SNEAK PEEK: The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein

THE

WARUNSEEN

Lambeth_Unseen War_FINAL.indd 1 7/9/13 11:27 AM

C O R P O R A T I O N

Published in cooperation with the RAND Corporation


THE

WAR

Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein

BEnjAmin S. LAmBETH

Foreword by Gen. T. michael moseley, USAF (Ret.)

Naval Institute PressAnnapolis, Maryland

UNSEEN


Naval Institute Press291 Wood RoadAnnapolis, MD 21402

2013 by RAND CorporationAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any in-formation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataLambeth, Benjamin S. The unseen war : allied air power and the takedown of Saddam Hussein / Benjamin S. Lambeth. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-61251-311-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-61251-312-6 (ebook) 1. Iraq War, 20032011Aerial operations, American. 2. Iraq War, 20032011Campaigns. 3. United States. Central CommandHistory. 4. Air powerUnited StatesCase studies. I. Title. DS79.76.L347 2013 956.7044348dc23

2013017743

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).Printed in the United States of America.

21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1First printing


List of Figures, Maps, and Charts vii

Foreword ix

Preface xiii

Acknowledgments xv

Acronyms and Abbreviations xxi

Introduction 1

1 The Road to War 9

2 CENTCOMs Air Offensive 59

3 The Allies Contribution 147

4 Key Accomplishments 178

5 Problems Encountered 242

6 Toward a New Era of Warfare 288

Notes 313

Selected Bibliography 399

Index 423

CONTENTS


Figures

FIgURe 1.1 general Franks Lines and Slices Matrix 17

FIgURe 2.1 Common grid Reference System 97

FIgURe 2.2 Kill-Box Status Change Request Format 98

FIgURe 4.1 Air Tasking Order Processing Cycle 208

maps

MAP 1.1 Iraqi Northern and Southern No-Fly Zones 10

MAP 1.2 general Franks Five-Front Construct 27

MAP 1.3 CeNTAFs Main Operating Bases 45

MAP 2.1 Iraqi Theater of Operations 60

MAP 2.2 Iraqi IADS Super MeZ 85

MAP 2.3 Iraqi Military Airfield Distribution 85

Charts

CHART 1.1 CeNTAF Aircraft by Category 45

CHART 4.1 CeNTAF Overall Sorties by Aircraft Category 179

CHART 4.2 CeNTAF Strike Sorties by Category 179

CHART 4.3 CeNTAF Strike Sorties by Service 180

FIGURES, MAPS, AND CHARTS


The three-week air offensive that figured centrally in the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a testament to air powers final maturation for the sort of high-intensity warfare that the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom represented. In both its independent strategic role and its enabling support to allied ground troops, that offensive reflected a culmination of all that the United States and its coalition partners had done by way of steady force improve-ment, doctrinal refinement, and realistic training since air powers breakthrough achievement during the first Persian gulf War more than a decade earlier.

It was my special privilege to command and lead the many fine airmen who made possible that remarkable air power success story. Notwithstanding our unmatched combat systems and technology, it is our high-quality profes-sionals at all levels whose devotion to mission and natural adaptability to over-come any challenge have rendered the American air weapon a unique asset to our nation. Those key shapers of events were backstopped in every way by the able contributions of the United Kingdom and Australia, whose respective air contingent commanders, then Air Vice-Marshal glenn Torpy of the RAF and then group Captain geoff Brown of the RAAF, were my partners from the start of our planning to the final execution of the campaign. It speaks volumes for the uncommon reservoir of talent that they brought to the fight that both of these outstanding airmen later went on to head their respective air forces.

In the years since those eventful three weeks, the United States and its allies have been consumed by lower-intensity counterinsurgency operations in which kinetic air attacks have been largely overshadowed by ground combatto a point where some observers suggest that the sort of cutting-edge applications of air power that were so pivotal in 2003 have since been superseded by a new form of warfare in which high-technology weapons have become irrelevant. That notion could not be further removed from the realities of todays world. The era of major wars entailing existential threats to the United States and its closest allies has not ended. Demands for the most lethal and survivable air capabilities that our nation can muster will arise again. And there is much in our experience gained from the air war over Iraq in 2003 that offers a preview of how such capabilities might be best exploited in the future.

