Trowbridge - 'Skepticism as a Way of Living; Sextus Empiricus and Zhuangzi'

john trowbridge

SKEPTICISM AS A WAY OF LIVING: SEXTUSEMPIRICUS AND ZHUANGZI

1. Introduction

When we think of skepticism today, we usually think of a negativeepistemological doctrine that in its most extreme form simply deniesthe possibility of knowledge for human beings. The content of anegative dogmatism such as this is often construed as anti-intellectualinsofar as it implies the futility of the quest for knowledge.Apart fromcharges that the most extreme version of this position is subject to thelogical problem of self-referential inconsistency (e.g., the skepticsclaim that human beings cannot attain to knowledge is itself a knowl-edge claim, thus falsifying the content of the position), this modernversion of skepticism is not especially interesting philosophically.

There are, however, versions of skepticism that were common inthe ancient Greek tradition, where skepticism is understood notmerely as a negative epistemology, but rather as a nondogmatic oraporetic attitude of open-mindedness, that was seen as contributing toa set of ethical recommendations for living a productive life. It is aversion of this form of skepticism that lies at the intersection ofepistemology and ethics that I intend to develop as a heuristic forunderstanding the philosophy of the fourth-century BCE Daoist text,the Zhuangzi.

2. Early Skepticism: Epistemological Issues

The English word skepticism is derived from the Ancient Greekskeptikos, which literally means, someone who looks, or examines(skopein, skeptesthai).1 It is usually contrasted with dogmatism,which simply meantsubscription to dogmas,or doctrines.2 Unlike thedogmatist, who quits the philosophical inquiry once he has acceptedparticular doctrines, the skeptic continues the search. It is important tonote that the skeptic almost never begins his inquiry with the intention

JOHN TROWBRIDGE, lecturer, Philosophy Department, University of HawaiiWestOahu. Specialties: classical Chinese philosophy, ancient Greek philosophy, epistemology.E-mail: [email protected]

2006 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

of becoming a skeptic. Rather, like any philosopher, he starts out hisinquiry with the hope that he will be able to locate some truths to whichhe can give his assent.Even the most open-minded philosopher,beforehe has become a skeptic, starts out holding some dogmas.

When the dogmatist investigates a hypothesis and fails to ascertainits truth, he believes that a negative conclusion is justifiable. However,the skeptic does not believe a negative conclusion is warranted, and sosuspends judgment on the matter. That is to say, he sustains theinquiry so as not to commit himself to holding beliefs (doxai), whichleads to disturbance (tarache).3 As a result, what the skeptic discoversis that the arguments are equally balanced on both sides of any givendebate (isostheneia). It is at this stage, where he cannot decidebetween two contrary arguments, that he withholds his assent orsuspends his judgment. Isostheneia (equal force, equipollence),then, is the motivation for the skeptics recommendation of epoche(suspension of judgment).4 The word, epoche is not etymologicallyconnected to doxai (beliefs), and simply means suspending orwithholding. In fact, it is defined in the lexicon as a check, a cessa-tion.5 Various scholars have supplied the object of this suspense asjudgment, belief, and assent based on the contexts in which theterm is employed. The noun, epoche is derived from the verb,epechein in the sense of to keep in, hold back, check or to stay,stop, wait, pause.

Understood in this way, skepticism need not be construed as anegative and anti-intellectual position. For example, Otvio Buenohas claimed that It is possible to articulate a positive description ofempirical knowledge within the constraints of a pyrrhonist [sic] atti-tude [. . .]6 Such an attitude about empirical knowledge would havethe following four features:

1. Knowledge without truth [. . .].2. Knowledge without justification [. . .].3. Knowledge without belief [. . .].4. Knowledge as a practice: For the skeptic, knowledge is a process

that emerges from a given attitude of investigation. By contrast-ing rival accounts of the phenomena, and assessing theirstrengths and weaknesses, the skeptic gains understanding of theworld, at least how the world could be.7

These points, especially the last, segue nicely into the next section.

3. Early Skepticism: A Way of Living

An important theme that emerges from an analysis of ancient Greekskepticism is that skepticism is as much a way of living an optimum

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human life as it is an epistemology. This is also attested to by the factthat the verb, epechein, from which the skeptical term of art,epoche, is derived, has several meanings, of which at least one mightbe appropriated in order to provide epoche with a richer semanticcontent than mere withholding assent or suspension of judgment.Theverb, epechein, when applied to things can mean to occupy orengage them.8 Thus, in addition to its meaning of suspending orwithholding, we may find in the term a positive recommendation ofproductively engaging things in the world.

