War and Politics Clausewitz Today

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DOI: 10.1177/001083677701200304

1977 12: 187Cooperation and ConflictJulian Lider

War and Politics: Clausewitz Today

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War and Politics: Clausewitz TodayJULIAN LIDER

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm

Lider, J. War and Politics: Clausewitz Today. Cooperation and Conflict, XII, 1977,187-206.

The study reviews the dispute on the nature of war in the West and in the SovietUnion.After a brief description of the Clausewitzian philosophy and his concepts ofabsolute and real war, three Western schools of thought - the so-called militaristicschool, political realism and pacifism - as well as the Soviet concept of war arediscussed in relation to the Clausewitzian scheme. Differences between the Westernand Soviet philosophies of war are then analyzed. They consist in different inter-pretations of the politics of war (emphasis on foreign policy in the West vs. internalwar in the Soviet approach), and of the notion of war (focus on interstate war in theWest vs. Soviet primacy of civil war), as well as in different perspectives on the futureof war (unclear future in the West vs. the Soviet assertion about the disappearanceof war after the inevitable world-wide triumph of socialism). The author maintains thatthe debate over the interpretation of the Clausewitzian formulas on war is usefulfor revealing basic differences and similarities between the two antagonistic interpreta-tions of socio-political reality and may therefore contribute to the prevention of war.

Julian Lider, The Swedish Institute of InternationalAffairs, Stockholm.

Few problems are so apparently simple,

yetare at

thesame time

objects ofsuch

intractable theoretical and political dis-pute as the problem of the nature of war.Three different postures, here called the

militaristic, the political-realist, and the

pacifistic, confront each other within thegeneral Western approach to war as apolitical phenomenon; and there is alsoa fundamental difference of views be-tween the two antagonistic ideologicalcamps - the so-called socialist and West-

ern camps. It seems therefore reasonableto arrange the review of this discussion

in two rounds: first to look at the differ-ences between the three Western schoolsof thought, and at the evolution of Sovietthought and then to compare the views ofthe two ideological antagonists.

1. THE CLAUSEWITZIAN FORMULA

AND ITS TRADITIONAL INTERPRE-

TATION

To look at the Western views first, thediscussion on the nature of war can be

seen as an off-shoot of the long debate

on the nature of war that has its roots

in the philosophical controversies of thenineteenth century. The central figure inthis respect is undoubtedly Clausewitz,for many modem theories on the nature

of war have been fashioned to defend,reinterpret, or refute his ideas.

Clausewitz analyzed two interrelatedproblems: what war is in its ideal andreal form, and how to win it. In investi-gating the first problem, he concentratedon two aspects of war - as a military

activity and as a political act. Clausewitzattempted to comprise the essence of hisviews within the preliminary definitionthat war is an act of violence intended to

compel our opponent to fulfil our will.22

Alogical development of this idea ledhim to the complementary formula thatwar is an act of violence pushed to itsutmost bounds.33 Clausewitz (and hiscommentators) considered this expressionto contain the

conceptof an absolute

war, because the logic of reciprocalviolent action to destroy the enemysforces or to disarm him in order to com-

pel him to act in some desired way would

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lead, he felt, to an extreme form of

fighting without any restraints or limits.Clausewitz commented that absolute

war in this sense should be taken as an

ideal form of hostilities; it describes whatall wars would be if no moderating fac-tors were to influence their course. In

reality, no war is ever absolute becauseall are limited in some way.Astate of

pure violence cannot be achieved owingto the friction created by some militaryand psychological factors as well aspolitical aims, all of which set bounds to

the amount of violence that can begenerated. Of these three, Clausewitzemphasized the importance of taking thelast into account when analyzing realwars; in his most famous interpretationwar is nothing but a continuation of

political intercourse, with a mixture ofother means,4 he contended that warsconducted more by military principlesthan political objectives tend to be nearlyabsolute.

Together the concepts of absolute andreal war constitute what might be calledthe Clausewitzian philosophy of war.When combined with his views of theinternational system, the nation-state, andthe role of war, they make up his politicalphilosophy. Clausewitz regarded war asa normal phase in the relations betweenstates, and as a normal instrument ofstate policy; since states aim at increasing

their power at the expense of other states,their interests are always in conflict. Waras a rational instrument of national policyhe considered to be the proper means of

resolving such conflicts and increasingpower. To him it was self-evident thatwar is planned and waged under thedirection of the ruler, who represents thewhole nation and embodies its spiritualqualities.5 Clausewitz therefore had nocause to address himself to the relation

between war and ethics; war needed no

justification beyond its effectiveness forachieving certain desired goals.

These then are the basic elements of

Clausewitzs position, if in a highlycondensed form. In the traditional debateon the nature of

war,three

contendingviews might be defined in relation to theClausewitzian scheme:

(1) the militaristic school, whichmaintains that once wars have broken

out, they are uncontrollable by politicalobjectives and must therefore be guidedby purely military considerations;

(2) the school of political realism,which upholds the view that war canbe waged under political control; and

(3) the pacifistic school, which deniesthe basic tenet shared by both of theother views, that war is an unavoidablereality, and offers an alternative philo-sophical perspective in which to set polit-ical conflicts and their resolution.

1. The Militaristic SchoolTo the military man of the mid-nineteenth

century,the Clausewitzian

conceptof the

ideal war as violence pushed to its utmostbounds summed up well the role he hadchosen in life: to conduct wars for his

country as efficiently as possible. To him,Clausewitzs writing was all the morevaluable in that it contained lengthy sec-tions of practical advice on the best strate-gy and tactics to adopt to approach theideal war. It therefore became well-known

amongst the military leaders of the great

European armies of the nineteenth cen-tury, and influenced their official militarydoctrines. The Prussian generals were thefirst to incorporate his views,6 but hisidea of war as a massive concentrated

attack of all disposable resources toachieve total victory also influencedFrench and English military thinking andtheir preparations for war. It was in factthe basis of their strategy at the beginningof World War 1.7

Members of this school of interpreta-tion contended that Clausewitz regardedwar as a primarily military act, intendedto disarm the enemy, thus military victory



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was the ultimate, decisive, and thereforethe only important aim of hostilities; po-

litical goals had very little influence onthe actual course of fighting. They point-ed out that the bulk of Clausewitzs workwas in fact devoted to strategic problemsand to the methods of winning war. Hiscomment that the whole conduct of

military operations should be guided bythe political aims of the war they con-sidered to be a secondary remark. There-fore, although wars might arise for polit-ical reasons, once they had actuallybegun, political considerations becamesubordinate. Politicians should therefore

be silent the moment mobilization begins.8Despite the debacle of the First World

War, the militaristic interpretation ofClausewitz survived and was particularlyinfluential in the German army; the fas-

cist war-plans, rooted in the whole tradi-tion of the German military thought,were also influenced by a militaristic

interpretationof Clausewitzian ideas of

absolute war and destruction of the

enemy.

2. Political Realism

There is also a long line of thoughtbehind the view which put emphasis ona quite different aspect of the Clausewit-zian philosophy of war, namely, that waris simply one of the means by which

states try to achieve their political objec-tives, and that it is therefore subordinateto politics. It is now generally recognizedthat this idea was one of the main onesin Clausewitzs study of war, but his riseto eminence in this school of thoughtoccurred only after World War II; earlierthe embrace in which he was held by hisself-appointed disciples in the militaristicschool caused him to be generally identi-fied with their standpoint.

Ideas very similar to Clausewitzs polit-ical conception of war were often ex-pressed in the second half of the nine-teenth century by statesmen, historians,

and other men of letters who understoodthe interplay of state affairs in terms of

the balance of power.9 Their treatmentof war as a means of acquiring power,pursuing national interests, and main-taining balance in international relationscorresponded to the Clausewitzian ideathat war is an instrument, largely deter-mined by power, which states employ inthe conduct of their foreign policy be-cause it is efficacious.l Many of thenotions of the balance of power frame-work have been inherited and given amodern guise by the school of politicalrealism.

