The Mind-Body Relation: Ancient Western Views

The Mind-Body Relation: Ancient Western ViewsThe Mind-Body Relation: Ancient Western Views

Materialism:Materialism: all things (including minds/souls all things (including minds/souls & mental events) are bodies in motion& mental events) are bodies in motion

Democritus (fl. 450 BCE)

Lucretius (94-55 BCE)

• Dualism: the soul is an immortal life force distinct from the body; its search

for truth is moral desirePlato (427-347 BCE)• Aristotle: the soul is the form of a body: the life of plants,

the sensation/motion of animals, the mind of human beings

(384-322 BCE)

The Hindu SelfThe Hindu Self

The experienced part of person (the conscious The experienced part of person (the conscious self and body) differs from the all-pervading self and body) differs from the all-pervading divine Self, which is not known or reasoned todivine Self, which is not known or reasoned to

• Sankara: The phenomenal world (including selves) does not exist

(788-820)

• Ramanuja: The phenomenal self is a modification of the inner self (God/Brahman)

(1077-1157)

Mind-Body DualismMind-Body Dualism

René DescartesRené Descartes: : human beings are composed human beings are composed of a material body and an immaterial mind that of a material body and an immaterial mind that are distinct butare distinct but linked through the pineal gland linked through the pineal glandProblem: Interaction. Proposed solutions:Problem: Interaction. Proposed solutions:

Anne ConwayAnne Conway: bodies are not really different : bodies are not really different from souls; both express different degrees of from souls; both express different degrees of how reality is organized and expressedhow reality is organized and expressed

(1596-1650) (1637-78)

Other Proposed Solutions to Mind-Body DualismOther Proposed Solutions to Mind-Body Dualism

Baruch SpinozaBaruch Spinoza: mind and body are simply : mind and body are simply different ways in which God is expressed different ways in which God is expressed (dual aspect monism)(dual aspect monism)

G. W. LeibnizG. W. Leibniz: mental and physical events : mental and physical events happen independently of one another but happen independently of one another but are harmonized by God (parallelism)are harmonized by God (parallelism)

(1632-77) (1646-1716)

The Mind-Body RelationThe Mind-Body Relation

• Dualism: human beings are composed of a material body and an immaterial mind which are distinct from each other (Descartes)

• Problem: how do minds and bodies interact?• Proposed answers: parallelism (Leibniz), occasionalism (Malebranche)

• Reductive materialism: all so-called mental actions are really nothing more than measurable physical processes (Hobbes)

Mind and BodyMind and Body

Dualism Dualism (Descartes): there are two kinds of (Descartes): there are two kinds of substances, substances, material bodies and immaterial material bodies and immaterial minds. Operations of mind are infallibly minds. Operations of mind are infallibly accessible only through introspectionaccessible only through introspection

MaterialismMaterialism: : Methodological behaviorismMethodological behaviorism: mental states might : mental states might

exist, but for scientific purposes, we should speak exist, but for scientific purposes, we should speak of mentality in terms of behaviors (B. F. Skinner)of mentality in terms of behaviors (B. F. Skinner)

(1596-1650) (1904-90)

More Materialist Theories of MindMore Materialist Theories of Mind Analytical BehaviorismAnalytical Behaviorism (Gilbert Ryle): (Gilbert Ryle):

mentality is nothing other than behavior. mentality is nothing other than behavior. There are no immaterial ideas or minds; There are no immaterial ideas or minds; they are merely “ghosts in the machine”they are merely “ghosts in the machine”

Objection: thoughts seem to occur apart from Objection: thoughts seem to occur apart from behaviors or even potential behaviorsbehaviors or even potential behaviors

Mind-Brain (Identity) TheoryMind-Brain (Identity) Theory: states of : states of consciousness & thoughts are simply brain consciousness & thoughts are simply brain states (“reductive materialism”)states (“reductive materialism”)

Objection: consciousness & brain states have Objection: consciousness & brain states have different properties (e.g., consciousness is not different properties (e.g., consciousness is not spatial)spatial)

(1900-76)(1900-76)

J.J.C. Smart (1920- )

