Unexpected Returns Version 1a

1

Unexpected Returns

• Theory & Strategy

• Fat Tails & Fractals

• Secular Stock Market Cycles

• Opportunities

2

Theory & Strategy

• “Rationale” Theories– L. Bachelier, Theory of Speculation, 1900

– H. Markowitz, Security Selection and Modern Portfolio Theory, ’52 (Nobel ’90)

– P.A. Samuelson, Fair Game Theory, ’56

– W.F. Sharpe, Equilibrium Theory and CAPM, ’64 (Nobel ’90)

– E. F. Fama, Random Walk Theory, ‘65

– E. F. Fama, Efficient Market Theory, ‘69

– F. Black, M. Scholes, Option Pricing, ’73 (Nobel ’97)

• Strategies– Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA)

• Risk Measurement: Std Deviation

• Return Emphasis: Relative Returns

– “Sailing” - Crestmont Research, Unexpected Returns, Chapter 10, ‘07

3

CAPM/MPT/Strategic AA…Turned On It’s Head

10 Yr Period Ending Aug ’09

CAPMGeometric Mean (%)

Standard Deviation (%)

Sharpe Ratio

BarCap US Agg Bond TR USD 6.31 4.01 0.47S&P 500 TR -0.79 16.4 0.01

Strategic Asset AllocationGeometric Mean (%)

Standard Deviation (%)

Sharpe Ratio

Conservative 5.09 4.58 0.34Conservative + 3.77 7.06 0.17

Moderate 3.07 8.54 0.12Moderate + 1.6 11.65 0.06Aggressive 0.03 14.81 0.02

4

Strategic AA ConfusionJan ’73 – Dec ‘08

International Debt, Gold, Domestic Debt, and Commodities are the best diversifiers over long periods…

Sept, Oct, Nov ‘08However they failed to provide diversification benefits in the fall of ‘08…

Jan '94 - Dec '08IA SBBI S&P 500

IA SBBI S&P 500 1.00MSCI EAFE NR 0.80

IA SBBI US Small Stock 0.67BarCap US Corporate High Yield 0.61

JPM EMBI Plus 0.55FTSE NAREIT All REITs 0.46

Morningstar Long-Only Commodity 0.17BarCap US Agg Bond 0.07

S&P GSCI Precious Metal 0.03Citi WGBI Non 10+ Yr 0.02

Date

Oppenheimer Int'l

Bd A

Vanguard Precious Metals

PIMCO Total

Return A

Fidelity Select Natural

Resources08/01/2008 -0.71 -0.37 -0.70 -0.2909/02/2008 -0.69 -0.08 -0.72 -0.0910/01/2008 -0.17 0.38 -0.48 0.3311/03/2008 0.66 0.82 0.32 0.8212/01/2008 0.83 0.92 0.58 0.9201/01/2008 0.89 0.96 0.57 0.95

5

The Volatility of Equity/Treasury CorrelationsJan ’ 26 – Aug ‘09

S&P % Change

12 Mo Corr

Above 0.00 Correlation

S&P % Change

36 Mo Corr

Above 0.20 Correlation

Sep-33 -11.45% 0.90 38% Aug-98 -14.46% 0.95 42%Mar-32 -11.36% 0.81 Sep-37 -14.04% 0.91Dec-31 -14.00% 0.76 Oct-37 -10.20% 0.90Feb-33 -18.75% 0.66 Oct-87 -21.52% 0.88Oct-29 -19.71% 0.43 Oct-29 -19.71% 0.85Apr-32 -19.23% 0.41 Nov-29 -12.50% 0.75Aug-98 -14.46% 0.28 Nov-73 -10.82% 0.74Sep-74 -11.70% 0.17 Jul-34 -10.83% 0.66Oct-32 -13.33% 0.10 Jun-30 -16.24% 0.40May-32 -22.22% 0.07 May-40 -23.12% 0.30May-40 -23.12% -0.01 Mar-38 -25.15% 0.22Mar-39 -13.33% -0.05 Sep-30 -12.62% 0.14Sep-31 -29.58% -0.19 Oct-08 -16.80% -0.04Nov-29 -12.50% -0.21 Sep-33 -11.45% -0.06Sep-37 -14.04% -0.27 Sep-74 -11.70% -0.43Jul-34 -10.83% -0.31 Mar-39 -13.33% -0.51Nov-73 -10.82% -0.45 Feb-33 -18.75% -0.57Jun-30 -16.24% -0.46 Feb-09 -10.65% -0.61Sep-30 -12.62% -0.51 Oct-32 -13.33% -0.66Oct-37 -10.20% -0.53 May-31 -13.25% -0.69Oct-87 -21.52% -0.57 May-32 -22.22% -0.72Oct-08 -16.80% -0.74 Apr-32 -19.23% -0.75May-31 -13.25% -0.83 Mar-32 -11.36% -0.76Mar-38 -25.15% -0.85 Dec-31 -14.00% -0.80Feb-09 -10.65% -0.92 Sep-31 -29.58% -0.84Sep-02 -10.87% -0.99 Sep-02 -10.87% -0.95

