Smithie

ii () 2006/6/19

iii ()( /) ()

iv Abstract This thesis discusses Michael Smiths argument for his theory of Naturalistic Moral Realism. Smith points out, there exists the moral problem in ethics. The moral problem occurs when we cannot accommodate both the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgement, if we accept Humes theory of human psychology. This problem makes the idea of morality altogether incoherent, and engenders vast discussions and disagreements in contemporary meta-ethical theories. Smith attempts to provide his solution to the moral problem. His solution is, in part, to defend two claims. His defense of the first claim consists in a naturalistic account of moral realism. According to Smith, moral judgements describe some natural states of affairs, and express beliefs that have cognitive natural content. But Moore (a non-natural realist) and Ayer (an expressivist/ emotivist) point out, moral concepts are unanalysisable. They maintain that we cannot define the moral in terms of the natural. Moreover, Ayer claims that moral judgements do not describe any natural states of affairs; rather, they express attitudes. For Ayer, moral judgements have only non-cognitive content. Smith argues that his naturalistic moral realism can make sense of another form of definitional naturalism, which offers a non-reductive way of analysis (dispositional analysis). That moral concepts are analyzable provides an important premise for Smiths argument for his second claim, that is, moral facts are facts about the reasons that we all share. In this thesis, first, I explain what the moral problem is and Smiths claim about how to solve the problem. Then, I explain Moores and Ayers arguments against the idea that moral concepts are analyzable. And I explain Smiths responses to both of them. But even if it can be justifiable that moral concepts are analyzable, is it also reasonable and necessary to argue for naturalistic moral realism? I will discuss Smiths arguments. In the final chapter, Smiths idea of dispositional analysis is further discussed, and I shall offer my tentative reflections about Smiths claims.

v .1 .....7 .7 ....15 ....20 ....21 vs. .23 ....24 ....28 ....55 ........58 .....60 ....61 ....65 79 .....81 ---85 ......101 ......109 .......110 .......117

A B B A (conflict)A B A B A B A B B A A B A B A B (i.e. ) ()

2 --- --- ()(

3 )1 (Michael Smith) (Davie Hume) (inert) (agreement)(disagreement) (Hume,1973: 509-10)(passions)(volitions) (Hume,1973: 510) (Hume,1973: 522) (Smith,1994: 7) 1 A.J AyerGilbert Harman

4 (1994) (1).(2). (3).( ) (fact) (Smith,1994: 13) (accommodate) (Moore,1093) (Ayer,1936)(/)

5 ()---() --- (dispositional analysis) --- ---C (desire)C (1994: 184) (morality) --- (1). --- --- (2).

6 --- ---(morality)(broader naturalism) (3). () ---

(the moral problem) 2 1. (1994: 11) (1994: 5) (1994: 5) (disagreement) --- 2 (Hume)

8 () 3 3 (Charles L. Stevenson1963:1-9) (disagreement in beliefs)SARSSARS (disagreement in attitude) (psychological disposition) AB (1).(2).

9 () () (discover)(1994: 5) () ( ) (circumstances) (1994: 5) 4(1994: 5) 4 (John Rawls) John Rawls,(1951),Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics

10 ( )(1994: 6-7) ( ) (1994: 6) (1994: 12) (1). (2).

11 (Hume) () (Smith,1994: 9) (Smith,1994: 7)(passion) (original) (reason)(truth) ()()() (Hume,1984: 462-3) 5 (moral realism) () 5 ( )

12 --- (cognitivism) (Smith,1994: 9) (Hume,1984: 460-1) (Hume,1984: 447) ( )() (non-cognitivism)(1994: 10) (irrealism) --- (expressivism) (Smith,1994: 10)

13 --- ()--- 2. (1). (2). (3).- ()(1994: 12) (1) (2) (3)(1)(2)(3)

