Semiotics Beyond Peirce

Beyond Peirce: The New Science of Semioticsand the Semiotics of Law

Charls Pearson

Published online: 15 August 2008

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract This paper shows how Peirce’s semeiotic could be turned into a

powerful science. The New Science of Semiotics provides not only a new paradigm

and an empirical justification for all these applications, but also a rational and

systematic procedure for carrying them out as well. Thus the New Science of

Semiotics transforms the philosophy of law into the science of legal scholarship, the

discipline that I call jurisology.

Keywords Semiotics � Semeiotic � Peirce’s philosophical principals �Phenomenology � Metaphysics � Taxonomy

Although semiotics received its original spark of life from St. Augustine in the fifth

century C.E., for which he is rightly regarded as the ‘‘father’’ of semiotics, a

moderate beginning of the development of semiotics as a science was not

accomplished until the Scholastic Age [6]. In the Modern Age, the science of

semiotics took a step backwards when Descartes framed modern thought in terms of

images and ideas, both dyadic relations, although Locke [17] continued to mention

semiotics as a goal of study. More recently, many attempts have been made to

establish semiotics as a rigorous science, the best known of which are John of

Poinsot in the sixteenth century, Charles Peirce [35] in the late ninteenth and early

twentieth centuries, Ferdinand de Saussure in the early twentieth century, and

Charles Morris [18] in the mid-twentieth century.

Among all of these beginnings, only that of Peirce [34] was able to work out all

of the logical and philosophical problems required to serve as a strong and solid

foundation for the founding of a rigorous, empirical science. Among the many

problems that Peirce [33] had to solve was the invention of a philosophy, a logic, an

C. Pearson (&)

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Int J Semiot Law (2008) 21:247–296

DOI 10.1007/s11196-008-9063-7

algebra, and a geometry of relations, including those for the triadic relations which

Peirce found to constitute the very heart of semiotics.

But if Peirce’s development [32] is to serve as the foundation of a new science,

there must be something that comes after it—something that goes beyond Peirce and

looks like a genuine science rather than mere philosophical eloquence. What is this

‘‘new science’’ of semiotics? This essay will suggest one possible answer to that

question—one that I refer to as the ‘‘New Science of Semiotics’’.

Peirce called his development ‘‘semeiotic’’ (pronounced seem-eye-OH-tik) after

Locke’s reference [17] to the Scholastic development. Therefore I will refer to it as

the ‘‘Semeiotic Paradigm’’. Over the years, my new science has come to be called

the ‘‘Semiotic Paradigm’’ (pronounced sem-ee-AH-tik), especially within the

environment of the Semiotic Society of America’s Special Interest Group for

Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES). I will therefore use that term to refer to it. The word

‘‘semiotics’’ itself only arose after an accidental mispronunciation by the

anthropologist Margaret Meade.

In order to qualify as a new science of semiotics, any development must satisfy

three conditions. (1) It must extend beyond Peirce in a scientific way. (2) It must

satisfy all of the conditions for any scientific paradigm, as first discovered by Kuhn

[16] but later extended by SIG/ES. And finally, it must be able to solve genuine

semiotic problems of genuine interest to both semioticians and semioticists and to

suggest fruitful new problems and approaches to solving problems. This essay will

suggest that the Semiotic Paradigm satisfies all three conditions and thus provides

such a ‘‘New Science of Semiotics’’. I will start with the first condition.

1 Beyond What: Characterizing Sciences

Like all things Peircean, ‘‘beyond’’ is a relative term. In WHAT1 way is WHAT2

beyond Peirce’s WHAT3. Since my goal is to compare the Semiotic Paradigm of the

science of semiotics to Peirce’s Semeiotic Paradigm of the science of semiotics, the

question reduces to asking in what ways may sciences be characterized. I thus ask,

‘‘In what ways is my Semiotic Paradigm beyond Peirce’s Semeiotic Paradigm?’’.

1.1 Taxonomy

The first characteristic of a science that I want to discuss is how it identifies,

distinguishes, and classifies its objects of concern. The study of such problems is

called ‘‘taxonomy’’. The one characteristic shared by every science is that it must

adopt some taxonomic system. Before doing that, scholars can only mumble

unscientifically (at best) and superstitiously (at worst) about their topic of concern.

In the case of alchemy, such mumbles were called ‘‘magical incantations’’.

Alchemy only learned slowly over the centuries how to identify and distinguish the

chemical elements as it gradually transformed itself into the science of chemistry.

All sciences start in this pre-scientific stage and gradually evolve by trial and error

into what may be called a ‘‘taxonomic science’’. We will shortly learn that semiotics,

like botany and zoology, remained in this taxonomic stage until just recently.

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Aristotle attempted to develop methods of aiding this effort with his logic of

definition. The result of using Aristotle’s method of definition was to develop a

taxonomy. In the study of signs, many scholars wrestled with definitions for their

various categories of signs as the taxonomy of semiotics gradually ebbed and flowed

in its nearly fifteen hundred years of development.1

St. Augustine was the first to see the need for a science of signs and to attempt to

define the important kinds of signs. He is thus considered the father of semiotics.

But the names of other scholars attempting to develop the semiotic taxonomy

include, but are not limited to, Albertus Magnus, Petrus Hispanus, Duns Scotus,

William of Occam, John Poinsot, John Locke, Charles Peirce, and Charles Morris.

However, it was Charles Peirce, with his discovery of the nature of triadic

relations and the triadic nature of all signs that was the first to achieve a completely

satisfactory and consistent taxonomy with his science of semeiotic. But Peirce, with

his discovery of the three metaphysical categories (see Hausman—this issue) and

his all consuming interest in logic, failed to see any potential for semiotics beyond

the taxonomic science needed to understand logic. In fact, Peirce died believing that

logic and semiotics were coextensive. It was the great ambassador, Charles Morris

[18], who foresaw more of the universal possibility and potential for the science of

semiotics.

1.2 Teleology

A second characteristic that distinguishes sciences is their use of the concept of

goals, purposes, or ends. Aristotle [1] distinguished these as the ‘‘final’’ of his four

causes and determined that science has no place for these ‘‘teleological’’2

explanations. Aristotle’s banishment of teleology from science worked wonderfully

well for millenniums while scholars concentrated on the dyadic, or physical,

sciences.

But once scientists began to examine the human, or social and behavioral,

sciences, teleology seemed to creep back into each one [3, 7]. It was Peirce who

formally reintroduced teleology back into science, saying that teleology is always a

required concept in every one of the triadic sciences but is never allowed in any of

the dyadic sciences. In fact, teleology is one of the distinguishing differences

between dyadic and triadic relations.

1.3 Triadic

Another distinguishing characteristic for sciences refers to the kind of relations that

they use to model reality. Experience has proven that all concepts in all of the

physical sciences can be modeled mathematically by dyadic, or two places,

relations. Although Peirce stated this initially, Faraday phrased it scientifically by

saying that all physical phenomena must be modeled in terms of field theory. Later,

Einstein refined this by saying that everything in all of the physical sciences can be

1 Roughly 400 CE (St. Augustine) to 1900 CE (Peirce).2 From the Greek word for ‘‘final’’.

The New Science of Semiotics and the Semiotics of Law 249

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modeled by covariant tensors. On the other hand, it was Peirce who also discovered

that all of the semiotic sciences require at least some triadic, or three place,

relations.

Peirce’s semeiotic paradigm brilliantly introduced triadic relations and teleology

into his taxonomic science, but it still remained in the taxonomic stage nevertheless.

2 Beyond Taxonomy

The teleological and triadic properties are required to characterize any stage of

semiotics. They are part of what it means to be a sign. Only the taxonomic property

characterizes a particular stage3 of any science. Are there any characteristics beyond

the taxonomic science? Of course, the modern philosophy of science gives a

resounding answer of ‘‘Yes’’ to this question. As Colapietro says (this issue):

The value of Peirce’s theory of signs resides primarily not in providing us with

a formal classification of signs, but in sketching in the most painstaking detail

a heuristic framework for instituting and developing an empirical investigation

of sign processes in their myriad forms…Formal classifications are, unques-

tionably, important; but they are valuable as tools of inquiry.

For purposes of inquiry, nomothetic sciences go beyond classification in search

of invariances. A mere taxonomy becomes less important than the search for general

laws. Peirce, himself, noted this distinction when he referred to it as the qualitative

sciences vs. the quantitative sciences. In a manuscript that was unpublished in

Peirce’s lifetime, he says: ‘‘…every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative

stage;’’ (MS 909: Chapter 1). The concepts of observation, measurement, and

mathematics are introduced in this stage. Peirce’s General Law of Mind [32] was an

initial attempt to develop a law of semiotics although this was not his motivation

and he never interpreted this as an extension of his semeiotic beyond the taxonomic

stage. Nomothetic sciences place a heavy reliance on inductive and deductive

reasoning that is absent in mere taxonomic sciences.

Abductive–subductive sciences are erroneously called hypothetico-deductive

sciences. What nominalistic scholars refer to as hypotheses are usually instances of

abductive reasoning, first studied and explained by Peirce [32, 33]; and their so-

called deduction (reasoning from interpreted generals to interpreted individuals) is

really instances of subduction (reasoning from interpreted abstract theories to

interpreted generals). But however they are called, it is obvious that abductive–

subductive sciences go beyond nomothetic sciences in search of principled

explanations. Even though the search for laws remains important, the development

of abstract theories to explain these laws also becomes important. Abductive–

subductive sciences are best described as promoting the invention of abstract theory,

with principled explanation following by subduction from theory.

Although Peirce developed many abstract concepts and an occasional snippet of

theory, he claimed never to have had the time to develop a complete and systematic

3 The first scientific stage.

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theory to explain his science of semeiotic. I like to think of my New Science of

Semiotics as what Peirce would have done, had he had the time to develop it—that

is, if Peirce had been a farmer instead of a backwoodsman, and had had the time to

plough his own fields.

To summarize the last two sections, I will use the history of chemistry as an

example. Table 1 outlines the historical stages of chemistry. The first column shows

the historical stage of progression. The second column shows the scientific stage as

discussed above. The last column gives an example when chemistry was in that

stage.

3 The New Science of Semiotics

In the ‘‘New Science of Semiotics’’, the Semiotic Paradigm replaces the Semeiotic

Paradigm of the ‘‘Old Science’’ by replacing Peirce’s metaphysical categorization

scheme and taxonomy4 with a new empirical categorization scheme and taxonomy.5

The Semiotic Paradigm is the result of a 10-year campaign by the Semiotic Society

of America’s Special Interest Group for Empirical Semiotics (SIG/ES) to find a way

to replace the honorific use of the word ‘‘science’’ in the phrase ‘‘science of

semiotics’’ with meaningful science by extending semiotics beyond the taxonomic

stage. During this time, many paradigms competed but only the Semiotic Paradigm

survived [30].

4 The Semiotic Paradigm

The Semiotic Paradigm is a complete scientific paradigm in Kuhn’s sense [16] with

all six required subparadigms in the SIG/ES sense [26]. These include a language,

terminology, and philosophy subparadigm called the language of ‘‘Menetics’’; an

observational subparadigm called ‘‘experimental semiotics’’, a descriptive and

invariance subparadigm called ‘‘nomothetic semiotics’’, an explanatory and

theoretical subparadigm called ‘‘theoretical semiotics’’, a mathematical subpara-

digm called ‘‘mathematical semiotics’’, and an applications subparadigm called

‘‘applied semiotics’’.

Table 1 History of chemistry# Stage Characterized by

1. Initial Alchemy

2. Taxonomic Knowledge of the elements

3. Nomothetic Mendeleev’s Periodic Table

4. Abductive/subductive Bohr’s atomic theory

4 Still using Peirce’s categorization schema, however.5 To be discussed in Sect. 4.4.2.


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4.1 The Language of Menetics

Our first subparadigm is the Philosophy, Language, and Terminology subparadigm,

but it probably would be more appropriate to call it the Ogden and Richards

subparadigm since it is their famous book, The Meaning of Meaning [20], that first

brought the necessity of developing a special philosophy, language, and termino-

logy for the scientific study of meaning to the world’s attention. But, in point of

historical fact, it is called ‘‘Menetics’’, for the language of meaning [21].

4.1.1 A Special Terminology

The language of Menetics contains a special vocabulary designed by means of a

computer science methodology used for designing computer languages. It contains a

special terminology for studying information, meaning, and communication

phenomena. Specifications for this terminology were chosen using the procedure

suggested by Ogden and Richards in their important book, The Meaning of Meaning[20]. It also is designed in such a way as to satisfy all three of Chomsky’s

requirements for the design of any scientific language. For example, the language

can be used to discover and describe an invariance in the nature of the empirical

reality of all concepts as discussed next.

4.1.2 The Empirical Reality of Concepts

4.1.2.1 Introduction One overriding question in the philosophy of semiotics

concerns the reality of concepts. Peirce [32–34] asked how a concept, proposition,

or argument could achieve empirical reality and in another place suggested that the

Cartesian single-chain mode of deductive reasoning, used by modern logic for

system building, be replaced by the multi-filament-cable mode of ampliative

reasoning, used by his postmodern logic for scientific inquiry. This was all the hint

that Wendell Garner, a mid-twentieth century psychologist, needed in order to

develop a concept of ‘operational convergence’ [12], which explained the empirical

reality of operational scientific concepts. However, this still leaves unanswered the

status of such important concepts as facts, laws, and theories. The language of

Menetics allows Garner’s approach to be completely generalized giving a

satisfactory answer for the empirical reality of all signs.