6

Risk Management Redefined

Watson Wyatt-• “The events of the last two years have demonstrated that risk management cannot stop at the 95 th

percentile. We need to find a way to include very unlikely, but potentially high impact, events.”

• “We believe the recent crisis has shown that risk management based solely on volatility is not sufficient.”

Source: “Extreme Risks” –Watson Wyatt, Nov‘09

7

Modern Portfolio Theory, Fat Tails & Strategic AA

Financial Research Corp Conference, Nov ‘09 R. Cheng, Former CIO, Founder, Fidelity Freedom Funds-

– "One fundamental mistake our industry is committing is that we love the clean, nice theory too much.“

– "Something with less chance of happening than 50 times the age of the universe happened three days in a row, or maybe there is a better explanation?" Cheng said. "Your theory sucks.“

– "We should see a higher frequency of what we used to call extreme events -- it's here to stay."

L. DeWitt, Director – Research, Subadvisory Mkts & Lifecycle Fds, FRC-– “Based on our recent experience with target-date fund product marketing, performance and

the volatile market, I project that target-date funds will not make it through another bear market.”

– “And... target-date funds may prove to be not the golden egg, but turn into the rotten egg instead for asset managers to be the catalyst for change that restructures the distribution of mutual funds through retirement plans.”

8

Modern Portfolio Theory & Fat Tails

David Blitzer, Chief Economist, S&P-• “In that particular trade-off between solving the problem and assuring that the answer can be

applied to reality, solving won out. We would have been better off if the answer were only approximately right but was truly applicable, instead of more accurate but not very useful.”

• “The normal distribution doesn’t work for markets—the volatility experienced in the last year should not have occurred were the market obeying a normal distribution.”

Source: “Another Victim of the Financial Crisis…” -Journal of Indexes, Nov/Dec ‘09

9

Theory & Strategy

• “Irrational” Theories– R.N. Elliott, The Elliott Wave Principle, ’38

– B. Mandelbrot, Fractal Geometry & Fat Tails, ’51 onward

– D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Cognitive Bias Theory, & Herding, ’72 (Nobel ’02)

– R. Prechter, Elliott Wave Theorist, ‘78

– D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Prospect Theory, & Loss Avoidance, ’79 (Nobel ’02)

– R. Prechter, Socionomics, ‘99

• Strategies– Market Timing/Technical Analysis

– Trend Following

– Tactical Asset Allocation & Hedging

• Risk Measurement: Portfolio Value & Drawdowns

• Return Emphasis: Absolute Returns

– “Rowing” - Crestmont Research, Unexpected Returns, Chapter 10, ‘07

10

Risk

• Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, ’78, ‘05 C. Kindleberger

• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #2,811

• This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, ’09, C. Reinhart, K. Rogoff Amazon.com Sales Rank: #204

• The Misbehavior of Markets, ’04, B. Mandelbrot

• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #5,378

• The Black Swan, ’07, N. Taleb

• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #251

11

Manias-• Mob psychology, herding; “the trend is my friend” • Supply of credit explodes; substitutes of traditional money are developed• Euphoria in asset prices (commodities, real estate, equities) and spending• Greed grows more rapidly than wealth• Investors speculate and seek short-term gains• Capital is leveraged for investment• Economists see a new era in which traditional business cycles become obsolete• Bubbles form, prices become un-attached to fundamentals

Panics-• Start with a displacement and shock to the macroeconomic system• Sudden fright without cause• Demand suddenly stops, buyers become sellers, with an awareness that it’s time to become liquid• Revulsion

Crashes-• Discovery of fraud and swindles• Regardless of where it starts, prices end below where they started• A lender of last resort steps forward

Lesson-• The last 400 years has been full of financial crises and so will the next 400 years

Kindleberger

12

Financial Crisis-• Again and again, countries (both developed and emerging), banks, individuals, and firms take on

excessive debt in good times without enough awareness of the risks that will follow when the inevitable recession hits.