The tendency in the literature has been to concentrate on theepistemological dimensions of ancient skepticism rather than itsethical implications. Still, the authors who have discussed the episte-mological aspects of ancient skepticism have regularly observed thatone of the unique qualities of ancient skepticism is its fascination withthe practical concerns of ethics and moral psychology. For example,M. F. Burnyeat writes, Pyrrhonism is the only serious attempt inWestern thought to carry scepticism to its furthest limits and to live bythe result [. . .].9

Whereas Aenesidemus of Cnossus (ca. 8565 BCE), one of theinitiators of the Pyrrhonist movement, had posited a relationshipbetween epoche and ataraxia (freedom from disquiet, imperturbabil-ity), it was epoche that he considered the telos (goal) of skepticism.Sextus, in contrast to this understanding, construed suspension ofjudgment as a causal condition for and a means toward achievingataraxia, which he considered to be the skeptics goal (telos). What issignificant here is that talk of an end or goal (telos) is central toancient (and even early modern) discussions of ethics. Interestingly,the literature on ancient skepticism tends to pay little attention to theskeptics telos.10 Perhaps this is a result of concern regarding the veryidea of skepticism having and making use of a telos. On this point,Martha C. Nussbaum writes: To have a telos or goal in the usual way[. . .] is a recipe for disturbance. What the Skeptic has done is not somuch to introduce a rival account of telos as to undermine the wholenotion of reaching for a telos.11 Nussbaums observation thataporetic skepticism seems to undermine the notion of goal-directedactivity that is entailed by the notion of a telos is well taken. Further-more, the idea of a telos contradicts what Sextus says about ataraxiafollowing, simply by chance (tuchikos), suspension of judgment just asa shadow follows the body.

When Sextus shifts the telos of skepticism from epoche itself toataraxia, the skeptical way of living becomes still more apparent.David Sedley writes,Withholding belief, like learning to walk a tight-rope, is easier when you do not try too hard.12 Michael Fredeemploys a similar example to illustrate the idea of a skill that is easier

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to perform effortlessly and without conscious awareness of onesphilosophical theories during the performance:

An expert craftsman is still acting on his expert beliefs, even thoughhe is not actually thinking of what he is doing when he is acting onthem. Indeed thinking of them might interfere with his activity. Buthaving finished his work he might well explain to us which viewsguided his activity. And for some of these views it might be true thatthis would be the first time he ever formulated them, either to himselfor to somebody else. Nevertheless he could properly claim to haveacted on them.13

These observations give support to Buenos idea, quoted above, thatthe Pyrrhonist construes empirical knowledge as both an open-endedpractice and a process.

According to Sextus, the skeptic, having given up living a life ofassent or judgment, lives according to appearances:

Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefs but inaccord with the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot be whollyinactive. And this ordinary regimen of life seems to be fourfold: onepart has to do with the guidance of nature, another with the compul-sion of the pathe [feelings, affect, states (of the soul [or mind])],another with the handing down of laws and customs, and a fourthwith instruction in arts and crafts. Natures guidance is that by whichwe are naturally capable of sensation and thought; compulsion of thepathe is that by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes usdrink; the handing down of customs and laws is that by which weaccept that piety in the conduct of life is good and impiety bad; andinstruction in arts and crafts is that by which we are not inactive inwhichever of these we acquire. And we say all these things withoutbelief.14

This passage goes a long way toward explaining the skeptic way of lifeas Sextus saw it.

3.1. Adoxastos Is Impossible

By far the most common criticism that has been launched againstskepticism of this variety, both in ancient and modern times, is the ideathat a life without commitments or belief (adoxastos) is impossible,since such a life makes purposive action impossible (apraxia). Forexample, Galen wondered if the Pyrrhonist would suggest that weshould remain on a ship while the other passengers are disembarkingover concern that what appears to be land is not actually land.15 DavidHume (171176),writing in 1748,also offered a version of this criticism:

[. . .] a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have anyconstant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would bebeneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will

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acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were hisprinciples universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all actionwould immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till thenecessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable exist-ence. [. . .] the first and most trivial event in his life will put to flightall his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, orwith those who never concerned themselves in any philosophicalresearches.16

It is to be noted though that the nondogmatic skeptics of whom Humespeaks should not be characterized as having any interest in theuniversal application of principles, for such a project would conflictwith and thereby undermine the approach of aporetic skepticism.17

Nussbaum notes that the skeptic never violates the principle of non-contradiction and in fact, appears in a number of passages fromSextus to be committed to it, although it is not clear to what extent theuse of logical precepts for purposes of intelligibility requires commit-ment to those precepts.18

3.2. The Response of Sextus Empiricus to the CriticismThat Adoxastos Is Impossible

Not surprisingly, the ancient aporetic skeptics responded to thiscriticism that a life without belief is impossible. As pointed out above,the Pyrrhonian alternative to a life of belief was one of living accord-ing to the appearances. Sextus writes:

