School Of Justice Studies | School Of Justice …...Secrets Exposed?: Selective state concern and the prosecution of “notorious” arms trafficker Viktor Bout Victoria Collins, PhD

Secrets Exposed?: Selective state concern and the prosecution of “notorious”

arms trafficker Viktor Bout

Victoria Collins, PhD and Melissa Pujol, B.S.

School of Justice Studies, Eastern Kentucky University

*Stanley Chow “Disarming Viktor Bout.”

A research project prepared with support from the School of Justice Studies Research

Grant

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Secrets Exposed?: Selective state concern and the prosecution of notorious arms trafficker

Viktor Bout

Introduction

Estimates indicate that there are approximately 875 million small arms in circulation

worldwide (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2013), manufactured by one

thousand different companies, and located in nearly one hundred countries (Small Arms Survey

2013). Small arms are defined as “civilian, private, and military weapons that fire a projectile

with the condition that the unit or system may be carried by an individual, a small number of

people, or transported by a pack animal or a light vehicle” (United Nations General Assembly

1997). They are used by a wide array of actors involved in various criminal enterprises

including, but not limited to, insurgents, drug lords, street gangs, pirates, as well as “traditional”

street criminals (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013). Small arms have also

been responsible for approximately 90 percent of all war casualties since World War II

(Bassiouni 2010; Bohlander 2008). Small arms have been used in some of the bloodiest conflicts

in recent history, including Sierra Leone’s eleven year civil war (Schroeder and Lamb 2006), the

genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch Project 1994), and most recently the conflicts in

Afghanistan and Iraq (Small Arms Survey 2013).

Although some of these arms reach their destination through legal transactions (termed

white market sales), a vast number of them are sold through illicit networks. This is due to the

covert nature of transactions that occur on the gray and black market (i.e. the concealed and

secretive transfer of arms for money), as well as the abstruse nature of gray market sales that

originate with legal state to state transfers but result in arms being transferred to third parties in

clear contravention of existing arms embargoes through the utilization of rogue brokers or

insurgency groups (Rothe and Ross 2011). Despite this fact, there has been relatively little

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attention paid to the role of the state as a complicit or implicit facilitators of arms trafficking

(with the exception of Rothe and Ross 2011).

While arms trafficking cases are relatively rare in relation to the totality of arms

trafficking, they do remain focused on a select number of individuals rather than the broader

system, or the host of actors involved in making such illegal transactions possible. This is a

similar approach that is taken to deal with street crime or the ‘war on drugs.’ We suggest that

through the analysis of the US prosecution of the international arms dealer, Viktor Bout, the

process of transforming the agenda and framing of Bout as a ‘lone’ arms trafficker further

reveals this pattern, regardless of the role of the United States and other countries in his illegal

arms trafficking. Special attention will be paid to the accountability assigned to Bout as well as

to network of actors engaged in the crime. We start by providing a brief history of Bout,

including the events that led up to his apprehension in Thailand in 2008.

The Case of Viktor Bout

Viktor Bout, made famous by the 2005 Hollywood movie Lord of War, and nicknamed

“The Merchant of Death,” is a Russian born private arms dealer who was apprehended in

Bangkok, Thailand in 2008, for offenses related to arms trafficking. Most often associated with

brokering arms deals in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bout has been accused of “making a career of

arming bloody conflicts and supporting rogue regimes across multiple continents, [and] even

using the US banking system to secretly finance a private fleet of aircraft” (Bharara as cited in

Gendar 2010). Bout, and his network, are said to have supplied arms to many countries,

including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, and

Bosnia (Control Arms 2006).

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Bout has an established history of providing services to many countries for their national

security operations (Austin 2012; Common Dreams 2012), including the US. For example,

between 1996 and 2001, Bout operated out of the United Arab Emirates (UEA) transporting

weapons to Afghanistan to clients that included both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda using an Al-

Qaeda controlled airline: Ariana Airlines (Farrah and Braun 2007). Although the US was

actively interested in Bout and he was subject to scrutiny and sanctions from the UN

(Brunwasser 2002), when the CIA became privy to this information, they chose not to take any

action. Instead, because of their relationship with the UEA, they urged for increased banking

controls, but they did so “delicately, not wanting to offend an ally in an already complicated

relationship” (Pasternak and Braun 2002). Contributing to the lack of action against Bout was

US intelligence priorities, that of counter-narcotics and the possibility that Al-Qaeda would

acquire weapons of mass destruction (Farrah and Braun 2007). This eclipsed Bout’s

involvement, especially as during this time period he was primarily viewed in his “African

context” (Wolosky in Farrah and Braun 2007: 143).

