Summer 2016 Philosophy & Public Policy Philosophy and ... · Summer 2016 Philosophy & Public Policy Gabriel Wollner 2 The global storm [The spaal dimension of the problem] The threefold

Summer2016Philosophy&PublicPolicyGabrielWollner

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Basicfactsofclimatechange

•  Dependingonwhereyoustandempirically,climatechangewillhave

nega0veconsequences(migra:on,poli:calconflict,lowergrowth),severely

nega0veeffects(floods,droughts,storms),orcatastrophicresults(endof

theworldasweknowit).

•  Humanac:vityisresponsibleandwekeepfuellingit.

•  Wearedealingwithuncertaintyonmanylevelsandlong0mehorizons.

•  Thephenomenonraisesscien:fic,economic,poli:calandmoralques0ons.

•  Itisaperfectmoralstorm(StephenGardiner):Manyindividuallychallenging

problemsintersectandoverlap,leavingusinadeepmess.

1  Basicfacts2  Aperfectmoralstorm

GlobalstormIntergenera:onalstorm

Theore:calstorm

3  Cost-benefitanalysis

andtherightlevel4  Jus:ceandthe

ques:onofdistribu:on

5  Paris?

Lecture3PhilosophyandPublicPolicyofClimateChange


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Theglobalstorm[Thespa0aldimensionoftheproblem]

Thethreefoldbasicproblem

(1) Dispersionofcauseandeffect:Thebenefitsofemissionsatoneplace,its

costsoccurelsewhereorglobally.

(2) Fragmenta0onofAgency:Theexistenceofmul:pleactors(individualsand

ins:tu:ons)withoutaclearstructureofagencythreatenstheabilityto

respond(prisoners’dilemma/tragedyofthecommons).

(3)  Ins0tu0onalInadequacy:Theinterna:onalpoli:calsystemlacksthetypeof

ins:tu:onalenforcerrequiredtosolvecollec:veac:onproblems.

Aggrava0ngfactors

•  Scien0ficuncertaintymakesagreementonmeasuresharder.

•  Deeprootsinoureconomyandvestedinterestsobstructsolu:ons.

•  Skewedvulnerabili0esleavethoseleastpowerfulmostvulnerable.




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Theintergenera0onalstorm[Thetemporaldimensionoftheproblem]

Thethreefoldbasicproblem

(1)  Dispersionofcauseandeffect:Thecostsarebackloaded,undermining

mo:va:onanddemocra:cabilitytoact.

(2)  Fragmenta0onofAgency:Becausepresentgenera:onshavepowerover

futuregenera:ons,thereisthedangerofoverconsump:onand

intergenera:onalbuckpassing.

(3)  Ins0tu0onalInadequacy:Standardsolu:onstocollec:veac:onsproblems

(repe::on/reciprocity)donotworkintemporalcases.

Aggrava0ngfactors

•  Theproblemgetsworseover0meandwithbuckpassing.

•  Con:nuedbusinessasusualincreasestransi0oncosts.

•  Wemayforcetragicchoicesonfuturegenera:ons




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Thetheore0calstorm

Climatechangeraisesques0onswearenotwellequippedtoanswer:

(1) Howshallwetradeofffuturecostsandbenefitsagainstpresentones?*

(2)  Howshallwedealwithriskanduncertainty?

(3)  Whatisstatusoffuturepeoplewhoseiden:tyweaffectbyourdecisions?

(4)  Whatrequirementsapplytoourrela:onshiptonatureandanimals?

(5)  Whattypeofinterna:onalins:tu:onscouldhelpsurvivethestorm?

(6)  Howshouldtheburdensofclimatechangebeallocated?*

Theaggrava0ngfactorofmoralcorrup0on

Inlightofthemoralstorm,wearetemptedtoavoiddealingwiththeproblem,

engageinself-servingbehaviourandsubvertgenuinemoralargument:Distract,

delude,encouragedoubt,etc.>IsParisdifferent?*




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Cost-benefitanalysisandresponsestoclimatechange(1/5)

Thefirstbigques0on

Howmuchac:onisrequirednow?Whatcoststopreventclimatechange?

[Inpolicyterms:Reduceemissionsbyhowmuchby2020etc.?]

Relatedques0ons

Whatareadequatepolicyresponsestothephenomenonofclimatechange?

Howdowechoosebetweenthem?

Howdoweallocatethecostsofclimatechangeacrossgenera:ons?

Twobasicresponsestrategies

(1)  Mi0gatethemagnitudeofclimatechange,e.g.bycu`ngemissions.

(2)Adapttotheeffectsofclimatechange,e.g.bybuildingdams.




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Cost-benefitanalysisandresponsestoclimatechange(2/5)

Thestandardframeworkofcost-benefitanalysis(CBA)

Keyidea: Apolicyshouldbepursuedifitsbenefitsover:mearegreaterthan

thecostsover:me.

Example:

PhilosophyPhD:Buyataxinowfor$100toearn$120nextyear:

IfapolicyhasanNPV>0,goahead.

Ifwehaveachoicebetweenmul:plepolicies,choosehighestNPV.

€

NPV =benefitst − costst

(1+ r)tt=0

T

∑

€

NPV = 0 −100 +120 − 0(1+ .05)

=14.3




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Cost-benefitanalysisanditslimits(3/5)

Costsinthecontextofclimatechange

Costsofmi:ga:on:Costsofreducingemissionsnow.

Costsofadapta:on:Costsofcopingwithconsequencesinfuture.

Fundamentalobjec0onstoCBAincontextofclimatechange*

CBAdoesnotlenditselftotheques:onofclimatechangebecause:

•  Itassumesperfectsubs0tutability,whichwecannotassume

•  Itisinappropriateforlowprobabilitycatastrophicevents

•  Itisdifficult/impossibletovaluenon-monetarybenefits.