14 (3) (Smith,1994: 12) --- ( 1.)( 2.) 6() (1)(internalism) (externalism)7(2) 8(3) (1994: 13) (moral nihilism) (accommodate) 6 A.J AyerR.M HareSimon BlackburnAllen Gibber 7 Philippa FootThomas ScanlonPeter RailtonDavid Brink 8 Thomas NagleJohn McDowellMark PlattsDavid McNaughtonJonathan Dancy

15 9 ( )(capture) (platitudes) (objectivity)((1))(practicality)((2)) (supervenience) ( ) (substance) (identify)(1994: 127) (motivating reason)(normative reason)A A (explanatory)(justification)A (Smith,1994: 95) 9 p.4-5

16 A(normative requirement)A A (truths)A (desirable)(required)(Smith,1995: 95) (prudence) (Smith,1995: 96)A A A A (psychologically real) (Smith,1995: 96) (categories) (desirable)(required) A (Humean)

17 (Smith,1994: 98)(- ) --- (norms)(Smith,1994: 130) () () (Smith,1994: 130) (anti-Humean) C C(Smith,1994: 181) --- ACBC (categorical)(hypothetical) (social matter) (Smith,1994: 181) C C CC

18 (1994: 182) --- (1994: 183-4) (1994: 184) ()C CC (appropriate substantive kind) (1994: 184) --- --- (1) (2) (3)(1)

19 (2)(1994: 185) (broader naturalism) C() C() --- (Smith,1994: 185) C C (conceptual claim) F C (substantive claim) F C F (conclusion) --- (Smith,1994: 186) ()(Smith,1994: 186) ( ) () () ---

20 (Smith,1994: 186) (legitimate) (Mackie) (Smith,1994: 186) (legitimate) (Smith,1994: 187) (a priori truth)--- (reflection) (conversation)(obvious)(1994: 187) (1994: 187) (1994: 187)

21 (thick) (1994: 188) (Smith,1994: 188) (1994: 188) --- (Smith,1994: 189) (1994: 13) ---

22 C CC // --- () ---

vs. (fact) (Ayer) --- ()(Moore) (open question argument) (reasoned argument) (supervenience) 10 (Smith,2004a: 192) (A.J.Ayer) 10

24 (Smith,1994: 17) (Ayer,1936: 108) --- () () (What is good)()()(1903: 2-3)() () ()(simple) ()() () (axiom) (1903: 5-7) () (definitions)(real

25 nature)(mean) (complex) --- (1903: 7)( )(1903: 17) () NMMN () ---(1903: 17) ()(analytically equivalent) (a priori equivalent)(Smith,2004a: 192) ( immediately obvious) 95% 5% (closed question)--- (open question)--- (reasoned argument)

26 (Smith,2004a: 193) EN NENE (sound) (2004a: 193) --- (Ayer,1936: 112) (Smith,1994a: 17) (Ayer,1936: 103) --- () ---

27 (subjectivists) (utilitarians) (1936:104) (1936: 104) (1936: 104) (general subjectivism)(1994: 18) (fist person subjectivism) (1994: 18) ( ) (1936: 104) X X (absolute)(intrinsic) (1936: 105) (1936: 105) (naturalistic fallacy)---N MM N(Smith,1994:17-8)

28 F(F )XFX (Smith,1994: 27) () ()(simple) NMN MN=M X( )() X FF() XX ---XXF

29 (Smith,1994: 26) (Externalist Naturalistic Moral Realism)--- (Internalist Naturalistic Moral Realism)--- () (utilitarians) (utilitarianism) (non-subjective definitional naturalism)--- (Smith,1994: 27) XX (Smith,1994: 27) 11 --- () 11 BrinkRailton (Smith,2004a:196)

30 (Smith,1994: 28)(a priori necessity) (a posteriori necessity)XFXG FGFG(pick out) (Smith,1994: 28) () (Smith,2004a: 196)H2O H2O H2O --- (a priori truth) (discover)--- (a posteriori truth) (Smith,2004a: 197) (rightness)(wrongness) ()() (2004a: 197) () (fix) (2004a: 201)

