W the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh II-Who Represents the Hindus

8/3/2019 W the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh II-Who Represents the Hindus

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The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: II: Who Represents the Hindus?Author(s): Walter AndersenSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 12 (Mar. 18, 1972), pp. 633-640Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4361149 .

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SPECIALARTICLEST h e Rashtriya Swayamsevak SangliIT

Who Represents the Hindus?Walter Andersen

Upto 1937 the Hindu Mahasabha was a loosely organised group collected around prominent indivi-duals. The two major issues dividing the reformers (in the Hindu Mahasabha), led by Lajpat Rai andSharaddhanand, from the Sanatanists (the orthodox ones), led by Parmanand, Munje and Kelkar, werethe elimination of caste restrictions and political participation. In 1937 Savarkar was elected Presidentof the Mahasabha and settled these differences by resolving to butild it into a political organisation repre-senting the Hindus.By turning the Hindu Mahasabha into a political organisation, Savarkar ensured that whatever sup-port the RSS had rendered to the Mahasabha would cease. Many RSS members were active in theCongress. And the RSS did not want to be associated with a group which would have placed it indirect opposition to the Congress.DuringXWorld War II, the Mahasabha sought to enroll Hindus in the army and to negotiate withthe British to get itself represented on variotusgovernment councils. This policy was to fail. The Britishat the Simla Conference in June, 1945 treated the Congress as the representative of caste Hindus and theMuslim League as the representative of the Muslims.The weakness of the Hindu Mahasabha was the more apparent because - unlike the RSS - itlacked any youth, peasant or para-military foundations. It tried to make up for this lack by appealingto the RSS, but in vain. It could not becone a mass organisation because so many of its supporterswere big landlords who were unwilling to allow any hint of mass mobilisation.Meanwhile, the RSS - due to its unstinted help to Hindu refugees during and after partition -had increased its influence throughout northern India.In the first part of this four-part narrative, the origins and growth of the RSS were dicussed. Thenexvtpart covers Gandhi's assassination and the subsequent banning of the RSS. The fourth and final

part discusses the genesis of the Jan Sangh and the role played by the RSS in its formation.IV

AT the tiiie the RSS and its leader-ship were avoiding political activity,the Iinidu Mahasabba HM was be-coming increasingly involved in poli-tics. The divergent policies increasedthe already strained relations betweenthe two Hindu groups.As mentioned in Part I of this arti-cle, the HM was revitalised during theI)reakdown of communal relations inthe mid-1920s. For many years, theorganisation was divided between thosewho desired increasing political partici-pation as an explicitly Hindu groupand those who felt the HM should bea forum for expressing the problems ofthe Hindu community, leaving politicsto the Congress. Another conflict inthe HM was between the reformersandthe Sanathanists (the orthodox ones).While the Sanathanistsfought an inten-sive rear guard action, the reformershave controlled the organisation from1923 to the present. As we shall show,this latter group toned down its reform-ist views to get the support of conser-vatives who had money and local stand-

ing, and to unite the Hindus to facewhat was considered the larger danger- Muslim domination of Indlia. More-over, the amorphous organisation of theHM prevented it from operationalisingany of its reformist views (or politicalobjectives, as we shall demonstrate be-low).The HM received its miiost ctive sup-port in Maharashtra,Punjab and to alesser extent in the United Provincesand quite late, in Bengal. In the lastthree cases, it owed its strength to areaction to Muslim-Hindu political andsocial conflict. In the first, however, itsleaders were almost all Tilakites with aparticular view of the independencestruggle and modemity that differedfrom Gandhi. As mentioned above, theTilakites gradually withdrew themselvesfrom participation in both the politicaland social movements led by Gandhi.Kurtakoti, the Shankaracharyaof KarvirPeeth, one of the leading Hindu au-thorities in Maharashtra, expressed awidespread feeling among Hindus inMaharashtra when he stated that thephilosophy of non-co-operation byGandhi "will uproot the very basic

principles of I-linduisni and Arya phi-losophy...". According to him, ahimsa(non-violence) was only an action andlike himsa (violence) is in itself notthe highest truth in Hinduism.Rather, the motive of an action alonei. what determines merit or demerit. Infact, he stated, himsa has offen beenadvocated in religious writings (e g,Krishna's advice to Arjuna). In otherwords, a worthy goal can have a widerange of means and the means thatleacls to success should be chosen.10'Lajpat Rai in his presidential addressat the HM session in Calcutta beganhis speech by specifying what ahimsameant to him. He felt that the way itwas being talked about led to pessimismand passivity. It was a misinterpretationof the stages of grihastha (householder)anid sanyasi to demand that a youngmnangive up every wordly, concern tolive the life of an ascetic. A young man'should be' worldly and ambitious. Afew young men might lead a life of re-nunciation,1'05 ut that should not bepreached to the nation, for that led, hefelt, to a "slave mentality."'06Perhaps,Gandhi himself suspected that Maha-