3. The Pacifistic SchoolThe third line of political thought aboutthe nature of war, which may also be

traced back to the nineteenth century,where it appears in various philosophicaland sociological works, might be calledpacifistic; with respect to the Clause-witzian

systemof ideas it is

whollycriti-

cal, for it is based on a different set offirst principles. Underlying the variousviews that constitute this tradition is the

assumption that war must be seen as apathological and highly undesirable phe-nomenon that ought to be eliminatedfrom social life. The idea that war mightbe used as an instrument of policy ap-pears militaristic because the approval itconfers on war implies that wars are

unavoidable, natural, and justifiable, aview which is anathema to the pacifists.Three ways of developing an anti-war

philosophy might be identified. One, thetruly pacifistic belief, is grounded onethical principles. It is highly critical ofany suggestion that because war is effica-cious it may be used as an instrument of

policy, for its total indifference to themoral issue of justifying means on theirown and not merely in relation to theends sought.Any theory of war that doesnot include a moral evaluation of war

itself must therefore be rejected as in-complete.



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Then there is the utopian tradition,which is based on the belief that there

exists a basic harmony of interestsbe-

tween all men and all states. The utopiansare highly critical of the position takenby the realists that the highest knowable

good is the national interest. This leadsthem into the fallacy of defining nationalinterest internally on the basis of a selfishethic, the utopians maintain. This is anerror because the nations of the world

coexist in a social system; the interest ofeach nation can have no meaning if

defined without regard to the rest of theworld of which the nation is an insep-arable part. Consequently, the contentionof the realists that wars must occur be-

cause states inevitably find themselves

engaged in insoluble conflicts in thepursuit of their respective national inter-ests is based in a faulty premise. On thecontrary, the utopians maintain, if allstates were to follow their true national

interests,based on a

global perspective,they could resolve all possible differenceswithout resorting to violence. 11The third group that might be included

under the pacifistic heading is the branchof sociology called peace research orconflict resolution, for it too is devotedto eliminating war.Although they con-sider war to be a political act, theyusually do not interpret it as Clausewitzdoes as an act that continues deliberate

efforts to fulfil some political purpose;to them it is rather the outcome of an

interplay of political forces that createsa situation, the structure of which obligesthe decision-maker to conclude that war

is the best course of action. These socialscientists believe that war can be pre-vented if steps are taken to create acultural setting in which war is less attrac-tive than other available means of resolv-

ing the political conflicts that arise.

II. WARAND POLITICS IN THE

NUCLEAR ERA

Before tracing the views of these threelines of political thought into the nuclearera, I should like to indicate how the

boundaries between them have changedin a way that makes it difficult to main-

tain the typology at all.The second World War and the events

immediately preceding it demonstratedthat the premises of pacifism, howeverworthy they may have been as ideals,were too far divorced from reality to be

useful for analysing it. These same ex-periences, together with the advent ofthe nuclear age and the unthinkable war,also discredited militarism. Only the

political realists seemed to have a gripon what was happening. For this reasonthe main conceptual elements of the

political realists became the basis for

virtually all Western understanding ofinternational relations in the post-war

period. However,such

conceptsas

pow-er and state interests have provensufficiently elastic to admit interpreta-tions that accord with a wide range of

perspectives on the politico-military situa-tion of the world and on trends in its

development. It is in this form thatpacifism and militarism have survived.

Scholars who search for peaceful waysof resolving conflicts or of creating aviable peace reflect the former pacifistsaim of eliminating war. However, theyare much less utopian than the inter-warpacifists, and they share with politicalrealists their general ideas about theessence of politics and war. The initialimpetus to peace research as a separatefield of study came from scholars withsuch an outlook. Despite the fact that thistype of research emerged in oppositionto the hard-boiled brand of politicalrealism that predominated in the 1950s,the profiles of the orientations havebecome somewhat blurred. What remains

of pacifism is a fundamental optimismheld by some scholars, who may indeed



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be traditionalists or peace researchers,that peace is possible and would be

normal if it were not for many unneces-sary obstacles created by men who pre-vent it from developing. Moreover, theystress that the interests of states must be

interpreted in the light of the needs ofworld community.

Militarism has similarly become morea basic attitude than a school of thought.It is based on the belief that war is inevi-

table and that one should therefore make

the best use of it one can. This perspec-

tive, though weaker than in the heydayof militarism, still pervades the thinkingof many professional strategists. Inas-much as these people, like the politicalrealists, conceive of politics in terms ofstate interests and of war as a means of

resolving interstate conflicts, they maybe called the right wing of modern polit-ical realism.

Finally, even those who feel they

belongto the tradition of

politicalrealism

have taken different paths in refining itsanalytical tools. Various schools havesprung up, and they often disagree witheach other. What distinguishes the per-spective (as different from the concept) ofa political realist from that of a militariston the one hand or a pacifist on theother is his unwillingness to pass a priorijudgment on the value of war: states willgo to war when they believe it lies in

their interest to do so; whether war willbreak out or not will depend upon thedynamics of the balance of power - somuch he is prepared to say, no more.

Consequently, in what follows, I shallnot treat the three lines of politicalthought of the previous section as threeseparate theories, but rather as three

perspectives within the Western study ofinternational relations. It is the devel-

opment of thermonuclear weapons which

has had the most profound impact on theWestern debate concerning the relationbetween war and politics.As mentioned,all participants in the debate have been

forced to modify their position somewhat,but all claim that the technological devel-

opments have demonstrated the basicsoundness of their respective view on thenature of war.

1. The Primacy of Politics QuestionedThe militarists have argued that theadvent of nuclear weapons, and especiallyballistic missiles with nuclear warheads,has strengthened the validity of theircontention that war is governed by a logicof its own. Such weapons make realizablethe Clausewitzian idea of absolute waras violence pushed to its utmost boundsThe technical limitations to pure war

have virtually been overcome, and thetotal destruction of the enemy is conse-

quently possible.One of the initial conclusions drawn

by the militarists as a result of the newsituation that emerged after the SecondWorld War was that the West was nowin a position to wage a preventive waragainst the Soviet Union.As the capa-bility of the Soviet Union to launch amissile attack quickly grew, it becameclear that such a doctrine was untenable,however. The realization that a thermo-nuclear war would risk mutual destruc-tion therefore forces the militarists toretreat from their traditional stand thatwar is inevitable and desirable to the

position that war is probably unavoidable(because of the designs of the enemy)even though it is undesirable.

2. War as an Instrument of PolicyConfirmedThe second great camp in the modemdebate on the nature of war i.e. politicalrealism proper, holds that with the ex-

ception of thermonuclear war, the ideathat war is a continuation and instrumentof policy has withstood the test of timeand remains valid. War is still a quitenormal phase in interstate relations,



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which is only natural, since no foreignpolicy can be carried out unless it isbacked

up by military capabilitiesto

wage war if the need should arise. The

following arguments are advanced insupport of this position.13

(1) The world is still full of politicalconflicts, some of which can only beresolved by means of armed violence.

(2) The main factors that have aninfluence on the incidence of war remain.

The number of independent states hasincreased, for example; other things

being equal, the risk that wars will breakout is thereby greater.

(3) War is still a practicable, perhapseven a necessary way of achieving somepolitical goals, particularly if it is usedrationally in proportion to the politicalaims.

(4) The theoretical statement that waris a continuation and instrument of policymost not be confused with the questionwhether war of some

particularkind is

useful as such an instrument. If warbreaks out, it will be a continuation of

policy; if not, even when the conflictis a major one that cannot be resolvedby peaceful means, the reason is simplythat there is no war of any kind that is

a suitable instrument for pursuing thepolicy. Thus far from invalidating theClausewitzian formula, the unlikelihoodof full-scale nuclear war actually confirms

it: such a war is unlikely for the veryreason that it could not serve any politicalpurpose. In this respect nuclear war is

unique, however.(5) The corresponding argument is that

governments continue to resort to limitedwars as a means of policy, as is witnessedby the frequency with which such warsstill occur. 14 Moreover, there are manyindications to show that limited wars are

in fact guided by political objectives:strategy and tactics stress flexibility tomeet a variety of situations, and thehostilities are intended not so much to killas many as possible as to demoralize the

enemys soldiers. Some even argue that inmodern revolutionary wars, the ultimateaim

ofwhich

isto

winthe

hearts andminds of men, the military operations arenot merely limited, but are virtuallydirectly governed by political directives.The realists, on the other hand, have

been prepared to admit that if a thermo-nuclear war were to break out it could

probably not be controlled by politicalobjectives,ls and that to this extent theconcept of war has changed. The realistscontend, however, that such a modifica-

tion cannot challenge the validity of thebasic idea of war as a political act, be-cause such a war would like the Clause-

witzian absolute war be purely destruc-tive ; it should therefore be regarded likeabsolute war as a hypothetical case. 16Since nothing of value can be achievedby realising so much destructive power,to launch a nuclear war cannot be a

real alternative.An unthinkable warmust be a

highly improbablewar. For all

other kinds of war - the real wars - the

primacy of politics has not been altered.