4.1.2.2 Empirical Convergence A proposed fact that is justified by a single

observation is nothing but an ad-hoc eduction from a concrete singular to a specific

individual—nothing but a convenient shorthand for recording the data from that one

observation. But a single fact that records and summarizes the data from many

different observations, all made from an infinite population of possible observations,

and each made objectively and fairly on different individuals chosen by random

sampling from the entire population using experimental design theory, gains more

empirical reality with each new observation that justifies it. This gain in empirical

reality is called ‘‘eductive phematic convergence’’. We say that the collection of

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observations converges to the empirical reality of the fact. Thus, eductive phematic

convergence means that one fact converges to the recording and summarization of

the data from many different observations. The resulting fact is a proposition with a

concrete singular denotation.

A proposed law that is justified by a single fact or single kind of experiment is

nothing but an ad-hoc induction from a concrete singular to a hypothetical

general—nothing but a convenient shorthand for describing that one fact or the

results of that one kind of experiment. But a single law that describes many

different facts or the results of many different experimental paradigms all

observed from an infinite population of possible facts or paradigms gains more

empirical reality with each new fact or kind of experiment that requires it. This

gain in empirical reality is called ‘‘inductive phematic convergence’’. We say that

the collection of facts or experimental paradigms converges to the empirical

reality of the law. Thus, inductive phematic convergence means that one law

converges to a description of many facts or the results of many different

experimental paradigms. The resulting law is a proposition with a concrete general

connotation.

A proposed theory that is justified by a single law is nothing but an ad-hoc

abduction from a concrete general to a hypothetical abstraction—nothing but a

convenient shorthand for remembering that one law. But a single theory that

explains many different laws, all derived from an infinite population of possible

descriptions of independent phenomena, gains more empirical reality with each

new law that enters into its network of explanation. This gain in empirical reality

is called ‘‘abductive dolemic convergence’’. We say that the collection of laws

converges to the empirical reality of the theory. Thus, abductive dolemic

convergence means that one theory converges to an explanation of many

different laws. The resulting theory is an argument with an abstract singular

pronotation.

The above explication has been sketched out for propositions, or signs with

phematic structure. It could equally well have been done for terms, or signs with

rhematic structure, and for arguments, or signs with dolemic structure. Thus, we

have a two-dimensional, nine-way classification of empirical convergence as shown

in Table 2. This makes it clear that Garner’s concept of operational convergence is

just my inductive rhematic convergence. Nevertheless, Garner, who followed a line

of reasoning initiated by Peirce, provided the necessary motivation for the above

explication.

Table 2 Forms of empirical

convergenceConvergence Rhematic Phematic Dolemic

Eductive Eductive

Rhematic

Eductive

Phematic

Eductive

Dolemic

Inductive Inductive

Rhematic

Inductive

Phematic

Inductive

Dolemic

Abductive Abductive

Rhematic

Abductive

Phematic

Abductive

Dolemic


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4.1.2.3 Garner’s Explication Wendell Garner was one of the earliest psycholo-

gists to apply Shannon’s concept of variation measures in modal statistics

(‘‘information’’—so called) to problems of perception and other areas of experi-

mental psychology [10, 11, 13, 22]. Although he came to use Shannon’s quantitative

measure of information less and less in later years, the basic idea of information

structure led him to develop several interesting semiotic concepts, such as the

concept of dimensional integrality, and the concept of energic vs. informational

properties [22]. In applying his basic methodology of ‘‘Critical Realism’’,6 he had to

ask himself how his concepts could achieve empirical reality, and in doing so, he

explicated his concept of ‘operational convergence’ [10, 12, 13, 22].

Garner gave as an example several of his own concepts. But one that will be

more easily understood by present readers, is that of the many experiments

involving, and the many different ways of observing and measuring, the

observational temperature, all of which converge to essentially the same result

and play the same role in the laws of thermodynamics, thus giving to the concept of

‘temperature’ an empirical reality.

One method of achieving convergence is to show that the results of two or more

experiments based on two or more independent observational techniques are

correlated. Garner claims that such corelational techniques provide a form of

convergence themselves [12, p. 188]. This process of establishing the existence and

nature of a concept based on psychosemiotic and sociosemiotic research and then

seeking the semiotic basis for the concept is the very heart of the experimental

research I have reported on over the last 35 years. It is, in fact, the very heart of my

Paradigm Inversion Principle and its Semiotic Reinterpretation corollary (1981).

See Sect. 4.2.

Since it is convergence, rather than the precision of a single technique, that

provides the empirical meaning of a concept, we should be free to use techniques of

reasoning that are not as precise and reliable as we might otherwise prefer. As

Garner says, ‘‘The ultimate validity of a concept does not depend on any single

procedure, but on a convergent result, so the importance of any one procedure is

greatly diminished.’’ [12, p. 188].7

4.1.2.4 Summary of the General Concept of Convergence Four things have

become obvious from performing this systematic analysis of the source of empirical

reality for all concepts. First, concepts with empirical reality fit together

systematically into a diagrammatic system very similar to the ampliative half of

the Ladder of Scientific Reasoning [8, 29]. This is shown in Fig. 1: Empirical

Convergence and Ampliative Reasoning. Eductive convergence may also be called

observational convergence. Inductive convergence may also be called descriptive

convergence, although one particular form of it, inductive phematic convergence,

was called operational convergence by Garner [12]. And abductive convergence

may also be called explanatory convergence.

6 Ironically, this is the same name that Peirce gave to his own philosophy.7 Cf. Peirce’s concept of a multi-filament cable and his convergence concepts of truth and reality.

254 C. Pearson

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Second, the diagrammatic system of Fig. 1 may be factored into the product of

two vectors. One vector along the semantic dimension refers to the nature of

ampliative reasoning: eduction, induction, and abduction. Let us call it S; for

semantic, so that

S ¼ hEduction, Induction, AbductioniThe other vector lies along the pragmatic dimension and refers to the

grammatical complexity of the scientific sign. Let us call it G; for pragmatic, so that

G ¼ hRheme, Pheme, Dolemei:

Then the convergence of ðST � GÞ gives the 3 by 3 matrix that abstracts Table 2 and

yields back all of Fig. 1. Thus, we can see that all concepts are composed of two,

more elementary, semiotic concepts; one involving pragmatic complexity and lying

along the pragmatic dimension, while the other involves the nature of ampliative

reasoning required to give empirical reality to the concept, and lying along the

semantic dimension. As is inherent in semiotic structure, each vector consists of

exactly three components and each is also in exactly the order dictated by the

‘‘universal sign structure theory’’ [21, 24–27].

Third, all concepts in Table 2 involve finite sampling from an infinite population.

Can this statistical process be restricted to either S or G; and which one, or must it

involve both? I think it is clear that the sampling process is a function of only the

kind of reasoning involved in developing the empirical reality of the concept and is

independent of the pragmatic complexity. This is easiest to see in connection with

the inductive modes of reality convergence. Whether it is inductive rhematic

convergence (Garner’s operational convergence), inductive phematic convergence

(classical Theophrastian induction), or inductive dolemic convergence (my

descriptive convergence), the explication of the concepts above should have made

it clear that the nature of the finite sampling from an infinite population remains the

same.

Index

Abductive

Inductive

Convergence

Eductive Convergence

Convergence

Icon

Index

Symbol

Fig. 1 Empirical convergence and ampliative reasoning


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In the case of the abductive modes of reality convergence, this is a little more

difficult to see, because of the questions of network cohesion and inheritance from

the primary convergence concept (that of abductive dolemic convergence to a

theory), but not very much more. In the abductive process, the investigator

considers a finite sample from an infinite population of laws to abduce one

abstract explanatory theory. The principles and other propositions of the theory

and the terms and other rhematic concepts of the theory then inherit their

empirical reality from their cohesiveness in the theory and the empirical reality of

the theory itself.

I think this may be most difficult to see in the case of the eductive modes of

reasoning. This is because traditionally, logicians and philosophers have been

conditioned to thinking of eduction as did Aristotle: as reasoning from one

individual to another. Instead, we must reason from the infinite population of

concrete singulars, the distributed collection that results from applying deduction to

every one of the undistributed members of the concrete general. We extract a finite

sample on this infinite population using the Peircean methodology8 and reason to an

observation, fact, or procedure.

Thus we can now see that all forms of ampliative reasoning require finite

sampling from an infinite population, and that this is represented within the

semantic vector S: It also follows that all scientific concepts involve ampliative

reasoning.

Fourth and last, all concepts involve the asymptotic approach of an infinite

possibility of vague proposals to a more or less precise fixed limit concept as the

appropriate sample size increases,9 i.e., as our confidence in the knowledge of the

sampling process and the nature of the infinite population increases. This is

consistent with Peirce’s asymptotic concept of truth and its twin concept of reality,

which breaches the distinction between correspondence theories of truth and reality

and cohesive theories of truth and reality.

4.2 The Observation Subparadigm

Our second scientific subparadigm concerns observation, measurement, and

experiment. This section introduces a discussion of this topic that results in the

development of a semiotically oriented understanding of semiotic observation,

measurement, instrument, experiment, evidence, and data.

All of the objects of the physical sciences are tangible. We can grasp billiard

balls and hold them in our hands. The only thing that prevents us from grasping,

touching, and holding planets in our hands is size and distance. We could do so if

we were bigger and they were closer. On the other hand, all of the objects of the

semiotic sciences are intangible. We cannot grasp, touch, or hold in our hand a

logical form, a legal interpretation, or the meaning of a word. For this reason, they

are called ephemeral, or esoteric.

8 Combining random selection with the appropriate experimental design.9 As small as one in the case of a good guess at a theory.

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We can easily observe and measure the tangible objects of the physical sciences.

It is much harder to measure the ephemeral objects of the semiotic sciences. But it

can be done. This section is about observing and measuring these ephemeral,

esoteric intangibles of the semiotic sciences.

4.2.1 Principles of Observational and Experimental Semiotics

Five powerful principles have been found useful for designing instruments,

experiments, and observations in semiotics. The first is the ‘‘principle of semiotic

reinterpretation’’, a generalization of an earlier principle enunciated for the physical

sciences by Albert Einstein. The second is the ‘‘principle of paradigm inversion’’, a

corollary of the first. The third one is the ‘‘principle of interdisciplinary translation’’,

an application of the first two. Finally we have two principles that have always

proven useful in all of the sciences: the ‘‘principle of gedanken experiments’’ and

the ‘‘principle of logical extremes’’.

4.2.1.1 The Principle of Semiotic Reinterpretation The principle of semiotic

reinterpretation states that all USEFUL information measures can be reinterpretedas a natural law describing a regularity between a semiotic measure and anothermeasure in any discipline. This can thus be seen as a rule for interdisciplinary

translation.10

A more restricted version of this rule was stated by Einstein in such a way that it

held only for the physical sciences. The statement here holds for all semiotic

sciences in general.

4.2.1.2 The Principle of Paradigm Inversion The ‘‘principle of paradigm

inversion’’ may be summarized as follows:

Every single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences, in each ofthe information sciences, and in each of the semiotic sciences, can be inverted tosupply an experimental paradigm which may be developed for Semiotics.

It is also interesting to note in passing that the ‘‘principle of paradigm inversion’’

is a corollary of the ‘‘principle of semiotic reinterpretation’’ but it is beyond the

scope of this essay to go into this relationship here. Again, like the ‘‘principle of

semiotic reinterpretation’’, this is a rule for interdisciplinary translation.

The ‘‘paradigm inversion principle’’ also enables us to distinguish between

semiotics and each of the cognitive, information, or semiotic sciences. For instance,

psychology uses known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of

behavior, whereas semiotics uses the known structure of behavior as a probe to

investigate the structure of signs [30]. As another example of an application of the

‘‘paradigm inversion principle’’ to distinguish between disciplines, logic uses

known properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of reasoning,

whereas semiotics uses the known structure of reasoning as a probe to investigate

the structure of signs. And as my final example: legal studies uses the known

properties of signs as a probe to investigate the structure of the Law, whereas

10 See Pearson [24].


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semiotics uses the known structure of the Law as a probe to investigate the structure

of signs.

The ‘‘paradigm inversion principle’’ was explicated in Pearson [23] and further

refined in Pearson [24]. However, its interdisciplinary aspects have never been fully

analyzed before. We will therefore take up this task in Sect. 4.2.2.2.

4.2.1.3 Translation Rules for Interdisciplinarity in Experimental Semiotics The

‘‘principle of interdisciplinary translation’’ simply provides the translation rules for

interdisciplinarity in experimental semiotics. Most of what I am going to say in this

section has already been said in other places. However, by bringing it all together

into one context and focusing on interdisciplinary translation, a new unity emerges.

4.2.1.4 Gedanken Experiment (a la Carnap) The method of ‘‘Gedanken exper-

iment’’ was popularized by Einstein who used the term to mean an experiment that

could be carried out completely by merely thinking it through without resort to any

actual laboratory apparatus and whose result was so clear that it settled some

outstanding question, thus the term ‘‘Gedanken’’, the German word for ‘‘thought’’.