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March 18, 1972 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYrashtra had martial traditions inheritedfrom Ramdas and Shivaji that made itsadherence to his particular nature ofspiritual politics difficult. The Mahrat-ta, the leading Tilakite English langu-age journal in Maharashtra,commentedon a speech Ganidhimade in Poona onSeptember 4, 1924,107 in which Gandhiaccused Maharashtraof a lack of faithin his views."'If ... by faith he means faith inhis special programme, Maharash-tra will have none of it ... It neednot be concealed that there is a radi-cal, fundamental difference betweenhis shadowy, flimsy philosophy andthe hard-headed, solid political know-ledge which Maharashtrianshave in-herited from their illustrious prede-cessors."10Up to 1925, the Tilakiteshad, by andlarge, agreed to follow Gandhi's direc-tion. Their division came on theissue of non-co-operation in coun-cils. Gandhi had supported the 'no-change' view within the Congress.109He agreed to the Delhi Special Coni-gress resolution allowing the SwarajyaParty to contest seats, but once havingwon, they were expected to follow acomplete obstructionist strategy. TheMaharashtrian ollowers of Tilak favour-ed responsive-co-operation, a view de-veloped by Tilak, and incorporated inthe Amritsar Session (1919). It was thisissue - combined with Nehru's tem-per - that drove a large number ofthem out of the Congress. When Tam-be joined the Central Provinces' Ex-ecutive Council, a large number of theexecutive members of the SwarajyaParty in the Central Provinces andBombay Province supported Tambe'smove. Many resignied their positions inthe elected assemblies as well as in theparty. Among them was Hedgewar'spolitical guru, B S Munje. As electionswere scheduled for 1926, the leadingTilakites in Bombay and the CentralProvinces met at Akola in Februaryand formed the Responsive Co-opera-tion Party. The membership was limit-ed to Congressmen110 in CP andBombay. In 1926, Lajpat Rai andMadan Mohan Malaviya formed theIndependent Congress, composed ofresponsivists from North India. A sec-tion of non-Congressmen in the HinduMahasabha led by Parmanand wantedto contest elections; this was opposedat the 1926 HM session and a compro-mise worked out by which candidatescould be put up in those cases wherethere was a Hindu candidate who didnot protect the interests of his com-munity.111 The major opposition toHIMparticipation in the elections came

from those HM members who were ac-tively participating in the various res-ponsivist parties. The leading spokes-man of this view was Lajpat Rai.The reformers in the HM, led byprominent Arya Samajists like LajpatRai and Sharaddhanand had, since

1923, advocated a number of itemsthat they wanted the HM to sponsorwidow remarriage, a minimum age forlrides, development of militancy an(dphysical well-being among Hindus, eli-mination of caste restrictions to pro-mote sanghatan, reconversion, removalof untouchability. The Sanatanistswithin the HM organised themnselves,npart, to counter some of these moves.On some they agreed. The chief pub-lic contention arose over integrating theuntouchables. Many in the orthodoxcamp took issue with untouchablesinter-dining with caste Hindus andwearing the sacred thread. The spokes-man of the orthodox camp, Din DayalSharma, mentioned that the chief dis-agreement with the Sanatanists wa-sabout the tendency of the reformersnot to follow shastric injunction in mak-ing their proposed reforms. Malaviyaand Rai were able to arrange compro-mise resolutions on both political parti-cipation and untouchables.113 But bothissues were to divide the HM andeventually cause a large number ofSanatanists and Congressmen to leaveit. The Leader, in an editorial opinionmentioned the Swarajist fear of poten-tial involvement of the HM in politics,

"The Swarajists generally have beentaking little interest in the Maha-sabha movement and a number ofthem have not disguised their hosti-lity to it." "The elections to the localbodies . . . had opened their eyes tothe influence it wielded and theywere very anxious .. . that it [HM]should not participate in the elec-tions."114After 1928, Malaviya and other active

Congressmen withdrew from the orga-nisation as it came increasingly in thehands of Parmanand, Munje, and N CKelkar. Moreover, there was a serioussplit in the ranks over the HM responseto the Simon Commission. Those close-ly associated with the Congress wantedthe HM to boycott it. Parmanand andthe followers of Munje in Maharashtradecided to co-operate with it.115 Be-cause of the strong reformist AryaSainaj inclination of the dominantgroup, the Sanatanists withdrew torally behind their own orthodox asso-ciations (ie, Bharat Mahamandal).The responsivists continued in theCongress until the change in the Conl-

gress Constitution and its ambivalentattitude towards the Communal Awarddrawn up by the Round Table Confe-rence in London. They were dismayedby Gandhi's decision that Congress-men resign seats in assemblies (manydid not resign when the Swarajistswithdrew) in late 1929, and the failureof the 1931 and 1932 civil disobediencecampaigns to achieve tangible politicalresults. They were most incensed atCongress' refusal to condemn the Com-munal Award. Munje, the leading HMactivist from Maharashtra, wamed theCongress that the HM would run itsown candidates unless the Congress, atits 1934 Bombay session, opposed theCommunal Award in its manifesto.116In August 1933, the responsivists hadformed the Democratic Swaraj Party inCP, *and Bombay, with council entrybased on joint electorates its mainplank.11 7Their creed was identical tothat of the Congress, but didnot place itself under Congress dis-cipline. At the 1934 Bombay Session,Gandhi between October 26 and28, convinced the session to changethree items in the Constitution: (1)"legitimate and peaceful" means toachieve aims was changed to "truth-ful and non-violent", (2) four annamembership was replaced by thestipulation to deliver 8,000 feet of welltested yarn, some of it spun by theprospective member (3) office was limit-ed to those on Congress registers forsix months and who had been habitualkhaddar wearers for the same period.118The Communal Award was neitheraccepted nor rejected by the Congress.Most of the responsivists, particularlythose in Maharashtra, opposed thechanges. Some left the Congress. Thel)reach between the responsivists andthe Congress was almost complete. Innorth India, Malaviya formed theNationialist Party in the United Provin-ces and the Punjab. After a longabsence, he also agreed to preside overthe 1936 Poona session of the HM. TheJIM at its 1933 session, fearing theambivalent attitude of Congress to-wards the Communal Award haddecided to fight the November, 1934elections in its own name. This wasreiterated (though not without opposi-tion from Parmanand and his support-ers) in the 1936 PooInasession prior tothe 1937 elections. 119Strong antipathy, however, still exist-ed between the Congressmen who re-turned to the HM and those whowanted the HM to become a politicalparty. A dispute broke out soon afterthe session absoutthe two rival HinduSabhas in the United Provinces, the