3. TheAnti-War-Tradition

Representatives of the third traditionalview on the nature of war have also madetheir voices heard in the modem debate.The shattering experience of total war inthe Second World War and the prospect

of total annihilation in a thermonuclearwar clearly show the grotesqueness of themilitarist position, they maintain. Theview held without any reference to ethicalnorms by many realists of war as a nor-mal and everlasting tool for realizingpolitical goals the pacifists condemn asextremely dangerous; it directs effortstowards maintaining war as an instrumentof policy and creating rational forms ofwar instead of towards searching for waysof completely eliminating war. 17



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4. The Traditional Notion of WarQuestioned

Finally it should be noted that within allthree main perspectives there are indi-vidual scholars who doubt the adequacyof the standard conceptions of war foran understanding of war in the nuclearera.Amongst the observations on which

they base their uncertainty are the fol-lowing :

(1) If a thermonuclear war were tobreak out, it would be quite unlike anytraditionally conceived war, not only be-cause of its uselessness as a politicalinstrument, but also because it would bea process of mutual destruction without

any combat.

(2) Unlike past wars, which were allthe result of at least some amount of

political planning and deliberation, it isvery likely that the next major war willbe unwanted and unintended and break

out accidentally.

(3)Wars at the national

level, whichwere once the most common type, occurmuch less frequently now in relation tosubnational or internal wars; the stan-dard war has in other words changedcharacter.

(4) Put another way, this observationcould point to the tendency for modemwars to be unconventional in their meansand ends if compared with the concep-tion of war as it is traditionally con-

ceived. In the old paradigm, war wasfought by clearly defined military forcesin a limited number of battles in order tosettle a dispute over the policy thecombatants would allow each other to

conduct. Most modern wars have the

less restricted aim of gaining control overthe socio-political system of the enemythrough protracted warfare involvingboth regular troops and civilians.

(5) If one of the main conceivable kindsof war, nuclear rocket war, cannot be

regarded as an instrument of policy, areexamination of the whole concept ofthe nature of war is required.185-Ca-Co1977133

The great debate in the Western theoryof the nature of war in the nuclear era

is thus very complicated - it is difficultto draw the lines between the variouspositions with any great degree of preci-sion.

III. THE SOVIET INTERPRETA-

TION OF CLAUSEWITZ

1. The TraditionalApproachTo turn to Soviet ideas, some evolutionof views may be noted. Within the frame-

work of Soviet theory the meaning of theClausewitzian formula which was inher-ited from the writings of the fathers ofMarxism has been profoundly changed intwo respects. In the first place, the prin-cipal terms, policy and war, weredefined in relation to the fundamental

Marxist concept of class.And secondly,in consequence of the broader conceptof war, the formula was applied not onlyto wars between

states,but also to in-

ternal war. Once these changes weremade, it was possible for Soviet scholarsto criticize Clausewitz for erring on thesetwo points, and to dismiss him bybranding him and his disciples as repre-sentatives of the reactionary classes.

2. Stalins Opinion of Clausewitz andits ConsequencesIn February 1947, when Colonel Razin

asked Stalin whether Clausewitz was stillrelevant, Stalin answered in the nega-tive,19 and his answer touched off a

thorough critique of the political-militaryideology and the philosophy of war onwhich Clausewitz based his formula ofwar as a political act.Three main objections were raised

against Clausewitzs philosophy of war.To begin with, the balance between histwo concepts of war as an act of violenceon the one hand and as a political acton the other was incorrect. In Clause-witzs view, the primary concept wasabsolute war, which in its pure form was



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by definition independent of politicalconsiderations. The political element ofwar was

clearly secondary,since its

onlyrole was to constrain the amount ofviolence used. Moreover the whole notionof absolute war was unacceptable toSoviet scholars. They interpreted it asthe licentiousness of biological, animalinstincts, massive physical violence, un-limited by any norms or laws of conduct-ing war.2 To regard absolute war as anideal, as some sort of perfect state worthstriving for, was an indication of Clause-

witzs reactionary class ideology. Thethird objection concerns the second con-cept of war as a political act.Althoughthis idea contains a grain of truth, it wasdistorted by an incorrect interpretationof what constitutes politics. In theidealistic interpretation of Clausewitz,politics and war are seen as the resultof the voluntary actions of rulers. Marxhad shown the folly of such a view by

demonstratingthat behaviour is rooted in

the material base, that is in the system of

production and the socio-economic struc-ture.

Owing to this philosophical approach,Clausewitz treats politics as a non-classphenomenon and confines himself toforeign policy. He thereby makes themistake of assuming that the policy con-ducted by the ruler of a state embodiesthe interests of the whole nation. By

treating politics and war as matters ofstate, he was able to conceal the realclass content of predatory wars waged bythe German Junkers.The Soviet critics therefore conclude

that the Clausewitzian formula of waras a political act, taken in the contextof his whole philosophy and ideologicalbackground, could be rejected as unsci-entific. His idea about the connectionbetween war and policy was only partlytrue, and it was not until Marxism-Lenin-ism gave it a correct interpretation thatit became scientific and true. Marx and

Engels were the first to reveal the social

character of war, and Lenin and Stalinwere the first to indicate that war had a

class-politicalcharacter.

Following this official critique, Clause-witzs work fell into oblivion in the SovietUnion. Most often when the politicalnature of war was discussed in some work

on political or military matters, no men-tion was made of Clausewitz. When his

name appeared, his whole theory wasdismissed as unscientific and idealistic.

3. The Reappraisal after StalinIn the course of the reexamination of all

political-military doctrine that took placeafter Stalins death, Clausewitzs idea onwar and politics were initially met withsomewhat more favour,21 but after sometime the Soviet scholars attitude has

gradually returned to the more traditionalposition. Occasionally he has been namedthe creator of the philosophy of war, andthe first who

gavea clear and

penetratingdefinition of the nature of war and of thelinkage between war and politics, forwhich reason his contribution should be

considered progressive rather than reac-tionary. But all the old criticisms haveagain been taken up and they tend todominate the general tone of the Sovietassessment.22

In recent years it has become usual toaccentuate the differences between the

Clausewitzian and Leninist interpreta-tions of the formula that war is the con-tinuation of politics by other means.23The discussion of the subject in thehistory of the SovietArmed Forces, writ-ten by the Minister of Defence, shouldserve as an adequate example.24 Therethree differences between the Clausewit-zian and Soviet interpretations are clearlypresented: first, war as a continuation offoreign policy alone as opposed to waras the continuation of both domestic and

foreign policy in their inseparable unity;second, politics as the embodiment of the

highest intelligence of the state as op-



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posed to politics as a class instrument;and third, idealistic philosophy, distorting

the nature of politics and war and ob-scuring the roots and character of partic-ular wars as opposed to the materialisticinterpretation of war and the class systemthat generates wars. 25

Moreover, in the modern critique ofthe philosophy of war considered to bemost representative of Western thought,namely political realism, the Clause-witzian theory which is said to be adopt-ed by realists is often to be tarred with

the same brush, particularly with respectto its exaggeration of the role of armedviolence and to its moral indifference. 26At the same time as the Clausewitzian

contribution to the study of war has beensoft-pedalled, that of Marxism-Leninismhas been played up. Sometimes the thesisthat war is a continuation of politics isdescribed as a Marxist-Leninist principlewithout any reference to Clausewitz. 27

On other occasions Clausewitz is men-

tioned as the author of the principle, butthe fundamental changes made by Leninare underlined. 28 In the most zealous

effort in this direction, it has even been

suggested that some Russian theoristsdefined the link between war and politicsbefore Clausewitz did.29

4. Some Changes in the Interpretation

of the FormulaWhile there was no Soviet discussion onthe nature of war as a continuation of

politics similar to the Western one, Sovietscholars have tried to decide in what waythe change in the international situationbrought about by the changes in thesocio-political picture of the world andby the advent of nuclear military tech-nology has affected the nature of war andits future.

In their re-examination of the tradi-tional Soviet position they have focusedon three questions:- Is war still a continuation of policy?

- Is it a practicable and advisable meansof achieving political goals?

