs.100, 000 per Moga to receive their due share of

water but the amount has yet not been increased.

Rana Muhammad Iqbal10 - Issues of Inequity in warabandi: Mogas and localities are

specified under the influence of big landlords, despite the fact that per acre production of small

farmers is more than the big one. If the small farmers would request the department to survey

their land and assess the need for water, land superintendent would not come without charging

at least Rs.10,000. Mogas locations are also determined by the powerful landlords. They not

only take ample water rather waste it too. Last year, we agitated against this injustice, even the

police visited to arrest him but the landlord (who is sitting MNA as well) did not give a single

drop of water until he satiated his lands in full. Changing warabandi is next to impossible

although it can solve part of the problem. Size of the land and moga work in a sort of an

equation. Say, water will be given for X amount of time to the Y size of land – owned by various

land lords. In the said time, whether the small farmers receive water or not, this is his own

problem. Water is stopped after the allocated time. Although the departments attempt enforcing

a schedule but the powerful land lords do not respect that. Say I purchased a land there and my

neighbouring landlord visited me and said he is entitled for one hours of water but he could not

get it for the last 20 years despite making several complaints to the department. I gave him, his

right and he will tell you that Foji. Iqbal has given me water after 20 years but the department

could not manage that. Department officials rather advise the complainants to compromise with

the landlord and not to create fuss. The big landlords will break moga at someone else’s’

location and time and blame him for the crime.

“With the diversion of Satluj to India, Pakpatttan Canal, 3 Km in the north of Vehari got closed

and a canal called Malcy-Karampur Canal, 14 Km from Vehari in the west also stopped flowing.

Likewise, there was a canal close to Kaccha Khoo shrank. However Sadhnai Malcy link canal

10 The story was told by Rana Muhammad Iqbal, a retired soldier and farmer in Lodhran tehsil.

32

was carved out to irrigate lands that were earlier irrigated by Satluj”, told a retired irrigation

officer named Ghulam Hussain. The same Malcy link canal was bricklined for around 300 kms

and new minors were created to supply water to those that earlier received water from river

Satluj. Now lands on western-end inhale enough water while the eastern part is dying out of

hunger. Sadhnai-Malcy link canal provides water to Vehari and Bahawalpur and that too far less

than its allocated share.

The same person categorically stated, “Where there are settlers’ Chacks in Vehari district,

canals are perennial while the locals get access to seasonal canals only. The situation is not

created recently. Most of the Chacks in Vehari were settled in 1931 or 1932 under the British

Raj and the injustice continues since then. It is the making of the colonial raj, perhaps certain

plans operated behind”. But in my opinion there is a way out. Another canal should be

constructed between Malcy and Mian Chanoon to irrigate around 50 km area in between that is

presently deprived of water, He argued.”

Muhammad Afzal, a farmer from Dunyapur

said, “Shortage of supply is serious. Usually

when the farmers need water, it is not

available and available when it is needed less

or not needed at all. Underground water in

Dunyapur is saline and if watered in case of

unavailability, it harms the crops. Let us say

this year the canal was closed for two months.

The farmers – large and small launched a

protested on the main road. They burned tires

and blocked traffic. Finally, the department

representatives visited the area.

A reflection of unmanaged water courses

Water was released in the canals for a day or two and closed back. Farmers did the same again

and response was again the same. The Department representatives, even some MPAs and

Secretary too visited the venue. People thought, where did the water come from after the

33

protest. How did they manage it now firming their belief that it is deliberately held back to

provide to influentials”

To some of the farmers, no baildar (the lowest ranking officer who supervises watercourses) or

canal officer manages water rotations. Baildar and overseer simply supervise water courses

with their scheduled visits. It is the farmers themselves who remember their turns and time and

run the system. Each farmer will close his neighbour’s nakka when his time is over and will open

his own. The next one will close the former one’s and will unchoke his own and so on and so

forth. A farmer needs to be alert even his turn happens to be in the middle of the night.

Reportedly, the day and night schedule changes over alternatively. But several other farmers

say that Baildars also open and close mogas according to the sanctified time to maintain

schedule. They keep roaming in their area on bikes or motorbikes and do the job.

Case Study11 - Corruption De-sheduling Warabandi: Qadirabad canal’s (of Kharadar

branch) water flows from Pakpattan to Malcy. It is seasonal canal and runs from mid April to Mid

September. Neeli Bar region is dominated by feudal lords. For instance, Mian Luddon,

Tahmeena Daultana and Mumtaz Daultana come from the same belt. Ghulamabad Canal is

linked to Khadar branch. Big land lords like Mangwana, Sanjera, Tajwanas and others provide

400-500 mounds of wheat to various department officials every year and keep cutting canal –

known as chhap in local terminology – through their fields. I possess only 2 acres of land and

cannot afford to brine officials. Yet they insist me to send something at Bangla Joya in return to

my wara. Warabandi’s cycle corresponds with the amount and efficiency in bribe. Revenue

department is party to it. This ‘system’ keeps going on and on – no justice. Let us say when I

introduced the ‘Water Entitlement Project12’ to the respective SDO, he said, “Please do not

implement in my area.” Simply he is afraid that his corruptions might be exposed. Even PMIU

has failed to stop corruption involved in warabandi. In the existing system, it is the small farmers

like me, who suffer the most. There is a serious need to check this corrupt business.

11 The Case study was documented by Sher Khan Khichhi (S.O. Damaan) and the Author.

12 Damaan Development Organization’s Citizens’ Voice Project Introduced meant to improve the provision of water to the small farmers.

34

If not a total breakdown of the system of warabandi itself has become an instrument of violating

the rule. Alternatively it does empower local elites and landlords to arbitrate and seek further

power to exploit the poor.

Very few canals are bricklined or pakka. A couple of attempts have been made in mid 1990s

and early 2000s however their number and length is too small. The pakka work was done with

20 percent cash or kind contribution of the land owners. Bricklining surely saves water but it

reduces the rechargability of subsurface water resulting in greater need of surface irrigation.

“Let us say the whole area from Thinggi to Borewals now needs more water as the Malcy Link

Canal was bricklined,” believes Ghulam Hussain of Vehari.

More than 90% of the watercourses (khalla in

local words) are katcha. Some of the pakka

water courses are either done by the big

landlords themselves or by the Water

Management Department (WMD) back in

2000s.

A few of the water course were turned pakka

early 2000s with the support of Citizens

Community Board (CCB) funds.

Reflection of a kachha Khalla irrigating fields

Even the pakka khllas are mostly pakka only from the headends, tails remain the same. Once

again, there is a little coordination between WMD and the Irrigation Department, even in case of

bricklining the water courses. “Cultivation without a break and the variety of cotton, sugarcane,

paddy, wheat and vegetables demand water more than the traditional varieties,” farmers

themselves accepted in more than one groups. Conventional yield is quite low though superb in

quality. It does not fetch enough profit, therefore no incentive to revert to the traditional

varieties”, Acknowledge most of the farmers. Say Bt cotton which is largely grown in the areas

needs excessive watering.