However, Carnap [4] adopted the method and used it extensively to show how to

conduct experiments in logic and other semiotic sciences.

4.2.1.5 Method of Logical Extremes The method of logical extremes is a form of

Gedanken experiment that has always been used to check the soundness of an

observation or result. By carrying a preliminary conclusion to its logical extreme

and comparing the result to common sense one can check on its original soundness.

Peirce warns that this kind of speculative thought is a risky mode of inquiry

because it is susceptible to the vagaries of you and me, but it is still essential. He

explains, ‘‘Nothing is more unwise than to carry an idea to extreme lengths, yet in

speculative thought, it is the greatest of locomotives for advancing upon the road to

truth. Indeed it is the extreme cases which alone teach you anything new’’ [34, p.

193].

4.2.2 A Close Relation Between Interdisciplinarity, Observation, and Measurement

We find that there are many forms of interdisciplinarity11 and that semiotics

provides a means of interdisciplinary translation satisfying all of them. But, in

addition, the semiotic approach yields a new understanding of interdisciplinarity,

with the concept of measurement playing the key role as the central concept of all

forms of interdisciplinarity. In this respect, the paradigm inversion principle is seen

as the archetypical method of interdisciplinary translation due to its relation to the

notions of measurement and interdisciplinarity.

4.2.2.1 Kinds of Interdisciplinarity In talking of interdisciplinarity, we must

distinguish between different kinds of interdisciplinarity, among which are:

11 I want to acknowledge the inspirational help of Thomas Daddesio who first asked me to analyze

interdisciplinary translation.

258 C. Pearson

123

• Conceptual interdisciplinarity, including the concept of sign and the concept of

information measures;

• Representational interdisciplinarity;

• Linguistic interdisciplinarity;

• Mathematical interdisciplinarity;

• Theoretical interdisciplinarity;

• Methodological interdisciplinarity;

• Analysis of concepts that will reformulate the study of other disciplines;

• Application to semiotics of insights and metaphors drawn from other disciplines; and

• Semiotics can be used to analyze signs that are the proper object of study by

other disciplines.

Conceptual Interdisciplinarity: There are several concepts that cut across many

disciplines. First and foremost among these is the concept of ‘sign’ that cuts across

all of the semiotic sciences. The ‘‘Semiotic Paradigm’’ is a Kuhnian [16] scientific

paradigm that specifically addresses the interdisciplinarity of sign phenomena.

Another concept that cuts across all of the semiotic sciences is that of information

measures. The ‘‘principle of semiotic reinterpretation’’ is an interdisciplinary

solution to this problem.

Representational Interdisciplinarity: Representation is an interdisciplinary prob-

lem that cuts across all the sciences of second intention (the Cognitive Sciences, the

Informational Sciences, and the Semiotic Sciences). This problem and its

interdisciplinary nature were discussed at length in Pearson [27].

Linguistic Interdisciplinarity: Most talk about language, information, and

meaning in any appropriate setting is non-testable and limited to a very narrow

range of topics. The language of Menetics was created in a deliberate attempt to

design a language that was adequate in all three of Chomsky’s senses that could

create linguistic interdisciplinarity by translating in an empirically testable manner

between all of the disciplines that talk about language, logic, information, meaning,

and communication. The language of Menetics was developed in Pearson [21] and

discussed at length in Pearson [26].

Mathematical Interdisciplinarity: The mathematical structure of information,

communication, and meaning is a universal problem across all of the semiotic

sciences and one that mathematical semiotics addresses. The mathematics of triadic

relations was developed by Peirce and discussed in Pearson [26] as a means of

satisfying the formal needs of interdisciplinary research.

Theoretical Interdisciplinarity: The theoretical components of the Semiotic

Paradigm, the USST and the TOS, discuss the theoretical relations between

semiotics and the various semiotic sciences and this gives us a reason for desiring

interdisciplinary translation of theory [26].

Methodological Interdisciplinarity: Many experimental methods can be applied,

after suitable translation, across several discipline boundaries, giving rise to a

concept of methodological interdisciplinarity. The ‘‘paradigm inversion principle’’

is an interdisciplinary methodological principle that unifies the method of

translating methodology between disciplines. The paradigm inversion principle

was introduced in Pearson [24, 25, 39]. The basis for using this sense of


123

methodological interdisciplinarity as a means for deepening our understanding of

interdisciplinarity is the thesis of the present section.

Interdisciplinarity due to the Reformulation of Other Disciplines: Finally,

Semiotics can analyze concepts that will reformulate the study of other disciplines.

This will not only aid the development of the other semiotic sciences, it will also help

to develop a systematic methodology for interdisciplinary translation. Semiotics can

use insights and metaphors drawn from other disciplines. This will not only aid the

development of semiotics, but also further aid in the development of a systematic

methodology of interdisciplinary translation. Sign theory can be used to analyze

systems of signs that are the proper object of study by other disciplines. Such was the

meaning of Garner’s plea to study the structure of the psychological stimulus [12].

4.2.2.2 Details of the Principle of Paradigm Inversion Many of the sciences

related to semiotics are much more mature as sciences than the parent discipline

itself and this is especially the case with the cognitive sciences. Examples are

experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, perceptual psychology, computer

science, linguistics, etc. This claim of maturity is simply a claim that they have

developed a more advanced empirical methodology than has semiotics, including an

inventory of experimental paradigms.

Is there any way that semiotics can avail itself of this ‘reservoir’ of experimental

paradigms in the cognitive sciences? The answer is a resounding yes. The process is

called inverting the paradigm or ‘‘turning the sock inside out’’. It allows semiotics to

adopt every single experimental paradigm in each of the cognitive sciences. The

procedure is best understood by noting the role that interdisciplinary translation

played in the growth of empirical methodology over the history of scientific

development. In field after field we see instance after instance where a controlled

but unmeasurable unit or process in one field led to the discovery of a general result

in a distinct but related field. This general result was in turn then inverted and used

as the means of measuring the originally unmeasurable unit or process.

This process has been repeated many times in the history of science. It is a

process that is completely generalizable and holds between semiotics and all of its

related sciences. In fact, semiotics is the common ground between all the semiotic

sciences, and it is only by taking the semiotic point of view for each of them that

their unity can be understood, and their methodology and knowledge become

interadaptable. Thus, we have Fig. 2.

The statement that humans are too subjective, or too variable, to use as

measurement standards just does not hold up. The use of a fixed panel of subjects as

a measurement standard is no more variable than the use of a bar of only one length

as a length standard and is just as complete. We get entirely different concepts of

temperature (not just different units) if we change our standard thermometer from

alcohol to water, and mercury gives yet another. It took almost two centuries of

experimentation to arrive at the theory which incorporated the abstract conception

of temperature involving ideal gasses. It will also take many experiments before we

arrive at the proper idealizations to replace concrete subjects in semiotics but, in the

meantime, experimentation and measurement are both possible and necessary, and

the ‘‘principle of paradigm inversion’’ allows us to proceed with our work.

260 C. Pearson

123

4.2.2.3 Summary Several of the principles previously enunciated as guides for

empirical research in semiotics are in essence translation rules for bringing

interdisciplinarity to bear on experimental problems in semiotics [2].

In Subsect. 4.2.2.1, we examined nine different kinds of interdisciplinarity and

found that semiotics cuts across all of them and that the Semiotic Paradigm, a

scientific paradigm in the Kuhnian [16] sense, for the whole field of semiotics, has

already provided means for handling each of these senses of interdisciplinarity. The

examination further showed that the Paradigm Inversion Principle, which generates

the experimental component of the Semiotic Paradigm, was at the core of each of

these concepts of interdisciplinarity.

We then proceeded to examine the Paradigm Inversion Principle in Sub-

sect. 4.2.2.2 and found that, in interdisciplinary translation, the experimental

paradigm, the observation procedures, and the measurement methodology were the

invariant heart of the success of the Principle.

4.2.3 Measurement

In Subsect. 4.2.2, we examined the role of interdisciplinary translation in facilitating

the observation, measurement, and design of semiotic experiments. We found that

this was due to the fact that the concept of measurement itself played an important

role in our understanding of interdisciplinary translation. In this subsection we

examine the concept of measurement in greater depth.

Those of us who grew up as working scientists have an intuitive understanding of

measurements and instruments. When faced with a practical problem of measure-

ment, we can perform it adequately, or invent an instrument to do so. However,

when pressed to abstract from the concrete context of the lab and explain the nature

of measurement and instruments in general, most of us would probably be perplexed

by the question. However, it has a direct bearing on many of the problems faced by

semiotics today. This subsection addresses the question of the abstract nature of

measurement and instruments in general.

Fittingly enough for a tool that is to be applied in empirical semiotics, the

question is treated from a semiotic standpoint. The phenomenon to be measured is

Semiotics/ Information

Science

Computer Science

Esthetics

Economics

Ethics

Sociology

Theology

Psychology

Linguistics

Fig. 2 The interdependence of the semiotic sciences


123

treated as a message of nature and the measurement itself is treated as a translation

process that adds indexical, iconic, and symbolic structure to that message in an

operationally specified way. Using this analysis, physical and semiotic measure-

ments have the same structure, and physical and semiotic instruments have the same

structure [15]. Knowledge of this structure is useful for comparing the nature of

semiotic experiments with the nature of physical experiments, and, in passing,

shows that semiotic experiments are possible and epistemologically valid. This also

legitimizes and explains semiotic evidence and semiotic data.

4.2.3.1 The Measurement Process Measurement theory tells us that measurement

is a means of determining the magnitude of some aspect of an individual object by

operationally specifying one member of a set of names to the object in such a way

that some structure among the set of names is algebraically homomorphic to some

structure of the set of all objects of a particular kind that includes the object being

measured. The set of names is usually chosen from some number system.

However, this measurement theory definition does not tell us anything about the

structure of the operational specification, the real heart of the measurement. In

particular, we would like to know enough about this structure to determine if

semiotic measurement is possible, the nature of semiotic evidence, the nature of

semiotic data, whether a semiotic experiment is possible, and whether there can be

such a thing as a semiotic instrument. Also, if such things are possible, we would

like to compare semiotic measurements to physical measurements, semiotic

instruments to physical instruments, and semiotic experiments to physical

experiments.

The definition I have chosen to explicate is that a measurement selects a

particular message of nature and:

• Translates this into an index by means of a transducer function which uses an

operationally specified procedure;

• Translates the index into an icon (or equivalently—adds iconic structure to the

index) by means of an interpretation-function which uses an operationally

specified procedure to employ either a physical linkage or an observer/device

interaction; and finally;

• Translates the icon into a symbol by means of a scale function which uses an

operationally specified procedure to add symbolic structure to the icon. The

symbol is the measurement and must preserve the original structure of interest

by means of a homomorphic mapping.

If a sign process can perform these three functions, then it will accomplish

everything that we understand by the term ‘‘measurement’’.

4.2.4 Instruments

If measurements are messages of nature, then instruments are the communication

devices that give us access to those messages. Instruments, in conjunction with the

experimental paradigm, select one message of nature and measure that message.

They provide access to read and record the measurement in symbolic form.

262 C. Pearson

123

Since there are a set of appropriateness conditions at each semiotic interface, the

form of the instrument must match the form of the message, and the design of the

instrument must satisfy all appropriateness conditions.

The instrument provides for the physical or semiotic transducer, as appropriate,

the interpretation stage, and the scale; and it assures the satisfaction of the

appropriateness condition at each interface.

4.2.5 Summary

The important questions to be answered in this summary are four: what are semiotic

(1) measurements, (2) instruments, (3) experiments, and (4) data; and a subsidiary

result is: how do they compare and differ from their physical counterparts.

4.2.5.1 Semiotic Measurements In Sect. 4.2.3.1 we saw the structure of a

measurement. In addition, teleology is important in measurement because of the

presence of a true third. In a semiotic measurement, the interpretation function is an

observer/device interaction which partakes of a true third in adding iconic structure

to the message of nature. The measurement icon is the interpretant of the observer/

device interaction and the observer becomes part of the measurement process.

Because the measurement involves a true third and the observer becomes part of the

interpretation process the observer’s goals, motivations, aims, purposes, etc. all

become part of that interpretation. Hence, observer training becomes critical for

accurate and reliable semiotic measurements. In semiotic measurements, teleology

becomes part of the measurement process and good measurement methodology

must take this into account.

Finally, with these caveats in place we can see that semiotic measurements are

certainly possible and that many semioticists have already been making them for

many years. We also see that semiotic measurements are the same as physical

measurements, with two exceptions. In semiotics, the objects of measurements are

regarded as signs while physics regards them as physical objects. This is a nominal

difference only. In either case, the messages of nature which these objects or

signs—they are the same thing—generate are called the texts of nature. However, a

more important difference between semiotic measurements and physical measure-

ments lies in the interpretation function which requires a true interpretive interaction

with the observer in semiotic measurements. Thus the observer becomes part of the

measurement process itself in semiotic measurements and the measurement itself

becomes a true third, or semiotic process. This can raise all kinds of teleological

problems if not controlled in the design of the measurement process; but these

problems can be controlled and reliable semiotic measurements made, as evidenced

in the theory of instruction used to instruct subjects in all contemporary experiments

in cognitive psychology. Thus the critical difference between physical and semiotic

measurement is not ontological, but epistemological.