This Time Is Different Syndrome-• The firmly held belief that financial crises are things that happen to other people in other

countries at other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now. We are doing things better, we are smarter, we have learned from past mistakes. The old rules of valuation do not apply.

“Second Great Contraction”-• Dispelled any prior notion that among academics, market participants, or policy makers that acute

financial crises are either a thing of the past or have been relegated to the “volatile” emerging markets.

• Both in the run-up to the recent crisis and in its aftermath, the United States has driven straight down the quantitative tracks of a typical deep financial crisis.

Reinhart & Rogoff

13

“Modern” Financial Theory is founded on shaky theories-1. Price changes are statistically independent (“efficient”)

2. Prices are normally distributed (bell)

3. Investors are rational

4. All investors are alike

5. Price change is continuous

6. Price changes follow a Brownian motion (“random walk”)

Mandelbrot sees (from studying prices)-1. Prices have fractal relationships with each other and have a “long memory”

2. The bell curve fits reality very poorly; markets are far wilder and scarier

3. Tails follow a “power law” typically found in nature

5 Rules of Market Behavior-1. Markets are risky

2. Trouble runs in streaks

3. Markets have a personality

4. Markets mislead

5. Market time is relative

Mandelbrot

14

The Elliott WaveA Grand Fractal

15

Black Swans-• Completely unpredictable

• Low probability, high consequence

• Underestimated

• Unconnected to a series of patterns or causes

Confirmation Bias-• Selective use of data to fit one's opinion, belief or "feeling" about something. A "natural tendency to

look only for corroboration."

The Platonic Fallacy- • People ignore “black swans” because we are more comfortable seeing the world as something

structured, ordinary, and comprehensible.

Leads to three distortions:1. Narrative fallacy: creating a story post-hoc so that an event will seem to have an identifiable cause

2. Ludic fallacy: believing that the unstructured randomness found in life resembles the structured randomness found in games

3. Statistical regress fallacy: believing that the structure of probability can be delivered from a set of data

Taleb

16

Secular Stock Market Cycles

• Usually lasts 5 to 25 years and consists of a series of sequential primary trends

• Secular bull- 1. Shorter less punishing primary bear markets which rarely (if ever) wipe out the gains of the

previous primary bull markets.

2. Succeeding primary bull markets which make up for the real losses of any previous bear markets.

• Secular bear-1. Shorter primary bull markets which are sometimes shorter than the primary bear markets

2. …and rarely compensate for the real losses of the primary bear markets occurring during the extended market cycle/trend

Source: Wikipedia

17

Are we in a Secular Bear Market?July ’09

“We’re halfway through a secular bear market in equities…it means you can’t really be a buy and hold investor.” · David Rosenberg, Chief Economist, Gluskin Sheff & Associates, former Chief Economist. Merrill Lynch, on CNBC’s Squawk Box, July 7, ‘09

“After considering all the technical arguments, I remain of the opinion that the bear market is still in force, and that the current advance is a correction against the primary trend.”

· Richard Russell, The Dow Theory Letters, April, ‘09 “The bull market that we all have come to know is now over.”· Bill Gross, PIMCO, Jan ‘09 “I believe we're in a secular bear market.”· Rob Arnott, founder and chairman of Research Affiliates, Oct ‘08

“We are still in the super bear of 2000.”· Jeremy Grantham, chairman of money manager GMO, July ‘08

“…a secular bear is self-evident. It's difficult to imagine how the market could be characterized any other way when, despite recent bull market highs, the S&P 500 has lagged Treasury bills for a decade.”