-

Do the answers to these questions haveany bearing on the theory of the inevi-tability of war, which has played a soprofound role in the Marxist-Leninisttheory of war?To recapitulate the discussion on war

as a continuation of politics,30 brieflySoviet scholars assert that this basic tenetin the theory of war remains valid.31The main form of the class conflict isthe struggle between the forces of capi-talistic imperialism on the one hand andthe progressive forces of socialism andnational liberation on the other. This

antagonism might take the form of awar between the two socio-political sys-tems32 - in other words, a world warbetween capitalist and socialist states -limited or local wars instigated by impe-rialism, or revolutionary wars for socialor national liberation.

If the first

questioncan be answered

in the affirmative without difficulty, thesecond question - is war a predictableand desirable means of conducting poli-cy ? - has posed some problems. For warto be a useful instrument of policy, theremust be some chance that it will lead to

victory and the achievement of the polit-ical goals desired. Even if war is usefulaccording to this criterion,33 it may stillbe an unadvisable means of pursuing

policy if the same goals could be achievedby peaceful means at lower cost, or iftotal costs, direct and indirect, of usingwar are greater than the resultant gain. Insuch a situation, victory and achieve-ment of goals would lose their meaning.

According to Soviet scholars, the appear-ance of nuclear weapons, which im-

mensely increased the costs of war, andthe growth of the socialist system whichcreated conditions for achieving revolu-

tionary goals by peaceful means, havehad a bearing on war in both theserespects, although the impact has beendifferent for each of the main types.



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As to the third question, the theory ofinevitability of war has been almost

wholly denounced. It may be argued thatthis theory is closely related to theWestern set of ideas about war as a

normal instrument of policy, and theabandonment of such a theory in theSoviet thinking cannot fail to mean achange in the interpretation of the Clau-sewitzian formula.

Single voices can also be noted aboutthe total obsolescence of all types ofwar in the nuclear epoch; and especiallyof a total war which in a sense would bean anti-war;34 it could not resolve anyinternational dispute and therefore itwould be neither a continuation nor an

instrument of policy.Such views were of course criticized

and condemned as pacifistic and de-

featist, since they implied that Sovietsociety would be destroyed and that novictory could be achieved; the very fact,

however,that such

opinionscould be

openly expressed was significant.

IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF

CLAUSEWITZ -ACOMPARISON

OF VIEWS

Despite the fundamental difference bothSoviet theory and political realism doassume that war is still a continuation of

politics by means of armed violence; theyare therefore conceptually related to thefamous Clausewitzian dictum.

Because of the diametrically opposedideologies prevailing in the Soviet Unionand in the West the same formula could

only be adopted by interpreting the prin-cipal terms in different ways. Therefore,although both agree that there exists arelation between politics and war wherebywar is the subordinate instrument of

politics, each views the nature of the

actual tie between the phenomena in adifferent way.

1.Approaches, Philosophies, and theFormula

Part of the difference may perhaps alsobe traced to the fact that the two tradi-tions have tried to answer two basicallydifferent questions in their approach totheir study of war. Clausewitz and hisfollowers continued a longstanding tradi-tion of analysing war to find the mosteffective method of achieving victory.His point of departure was clearly mili-tary. In his view, the Napoleonic cam-paigns had demonstrated the need fora new concept of war and a new kindof strategy. His interest in politics derivedfrom his belief that political aims in the

post-Napoleonic world influenced mili-tary strategy more than ever before.A

knowledge of policy would thus behelpful in winning war. The course hetook in his reasoning was thereby fromwar to politics.

In contrast to the Clausewitzian ap-

proach,the aim of the Marxist-Leninist

analysis of war was to discover how towin the great political struggle betweenclasses.Armed uprising seemed to be theonly way the working class could gainpower, although the possibility of ex-ploiting the First World War for revolu-tion soon became a central focus. Inboth cases, however, the primary objectof the Soviet analysis was to win a partic-ular political struggle. War was studied

as one of several factors that mightcontribute to the victory of the workingclass. The path of analysis was frompolitics to war.To digress for a moment, there is a

second and related respect in which thetwo traditions diverged right from thebeginning. Clausewitz took the state-system and the fact that wars normallyoccur between states as givens. He wasinterested in how states made use of war

in the conduct of their foreign policy. Inthe Marxist-Leninist tradition, however,what was given was the need to put anend to the inhumanity of capitalism



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through revolution. The main focus wasthus on the role of war in domestic

politics.Clausewitz thus began with war andconsidered politics to be a factor influ-encing and moderating its course. Hetherefore found it logical to treat un-modified war as pure violence, as vio-lence pushed to its utmost bounds. Thishe called absolute war. In his scheme

it became the ideal form of war, the

archetype in relation to which real wars,limited to some extent by policy, were

to be compared and measured.Marxism-Leninism has, on the con-trary, never adopted a concept of idealwar nor accepted that there can be anysuch thing. The only wars are real wars,all of which are a type of activity bymeans of which class goals may directlyor indirectly be obtained. When wars areassessed, it is with respect to their effec-tiveness in bringing closer the goal of

long-term policy. While the Clausewitzianrun of thought might be reduced to theformula from absolute war to real war,the direction in Marxism-Leninism mighttherefore be expressed as from absolutepolicy to real war.

Clausewitzs heirs in the long traditionthat regards war primarily as a militaryphenomenon expanded upon the idea ofwar as violence aiming at the destructionof the enemy. These militarists either

ignoredClausewitzs

positionon the

moderating function of politics on realwars or else considered the idea on

primacy of politics relevant only to theoutbreak but not the course of war.

Political realists have preferred to seeClausewitz in the light of the positivistictradition to which they are anchored.They have argued that Clausewitz recog-nized that wars are in reality a form of

political activity. His discussion of ab-

solute war is conducted at a metaphysicallevel, and is therefore of less practicalvalue. It is to misconstrue his intent, theyargue, to maintain that he advocated war

as unlimited violence.According to thisinterpretation, then, Clausewitz is thefather of a line of

thoughtin which war

is in actual practice a political phenom-enon.

Soviet scholars regard Clausewitz asan exponent of bourgeois i.e. reactionaryideology and are therefore unconcernedwith the Western debate about the correct

interpretation of his ideas. On the onehand, his preoccupation with violence isconnected with a militaristic and expan-sionistic policy. On the other, his ideas

on war as a political act distort the truecharacter of politics by neglecting itsclass essence and relating it to powerpolicy. In either interpretation, Clause-witzs ideas are unscientific.

The distinctions can also be conceived

of in another, perhaps overly simplifiedway, if Clausewitzs contribution is divid-ed into his philosophy of war on the onehand, his philosophy of politics on theother, and the formula by which he linksthe two together.

In general, the militaristic line ofinterpretation of Clausewitz stressed hismilitary philosophy so much that eventhough they accepted his view of politics,they tended to ignore the political impli-cations of the formula. The tradition of

political realism adopted the formula andthe political philosophy underlying it, butplayed down the significance of Clause-witzs

philosophyof war. The modem

neo-Clausewitzian variant of politicalrealism has brought the political philos-ophy up to date with the new politicaland military-technological conditions.And, quite differently, while adopting

the formula of war as a continuation andinstrument of policy, Marxism-Leninismplaced it in a completely new setting andrejected Clausewitzs view of both warand politics.

2. Clausewitzian Ideas in the MutualAssessmentt

A. The Soviets Look at the West. - It is



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therefore a mark of criticism when Sovietscholars refer to the Clausewitzian influ-ence on the Western theories of war. Nor

is it sufficient to win approbation that theWestern scholars reject Clausewitzianideas: they must do so for the rightreasons.

In the analysis of Clausewitzs influ-ence on the Western thought up to WorldWar II, Soviet scholars mainly pointedout the military tradition that idolizedwar.35 The Nazis themselves claimed to

continue the heritage of Frederick the

Great, Clausewitz, Moltke, and Luden-dorff, and to apply the military principlesof these men in their war campaigns. TheSoviets criticized such ideas for the

emphasis placed on the theory of absolutewar and all its corollaries (e.g. that themain aim of war is to destroy the enemyforces)36 and for the neglect of the pri-macy of politics over warfare. This errorled logically to a view in which militarystrategy is independent of policy, or even,as in Ludendorffs writing, to the thesisthat policy is completely subordinated towarfare. Western militarism was therefore

incorrect on two counts: it was based

on the false idea of absolute war inherited

from Clausewitz; moreover, unlike Clau-

sewitz, who despite his non-class politicalphilosophy at least recognized the prima-cy of politics over warfare, the militaristscommitted the blunder of elevating war-fare to an end in itself.