Despite all the anomalies, the Department’s Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit

(PMIU) still claims on its website that, “the experts and other professionals for this Cell have

35

been appointed on contract basis. The Unit has been strengthened with 12 Mobile Teams (two

for each Irrigation Zone) and will be equipped with double cabin pickup and discharge

observation devices and 58 Gauge Readers (one for each Operation Division) equipped with

motorcycle. One and half months training for Assistant Director Mobiles and Monitoring

Assistants started on April 3, 2006. The Mobile Teams frequently move in the zone to observe

the actual discharge of channels/outlets and Gauge Readers regularly observe the gauges

especially of the tail of channels of a Division. This will facilitate the Monitoring Unit to ascertain

the correctness of data loaded by the Canal Divisions and exercising proper check for feeding of

tails and ensuring equitable distribution of water in the channels/out-lets according to the

authorized shares and approved plans”.

Waste and Water Logging: As indicated above an extensive network of canals, rajbahs and watercourses operates in South

Punjab as they do in the rest of the province. Yet the delivery of water is highly skewed and

inefficient due to waste, mismanagement, excessive demand, weird engineering structure and

poor maintenance. Delivery efficiency is approximated to be little over 35% from branches and

distributaries down to the tertiary lanes. Most loss is recorded at the watercourses, communally

known as khallas. Non local and water intensive cropping consumes another 15% of the flows.

In certain parts of and passages the loss rises as high has 65 to 70% touching 30 MAF per

annum. Such a big trounce causes not only shortage rather water logging and salinity as well.

Reuse and exploiting return flows is almost absent. The shortfall of water is projected around

40% or 108 MAF.

According to Water and Power Development Authority’s (WAPDA) estimate, 30% of the land in

Punjab suffers from surface and 45% by profile salinity – recurring through plant roots. Around

5000 tubewells are installed every year salinizing the soil further. Water table is falling in 15 out

of 45 command areas. Salinity and water logging, already on the rise, is one the major threats to

irrigation and agriculture system.

Almost all the farmers, poor or little prosper, face it seriously. They also realize that groundwater

is increasing infertility, lowering down water table and decreasing grain production but the

deplore they have no way out.

36

However some of the farmers think, “it is the

electrified water i.e. water generated by tube-

well that harms earth. Canal water is natural

hence safe for earth and harvest”. Others say,

“it is back to back cropping but we cannot

afford to spare our soil for a season or two to

breathe”. To fulfill their rising hunger for water

farmers who can afford are haphazardly

Tubewell irrigation, a key source of water logging

installing tubewells here and there. Officially approved or un-approved, there seems no

specification or regulation of distance or number within a certain size of the land. Overpumping

and wastage of groundwater like the fresh one is common that is increasing charges and

waterlogging and decreasing productivity. Skimming wells, cause relatively lower salinity, but

are rarely observed in the area. Waterlogging ratio of commercial tubewells is multiple times

higher, yet they are popular. Marketing agents persuade them in several ways. However, in our

case most of the smallholders do not own tubewells. They purchase water paying Rs. 800 to

1200 for an hour or so.

At much higher a cost, public tubewells, that we saw a few, are being installed to treat water

logging. Devouring more money and more energy with limited capacity for desalination and

desodification, these themselves prove problematic. Once again a technical solution to solve

technically created problem proves expensive, ineffective and interim only. Once again

waterlogging is being perceived exclusively a technical problem asking for technical solutions. In

In department’s technical thinking, farmer communities feature in, if at all, just in the passing.

One can feel whatever additional amount of water is brought under cultivations through by

creating new and new canals perhaps more is being lost through waterlogging, salinity and

sodification.

Water Theft:

Popular and perceptual meanings of the word ‘theft’ rarely convey the problems and typology of

stealing quantities and turns of irrigation water. Multiple tricks and traits of grabbing water, at

times, make it difficult to identify an act as outright violation or larceny. However amongst all the

37

farmers, who I spoke to, enumerable stories of water stealth circle around. I could hardly recall

any discussion without recurrent references to stealing water.

“Stealing water is the main issue and there are multiple means and methods to of stealing it.

Farmers install pumps and machines to pull huge amount of water in a limited time. Influentials

such as Sahu, Gardezis, Maliks all steal water from rajbahs. Small farmers are simply helpless.

As they are powerful, therefore no one can lodge a complaint against or stop them. Stealing

water is almost a day to day activity. Small farmers or the tialenders, do get water but untimely

and far less than their actual need. Why? The reason is very simple. Department employees

are appointed with their sifarish (recommendation). How can they stop the big land lords from

stealing water?” The views were expressed by a Local NGO worker, Muhammad Zulfiqar at a

collective meeting in Khanewal.

In Tehsil Vehari we saw motor operated big fans of wood (jhallaras) installed on water courses,

just across the minor, meant to transport water to some landlord’s lands. Installed on the

landlords own water lines, however it speeds up and pulls down more water for the owner. “This

is illegal, complain all small farmers, as it draws down an amount of water more than one’s due

share”. In common perception, closeness to the minor helps propelling more water within the

allocated time to a farmer.

To the department, it is pretty legal because

the machine sits on one’s own course of

water. Neither on the minor nor on someone

else’s flow. When we raised this issue with an

SDO at Thinggi, he was initially reluctant to

accept any such thing operating on any one’s

land. When we insisted, he said, “Oh! Yes!

that is perfectly legal for it functions on such

and such landlord’s piece of land.

Jhallar or wood-fan flank to speed up water

If some of the farmers do have reservations on it, they should report to the department. We

never received any application against it. In case we do, we might visit and assess, if it is

affecting smallholders or tail-enders or not”.

38

An old man of Chack 51-KB, Tehsil Borewala, who did not reveal his name, showed us an act of

stealing water. Locally known daaf, it is a method of stealing water by cutting across a canal

through to one’s land. It is done almost every rabi season. I fail to believe how it is possible

without departmental collusion or bribing to a concerned official. Another man of the same

village, whose name I keep anonymous, disclosed that “big landlords of the area obstruct minor

with sacks of clay or bundles of reeds to make the water flow back to their lands. Last time we

made a complaint to the concerned Xen. He held an open meeting (Khulli Kachehri) at Joya

Bangla and publically committed to stop that practice. Reported to the police, once it raided on

the spot. Workers and servants of the land lord ran away. No arrests were made. With the gap

of a year or two, its’ all the same.

Case Study13 - Irrigation Department Tortures a Poor Farmer in Union Council 22, Chack Tehsil Lodhran: Water theft, tinkering with the size of moga, big landlords’ and

departmental oppression is common in the area. Small farmers are particularly oppressed and

wronged by the wealthy and powerful farmers in collusions with the departmental staff. I hereby

quote a representative case as told by the victim himself.

“I am Muhammas Hussain (55) and live in the said Village. Three to four weeks ago I was

standing outside my house close to Bahashti Canal around 8.00pm. Mushtaq Ahmad, popular

with the name of Pappu was also standing with me, who just came out to purchase his child’s

milk and cigarette for himself. In the mean time irrigation staff, SDO Ahsan Bukhari, Overseer

Rana Riaz and a couple of other guys, approached to us in a Double Cabin and a Jeep. Some

of them were even carrying weapons. They were raiding the people who used to steal water

through tube. Actually the Jhanderi family commonly stole water with this method. Their homes

and land is situated close to the canal and they are quite influential. Catching an eye of the

department, all of them ran away. The staff occupied all the tubes fixed with the canal to steal

water. When they noticed, the two of us were standing there as it is, they pounced upon me and

asked. Who are you and how much land do you posses. Nothing, I told them save a couple of

acres and that too is leased in. Grabbing, they roughly dragged me on ground. I said, I am not a

thieve and neither it was my turn. Had I been culprit, I would have ran away. Turning a deaf ear

13 The Case Study was documented by Malik Ashtar (S.O. Damaan) and the author.

39

to my requests, they pushed me in water and jumped in and kept sinking me up and down.