· John P. Hussman, Ph.D., Manager, Hussman Strategic Growth, Feb, ‘08

“…stocks have entered a secular bear market, a long period of flat or declining stocks.” · Ned Davis Research, Nov ‘01 “What matters above all is that the stock market is transitioning from the biggest bull market ever into the biggest bear market ever.” · Elliott Wave Financial Forecast, July ‘99 Others secular bear market believers - Jim Rogers, Robert Shiller, George Soros

18

Opportunities

19

Opportunities

Type Asset Class Factor Reference Author Year Publisher

EquitiesS&P 500 - 10 month

moving avg "A Quantitative Appraoch To Tactical

Asset Allocation"Mebane T. Faber 2007

The Journal of Wealth Mgmt

"Diversification and Risk Management: What Volatility Tells Us"

Paul Goldwhite 2009The Journal of

Investing

"The Investor Fear Gauge" Robert E. Whaley 2000The Journal of Portfolio Mgmt

"Understanding the VIX" Robert E. Whaley 2009The Journal of Portfolio Mgmt

Equities Put/Call Ratio"Put - call ratios and Market Timing

Effectiveness"

Randall S. Billingsley, Don M.

Chance1988

The Journal of Portfolio Mgmt

Large & Small/Mid

Real Fed Funds Rate"Fed Up, Can Following the Fed help

pick winners?"Nancy Opiela 2007 CFA Institute

Growth & Value MultipleStyle Investing: Unique Insight Into

Equity Management Richard Bernstein 1995 Wiley

Large GARP"The Empirical Relationship Between

Stock Prices and Long-Term Earnings"

Joe Callaghan, Austin Murphy,

Mohinder Parkash and Hong Qian

2009The Journal of

Investing

International Equities

GDP Weight"International Equity Indices: Exploring Alternatives to Market Cap-Weighting"

Olfa Hamza, Mohamed Kortas,

Jean-Francois L'Her, Andmathieu

Roberge

2007The Journal of

Investing

Alpha

VIXEquitiesLoss Avoidance

20

Opportunities

No. Factor Type Factor Asset Classes Start Finish Yrs Alpha Std Dev Sharpe1 Loss Avoidance 10 month moving avg. S&P 500 Equities & Debt 1926 2009 83 0.52 -37% 54%2 Loss Avoidance Relative VIX Equities & Debt 1990 2009 19 3.68 -34% 109%3 Loss Avoidance Relative Put/Call Ratio Equities & Debt 1996 2009 13 1.33 -28% 60%4 Alpha Real Fed Funds Large & Small/Mid Domestic 1926 2009 83 1.01 1% 8%5 Alpha Growth/Value/Sector Fundamentals Large Domestic 1989 2009 20 1.12 2% 11%6 Alpha GDP International Equities 1970 2009 39 0.73 -2% 8%

21

Dynamic Asset Allocation Defined

– The term 'Dynamic Asset Allocation' (DAA) can also refer to an investment strategy that seeks to produce high total returns irrespective of the performance of market indices using the tools of Tactical asset allocation/Global tactical asset allocation (TAA/GTAA) around a strategic benchmark. Indeed, many investment firms and commentators use the terms TAA, DAA, and GTAA interchangeably.

Source: Wikipedia

22

Opportunities

Bull Bear Bull BearEquities 70% 70% 100% 0%

Debt 30% 30% 0% 100%

Bull BearEquities 70% 55%

Debt 30% 45%

Strategic Tactical

Dynamic

23

Opportunities Combine Strategic/Sailing with Tactical/Rowing

Rowing Sailing

No Trigger Trigger No Trigger Trigger

Large 40% 37.5% Large 40% 30%

Small/Mid 10% 0% Small/Mid 10% 20%

International 20% 17.5% International 20% 20%

Equities 70% 55% Equities 70% 70%

Debt 30% 45% Debt 30% 30%

24


Aug 1996 - Aug 2009Ending Index

ValueGeometric

MeanNumber of

DrawdownsAverage Decline

Maximum Decline

N Positive Periods

N Negative Periods

Standard Deviation

Sharpe Ratio

S&P 500 Sec/Information Technology TR $22,476 6.39 10 -15.04 -80.26 88 69 35.18 0.103S&P 500 Sec/Health Care TR $25,563 7.44 11 -11.89 -35.32 97 60 17.84 0.1504

S&P 500 Sec/Cons Disc TR $19,601 5.28 10 -13.94 -54.86 88 69 21.44 0.1035S&P 500 Sec/Utilities TR $21,168 5.9 15 -10.62 -55.03 98 59 18.75 0.1205