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ECONOMIC ANI) POLITICAL WEEKLY March 18, 1972home province of Malaviva, one loyalto Parmananid aind the other toMalaviya. At the Lahore Session inlate 1936, the two factions came intoopen conflict. Parmanand explainedthe disagreement with Malaviya's fol-lowers. The Timles of Inidia reportedthat,

"He [Parmanand] said that MALA-VIYA (sic) wanted to hand overHindu representation in the UnitedProvinces to the Congress, but thatunless Hindu Sabha took over thework, Government would establishMuhammadan rule there.'20The responsivist followers in northIndia and Maharasbtra could not forma united front to oppose the Congress,nor were they able to form any effec-tive alliance with the Hindu Maha-sabha.

In Nagpur, Hedgewvarhimself acti-vely supported the responsivist opposi-tion candidate againist Khare, theCongress candidate. In the CentralProvinces, the Democratic Swarajistsdid make an electoral agreement withthe Congress which resulted in an over-whelming electoral victory for theircombined forces in CP, enabling aministry to be formed under, N BKhare. Shankar Ramchandra Date, aleader of both the Democratic Swaraj-ists and the HM from Poona, hasnoted that in Maharashtra the HMsupported the Democratic Swarajists.Both political groups ceased to functionas effective units by 1943.

Generally, all three groups (Demo-cratic Swarajya, HM and Nationalists)were poorly financed, poorly organised,and made little impact electorally inthe elections of 1937. Upto 1937 thelIM was *a oosely organised group col-lected around prominent individuals.No single individlual united it likeGandhi united the Congress. A changetook place with the emergence ofSavarkar at the helm of the HM andthe war situation which generated mtuchcommunal identification in anticipationiof a struggle for control of India afterthe war. While Savarkar provided aphilosophy and char-ismafor the HM,his aggressive style anid lack of closepersonal contacts wVithhe RSS leader-ship drove a wedge between the RSSand the HM (particuilarlv fter the deathof Hedgewar in 1940).Savarkar had been imprisone(d or hisconnection with the Nasik Conspiracyand after being imprisoned on theAndamans for eleveni years was releasedwith strict limitations on his activities.These restrictions were removed onM,ay 17, 1937. With the active sup-port of Parmanandl, he was elected

Presi(lenitof' the INf in 1937 atndlre-naiined the leadling personality in itLIntil his death. He resolvedl to buildit into a political organisation repre-senting the Ilindus of In(lia, like theMuslim League dlid for In(lia's Muisliimis.Neither Golwalkar nor Iledgewarwar)ted the RSS to be too closely a.sso-ciated with a group which wvouldhaveplaced it in direct opposition to theCongress m-ovement. Many RSS mem-bers were active in Congress. More-over, the RSS claimed to be abovepartisan attachment. By turning theJIM into a political organiisation,Savar-kar ensured that whatever support theRSS had rendered to the IIM beforewvould cease. Savarkarwas viewed byhis HM followers, particularly those inMaharashtra, as the source of inspira-tion of the Hindu Sanightlani move-ment. The RSS members wNere lot pre-pared to accept this as thyN viewedtheir own Sarsanghchalak (leader) asthe director of the Sanghthan move-mnent. Digambar Badge, an approverin the trial of the murderers of Gandhi,told the court that he believed thatSavarkar was not only the leader ofthe Hindu Sanghthan movement, buta god as well. His birthday was cele-brated by HM youths like ShivaJayanti and Krishna Jayanti.122Nathu-ram Godse, in his final statement to thesame court said, "Millions of HinduSanghthanists looked up to him as thechosen hero, as the ablest and mostfaithful advocate of Hindu cause. Itoo was one of them.""2 The leadingHindu religious figure in Maharashtra,the Shankaracharya of Karvir Peeth,accused Savarkar of messianic visionsof himself and advised the HM notto transform itself into a political

party.124RSS members have frequently toldthe author that the HM was a collec-tion of rich talukdars and zamindarswith no real organisation capable ofdefending Hinduism. 'fhe organisation

that Savarkar inherited was certainlythis. Except in a few areas, it re-mained this."5 It is a fact that bothmembership and branch units did in-crease while he was President of theHM.'26 But it was never effectivelyorganised nor did it ever seriously chal-lenge the Congress for the support ofHindus.Throughout the Second World War,the HM sought to implement two pro-grammes. One was the campaign toenroll Hindus in the army and thesecond was the negotiattions with theBritish to get Hindu representation onvarious government councils. Bothwveremotivated by a belief that Hindus

lha(l to prepare for tle eventualstruggle for power betweeni MuslimsaTid Hindus when the British finallyvacated India. B S Munje, at the begin-ning of the War, defended themnilitarisation olicy by sayiing,"The importance of the move lies inthe fact that when after the war theGovernment will again take in handthe question of Federation, it is thequestion of recruithrncnt that willcount at the time. The balance bet-ween the twvorival communities, theHindus and Musalmans, competingfor power and dominiation, will bestruck mainly on the nutimbers orrecruitment supplied by each coni-munity."12>7To keep Hindus united, HM leadersfelt it necessary to de-emphasise thereform programme. Moreover, theyseemed too anxious to please theBritish authorities by a(lvocating enrol-ment of Hindus in the military and by