31 (2004a: 197) (2004a: 198) () (Smith,2004a: 198) ( ) (2004a: 198) (2004a: 198) () ( ) (2004a: 198) ---

32 (2004a: 198) (reasoned argument) (Gilbert Harman) (perceive) (1977: 4) (perception) --- --- (Harman,1977: 5)

33 (2004a: 199) (non-reductive) (summary-style)(dispositional analysis) (analytic truth) (1994: 29) (mastery) (constraints)(2004a: 199) (platitudes)------ (Smith,1994: 29)

34 (remarks)(platitudinous) (Smith,1994: 30) --- (capture) (dispositions)(Smith,1994: 30) (1994: 30) (prima facie a priori) (Smith,1994: 31) 12 (habit)13(1994: 30) () 12 --- --- Saul.A.Kripke(1982) Philip Pettit(1990) 13 (2004c:242) (platitudinous)( )

35 (Smith,1994: 30-1) (being red) (redness)(relevant) (Smith,1994: 31) (conjunction) --- ( ) () (Smith,1994: 31) (encapsulate)(summarize)(systematize) (1994: 31-2) --- () ( )---

36 (1994: 32) --- (rightness) (1994: 32) A B A XBXAB (Hare) (good)() (1952: 148)

37 (Hare,1952: 148-9) (radical relativism) (Smith,1994: 34) (really) (1994: 34) --- ---(Smith,1994: 34-5)(

38 ) --- (build into) (1994: 35) --- (Paradox of Analysis) --- (reductive) (1994: 35) FXF XFXFX

39 F XFX(1994: 36) X C*CXC*XC(1994: 36) A A(AA/ ) (open question)(1994: 36) ( )(Paradox of Analysis)(1994: 37) CC*C*C C C*(unobvious)(informative) C*CC*C C* (Smith,1994: 37) (1994: 37) (nature

40 of conceptual analysis)(1994: 37) C CC C* CC*C ---C(Smith,1994: 38) C (transparent)14(summarize) (1994: 38) (knowledge-how) ---(knowledge-that)(1994: 38)CC*C (2004a: 199-202) 14 (transparency) (Smith,1993:273-4)

41 CCr XCr Cr (2004a: 200) X X ( ) (2004a: 200) (irrelevant) --- (2004a: 200) C CC

42 () (practical) (Smith,1994: 39) (objective)AB AB AB AB

43 15(Smith,1994: 40) (supervenience) 16 (Smith,1994: 40)(substance of morality)(Philipa Foot) (Ronald Dworkin) (Smith,1994: 40) (procedures)(John Rawls,1951) (Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics) (reflective equilibrium)17 (Smith,1994: 40)18 () 15 (circumstances) 16 17 (1971:18) 18 (1994: 40-1)

44 (1994: 41) (Smith,1994: 41) X XX X XX (1994: 42) W1 FF W2 F

45 (Smith,1994: 42) --- (1994: 42) () (1994: 42) ( ) (1994: 43) vs. ---

46 --- (reductive)(1994: 44) (redness)--- R-C-L-J R-C-L-J (Frank Ramsey)(Rudolf Carnap) (David Lewis) (Frank Jackson) (network analysis) (explicitly)(summary) --- (Smith,1994: 44-5) (permutation problem) () (property-name)

47 Mrst M[r s t] M[x y z] x y z.M[x y z ]&(x*)(y*)(z*)M[x*y*z*] iff (x=x*,y=y*,z=z*) (Smith,1994:45-54) x x x y z.M[x y z ]&(x*)(y*)(z*)M[x*y*z*] iff (x=x*,y=y*,z=z*) x x y z x iff x & x & x & A xB y x y & M (1994: 46)

48 () (Smith,1994: 46) xx y z.M[x y z ] & (conceptual claim) (x*)(y*)(z*)M[x*y*z*] iff (x=x*,y=y*,z=z*) x: y z.M[x y z ] & (x*)(y*)(z*)M[x*y*z*] iff (substantive claim) (x=x*,y=y*,z=z*) F F (conclusion) (Smith,1994: 47) (1994: 48) --- (color wheel)