[. . .] one must scorn those who fancy that he [who suspends judg-ment about all things which depend on belief] is confined to a state ofinactivity or of inconsistency,to inactivity, because, as all life con-sists in desires and avoidances, he that neither desires nor avoidsanything is virtually rejecting life and remaining like a vegetable; andto inconsistency because, should he ever be subject to a tyrant andcompelled to do something unspeakable, either he will not submit tothe order given him but will choose a voluntary death, or else toavoid torture he will do what is commanded [. . .] but will choose theone and refuse the other, which is the action of those who confidentlyhold that something to be avoided and desirable exists.Now inarguing thus they do not comprehend that the Sceptic does notconduct his life according to philosophical theory (for so as regardsthis he is inactive), but as regards the non-philosophic regulation oflife he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others. Andwhen compelled by a tyrant to commit any forbidden act he willperchance choose the one course and avoid the other owing to thepre-conception [ prolepsis]19 due to his ancestral laws and customs;and as compared with the Dogmatist he will certainly endure hard-ship more easily because he has not, like the other, any additionalbeliefs beyond the actual suffering.20


Sextus is consistent in pointing out that the ancient skeptics did nothold fixed philosophical theories and did not live their lives accordingto theoretical precepts. What he describes as the nonphilosophicregulation of life might best be understood as referring to the avoid-ance of endorsing such philosophical theories, opting instead to liveaccording to a philosophical practice. In following such a course, it ispossible for one to perform the same actions as other people, undersimilar circumstances, while entertaining very different ideas from theothers about ones reasons or justification for performing thoseactions. The skeptic, then, lives according to the common conventionsand regulations of his society and according to what appears to him tobe the case in any particular circumstance. For this reason, an aporeticskeptic would not engage in behaviors that others would regard asimmoral and/or illegal merely for the reason that there seems to be nofirm evidence to justify those behaviors as opposed to the oppositeactions. Instead, he will follow the conventions of traditional moralityas it is generally construed in his time and place, not because heaccepts his actions as moral or immoral, but because it appears to himthat it is useful to do so in so far as such an accommodating approachtends to bring about freedom from disturbance.

4. Skepticism in the ZHUANGZI

There are significant precedents for understanding the philosophy ofthe Zhuangzi in the light of skepticism. For example, Chung-yingCheng, A. C. Graham, Chad Hansen, Victor H. Mair, Lee Yearley, andMichael Mark Crandell have all applied the term, skepticism in avariety of different ways to the philosophy of Zhuangzi.21 Paul Kjell-berg, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Lisa Raphals, and Bryan W. Van Norden havealso considered Zhuangzi to be one sort of skeptic or another.22

Ivanhoe, Van Norden, and Hansen are just three representatives ofthe trend of regarding Zhuangzi as skeptical in the modern sense ofthe word, the negative dogmatism of claiming that human beingscannot have knowledge, an analysis which I consider to be problem-atic. Kjellberg and Raphals have suggested that he is a nondogmaticor aporetic skeptic who suspends judgment when confronted withconflicting propositions or appearances. The question is, If the phi-losophy of the Zhuangzi is skeptical in any sense, what understandingof skepticism will enable us to offer the most coherent interpretationof the text? I aim to articulate here a positive interpretation of theZhuangzi that involves construing the text as embodying skepticismof a sort similar to that of the ancient Greeks.The Greek skeptics, likeZhuangzi, were primarily interested in the question of how to live well

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and were consistent in addressing epistemological questions in thelight of this broader ethical concern. This question was for Zhuangzi,as it was for the ancient Greeks, an ethical question, one that involvespractice as much as it does theory.

One of the passages in the Zhuangzi that is regularly cited asembodying skepticism is the exchange that occurs between Nie Que(Gnawgap) and Wang Ni (Kingly Boundary) in the second chapter ofthe text, the Qiwulun (Discussion on Giving Parity to Things andEvents):

Gnawgap asked Kingly Boundary saying, Do you know what crea-tures agree in affirming as this, the one in question (shi)? He replied,How would I know it?Do you know what you do not know?Thereply was, How would I know it? That being so, do creatures lackknowledge? He answered,How would I know it? Even though thisis so, allow me to try to put it into words. How do I know that whatI refer to as knowing (zhi) is not not-knowing (bu zhi)? How do Iknow that what I refer to as not-knowing (bu zhi) is not knowing(zhi)?23

The skepticism expressed in this passage is consistent with the non-dogmatic variety of the Pyrrhonists because Kingly Boundary castshis skeptical doubts onto his own skepticism. He responds to Gnaw-gaps question concerning his own knowledge or lack thereof aboutwhat creatures agree in affirming as this, with a further admission ofuncertainty.