Brought out, they came to down to blows. Mushtaq, standing by protested and said, he is

innocent. Angered, they gave a similar treatment to him too. My mouth and nose bled profusely.

I lost two of my teeth. Yet they did not stop me here. Throwing me inside the Jeep, they forced

me to the irrigation office, Lodhran. Over there they got my thumb prints. Knowing the story 30

to 40 villagers followed the office to save me. Scared me, they kicked me out of office. It will be

mid night that my fellow villagers brought me back home.

After the whole episode, overseer Rana Riaz kept intimidating me over one of my relative’s cell.

If you took up the case to police, we shall treat you even worse and will make a police case

against you of stealing water. I and my family being poor are helpless and scared. Did not move

even after such a terrible torture and injustice.

Ahmad khan, our MPA, intervened later and tried arbitrating the matter. He too suggested us to

be quite and forget it. No way out, we turned silent. Such injustice and oppression on part of

department is heard every now and then. A few days ago the same SDO visited the village and

said, sorry. We actually took you for another person. Under the pressure of the MPA, villagers

also suggested to forget the whole story. Perhaps they are right. How can I afford thana-

kachehri and lose my living too? I am oppressed and tortured, yet silent as if nothing happened.

How could I forget such a big injustice?

Department is also reported of taking action against complaints of theft or breach of rules and

regulations. Ransom or a system of twaan, with respect to the nature of crime, its’ time and

amount of water stolen is specifically described and the offense and punishments are also

elaborated in the department’s regulatory system. The system of punishing the whole

community for the crime of one person also survives in some of the situations. Farmers do know

it from heart to heart and there are several cases of tawaan heard and told by several farmers in

every district. But the way it functions is totally disappointing and unjust according to the farmers

we discussed the issue with. Like the system of crime and punishment in the civil sector, much

of the arm-twisting happens under the pressure of big landlords, politicians and superior

bureaucrats.

One of the farmers at Jahanyan disclosed, “We had to pay 20 times fine (tawaan) for breaking

our neighbor’s water. All of us had to pay fine collectively, each with a different amount ranging

40

from Rs.10,000 to 25000. Even a couple of farmers had to pay tawaan just for sitting in the

Chair in front of an Xen. It was perhaps disrespecting him that got furious at. If tawaan is not

payed, one can face 6 months imprisonment. An amount 20 times of one’s abyana is the

maximum fine to be placed. If an FIR registered the case will go to civil court, in case of not

paying off the twaan”.

Case Study14: Community’s Action to Stop Water Theft: District Vehari, Chack 51 KB, UC # 78, Tehsil Borewala: River branches and minors from Satluj irrigate Borewala

Tehsil of Vehari. Tail-enders of Chack 51-KB fail to receive water from Kharadar Branch, the six

monthly canal an offshoot of River Satluj. Joya Sladeer, Chishti, Daultana, Khakwani and

Mangwaney and Khichi, Arayaen and Langryal are the big landlords of the area. Big landlords,

Saldera in this case, cut water from the minor in the night by chocking it with the earth filled

sacks and diverting water back to their lands. Alternatively they have to irrigate their lands with

the tubewell water which is 100 times expensive and poor in quality. For expensive water, inputs

and unfair pricing the small, poor and tail end farmers are getting poorer. Eventually, they

registered complaint to the respective SDO and DPO of the districts but in no vain. Finally the

affectees organized a committee and began watching the minor. One night they identified the

right persons who stole water. With repeated complaints and openly naming and shaming the

landlords who stole water, they succeeded to stop this criminal practice after several years.

The farmers of Khanewal, Lower Bari Canal 3R-10R, 4R-10R etc, confessed that “beyond their

size of land or power, all farmers steal water, less or more according to the chance they get or

the capacity they have. Whosoever can do it of whatever level, he will do it”. From Head Blocki

to Lower Bari Canal all the farmers, save the massively big ones, suffer from the stealth and

insufficiency of water. Water schedule available with the department or the irrigation patwari

usually remains intact but in practice discrepancies are rampant. An irrigation overseer present

in this meeting stated, “actually there is a deficit of water in dams. The tail-enders suffer

because the moment it reaches out to them, water gets over. Where to bring more water is the

Question. More dams, is one of the answers”.

14 The Case Study was documented by Sher Khan Khichhin (S.O. Damaan) and the author.

41

“Earlier we had a fight with an SDO, said Farooq Khan, a tailend farmer from Malcy. Offended

by our frequent complaints, he said, “I shall provide you water, the way I did last year.” It was a

clear threat. We also removed daaf from Malcy Canal placed by a powerful landlord. Around 17

people were booked in the case by police. “Actually, tailend farmers are unified. They even

exchange water if someone has got sufficient supply or does not need water on his turn.

However, water deficit and low production make several hundred cultivators seasonally work in

ginning or other factories. For example a farmer has to spend Rs. 40,000 on one acre to grow

rice. Much of the cost is incurred on purchasing water. We receive less than one tenth, if

irrigation water has a poor speed. Tubewell owner charges us Rs.750 per hour. One acre of

land takes at least 40 hours of tubewell in a season. What can he earn or save. In case, it does

not rain, he is ruined by debt”.

Case Study15: Village 171 WB, UC - 47, Tehsil Malcy, District Vehari: The Issue of Stealing Water through Bed Bars: The tail-end farmers of 1L/10L are deprived from their

share of water for 6 years. The poor farmers individually owned land between a size of 0.5 acre

to 1 acre. A population of 10,000 possessed 1400 acres of land in total who suffered from a

severe shortage of supply as the powerful and politically influential landlords stole water at the

head reaches. The village is situated just 10 km west of the Thinggi Headquarters of Canal

Department. The rajbah 1L-10 is an offshoot of Malcy-Sidhnai canal and it is allocated 32

cusecs of water on turn? In total 19 further water courses flow down from the said minor and the

farmers have a right to receive 19 to 31minutes of water per acre each turn.

Numberdars of the area and a local committee constituted by the poor farmers themselves

submitted more than one application to the Xen, Chief Engineer, Executive Engineer, Divisional

and Sub-divisional Officers of Western Bar against their water share being stolen. Coming from

Moza Shitabgarh, the brother of a former MPA of Zilla Vehari who is also the close relative of

former Nazim Vehari had placed daaf (bed-bars) in the 1L-10L for the last several years.

Distressed, the poor farmers were migrating to urban areas in search of menial jobs and labour.

Repeated applications to several officials at various levels resulted in visiting the site by some of

the officials who confirmed the act of stealing and said it appears to be pretty old. According to

15 The Case Study was described by Farooq Khan Numberdar and documented by this author.

42

the locals, the daaf was there from at least 2005 and had not been removed after several

complaints.

Finally, more than 500 poor farmers of respective villages organized a protest demonstration in-

front of Thinggi Headquarters and blocked traffic for several hours. Aftab Khan Khichhi, the

influential landlord lodged an FIR against the 17 farmers leading the protest. But the farmers did

not back off and continued protesting and approaching the department officials. After struggling

for at least five years, the bed-bars were removed and tail-end farmers began receiving their

share of water. This is just one case, several bed-bars are operating unauthorized at various

points of Neeli bar off shoots. (Please see the copies of applications and official response in the

Annexure IV).