advocation of participationi n ministries.The organisation was also reluctant toembark on any mass anti-British move-ments that might alienate governmentsupport, Savarkar wrote to the Viceroy,"In accordance with the seasonedpolicy of the Hindu Maha Sabha ofresponsive co-operation, of occupyingevery point of vantage with a viewto march on further..., the HinduMaha Sabha has decided to parti-cipate in and utilise every war efforton the part of the Government whichis genuinely calculated to contribtetf.to Indian Defense and to further..Hindu interests."'28He encouraged the Viceroy toappoint supporters of HM to theadvisory council of the Viceroy andthe War Committee.'29 Munje wrote

to the Viceroy, " . .. between the twocommunities, the Hindu Mahasabha...will be in a position to give immenselylarge help both in men, material andintellect (sic) than the MuslinmLeaguecan hope to do.'..^ 1 Moreover, theHM organised a Militarisation Boardto encourage enrolment of Hindus Inthe armed forces. Savarkarassured theCommander-in-Chief of British forcesthat the Hindu Mahasabba wouldadvise Hindus to be obedient to militaryauthorities.131At the Madurai sessionin December, 1940, a Bengali delegatemoved a resolution that, if by March31, 1941. the British did not make anunequivocal declaration concedingDominion status within one, year afterthe conclusion of war and did not alsoreject the concept of Pakistan, the HMwould launch a programme of massdirect action.'32 Opposition to theproposed direct action developed, parti-cularlv among the Maharashtrian ead-ems who favoured militarisation andsaw direct action as a threat to thegovernment's goodwill. The govern-

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M.farch 8, 1972 ECONOMIC.AND POLITICAL WEEKLYment milight ive advanitages o Muislimils1)oth in nlilitary recruitimlent anidadministrative positioris if they felt thbhIindus were anti-British. Miinjc';resolutioni to postpone indefinitelydirect actioIn was passed by a vote ef61 to 10 at the Calcutta meeting ofthe HIMWorking Committee in June,1941.'33 Shyama Prasad Mookerjeewrote to Savarkar,"UPtil (sic) nov all big nationalstruggles have had no direct connec-tion with the cause of Hflindlusssuch. Today every Hindui feels therigours of oppression . . . To mymind the immediate success of sucha campaign is not the 6o1ilypoint atissue. Suich a campaigni is necessaryfor the full propagation of Ilin(lsolidarity among the nmassesw hichcan only growvas a result of somemovement of resistance."V''When the violence associated with the"Quit India" movement broke out inAugust, 1942, a Fortnightly Reportnoted that Savarkar had informed aninfonnal meeting of HM members inPoona to adopt "a policy of neutralitytowards the present Congress policy."135After the fall of Singapore onFeb')ruary 5, 1942, Staffordl Crippsarrived in India to see if sonic workableconstitutional arrangement could beworked out with India's lea(ling politi-cians. He met Savarkar, wlio acceptedthe scheme of National Governmentand the HM was offered representationin the proposed governmnent. TheCongress Working Committee rejectedCripps' proposals. Even Miinje wasquite uipset that the HM had ruishbe,dinto accepting the proposals and hadthe dubious honour of being the first(and as matters tuirned ouit the onlysignificant political group to (lo so) toaccept Cripps' plan.i36 While theAll-India Hindu Mahasabh-a did notput up candidates in the elections,various Hindu-minded independentsran for elected office and a few localHindlu Sabhas ran candidates for theprovincial assemblies and the CentralAssembly in the 1937 electiorns.Politi-ciabs who had some connection withthe Hindu Mahasabha participated inministries in Sind, Bengal and NWFPduring the Second World War, some-times in alliance with the MuslimLeague. The Congress dominated eightof the eleven provincial legislaturesafter the 1937 elections. In October,1940, Congress ministers, but notassembly members, resigned.

Participation was not part of a cen-tralised Hindu Mahasabba strategy assuch, buit each HM sympathiser tookpart in the elections on the basis oflocal problems and pro-Hindu Maha-sabba legislators were not organised

inlto a Hindu Mahasabba politicalparty. Savarkar and his followers Inthie IIM activily espoused this policy.There was considerable resenitjiietmt frOmw,vithinhe IIM to any co-operationiwith the Muslim League. This policymutst have seenmedike rank politicatopportunism to the RSS, as it did tomany other Inndians. In a letter toMehr Chand Khanna, leader of thepro-HM legislators in the North-WestFrontier Province, Savarkar advisedhim to join what was a Congress coali-tion cabinet as a specifically Hindu Ma-hasabha member."This is most e6ssentialto get Hindu Mahasabba recogllsed asan indispensable constituent in any con-stituitionlmaking bodiywhich may he call-cd after the war is over."'I7 Savarkaralso defended the participation of HinduSabha sympathisers in those provinces nwhich Congress ministries had resigned."If a group deliberately absents itselffrom alny elected body, the remainingrepresentatives, f they can form a corum(sic) in case it is required do always andlof a right constitute the institution..."While leaving the decision to theindividual provincial Hindu Sabha, hedid lay down a'guideline for such parti-cipation. Hindu ministers must opposeany move supporting the concept ofPakistan or the right of secession. Hefelt that the co-operation of the politicalrepresentatives of the two comnmunitieswould "train pe'ople to get themselves