5. Positive Recommendations

Zhuangzi arguably moves beyond aporetic skepticism in his positiverecommendations regarding dao, as evidenced in the following quo-tation, where he provides some recommendations as to how torespond efficaciously to the situation of competing alternative pointsof view:

[. . .] as soon as something is living, it is dying. And as soon as it isdying, it is living. As soon as it is acceptable, it is unacceptable. Assoon as it is unacceptable, it is acceptable. Accommodating affirma-tion (yin shi), it accommodates denial (yin fei). Accommodatingdenial (yin fei), it accommodates affirmation (yin shi). For thisreason, the sage does not proceed in this way and illuminates them intian, which is also an accommodating affirmation. [. . .] When neitherthe other (bi) nor this (shi) gains its counterpart, we call it the axis ofdao (daoshu). When the axis begins to obtain the center of its circle,it thereby responds without end. This is also continuously withoutend. Not this is also continuously without end. Therefore, I say,nothing is like using awareness (ming).24


In this quotation, Zhuangzi does not assert a preference in any givenpair of opposites. Neither life nor death is conceived of as intrinsicallybetter than its counterpart. Based on the correlative thinking thatpervades much of Chinese thought and culture, acceptability (ke) of aproposition, for example, evokes unacceptability (bu ke), just as shiand fei evoke each other.25 Zhuangzi suggests that the sage does notfavor one side of a distinction over the other. Rather, he accepts themboth together as correlatives. Because of this, it is inconclusive as towhether there is really a fixed distinction. Therefore, in illuminatingthe alternatives in tian (zhao zhi yu tian), the sage occupies a neutralground, where no single point of view is dominant and from where hecan adaptively respond to the situation according to the changingcircumstances (yin shi). This nonpreference for either side of anygiven distinction is consistent with aporetic skepticism as follows. ForZhuangzi, to make use of awareness (ming) of the plurality of per-spectives is the first step in harmonizing the cacophony of disagree-ment that arises from various individuals and competing lineagesmaking excessively specific determinations about shi and fei (this andnot [this]). One who uses ming rests in the daoshu (the axis, hinge, orpivot of dao). The epistemological concerns in this passage aredirectly linked with Zhuangzis perspective on cosmology. Pairs ofopposites are mutually dependent and correlative based on the expe-rience of the world as in process and flux. Living is an inexorableprocess that includes dying, and dying in turn is a process that engen-ders new living things.This cyclical interchanging and interconnectionof opposites in an ongoing process was a general characteristic ofChinese cosmology and commonsense.

In the passage that is known as Three in the Morning, Zhuangziexpands upon his recommendations for how to act.

To exhaust ones spirit and awareness and to regard them as one,without realizing that they are the same, we call this Three in theMorning.What is referred to as Three in the Morning?A monkeykeeper in giving chestnuts said,Three in the morning and four in theevening.All the monkeys were furious.He said,If this is so, then fourin the morning and three in the evening. The monkeys were alldelighted. While the name (ming) and the actuality (shi) were notlacking, their happiness and anger were in use. This is also accommo-dating affirmation (yin shi). For this reason, the sage harmonizes thealternatives with affirmation and denial,and rests in the potters wheelof tian (tianjun). This is called letting both alternatives proceed.26

The perspective of the monkeys changed with regard to the number ofchestnuts they were allotted in the morning and in the evening, eventhough the total number was quantitatively the same on any given day.Zhuangzi thinks that this foolishness is similar to that of the Confu-cians and Mohists, who argue for the final correctness of their points of

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view. Zhuangzis conception of the sage is that of one who appeasesthose who hold to rigid points of view in the same way that the monkeykeeper appeased the monkeys. However, this is not to say that Zhua-ngzis vision of the Daoist sage is a person who has no positiverecommendations to offer; far from it, he recommends specific prac-tices that are intended to be productive of a good life lived well.

In chapter 4 of the Zhuangzi, Renjianshi (Among the HumanWorld) in an exchange between the characters of Confucius and hisbeloved disciple, Yan Hui, the ideal condition of the heart-mind,namely emptiness or vacuity (xu), is developed further:

Zhongni [Confucius] said, Fast, and I will tell you. Once you havefixed dispositions, is that not too easy? If it is too easy, it is not suitablefor the bright heavens. Yan Hui said, My family is poor. I havealready not drunk wine or eaten meat in several months. It being likethis, can this then be regarded as fasting? He replied, This is thefasting of sacrifice, and is not the fasting of the heart-mind (xin zhai).Hui said, May I dare ask about the fasting of the heart-mind?Zhongni answered, Unify your purposes (zhi). Do not listen withyour ears, but listen with your heart-mind, or rather, do not listen withyour heart-mind, but listen with the qi. The ears stop at listening. Theheart-mind stops at being in agreement with thought. As for qi, it isempty (xu) and contains things-and-events. Only dao collects empti-ness.That which is empty is fasting.Yan Hui said,My not yet havingobtained instruction, I was actually thinking from my own point ofview. Once having obtained the instruction, there was not yet a Hui.Can this be considered emptiness? The master replied, You haveexhausted it, I am telling you. You can enter [Wei] and roam freewithin the cage, without feeling a need for reputation.27

In this passage, Confucius describes what appears to be a meditativepractice designed to bring about a disposition of emptiness in onesheart-mind. The fasting of the heart-mind (xin zhai) is a practicewhereby ones understanding goes beyond the data from the senses,rational discourse, thought, and even ones own identity.The fasting ofthe heart-mind is the cultivation of a disposition of emptiness andaccommodation.