J.J.C. Smart (1920- )

Contemporary Materialist TheoriesContemporary Materialist Theories• Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: thoughts and states of consciousness are simply brain states

• Problem: brain states and consciousness have different (e.g., spatial) properties

• Behaviorism: to have a mind is to behave or be disposed to behave in certain ways• Functionalism: mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors• Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with material expressions

The Turing TestThe Turing Test

• If there is no difference between the performances of a computer and a human being, the computer can be said to think

• Objection: thinking involves more than following a program; it involves awareness or consciousness of what following the program means (Searle)

Newall: Philosophy of MindNewall: Philosophy of Mind

I.I. Mind and body are the same (monism)Mind and body are the same (monism)a)a) PhysicalismPhysicalism: physical objects or processes (e.g., : physical objects or processes (e.g.,

neural firings) are “tokens” (examples) of neural firings) are “tokens” (examples) of “types” of things (minds or mental events)“types” of things (minds or mental events)i.i. Reductive physicalismReductive physicalism: minds/mental events : minds/mental events

are are reduciblereducible to physical objects/events to physical objects/eventsii.ii. Non-reductive physicalismNon-reductive physicalism: minds/mental : minds/mental

events “supervene on” physical objects and events “supervene on” physical objects and events: that is, they depend on, but are not events: that is, they depend on, but are not reducible to, physical objects and processesreducible to, physical objects and processes

More Monistic Theories of MindMore Monistic Theories of Mind

b)b) Mind-Brain (Identity) TheoryMind-Brain (Identity) Theory: mental states are : mental states are simply brain statessimply brain states• Objection: brain states and introspective Objection: brain states and introspective qualiaqualia

(experiences) have different characteristics(experiences) have different characteristics

c)c) FunctionalismFunctionalism:: mental states are associations or mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviorslinkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors

d)d) Eliminative MaterialismEliminative Materialism: we should replace terms : we should replace terms like “thought” with materialist expressionslike “thought” with materialist expressions

e)e) IdealismIdealism: physical objects/processes are really : physical objects/processes are really only mental events or objects of mindonly mental events or objects of mind

Dualistic Theories of MindDualistic Theories of Mind

a)a) Predicate DualismPredicate Dualism: the mental and physical : the mental and physical are said to beare said to be different kinds of things different kinds of things

b)b) Property DualismProperty Dualism: the mental and physical : the mental and physical are different are different characteristicscharacteristics of things of things

c)c) Substance DualismSubstance Dualism: the mental and physical : the mental and physical are simply different are simply different kindskinds of real things of real things• The major problem with dualism (viz., The major problem with dualism (viz.,

interaction) concerns how the physical and interaction) concerns how the physical and mental can affect or relate to one anothermental can affect or relate to one another

Attempted Solutions to the Challenge of Dualistic InteractionismAttempted Solutions to the Challenge of Dualistic Interactionism• EpiphenomenalismEpiphenomenalism: bodies can influence : bodies can influence minds, but minds cannot influence bodiesminds, but minds cannot influence bodies

Objections: why can’t minds influence bodies? Objections: why can’t minds influence bodies? Why have the mental at all?Why have the mental at all?

• OccasionalismOccasionalism: God’s intervention : God’s intervention accounts for the interactionaccounts for the interaction

• Parallelism: apparent interaction is due to a pre-established harmony between the physical and mental

N. Malebranche

G. W. Leibniz

The Question of Personal IdentityThe Question of Personal Identity

• The self is continuous (the same) in virtue of:

• The body• The soul or mind (Descartes)• Memory (Locke)

• There is no continuous, unchanging self; it is:• an illusion and the source of suffering, desire, and vanity (Buddhism)• a bundle of changing perceptions (Hume)

Views of IndividualityViews of Individuality

• Atomistic: the real self is independent of all external influences (Descartes)• Autonomous: freedom and rationality presuppose that the self imposes its own laws on itself and does not depend on others (Kant)• Interdependence: the self is defined by its relations with others—for example, to be recognized and respected—particularly in terms of culture (Hegel, Taylor). There are as many “selves” in me as there are groups of others who recognize me (Wm. James)

The Problem of Personal Identity: What makes me the same person over time?