consolidated into an integral commonstate."138 Within the Hin;cduMaha-sabha there was a group very *nuchopposed to this policy. Shyama PrasadMookerjee wrote to Savarkar,"The Moslem League today standsas a great hindrance not only toHindu interests bit also to theinterests of India as a whOle andthere should have been no prounce-nient (sic) favouring open alliance orco-operation with the League... "13qHe felt Savarkarhad weakened the posi-tion of the HM by such a policy, "Itis indeed lamentable that your state-ments should have clouded the issuesso much and have encouraged peopleto think that the Hindui Mahasabhadepends on careerists an(d job-hunt-ers. 146At the end of the war, the HM.except in a fewvscattered places likeBengal, was totally unorganised andwith little popular support. AshutoshLahiry, a Bengali HM leader, wroteto Savarkar,"I am really perturbed at the trendof events that are developing in theHindu Mahasabha organisation. APolicy of opportunism is not the onewhich can best serve the interest ofthe Hindu Mahasabha.. . The fieldwork is being sadly neglectedl. Merewvorcls . . wvill not take us to the

desired goal ... 141To a large extent, the JINM epenidedon the contributions of a few wealthyl)usinessmnen, certainly a coniservativeinifluence. When Jugal Kishore Billathreatened to cuit off his contributions-xvhich enal)led the head offi'ceto

fuinction - the I-IM leadership didtheir utmost not to displease himn. Theissue concerned the right of Parini'anandto use the office premises for o'ne of hisservice ventures. This conitroversydragged on for several years, leadingParmanand at one point to r6sign indisgust from the HM. This issue istalked about in a large ihimber of let-ters (in the Savarkar Files) duringWVorldWar II.The RSS itself got involved in thiscontroversy and was forced to discon-tiniue using some parade-grounds, creat-ing a great deal of bad feeling betweenthe two groups in Delhi. The HM hadno viable youth, labour or farm organ-isations and was poorly financed. Forthis reason, the HqM eadership wasparticularly anxious to get the supportof RSS cadres. However, Savarkar,theblunt revolutionary turned politiciani,and the ascetic Golwalkar were notparticularly close to one another. Veryfew letters either from or to GoIwAkarare, in the Savarkar Files, unlie thefairly large number between Hedgewarand various Mahasabha leaders. Savar-kar hoped to create a HIinduorganisa-tion that would organise the Hindusaccording to his ownv philosophypopuarly referred to as "Savarkarism".That organisation was the HinduRashtra Dal, organised by NathuramGodse.142 It was never a large organis-ation, nor did it even approach thesuccess of the RSS in recruiting youngHindus. This action antagonihsed omeRSS leaders. Savarkar is still remem-bered as a proud Chitpavan Brahmi*,unable to work well in groups. Lettersin his own files reveal that the HMDelhi office and his o%vn ffice in Dadaroften worked at cross-purposes witheach other. He trusted few people. Inan otherwise extremely complimentarybiography, DharnanjayKeer writes,"A leader who passes his days in thegrooves of revolutionary methodsoften suspects the loyalty of his col-leagues and someitimnes describesthose who differ froim him as spiesor tumcoats. Savarkar was no ex-ception to it."1443

Some HM leaders told the authorthat the Chitpavans, who formed a dis-proportionately large numnber of theleaders of the HM in Maharashtra,were"by nature" proud, practical, an-d mili-tant. They felt unicomfortable n an or-ganisation like the Congress, led by a

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY March 18, 1972"sainit",MahatiimaGandhi. They thouglhtthat Chitpavans wvcre qually suspiciousof the "saint" who led the RSS, Gol-valkar. Moreover, this statement wasoften couiple(l with the view that thethlree other major Brabhmiinroups inMaharashtra could more easily adjlistto the ascetic style demnandedof RSSsw^%ayalmsevakshan couldI the Chitpa-vanis. This hypothesis nmightbe an in-teresting subject of research.

VWho represents the Hiildus? The IIMfought a losing battle wvith both theBritish government and other Hindusin getting itself recognised as the re-presentative of Hindus. However, totest the proposition, the IIindu Mahasa-bha decided to ruin its own candidatein the central and provincial assemblies

after the Second World War. It didvery poorly. Its counterpart amiiong heMuslims, the Muslim League, cant-paigning on the single issue of Pakistan,won almost every Muslim seat in theprovinces and every Muslini seat in thecentral assembly. Fewv RSS memberssupported the HM.144 Of those whovoted, most probably voted for theCongress.'4"In despair, Annarao Bho-patkar, Maharashtrian I-IM lea(ler,wrote to Savarkar,"Democracy thrustmthe most ignorant untrained electorateall of a sudden has alwvaysprove(Idangerous to nations a.nd hastentcltheir fall."'"-The voters had rejected the HMNtclaim to speak for the H-Iindus.As mat-ters turned out, so did the British. At theSiimilaConiference n June 1945, the Bri-tish treated the Muslim League as therepresentative of the Musliins of Indiaand the Congress as the representativeof caste Hinidlus. The l IM was n