In chapter 6, Dazongshi (The Great Master) there is anotherdialogue between Confucius and Yan Hui that is frequently discussedtogether with the xin zhai passage:

Yan Hui said, I have improved. Zhongni [Confucius] asked, Whatare you referring to? He replied, I have forgotten authoritativehumanity (ren) and appropriateness (yi).The reply was,Acceptable,but you still have not yet reached it. Another day, he saw Confuciusagain and said, I have improved. Confucius asked, What are youreferring to? He replied, I have forgotten ritual propriety (li) andmusic (yue). The reply was, Acceptable, but you still have not yetreached it. Another day, he again saw Confucius and said, I have


improved.Confucius asked,What are you referring to?He replied,I sit in forgetfulness (zuowang) now. Zhongni nervously asked,What do you mean bysitting in forgetfulness?Yan Hui responded,Drop off your limbs and body, eliminate the faculties of hearing andseeing (cleverness), part from your bodily form, dispense withwisdom, and merge with the great thoroughfare (datong).This is whatI call sitting in forgetfulness. Zhongni said, If you merge with it,then you are without preferences (wu hao). If you transform, then youare without persistence (wu chang).You are truly worthy! I would liketo request permission to follow you as a disciple.28

Sitting in forgetfulness, like the fasting of the heart-mind, involvesgoing beyond sense faculties and the physical body.Merging with thegreat thoroughfare can be seen as eliminating the notion of an egothat is often implicated when one clings tenaciously to various dog-matic convictions. In this way, the Daoist notion of wang (forget-ting) might be considered as a functional equivalent to the Greekskeptics epoche.

The practices described in these quotations specifically involveadopting an attitude of wu zhi, translated literally as not knowing,sometimes rendered as ignorance, but perhaps best understood asunmediated knowing or realization. Thus, wu zhi is understood as aspiritual achievement, which results from the practices of xin zhai (thefasting of the heart-mind) and zuowang (sitting in forgetfulness).These sections recommend practices that are consistent with thesages activities of harmonizing the alternatives with affirmation anddenial, resting in the potters wheel of tian, and letting both alterna-tives proceed, described in the Three in the Morning passage.

Part of the motivation of the Zhuangzi is the harmonization andmutual accommodation (he) of different perspectives. It is written inXiaoyaoyou (Wandering without a Destination), Petty under-standing does not reach great understanding.29 And in theQiwulun, we find the following verse:

Great understanding (da zhi) is broad and expansive.Petty understanding (xiao zhi) is narrow and confining.Great words (da yan) are rare and valued.Petty words (xiao yan) are verbose and incoherent.30

Although these passages draw a contrast between great understand-ing (da zhi) and petty understanding (xiao zhi), it is not the case thatgreat understanding is to be conceived of as vanquishing petty under-standing. Instead, both forms of understanding are accommodated asdifferent perspectives on the same phenomena. Although xiao zhi islimited, it is not an unhappy condition in itself. Unhappiness ensueswhen ones perspective broadens and one learns that ones under-standing is small. This is the respect in which petty understandingdoes not reach great understanding. In this way, da zhi offers a

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broader epistemology of pluralism that necessarily accommodatesxiao zhi. For Zhuangzi, there is a noncognitive element involved inxiao zhi becoming da zhi. As it says in the text, Dao tong wei yi31

(dao interpenetrates the alternatives and they become one). Thisopen-ended pluralism is an example not only of epistemology but alsoof ethics insofar as it includes recommendations for how to act.

Many passages in the Zhuangzi make specific recommendations ofpluralism. The refrain, mo ruo yi ming (nothing is like using illu-mined awareness)32 in the Qiwulun recommends harmonizing com-peting judgments of shi (affirmation) and fei (denial) by means ofming (illumined awareness). Perhaps this awareness should be takenas applying to the plurality of perspectives, so as to enable one toavoid making dogmatic judgments from within one perspective withthe additional belief that these judgments are fixed, final, complete, oruniversally true.

We again see Zhuangzis positive recommendations for living asignificant life in the following passage.

What is referred to as harmonizing them [the alternatives] on thegrindstone of tian (tianni)? It is said, This and not this, so and notso. If this is really like this, then the difference between this and notthis is surely without a distinction. If so is really like so, then thedifference between so and not so is surely without a distinction. Themutual alternation of the transforming sounds, harmonize them onthe grindstone of tian, accord with their endless transformations andthereby come to the end of your years.33

The grindstone of tian (tianni) and the potters wheel of tian (tianjun)are closely related and are even equated in a passage from chapter 27of the Zhuangzi, Yuyan (Lodged Words).34 The sage uses thecorrelative concepts of tianjun (the potters wheel of tian) and tianni(the grindstone of tian) to harmonize conflicting alternatives in anaccommodating and adaptive manner. So Zhuangzis recommenda-tions for pragmatic action include using illumined awareness (ming)and accommodating affirmation (yin shi) to harmonize (he) the mul-tiplicity of shifei distinctions on the grindstone of tian (tianni), to restin the potters wheel of tian (tianjun), and thereby to allow the axis ofdao to find its center from which the sage can adaptively respondwithout end.