49 xx y z x iff x x y z&( ) yy z w y iff y y z w&( ) zz w v z iff z z w v&( ) (Smith,1994: 49-50) (1994: 50) (1994: 50) --- ---

50 (permutation problem)(1994: 50) (Smith,1994: 51) (prima facie a priori)(1994: 51) (Smith,1994: 51) (1994: 51) ( )

51 (1994: 53) --- 19(1994: 53) x x y z.M[x y z ]&(x*)(y*)(z*)M[x*y*z*] iff (x=x*,y=y*,z=z*) --- 19

52 (1994: 55) (1994: 55) 20 --- --- ( ) /( ) 20 (1936)

53 C C (conceptual claim) F C (substantive claim) F C F (conclusion) (2004a: 202) (justification) () (Smith,2004a:203)

54 (amply) (2004a:203) (Smith,2004a:203) (idealized) (2004a:202) (2004a:203) () (Smith,2004a:203) --- --- //

55 (error theory) 21 21 (1994: 64)

56 600nm (1). 600nm (2). (1). 600nm 600nm (2). (2)(1)(1) 600nm 600nm (2)

57 (2) A( ppqqppq )( ) A ---F

58 (N)(M) N=MNM () --- /

(really)22(2004a: 181) --- () 23(error theory) (1). (2). (1)(2) (commitment) (cheaply) 22 23 (1977)

61 24(2004a: 183)(1)(2)(semantic) (2004a: 183) (Minimal Moral Realism) (true)(false) (Minimalism about truth) 25(true)(false) 24 (mentioning) () (Smith 2004:183-184) 25 (truth predicate) (is true) (It is true that) (deflationary nature of truth) (Jackson, Oppy, Smith2004)

62 (2004a: 184) (strictly) s (is true) ss ss (strictly speaking) (2004a: 185)

63 (2004a: 185) s ss s (truth)s s (2004a:185)(1)(2) (1). (2). ss ---(truth-apt) ---(non-truth-apt) (2004a: 185-6)

64 (purely syntactic feature) (well-formed sentences) __________ (Lewis Carroll)Jabberwocky26 (2004a: 186-7) (meaningful) (patterns of usage)--- --- 26 Twas brilling, and the slithy toves did gyre and gambling in the wabe (conjunction)If the toves are gyring and gambling in the wabe then I will watch them. I believe that the toves are gyring and gambling. ______is true the toves are gyring and gambling in the wabe is true

65 27 ( 2004a: 187) (Smith,2004a: 187) () --- --- 27 Moorean (I have no beliefs)(Smith2004a:187)

66 (2004a: 188) --- (internalism constraint) (2004a: 188) () --- --- (desires) (averse) (indifferent)(Smith,2004a: 189)

67 (2004a: 190) (2004a: 190) (idealized) ---

68 (2004a: 191) (2004a: 191) (pick out)(2004a: 191) (supervene) (conceptual truth) (supervenience constraint) (2004a: 191)

69 --- (pick out) ()NN*N** NE (2004a: 223) N E NE (Smith,2004a: 223)(James Griffin,1992) (Smith,2004a: 231) (e.g. )(identical)--- ---

70 (Smith,2004b: 208) A B B- A-(Horgan,1993: 150) ABBBA ABAB A(R.M Hare,1952: 79-81) (operate) () NEN* (2004b: 208) E* NE --- (trivial)(2004b: 210)

71 (G.E.Moore) (1903: 40-1) (causally explaining) (figure in) (Smith,2004b: 210-1) (Smith,2004b: 211) PP (P)P P P P ( ) W1 W2W1 P

72 W2 PP28 (Smith,2004b: 211-2) P P (could) P (2004b: 212) (could)(such as to) (such as to) (could) (inter-world)(intra-world) (2004b: 215) 28 PPP PP P PP