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March 18, 1972 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYmany of his devotees either refutse(d oco-operate with Mooker-jee or did sowith great reluctance. Savarkar heldthe office of president from the 1937session of the HM at Ahmedabad till1944.l', He remained the dominatingfigure in the HM for another twentyyears.Besides failing to succeed electorallyor to conduct mass contact campaigns,the HM also failed in organising para-military groups for Hindus. As relatedabove, an effort was made to getHindus to enlist in the armed forces.From 1945 to Independence in 1947,the HM kept passing resolutions ask-ing Hindus to organise and arm them-selves. After Mountbatten made hisbroadcast on June 3, 1947 announcingpartition, the HM Working Committeemet on June 6-7 in New Delhi andpassed a resolution asking Sikhs andHindus to organise a HindustanNational Guard. This, like other efforts,met with little response.160 In despera-tion, some HM leaders, notably Maha-rashtrians, looked on the princes aspotential rallying points to a militantHinduism. L B Bhopatkar, writing inMahratta, called on the Hindu princesnot to co-operate with Congress, but toorganise a union among themselves.He advocated the formation of aMahratta Confederacy which would bethe nucleus of a Hindu India. 161 Aftera long history of demanding an un-divided India, the HM Working Com-mittee met on June 6-7, 1947 in NewDelhi, and begrudgingly accepted divi-sion, but proposed a Day of Protestagainst division. It recognised thenecessity, under the circumstances, todivide Bengal and the Punjab.Shortly after the announcement,events in Punjab were to create a greatfollowing for the RSS. Large numbersof Punjabis were attracted to it and asthey spread out over India and spreadthe influence of the organisation. Inearlier riots in Bengal and easternlBihar, the RSS was only marginallyinvolved as it was relatively weak inthose areas.

VIIBy admission of their owvn leaders,the RSS at the time of partition inPunjab, was largely composed of urbanhigh caste Hindus. During 1946-47, itgrew rapidly. Punjab dturing WorldWar II was governed by an unstablecoalition of Unionists (Muslim andHindu landlords), Akalis, Congres.s,and independents, with a UnionistChief Minister, Khizar Hayat Tiwana.162Tiwana, no friend of Jinnah's, had been

cxpelled fromn he Muslim League,leading to a split among the Unionists.The results of that rift appeared in the1946 elections when it won only 10seats. All three religious groups (Sikhs,Hindus and Muslims) wNre collectingarms and getting ready for open war-fare. On January 24, 1947, Tiwana'sgovernment declared the MuslimLeague's National Guards an unlawfulbody. According to ChauidhriMuham-mad Ali,

"To keep up appearances, RashtriyaSwayamsevak Sangh, a mnilitantHindu organisation,was also declaredunlawful, but no action was takeneither against the Congressvolunteers,or the Sikhs who, as everyone knewv,were busy collecting arms."l63The Muslim League reacted to thischallenge by declaring a non-violentmass struggle. Its purpose was also to

demonstrate the "injustice" of denyingthe largest single party their "just" rightto rule. Unable to curb the movement,the government was forced to rescindthe order on January 28. According toa reliable witness of partition events inPunjab, "The hooligan Muslim elementsin the big cities perceived all too clear-ly the weakness of the Government; theforces of law and order, not toostaunch in any case, becamnepuzzledand doubtful of what was expected ofthem."'"1 Moreover, a police force,about 75 per cent Muslim, could notbe expected to enforce such actionwith any enthusiasm.165 On March 3,the ministry resigned, leaving thefield to the Muslim League to formthe coalition. The Governor did askthe Muslim League to form a ministry,but the Hindug and Sikhs would notsupport it and took out demonstrationsagainst the Muslim League. Terriblecommunal riots soon broke out. Thoughthere were clues in March of the holo-caust that was to follow, miianypoliti-cal leaders felt that once partition wasaccomplished the minorities wouldadjust themselves. Typical of the Coni-gress view regarding the future ofminorities in Pakistan annd India wasNehru's comment in mid-1947, "Thereis no reason why minorities there...should be tyrannised and persecut-ed."166 Some prominent Congressmen,such as Vallabhbhai Patel, felt that thenew state of Pakistan would not surviveand the long run possibility of a Hindiiminority continuing to live in Pakistandid not exist. As it became clear thatthere was a potentiality for massviolence, it was decided at a PartitionCouncil meeting in July 1947, to createa Boundary Force composed of mixedtroops under a Britishoml, mand-er. Itwas disbanded in September 1947, enl

the insistence of 1)oth countries. Pende-rel Moon's diagnosis of the weakness ofthis force wvas typical of complaintsraised against it. He felt that thetroops themselves would be infected bythe communal virus and prove unreli-able. They would, even in the absence ofa shift of the populations, be inade-quate in nuimibers to dleal with theenormity of the problem.167 Bothcountries agreed to shift the administra-tive personnel of the mninority com-munity on their side of Puinjal)to theother side. Strangely, this sameprinciple was not applie(l to the generalpopulation. In view of the rapidlydeteriorating communal sittuation afterIndependence, 1)oth countries finallvreached an agreement to move theminority population.'68 The same com-plaints regarding the miiilitaryadmin-istration apply to the adlministrativeagencies established to remove theminority populations. Within a fewmonths, millions of people moved acrossthe border of the two cotunitries. Be-sides the miseries involved in suddenlyleaving their homes and bwsinesses, therefugees had to pay hiighly inflatedrates for various means of transporta-tion.'69 The urban refugees l'?facedparticularly severe probOlemnsf reloca-tion - lack of adequa'te housing, lackof employment in their prior occupa-tions, lack of investment opportuni-ties. 171

It was in this setting of aroused corn-munal frenzy and misery that the RSSrendered service to the Hindu andSikh refugees; this was to provideenormous goodwill for it later and wasto have a pronounced effect on votingpatterns for the political party in-colporating the ideology of the RSS --the Jan Sangh. As the refugees spreadout over northern andl western India,they took the RSS with themnandserved as the membership nucleus fornew shakhas. Many of the full-timeRSS cadres emerged from this group.The RSS membership rieached a peakin 1947 which it has not equalled untilrecently.'72 The core of the Punjabimembership were Aiya Samajis or thesons of Arya Samajis.'7' Thousands ofSwayamsevaks helped organise rescuesquads, guarded refugees,'7' providedfood and medicine, an(d even led somerefugee groups into India. VallabhbhaiPatel, the Deputy Prime Minister, him-self appreciated this service of the RSSand was reluctant to take strong actionagainst it as long as the disturbancescontinued. He considered the RSSmembers patriots, if a b)it misguided.On January 6, 1948, at Lucknow, h1e