The Problem of Personal Identity: What makes me the same person over time?

1. My bodyObjection: ship of Theseus

2. My immaterial soul or mind (Descartes)

Objections: - transmigration of souls- multiple personalities

3. Memory (Locke)Objections: - transitivity problem- unreliable memories- applies only to apparent memories

Rene Descartes(1596-1650)

Rene Descartes(1596-1650)

John Locke(1632-1704)John Locke(1632-1704)

4. Social definition: the self is defined by its relations with others—for example, to be recognized and respected—particularly in terms of culture (Hegel, Taylor). There are as many “selves” in me as there are groups of others who recognize me (James)

Objection: personhood can be gained or lost depending on society’s whims

Personal Identity (continued)Personal Identity (continued)G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)

G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)

Charles Taylor (1931- )

Charles Taylor (1931- )

William James (1842-1910)

William James (1842-1910)

1. The self is an illusion, the source of suffering, desire, and vanity (Buddhism)

Personal Identity: There is no continuous, unchanging self

Personal Identity: There is no continuous, unchanging self

2. The self is simply a bundle of changing perceptions (Hume)

2. The self is simply a bundle of changing perceptions (Hume)

Siddhattha Gautama (565-486 BCE)

Siddhattha Gautama (565-486 BCE)

David Hume (1711-76)

David Hume (1711-76)

Theories of Human NatureTheories of Human Nature• Psychological Egoism: human beings are simply physical bodies in motion; they always act in self-interested, aggressive ways (Freud, Hobbes, Schlick)• Traditional Western view: all human beings have an enduring, rational, independent, spiritual self separate from the body

• Rationalist view: reason can achieve happiness by controlling our appetites and aggression (Plato, Aristotle)• Religious view: through love of God and others, we can be happy by fulfilling our call to be God-like (Augustine)

Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature

Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature

• $ Evolutionism: like other animals, human abilities have evolved due to random variation and natural selection, not because of purposeful design (Darwin)

• Objections: evolution could be divinely directed; and human reason and language are qualitatively unlike anything found among animals

Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature

Challenges to the Traditional Views of Human Nature

• Existentialism: we freely choose to create our essence or nature; to choose to believe we cannot choose due to genetics, upbringing, or unconscious motives is to act in “bad faith”; our existence precedes our essence (Sartre)• Feminism: feeling and emotion are just as important as reason in defining human nature

Personal Immortality: ArgumentsPersonal Immortality: Arguments

1.1. Socrates/Descartes: unlike the body, the soul Socrates/Descartes: unlike the body, the soul is simple, immaterial, & does not come apartis simple, immaterial, & does not come apart

• Objection: death is not dissolution of material Objection: death is not dissolution of material parts, only the end of bodily (brain) activityparts, only the end of bodily (brain) activity

2.2. Peter van Inwagen: God re-creates our Peter van Inwagen: God re-creates our same body after we die same body after we die

• Objection: no re-creation would be identicalObjection: no re-creation would be identical

Rene Descartes (1596-1650)

Socrates (470-399 BCE)

(1942- )

Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)

3.3. If If there is a loving God, he would give us there is a loving God, he would give us more than the brief span of our time on earthmore than the brief span of our time on earth

Objection: this assumes that there is such a GodObjection: this assumes that there is such a God

4.4. Kant: morality requires that the injustices of Kant: morality requires that the injustices of this life be balanced in an afterlifethis life be balanced in an afterlife

Objection: morality does not require happiness Objection: morality does not require happiness to match virtue; so eternity is unnecessaryto match virtue; so eternity is unnecessary

Kant

Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)

5.5. The fact that the belief in an afterlife is The fact that the belief in an afterlife is found almost universally argues in its favorfound almost universally argues in its favorObjection: this shows only widespread desireObjection: this shows only widespread desire

6.6. Reports of “near death experiences” are too Reports of “near death experiences” are too common, similar, and accurate to ignorecommon, similar, and accurate to ignoreObjection: such reports are explainable in purely Objection: such reports are explainable in purely

psychological termspsychological terms

Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)Personal Immortality:Arguments (continued)