4.2.5.2 Semiotic Instruments In Subsect. 4.2.4, we saw that the notion of an

instrument could be generalized in such a way that semiotic and physical


123

instruments have the same conceptual structure with the one difference being that

semiotic instruments are designed to facilitate the observer/device interaction which

constitutes the interpretation linkage of the measurement process. There are thus

some additional technological considerations in the design of semiotic instrumen-

tation, but otherwise business is pretty much the same as usual between physical and

semiotic instruments. Many psychological instruments are semiotic instruments,

such as the IQ Test, to name a notorious one, or familiarity of words as measured in

cognitive psychology. The eidometer is a semiotic instrument that has been in use

for many years.

4.2.5.3 Semiotic Experiments In this section, we saw that the generalization in the

measurement and instrument concepts that allowed for semiotic measurements and

instruments required us to distinguish the experimenter from the observer in

analyzing the structure of an experiment. Here, too, we found the structure of both

physical and semiotic experiments to be encompassed by the same generalized

concept of an experiment. This concept, by the way, may be useful to physicists as

well, as they wrestle with concepts of observability in fundamental particle physics.

Not only are semiotic experiments possible but semioticists have been doing them

for years. The one major difference between semiotic experiments and physical

experiments lies in physics’ ability to use the experimenter as the observer and

eliminate any considerations on the design of the observer set, while semiotics must

not use the experimenter as an observer, and much care must be employed in the

design of the observer set to facilitate control and analysis of teleological factors.

4.2.5.4 Semiotic Data We have seen throughout this analysis that data is merely

the permanent recording of the measurement symbol and hence not only is semiotic

data possible and meaningful, but there is absolutely no difference between semiotic

data and physical data. The differences lie in the nature of measurements and

instruments.

4.2.5.5 Future Problems for Empirical Semiotics This section showed us the

importance of teleology in the conduct of semiotic experiments. It may very well

become necessary to develop a technology of teleology, as suggested by John

Dewey, including a theory of teleology in the design of very refined semiotic

instrumentation and experiments. This is currently encompassed in the instruction

and training of the experimental subjects, but this alone may not be enough. In fact,

it may ultimately be necessary to revise our whole understanding of the cause–effect

relation of science.

Also in Sect. 1, it was pointed out that the operational specification of the

observer/device interaction may present us with new problems in triadic logic. In

the meantime we must proceed with the tools we have to develop the classical

empirical interaction between semiotic theory and experimental semiotics,

because—paraphrasing John Tyndall—with accurate experiment and observation

to work upon, imagination becomes the architect of semiotic theory.

264 C. Pearson

123

4.3 Search for Invariants and Discovery of General Laws

Our third scientific subparadigm concerns generalization, the search for invariants,

and the discovery of the laws of semiotics. However, semiotic laws are neither so

simple nor straight forward as physical laws. This is because of the presence of a

true third in the law-like relations of semiotics and their absence in the physical

sciences.

In the last section, I introduced the concept of observation and measurement of

the intangible and ephemeral phenomena of semiotics, the esoteric and living

relations of the triadic sciences. We now switch to trying to make semiotic sense of

these experiments and observations. Can any patterns or structure be found in

semiotic data? Can the observed facts be generalized? Not if some philosophers are

to be believed. These are the ones who say that the introduction of any living being

or any form of mentation into the observations makes them too variable and too

subjective to develop any cognizable patterns. However, this section will give a

strongly affirmative answer to these questions.

4.3.1 Principles of Descriptive Semiotics

The one great principle of descriptive semiotics is induction. However, since the

results of induction are never guaranteed, all results of induction must be tested.

This involves forms of metaphor, deduction, and eduction as well as induction.

Abduction, Subduction, and Theoreduction also play a lesser role in the discovery of

semiotic laws and for this reason their discussion will be delayed until Sect. 4.4.

Laws are arrived at by induction from a set of facts and observations to a general

description that describes both the known facts and observations as well as many

new facts and observations not yet observed. A law has the status of a best working

description that describes the patterns in the data.12

Induction carries us from signs with indexical structure to signs with full iconic

structure. This allows the development of general concepts and their relations.

Generalization is achieved by induction from the observed data to a best working

description of a pattern or invariance in the data.

4.3.2 The Law of Word Interpretation, an Example

Our example of invariant generalization shows the power of semiotic instruments

within the new science of semiotics to increase knowledge and understanding across

all the semiotic sciences.

This example discusses one measurable aspect of signs, generated by semiotic

shape, and a very simple and pervasive regularity which has been found to hold

between it and the interpretability of artificial words. The technical term for this

shape concept is ‘‘eidontic deviance’’, which is a metrological explication of the

strangeness of the shape of a sign.

12 See Sect. 4.1.2. for the concept of empirical convergence of many facts to one law that describes them

all.


123

An instrument, called the ‘‘eidometer’’, was invented in order to quantify an

intuitive relation between eidontic deviance and interpretability suggested by the

work of both Shannon regarding the shape of artificial words and that of Miller,

Bruner, and Postman regarding the interpretability of artificial words. Experimental

analysis of this relation using the eidometer led to a new law of information, called

the ‘‘Law of Word Interpretation.’’ [21, 24, 26] which the author described as an

empirical explication of the Miller–Bruner–Postman (MBP) effect:

E ¼ aþ bS

Finally, in investigating deviations from the ‘‘Law of Word Interpretation’’, a

systematic second order correction term was found that involved an information-

like function that describes a semiotic process of immediate memory, where the fiare the occurrence frequencies of the eight letters composing the shape of the sign

[24].

F ¼ 1=8X8

i¼1

lgfi

The experiments required for isolating this function reached the limits of reliability

and precision of the Mk. IV eidometer. Without precise quantification of the ‘‘Law

of Word Interpretation’’, it would have been impossible to isolate this important

semiotic relationship.

4.4 Explanation by Theory

Our fourth subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm concerns abduction and the

development of semiotic explanations, i.e., semiotic theories; however, this also

requires an understanding of transduction, subduction, and the interpretation of

theories. Theories are developed using Peirce’s method of abductive reasoning

and tested by subductive reasoning back to empirical laws, and once accepted

they are used to explain new or other laws by subductive reasoning back to the

empirically observable world. We take up abduction next and subduction in

Subsect. 4.4.4.

4.4.1 Abduction and Explanation

One of Peirce’s many uses of the term ‘‘abduction’’ was for the invention of abstract

theory to explain the generals of nature and life. Peirce called this ‘‘reasoning to the

best explanation of the phenomena’’. This is the meaning of ‘‘abduction’’ as used in

the Semiotic Paradigm.

Abduction carries us from signs with iconic structure to signs with full symbolic

structure. This allows the development of abstract concepts, principles, theories, and

their relations. Thus theory is arrived at by abduction from a set of known laws to a

set of abstract principles that explain both the known laws and many new laws.

Therefore, theory has the status of a best working hypothesis that explains the

known laws.

266 C. Pearson

123

4.4.2 The Universal Sign Structure Theory—USST

The Universal Sign Structure Theory is the main explanatory tool of the semiotic

paradigm for static structures. The standard version was adopted by SIG/ES in 2000

and is therefore known as the USST-2000. The USST is the static theory of sign

structure for the semiotic paradigm, explaining the static structure of all signs. The

dynamics of sign processes is explained by the ‘‘Theory of Operational Semiotics’’

(TOS), discussed in Subsect. 4.4.3.

In Subsect. 4.4.2.1, I present the details of USST-2000, explaining the Universal

Sign Structure Diagram and deriving some very elementary but important theorems

on sign structure and sign classification that shows the intimate relation between the

Peircean theory of taxonomy and the USST theory of sign structure. Then in

Subsect. 4.4.2.2, I summarize a very few of the results of the USST, going far

beyond the taxonomic science of semeiotic.

4.4.2.1 The USST-2000. Background The USST is an abstract theory whose

purpose is to explain the nature of semiotic laws and to aid in the understanding of

all semiotic reality. It can be developed logically as a result of Peirce’s abduction

process. A sign is an abstraction and hence cannot really exist in the positivistic

sense, but if it did exist, that would explain… (insert here whatever semiotic law,

effect, or phenomena you are trying to explain)…, and then apply the USST to

derive that law, effect, or phenomena. The derivation is the semiotic explanation of

the law, effect, or phenomena.

The USST may be considered a development, or outgrowth, of Peirce’s Theory of

Semeiotic. The reason for this is that throughout our investigations we have had

occasion to use several different taxonomies, or classification schemes, for signs. Of

these, only the classification by Peirce (CP)13 has proved to be satisfactory in every

empirical setting for which a classification was wanted. We therefore ascribe the

Peircean scheme an empirical reality, and would like our theory of sign structure to

explain the applicability and usefulness of the Peircean classification scheme in terms

of the structure of the sign. This is accomplished by the first nine theorems of the theory.

However, the USST goes beyond the Peircean theory in that it provides not only

a taxonomy, but systematic methods of description and explanation as well. In this

theory, language, meaning, information, and information measures are interpreted

as semiotic phenomena and semiotic processes.

Development of the USST The guts of the USST is embodied in the Universal

Sign Structure Diagram, (USSD). The standard version, called the ‘‘USSD-2000’’, is

shown in Fig. 3. The theory is universal in the sense that it displays the structure of

all categories of signs. In order to show how this diagram explains the Peircean

taxonomy, we must first state the following three principles of the theory:

The Representation Principle: A sign must consist of a real triadic relation thatsignifies. A sign, therefore, consists of three parts: a syntactic structure, a

pragmatic structure, and a semantic structure.

13 The W series was not yet available at the time the majority of this work was performed.


123

The Principle of Internal/External Balance: The internal and external structureof a sign must be balanced, consisting in the syntactic and semantic dimensions ofexactly one external component for each internal component and vice versa, andin the pragmatic dimension of exactly two external components for each internalcomponent. The external components are called ‘‘information generators’’ and the

internal components are called ‘‘components of meaning’’. The double external

structure in the pragmatic dimension is required because of its dual mediating

role between the syntactic and the semantic dimensions and also between the

source and target interpreters. The two sets of external components belong to the

source and target structures, respectively.

The Principle of Additional Structure: Whenever a sign has more than theminimum structure of one level in each dimension, the additional structure is builtup from the center out (as per Fig. 3), and for each dimension independently(Fig. 4, Table 3).

Using the USSD of Fig. 3 and these three principles, we can now explain the Peircean

taxonomy of signs by means of nine representation14 theorems. Internal components are

represented in the USSD by circles and the external components by ovals.

Syntactic

Semantic

The Renvoi Relation

Medium

ShapeSyntactic Context

Cognitive Mentellect

Ground Cognitive Context

Pragmatic

EMS EMT

IS IT

S&BCS S&BCT

SpiritS SpiritT

God

Fig. 3 The USSD-2000

14 Representation is used here in its mathematical rather than its semiotic sense.

268 C. Pearson

123

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123

Certain rules of interpretation or translation between the theoretical vocabulary

and the observational (or less theoretical) vocabulary will become apparent as we

proceed with the proofs of these theorems15. The rules of interpretation are obvious,

and they form an integral part of the theory. We first define the Peircean

taxonomy.16 We then give the nine representation theorems, and finally an example

proof.

Definition 1 A sign, which exists as an abstract quality both in itself and in its

relation to other signs, is called a ‘tone’.17

Definition 2 A sign, which exists as a general kind, both in itself and

distinguishable from other signs, is called a ‘type’.

Definition 3 A sign, which exists as an actual, single, physically existing

individual, is called a ‘token’.

Definition 4 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of possible reference

to its interpreter, is called a ‘rheme’.

Syntactic Context

Syntactic Context + Shape

Syntactic Context + Shape + Medium

Theory of Syntactic Structure Syntactic Structure Abstracted (Abducted) into Syntactic Categories

On- to- sion

Medium

Ei-den-

onsiShape

Syntactic ontexC t

Tag-men-

onsi Ton

e (Q

ualis

ign)

Typ

e(L

egis

ign)

Tok

en(S

insi

gn)

Fig. 4 The syntactic sign category diagram

15 Now called the ‘‘subduction’’ rules. See Pearson [29].16 Strictly speaking, this will not be exactly the Peircean taxonomy, but an explication of it (in the sense

of Quine [36]) since the three classification schemes used by Peirce to define his sign categories are

significantly changed, despite bearing the same names, due to a change in the concept of semiotic

dimensionality [22].17 It must be remembered that Peirce employed a great number of different and differing nomenclatures.

The one adopted here was used in Pearson [22].

270 C. Pearson

123

Definition 5 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of fact or actual

reference to its interpreter, is called a ‘pheme’.

Definition 6 A sign, whose interpretant represents it as a sign of reason to its

interpreter, is called a ‘doleme’.18

Definition 7 A sign, which is related to its object by an actual, single, existential,

cause and effect relation, is called an ‘index’.

Definition 8 A sign, which is related to its object by a concrete similarity between

the shape of the sign and its object, is called an ‘icon’.

Definition 9 A sign, which is related to its object by an arbitrary convention,

agreement, or general law, is called a ‘symbol’.

We may now state Theorems 1–9.

Theorem 1 A sign is a tone iff it has exactly one level of syntactic structure. Ittherefore has one component of syntactic meaning (tagmension) and one syntacticinformation generator (the syntactic context).