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL \WEEKLY March 18, 1972implored Congressmen to drawv he RSSmembers into their owNn organisation."They are to be won over by Congressw th love."175As the Punjabi refugees poured int0)Delhi, the communal riots spread tothat city. They were greatly disillu-sioned with the Congress party, andparticularly angry wvith Gandhi.'76Gandhi was horrified at what wvastaking place in the city and decided totake the ultimate step to stop the riot-ing - undergo *afast. He began hisfast on January 12, 1948,1'7 an(dended it on Janualy 18 only after lead-ers of the Sikh and Hindu communitiesin Delhi verbally promised him thatthey would adhere to his six point pro-gramme to end the ill-will. This ratherproforma agreement did not reflect theviews of a large part of the two corm-munities, as Azad himself admits.'78Partof this reaction Nwas he result of hatredbuilt up during the communal frenzyin Punjab, but part of it was based onithe view that Muslims wvere disloyaland a danger to the state. Many pro-minent Congressmenbelieved this. Patelsubscribed in part to this view.""9In Delhi itself, the RSS organised animpressive relief programme for re-fugees. It organised a group called theHindu Sahayata Samiti in April 1947under the presidentship of Hans Ra;Gupta, who was later to become mayorof Delhi.'80 Swayamsevaks would meetthe refugees as they arrived from Pun-jab and take them to one of the fourlodging c.mps.181

(To be continued)Notes

104 Mahratta, October 29, 1922.105 Leader, April 13, 1925.106 Ibid.107 The occasion was the unveiling ofa statue of the revolutionary, Vish-nushastri Chiplunkar.108 September 7, 1924.109 The 'no-change' view was that theCongress should continue to boy-cott completely the electoral pro-cess.110 See Mahratta, February 21, 1926,for an account of this.111 Lea(ler, March 17, 1926.112 See a discuission of this in IndraPrakash, "Hindu Mahasabha: ItsContribution to India's Politics",Delhi, 1966.113 See Leader, March 15, 17 and 18,for summaryof events at 1926 HMsession.114 Leader, March 18, 1926. Amongthose at the 1926 HM session wasMotilal Nehru, who wrote a state-ment to the session imploring HMmembers to join Congress, a largerplatform of all communities, ratherthan splitting the already dividedHindu community by running can-didates who would oppose fellow

llind(us. Ile admitted that, "It isI1o use concealing the fact that theIndian National Congress is predo-minantlv a Hindu organisation."Leader, March 17, 1926.115 See Prakash, op cit, pp 36-40 fora discussion of the disagreement.116 Alahratta,June 10, 1934.117 Malbratta,October 8, 1933.

118 See Bose, op cit, discussion pp269-71.119 See the development of the HMinto a political party in Mahratta,August 30, 1940.120 Tinmesof India, November 24,1936.121 Private correspondence, January1970.122 Dhananjay Keer, "Veer Savarkar",Bombav, 1966, p 410.123 Page 11 of the mimeographedstatement of Nathuram Godse,given to the writer by his brother.124 Mahratta, July 8, 1938.125 There is evidence that Savarkarwas very much aware of this him-

.self. The Mahratta reports a con-versation of Savarkar with a Con-gress Socialist leader who madethe same chaige. Implicitly accept-ing the accusation, he respondedby saying he planned to make theHM a progressive and livingorganisation. Mahratta, April 22,1938.126 An incomplete report, entitled "Re-port Received by the PresidentialOffice up to the 1st August, 1940"in the Savarkar Files at Dadar,notes that there were some 66,000mnembers in 1940 with two-thirdsof them in Bombay Province andBengal.127 Munje Files in Nehru Museum, No3, 1939, pp 98-9.128 Letter to Viceroy of August 19,1940, Savarkar Files.129 Ibid.130 Letter to Viceroy of September 25,1940, Savarkar Files.131 Letter to J P Shrivastav, MLA, ofMarch 3, 1941, Savarkar Files.13_ See Times of India, December 30,1940, for discussion. The Bengalileaders were politically astute andrecognised that the HM couldbuild an effective organisation onlyalter engaging in mass movementsthat articulated the demands ofthe people, even if this antagonis-ed the British.

133 There was concerted opposition tothis move within the HM. Seean account of this in BombayChronicle, June 16, 1941.134 Letter of January 28, 1941, inSavarkar Files.135 Home Political (I), first half ofAugust 1942, 18-8-42. Savarkaron the day after this meeting didtell a HM group that the HM didagree with the aims of the 'QuitIndia' movement. Presumably, hedisagreed with the timing of it.136 Letter to Savarkar, April 9, 1942,in Savarkar Files.137 Letter of June 12, 1943, in Savar.kar Files. He gave the sameadvice to Rai Bahadur Gokulchand,a minister in Sind Province. Letterof November 4, 1942, in Savarkar