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Thesignificanceofasocialdiscountrate

Thechoiceofdiscountratemagersforhowweassessclimatechange,for

whatwedonowandforwhichop:onwechoose.Thehigherthediscount

rate,thelessurgenttheproblem(Nordhausvs.Stern).

Internalobjec0ons

Whatsocialdiscountrateshallwechoose?Whyhaveaposi:vediscountrate?

Theargumentfromgrowth

Claim: Wehavetodiscountbecausewecouldhaveearnedareturn.

Objec0on:Circularity>Decision-makersdeterminereturn

Context>Hasmarketreturn(costofcapital,interest)aplacehere?

Domarketpar:cipantstrytoanswerthemoralques:onofinter-

genera:onaldistribu:ons?




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Theargumentfrom0mepreference

Claim: Peoplejusthaveapreferenceforpresentconsump:on

Objec0on:Evenifthatreasonwouldallowdiscoun:ngwithinthelifeofone

individual,itwouldnotjus:fydiscoun:ngacrossgenera:ons

(separatenessofpersons).

Thepriorityargument

Claim: Becauseitismoreimportanttoimprovethesitua:onofthosewho

areworseoff,whileweareeconomicallyworseoffthanfuture

people,futurepeopleshouldbeartheburdensofclimatechange.

Objec0on:Whataboutourresponsibility?

Whataboutfuturepoorpeople?Atleast,alsoredistributenow.




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Thesecondbigques0on

Howshallwedistributethecostsofcopingwithclimatechange?

[Inpolicyterms:Whoshouldreduceemissionsbyhowmuch?]

Twobasicapproaches*

(1) Polluterpays(Historical,backwardlooking)

a)Firstargument:Youbrokeit,youfixit

b)Secondargument:Compensa:onforoveruseofcommonresource

>From1850to2003:USA29%,EU26%,China8%,India2%.

(2)Fairemissions(forwardlooking,fairness)

Idea:Weshouldsharetheremainingemissionsaccordingtostandardsof

fairnessandequality,basedoncurrentandforwardlookingconsidera:ons.




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ThePolluterpaysprinciple

Ques0on

Whomdoestheprincipleapplyto:individuals,states,corpora:ons?

Objec0ons

(1)  Pastgenera0ons:Mostoftheemissionarebypeoplenotaliveanymore.

Doestheprincipleremainplausibleifwepayforourancestors?

(2)  Ignorance:Un:lrecently,peoplewereunawareofthenega:ve

consequencesofgreenhousegasemissions.Canwes:llholdthem

responsible?

(3)  Theimpoverishmentargument:Someofthehistoricalemigersmaytodaybe

impoverished.Tohavethembearthehighestburdenseemsodd.

> Butshallwegiveuponhistoricalaccountability?




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Fairemissionsapproaches(1/2)

FirstProposal:Equalpercapitaemissions

Asamageroffairness(veilofignorance/arbitrarinessofcircumstances)every

ci:zengetsanequalshareofwhatwethinktherightamountofemissionis

Feasibilityobjec0ons

(1)  Radicalimplica:ons:A20%emissioncutwouldmeanan80%cutfortheUS.

(2)  Redistribu:on:Toavoidinefficiencyandtoaccountfordifferentenergy

needsyoumayallowfortradeinemissionrights.Thatwouldentailmassive

redistribu:onfromrichtopoor?Valueofanapproachthatwon’tbetaken?

Principledobjec0ons

(1)  Ifwewantfairequality,wewouldhavetolookateffectsofclimatechange.

(2)  Aprincipledconcern:emissionsrightsonlyhaveaninstrumental,notan

intrinsicvalue.Whatmagersisthathumanshaveaccesstobasicgoods




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Fairemissionsapproaches(2/2)

SecondProposal:Equalburdenapproach

Everyna:onshouldtakeanequalburdenandreduceemissionsbysame%.

A[empttomo0vate:LockeanProvisoJus:fica:on>Absorp:vecapacity.

Objec0ons

(1)  Historicalaccountability:Ignoreshistoricalemissions.Somena:onshave

emigedmorethanothersands:llbenefit.

(2)  Arbitrariness:Whytakethestatusquoasstar:ngpoint?Usingcurrent

emissionsasabaselineismorallyarbitrary.

(3)  Inequality:Isnotsensi:vetoinequali:esinwealthbetweenemigers.

Shouldn’tthosebegeroffandhenceinaposi:ontoshoulderalargershare

paymore?




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DoestheParisAgreementwithitspledgeandreviewmechanismgiveusreason

tobemoreop8mis8c?

Whatifcountriesdonotliveuptotheirfairshare?




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Distributingresponsibilitiesunderconditionsofnon-compliance

Therearethreebasicoptionsofdealingwiththesituation:

Option(1):Justdoyourfairshare.

Pro:Forafterall,thefailureofothersistheirresponsibility.

Con:Reasonsgroundingdutymaysupportstrongremedialresponsibility.

Option(2):Domorethanyourfairshare(pickuptheslack).

Pro:Thereisanewmoralsituation,inlightofwhichwedetermineshare.

Con:Responsibilitydoesnotsimplyshift.

Option(3):Dolessthanyourfairshare(grouch).

Pro:Fairness>Youshouldnotbedisadvantagedasresultoffailureofothers.

Con:Reasonsgroundingdutyarestrongerthanhorizontalequity.

RelevantFactors:(a)Costs?,(b)rights?,(c)difference?,(d)reversible?




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Summer 2016 Philosophy & Public Policy Philosophy and ... · Summer 2016 Philosophy & Public Policy Gabriel Wollner 2 The global storm [The spaal dimension of the problem] The threefold

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