Woes of Tenants and Tailenders:

Roughly two thirds of water is used, abused and stolen by the head-end users and those at the

tail end get almost nothing. Say in Bailewaal village of Dunypur, the whole 50 acres of land is

totally deprived of water. Tail-enders’ lands are drying up. The big land lord can pull water by

peter pump or by tractors motor. However, small landlord’s time and quantity of water is strictly

scheduled and controlled. Small farmers have no means to secure water. Feudal lords,

sometimes threaten the whole family, if small farmers complain or try asserting their water

rights.

Tenants are entitled to the share of water whatever is prescribed in the name of their landlord.

But most of them have got very limited connection with the Department. As the schedule fall on

the landlord’s name, they usually avoid visiting the department, in case of a problem. Some of

them have never visited the department even in case of short supply. Others did but only once

or twice in several years. The landlords themselves, poor or moderate as we observed in

Vehari, are far more active and assertive than mustajirs, the tenants. “Mustajirs have limited

conflicts in between. They mutually agree better because the water is quite low so what to fight

over”, the group members said in Jahanyan tehsil of Khanewal.

Dera Ahmad Din, Tehsil Malcy, Chack 171 is entitled to receive water from 1L-10L/10L Canal

which is an offshoot of Thinggi. It has got 19 Mogas and is officially allocated 35 cusecs while

43

the water usually flows down less than 30 Cusecs. Similarly small farmers of Malcy, Chak 171-

10-L has got a population of 10,000 and farmers own land from 1 Acre to 12 acres. They

receive little water at the tail-end to live on. For over 5 years i.e. from 2005-2010, they could not

receive even one tenth of their officially allocated share.

Farmers situated at the head reaches usually consume water more than their allocated share.

Add tempering, some of the tail-enders either do not receive water or far less than their usual

share. In the peak rabbi season they rarely receive any water and when supply is abundant,

downstream lands are flooded. Users in the middle or upper reaches sometimes, one case is

delineated to exemplify, cut down minors even distributaries to accumulate water. Baildars and

overseers, if not a direct party to the steal, usually know it but their powers to stop that are too

limited.

Case Study16 - Community’s Successful Effort to Secure their Share of Water: A

Poor tail-end Chack of Vehari comprises on 1400 acres land in total. It is fed by 40 tubewells in

the absence of canal water. Around 600 acres of land remains completely deprived of canal

water and survives on tubewells. What they received only after a prolonged efforts with

individual and collective bribe too hardly fulfills the need of one third of their lands. Bashir

Ahmed owning 11 acre of land told that “Khicchi MNAs and MPAs place daaf to cut water. The

department remains silent”. Daaf does not allow water to flow down and proceed to the tail-

enders – pandis in local word. Poor and powerless farmers cannot obstruct or object the

influentials to not to steal their share. Finally, continued Bashir Ahmed, I happened to meet a

nice Chief Engineer. We facilitated him to visit the area and see the act with his won eyes. He

ordered an enquiry that happened to work out. He finally got the daaf removed. Villagers

cooperated with the baildars to get our share flow down. It is just two years now that we receive

some amount of water though direly insufficient.

Adding to our wows the Buffalows of Khicchi landlord keeps bathing in the rajbah that has

almost turned into a lake, which obviously obstructs the flow, said the same person. The only

solution, what now seems us reasonable is brick-lining our rajbah to speed up flow and reduce

waste. A department official rarely visits to see the situation. full with agony now, whosoever

asks our story, tears roll down instead. I have turned old man of mid 70s running after the canal

water. 16 The story was told by an old farmer Basheer Ahmed and documented by the author.

44

Conflicts around Distribution and Access:

The very mechanism of time, rotation and who will get what amount of water and when,

appearing so perfect on paper causes number of conflicts amongst individual farmers and

communities across the whole region. Where legal and systematic measures fail to arbitrate or

do justice, farmers and communities tend to use conflict as a mechanism to shift power in their

own favour. A range of conflicts between public institutions, individual farmers, communities,

clans and families are seen and heard in the field. Either inadequate or no system of resolving

conflicts exists with the Department. Conflicts being multidimensional are difficult for an official

system to resolve or arbitrate as the relevant department holds very limited or no coordination in

between17.

Although the scarcity assumption cannot be challenged but many a conflict emerge from official

mismanagement or sheer act of injustice. Elite capture of the resource is common. Like big and

small landlords or the landed and landless people head-end and tail-end itself has created a

divide between the powerful or prosperous and the underprivileged farmers. This divide is

sharper in Khanewal and Vehari, where new Chacks were also settled with new canals. In

Lodhran the injustice is vivid. Tailend farmers are far more discriminated than settled villages in

the Khanewal and Vehari than Lodhran.

Most conflicts circle around tampering the size of a moga. An inch here and there can increase

or decrease several cusecs of water each turn. Department claims of having a standard size of

the mogas while in reality tampering, mostly done by powerful landlords, is very common. Let us

say the size of Hyatullah Tareen’s mogas and Khallas in Lodhran are much bigger than the

ordinary mogas and kahllas of small farmers.

Tailenders, small farmers and tenants usually try hiding their internal conflicts. Most of them

said, “The amount of water they receive is so low that rarely a situation occures to fright over”.

However, I could clearly judge from their meaningful smiles and satirical comments that

emergence of conflicts is more or less same at every level. In certain cases, it could be less in

frequency but never absent.

17 Altaf Abro and Nafisa Shah (2003) Water and conflict: The case of upper Sindh

45

At several points the farmers showed me mogas where their size was tampered either by

removing its bed-bar – an iron made shaft approved by the department – or by widening the

outlet a bit by one or another tactics. Some of the farmers even pump water directly down to

their lands in night with a peter pump. Simply, cross a tube or pipe over the pavement and pull

water down to your lands. Persuasion and defiance both run side by side in people’s efforts to

secure water. In certain cases when department does not take an action to provide water to

someone who believes his share is being exploited by someone else. Farmers themselves are

tempted to take a retaliatory measures. Contrary to the departmental perceptions of scheduling

and control, it is the community arbitration that proves effective in case of distributional conflicts

or conflicts emerging from steal. Police comes at the end, in case a conflict turns violent.

Case Study of a Conflict Over Water Theft: Muhammad Farooq a former police officer

and mid-range landlord said, “in my area one of the big landlord (name kept anonymous) put

daaf in the minor. I decided to seek my share of water and formed a small committee and

requested everyone to cooperate. First of all I got schedule from department with a great

difficulty. Pursuing the head draftsman, I succeeded to secure. It was important to know, how

much water I am entitled to. My schedule was 8 Cusecs and the landlord was stealing my water

too. I questioned the steal and the department had no answer save the excuse of some

influence, possible bribe. There was a police case against same person for over the water theft.