Bout is most often associated with the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and for

providing weapons to UNITA rebels in Angola, earning him millions of dollars in diamonds

(Farrah and Braun 2007). Despite there being reports from private investigators, government

officials, non-governmental organizations, and various intelligence agencies, including the

British and Americans, the information gathered on Bout and his weapons pipeline was largely

neglected. In the Angolan conflict, the US allied itself with Savimbi and his UNITA rebels, the

same rebels that Bout was arming (The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists

2002). As indicated by analysts at the CIA, “there was no direction from senior policymakers at

State or elsewhere in the Clinton administration to target African weapons flows” (Farrah and

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Braun 2007: 96). As indicated by Johan Peleman, a researcher working for the International

Peace Information Service (IPIS) and investigator of Bout’s network, “Africa is not high on the

agenda. There are no classrooms of analysts and secret agents looking into the situation in Sierra

Leone and Liberia. These countries are not important enough on the national agendas of those

states, I’m afraid” (Peleman in Farrah and Braun 2007). Bout’s actions in Africa were not in

contradiction with US foreign policy interests and as a result he did not warrant their attention.

US interest in Bout however, changed dramatically after 9/11 when Bout became directly

involved in assisting the US in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Immediately prior to 9/11, the US State Department in conjunction with the National

Security Council had created a team for the purposes of apprehending Bout, but the election of

Bush in early 2001 re-focused priorities and the investigation into Bout dwindled and eventually

ended after the attacks on New York (Farrah and Braun 2007). Although the Bush administration

had been briefed on Bout’s network, specifically Condoleezza Rice, the then National Security

Adviser, when Bout moved back to Russia in 2002 she decided that it would not be in the US’s

political interests to pressure Russia about arms trafficking as the US had “bigger fish to fry”

(Landesman 2003). It is during this same time period however, that the US began to use Bout

and his network to transport weapons to the Northern Alliance to arm them against the Taliban.

Although this has been vehemently denied by the US, European officials have reported that

“Bout had his aircraft near Afghanistan and made them available to the US efforts almost

immediately. They needed him and he had the only airlift capacity in the region…The deal was,

if he flew, the US would leave him alone” (Farrah and Braun 2007: 198).

Bout was also contracted by the US to fly weapons to Iraq in 2003. Reports indicated that

many of the supplies for US troops were transported to Iraq by aircraft that were owned and

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operated by Bout (Huband, Parker and Turner 2004). Further reports connect Bout to private

military companies Halliburton (then Vice President Dick Cheney’s former company) and

Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) through Bout’s companies Aerocom/Air Mero (Madsen 2005)

and Irbis Air (Spiegel Online International 2010). This occurred despite there being a specific

ban on dealings with Bout issued by the UN. US intelligence launched an investigation into

Bout’s activities that confirmed that Bout was flying supplies for the US Air Mobility Command

– a major command for the US Air Force (Farrah and Braun 2007).

In 2004, the Bush administration also exerted political pressure on other states to curb

their interest in Bout. For example, they pressured the UN to omit Bout from sanctions despite

there being considerable efforts from France to freeze his assets and an Interpol warrant for his

arrest. Furthermore, the Bush administration called on its ally the UK, to remove Bout’s name

from their list of individuals recommended for sanctions by the UN (Fenzel 2007). There have

also been reports that the US may have interfered with Belgian efforts to apprehend Bout on a

warrant they attempted to execute in February 2002. Belgian authorities, somewhat

clandestinely, had indicted Bout on charges of illegal weapons trafficking and money laundering.

As a result Interpol issued an arrest warrant, and Belgian intelligence planned to execute the

warrant after finding that Bout was due to board a flight from Moldova to Greece. British

intelligence services sent an encrypted message to their superiors in London, informing them that

Bout would be arrested when the plane landed in Athens. A short time after the message was

received in London, the plane changed course and disappeared off the radar. It was missing for

approximately 90 minutes before it reappeared and continued to Athens where it landed. British

and Greek special-forces, who had been waiting in Athens, boarded and searched the plane. Bout

was found not to be on board, but was later sighted by Belgian intelligence in the Democratic

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Republic of Congo (Farrah and Braun 2007). In an interview with Douglas Farrah and Stephen

Braun, authors of the 2007 book Merchant of Death: Money, guns, planes, and the man who

makes war possible, European intelligence officials stated “There were only two intelligence

services that could have decrypted the British transmission in so short a time…The Russians and

the Americans. And we know for sure it was not the Russians.”