73 --- (Smith,2004b: 214) (particularity) (particulars) (Smith,2004b: 214) (Smith,2004b: 214-5) (such as to) 29 ( )() ()(morality) (broader naturalism) 29 p.67-8

74 (1992: 314) (trivial) (relevance requirement) (1992: 314) (subclass) (1992: 315) (1992: 317) 30 (1992: 317-8) 30 (understanding)(figures in) (Smith,2004b:227)

75 (begging question) (2004b: 219) (2004b: 220) (a principle of plenitude about possibilia) (2004b: 220) (conceptual truth) (Smith,2004b: 220) (substantive evaluate theory) (2004b: 221) (2004b: 222)

76 (barely true) (2004b: 225) (goodness) (2004b: 225)() (O)O (2004b: 225) (1992: 302)(more general) (more specific)

77 (Smith,2004b:226-7) (2004b: 228) ( ) () (could)(2004b: 228) ( )() (2004b: 228-9) (fix) 31 31 ---/ --- () () ()

78 (2004b: 228-9) (barely true) --- 32 (pick out) ()() (begging question) (Griffin,1992:316-7) (identify with) --- (reality) (Smith,2004b: 223-4) 32 p67.

79 (2004a: 192)(rightness) ( ) (such as to) (pick out)

(pick out)

82 1. 2. ( ) --- --- 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. [] 33(1). (nature of color)(2). 33 p33.

83 (3). S CS C 34 S MS M --- --- (rationalists) (2004c: 253) (2004c)(John Mackie)(John McDowell) (1977) 34 (Crispin Wright) (Wright ,1989:134) (extension-determining) (extension-reflecting) (order-of -determination)------ (Wright ,1989)

84 (Smith,2004c: 234)(error theory)(commitment) (Mackie,1977)(common sense) (McDowell,1998) (McDowell,1998) (secondary quality)(primary quality) (McDowell,1998) ---(rationalism) (2004c: 235) (is)(seems) (platitudes)

85 () --- (phenomenological thesis)--- (Smith,2004c: 235;McDowell,1998: 131-2)(Mackie,1977) (primary quality) (McDowell,1998) (disposition)(perceptual appearance) ()(McDowell,1998: 133) () (internal relation)(Smith,2004c: 235) (McDowell,1998: 136)

86 (secondary) (Smith,2004c: 236) (Smith,2004c: 236) (discovery) (prescriptive) (Smith,2004c: 236) 35 (conceptual claim) (alike) (there to be experienced) (McDowell,1998:136;Smith,2004c: 236) (veridical) () (really)--- 35 ()(1). (2). (to-be-pursuedness) (Micke,1977) (substantive)(conceptual) (1994:64-65) (error theory)

87 36 (Harman,1977)(only if) (satisfying) 37 (explanatory test) 38X (Smith,2004c: 237) 36 (1998) 37 (observation) (1977:6) -- --(really) (1977:6) 38 John Mackie, Problems from Locke(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1976),pp.17-18.

88 (Harman,1977: 22) ---(Harman,1977: 14) (Smith,2004c: 238) (properly apply) --- (dispositions)(Smith,2004c: 238) virtus dormitiva (structural ground)(McDowell,1998: 142) (McDowell,1998: 142) --- (Smith,2004c: 238) ---

89 (Smith,2004c: 238-9) (really) --- (perceptual awareness of properties)(genuinely) (taking)(McDowell,1998: 134) (representational) () (colored objects) (surrogate) (2004c: 239-40) --- (seem to

90 be there) (is)(seems) (is)(Smith,2004c: 240) (dispositional analysis) (Smith,2004c: 240) (material) (2004c: 240) (2004c:241) (1998: 136) ------ (1998: 135) (McDowell,1998: 135) (2004c: 241)

91 (read off) ( ) (2004c: 241) (2004c: 241) --- (platitudes)(conjunction) --- ( ) () (encapsulate)(summarize)(systematize)