The opening passage of the Yuyan chapter also introduces threeconceptions of language that are important to the Zhuangzi:

Lodged words (yuyan) are effective nine out of ten times, weightedwords (zhongyan35) are effective seven out of ten times, but gobletwords (zhiyan) emerge anew on a daily basis and harmonize on thegrindstone of tian.Lodged words are effective nine out of ten timesmeans discoursing on it outside of pretexts. [. . .] What is in agree-


ment he affirms in a contrived or artificial36 manner (wei shi).What isnot in agreement he denies in a contrived or artificial manner (weifei). Weighted words are effective seven out of ten times meansthat by which one brings ones words to an end. [. . .] Goblet wordsemerge anew on a daily basis, harmonize on the grindstone of tian,accord with the endless transformations, and thereby enable one tocome to the end of his years.37

I translate yuyan as lodged words because there are many refer-ences to yu (lodging) in the Zhuangzi, several of which occur in theQiwulun which is significantly related to the Yuyan chapter inseveral respects.38 For example, a person of penetrating understanding(dazhe) is said to lodge (yu) conflicting alternatives in the usual(yong): Contrived or artificial affirmation (wei shi) he does not use,and lodges them [the alternatives] in the usual. As for the usual, it isuseful. As for the useful, it interpenetrates.39

I think it best to interpret the term zhongyan as weightedwords, that is words which carry the weight of authority, though theapproach that suggests interpreting this term as chongyan andunderstanding it as repeated words or quotations is also accept-able for conveying this sense of authority. It is suggested that suchweighted words bring an effective end to a persuasive speech, at leastapproximately seventy percent of the time. This is a common featureof the narrative as opposed to the analytical approach generallyadopted in classical Chinese philosophical texts.

Perhaps the most challenging of the three terms to get a handle on iszhiyan.A zhi is a wine vessel that tips when full and then straightensitself out when empty. Graham thus translates zhiyan as Spilloversaying and writes, It is speech characterized by the intelligent spon-taneity of Taoist [Daoist] behaviour in general, a fluid language whichkeeps its equilibrium through changing meanings and viewpoints.40

Cheng has pointed out that with zhiyan, language becomes highlyexpressive, a free and spontaneous overflowing means of expression.For Zhuangzi, language is performative, and is not something that canbe sharply distinguished from other forms of action.Poetic language ofthe sort Zhuangzi uses creates an ambiance of associations.A goblet isempty on the inside and this resonates with the image of the emptyheart-mind discussed above. Zhiyan as overflowing goblet languageis directly related to the idea of harmonizing on the grindstone of tianand according with the endless transformations.

6. Conclusion

The philosophical similarities and differences between the Pyrrhonismof Sextus Empiricus and his predecessors, on the one hand, and the

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Daoism of the Zhuangzi,on the other hand,can be used to highlight thephilosophical significance of the two traditions. For example, Sextusand Zhuangzi are similar to the extent that neither assumes that thereis a right way of being to which he has unique and privileged access.Rather, there is a genuine open-mindedness and accommodation ofdiverse points of view.A possible explanation for the tendency of bothaporetic skeptics and Daoists to present their philosophies in negativediscourse is that there is a certain degree of modesty and humility, aswell as subtlety that attends such an approach.

By contrast, whereas the ancient skeptics conceived of a telos forskepticism, Zhuangzis approach is nonteleological. As pointed outabove, the notion of a telos is potentially problematic for nondogmaticskepticism. I think the Zhuangzi goes beyond Pyrrhonism by eschew-ing talk of final ends or purposes, embracing instead a robust cosmo-logical notion of process and change. A further way in which theZhuangzi goes beyond Pyrrhonism is in its emphasis on pluralism aswell as its attention to ethical practice, which the Pyrrhonist writingsallude to but the specifics of which are largely left to the imaginationof the reader. As Cheng points out:

Skepticism is used by Taoism [Daoism] as a method of criticism forestablishing an ultimate antiskeptical view of philosophy. In thissense, Taoism is not a negative skeptical position: it is a constructivephilosophy which contains skeptical elements for constructivepurposes.41

While I agree that Daoism is a constructive philosophy that utilizesskeptical elements and goes beyond its skeptical points of departurewith its recommendations of spiritual and ethical practices, I disagreethat it represents an ultimate antiskeptical position. I take its practi-cal, constructive dimension to be consistent with the recommendationby the Pyrrhonists to suspend judgment. The Zhuangzi recommendscultivating an illumined awareness (ming) of the plurality of perspec-tives on a given phenomenon among the changing circumstances andphenomena we experience, so as to enable us to keep in mind that theperspective from which we are viewing it is just one of many points ofview, conceived spatially, temporally, and otherwise, and as such isunlikely to reflect a fixed, complete, final, or universal perspective, forthe perspective one takes is itself subject to change and transforma-tion. Thus, in observing the difficulty involved in the encounter withconflicting alternatives and in presenting the pragmatic advice that itdoes, the Zhuangzi moves from nondogmatic skepticism to a notionof dao that is construed as a central component of a productive life.