S&P 500 Sec/Financials TR $16,788 4.04 15 -13.53 -78.8 87 70 27.02 0.083S&P 500 Sec/Energy TR $39,636 11.1 22 -9.28 -49.03 92 65 22.95 0.1796

S&P 500 Sec/Materials TR $19,833 5.37 16 -11.43 -56.91 88 69 24.12 0.1001S&P 500 Sec/Cons Staples TR $22,498 6.39 19 -6.98 -29.6 94 63 15.07 0.1479

S&P 500 Sec/Industrials TR $19,177 5.1 17 -10.68 -58.52 92 65 20.63 0.103IA SBBI US Small Stock TR USD $27,882 8.15 12 -14.46 -56.88 93 63 25.51 0.1323

MSCI EAFE GDP Weighted NR USD $19,917 5.41 13 -12.34 -58.06 97 60 19.55 0.1106MSCI EAFE NR USD $17,168 4.22 13 -11.89 -56.68 97 60 18.49 0.0942

IA SBBI US IT Govt TR USD $22,126 6.26 21 -1.76 -4.29 104 53 4.9 0.3862

Dynamic AA $29,589 8.65 21 -4.46 -28.64 101 56 10.56 0.261Strategic AA $24,349 7.04 21 -4.99 -37.01 99 58 11.53 0.1988

S&P 500 $20,049 5.46 14 -11.05 -50.95 96 61 17.73 0.1171

Variance w SAA $5,240 1.61 0 0.53 8.37 2 -2 -0.97 0.0622Variance as a % of Strategic 22% 23% 0% -11% -23% 2% -3% -8% 31%

Variance w S&P $9,540 3.19 7 6.59 22.31 5 -5 -7.17 0.1439Variance as a % of S&P 48% 58% 50% -60% -44% 5% -8% -40% 123%

25


BULL: Aug 1996 - July 2000Ending Index

ValueGeometric

MeanNumber of


Maximum Decline

N Positive Periods

N Negative Periods

Standard Deviation

Sharpe Ratio

S&P 500 Sec/Information Technology TR $52,640 51.47 10 -8.87 -18.59 32 16 47.95 0.438S&P 500 Sec/Health Care TR $25,301 26.12 8 -6.98 -17.63 35 13 26.48 0.355

S&P 500 Sec/Cons Disc TR $22,166 22.02 8 -6.84 -16.48 32 16 22.63 0.340S&P 500 Sec/Utilities TR $17,379 14.82 9 -5.62 -13.92 29 19 17.68 0.283

S&P 500 Sec/Financials TR $23,631 23.99 8 -8.78 -23.06 31 17 32.97 0.279S&P 500 Sec/Energy TR $18,238 16.21 7 -8.17 -19.91 27 21 23 0.250


S&P 500 Sec/Industrials TR $19,668 18.42 8 -7.26 -19.99 30 18 22.01 0.293IA SBBI US Small Stock TR USD $17,598 15.18 5 -14.99 -30.63 27 21 29.54 0.200




S&P 500 $23,782 24.18 10 -5.23 -15.37 31 17 20.42 0.407

Variance w SAA $709 1.17 0 -0.08 0.36 0 0 0.39 0.020Variance as a % of Strategic 4% 8% 0% -3% 4% 0% 0% 3% 5%

Variance w S&P -$5,933 -8.59 1 2.38 4.99 1 -1 -8.86 0.026Variance as a % of S&P -25% -36% 10% -46% -32% 3% -6% -43% 6%

26


BEAR: Aug 2000 - Aug 2009Ending Index

ValueGeometric

MeanNumber of


Maximum Decline

N Positive Periods

N Negative Periods

Standard Deviation

Sharpe Ratio

S&P 500 Sec/Information Technology TR $4,270 -8.94 1 -79.46 -79.46 56 53 29.62 -0.044S&P 500 Sec/Health Care TR $10,104 0.11 3 -25 -35.32 62 47 13.77 0.022

S&P 500 Sec/Cons Disc TR $8,842 -1.35 5 -23.02 -54.86 56 53 20.65 0.010S&P 500 Sec/Utilities TR $12,180 2.2 6 -18.13 -55.03 69 40 19.05 0.061