Theorem 2 A sign is a type iff it has exactly two levels of syntactic structure. Ittherefore has two components of syntactic meaning (tagmension and eidension) andtwo syntactic information generators (the syntactic context and the shape of thesign).

Theorem 3 A sign is a token iff it has all three levels of syntactic structure. Ittherefore has three components of syntactic meaning (tagmension, eidension, andontosion) and three syntactic information generators (the syntactic context, theshape of the sign, and the medium in which it is embodied).

Theorem 4 A sign is a rheme iff it has exactly one level of pragmatic structure. Ittherefore has one component of pragmatic meaning (contension) and two pragmaticinformation generators (the source social/behavioral context of the sign and thetarget social/behavioral context of the sign).

Theorem 5 A sign is a pheme iff it has exactly two levels of pragmatic structure.

It therefore has two components of pragmatic meaning (contension and purporsion)and four pragmatic information generators (the source social/behavioral context,the target social/behavioral context, the source interpretation, and the targetinterpretation).

Theorem 6 A sign is a doleme iff it has exactly three levels of pragmatic

structure. It therefore has three components of pragmatic meaning (contension,purporsion, and emosion), and six pragmatic information generators (the sourcesocial/behavioral context, the target social/behavioral context, the source inter-pretation, the target interpretation, the source emotive mentellect, and the targetemotive mentellect of the sign).

18 Peirce’s actual term was ‘deloam’ from the Greek dekxl:


123

Theorem 7 A sign is an index iff it has exactly one level of semantic structure. Ittherefore has one component of semantic meaning (denotation) and one semanticinformation generator (the dynamic object of the sign).

Theorem 8 A sign is an icon iff it has exactly two levels of semantic structure. Ittherefore has two components of semantic meaning (denotation, and connotation)and two semantic information generators (the dynamic object and the dynamicground of the sign).

Theorem 9 A sign is a symbol iff it has all three levels of semantic structure. Ittherefore has three components of semantic meaning (denotation, connotation, andpronotation) and three semantic information generators (the dynamic object, thedynamic ground, and the cognitive mentellect of the sign).

Proof of Theorem 1 By the Representation Principle and the Principle of

Additional Structure, any sign must have at least one level of syntactic structure and

this must be the innermost, or tagmatic, level. According to the USSD-2000

(Fig. 3), the outermost syntactic level consists of the embodiment of a sign in a

physical medium. But if a sign had an embodiment in a physical medium, it would

exist as an actual, single, physically existing individual and could not exist merely

as an abstract quality. It would be a token, not a tone; therefore, a tone cannot have

an ontotic level of syntactic structure.

Also from Fig. 3, the second (or middle) syntactic level consists of the

distinguishability of a sign by a shape. But, if a sign had a distinctive,

distinguishable shape, it would exist as a concrete general, serving as an archetype

for all tokens of the same type and could not exist, etc. It would be a type, not a

tone. Therefore, a tone cannot have an eidontic level of syntactic structure.

Thus, a tone has exactly one level of syntactic structure, which is the tagmatic

structure. By the principle of Internal/External Balance, this structure will consist of

both one internal component and one external component. From Fig. 3, we see that

the internal component is tagmension, the meaning component abstracted from the

syntactic context, and the external component is the syntactic context, the syntactic

information generator abstracted from the tagmatic level of syntactic structure. (

The other proofs are all similar and equally simple, but all nine proofs may be

found in Pearson and Slamecka [24, 25, 39].

4.4.2.2 Going Beyond Semeiotic. Some More Theorems Some other theorems

may easily be added to the above.

Theorem 10 The sum of the number of syntactic and semantic levels must not beless than four.

Letting LX stand for the number of syntactic levels, and LS stand for the number

of semantic levels, this may be easily expressed as

LX þ LS� 4:

272 C. Pearson

123

Theorem 11 The number of semantic levels must not be less than the number ofpragmatic levels.

If we let LP stand for the number of pragmatic levels, then this can be expressed

as

LS� LP:

This can be interpreted as saying that a term can be an index, icon, or symbol, but a

proposition can only be an icon or symbol, while an argument must only be a

symbol, an observation first made by Peirce.

The following four theorems assure that every sign must always be able to

determine an interpretant.

Theorem 12 Three level syntactic structure generates syntactic recursion.

Theorem 13 The first three levels of pragmatic structure generate pragmaticrecursion.

Theorem 14 Three level semantic structure generates semantic recursion.

Theorem 15 The simultaneous and joint action of syntactic recursion, pragmaticrecursion, and semantic recursion guarantee that any sign has the possibility ofbeing interpreted at any time in the future.

Many other theorems of semiotic structure may easily be derived from the above

theory. These few were chosen as examples for their simplicity, clarity, and

importance. As an example of applying the USST to obtain a satisfying solution to a

famous philosophical problem, I select Moore’s Paradox of Analysis.

Explaining Moore’s Paradox G.E. Moore, an early twentieth century British

philosopher, was concerned about a paradox discovered earlier by Alexius Meinong,

but which has since come to be called Moore’s Paradox of Analysis, and may be

stated as follows: if the analysis of the meaning of a philosophical concept has the

same meaning, it is trivial; but if it has a different meaning, then it is wrong.

Meinong and Moore both knew well that philosophers very often make correct and

non-trivial analyses, but they were never able to develop a theory of analysis which

explained the paradox.

While other philosophers have tried with varying amounts of success, the

problem has never been solved completely. The most popular approach is to say that

the problem lies in the formulation of the paradox, which assumes that meaning is

either a single or a holistic kind of thing that is either completely the same or else

totally different. Frege [9] and Carnap [4] both assumed that the meaning of signs

has two semantic components, but their assumptions were for entirely different

purposes. Carnap was able to delineate the character of scientific analysis very well

with his concepts of ‘‘extension’’ and ‘‘intension’’, but he was never able to handle

the kind of philosophic analysis that Meinong and Moore were interested in. Moore

himself said that he thought philosophic analysis required something like

determining the same objects by the same properties but understanding or cognizing

this determination in a different way.


123

From the USSD, we note that pronension uniquely determines intension, which

in turn uniquely determines extension; while a difference in extension ensures that

two terms will have a difference in intension, which in turn ensures a difference in

pronension. We may therefore state the solution of Moore’s Paradox as follows:

Scientific analysis requires identical extensions with a difference in intension, whilephilosophic analysis requires identical intensions with a difference in pronension.

It turns out that three levels of semantic structure is just the right amount and kind

of structure to solve every known semantic paradox. Of course, this gives us

increased confidence in the semantic structure hypothesized in the USSD.

In this section, we have described the USST, a new theory of sign structure that

explains the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic taxonomy of signs due to Charles

Peirce [32–34], and goes beyond Peirce to begin the development of an abductive/

subductive theory [27, 29]. Fifteen theorems were given in order to show the kind of

formal power this theory makes available to the study of semiotics. Moore’s

Paradox of Analysis was solved in order to show the power of the USST-2000 to

explain difficult semiotic problems.

4.4.3 The TOS19

The Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST), was introduced more than 30 years

ago [21, 24, 26, 27, 39], as the theoretical part of the Semiotic Paradigm [26–28], in

order to provide a scientific theory that could explain all the semiotic phenomena

associated with the static structure of signs. Although the USST was successful for

its intended purposes, it could never explain phenomena associated with dynamic

semiotic processes (what Peirce called ‘‘semiosis’’).

Now the Semiotic Paradigm has been expanded to include a second theory that

can handle dynamic sign processes. This section will formally present the Theory of

Operational Semiotics (TOS), provide examples of its use, and make the claim that

the Semiotic Paradigm is now able to explain all semiotic phenomena.

Parsing trees and linguistic transformations are too limited to handle all of the

processes of semiotics, but trees and transformations are just narrowly restricted

forms of mathematical operators. The TOS uses the more general concept of a

functor, or operator function [5], to explain what happens when sign processes take

place, thus introducing a theory of semiotic dynamics to accompany the USST

which is a theory of semiotic statics.

4.4.3.1 Background Bernard Bosanquet, British idealist philosopher (1848–

1923), claimed that every proposition can be factored into a predicate about the

ideal world. Thus example (1), which appears to predicate blue of sky as in analysis

(2), or even to be a two place relation predicating blue and sky of the copula as in

analysis (3), actually is predicating a proposition, (4), of the ideal world, as in

analysis (5). This thesis was adopted by Francis Bradley, another British idealist

philosopher of the same period (1846–1924) and made a key point of his logic.

19 A preliminary version of this section appeared as ‘‘The Theory of Operational Semiotics’’ in Pearson

[31].

274 C. Pearson

123

(1) The sky is blue.

(2) Blue(sky).

(3) Is(blue, sky).

(4) the sky being blue

(5) The ideal world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue).

(6) The actual world is such that it can be described by: (the sky being blue).

Actually, their terminology was already obsolete at the turn of the century (1885–

1915) when they were working this out, and we now use ‘‘sentence’’ and

‘‘proposition’’ for far different concepts than what Bosanquet and Bradley meant,

but this has little relevance for us here and now [29, 30].

What is important is that Bosanquet’s analysis does not require an ideal world; it

holds for any world or genre whatever, (thus analysis (6)), and it does not hold for

every sentence but it does hold for every utterance of an indicative type in any

language. Thus we may call this ‘‘Bosanquet’s Law of Factorization’’.

4.4.3.2 Factoring the Sentence A similar strategy works for any mood, but I

would like to use a different example for a very simple reason. One can say both (1)

and (7), but it is hard, at least in American, to say (8). This is merely an accident of

linguistic history. Therefore I choose proposition (9) for an example, which, at least

in American, is fairly easy to utter in each of the more common moods: indicative,

imperative, interrogative, etc.

(7) Is the sky blue?

(8) Blue the sky!

(9) the door being open

(10) The door is open.

(11) Open the door!

(12) Is the door open?

The factorizations are as follows:

(13) The real world is such that it can be described by: (the door being open).

(14) Endeavor to make the real world such that it can be described by: (the door

being open)!

(15) Is the real world such that it can be described by: (the door being open)?

By all accounts examples (10), (11), and (12) contain the same proposition.

Analyses (13), (14), and (15) make it obvious that this is so, a decided advantage for

any system of notation. I am not certain, but evidently I am the first to carry out this

complete analysis and so I make the universal claim: Every natural languagesentence type can be factored into a mood operator followed by a semantic operatorcontaining a proposition.

Propositions have been represented variously thruout history, depending on

which aspect it was desired to emphasize. I use the gerundial form to emphasize that

the proposition is an abstract semantic operator rather than a concrete sentence, etc.

[29, 30]. Thus we have the logical form given by expression (16):


123

(16) PM : PS

where PM is a mood operator and PS is a semantic operator.

We have not got to the end of our analysis but already it is yielding very

surprising results. When we have finished it will motivate an entirely new approach

to semiotic theory. For now, we merely need to notice that according to the

conventional sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, we would expect either a

syntactic or a pragmatic operator to appear in the final factored position, not a

semantic operator. But instead, this is just what we do get. This is indeed unusual.

Could we have our categories in the wrong sequence? Should it be syntactic,

pragmatic, semantic, or semantic, pragmatic, syntactic? Actually both occur

depending on whether we are synthesizing the sign, or analyzing it. What will

become clear is that the sequence: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic used by Peirce,

Morris, Bloomfield, Chomsky, etc. is wrong [29].

4.4.3.3 Factoring the Mood The next step is to break down what I have loosely

called the mood operator into its component factors. It turns out to be difficult

because so much of the structure of the sign is contained in it. One such attempted

analysis of the indicative operator showed that two distinct interpreters were

required for every sign along with a truth warrant, an epistemic operator, a

convention binding operator, etc., such as for instance in analysis (17), with similar

analyses for each of the other moods. It seems that all of the meaning contained in

analysis (17) is imbedded in the sentential period of examples (1) and (10).

(17) IS(I) WARRANT to IT(YOU) that IS am placing myself under all the

conventions of LANGUAGE COMMUNITY(LC) including all punishments

for not adhering strictly to all such conventions and that IS KNOW

sufficiently a restricted part of the WORLD(W) as it relates to LC and that this

part of W may be DESCRIBED(D) by:

This showed that each of the moods can be represented by an invariant operatorindependently of the semantic proposition, and that each semantic proposition canbe represented by an invariant operator independently of the mood of the sentence.

At this point I became aware of the work of the American semiotician, John

Searle, and the critical relevance it has for the project of factoring semiotic

operators in general. Searle’s work relates to the factorization of what I loosely

called the Mood Operator, but concerned not so much mood itself as the pragmatic

structure of the sign in its relation to the illocutionary force, a concept developed by

the British philosopher, John Austin but adumbrated earlier by Charls Peirce.

I later learned that an important part of this relation between the pragmatic

operator and the illocutionary force concerned the operation of converting a type

into a token, so I thus began to look at the structure of the type-token conversion

operator as part of the structure of the pragmatic operator and gradually the concept

of semiotic factorization started to become clearer. To finish this brief thought, allcomplete utterances have both a mood and an illocutionary force and these arealways present and distinct in every rheme token, even when they appear identicalin the surface structure of the utterance. The mood is part of the type while theillocutionary force is part of the token.

276 C. Pearson

123

After figuring this out, it became obvious that all sentential utterances can berepresented by a pheme operator as in equation (18).