Files.138 A mimeographed circular in theSavarkar Files.1:39Letter of July 22, 1943, in Savar-kar Files140 Ibid.141 Letter of May 5, 1945, in SavarkarFiles.142 During a speech in Poona, Savar-kar complimented the HinduRashtra Dal by stating that theconsolidation of Hinduism "couldnot be principally preached in anyother Hindu organisation." Report-ted in Keer, op cit, p 363.143 Keer, op cit, p 359.144 An exception seems to have beenthe Marathi speaking part of Bom-bav Province.145 Interview with J P Mathur, JanSangh Office Secretary in Delhi,w7howas an active Swavamsevakin 1945 and 1946, on January 29,1969. This view was repeated tothe vriter by many other personsactive in the RSS during thoseyears. Most HM members inter-viewed also agree with this opi-mion.146 Letter of December 7, 1945, Savar-kar Files.147 See R C Majumdar (General Edi-tor), "Struggle for Freedom",Bombay, 1969, p 718.148 Congress, 5 Muslim League, 1Sikh, 1 Indian Christian, and 1Parsi.149 The Muslim League did, however,join the Interim Government oiOctober 12, 1946, after the Con-gress members themselves had be-guin operating the Interim Execu-tive.150 L E Mosley, "The Last Days ofThe British Raj", London, 1961.151 There is a controversy betweeniPakistani and Indian writers overthe severity of the east Bengalriots. See Chaudhri MuhammadAli, "The Emergence of Pakistan",New York, 1967, p 85. PattabhiSitaramayya in the second volumeof "Historv of the Indian NationalCongress", Delhi, 1969, p 867, pre-sents a far more serious situation.152 Mountbatten gave this reason toAlan-Campbell Johnson, "Missionw th Mountbatten", Bombay, 1951,pp 15-17.15:3Congress had previously acceptedthe principle of division on May 1,1947.154 Letter of June 17, 1945, in Savar-kar Files.155 Letter of March 3, 1945 in Savar-kar Files.156 The Hindu Sabba in Bengal waspopular in a way no other provin-cial sabha was. It was led by adynamic group of high caste Hindulawyers wbhohad organised theSabha for political purposes againstthe Muslim dominated ministriesthere. These ministries wNerem-plementing legislation, wN,hich hewealthier Hindu community feltuindermined its position of influ-ence in the province, as well asselectively recruiting Muslims tofill vacancies in the public seryices.157 Keer, op cit, p 366.

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March 18, 1972 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY158 Rai Bahadur Kunwar Guru Narainto Shyama Prasad Mookeriee onAugust 27, 1945, in SavarkarFiles.On September 5, 1945, Mookerjeeaccepted his resignation and re-sponded that "responsive co-opera-tion does not mean unconditionalco-operation." Letter In SavarkarFiles.159I From 1942, Savarkar had wantedto resign because of illness, butwas persuaded by HM members toremain; for a large part of thistime, Mookerjeehad acted as work-ing President of HM. It was wellknown in the HM that the twooften disagreed over HM policy(i e, over joininc ministries withthe Muslim League). Disagree-ments grew, so that in 1944 Moo-kerjee threatened to discontinuehis activities in HM. Letter fromhim to Savarkar of April 9, 1944in Savarkar.Files.160 Many Hindu para-military groupsdid organise, but few under the

direct management of the HM.161 Mahratta, July 4, 1947. LaterSavarkar in the same vein sup-ported the independence move ofthe Maharaja of Travancore.162 In 1946 elections the MuslimLeague wvon79 of 86 Muslimseats, Congress 51, Panthic AkaliSikhs 22, Unionists 10, and In-dependents 10. See Satya M Rai,"Partition of the Punjab", Bombay,1965, pp 39-46, Chaudhri Muham-mad Ali, "The Emergence of Pak-istan" New York, 1967, pp 100-103, Penderel Moon, "Divide andQuit", pp 71-96.163 Chaudhri M Ali, op cit p 101.164 Penderel Moon, op cit, p 76.165 Ibid, p 78.166 Quoted by Michael Brecher in"Nehru, A Political Biography",London, 1959, p 367.167 Penderel Moon, op cit, p 95.Moon's experience in Bahawalpurstate reveals the complicity of thetroops in the disturbances, and thedesire of Muslims to rid that stateof all Hindus, as quickly as pos-sible.168 The immensity of the task can beseen in observing that in 1941,there wNre approximately 3,800,000non-Muslims in West Punjab andabout 5,300,000 Muslims in EastPunjab. Rai, op cit, p 78.169 Reports on this in East PunjabLiaison Agency Records as cited inRai, op cit, pp 87-8. A large numberof refugee camps were set up allover India. Over 160 such campsaccommodating some 1,250,000refugees were established in India.Ibid, p 108.170 1,090,000 according to Rai, p 120.This figure does not include some300,000 rural refugees who movedto urban areas in India.171 See Rai's rather exhaustive studyof the situation in Chapter VI.172 Interview with Eknath Ranade,January 1, 1970.173 Interview with Madhav Rao Mule,July 31, 1969. The Arya Samaj

was a reformist IIindu sect parti-cularly strong in the urban areasof Punjab.

174 Lahore's DAV college was a centreused by the RSS for assemblingrefugees before escorting them intoIndia.175 Quoted by KewvalL Panjabi, "TheIndomitable Sardar", Bombay,1962, p 131.176 Not only refugees were antagon-istic to Muslims. Azad writes,"Trouble was not confined to therefugees or even to the generalpublic. Even the areas whereonly Government servants livedwere involved. When the reports

of massacres in the West Punjabreached Delhi, Muslims in the citvwvere attacked by mobs of unrulymlen. Some Sikhs took a leadingpart in organising these murderousattacks in Delhi." Abul KalanAzad, "India Wins Freedom",Calcutta, 1959, p 201.177 See Azad for description, pp213-22.178 Ibid, pp 221-2.179 See Punjabi, op cit, pp 130-31.180 Organiser, August 21, 1947.181 Organiser, August 21, 1947.

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W the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh II-Who Represents the Hindus

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