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAIIWEST OAHUPearl City, Hawaii


Endnotes

1. R. J. Hankinson, The Sceptics (New York: Routledge, 1995), 13.2. Ibid., p. 318, n. 2.The Greek word dogma is equivalent to teachings or doctrines

but also includes in its definition the notion of tenets or principles.3. This tendency not to judge too quickly calls to mind a story from the Ren Jian

chapter (scroll 18) of the Huainanzi: Among those who live close to the pass, therewas one who was proficient at magical techniques. His horses without reason ran offand were lost in the Hu territory. People all mourned the event. The familys fathersaid, How can this so quickly not be considered good fortune? After several months,his horses led several of Hus fine horses and returned. People all congratulated it.Thefamilys father said, How can this so quickly not be considered misfortune? Thefamily was rich in fine horses and the son loved to ride them. One day he fell andbroke his femur. People all mourned it. His father said, How can this so quickly notbe considered good fortune? After a year, the Hu people entered the pass in greatnumbers, and able-bodied men went to draw the bowstring and fight. Of the peoplewho lived near the pass, nine in ten died. Only on account of being lame, father andson were able to care for each other. Therefore, as for misfortunes becoming goodfortune and good fortunes becoming misfortune, we cannot exhaust this transforma-tion, and we cannot fathom its profundity. For this, see Xiong Lihui and Hou Naihui,eds., Xinyi Huainanzi [New Annotated Huainanzi], vol. 2 (Taibei: Sanmin Shuju,1997), 965.

4. Isostheneia, as a philosophical method, is the practice of arguing both for a particularconclusion and for its contrary, which results in the absurdity that both p and not-p aretrue. As such, it can also be used to refute the dogmatic conclusions of the skepticsphilosophical opponents. The conclusion that p and not-p, a violation of the Principleof Non-Contradiction, is a logical absurdity that neither the skeptic nor his dogmaticopponent would be prepared to accept.

5. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon Founded upon theSeventh Edition of Liddell and Scotts Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1889, 1997), 309.

6. Otvio Bueno, How to Be a Pyrrhonist about Empirical Knowledge (paper pre-sented in the Society for Skeptical Studies panel at The American PhilosophicalAssociation Eastern Division One Hundredth Annual Meeting in Washington, DC,December 27, 2003), 3.

7. Ibid.8. Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 28586.9. M. F. Burnyeat, Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism? in Doubt and Dogmatism:

Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, andJonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 21.

10. Tad Brennan, Ethics and Epistemology in Sextus Empiricus (New York: GarlandPublishing, Inc., 1999), 76.

11. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire:Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29091.

12. David Sedley, The Motivation of Greek Skepticism, in The Skeptical Tradition, ed.Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1983), 23. The parallelwith the Daoist notion of wu wei, which Roger T.Ames and David L. Hall translate asnonassertive or noncoercive action, is inescapable. See for example, Hall and Ames,Thinking from the Han: Self,Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 52.

13. Michael Frede,The Skeptics Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibilityof Knowledge in Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: Uni-versity of Minnesota Press, 1987), 209. The parallel with the story of Butcher Dingfrom the Zhuangzi is notable. See 78/3/212. References to the Zhuangzi in the formx/y/z, where x = the page number, y = the chapter number, and z = the line number,are to Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20, AConcordance to Chuang Tzu, May 1947. See A. C. Graham, trans., Chuang-Tzu: The

262 john trowbridge

Inner Chapters (London: Mandala, 1991, 1981), 6364; and Burton Watson, trans., TheComplete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 5051.

14. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.11.231.11.24. See Benson Mates, trans., The Skeptic Way:Sextus Empiricuss Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press,1996), 92.

15. See Burnyeat, Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism? 2223, n. 4.16. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Antony Flew (La

Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1988), 191.17. As an example of this, consider David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames interpretation of

wu zhi as unprincipled knowing. See Hall and Ames, trans., Daodejing: MakingThis Life Significant: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books,2003), 3948, 6768.

18. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 3078, 311.19. Mates points out that Bury somewhat misleadingly translates prolepsis as pre-

conception and suggests understanding this term as the common prephilosophicalconcepts and assumptions of all mankind. See Mates, The Skeptic Way, 71.

20. Against the Mathematicians 11.5.160167 (Against the Ethicists 5.160167). See R. G.Bury, trans., Sextus Empiricus III: Against the Physicists, Against the Ethicists (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, The Loeb Classical Library, 1936), 46265.