(18) Pph ¼ PX : PP : PS

where Pph is a general pheme operator governing pheme tokens, PX is a syntactic

operator, PP is a pragmatic operator, and PS is the semantic operator as before.

Note we have arrived at the sequence: syntactic, pragmatic, semantic which is

necessary here to make phematic analysis work. Similarly in the case of phematic

synthesis we have equation (19), containing the sequence: semantic, pragmatic,

syntactic, just as predicted. There is no way we can force the sequence: syntactic,

semantic, pragmatic to work.

(19) ðPSÞ�1 : ðPPÞ�1 : ðPXÞ�1 ¼ ðPphÞ�1

4.4.3.4 Developing the Theory The Theory of Operational Semiotics is abbrevi-

ated as TOS. The TOS is intended to explain sign dynamics, or semiosis. It fits

within the Semiotic Paradigm [26–28], as a second theory that complements the

USST rather than competing with it. The TOS starts by assuming one basic

principle in addition to the three principles of the USST [39]. All sign processes, all

transformations, all changes in sign structure whatever can be represented by an

operator which transforms an initial sign into a final sign. Equation (20) is called the

‘‘Dynamic Principle’’.

(20) Wf ¼ Pf;in : Win

where Wf represents the final sign, Win the initial sign, the structure of Wf and Win

are given by the USST, and Pf;in represents the operation of changing Win into Wf :This implies that the USST explains the static structure of sign systems, the TOS

explains their dynamic properties, and the USST acts as a set of boundary

conditions on the TOS.

In many analyses, the structure of the W are assumed given and fixed. In such

cases, the entire process is characterized by the Pf;in and all attention is devoted to

the study of Pf;in: Such for example is the case with the study of induction:

(21) WKS ¼ Pind : WIS

where WKS is an iconic symbol and WIS is an indexical symbol. The problem is to

completely characterize the induction operator, Pind:There are similar ways of studying abduction, subduction, deduction, analogical

reasoning, and symbolic transformation [29]. When this is done, the following

amazing diagram is uncovered, which I call the ‘‘Ladder diagram of semantic

reasoning’’, see Fig. 5.

Equation (18) implies that pheme processes are represented by Eq. (22):

(22) Wf ¼ PX : PP : PS : Win

This may, in fact, be trying to tell us that conversion from a tone to a token takes

place in exactly the same sequence, with the same structure as Eq. (23):


123

(23a) Wph;K ¼ PX : Wph;T

(23b) ¼ PX : PP : Wph;N

(23c) ¼ PX : PP : PS : Win

which implies that we could separate phematic analysis into three distinct stages:

(24) Wph;K ¼ PX : Wph;T

(25) Wph;T ¼ PP : Wph;N

(26) Wph;N ¼ PS : Win

in which case, one is sorely tempted to identify equation (24) with Chomsky’s

program of transformational syntax and to predict two other associated programs:

operational pragmatics associated with equation (25); and operational semantics

associated with equation (26). This very strongly suggests that linguists and other

semioticists should deliberately tackle the development of a science of pragmatics

after the development of syntactics (as in transformational grammar) and before

attempting systematic development of a science of semantics (as in generative

semantics).

4.4.3.5 Intention, Intentionality, and FEMs The complexity of mapping the

various detailed operators in any practical sign process may be likened to unraveling

the human genome. Many investigators have already started to do this. I already

referred in Subsect. 4.4.3.4. to the work of transformational linguistics as working

out the details of PX for sign systems having the structure of linear text. Other

groups working on this problem include the speech act theorists, especially its

founder, John Searle [38], and the logical semanticists, especially Grice [14]. Tools

that are available for the semiotic analysis of the operator string include

philosophical analysis, logical analysis, speech act theory, discourse theory,

transformational grammar, linguistic semantics, linguistic pragmatics, cognitive

science, and artificial intelligence. Among these, Grice’s Conversational Postulates

Symbolic Transformation

Analogical ReasoningAbduction

Induction

Icon

Subduction

Deduction

Icon

Index

Symbol Symbol

Index

Eduction

Fig. 5 The Ladder diagram of semantic reasoning [29, p. 309]

278 C. Pearson

123

and Searle’s Felicity Conditions, Rules, Dimensions, etc. are especially useful with

a very important caveat. Grice’s Conversational Postulates contain a mixture of tone

concepts, type concepts, and token concepts all intermingled. I expect that the

Conversational Postulates will factor into at least three subsets referring to tone

operators, type operators, and token operators, as given by the USST. Similarly,

Searle’s analysis contains a mixture of tone, type and token concepts. If these are

distinguished, Searle’s tools become much more powerful.

One area of semiotic operator string analysis that has been developed

extensively is speech act theory, SAT. A speech act contains an illocutionary

point, followed by an intentional attitude, followed by illocutionary force

indicating devices, followed by the propositional content. Illocutionary points

are such things as asserting, reporting, promising, warning, etc., i.e., the purpose

for which the source interpreter creates the sign [28, 29]. Intentional attitudes

express a psychological state, such as believing, intending, wishing, etc.

Illocutionary force indicating devices are conditions that require the propositional

content to suitably match the illocutionary act and the intentional attitude. And the

propositional content contains the abstract proposition along with modal operators,

generalization operators, abstraction operators, such as Church’s k; along with

other propositional operators.

If we let F stand for the illocutionary force of the speech act; I stand for the

illocutionary point; S stand for the psychological state; C; for the illocutionary force

indicating devices; � ; for the propositional operators (such as negation); m; for the

modal operators; P; for the predicate operators; and s; for the subject operators, then

we can represent the speech act, or at least its illocutionary force, by:

(27) F ¼ IðSðCð� ðmðPðsÞÞÞÞÞÞ;

as long as we insist that the notation does not imply simple functionality in the strict

mathematical sense, altho, it must be admitted that there is a strong feeling of some

kind of functional dependence hinted at by this representation. For this reason, it is

better to use an operator notation, so we write:

(28) PF ¼ PI : PS : PC : P� : Pm : PP : Ps

for the structure of a general speech act. In this representation, P� : Pm : PP : Ps

corresponds roughly to PS in the notation of Eq. (18), and PI : PS : PC to part of

PP in the same notation, along with Æ, K; ð, I, f ; and others.

Now, a very important sign system is intentionality, including all intentions

and FEMs, (feelings, emotions, and psychological moods). Semioticians have

not always recognized that these all fit together in one system. In fact, one of

the saddest legacies of the modern age is the separation of intentionality from

emotionality along with the separation of mind from body, and science from

religion. Semioticians have wrestled with the theory of intention and

intentionality for years, but without any good notation for representing

intentions, the job has been slow and difficult. The operator string notation

employed by the TOS gives us the desired representation. In fact, all we have

to do is drop the illocutionary point operator from the front of the right hand

string of equation (28) and we have the TOS representation of intentions,


123

intentionality, and FEMs as in equation (29), where PN is the operator

expression for intentionality.

(29) PN ¼ PS : PC : P� : Pm : PP : Ps

Suppose the operator P is the value of S that stands for the psychological state of

surprise (not the word ‘‘surprise’’), likewise the operator U the value of C that stands

for the conditions that relate surprise to unexpected events, H the value of P that

stands for the predicate (not the assertion of a predicate) of being in my home, and Bthe value of S that stands for a burglar (again, not the word ‘‘burglar’’), then

equation (30) represents the feeling of surprise at encountering the unexpected event

of a burglar being in my home. This feeling need never be asserted, nor even

expressed silently to oneself. It may remain just a raw, unexpressed, feeling of

surprise. And yet equation (30) shows that the TOS has the ability to handle even

this ephemeral kind of sign.

(30) F ¼ P : U : H : B

Now, intentions have often been defined as internal psychological states that

relate to objects, events, or conditions in the external world, while emotions have

been defined in some instances as simply ‘‘a rush of hormones’’. So it may be

surprising to find that equation (29) will handle FEMs as well by the simple

expedient of defining various of the operators in expression (29) as either null or

identity operators. For instance, if D is the value of S that stands for the

psychological state of being depressed, equation (31) represents the feeling, or

emotion, of being depressed.

(31) E ¼ D : 1 : 0

Not all feelings and emotions have trivial values for PC;PP; and Ps; however.

The language for discussing intentions, intentionality, and FEMs is notoriously

imprecise. Many feelings behave more like propositional attitudes, while many

others behave more like emotions, while some even behave like internal

perceptions. One advantage of the more precise language and more powerful

theory of the TOS is that it should help to sort out and systematize much of our

observation and understanding of FEMs.

Another advantage of the TOS, not shared by any of its competitors, is the

additional insight that the TOS gives into the semiotic interpretation of the sign

and its relation to the source interpreter, IS: For instance, SAT represents the

utterance (32) as an assertion of the proposition (33). This explains the linguistic

and grammatical properties of (32) very well, but also represents IS as a

disinterested party with no more personal involvement with (33) than if he had

uttered (34) as an assertion of (35). What is needed here is an acknowledgment of

the very special first person, subjective, relation existing between IS and its feeling

of sadness that cannot be experienced or shared when it asserts someone else’s

sadness. Now, this is just what the TOS does when it lets S be the value of S that

stands for the psychological state of sadness (not the word ‘‘sad’’, nor even the

proposition ‘being sad’), and explains (32) by (36), and the assertion of (32) by

(37), the assertion of G.

280 C. Pearson

123

(32) I’m sad.

(33) my being sad

(34) Tom is sad.

(35) Tom’s being sad

(36) G = S:1:0

(37) ? : G

We thus see that by bringing each of the components of the USST diagram into

the representation as an operator, the TOS gains in both power and flexibility in

ways that no other semiotic theory can do, especially a theory like SAT which is

limited to such a narrow semiotic domain as natural language.20

4.4.4 Subduction and Interpretation of Theory

To my knowledge, subduction as a form of inference was first explicitly noted by

Carnap [4] where he called it ‘‘the one-way codebook’’. Carnap noted many of the

properties of subduction but never managed to give it a technical name. Others21

have either acknowledged Carnap’s work or have attempted to work out the details

on their own without acknowledging Carnap’s priority. But none of them have given

it a technical name. Therefore I called it ‘‘subduction’’ (1991) to both acknowledge

its existence and importance and its nature as a form of inference inverse to

abduction.

In subduction, some of the abstract terms of the theory are interpreted22 as

observational concepts so that the theory may be tested against reality.23 The

invention of good interpretations can sometimes be as ‘‘easy’’ as interpreting the

mass in Newton’s theory as the weight of a body divided by the force of gravity, or

as ingenious as Gibb’s brilliant guess regarding entropy.

4.5 Application to Applied or more Applied Questions

Our fifth scientific subparadigm concerns the applications of the Semiotic Paradigm,

especially those applications that might shed light on details of the paradigm itself

and help to work out those details or help to prioritize the areas of research and

development of the paradigm. In the New Science of Semiotics, using the Semiotic

Paradigm, general problems are solved by a judicious use of laws, theory, and facts,

using triadic logic.

It is in its applications that the new science is expected to shine, where its

empirical approach keeps it in close touch with real-world problems and its new

explanations take it beyond the solutions of Peirce’s old taxonomic science. Here is

one that is very useful in legal studies.

20 However, Peirce, who pioneered SAT [37] did not so limit his analysis.21 Such as Hempel and Popper.22 Carnap called it ‘‘translation’’, or ‘‘decoding’’.23 And because theories are invented by fallible human beings, they must be tested against reality.


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4.5.1 Understanding the Modes of Reasoning24

This section represents just a bare beginning on an application of the Semiotic

Paradigm to understanding the modes of reasoning that is hoped to eventually result

in a semiotic theory of reasoning. It sketches an approach to a theory of reasoning

that appears to be productive. It relates the nature of a reasoning process and its

structure to the changes in the structure of the signs involved in that reasoning

process. Seven distinct modes of semantic reasoning are isolated, and a ladder

diagram shows their interrelationships. Only one of these modes is deductive,

leaving six modes of non-deductive semantic reasoning.

4.5.1.1 Introduction The general problem of reasoning is to determine, given one

or more initial signs, what other signs one ought to entertain on the same basis. For

instance, if one believes that ‘‘P’’ and also that ‘‘P?Q’’ are both true, should one

also believe that ‘‘Q’’ is true? Alternately, if one enjoys doing ‘‘R’’ and also enjoys

doing ‘‘S’’, does one necessarily enjoy doing ‘‘both R and S’’?

There are many forms of reasoning, some more immediate, or more accessible,

than others. For instance, to determine the truth of ‘‘Q’’, a medium might consult a

crystal ball, while a trained scientist might design a controlled experiment.

Depending on the meaning of ‘‘Q’’ either approach might be more or less

appropriate under different circumstances. We would not normally believe that the

revelation of a crystal ball would be justification for believing that the existence of

anyons could be a sufficient explanation of the Anomalous Quantized Hall Effect.

On the other hand just such a reason could justify a lady’s belief that she will

eventually meet a tall, dark, and handsome stranger who will fall in love with her. I

think most ladies would not go to the trouble of designing and carrying out a

controlled scientific experiment to evaluate this sign. In fact, the very doing so could

well destroy the truth of this sign, while believing the crystal ball could, in fact, help

to establish its truth.