S&P 500 Sec/Financials TR $7,104 -3.69 7 -18.95 -78.8 56 53 24.48 -0.008S&P 500 Sec/Energy TR $21,732 8.92 15 -9.8 -49.03 65 44 22.98 0.150


S&P 500 Sec/Industrials TR $9,750 -0.28 9 -13.72 -58.52 62 47 19.91 0.024IA SBBI US Small Stock TR USD $15,844 5.2 11 -14.68 -56.88 66 42 23.87 0.099




S&P 500 $8,430 -1.86 4 -25.59 -50.95 65 44 16.27 -0.010

Variance w SAA $2,371 1.78 0 -1.03 -8.37 2 -2 -1.5 0.066Variance as a % of Strategic 17% 45% 0% -14% -23% 3% -5% -13% 56%

Variance w S&P $8,147 7.58 6 19.36 22.31 4 -4 -6.19 0.192Variance as a % of S&P 97% 408% 150% -76% -44% 6% -9% -38% 2025%

27


12 Mo Rolling

Dynamic AA

Strategic AA S&P 500

Difference w SAA

Difference w S&P

3 Mo Rolling

Dynamic AA

Strategic AA S&P 500

Difference w SAA

Difference w S&P

Median 10.70 9.73 9.23 0.97 1.47 Median 2.34 2.19 2.62 0.15 -0.28Average 8.18 6.60 5.46 1.58 2.71 Average 2.15 1.79 1.60 0.35 0.55

28

Morningstar Ratings & The Utility Theory

“A rating system that provides a heavier penalty for risk.”– “Investors have a certain level of utility or satisfaction for each level of monthly return”

– Utility function• Decreasing marginal utility as returns increase

• Emphasis on downside variation since “investors don’t like to lose money”

– “A fund’s excess returns over and above the return on the risk-free asset.”• Risk-Free Asset = T-Bill

Fund % Rankings– Utility Theory = Wealth at the beginning-of-period vs end-of-period

• Morningstar Risk Adjusted Return = Annualized value of the “certainty equivalent” geometric excess return– “Certainty Equivalent” Geometric Excess Return = Guaranteed riskless return that provides the same utility to

the investor as the variable excess returns

29

S. KrawcheckAsset Allocation & Risk

Barron’s, Oct ‘09• "There is only one free lunch in investing, and this is asset allocation"

• “Risk is not just about standard deviation, it's about how much money you can lose."

30

Strategic Insight ForumObservations from Our Nov Conference

“The View From Distributors-”• "All four distributors* have seen advisors question the traditional model

of ‘buy-and-hold.’ This means an increasing emphasis on dynamic or tactical allocation, including shifting assets into cash and/or greater use of global allocation funds.”

“Challenges of Product Innovation-”• “The long-term, “buy and hold” model needs some tweaking – notably by

mixing it a greater awareness of short-term market dynamics, risk management and diversification.”

• “Products need to be designed with more of an eye to outcomes, not processes.”

* Merrill L, Morgan S, Smith B, Edward J

Source: “Windows Into The Mutual Fund Industry” –Strategic Insight, Dec‘09

31

Lessons Learned

1. The last 400 years has been full of financial crises and so will the next 400 years.

2. Again and again, countries (both developed and emerging), banks, individuals, and firms take on excessive debt in good times without enough awareness of the risks that will follow when the inevitable recession hits.

3. The bell curve fits reality very poorly; markets are far wilder and scarier.4. Losses have a greater impact on performance than gains and can occur

in near turn succession and/or over secular periods.5. Fat tails and secular bear mkts turn strategic aa programs upside down

– If we are in a secular bear that started in '00 or '07 then more losses and lower lows in equities may be in front of us.

– The next mkt downturn may put strategic aa funds (plus target dates) out of business.

6. Opportunities exist to improve on strategic aa portfolios.7. To maintain high Morningstar Ratings a portfolio must primarily protect

on the downside. 8. Advisors and their clients are looking for portfolios that protect on the

downside.

32

Unexpected Returns

“Consequences are more important than probabilities.”

– Peter Bernstein, Founder, Journal of Portfolio Management

Unexpected Returns Version 1a

Documents

inevitable

opportunities

modern portfolio

secular bear

unexpected

secular bear

bear market

fat tails