In the critique of the Clausewitz heri-

tage in Western thought after the SecondWorld War, the reference to Clausewitzin Soviet assessments of Western theoriesof war were more diversified, reflectingperhaps the Western debate on the inter-pretation of Clausewitzs ideas.All threemain perspectives - the militarist, thepolitical realist, and the pacifist - havebeen criticized.

Firstly, such ideas as massive retalia-tion, which dominated Western political-military doctrines during the 1940s and1950s but traces of which can still be

found, are interpreted as applications ofthe Clausewitzian concept of absolutewar .37 These ideas err in underesti-

mating the importance of policy as amoderating and controlling factor. Point-ed out as advocates are not only leadingmilitary officers, who might be expectedto carry on the militaristic tradition, butsurprisingly enough, also many politicalrealists, who during the period when theUnited States had a nuclear monopolyand then gradually lost it, supposed thattotal war might be applied as an instru-

ment of policy.Secondly, Soviet scholars criticize themain body of political realism foradopting the political philosophy under-lying Clausewitzs formula of war as apolitical act. Their treatment of war asa normal instrument of foreign policy,which is conceived not as class policy butas state policy, must be regarded asunscientific.3$ It leads them to neglectinternal politics as well as internal wars,and to depreciate the impact that changesin socio-economic structures and in

military technology have had in thenature of international politics.39 Byrestating the Clausewitzian assumptionthat the only valid criterion for assessingwar is its usefulness in increasing thepower of the state that uses it, politicalrealists exploit a false amorality to con-ceal the immorality of the wars unleashedby

imperialism.They have no moral

qualms about nuclear war; it is merelytheir callous opportunism that movesthem to condemn it.

Thirdly, Soviet scholars disagree withthe type of opinion common amongstpacifists, and held by some politicalrealists as well, that the Clausewitzianconception of war as an instrument ofpolicy is no longer valid. Such a viewfosters the dangerous illusion that war is

no longer possible. On the contrary, theimperialistic forces may well try to gaintheir ends by war. The only way theycan be prevented is by actively struggling



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against their every attempt. The anti-imperialistic front is only weakened bysuch a complacent attitude as that of thepacifists.4

Reference to Clausewitz has thus been

a vehicle through which Soviet scholarshave criticized the main ideas on war

held in the West in modern times. The

thread linking these three types of criti-cism together - and joining them to thecritique of Clausewitz - is the conceptof politics in terms of class. This is thefoundation on which Soviet scholars

rejectthe Western notion of war and

politics - ideas shared by or derived fromClausewitz - as well as the absolutism of

pacifists, who fail to see that war maystill be an instrument of class policy.

B. The Non-MarxistsAssess the Marx-ists. - When Western scholars - and this

may be said about all political ap-proaches, not only political realists - take

up Clausewitz in relation to Marxism-Leninism, it is usually in connection withone of two themes. According to thefirst, Soviet theory is greatly indebted toClausewitz for some of its basic concepts:the Soviet notion of the relation betweenwar and politics is interpreted as an out-growth from Clausewitzian roots.41 Inthe second, more critical theme themilitant tone in Soviet policy is attributedto its adoption of Clausewitzs idea ofabsolute war.

The argument of those who interpretthe Soviet concept of war as a variant ofthe Clausewitzian is fairly straightfor-ward. It is known that both Engels andLenin read and admired Clausewitzs

study of war.42 Lenin himself has de-clared that war is a continuation and

instrument of policy by other means -virtually a direct loan from Clausewitz.43

Therecan be no doubt therefore of the

Clausewitzian influence; the object ofanalysis is to define its extent.44 Somescholars go so far as to claim, that almost

every part of the Soviet theory of warborrowed some basic ideas from Clause-

witz.

Something of the same type of argu-ment is used by those critical of the

militancy in Soviet politics. They main-tain that historical materialism paints apicture of society so simplified and so

utterly devoid of any faith in the abilityof men to solve their differences throughmutual understanding that it must becalled a distortion. The only hope theSoviets can offer is that when the miseryof the

exploitedclass has reached the

point where it is no longer bearable,revolution will break out and deliver

mankind not only from the capitalistyoke, but from all internal and interna-tional struggle and violence. Here Soviet

theory shares with Clausewitz - or per-haps even borrows from him - a conceptof violence, as a great outburst of de-structive force, which at the same time

paves the way for the new balance or

the new order.This idealization of violence including

the use of armed force can be traced

throughout Marxian and post-Marxianthought, from Marx himself to Mao.Marx and Engels provided the basic ideaof inevitable revolution or class war, but

they confined its application to internalsituations. Lenin expanded the scope ofconfrontation with his theory of imperial-ism, in which all interstate wars are

interpreted as a reflection of the classstruggle. Stalin further emphasized theantagonistic dichotomy between capital-ism and socialism at the internationallevel by declaring all revolutionary warsand all wars fought by the Soviet Unionto be one and the same war.After theSecond World War, this policy of totalconfrontation was practised in the strat-egy of cold war, in which a combination

of all

militaryand

non-militarymethods

was used to realize long-range politicalgoals.45 The resultant state of neither-war-nor-peace can be regarded as a kind



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of warfare that corresponds with theClausewitzian concept of war as politicalintercourse conducted with an admixture

of military methods. Some scholars assertthat Mao has rounded off the adoptionof the Clausewitzian theory of war by thesocialist camp.46 To the theory of civilwar as a continuation of internal class

struggle, and world war as a continuationof world class struggle he has added thetheory of the peoples war as a struggle inthe underdeveloped areas against thealliance between domestic reactionaryforces and world

imperialism.The

theoryof war of the rural areas of the worldagainst the cities is said to be the logicalextreme of the Marxist-Leninist interpre-tation of war as absolute violence, since itreduces all political conflicts into onegreat struggle that can only be resolvedthrough one great war.

V. THE MEANING OF THE

DEBATEWhen such various ideas are attributedto the influence of one mans writing, onemight be pardoned for suspecting that thecritics themselves are guilty of a certainamount of exaggeration. Have not West-ern scholars progressed in their politicalthinking beyond the state-centred bal-ance-of-power concepts of Clausewitz?Does not the Soviet concept of revolutionin the context of peaceful coexistence

imply in non-Marxist terms a less violentform of militancy? Indeed, when alladjustments and modifications aremade to take into account all the socialand technological developments that havetaken place since Clausewitz wrote OnWar almost 150 years ago - howeverthese are interpreted - can there reallybe anything of the Clausewitzian essenceleft beyond the idea that war is a con-tinuation of

politics?Apart from the problem of decidingwhether modem ideas that bear someresemblance to ideas put forward by

Clausewitz are sufficiently similar to becalled Clausewitzian - and that is whatthe name-calling is about - one mightalso ask what it signifies at all to call afamily of concepts Clausewitzian. Itwould seem from the way some critics

argue that they believe the object of theirattack never would have come into

being had it not been for that evil geniusClausewitz. For example, the Westernversion might run: if only Clausewitz hadnever written war is a continuation of

politics by other means, then Leninwould never have

expressedthe idea

himself. This argument is surely a falseone; it presents the development of ideasin a far too causal fashion. ClausewitzsOn War was not a necessary prerequisiteto Lenins theory of interstate war; it wasrather the case that Clausewitz gave

expression to an idea that was alsoinherent in Marxism. Reading On Warmay have stimulated Lenin to find theidea in Marxs conceptual system, but so

well does it fit into the Soviet train ofthought that it would have emergedsooner or later. Similarly, militarists, po-litical realists, and pacifists may beindebted to Clausewitz in one sense, but

their ideas are not causally dependentupon his.

These reflections point to a common-place that seems nevertheless to be over-looked. Certain ideas are called Clause-

witzian, not because Clausewitz was thefirst to express them, nor because hispresentation was complete, but becausehe succeeded in articulating many of theconclusions that could be and were beingdrawn by men of military science aboutthe great socio-political changes occurringin nineteenth century Europe. Clausewitzwas not the first who said that wars are

fought for political aims, nor did he everprovide a comprehensive description ofwar as a

political instrument.It is never-

theless to his credit that in one excellentbook he presented both a very valuableanalysis of the military theory of his times



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and the war/politics formula, even if hedid not succeed in combining them.Andhis

studyof war has become a source of

intellectual stimulation to several genera-tions of scholars. Therefore, the Clause-witzian tradition neither begins nor endswith Clausewitz, even if On War is itsfocal point.