There are many bases for entertaining signs, and some of these get tied up with

the notion of truth. For instance, if one believes a sign, this is the same as holding in

one’s mind that sign to be true. I want to avoid a discussion of ‘truth’ for now

because it is more complex than most methods of analysis are competent to handle,

and besides, truth forms only a very small part of the concept of ‘reasoning’,

although this small part has played a dominant role throughout history in our

understanding of the nature and methods of science. It is for this reason that I

defined the general problem of reasoning around the more general and less

restricting concept of ‘entertaining on the same basis’. In addition, this freeing up of

the concept of ‘reasoning’ from the concept of ‘truth’ allows us to see more of the

structure of reasoning and its relation to the signs that must be processed in its

behalf. This, in turn, will lead to a better understanding of ‘truth’ in the long run.

In the Semiotic Paradigm, it is possible to examine some of the relations between

reasoning and the structure of the signs reasoned with and thereby gain a better

understanding of the structure of reasoning. We find thereby seven semantic modes

24 A preliminary version of this section appeared as Pearson [29].

282 C. Pearson

123

of symbolic reasoning and how they fit together with each other. These are the ones

that have traditionally been called the modes of scientific reasoning. In general,

there are many more modes of reasoning than have ever been listed in any logic

book, even the ones in Peirce’s unfulfilled dreams; and they fit together perfectly in

what may be regarded as a semiotic jig-saw puzzle. For instance, the modes of

semantic reasoning fit together to form what might be called the ‘‘ladder of semanticreasoning’’.25

It is important to determine which of these forms of reasoning are most

reasonable, i.e., have the best justification under given circumstances. This leads to

21 modes of symbolic reasoning. Seven of these are syntactic modes, (i.e.,

mathematical reasoning); seven are semantic modes, (i.e., scientific reasoning); and

seven are pragmatic modes, (i.e., affective reasoning). Six of these modes are

information increasing, six are information decreasing, and nine are information

transforming.

Although the concept of ‘sign’ dates back to the Greek medics, was foregrounded

for epistemology and logic by St. Augustine, and was reintroduced into Western

philosophy by John Locke [1], it was the American philosopher, Charles Peirce

[35], who first introduced the concept of ‘sign structure’ and first investigated the

internal structure of the sign. Peirce was especially concerned with reasoning,

especially scientific reasoning, so it is perhaps surprising that Peirce himself did not

attempt to relate the structure of reasoning to the structures of the signs involved in

the reasoning process. However, from the Collected Papers (CP) it appears that he

did not; but then, he only had his taxonomic science of semeiotic to work with

[32, 33]. Maybe some indications that he did attempt this kind of analysis will show

up in the new ‘‘Writings’’ edition (W) now in preparation. But if not, at least there is

some precedent for this kind of oversight in that Galileo, who was so interested in

inventing the clock, and who discovered all of the necessary elements for inventing

the clock, simply failed to put them all together. Perhaps Peirce, like Galileo, was

just too closely involved with the obvious to take that final step.

4.5.1.2 USST All of the essential aspects of the USST needed for analyzing

reasoning processes are summarized in the USSD.26

We will be working primarily with the structure of the sign. We note specifically

the syntactic structure represented by the lower left-hand portion of the USSD, the

pragmatic structure represented by the upper portion of the USSD, and the semantic

structure represented by the lower right hand portion of the USSD. For this example

we will concentrate mainly on semantic structure and the semantic forms of

reasoning.

We will be concerned with the structure of concrete individuals, the structure of

concrete generals, and the structure of abstract individuals. We recall from the

definitions in Sect. 4.4 of indexes, icons, and symbols that indexes can refer only to

concrete singulars, icons only to concrete generals, and symbols to abstract

singulars. In this connection we should recall that the USST explains the structure of

25 See Figs. 5, 17.26 Figure 3 of Sect. 4.4.2.1(Background).


123

indexes as consisting of only the first level of semantic structure with the object as

its external structure and extension as its internal structure. It explains the structure

of icons as consisting of both of the first two levels of semantic structure, adding the

ground and intension to the structure of the index. And it explains the structure of

symbols as consisting of all three levels of semantic structure, adding the cognitive

mentellect and protension to the structure of the icon.

In our first cut at attempting to understand reasoning, we shall deal only with

symbolic reasoning and so we shall be dealing only with indexical symbols, iconic

symbols, and symbolic (or pure) symbols while calling them by their shortened

names for simplicity of reference.

4.5.1.3 The Modes of Reasoning. Deduction (Formerly called Demonstration) For

purposes of developing theory, we select that meaning of ‘‘deduction’’ which

involves semantic reasoning from an interpreted general to an interpreted singular.27

This reasoning from a general to an individual involves a process of changing the

structure of the subject of the entertained sign from that of an icon (iconic symbol)

to that of an index (indexical symbol). For instance, from ‘‘All men are mortal.’’ we

apply ‘‘Socrates is a man.’’ to get ‘‘Socrates is mortal’’. ‘‘Mortal’’ and ‘‘man’’ are

general terms and so the predicates of the hypothesis and of the conclusion retain

the same structure. The subject of the hypothesis is ‘‘all men’’, a general term, while

the subject of the conclusion is ‘‘Socrates’’, a singular term. Thus only the structure

of the subject has changed.

The particular is already predicated in the general so that we know for certain that

the predicate applies to it. This allows semiosis to descend by both external and

internal structure, i.e., by both a relation of secondness and a relation of thirdness, so

that both reinforce and complement each other. The descent by secondness goes

from ground to object, while the descent by thirdness goes from ground to intension

to extension to object. These descents are illustrated in Fig. 6.

Secondness

Thirdness

Inten-sionGround

Object Extension

Fig. 6 Comparison of descents from icon to index by secondness and by thirdness

27 We are essentially adopting Quine’s concept of ‘explication’ [36] wherein one sets about refining

one’s concepts in such a way as to maintain those theoretical implications which have the strongest

anchors at the lowest levels of observability and doing the least damage in those areas where our

intuitions are not as strong. Theoretical implications which have no anchor in reality at all have a ‘‘don’t

care’’ impact on the design of our concepts so that in these cases we are free to invent our refinements in

such a way as to simplify the overall theory.

284 C. Pearson

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The result of this descent process is to eliminate the iconic level of structure from

the entertained sign thus leaving us with an index. We can identify this descent

process with a loss of information so that loss of information and descent from an

icon to an index are both represented by the abstract diagram of Fig. 7. One further

abbreviation of the diagram process allows us finally to collapse the diagram of

Fig. 7 into the diagram of Fig. 8, thus representing the overall structure of the

deduction process.

Induction There have been many different forms of induction proposed, ranging

from mathematical, or complete, induction, to statistical induction, to ampliative, or

incomplete, induction, to even proof by complete listing of cases. Therefore we fix

our attention here on just one of the many meanings of the word ‘‘induction’’, that of

scientific, or ampliative, induction. This method of reasoning was also first

commented on by Socrates. Scientific induction, or as we shall call it, simply,

induction, has always meant something like reasoning from a set of individuals, a

set of indexical symbols, to a general conclusion, an iconic symbol. This requires

the following steps:

(1) Observation of individuals, and their description by a set of indexical symbols.

(2) Invention (or guess) of:

(a) A set of pertinent categories (iconic symbols).

(b) A general hypothesis (an iconic symbol).

(3) Transform the general hypothesis into a more convenient general form.

(4) Testing the hypothesis for the categories over the original individuals.

(a) Design of experiment.

(b) Observation of additional individuals, if necessary.

(5) Deduction from the general to new individuals in support of 4.

(6) Conclude to the general hypothesis, if warranted.

Fig. 7 Descent from icon to index with loss of information

ICON

INDEX

Fig. 8 The structure ofdeduction


123

Although induction is nearly the inverse of deduction, it is considerably

complicated by the necessity for the double invention (step (2) above), and an

increase of information is occasioned by the conclusion to unobserved individuals

in step (6). From the above it can be seen that the value added in induction is due

to the increase in structure of a set of indexes to the structure of an icon as

illustrated in Fig. 9, which can be seen to be the diagrammatic inverse of Fig. 7.

Thus we see that although the diagrams help clarify the nature of structural

changes in sign processes, they are abstractions and do not retain the full detail

involved in semiosis. For this we need the full Theory of Operational Semiotics

(TOS). Induction is an information intensive step in that it requires the addition of

extra information in the form of observation of previously unobserved individuals

and the invention of both a set of categories and a general hypothesis. Because of

these creative steps, the conclusion of an induction can never be assured and must

always be tested.

We also note that we cannot ascend from object to ground by two different routes

as we descended in deduction. This is consistent with the conclusion that induction

is never self validating and must always be verified.

The general always contains individuals not contained in the original. Because

induction is only interesting when it cannot be tested to completion (because of an

infinite number of individuals, or etc.) induction is always fallible and hence open to

revision, or refinement. We therefore see that induction as thus defined is

completely inverse to deduction in every way. We therefore diagram induction and

deduction conceptually as arrows with the tail of deduction leading from icons and

its head pointing to indexes and the tail of induction leading from indexes and its

head pointing to icons. This conceptual diagram will determine our whole approach

to developing a theory of reasoning processes as attempts to change the structure of

given signs relative to certain entertainment. We thus diagram induction as in

Fig. 10, which may be compared to Fig. 8.

Analogical reasoning Several forms of analogical reasoning have been described

in the literature. We use the term here to mean reasoning from one set of generals to

another set of generals by the use of arguments involving similarity, or the

INDEX

ICONFig. 10 The structure ofinduction

Fig. 9 Ascent from index to icon

286 C. Pearson

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reasoning from one icon to another icon while staying on the iconic level. Such a

definition would include for instance, troth metaphor, argument by similarity, and

physical modeling.

Analogical reasoning can be a direct process, as diagrammed in Fig. 11. But it

may also proceed indirectly, passing thru the symbolic as diagrammed in Fig. 12.

Indirect analogy is also called symbolic analogy, theoretical analogy, abstract

analogy, symbolic modeling, theoretical modeling, argument from definition, and/or

metaphor.

Eduction ‘‘Eduction’’ is defined as reasoning from an individual to another

individual. This would correspond to reasoning from an index to an index.

Argument (a) is an example of this type of reasoning. It may be diagrammed as in

Fig. 13, wherein the solid arrows indicate the valid, indirect, eduction, while the

dotted arrow represents the direct process. Eduction may also proceed by an even

more indirect process by passing up to the symbolic level and then back down.

(a) This bottle of catsup is red; therefore, that jar of pickles weighs 16 oz.

Abduction Peirce, who coined the term ‘‘abduction’’, as well as ‘‘hypothetical

reasoning’’ and ‘‘retroduction’’, used all three of these terms ambiguously to stand

for several forms of reasoning, as well as a kind of inventing which included either

categories, a general hypothesis, or an abstract theory. It can be seen that two of

ICON ICONFig. 11 Direct analogy

ICON

SYMBOL

ICON

SYMBOLFig. 12 Indirect analogy

INDEX

ICON

INDEX

ICONFig. 13 The process ofeduction

SYMBOL

ICON

Fig. 14 The semiotic process ofabduction


123

these forms of invention result in the creation of an icon, while the third results in

the creation of a symbol. Strictly speaking, these inventings are not forms of

reasoning, but steps in several different reasoning processes. For this reason, and to

simplify the design of technical language that will be adequate to the resulting

theory,28 I use the term ‘‘hypoduction’’ for Peirce’s invention of a hypothesis, and I

use the term ‘‘abduction’’ for invention of abstract explanation—reasoning from

icons to symbols—often used for development of scientific theory. We see,

therefore, that abduction, in this sense, like induction, is information intensive, since

it too involves an invention, the hypoduction of an abstract explanation. We

diagram this as Fig. 14.

The steps to abduction are thus:

(1) The development of several general laws for which a single abstract

explanation is desired.

(2) The hypoduction (invention) of an abstract theory, including theoretical

concepts, relations between the concepts, rules for abstract manipulation of the

concepts and relations, and rules for translating back to observable concepts

(see subduction).

(3) Manipulation of the theory by the given rules of transformation in order to

arrive at other abstract statements that may be more convenient for

interpretation (see symbolic reasoning next).

(4) The translation of certain of the abstract concepts and relations into observable

concepts and relations by use of the code book (see subduction again).

(5) The comparison of resulting singular and general statements with the known

facts and laws.

(6) Conclusion of the abstract theory, if warranted.

Symbolic reasoning Any form of reasoning that starts with pure interpreted

symbols in the subject position of the premise, reasons to a conclusion with pure

interpreted symbols in subject position, and uses only interpreted symbolic

transformations is called ‘‘symbolic reasoning’’. Peirce also called this form of

reasoning, ‘‘theorematic reasoning’’ and ‘‘argument from definition’’. Manipulation

of theory to get from explanatory principles to other abstract statements that are

easier to interpret observationally (as in step 3) above is a good example of this

kind or reasoning. In science, this kind of reasoning can often be ‘‘abbreviated’’

by mathematical manipulation, but there is always a fine distinction between the

semantic reasoning and the mathematical manipulation. Since symbolic reasoning

involves arbitrary conventions, its conclusions can not be guaranteed in advance

and must be tested for validity. In the case of scientific theory, this is done as part

of the overall theory validation process. We thus diagram symbolic reasoning as

Fig. 15.