7.7. Reports of reincarnation are also widespreadReports of reincarnation are also widespreadObjections: why don’t babies remember their Objections: why don’t babies remember their past lives? Furthermore, not enough people have past lives? Furthermore, not enough people have lived in the past to account for everyone todaylived in the past to account for everyone today

8.8. Reports of communication with the dead and Reports of communication with the dead and “miracles” are likewise widespread“miracles” are likewise widespread

Objection (Hume): these are due to Objection (Hume): these are due to wishful thinking and deceptionwishful thinking and deception

David Hume

The The self is the unity of what we necessarily are self is the unity of what we necessarily are and what we choose to beand what we choose to be

The The nobility of the human condition consists in nobility of the human condition consists in despair/anxiety: (1) having to acknowledge that despair/anxiety: (1) having to acknowledge that we are put into a situation (by God) where we we are put into a situation (by God) where we have to make real, un-guaranteed choices; and (2) have to make real, un-guaranteed choices; and (2) having to make the choices whereby we become having to make the choices whereby we become selvesselves

The Self as Chosen: Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55)

Human beings are naturally inclined to Human beings are naturally inclined to work and be sociable. What distinguishes us as work and be sociable. What distinguishes us as human is our freely chosen, creative laborhuman is our freely chosen, creative labor

Capitalism alienates us from the products of our Capitalism alienates us from the products of our labor and thus alienates us from ourselves and one labor and thus alienates us from ourselves and one anotheranother

By controlling property, the ruling class controls By controlling property, the ruling class controls thought. Only communal ownership of property can thought. Only communal ownership of property can counteract social alienationcounteract social alienation

The Self as Worker:Karl Marx (1818-85)The Self as Worker:Karl Marx (1818-85)

Nobility consists in the exercise of will. The Nobility consists in the exercise of will. The pessimistic all-too-human reliance on God, pessimistic all-too-human reliance on God, religion, and morality is a crutch for the weakreligion, and morality is a crutch for the weak

The true self (the overman) transcends the The true self (the overman) transcends the “last man,” the person who takes no risks and “last man,” the person who takes no risks and seeks equality, complacence, and happinessseeks equality, complacence, and happiness

The Self as Will to Power: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)The Self as Will to Power: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

The Self as Part of a WholeThe Self as Part of a Whole

HinduismHinduism: all individuals are really only : all individuals are really only expressions of one divine, eternal self. We expressions of one divine, eternal self. We cannot really possess anything privately as cannot really possess anything privately as our own, and should affirm the totality of our own, and should affirm the totality of the world as our sacred realitythe world as our sacred reality

TaoismTaoism: all things express the order and : all things express the order and cycle of reality. We should embrace the cycle of reality. We should embrace the way or harmony of nature as our ownway or harmony of nature as our own

Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948)

The Non-Human-Centered Self: Deep EcologyThe Non-Human-Centered Self: Deep Ecology

My true self includes all beings in the worldMy true self includes all beings in the world We maximize We maximize selfself-realization by identifying -realization by identifying

with and promoting the welfare of all of naturewith and promoting the welfare of all of nature We should avoid the selfish consumption of We should avoid the selfish consumption of

resources and destruction of natural diversity resources and destruction of natural diversity not because such acts are immoral but because not because such acts are immoral but because they inhibit our joyful experience of naturethey inhibit our joyful experience of nature

Arne Naess (b. 1912)

The Self as Evolved Animal:Charles DarwinThe Self as Evolved Animal:Charles Darwin

Physical similarities between humans and Physical similarities between humans and other animals indicates our links to themother animals indicates our links to them

Intellectual and emotional differences Intellectual and emotional differences between humans and other animals are minor between humans and other animals are minor and can be explained as products of random and can be explained as products of random variation, adaptation, natural selection, and variation, adaptation, natural selection, and conditioningconditioning

(1809-82)

More 20th Century Theories of MindMore 20th Century Theories of Mind

Eliminative MaterialismEliminative Materialism: we should : we should replace terms like “thought” with replace terms like “thought” with purely material expressionspurely material expressions