92 (idea)(privileged) (Smith,2004c: 242) () (really) (2004c: 243) (genuinely) --- (2004c: 243) --- /(2004c: 243) (Smith,2004c: 244) ((Simon Blackburn) (realist-seeming) ---()

93 (2004c: 244) 39(being red) (being nauseating) --- (as experiences of the nauseating) (Smith,2004c: 245) (out there, on the object)(2004c: 245) (attention) (Smith,2004c: 245) --- ( ) (in here, in my body)(Smith,2004c: 245) 39 (Simon Blackburn)

94 (primitive) (2004c: 245) (platitudes) / (nature) (Smith,2004c: 246) --- --- (Smith,2004c: 246) ---(Smith,2004c: 246) (2004c: 246) ()( )()( )(2004c: 247)

95 (Smith,2004c: 247) (Smith,2004c: 247) --- --- (really) (2004c: 247)

96 (Smith,2004c: 249) (governing) (privileged) (casual contact) (2004c: 248)() (Smith,2004c: 248) ()() (moral perception) (perceptual knowledge) (2004c: 248) (Smith,2004c:248-9) (privileged) (quasi-statistical)(Smith,2004c: 248) ()

97 --- --- --- (2004c: 249) (2004c: 249) (rationalism)(Smith,2004c: 250) () (Mackie,1977: 29) ---

98 ------ (Mackie,1977: 29-30) (moral norms)() (norms of practical reason)(2004c: 250) ppqqp pqModus PonensModus Tollens -(Smith,2004c: 250)40 ---A (desire to)A --- Modus PonensModus Tollens- (Smith,2004c: 250) () (Smith,2004c: 251)/( ) (Smith,2004c: 251) () (common-sense) 40 (Smith,1994: 250)

99 (articulate)(platitudinous)(2004c: 251) 41 (appreciation) (Smith,2004c: 251) ppqq () (2004c: 252) AB ABBA AB AB AB AB (disagreement)(difference) (substantive content)(2004c: 252) A BAB AB(norm) AB AB---AB (Smith,2004c: 252) 41 (Smith,1994: 251)

100 ()/() () --- (fill out) (2004c: 253) (Smith,2004c: 253) ---(2004c: 253) --- ---

101 (2004c:235-4) 42(relativism) (disagreements) (Williams,1985: 156) (conflict) (Williams,1985: 156) (Bernard Williams)(explain away a conflict) (1985: 156-7) (Strict Relational Relativism) (Williams,1985: 156) (compatible structure) 42 (Bernard Williams) (the relativism of distance) --- --- ,

102 (Williams,1985: 156) (Williams,1985: 157) (incommensurability) (1985: 157) AB (Williams,1985: 157-8) (dispositions)(expectations) ()(1985: 158) (1985: 158) (instant relativism)(Williams,1985: 158)

103 (inherent) (S) S S(1985: 159) S S (Williams,1985: 159) (aspiration) (1985: 159) (Williams,1985: 159) (morality of universal toleration)(1985: 159) (Williams,1985: 159-60) (1985:

104 160) (platitudes) (build into) ( )( ) (conjunction) --- (prima facie a priori)43 43 p33-35.

105 --- ( )

106 ()

107 (moral norms)() ppqq ppq A B B AB A AB A AB ABA B BA BC A ppqqppq

108 --- (Mackie) (1977:23) ( moral facts indeed facts about the reasons that we all share.)(1994:13) (agent) () --- ppqqppq p

109 ppqq ppqp

C C (conceptual claim) F C (substantive claim) F C F (conclusion) C () (fact) (

111 ) (1). (2). (3).-( ) --- --- --- ( )C CC ---

112 () (/) () N MNM N=M X --- --- ()

113 ( )XX ---

114 --- / (e.g.)

115 () --- --- --- --- --- p pqqppq ---

116 ( ) ppq qppq --- --- (1). (2).

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