21. See Chung-ying Cheng, Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese Philosophy,Philosophy East and West 27, no. 2 (1977): 13754, and A. C. Graham, Taoist Spon-taneity and the Dichotomy of Is and Ought, Chad Hansen, A Tao of Tao inChuang-tzu, Victor H. Mair, Chuang-tzu and Erasmus: Kindred Wits, MichaelMark Crandell, On Walking without Touching the Ground: Play in the Inner Chap-ters of the Chuang-tzu, and Lee Yearley, The Perfected Person in the RadicalChuang-tzu, all in Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Hono-lulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 323, 2455, 85100, 10124, and 12539,respectively. See also A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument inAncient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1989), 170211; ChadHansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1992), 265303; and Victor H. Mair, trans., Wanderingon the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu (New York: Bantam Books,1994), xliii.

22. See Paul Kjellberg, Zhuangzi and Skepticism (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University,1993) and Skepticism, Truth, and the Good Life: A Comparison of Zhuangzi andSextus Empiricus, Philosophy East and West 44, no. 1 (1994): 11133; Philip J.Ivanhoe, Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao, Journal of theAmerican Academy of Religion LXI, no. 4 (1993): 10116; Lisa Raphals, SkepticalStrategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus, Philosophy East and West 44, no. 3 (1994):50126; and Bryan W.Van Norden,Competing Interpretations of the Inner Chaptersof the Zhuangzi, Philosophy East and West 46, no. 2 (1996): 24768. See also PaulKjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics inthe Zhuangzi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

23. 6/2/6466. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Classical Chinese are myown. Compare with Graham, trans., Chuang-Tzu:The Inner Chapters, 58; and Watson,The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 45.

24. 4/2/2831. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 5253; andWatson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 3940.

25. The terms shi and fei require considerable explanation. The literal meaning ofshi is the demonstrative, this, the one in question, and the literal meaning of feiis the negative, not (this). Consequently, to translate these terms in particularcontexts requires applying to them derivative sets of meanings. One way to translatethe terms is to assert [to affirm, to accept] and to deny, respectively. Anotherrenders them as correct and incorrect. However, in addition to these logical andepistemological derivative meanings, there is a long tradition in China that assigns tothese terms a set of meanings that is moral in implication (in which contexts, they aretranslated as right and wrong or approval and disapproval, respectively).Therefore, many passages that contain these words can be given equally acceptable


logical, epistemological, and ethical readings. This is still further evidence that disci-plines such as epistemology and logic were not sharply separated from disciplinessuch as ethics and social and political philosophy in the classical Chinese tradition.

26. 5/2/3740. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 54; and Watson,The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 41.


28. 19/6/8993. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu:The Inner Chapters, 92; and Watson,The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 9091.

29. 1/1/10. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 44; and Watson, TheComplete Works of Chuang Tzu, 30.


31. 4/2/35. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 53; and Watson, TheComplete Works of Chuang Tzu, 41.

32. 4/2/27, 4/2/31. Compare with Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 52, 53; andWatson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 39, 40.



35. Some have chosen to read this as chongyan and have accordingly translated it asrepeated words or quotations. See for example, Frederic Henry Balfour, trans.,The Divine Classic of Nan-hua; Being the Works of Chuang Tsze, Taoist Philosopher(Shanghai & Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1881), 339; Watson, The Complete Works ofChuang Tzu, 303; and Victor H. Mair, trans., Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Talesand Parables of Chuang Tzu, 278.

36. Wei (to deem, act, make, do) is cognate with wei (artifice). In fact, Steve Coutinhotranslates wei shi as artificial judgment. See Steve Coutinho, Zhuangzi and EarlyChinese Philosophy: Vagueness, Transformation and Paradox (Aldershot: AshgatePublishing, 2004), 33, 171.


38. Wang Fuzhi (161992) has claimed that the Yuyan (Lodged Words) chapter canbe considered a preface to the entire text of the Zhuangzi.


40. Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 107.41. Cheng, Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese Philosophy, 140.

Chinese Glossary

bi

bu ke

bu zhi

Cheng Zhongying [Cheng

Chung-ying]

datong

dazhe

dao

daoshu

Daodejing

Dao tong wei yi

da yan

Dazongshi

da zhi

Ding

fei

he

Hou Naihui

264 john trowbridge

Hu

Huainanzi

ke

li

ming

ming

mo ruo yi ming

Nie Que

qi

Qiwulun

ren

Renjianshi

Ren Jian

shi

shi

shifei

tian

tianjun

tianni

wang

Wang Fuzhi

Wang Ni

wei fei

wei shi

Wei

wei

wei

wu

wu chang

wu hao

wu wei

wu zhi

xiao yan

Xiaoyaoyou

xiao zhi

xin zhai

Xiong Lihui

xu

Yan Hui

yi

yin fei

yin shi

yong

yue

yu

Yuyan

zhao zhi yu tian

zhi

zhi

zhi

zhiyan

zhongyan/chongyan

Zhongni

Zhuangzi

zuowang


Trowbridge - 'Skepticism as a Way of Living; Sextus Empiricus and Zhuangzi'

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