But what is all this interest in whatClausewitz wrote on the subject of warreally about? Why do so many militarytheorists, and political scientists beginby acknowledging their intellectual debt

to Clausewitz for the ideas they areabout to expound? Why is there so much

controversy about what Clausewitz reallymeant? Has what he really meant thestatus of scientific truth, whereas whathe might be interpreted to mean can bea distorted nonsense?There may be some historical value

per se in trying to understand the ideasbehind the words Clausewitz wrote, evenif we can never know whether or not we

have reached such an understanding. Ibelieve, however, that the scientific valueof Clausewitzs contribution lies not inthe truth of his ideas (whatever these mayhave been) but in the generality of histools of analysis - the formulas on war.

Clausewitz endeavoured to comprisetwo main features of war in his study ofits character: its outward visible aspectas armed violence and its inward, pur-

posive aspectas an act in

pursuitof

political goals. Therefore he not onlydefined war as an act of violence bywhich we intend to compel our opponentto obey our will, but to penetrate deeperinto its nature he also offered two for-

mulas, one about war as an act of vio-lence pushed to its utmost bounds, theother about war as a continuation of

politics. The first is a logical extensionof the military aspect of war to an

absolute extreme where there are nochecks on military violence, and thesecond reminds us that war is one of

that class of actions called political.

Many commentators of Clausewitzhave treated these as two quite different

concepts.Some have contended that

while he conceived of absolute war as

an ideal type in a philosophical sense, 47he related the formula on war as a

political phenomenon to real wars. Othershave tried to express a similar dualitybetween a pure and an impure form ofwar by identifying absolute war withtotal (unlimited) war and regarding wargoverned and controlled by politics asinherently limited. I believe, however,

that whatever Clausewitz himself mayhave meant by war, it is not necessary tosuppose that the two formulas representtwo quite different ideas, or two quitedifferent levels of generalization; they canplausibly be interpreted as two comple-mentary expressions of the same notion.To begin with, it seems to me that

Clausewitz conceived of absolute warnot only as an abstraction - an arche-type4$ or a complex of features commonto all wars49 - but also as a kind of realwar. He considered the Napoleonic warsto be absolute wars, for example, and heindicated that he believed absolute warscould occur again.50 Furthermore, heattributes many of the features of actual

wars, without which they could hardlybe called wars at all, to the idea ofabsolute war.51 In the third place, hewrites that absolute war can spring from

extremely powerful motives,52which

one might also expect to give rise toextreme political goals. In this view, anabsolute war is not one completely di-vorced from political aims, but ratherwhat we should nowadays call a total warfought by unlimited military means forunlimited political goals. On the otherhand, the Clausewitzian formula on waras a political phenomenon can hardly bemeant as a strictly factual descriptionof real wars. Neither of two conditionsof subordination to politics - that theoutbreak of war be a result of a rationaldecision to pursue the same political



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goals that had been pursued in peace byviolent means, and that political goalsshould guide the whole course of war,is ever completely fulfilled in practice.

The war/politics formula is therefore asmuch an abstraction as absolute war, it

expresses in an ideal form the fact thatall real wars are more or less governedby political goals. Nor is there anythingin the war/politics formula that precludesthe possibility of unlimited war, for thepolitical goals that ideally guide war maythemselves be unlimited, or they may

becomeso

in thecourse of war.

On this interpretation, the set of Clau-sewitzian formulas constitute a singleconcept of war with two main aspects,one military and the other political. Thetwo formulas provide two complementaryperspectives from which to view anygiven war: according to the meansemployed or the extent by which it iscontrolled by political aims. Seen in this

perspective, the formulas on war are

analytical statements about the conceptof war, for they say what is entailed inthe idea of war. The social phenomenonwe call war is a combination of armed

violence and political activity: it is foughtby military means to achieve certain

political ends, regardless of whether theoutcome actually meets expectations; it is

always considered a means to those ends,or else it is not resorted to. In all situa-

tions the formulas can be applied to the

analysis of a concrete war.Since Clausewitz was living in a world

different in significant ways from ourown, his understanding of all the mainconcepts must have been different fromours. To study Clausewitzs writingsmay help us better to understand the erain which he lived and give us a newperspective on the modem world. How-ever, we should only misunderstand

modem war ifwe

were to suppose thatthe substance of Clausewitzs ideas couldbe uprooted from their nineteenth-centurycontext and directly replanted in the

present-day situation. For this reason,modem interpretations tend to say moreabout the interpreters general ideas ofwar, society, and war than they do aboutwhat Clausewitz meant himself.

Clausewitzs lasting contribution -and it is a very great one - amounts tohis having provided a framework withinwhich war can be analysed. His formulasexpress the idea of war at such a highlevel of generalization that they are stilluseful today. The measure of his successis the work to which his formulas havebeen

put. The formulaon

absolutewar

became famous after the Prussian militarystaff adopted it about a century ago. Itsubsequently became notorious in reac-tion to the use to which it was put bymilitarists. Nowadays the war/politicsformula is used as the point of departurefor most military analyses in both Eastand West.

This brings me back to the main themeof this article. Since the theory of war

in both East and West adopts theanalytical framework proposed by Clau-sewitz, it is possible to use his formulasas an analytical tool with which tocompare these theories and thereby toreveal basic similarities and differencesin the two underlying interpretations ofsocio-political reality. One of the pre-conditions to a meaningful exchange ofviews, which would further the cause ofpeace, is the perception that reality maybe legitimately understood in severaldifferent ways. Thus, although thesolution to the problem of doing awaywith war is only remotely related to thedebate over the interpretation of theClausewitzian formulas per se, it does

depend in part upon reducing the riskinherent in the dialogue of the deaf.



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NOTES

1This article is based on four chapters ofmy study On the Nature of War in which Icompare the Soviet and Western philosophiesof war. It is being published by Teakfield Ltd.,England.

2 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 17th ed.,Ferd. Dmmlers Verlag, Bonn 1966, pp. 89-90;Clausewitz, On War, Pelican Books, London1971, p. 101.

3 1971 ed., p. 103.4 Ibid., p. 402.5 That policy unites in itself, and reconciles

all the interests of internal administration,even those of

humanity,and whatever else

are rational subjects of consideration is pur-posed for it is nothing in itself, except amere representative and exponent of all theseinterests towards other States (ibid., p. 404).

6 F. N. Maude, Introduction to an Englishedition of On War 1908, reprinted in Pelicaned. 1971, p. 83; H. Rothfels, Clausewitz, inEdward Mead Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern

Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton1943, p. 93;Alfred Vagts, Militarism Civilianand Military, Greenwich 1957, p. 185.

7 Dallas D. Irvine, The French Discoveryof Clausewitz and Napoleon, Military Affairs,Vol. IV (1940); Jay Luuvas, European MilitaryThought and Doctrine, in Michael Howard(ed.), The Theory and Practice of War, Cassell,London 1965; Dale O. Smith, U.S. MilitaryDoctrine, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York

1955, p. 50; B. H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy. TheIndirectApproach, Faber and Faber, London1967, p. 357.

8 Helmut von Moltke, after: Roger Parkin-son, Clausewitz:ABiography, Stein and Day,New York 1971, p. 337.

9 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the Nine-teenth Century, in Howard, op. cit., 1965.

10

The similarity is sometimes striking, e.g.Clausewitz regarded the European states as acommunity of nations with collective in-terests, in which the whole relations of allStates to each other serve rather to preservethe stability of the whole than to producechanges. He conceived this tendency to sta-bility or tendency to maintain the existing stateto be the true notion of a balance of powerand in this sense it will always of itself comeinto existence, wherever there are extensiveconnections between civilised States. If a singlestate wants to effect important changes for

itsown

benefit, thewhole

usually prevents it;if it doesnt prevent it, this means that theaction of the tendency in favour of stabilitywas not powerful enough at the moment. (OnWar, Routledge and Kegan, London and Bos-

ton, Eighth Impression 1968, vol. II, book VI,pp. 160, 162).