FOREWORD


x FOREWORD

This important book, begun under my sponsorship as the commander of U.S. Central Command (CeNTCOM) Air Forces, reconstructs the campaigns air contribution in impressive depth of detail. Along the way, it weaves a grip-ping narrative of the air war at multiple levels of analysis, from the perspective of the coalitions most senior leaders all the way down to individual airmen as they watched the campaign play out from their cockpits in the heat of combat. One of the many notable aspects of the air offensive explored in the pages that fol-low concerns the trust relationships that were first forged within CeNTCOM during Operation enduring Freedom against Al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan in late 2001 and 2002. Those close interpersonal ties were sus-tained among the same top leaders as we segued into the campaign against Iraqs Baathist regime the following year. They were indispensable in accounting for the campaigns all but seamless cross-service harmony.

This assessment also explores the many challenges that those at the center of preparations for Iraqi Freedom faced, including the possibility of an Iraqi chemi-cal weapons attack on both allied forces and civilian populations in the theater, our felt need to ensure that the Iraqi air force would not generate a single combat sortie, our determination to ensure that our air support arrangements were in closest possible accord with the land components anticipated maneuver needs, and our resolve to keep Iraqs western desert free of any means for Hus-seins forces to fire missiles into Israel and Jordan.

The compression of the campaigns phases into a concurrent air-land push into Iraq compounded those concerns. That last-minute development saddled CeNTCOMs air component with the daunting need to satisfy multiple mission demands simultaneouslyestablishing airspace control, finding and destroying hidden Iraqi Scud or other tactical missiles, targeting Iraqs key command and control centers to impose rapid paralysis on the regime, and supporting the con-ventional land advance and associated covert activities by allied special operations forces in both southern and northern Iraq.

Finally, this book spotlights the many unique achievements registered dur-ing the three-week air offensive, such as the close integration of our naval and Marine Corps air assets into the overall campaign plan, meeting the immense challenges of securing adequate fuel supplies and tanker support, assigning a senior airman to the land component as my personal representative, and secur-ing for the air component the all-important prerogative of approving the nomination of enemy targets without my having to defer repeatedly to higher authority for permission. It also explains the many valuable lessons that were driven home by the campaign experience, such as the importance of organizing


FOREWORD xi

the air components elements for maximum effectiveness, training those elements routinely in peacetime in a way that fully exercises the entire command and control system, and equipping our forces with the most effective and survivable aircraft and systems.

Ben Lambeths assessment offers an exhaustive account of the Iraqi Free-dom air war in its most essential details. His adept telling of that story is con-veyed with a tone of authority that will resonate instantly among the airmen who were actually there in the fight. Yet at the same time, it is written with a clarity of expression that will render it equally accessible to a wider circle of readers. I commend it highly to all who have an interest in air power and its key role in our nations defense, and most particularly to the successor generation of military professionals in all services who will gain much of lasting value from its many informed observations and insights.

T. Michael Buzz Moseley general, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces (20012003) and Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (20052008)


Since early 2004, under the sponsorship of U.S. Air Forces Central (AFCeNT), I have pursued an in-depth assessment of the American and allied air contribution to the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Free-dom that ended the rule of Saddam Hussein. This research followed an ear-lier AFCeNT-sponsored study to assess the war against Al Qaeda and its Tali-ban hosts in Afghanistan between early October 2001 and late March 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. That earlier effort is reported in Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: Americas Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom.1 The present book offers a similar treatment of the shorter but more intense air war that occurred over Iraq a year later when American air assets, aided substantially by the contribu-tions of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), played a pivotal role in securing the immediate campaign objectives of U.S. Central Command. This book aims to fill a persistent gap in the literature on Operation Iraqi Freedom by telling that story as fully and credibly as the available evidence will allow.

1 Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, Mg-166-1-CeNTAF, 2005. The abbreviation CeNTAF (for U.S. Central Command Air Forces) was changed to AFCeNT (for U.S. Air Forces Central) on March 1, 2009, after the U.S. Air Force leadership redesignated some of the Air Forces numbered air forces as formal warfighting headquarters. I use the abbreviation CeNTAF through-out this book because it was CeNTAF that planned and fought the three-week Iraqi Freedom air war in 2003.

PREFACE


For the indispensable support he offered toward making this book possible, I am indebted, first and foremost, to gen. T. Michael Buzz Moseley, former U.S. Air Force chief of staff and, before that, commander of U.S. Central Com-mand Air Forces (CeNTAF) during the planning and conduct of the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. general Moseley consented unhesi-tatingly to underwrite the research reported here as a sequel to an earlier study I prepared for CeNTAF, also under his sponsorship, on the largely air-centric war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. I am also grateful to Lt. gen. Robert elder, then vice commander of CeNTAF, who lent abiding support to me in late 2003 and early 2004 after general Moseley had moved on to become the Air Force vice chief of staff. My thanks go as well as to Kathi Jones, CeNTAFs command historian, who oversaw this effort through-out its long gestation.