I got the copy of that too. Actually two rajbahs pass through my area. Now the Senior Engineer

is Sheikh Murtaza Khurshid, in his place earlier there was I Iftikhar Bhutta. He was a very nice

guy. The SDO Vehari agreed and gave us an appointment. I told him that some people are

stealing my water with lift pump and other methods. We are Arayeen, poor and week but once

we know that we are deprived of our rights we get it at any case. I removed the trolley from

tractor and placed it on road. Traffic was blocked. We planned to set it on fire as a token of

protest. Knowing it, SDO and SE got embarrassed. I mobilized around 1500 people in Thinggi,

all up in protest. There from we went to the Mumtaz Khan Khicchi’s dera. Two of our nazimeen

were there who fled away. “We have our voting interests with your opponents and we cannot

fight against them. Deal your case yourself. People grabbed an MPA’s vehicle and even

smashed off its windows. I said, in your government the MPA breaks our Moga and steals

water. Getting the news, PIDA authorities called secretary irrigation and told him the story. They

changed the schedule immediately and agreed to not to give my share back to anyone. I am

46

actually a migrant from Sheilkhpura. Event then I got the local department to remove daafs.

Normally the department does not do anything without a bribe. Just in your presence, I can call

on the cellphone to an SDO and ask how much will you charge for a Moga. How much? You will

know it straight on.

Water Charges, Abyana or Moamla:

Punjab has got the largest irrigation network as well as revenue system and the proportion of

recovery. Even then annual revenue falls far short of its’ management expenses. The total

recovery hardly approaches one fourth of the maintenance expenses. Department takes

responsibility only to repair main canals while outlets and water courses are left to users

following the colonial tradition. The loss at the watercourse level is roughly estimated to be no

less than half the amount and more than one fourth is lost by the flood irrigation system, uneven

fields and poorly designed farms.

In all three districts water tax, what local people prefer to call moamla, ranges from less or more

Rs.85 to below Rs.135 per acre for six monthly and perennial canals. Per acre tax also varies

marginally for rabi or kharif crops. Minor variations are also mentioned by farmers with respect

to the amount of commission paid to the numberdar (sirpunch) fluctuating between 15-20%. It is

always the numberdar who collects tax for the Department but never considered a formal

employee of the department. Farmers almost unanimously agree that water tax is quite low and

easily affordable even for poor or small farmers. The issue is of faulty provision, shortage or

unavailability. Evading tax what I can readily infer is never a reason for stealing water.

In the opinion of a small farmer Rana Iqbal, “Big landlord’s rarely pay abyana (water tax).

Patwaris and Tehsildar only pressurize small farmers, possessing 2, 3 or maximum 10 acres of

land including the lessee. Water tax is quite small i.e. Rs. 95 per acre every 6 months both for

rabi and khrif season. Yet it is not paid by the rich landlords. I own 75 acres and am moderate

comparing others. Those who pay abyana more than 70% of them are small of medium farmers.

May be 10 or 20% of the big land lords who own land close to 2000 or more acres of land, might

be paying abyana”.

47

Wherever or whosoever I spoke to, all of the farmers – medium, small or poor – said that

moamla was conveniently affordable. Interestingly enough that more or less all the farmers

agreed that comparing the benefit they gain from canal water, the charges were either pretty

moderate or even low. Some of the farmers said, “We are willing to pay more only if the

department provides sufficient water and improves water courses”. This is what they would

repeatedly stress. If there is any reluctance, it is because they clearly see a disconnect between

O & M expenses and abyana. The revenue, as few of the farmers appear to know, adds up to

the provincial revenues and diverted back a little, if at all. Farmers do have an idea that

whatever users charges they pay go into bearing the burden of bureaucratic management O &

M activities are almost invisible in the area.

Nevertheless they did have some reservations about how or by whom it was collected but none

about its amount or affordability. However, they did believe that moamla is never spared. One

can be arrested for not paying it. Some of them even expressed sympathy with the collector that

he spends perhaps more on his bike’s petrol than he would get the commission from. At times,

he has to visit a farmer more than once for the purpose.

The government of Pakistan raised water charges by 25% in all the four provinces back in mid

1990s. Even then it is too low and seldom works as a motivating factor for farmers to use water

efficiently. The water revenue that the department collects is utterly insufficient to bear the

operation and maintenance (O&M) charges of the system. Marked by inefficiency and waste,

agriculture still consumes three-fourth of the fresh water available in the country. Farmers do

realize that much of the water is wasted in conveyance. However, they are not seen proactively

engaged in its parsimonious use. In Arif Hassan’s views, “infrastructure that costs one rupee in

terms of labour and material is delivered by the government in 8 to 10 rupees. Where

international consultants and loans are involved costs can go up by additional 40 percent, and

where international tenders are involved they may go up by additional 300 percent18.”

18 Arif Hassan (2003) National water plans and socio-economic realities, Oxford University Press and SDPI, Islamabad.

48

It is a fact that establishment charges are more than 150 percent of the revenue collected. Less

than 35%, if at all is spent on the maintenance services. Whenever budget cut is made, it is

made in the area of O & M expense not on huge bureaucracy retained by the system. Irrigation

department’s is estimated to be at least more than 50% overstaffed in Punjab while doing less

than 50% of the drainage and O & M work19. Therefore, tertiary level infrastructure tiers down

rapidly to multiply waste.

Ignoring the need for O&M improvement at the farm level, the Government of Punjab is

ironically keen on building or rehabilitating mega water infrastructures with billions of dollars

loans from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) where Asian Development Bank (ADB) and

World Bank (WB) are on the lead. After an objectionable Jinnah Barrage rehabilitation the

reconstructions of Jinnah Barrage is in process once again putting the people of Punjab under

heavy debt.

Grand schemes and plans, as our technical experts and engineers learn from their universities

are borrow from the western world are encouraged by technicians, engineers, contractors and

bureaucrats for to serve their lucrative objectives. Community driven, small and environmental

friendly techniques are opposed by the powerful bureaucrats, engineers and technicians. Big

projects, big corruption, the reason is very simple to understand.

Using the Used Water:

None of the farmers are observed using the used water by industries. Although I could not

observe a case but I came to know that very few farmers use it in Khanewal and parts of Vehari

but unprocessed. In that case both surface and ground water, already poisoned by pesticides

and fertilizers are further poisoned in the area. The issue asks for further investigation.

National Water Policy and Irrigation Water:

Meant to introduce sustainable use of all sources, the proposed National Water Policy 2002, an

autonomous corporate body covered by law, realizes the problems and challenges of water

sector. Under increasing economic and food needs it acknowledges the problems of shortage, 19 Mahmood Ahmed (2003): Issues in water policy reform, Oxford University Press and SDPI, Islamabad.

49

depletion, misuse, theft, contamination, salinity and mismanagement. It does realize the

changing notions of water, the need for comprehensive planning, institutional framework and the

need for strategic action. Despite certain merits, the policy does not cater the needs for small

and the tail-end farmers. The policy does consider integrating drainage with irrigation system.

The policy assumes that within a decade our water need will touch 40 MAF at the farmgate

level. Close to 2025 annual yield will rise to 25% hardly catching up the population burst to 220

million. The policy addresses the issues of irrigated agriculture, rural water supply, routine

maintenance, water rights, per unit allocation and several other dimensions of distribution and

management of water. It also comments on economic and financial management, groundwater,

stakeholders’ participation, drainage and reclamation, ecology, quality of water and a couple of

other aspects too. It also hints upon changing certain technico-legal promulgations done from

1973 to 1997, if and where needed to make provisions and regulations clearer and

comprehensive. It commits to constitute a National Water Council (NWC), National and

Provincial Water regulatory Commissions, Area Water Boards (AWBs) and improve PIDA’s

competency relegating WAPDA to inter-provincial management alone20.