Subduction Interpretation of theoretical concepts can be as ‘‘apparently’’ simple

as the interpretation of the mass of a particle by dividing its weight by the

gravitational constant or the interpretation of the temperature of an ideal gas by the

observation of a real thermometer, or as obviously ‘‘contrived’’ as the interpretation

28 The first modification to the language of Menetics since it was initially designed in 1976, (1977).

288 C. Pearson

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of the curvature tensor of empty space by the displaced position of stars during a

solar eclipse or the interpretation of the mean kinetic energy of an ensemble of

molecules averaged over all of the molecules in the ensemble by the observed

temperature of a real gas in a finite container. From the most transparent to the most

opaque interpretation, all involve a step down in structure from symbols to icons.

‘‘Temperature’’ can be either a pure symbol or an iconic symbol depending on

whether it is used to mark a theoretical concept or an observable general concept. In

either case it is spelled the same, although both meaning and structure are drastically

different.

Carnap was the first to isolate and study this form of reasoning although it was

certainly used (perhaps unconsciously) by scientists long before his time as

witnessed by the examples from Newton, Carnot, Gibbs, and Einstein in the

previous paragraph. Carnap [4] used the term ‘‘code book’’ to describe these

translation rules29, but it is a peculiar kind of code book. Whereas most code

books show how to translate back and forth either way, this code book only needs

to translate in one direction, from theoretical to observable, that is, from abstract

to general. In addition, it need not translate every theoretical term in the theory,

but only a finite subset of them. Those theoretical statements that are translatable

into observable terms must then be amenable to observation and where

observation is in accord with the translated statements, this counts as evidence

in favor of the theory. Because not every theoretical statement is translatable,

subduction is an information decreasing process. The diagram for Subduction is

thus given by Fig. 16.

4.5.1.4 The Structure of Semantic Reasoning From this cursory overview of the

forms of semantic reasoning we can construct Fig. 17: The Seven Modes of

Semantic Reasoning by consolidating each of the previous seven semantic

reasoning diagrams. The result is a compact, terse diagram that is reminiscent of

the semantic structure of the sign itself. From the placement and fit of deduction and

induction, we can determine how to interpret this diagram in an overall sense to

SYMBOL

ICON

Fig. 16 Structure of thesubduction process

SYMBOL SYMBOLFig. 15 The symbolicreasoning diagram

29 I provided the name ‘‘subduction’’ (1991).


123

show the relation and fit of all seven modes of semantic reasoning.30,31 The purpose

of Fig. 17 is to emphasize the structure of the various semantic reasoning processes

and the way they fit and complement each other, and not to illustrate their most

intricate details.

We must recall the great variety of usages of these names in the literature and

note that Fig. 17 uses these terms each in a particular sense as discussed above.

Figure 17 can be used to analyze many of the steps in each of the modes of

reasoning and was in fact the means whereby the steps in the above analyses were

developed.

4.5.1.5 Pragmatic Modes of Reasoning The semantic modes of reasoning are not

the only forms of reasoning, although they are the best known and the best studied

because they include the forms of reasoning used by science. All semantic forms

analyzed in this example were of the subject-predicate form. Peirce pointed out the

importance of studying a more general kind of reasoning using relational forms.

Mathematics employs the syntactic modes of reasoning. But in many ways, the

pragmatic modes of reasoning are the most interesting, although they are the least

studied and the least understood.

In a preliminary literature survey, only one name, ‘‘coduction’’, was found that

referred to a specific form of pragmatic reasoning. Coduction appears to involve the

social and behavioral context of the sign, (S&BC). It was Freud who called most

attention to the need for a better understanding of pragmatic reasoning, especially in

Abstract Singular

Symbolic Reasoning

Concrete General

Concrete Singular Indexical Reasoning

INDEX INDEX Indexical ransformation T

Deduction

ICON ICON Iconic

Transformation

Subduction

Abduction

Symbolic ransformation

SYMBOL SYMBOLT

(Information Increasing)

Logic of D

emonstration

(Information D

ecreasing) Exten-xsion

Object

Inten-sion

Cognex

-sion

Cognitive Mentellect

Ground

Induction

Logic of D

iscovery/Invention

Iconic Reasoning

Fig. 17 Seven modes of semantic reasoning

30 This diagram was originally published as Fig. 8 in my review of Rauch and Carr (1989), in the section

discussing Allan Chinen’s paper (1989).31 It was Chinen who originally gave me the idea of relating the various kinds of reasoning to each other,

although he related reasoning to the reference of signs. It was I who conceived of interpreting reasoning

as the change in structure of the signs used in the reasoning process, and the way these processes fit

together. I thank Chinen for his original contribution.

290 C. Pearson

123

his discussions of the logic of dreams and his analysis of the logic of personal

relations. Likewise, Jung called attention to the logic of the collective unconscious,

again involving the social and behavioral context of the sign.

In semantic reasoning we are involved with individuals, generals, and

abstractions, through concrete and abstract. It was our knowledge of the semiotic

structure of these entities32 that allowed us to analyze the semiotic structure of

semantic reasoning. In pragmatic reasoning we are involved with feelings,

emotions, moods (in the psychological rather than the grammatical sense), and

affect. We shall have to learn more about the semiotic structure of these entities in

order to help unravel the semiotics of the pragmatic modes of reasoning. Are

emotions rhemes, phemes, or dolemes? What is the difference between feelings,

emotions, and moods? The New Science of Semiotics is the best tool for attacking

and solving these problems.

I suspect that when the pragmatic modes of reasoning are untangled, we shall find

some kind of structural relationship similar to that in Fig. 17. Nature has a habit of

preserving structure. Much of the current investigation centers on this pragmatic

structure, especially legal inquiry, esthetic inquiry, and theological inquiry. This

offers an exciting opportunity to improve our understanding of semiotic structure.

Our early studies of grammatical mood have done much to improve our

understanding of pragmatic structure, and these studies of reasoning will do far

more.

4.6 Mathematical Methods and the Solution of Problems

Our last subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm involves the rigorous systemati-

zation of semiotic thinking in order to bring mathematical reasoning to bear in

solving semiotics problems.

Any serious study deserves the use of the most powerful tools available; and the

most powerful tools all include the use of mathematics. In the new science of

semiotics, math pops up everywhere we look: in measurement, in data analysis, in

discerning exact laws to describe observed patterns, in the development of the most

useful explanatory theories, etc. But that branch specifically called ‘‘mathematical

semiotics’’ usually consists of the solution methods for the mathematical

formulations of the problems of applied semiotics.

A new golden age of mathematics is coming. The old golden age included the

seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, wherein all mathematics was

developed by physicists for solving problems of the physical sciences. All

mathematics of the golden age was dyadic mathematics.

The new golden age will be the age of triadic mathematics. It will be developed

by semioticists for solving the problems of the semiotic sciences. In order to be a

good semioticist in the 21st century you must first be a master of mathematics. The

principles of mathematical semiotics have yet to be written. They will be written by

you.

32 Due primarily to Peirce and myself.


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5 New Problems for the New Science

5.1 A New Way of Thinking, A New Way of Knowing, A New Way

of Understanding

Traditionally there have been two ways of looking at the world. The older one is

often credited to Socrates, although it was formalized and made explicit by

Aristotle [1]. Whitehead [40] most improperly called it the Platonic philosophy

and the only true philosophy. It involves looking at the world from outside-in.

Aristotle called this ‘‘hylozoism’’ because it views every existing body as a living

being. The newer view was created by Peirce, although the public often associates

James’s name with the phenomenological viewpoint. Husserl is often credited

with founding the science of phenomenology, although Peirce actually began to

investigate phenomenology as a science some half-century earlier. This viewpoint

involves looking at the world from inside-out, but is also called hylozoism

because like Aristotle, Peirce viewed every existing body as a living being. In

fact, hylozoism has been a very popular philosophy thruout the ages. It has been

stressed more recently by both Whitehead and Teilhard de Chardin (Fig. 18).

The New Science of Semiotics involves a third way of looking at the world, also

initiated by Peirce. This generates a new way of thinking, a new way of knowing,

and a new way of understanding. It, thereby, gives us the power and ability to unify

science and phenomenology thus providing an integrated and unified methodology

for a new way of inquiring. This involves looking at the world from the middle

ground inside the sign, from whence one can look both outward toward all existent

Bilateral structure of the sign

This view leads to an inte-grated methodology for in-quiry involving the unifica-

tion of science and phe-nomenology, yielding an integrated and unified ap-

proach to reality.

This view leads to scientific inquiry.

Aristotelian Viewpoint

Real object as it really is.

This view leads to phenomenological

inquiry.

Jamesian Viewpoint

Phenomenal feel-ing as actually experienced.

SIGN

Kantian Veil

Inexpressibility of the 1st person

Peircean Viewpoint

Semiotic logic points outwardly to an external world as represented by

signs and inwardly to our phenomenal world as

cognition of an external world.

Fig. 18 A new viewpoint for the new science

292 C. Pearson

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bodies of the external world and inward toward all mentating consciousness of the

internal world, i.e. what is normally called ‘‘the self’’. This approach is made

possible by the bilateral structure of the sign. It still involves the hylozoic

assumption that in the words of Whitehead: every grain of sand, every electron, is

alive [40]. In this assumption, the New Science of Semiotics is consistent with

virtually all post-Peircean philosophy.

1. Strengths of the Aristotelian Viewpoint:

a. Has lasted since at least the time of Socrates and possibly before.

b. Leads to an easy development of science

c. Simple and easy to understand

d. Superficially obvious and intuitive

e. Explains the reality of individuals, generals, and abstractions

2. Faults of the Aristotelian Viewpoint:

a. Violates the Kantian Veil

b. Leaves out all first person experiences

c. Cannot explain the reality of feelings and emotions

3. Strengths of the Jamesian Viewpoint:

a. Concentrates on first person experiences

b. Explains the reality of feelings and emotions

4. Faults of the Jamesian Viewpoint:

a. Violates the Veil of Inexpressibility

b. Cannot express the objective or the cognitive

c. Makes science impossible

d. Cannot explain the reality of individuals, generals, and abstractions

5. Strengths of the Peircean Viewpoint:

a. Integrates science and phenomenology

b. Does not require violation of either the Kantian Veil or the Veil of

Inexpressibility

c. Integrates the correspondence and cohesion theories of truth with the

convergence theory of truth

d. Explains the reality of both cognitive and affective aspects of the world

e. Explains all aspects of the ‘‘self’’, by integrating first person, second

person, and third person experiences

6. Faults of the Peircean Viewpoint:

a. Complex—but only complex enough to model nature

b. Difficult to understand—but only because nature is difficult to understand

c. Requires development of new mathematics and science—but only because

we have not yet developed the required mathematical and scientific tools


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6 Application to the Philosophy of Law

6.1 Apology

There is far too little space here to do justice to the approach to the philosophy of

law suggested by the New Science of Semiotics. I have given some examples as

small hints thruout this essay. All we can do now is give another small example to

tease the reader and promise that, the editors willing, a full essay devoted

exclusively to the New Science approach to philosophy of law will appear in this

journal at a later date.

6.2 Three Kinds of Justice; Three Kinds of Law

For this example, we start with Aristotle’s claim that there are only two kinds of

justice.

Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of

justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend

on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may

be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been

settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be

a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep. (Quoted in

Cl. Morris [19, p. 21])

Augustine, on the other hand, distinguishes between two kinds of law, which he

calls eternal law and temporal, or human, law. Thomas Aquinas proceeds to

interpret these as particular and eternal law, sometimes referred to as divine law.

However, the New Science of Semiotics explains that there are three kinds of

justice: the first is material justice. It is directed to a particular good. This is

Aristotle’s ‘‘natural justice’’. The second is conceptual justice. It is directed to the

common good. This forms part of what Aristotle called ‘‘conventional justice, but not

all. For Aristotle [1] was a conceptualist and recognized only the lower two levels of

semantic structure. The third is analytical justice. It is directed to ways of arriving at

new or revised good, i.e. pertaining to the eternal good, such as, for example,

constitutional justice. This completes what Aristotle called ‘‘conventional justice’’.

Material justice involves only the denotative/extensional level of semantic

structure in an essential way. Conceptual justice involves both the denotative/

extensional and the connotative/intensional levels of semantic structure essentially,

but does not involve the pronotative/processional level. Finally, analytical justice

requires all three levels of semantic structure, involving all three in an essential way.

On the other hand, the New Science of Semiotics explains that there are three

kinds of law. In fact, there is one kind of law corresponding to each kind of justice,

thus unifying Aristotle’s theory of Justice with St. Augustine’s and St. Thomas’s

theory of Law. Material law corresponds to St. Thomas’s particular law and is that

body of law that implements material justice. Conceptual law corresponds to what

both of them called ‘‘eternal’’ law and implements conceptual justice. Finally,

294 C. Pearson

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analytical law corresponds to the laws implementing analytical justice. Such laws

are more often called ‘‘constitutions’’ because they specify the purpose of laws, how

they can be changed, and how new laws and institutions can be created.

References

1. Aristotle. 1896. Nicomachean ethics, Book V. London: K Paul, Trench & Co.

2. Bhattacharya, Nikhil. 1979. Signs and experience: Steps towards a semiotic theory. Semiotica, 26(3/

4): 311–354.

3. Boole, Georges. 1854/2004. The laws of thought. Cambridge: MacMillan.

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