I also am indebted to Vice Adm. David Nichols, deputy air component commander under general Moseley throughout the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom; to gen. gene Renuart, director of operations at CeNTCOM during the planning and initial execution of Iraqi Freedom; and to Lt. gen. Daniel Darnell, principal director of CeNTAFs combined air operations center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during the workups to and initial conduct of Iraqi Freedom, for generously sharing their time and recollec-tions of those aspects of the air war that most bear remembering.

I am additionally indebted to gen. gary North, who as CeNTAFs com-mander in 2007 sponsored an extension of this effort so that I could flesh out my initial draft by incorporating the many reader reactions that I had received and take advantage of some important additional documentation bearing on the Iraqi Freedom air war that I had since accumulated. In this regard I owe particular thanks to Col. Douglas erlenbusch, at the time CeNTAFs director of operations, and to Maj. Anthony Roberson, then chief of general Norths com-manders action group, for commenting in detail on my initial analysis and help-ing me to refine my plan for this more expanded and enriched final product.

In connection with my treatment of the contribution of the United King-doms Royal Air Force (RAF) to the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom, I

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

am pleased to acknowledge the generous support that I received from Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, then chief of the air staff. During a four-day visit to the United Kingdom on October 2629, 2004, I was able to meet virtually all of the RAF players who were pivotal in the planning and conduct of the RAFs contribution to the British role in the campaign, code-named Operation Telic. These included Air Chief Marshal Stirrup and his personal staff officer, then group Captain Stuart Atha; Air Commodore Andy Pulford, who com-manded the UK Joint Helicopter Command during the air war; Sebastian Cox and Sebastian Ritchie of the RAFs Air Historical Branch; then Air Marshal glenn Torpy, at the time chief of Joint Operations, who had served as the Brit-ish air contingent commander during Operation Telic; Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, commander in chief of RAF Strike Command and the Brit-ish national contingent commander up to and throughout the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom; Air Vice-Marshal Andy White, air officer commanding of Strike Commands No. 3 group; group Captain Mike Jenkins, station com-mander at RAF Wittering; group Captain Chris Coulls, station commander, and a group of his subordinate unit commanders at RAF Waddington; and Air Commodore Chris Nickols, commander of the RAFs Air Warfare Centre at Waddington.

With respect to my similar treatment of the role played by the Royal Aus-tralian Air Force (RAAF), I thank former chief of the air staff Air Marshal Ray Funnell, RAAF (Ret.), and Alan Stephens, former chief historian of the RAAF, who brought my initial working draft to the attention of group Captain Rich-ard Keir, then director of the RAAFs Air Power Development Centre. group Captain Keir provided me with copious documentation on the RAAFs role in the three-week campaign that allowed me to fill in that still-outstanding gap in my chapter on the allied air effort.

For their valued help in providing me additional documentation, for com-menting on all or parts of my earlier draft, and for otherwise helping to enrich this assessment in various ways, I wish again to thank general Moseley for the generous amount of time he shared from his busy schedule, first as Air Force vice chief and then as chief of staff, during three lengthy sessions in which he offered his reflections on those aspects of the war that mattered most from his perspective as the air component commander; gen. John Corley, commander of Air Combat Command; Lt. gen. Allen Peck, then commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and numerous members of his staff, particularly Lt. Col. John Hunerwadel and Lt. Col. Robert Poyner; Lt. gen. Michael Hamel, then commander of 14th Air Force at Vandenberg AFB,


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii

California, and Maj. Mark Main, chief of his commanders action group; Lt. gen. Richard Newton, then with AF/A3/5, Headquarters U.S. Air Force; Lt. gen. William Rew, CeNTAFs director of operations and co-director of the CAOC during the three-week air war; Maj. gen. eric Rosborg, commander of the 4th Fighter Wings F-15e Strike eagles during the campaign; Air Vice-Marshal geoff Brown and group Captain Keir of the RAAF; Dick Anderegg, director of the Office of Air Force History; Maj. gen. David Fadok and Col. Scott Walker, Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency; and Brig. gen. Mark Bar-rett, commander, 1st Fighter Wing, and former executive assistant to the USAF vice chief of staff.