Despite tall claims NWP vision never took a step ahead of political statements. Irrigation and

agriculture virtually work in isolation. The whole thrust of agriculture is laid on how to increase

the yield or what to grow and how much to grow in a year at most.

Water intensive crops like Bt are rigorously being encouraged by the Agriculture Department

without giving a thought to the provision and availability of water in the system. Communication

and integrated planning is almost missing. Irrigation Department, on the other hand, manages

water supply as a huge but sophisticated engineering mechanism. To farmers, as it is vivid in

the sector, irrigation and agriculture are one and the same. Simply put sustaining agriculture is

impossible without a proper irrigation or integrated management and supply of water.

Institutional forums to discuss the gaps and fragmentation between multiple water sectors do

20 Khaleeq Kiani (2004) Permanent water body to settle vital issues: province to have similar management forum, See: http://archives.dawn.com/2004/11/05/top9.htm; South Asia Partnership – Pakistan (2008) Aabi haqooq: Nizam-e-aabpahi mein ghareen dost islahat ki zaroorat (Urdu) and Khaleeq Kiani (2005) Draft water policy placed before cabinet, See: http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/20/top5.htm

50

not exist. Multiple stakeholders need to sit, talk and agree over the differences meant to

enhance utility and productivity of irrigation water.

Revenue department turns up to be a facilitator for the two - helping both to collect only the

revenue – not a partner in O & M planning and implementation. Developing coordination

between Irrigation, Agriculture, Water Management, Drainage and Flood Authorities, Livestock

Department and National Agricultural Research Council (PARC) is no more than empty claims.

Strengthening linkages with International Water Management Institute (IWMI), International

Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and International Food and Agriculture and Development

(IFAD) is confined to some funds driven activities.

Along with the existing problems of agriculture and other water sectors the said policy also

envisaged needs and options for future in the area of agriculture. Unfortunately, the said road

map is yet not materialized. Farmers in the target districts, save in Khanewal tehsil, have even

not heard of Water Boards. Similarly Water Users Associations are almost missing.

Rudimentary, but farmers Associations are present in Vehari and Khanewal, not in Lodhran.

These too are less coordinated, situationally active and not effective in managing supply or

resolving conflicts for not being recognized by the Irrigation Department.

Women Farmers and Entitlement to Water:

While interviewing officials, individuals and groups in the field, women’s role in water

management, conflicts, contests, claims or complaints is entirely missing. Nevertheless farmers,

officials and people associated did acknowledge, and I myself could spot it too, there are few

cases where women are entitled to water. Water schedules or warabandis could be identified on

a woman’s name if she is the rightful heir or owner of a piece of land. In practice, their role tends

to be negligible. Proxy representation comes through a male relative to secure the share of

water in her name.

A stereotype argument comes forth on questioning their conspicuous absence. “It is dishonoring

for men that a woman should deal with the affairs of water in public. The system is replete with

conflicts and complications that a woman cannot handle. Frequenting offices is difficult and

51

shameful for a woman. Right from departmental personnel to neighboring landlords and farmers

all are men and women ought not to interact with na-mahrameen (strangers). Islam ordains

women to observe parda and stay inside etc”. In nutshell, it is women’s morality that men are

custodians to defend”, farmers argue to justify their position. “It is no injustice if women are not

active or not acknowledged as water users. They too will face the same injustice as are the men

farmers. Does it make any difference to the department, who is entitled to water and who is not?

The system will keep operating in a similar manner, even if more women are entitled to water”,

reasoned several farmers in response to my question.

Ironically, I observed hundreds of women seedling, weeding, thinning, winnowing and picking

onions and cotton in the fields. Groceries and paddies are nursed by women more often than

not. Herding and milking is a responsibility almost entirely performed by women, in addition to

the household chores wherefrom there is no let up.

“Nevertheless Tehmina Daultana, Natasha Daultana – the sitting MPAs and other powerful

women do interact with the department and neighboring landlords, if it is inevitable to secure

their interests in terms of canal water,” people of the area explained. Very simple, it is more the

operative agency of ‘power’ not of ‘gender’ that set the norms. Women are key stakeholders in

the use of water whatever area of operation it is. Their strategic role in agriculture and water

sector must be acknowledged. Their participation in policy and practice fora must be enhanced

to make the situations gender sensitive.

Water Users Associations (WUAs):

PIDA prides itself of being ‘on the threshold of change. Its Urdu subtitle on its official website

invites farmers to ‘step in and efficiently manage the irrigation system. The vision purported by

the department says: “Punjab, the largest of the four provinces of Pakistan, is implementing

wide ranging reforms under its economic visions and water strategy through improving

governance and reforminmg all sectors to improve delivery of public services in association with

52

private sector. “To provide adequate, equitable and reliable irrigation supplies to the culturable

lands of Punjab, aiming of enhanced agricultural productivity”21.

No successful example of Water Users Associations was found in the area. However there are

a few examples in the province. WUAs began to be formed in mid 1990s. I hereby quote a case

studied by South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) in its book on pro-poor irrigation reforms

(2008).

Case Study22: Water Board and Participatory Water Management: Development of

Water Boards (WBs), devolving management and encouraging farmers participation were its’

key purposes. The responsibility of irrigating around 40,000 acres of land was vested with Area

Water Board (AWB). Farmers Associations, Provincial Drainage Authority and Agriculture

Department constitute the Board. The Board attempts to provide equal representation to the

head-end and the tail-end users. Farmers Associations are also responsible to manage a

distributary canal too. One moga per associations was assigned. Collecting water taxes, of

which 60% is to be paid to the Department is also the Associations responsibility. Farmers can

use the rest for the maintenances of water courses. At least 9 members constitute an

Association. At least 3 of them should represent the poorest farmers. According to some of the

reports the said system worried most of the departmental employees. Some of the department

employees are even reported of seeking work from with associations. Big landlords are also told

to be opposing the proposed system.

In one of the studies that assessed the performance of 75 farmer groups. It was told that in the

canal area of Lower Chenab East several groups had almost controlled water theft and raised

water tax from 52% to 75%. The big and powerful land lords stopped given abyana as the steal

was controlled. But with this system, the farmer groups fined those found guilty of stealing water

or not paying abyana which would amount to the 20 times charges of the stolen water. However

the system could not spread and was obstructed by the politically influential land lord. The

bureaucracy too was not totally supportive of the system.

21 Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) See: http://pida.punjab.gov.pk/

22 The Case Study has been quoted in South Asia Partnership – Pakistan’s study, Water Rights: The need for pro-poor reforms (2008)

53

V - Much Needed Reforms in Policy and Practices Arena

Punjab Irrigation Department claims, “A specially designed system is being developed for each

channel whereby data about authorized discharge, indented supply, gauge reading, actual

releases of every channel will be entered in it on daily basis by each Canal Division. All other

related data such as L- Section, number of reaches of each channel, and location, discharges

and CCA of off takes/out-lets of each channel, would be linked up with the System in the form of

data base. Under this arrangement decision makers/monitoring units, without waiting for the

information from field, will have access to essential data through computers, which would

enable them to make appropriate decision without delay. This digitized data would be used as a

tool for achieving proper management of the canal system, equitable distribution of water to

shareholders/Farmers Organizations23”. But on the ground the situations is still the same as we

have studied. Abundance assumption has created number of problems with the use of water, policy

formulation and management of water. Supply orientation and recurrent demands from the

users as well as departmental reasoning all stress on the shortage of supply not on effective

planning or management. Managing demand, saving line losses, minimizing waste and less

water intensive cropping is rarely spoken about. The whole orientation needs to be shifted

around as no resource is ever abundant to be abused. Mindful of the scarcity and associated

problems radical reforms are needed at the branch canals and distributaries in Punjab and

23 (Ibid)

54

South Punjab in particular. Institutional and policy failure is evident from the above drawn

analysis. Low rechargability, inequity and flawed delivery riddled with maneuvering and power

play present a disappointing state of irrigation water management on ground.