11 This is the main theme in NormanAngell,

The Great Illusion, G. P. Putnams Sons, NewYork 1910.12Atypical statement: In these conditions

war can no longer be a continuation of policybut rather its negation (S. O. Tiomain Clause-witz :AReppraisal, Military Review, May1973, p. 79); P. R. Schratz contends that theabstract formula may now become reality(Clausewitz, Cuba, and Command, U.S. NavalInstitute Proceedings,August 1964, p. 26); cf.Forrest K. Kleinman (The Pied Piper ofModern Military Thought, Military Review,November 1957) who contends that unlimitedwar is

acceptedas a rational

possibilityin

modern military thought.13 This is the main theme of political realist

analysts like Henry A. Kissinger, Robert E.Osgood, George Ball, Bernard Brodie, Mi-chael Howard and others; cf. the West-Germanadmirers of Clausewitz (Werner Hahlweg, Wil-helm Ritter von Schramm, Friedrich Ruge, W.Gembruch, and others). For a broader analysisese: J. Lider, Nowe tendencje w mysli polity-czno-wojskowej NRF 1966-1969, Instytut Sla-ski w Opolu-Ossolineum, Wroclaw-Warsaw1971, pp. 40-72.

14 Clausewitz has often been quoted as a

proponent of limited war, especially in militaryperiodicals, e.g. William D. Franklin, Clause-witz on Limited War, Military Review, June1967; George W. Smith, Clausewitz in the1970s, Military Review, July 1972; cf. ByronDexter, Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy, For-eign Affairs, October 1950, p. 42; Gordon B.Turner and Richard D. Challener (eds.), Na-tional Security in the NuclearAge, Praeger,New York 1960, p. 3-30.

15 It is a deeply disturbing reflection thatnone of Clausewitzs three "modifying factors"apply to nuclear war (John Strachey, On the

Prevention of War, Macmillan, London 1962,p. 7476); nuclear war cannot be regarded asa continuation of policy by other means; sucha war if unleashed, would be the end of allpolicies and an utter mutual annihilation (E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, Global Strategy,London 1957, p. 248); nuclear weapons havemade a total war impossible as a rationalpolitical act, the existence and possibility ofa use of these weapons have today madesenseless Clausewitzs thesis on war as con-tinuation of policy by other means (Krieg, inC. D. Herning (ed.), Sovjetunion und demo-kratische

Gesellschaft.Eine

vergleichendeEn-

zyklopdie

,

Bd. III, Harder, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1969, p. 1042); cf. George Kennan, Rus-sia,Atom, and the West, London 1958; JohnFinletter, Foreign Policy: The Next Phase,



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New York 1960; J. F. C. Fuller, The Conductof War, 1789-1961, London 1962; TheodorEbert, Wehrpolitik ohne Waffen. Das Konzeptder sozialen Verteidigung, Beitrge zur Kon-fliktforschung, 2/1972; Andr Beaufre, Kon-flikte der Zukunft, sterreichische MilitrischeZeitschrift, 1/1973; Andr Beaufre, StrategiePour Demain, Librarie Plon, Paris 1972; AndrBeaufre, La Guerre Revolutionaire, Fayard,Paris 1972; Ferdinand Otto Miksche, VomKriegsbild, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1976.

16 Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, Die "Stu-dien" des Generalobersten Beck und ihre wehr-

politische Bedeutung, Wehrkunde, XXIII:7(1974). Since war in the 20th century may bevery similar to the Clausewitzian concept of anabsolute war, and not to his concept of a real

war, to fight the latter one should considerwhat is politically purposeful and militarypossible (p. 340-341).

17 For a comprehensive critique, seeAnatolRapoport, Strategy and Conscience, Harper andRow, New York 1964 and his Editors Intro-duction to the Pelican edition of Clausewitzs

On War (1971).18 "The Clausewitzian dictum that war is

an extension of politics by other means hasbeen fundamentally altered by the strategicnuclear equation" (Richard B. Foster, TheEmerging U.S. Global Strategy: Its Implica-

tions for the U.S.-European Partnership, inRichard B. Foster, Andr Beaufre, and Wyn-fred Joshua (eds.), Strategy for the West, Mac-donald and Janes, London 1974).

19 Bolshevik, 2/1947.20 L. Leshchinskii, Bankrotstvo voennoi ide-

ologii germanskikh imperialistov, Voenizdat,after Polish translation, Wyd MON, Warsaw1953, p. 96.

21 Ernst Engelberg, Carl von Clausewitz inseiner Zeit in Carl von Clausewitz, VomKriege, Verlag des Ministeriums fr NationaleVerteidigung, Berlin 1957; General MajorA.D. Dr. Otto

Korfes,Clausewitz Werk "Vom

Kriege" und seine Nachwirkung, ibidem.22 Problems of War and Peace, Progress

Publishers, Moscow 1972, ch. III.1; Marxism-Leninism on War andArmy, Ch. 1.1.

23 Metodologicheskie problemy voennoi teo-rii i praktiki, Voenizdat, Moscow 1969, p. 76;V. Shelag and T. Kondratkov, Leninskii analizsushchnosti voiny i nesostoyatelnosy ego kri-tiki, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, 12/1970;Filosofskoe nasledie V. I. Lenina i problemysovremennoi voiny, Voenizdat, Moscow 1972,p. 55; Problems of War and Peace, p. 81.Marxism-Leninism on War andArmy, p. 7-8.

24A.A. Grechko, Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR,Voenizdat, Moscow 1974, p. 291.

25 V. Shelyag has presented an extremelysharp critique of the Clausewitzian idealistic,

antiscientific, and methodologically weakmilitary philosophy in Pod lzhivym flagom"renesansa", Krasnaya Zvezda, 3.07.1975. Ref-erence is made to Clausewitzs occasional re-mark that his work On War is a relativelyformless mass, which ought to be rewrittenby a greater mind.26... Clausewitz exaggerated the role of

armed coercion in the implementation ofpolicy and spoke in favor of its unrestrictedutilization in the so-called "absolute war"

(Filosofskoe nasledie... p. 60).27 Y. I. Rybkin, Leninskaya kontseptsia

voiny i sovremennost, Kommunist Voorushen-nykh Sil, 20/1973; cf. G.A. Deborin, O kha-raktere vtoroi mirovoi voiny, Voenizdat, Mos-cow 1960, pp. 8 ff.;A.A. Kirillov, Predotvrash-

chenie voiny-vazhnieishaya problema sovre-mennosti, Socekgiz, Moscow 1962, pp. 5 ff.

28A.A. Strokov, Istoriya voennogo iskusst-va, Voenizdat, Moscow 1965, pp. 258-259.

29 E.g. I. G. Burtsev was presented as atheorist, who pointed out the linkage betweenwar and policy before Clausewitz (Mysli oteorii voennykh znanii, Voennii Zhurnal, v. I,Petersburg 1819, p. 55), after O sovetskoivoennoi nauke, Voenizdat, 2nd ed., Moscow1964, p. 162.

30 The official papers as well as the litera-ture on the subject are too voluminous to be

listed here. For the exposition of the mainideas, see V. D. Sokolovskii, Voennaya strate-giya, Voenizdat, Moscow 1962, 1963, 1968;Y. I. Rybkin, Voina i politika v sovremennuyuepokhu, Voenizdat, Moscow 1973; N. V. Puk-hovskii, O mire i voine, Voenizdat, Moscow1965; N. P. Prokopev O voine i armii, Voeniz-dat, Moscow 1965; Marxism-Leninism on WarandArmy; Problems of War and Peace; Filo-sofskiei sotsialno-politicheskie problemy voinyi armii, Voenizdat, Moscow 1973.

31 It is well known that the essential natureof war as a continuation of politics does not

changewith

changingthe

technologyand ar-

mament (Voennaya strategiya, 1968, p. 25).32 Marxism-Leninism on War and Army,

pp. 28-29; Filosofskoe nasledie... pp. 36-37;T. Kondratkov; War as a Continuation ofPolicy; Soviet Military Review, 1/1974, p. 8.

33 Undoubtedly, a new world war, shouldit be unleashed by the imperialists, will burythe capitalist system (Marxism-Leninism onWar andArmy, p. 78); a thermonuclear warwould be suicidal for the aggressors (N.Sushko, The Essence of War, Soviet MilitaryReview, 7/1965, p. 11).