For their helpful comments on various earlier iterations of this study, I thank Brig. gen. Michael Longoria, commander of the 484th Air expeditionary Wing, who oversaw air-ground integration on the CAOCs behalf during the cam-paign; Col. David Hathaway and Col. Mason Carpenter, key principals in the CAOCs strategy division during Iraqi Freedom; Col. Lynn Herndon, director of the ISR Division in the CAOC during the air campaign; Col. David Belote, former air liaison officer to the commander of the U.S. Armys III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas; Brig. gen. Rob givens, an F-16Cg pilot with the 524th Fighter Squadron during the three-week air war; Col. Matt Neuenswander, comman-dant of the USAFs Air-ground Operations School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, dur-ing the campaign; Col. gregory Fontenot, the principal author of On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Naval Institute Press, 2005); Col. Thomas ehrhard; Col. Charles Westenhoff; Lt. Col. Mark Cline, head of the CAOCs master air attack planning cell during the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom; Lt. Col. Chris Crawford, who served with CeNTAFs air component coordinating element to the land component during the campaign; Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen of the Royal Norwegian Air Force; Maj. Scott Campbell, A-10 Division, USAF Weapons School; Robert Jervis, professor of political sci-ence, Columbia University; Sebastian Ritchie, deputy director of the RAFs Air Historical Branch; and Thomas Rehome of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for his helpful archival research.

For their informed suggestions regarding my treatment of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps air operations, I extend my thanks to Adm. Tim Keating, CeNT-COMs maritime component commander during the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom; Adm. John Nathman, then commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Vice Adm. Lou Crenshaw, then director, assessments division, OPNAV N81; Vice Adm. Marty Chanik, then director, programming division, OPNAV N81; Adm. Mark Fitzgerald and Vice Adm. Tom Kilcline, successive


xviii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

directors of air warfare, OPNAV N78; Vice Adm. Dick gallagher, then com-mander, Carrier group Four; Vice Adm. Jim Zortman, then commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Adm. Sandy Winnefeld, then executive assistant to the vice chief of naval operations; Vice Adm. Mark Fox, then commander, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center; Capt. Brick Nelson and Capt. Flex gal-pin, OPNAV N3/5 (Deep Blue); Capt. Chuck Wright, then director for naval aviation systems, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Operational Test and evaluation); Capt. Calvin Craig, then OPNAV N81; Capt. Ken Neubauer and Cdr. Nick Dienna, both former Navy executive fellows at RAND; and Capt. Andy Lewis, then executive assistant to the commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Although this book is primarily a product of research, it is also informed by opportunities I was privileged to have in direct support of it to fly in six aircraft types that took part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These experiences included a close air support training sortie in a Block 40 F-16Cg with the 510th Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy, on May 19, 2004; a strike mission orientation flight in a Tornado gR4 with 617 Squadron out of RAF Lossiemouth on Octo-ber 27, 2004; a fifteen-hour night combat mission over Afghanistan in an e-3C AWACS out of Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab emirates, with then Lieutenant general North, CeNTAFs commander, in April 2007; three F-16B Topgun sorties and an F/A-18F Super Hornet sortie with the Naval Strike and Air War-fare Center at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada, on August 46, 2009; a U-2 high flight to more than 70,000 feet on a surveillance mission orienta-tion sortie with the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron at Beale AFB, California, on September 3, 2009; and an air combat training sortie in an F/A-18 with No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit at RAAF Base Williamtown, Australia, on March 26, 2010, with an RAAF pilot who took part in the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For these opportunities to gain firsthand conversancy with many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that figured centrally in the Iraqi Freedom air offensive described in the chapters that follow, I am grateful to Lt. gen. glen Moorhead (Ret.), former commander of 16th Air Force; and Maj. gen. Mike Worden (Ret.), then commander of the 31st Fighter Wing, U.S. Air Forces in europe; Air Chief Marshal Stirrup; general North; Vice Admiral Kilcline, then commander, Naval Air Forces; general Corley; and Air Marshal Mark Binskin, chief of air force, RAAF.

Finally, I thank Barry Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and my RAND colleagues Nora Bensahel, Paul Davis, James Dob-bins, David Johnson, and Karl Mueller for their helpful suggestions regarding


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix

all or parts of an earlier version of this book. I am additionally indebted to Harun Dogo, a doctoral candidate at the Pardee RAND graduate School of Public Policy, for his outstanding and well-targeted research support. Finally, I owe a special note of thanks to my able editor, Mindy Conner, for her keen eye and deft touch in improving my use of words at every chance. As always, any remaining errors of fact or interpretation, sins of omission, or other failings in the pages that follow are mine alone.


SNEAK PEEK: The Unseen War: Allied Air Power and the Takedown of Saddam Hussein

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