Paul Churchland (1942 - )

Paul Churchland (1942 - )

•Functionalism: mental states are “types” of patterned associations of sensory stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to particular “tokens” of anatomical mechanism

•Functionalism: mental states are “types” of patterned associations of sensory stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to particular “tokens” of anatomical mechanism

Jerry Fodor (1935 - )

Jerry Fodor (1935 - )

Minds and MachinesMinds and Machines EpiphenomenalismEpiphenomenalism: “conscious” : “conscious”

activity is simply the result of activity is simply the result of physical organizationphysical organization Thomas Huxley

(1825-95)Thomas Huxley

(1825-95)

• Objection against all metaphysical attempts to describe mind: to say that a

being thinks or feels pain is not to describe anything; it merely reveals how we speak (which is linked to a network of

other beliefs)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Materialist Accounts of Mind: ProblemsMaterialist Accounts of Mind: Problems

SubjectivitySubjectivity: the : the experienceexperience of thinking and of thinking and having a point of view seems not to be captured having a point of view seems not to be captured in materialist accountsin materialist accountsMental activity (e.g., consciousness) does not Mental activity (e.g., consciousness) does not

have physical properties (e.g., location). Even have physical properties (e.g., location). Even if mental activity is if mental activity is correlatedcorrelated with physical with physical activity, that does not prove they are identicalactivity, that does not prove they are identical

IntentionalityIntentionality: consciousness is always “of” or : consciousness is always “of” or “about” things (even things that don’t exist); “about” things (even things that don’t exist); physical objects/events lack such physical objects/events lack such intentionalityintentionality

20th Century Views on Mind and Body20th Century Views on Mind and Body

• Logical Behaviorism (Gilbert Ryle): “mind” refers simply to a way of speaking about behaviors

(1900-76)(1900-76)

Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: states of consciousness & thoughts are simply brain states (“reductive materialism”)

Problem: consciousness & brain states have different properties (e.g.,

consciousness is not spatial)

Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: states of consciousness & thoughts are simply brain states (“reductive materialism”)

Problem: consciousness & brain states have different properties (e.g.,

consciousness is not spatial)

J. J. C. Smart (1920- )

J. J. C. Smart (1920- )

More 20th Century Theories of MindMore 20th Century Theories of Mind

• Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with purely material expressions

Paul Churchland (1942 - )

Paul Churchland (1942 - )

Functionalism: mental states are patterned associations of sensory

stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to any

particular anatomical mechanism

Functionalism: mental states are patterned associations of sensory

stimuli and behaviors; these associations are not tied to any

particular anatomical mechanismJerry Fodor (1935 - )

Jerry Fodor (1935 - )

Minds and MachinesMinds and Machines

• EpiphenomenalismEpiphenomenalism: “conscious” : “conscious” activity is simply the result of activity is simply the result of physical (“automatic”) organizationphysical (“automatic”) organization Thomas Huxley

(1825-95)Thomas Huxley

(1825-95)

• Objection: to say that a being Objection: to say that a being thinks or feels pain is not to thinks or feels pain is not to

describe anything; it is to reveal describe anything; it is to reveal how we speak (which is linked how we speak (which is linked to a network of other beliefs)to a network of other beliefs)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

Can Computers Think?Can Computers Think?

• Turing test: if a computer performs like a human being, it can be said to think

John Searle (1932 - )

John Searle (1932 - )

• Thinking or understanding involves more than syntax (i.e., following a program or manipulating symbols

according to rules as in the Chinese Room); it involves a semantics, being aware of what following the program

means or interpreting an intended action

Alan Turing (1912-54)

Alan Turing (1912-54)

Is Artificial Intelligence Possible?Is Artificial Intelligence Possible?

• If computers were programmed in the same way humans are raised, their functional behavior might be intentional

John Haugeland (1945 - )

John Haugeland (1945 - )

• Computers could be said to engage in intentional (thoughtful) behavior only if they are conscious and able to think of things as meaningful or important

(which they cannot do)

Bill Lycan (1945 - )Bill Lycan (1945 - )