34 The main theme of N. M. Nikolskii, Os-novnoi vopros sovremennosti, Voenizdat, Mos-cow 1964. The disappearance of the possi-bility to win a world thermonuclear war, as ameans of achieving political aims of states,



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and the negation of all military categories ofwar in it, indicate that a world thermonuclearwar is in fact not a war, but a self-denial of

war (p. 381); In our times no illusion can bemore dangerous than the view that a thermo-nuclear war may be an instrument of policy,that some political aims can be achieved bythe use of thermonuclear weapons (N. Talen-skii, Razdumiya o minuvshei voine, Mezh-dunarodnaya Zhizn, 5/1965, p. 23). Cf. V. I.Zamkovoi, Kritika burzhuaznykh teorii neiz-bezhnosti novoi mirovoi voiny, Izd. "Mysl"Moscow 1965; P. N. Fedoseyev, Dialektikasovremennogo obshchestvennogo razvitiya,VestnikAkademii Nauk SSSR, 9/1965.

35 Leshchinskii, op. cit.; Sovremennaya

imperialisticheskayavoennaya

ideologiya,Voe-

nizdat, Moscow 1958; M.A. Milshtein,A. K.Slobodenko, O burzhuaznoi voennoi nauke,2nd ed., Voenizdat, Moscow 1961; O sovetskoivoennoi nauke, Voenizdat, 2nd ed., Moscow1964.

36 The idea of an unlimited armed violence,stemming from Clausewitzs assertion on the"absolute war" was basic in the Germandoctrine (Sovremennaya imperialisticheskayavoennaya ideologiya, p. 65).

37 Statements by Clausewitz on the employ-ment of unlimited force in war exerted someinfluence on the forming of the military theoryof imperialism. The most shameless ideologuesofAmerican imperialism, grasping at errone-ous, contradictory statements by Clausewitz,hyperbolize armed coercion, depicting it asthe sole effective means of policy, its founda-tion ; in their statements they endeavour to findarguments to justify the aggressive military-political doctrines and strategic concepts ofimperialism (Filosofskoe nasledie..., p. 43);A.A. Strokov contends that some Clausewitzianassertions are now applied by theAmericanmilitary theorists and West German militarists(op. cit., p. 257).

38

V. Shelyag, op. cit.39 In extolling Clausewitz and ignoringhistorical experience the ideologists of thereactionary bourgeoisie, especially those closelyconnected with the top brass of the aggressiveNATO bloc, make it appear that no changehas taken place in the interrelation betweenpolitics and war. They justify the policy ofnuclear blackmail, insist on keeping thermo-nuclear war in their political arsenal ...(Marxism-Leninism on War andArmy, p. 26).

40 Rybkin, 1973, p. 26.41 Rothfels, op. cit.; Byron Dexter, Clause-

witz and the Soviet Strategy, ForeignAffairs,October 1950; C. Beyerhaus, Der urspriing-liche Clausewitz, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rund-schau, 3/1953; Raymond L. Garthoff,How Rus-sia Makes War. Soviet Military Doctrine,Allen

& Unwin, London 1954; Gerhard Ritter,Staatskunst und Krieghandwerk, Bd. I. Mn-chen 1954; Vincent J. Esposito, War as a

Continuation of Politics, Military Affairs, v.XVIII (1954); Stefan T. Possony, JahrhundertdesAufruhrs, Miinchen 1955; J. F. C. Fuller,op. cit.; Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, Vonder klassischen Kriegsphilosophie zur zeit-gerechten Wehrauffassung, Wehrwissenschaft-liche Rundschau, 9/1965; Dirk Blasius, Carlvon Clausewitz und die Hauptdenker desMarxismus, I-II, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rund-schau, 5-6/1966; W. Hahlweg, Das Clause-witzbild einst und jetzt, Introduction to: Vom

Kriege, 17 ed., Dmmlers Verlag, comp.foot-note 2; Friedrich Ruge, Politik und Strategie,Bernard und

Graefe, Frankfurt/M., 1967;Je-

huda L. Wallach, Kriegstheorien

,

Bernard und

Graefe, Frankfurt/M., 1972 (chs. 11 and 12).42 See footnote 41. Alastair Buchan wrote

that Marx and Engels were great admirers ofClausewitz (War in Modern Society, Harperand Row, New York 1968, p. 95).

43 In many Western writings Lenin is calledthe disciple of Clausewitz, e.g. Donald E.Davis and Walter S. G. Kohn, Lenin as

Disciple of Clausewitz, Military Review, 9/1971.

44 The assesment was very different; it variedfrom the opinion that the influence wasmoderate (Esposito, op. cit.) to assertions thatalmost the whole of Lenins analysis of politics,war, revolution, etc., was based on Clause-witzian ideas (Blasius, op. cit.).

45 The distinctive characteristics in Sovietwarfare - based on Clausewitzian ideas on

continuity of political goals in peace and waris the interchangeability of political andmilitary means. A "peace offensive" in Mos-cow, a cultural conference in Warsaw, astrike in France, an armed insurrection inCzechoslovakia, the invasion of Greece andKorea by fully equipped troops - all are instru-

ments of one war, turned on and turned offfrom a central trap (Dexter, p. 41); the Soviettheory of a global and total unified war, a warin all dimensions, directed by a supreme centralintelligence, is in accord with Clausewitzianideas (Fuller, op. cit. p. 202); Lenin invertedClausewitzs well known dictum that war is acontinuation of state-policy by other meansand substituted for it a formula holding thatstate policy is a continuation of war by everymeans (J. F. C. Fuller, Our War Problems,Marine Corps Gazette, Nov. 1960, p. 10)Garthoff contends that the Soviets regard allpolicy, international as well as internal, as aunified process of permanent struggle wheremilitary and non-military means are usedaccording to circumstances. Except that theyare phases of policy with a different component



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of armed forces, no distinction between peaceand war is meaningful in Soviet doctrine (op.cit., pp. 11-12).

46

Gerhart Matthus, Krieg ist Politik mitBlutvergiessen, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rund-schau, 7/1967; Donald E. Davis, Marxism andPeoples Wars, Orbis, Winter 1972, XV:4;Chalmers Johnson,Autopsy on Peoples War,University of California Press, Berkeley, LosAngeles, London 1973; Wallach, op. cit., ch. 13;W. Hahlweg, Typologie des modernen Klein-krieges, Wiesbaden 1972; W. Hahlweg, Gue-rilla. Krieg ohne Fronten, Stuttgart 1968.

47 E.g. Dieter Senghaas, who analysed thetwo Clausewitzian concepts of war, called theabsolute war formula the philosophical con-

ceptof war and the

war/policyformula the

concept of real war (Abschreckung und Frie-den, Europa Verlaganstalt, Frankfurt 1969;Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt 1972pp. 40 ff.

48 Support for such an interpretation seemsto be uncontroversial. Many scholars quoteClausewitzs appraisal of the absolute form ofwar as a general point of direction andnatural measure of all that is done in war

(Sketches for Book Eight, ch. II, p. 370, 1971ed.

49 Clausewitz writes that only through thiskind of view (i.e. by keeping constantly in viewthe absolute kind of war) does war recover

unity, only through it can we see all wars asthings of one kind (ibid., ch. IV, p. 403).

50 Clausewitz writes that we might doubt

whether the notion of the absolute characterof the nature of war was founded in realityif we had not seen real warfare make its

appearance in this absolute completeness evenin our own times (ibid., ch. II, p. 369) andadds that in the next ten years there mayperhaps be a war of that same kind.

51 Moreover, in describing real war assomething distinct from absolute war, he usessuch expressions as in general, often, etc.,which seem to suggest that war may sometimestake another form, namely the form of absolutewar.And in a little known article from 1827Clausewitz writes about the two kinds of warthat occur in reality: the one aims at defeatingthe enemy by destroying him politically or by

disarminghim and

compellinghim to uncondi-

tional surrender; the aims of the other arelimited. Since the degree of limitation mayvary, there are many intermediate forms of war,but in principle their aims may be limited orunlimited.

52 Book One, Ch. I, pp. 119-120.53 Some scholars consider total wars as

Clausewitzian absolute wars. Total war isunlimited in character; it is what Clausewitzcalled "absolute war". It differs from that

type of war which prevailed in the twocenturies prior to World War I. Then war was"limited" (Hans Speier, Class Structure andTotal War, in Hans Speier, Social Order andthe Risks of War, The M. I. T. Press, Cam-bridge and London, 1969, p. 253).

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