Water, like any other commodity, is scarce and getting scarcer. Insufficiency, inequity and

uncertainty are the strategic issues to be dealt with. The problem of quantity and quality both

are a matter of concern. Productivity is rapidly falling. Environmental and ecological balance is

fatally affected. Using less to produce more asks for elaborate strategy. Comprehensive

planning, management and provision of water is not possible unless concerned departments

stop working in isolation. Management and supply of water, as we have seen, is pertained as

technical and engineering phenomenon which stands contrary to social and economic reality.

Users and rural communities, their attitudes and priorities need to be taken into account while

planning and policy formulation.

With changing cropping pattern, from subsistence to profitable business, sprawling populations

and food need, feeding the agro-industry compound the problem. Management and sustenance

of water, irrigation water in particular, call for a holistic vision for reforms. Broad spectrum of

water sector needs to be integrated with far reaching institutional reforms:

Along with the seasonal adjustment, allocation of water is at present is too technical and

straight that needs to be revisited and made equitable and socially rational. Irrigation

department needs restructuring – including water cess, warabandi, O & M cost and

regulatory mechanism to carry out its role in effective manner. A cost-effective, people-

sensitive, eco-friendly and participatory planning and management is a must for optimum

utilization of water. Part of the O&M and supervisory responsibilities should be

transferred to the farmers associations to shed off burden from public sector. To curb

down flood irrigation pattern, small irrigation schemes like check dams, infiltrations

galleries, delay action dams, diversion weirs and other frugal methods need to be widely

brought into practice.

Tying it up with O&M cost and minimizing waste there lies a potential to gradually

increase abyana or water cess. In theory, two approaches are suggested in relation to

pricing with efficiency i.e. market efficiency which favours raising revenue as per O&M

55

cost and public authority to be authorized to collect revenue to recover maintenance

cost. I will advocate the latter. The first one supports stringent entitlement of using water,

even the trading rights given to users. State authority is preserved here but legal or

usufructory rights are allotted to users including the right to trade. None of the above

arrangement exists in Punjab or any other province. Subject to economic, technical and

social test more cost effective and efficient system could be adopted.

On the other count, entirely a market led solution to reduce waste and enhance

efficiency may not work. It will not support the small and medium range farmers.

Transforming water into a tradable commodity might sweep away poor farmers. Unable

to bear the cess, they might sell their lands to the big landlords at throwaway prices and

turn into wage labourer. Therefore, alternative and multiple way outs are necessary to

mull over.

Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), already practiced successfully in

parts of Punjab, need to be extended in southern Punjab, including the districts in hand.

To minimize salinity, public tunbewells that are not in fashion have got a discharge rate

more than double of the private tubewells. If at all necessary, fractional or more than one

cusec tubewells should be installed whose discharge rate is as low as 6lps.

Indigenous varieties of seeds and traditional crops need to be reintroduced that need

less water and can even survive with a very limited amount of water.

National Drainage Programme (NDP) and Accelerated Water Management (AWM) need

to be implemented effectively and efficiently.

Broadly, the technical and engineering solutions are not successful in fulfilling the need

and equitable distribution of water. Fulfilling water needs through designs and

techniques subservient to engineering standards rarely resolve the problem. Social,

economic and ecological preferences must be kept in mind. Conservation, frugal use,

and reuse is more important than creating more and more canals or employing new

technologies for short term gains.

56

Large dams, given the massive silt they collect in a couple of decades and serious

environmental damages they cause, must stop being considered as a solution to the

problem. Therefore alternative, small-scale, sustainable, environment friendly means

should be employed to collect, store, use and reuse water for longer periods of time.

Interacting with the people to understand their social and economic preferences is also

important. Local knowledge and experience must be incorporated in the irrigation water

management and conflict resolution.

There is a need for creating a separate conflict resolution body and policy institution at

South Punjab level. Desegregated data for irrigation canals, water-courses, shares and

allocations, shortage and supply need to be provided for the area to resolve problems at

relatively smaller administrative units to appropriately and timely resolve conflicts and

other issues.

Civil society and farmers’ participation in irrigation water supply and management needs

to be enhanced. Farmers need to be trained for efficient water use, less water intensive

cropping and most importantly efficient and innovative water use methods. Water Users

associations need to be empowered. Bio-saline farming be introduced to cultivate

salinity affected lands. NGOs intervention, where found, in case of irrigation water

supply, is sporadic and unsustainable. An integrated system of managing ground, canal

and used water be developed and regulated.

High efficiency irrigation systems such as such as drip, bubbler, sprinkler and community

irrigation system need to be widely introduced and encouraged. Along with that

agriculture sector needs to be diversified to make best of the available water. Furrow

closed and ridge and bed irrigation is also recommended to save water and adjust the

supply of water according to needs of a crop.

Last but not least media needs to play important role in introducing and encouraging

farmers to use water efficient methods and technologies to minimize waste and enhance

efficiency. Proper scheduling, if adopted, is likely to reduce water logging and manage

soil structure and salinity problems. Farmers conserve moisture and estimate what crop

57

in which type of soil and temperature needs to be grown with what amount of water.

Water courses should regularly be cleaned from mud, weeds and herbs to keep the flow

of water smooth and efficient.

***

58

Bibliography:

Arif Hassan (2003) National water plans and socio-economic realities in Kaiser Bangali (2003) The politics of managing water, Ed. Oxfaor University Press and SDPI, Islamabad.

Danish Mustafa (2008?) Colonial law, contemporary water issues in Pakistan, Department of Geography, University of South Florida, 140 7th Ave South, St Petersburg, USA, Danish Mustafa (2010) Hydropolitics in Pakistan, USIP, Washington DC, See: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR261%20-%20Hydropolitics_in_Pakistan's%20_Indus_Basin.pdf Irrigation System in Pakistan (2012): http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/isp.pdf

Mahmood Ahmed (2003): Issues in water policy reforms in Kaiser Bangali (2003) The politics of managing water, Ed. Oxford University Press and SDPI, Islamabad.

Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) See: http://pida.punjab.gov.pk/

Punjab irrigation and Drainage Aurthority (PIDA) On the threshold of change, See: http://pida.punjab.gov.pk/reforms_initiatives.htm

Shahrukh Rafi Khan and Haroon Ayube Khan (2003) Water vision Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Islamabad.

Ben Orlove and Steven C. Caton (2010) Water sustainability: Anthropological approaches and prospects, Annual Review of Anthropology 39: Pge. 401–15, New York, U.S.A.

Canal System in Pakistan (2012): http://agripoint.blogspot.com/p/canal-system-of-pakistan.html

Land Use in Pakistan (2012): http://www.google.com.pk/imgres?imgurl=http://www.tbl.com.pk

Mubashir Rizvi (2012) Joy in the Wilderness: Millenial irrigations as gift of colonial infrastructure, Reported in Published In The Express Tribune, June 28th, 2012, See: http://tribune.com.pk/story/400143/re-thinking-canal-colonisation-caste-was-integral-to-canal-colonisation/

UNHC (1999) Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, See: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf

Waqar A. Jehangir and Nazim Ali (2003), Salinity and sustainability of agricultural productivity in irrigated areas, Oxford University Press and SDPI, Islamabad.

Khaleeq Kinani (2004) Permanent water body to settle vital issues: province to have similar management forum, See: http://archives.dawn.com/2004/11/05/top9.htm

59

Khaleeq Kiani (2005) Draft water policy placed before cabinet, See: http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/20/top5.htm

South Asia Partnership – Pakistan (2008) Aabi haqooq: Nizam-e-aabpahi mein ghareen dost islahat ki zaroorat (Urdu)

World Wide Fund for Nature (2006) Better Management Practices for Cotton and Sugarcane, Crop management review: Helping farmers mange their crops in the most appropriate and better way, WWF and Fereoze Sons Pakistan, Lahore.

60

Annexure - I

Data Collection Plan Before Conducting Research

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): The researcher will conduct at least “8” Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), in total, “3” in each of

the target areas i.e. Lodhran, Khanewal and Vehari and “1” with the Civil Society Group active

or engaged in the water entitlement and agriculture issues and practices. In each focus groups

discussion at least 15 to 20 persons will be managed to participate for enriched discussion and

better assessment. At least one FGD will be organized exclusively with women in each district.

Please see FGD Questionnaire in Annexure – I. Notes of the Questionnaires and where

possible or agreed by the correspondent, an audio recording shall also be made of this one and

all types and categories of the interviews here-below shall be made.

Individual Interviews: The Researcher plans to conduct at least “8” individual interviews, government and independent

experts inclusive. Interviewing public sector authorities, i.e. SDO and XEN of irrigations

department, “1” each at district level, “1” with SE at the divisional level (Multan) and “1” with

Secretary Irrigation at provincial level, and “1” each with Assistant Agriculture Engineer, Deputy

District Officer, District Officer, Executive District Officer and the last one with Director General if

available seem to be important. The interviews will be documented, thrashed and referenced to

approach to the issues and proposed solutions. Please see Individual Interview Questionnaire

in Annexure- III

Meeting and Discussion with Civil Society Networks: The researcher will hold open ended interviews (maximum 3) with the select representatives of

SAAG, PKI and any other if relevant. These will help him to understand their approach, problem

analysis and policy position they have been advocating or recommending for X number of

years. This will prove instrumental to get to the adequate policy positions recommended in the

61

course of action taken during the project implementation as well. Please see Civil Society and

Agriculture Network Questionnaire in Annexure .

Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses & Documentation: To serve the key purpose, the whole data shall be sequenced, assessed and understood to

generate a policy discourse around the entitlement issue of water. With an Executive Study and

Conclusion, the study will comprise on various parts classifying and correlating the issue and its

main findings. Depending on findings, adequate advocacy, lobbying, campaigning strategies

and policy recommendations shall be put forth. The said research, will not only set the course

the project in the right direction, it will rather orchestrate progress measurement and end-line

studies, as incorporated in the project. However, the raison-de-tre and the most strategic use of

the project will be to seek improvement in the policies, provision, practices and regulations in

the entitlement of irrigation water, favouring the poor, medium and smallholders in particular and

improving their livelihood and reducing poverty in general. Institutionalizing, water rights and

water entitlements and accountability in this regards shall be the ideal outcome of the whole

exercise.

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Annexure - II

Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire

(Both for Men and Women Farmers)

Note: All the questions will be asked in the local languages i.e. Saraiki and Punjabi or Urdu as it

goes convenient to the correspondent

1. What is the water distributions system in your area?

2. Who gets how much share, how and why?

3. What is the range of the land size of the participants of the FGD – a general

assessment?

4. What are the key problems of the water distribution ‘system’ in the area?

5. Do you know the law of water distribution and if you do what is the source? Customary

knowledge, employees of the Irrigation Department or what?

6. Do you think that the law is perfect and there is a problem with the practice or the law

itself is discriminatory?

7. What is the water tax system in the area? Is it fair and if not what is wrong with it?

8. Who gets the larger share of water in the area, more than (he, she or the family)

deserves, why and how?

9. What is the role and entitlement of women with respect to distribution, getting and/giving

a share of water and water taxation?

10. How can we increase the role of women in the above said areas of water distribution?

11. How can we change the situation? What can be done and how can you succeed?

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12. Do you foresee any threats or dangers in case you try to set things right? Anything you

would like to share on your own?

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Annexure - III

In-depth Individual interview Questionnaire

From the Departmental Representatives:

1. What is your designations and role in the water distribution system in Lodhran,

Khanewal or Vehari (Whatever district representative he is)?

2. What official and unofficial (carefully asked) authorities you have in providing, blocking,

increasing or decreasing the water share of an individual, village and or a family?

3. Do you have any complaint mechanism of water availability, unavailability, accessibility

or inaccessibility and how do you register and address it?

4. Do you think the distributions of water in the said area or to the said groups of people or

individual is fair or there is a need for change? If yes what, if not why?

5. Who is who and what is what in the department? (carefully asked while taking the

official) in confidence.

6. Eventually who owns water and who is the custodian of water? (artfully asked question)

7. Do women have or need to have an entitlement of water as users, and if not why?

8. Who (which group, family or class of farmers) suffers the most and how can we improve

the situation.

9. What is the distribution of authorities between the district, division and the Province?

10. How do you and or the department resolves the conflict between water users,

individuals, families or villages?

11. Do you believe that the water is distributed according to the ‘schedule’ written in books

or there are certain violations and if it is in the departmental knowledge why an action is

not taken (carefully asked question)?

65

12. Would you like to share the water distributions ‘schedules,’ timing, quantity and the

period as described by the law?

13. Anything you would like to share on your own?

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Annexure – IV

Individual Interviews from Users or any-one else in relation to the Issue

Most of the Questions will remain the same as described in the FGD and the above mentioned

individual questionnaire. However some of the questions shall be added according to the role,

position or interests of the interviewees.

Civil Society and Agriculture Network Questionnaire

Note: Part of the Questions shall remain the same as described above with somewhat tilting.

However rest of the specific questions are asked here under.

1. What are the key objectives of the network or the association and what connection it has

got in or with the improvement of the irrigation water distribution system?

2. What role have you played so far?

3. In your eyes what is the major flaw in the present water distribution system in Punjab?

4. What are the successes and the failures so far? What are the causes and the factors

behind?

5. What is your take on the water distribution system in the province and particularly in the

target areas?

6. What lobbying tactics do you or have you been using? Could you please count any

successes or failures and the reasons behind?

7. Would you like to intervene in the unfair distribution system of water in the target districts

and how?

8. Are there any chances of making the water distribution more user and particularly

smallholders and small-farmers friendly and how cum?

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9. What could be the best lobbying method, who to lobby with and how to make a

difference in favour of the rural poor?

***