Bout continued to fly supplies to Iraq for the US government until 2007. During this time

period there were sporadic news reports of his connections with the US, but CIA intelligence did

nothing to address the issue until 2004. In July 22, 2004, President Bush issued an executive

order labelling Bout a “specially designated person.” This explicitly banned all US business with

Bout and froze his assets. Yet this was largely symbolic as the US continued to use Bout, with

estimates indicating that he was paid as much as $60 million to fly US supplies into Iraq despite

the ban (Farrah and Braun 2007). There has been no official acknowledgement from the US of

their connection to Bout, instead they have maintained that any possible connection to Bout was

made because of the incompetence of US military contractors who hired Bout’s companies

without their knowledge. This explanation however, has been met with considerable skepticism,

especially as there were reports of direct contracts between Bout and the US military (Braun in

Silverstein 2007). As indicated by National Security Adviser Lee Wolosky who had previously

headed up the pre-9/11 taskforce to apprehend Bout, ”It befuddles the mind that the Pentagon

would continue to work with an organization that both the Clinton and Bush White Houses

actively fought to dismantle” (Farrah and Braun 2007: 237).

The US attitude toward Bout changed when their intelligence agencies found that Bout

had been arming Hezbollah in their 2006 conflict with Lebanon. US intelligence revealed that

Bout had been spotted in a Hezbollah military camp and Israeli intelligence indicated that Bout

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had been the one to supply them with Russian made armor-piercing anti-tank missiles. Hezbollah

has been designated a terrorist organization by both the US and Israel, and has a long history of

conflict with Israel – who is arguably the US’s strongest ally in the Middle East. Furthermore, in

July 2006, it was also revealed that Bout was supplying weapons to the Islamic Courts Union

and Islamist militias in Somalia and Eritrea, some of whom have been associated with Al-Qaeda

(Farrah and Braun 2007). Therefore, although Bout was assisting the US in Iraq, the US found

that he was also providing services for groups who they were actively or covertly fighting in the

US-led war on terror, and by continuing to use his services they were effectively undermining

their own global policies. Official statements from the Whitehouse differentiate between those

“who are either with us or against us” (Bush in Farrah and Braun 2007: 11), and in the case of

Bout he was both. Shortly after these revelations, the US launched an operation to apprehend

Bout.

In March 2008, Bout was apprehended in a luxury Bangkok hotel by Thai police

following a six month long sting in cooperation with US intelligence who posed as members of

the Columbian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaires de Colombia (FARC) seeking to broker an

arms deal. The initial charges against Bout were arms trafficking in Thailand and attempted mass

murder (Falconer, 2008), however shortly following his arrest both the US and Russia began to

exert political pressure on the Thai government to extradite Bout to their respective countries for

prosecution.

Almost two years later, Bout was extradited to the US in such an abrupt manner that

neither his wife nor his lawyer, were made aware of the extradition until the morning after it

occurred. This elicited considerable criticism from Russia who accused the US of being

politically motivated and being blatantly unjust (The Moscow News, 2010a). Despite these

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accusations, Bout was prosecuted in a US court for the following four charges: 1) Conspiracy to

kill US nationals; 2) Conspiracy to kill officers and employees of the US; 3) Conspiracy to

acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and; 4) Conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign

terrorist organization (the operatives posing as the FARC) (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011).

On April 5, 2012 Bout was sentenced to 25 years in prison by a New York court (Katersky

2012).

Method

Here we utilized a qualitative case study approach to examine the framing and

presentation of arms trafficking charges against Viktor Bout, for the four year following his

apprehension on March 7, 2008. Discourse analysis was used to examine the role of state/s in the

prosecution of an international arms dealer, paying particular attention to the power of the state

in shaping the course of the trial, creating discourse about the crime itself, and the network of

actors both involved in the sting and the charges being prosecuted. In this instance primary data

were collected from the US court records of the trial of Viktor Bout which was accessed through

the online electronic filing system (PACER) and through the court reporting service that

provided the transcription for the trial. In addition, data were collected from political statements

about the case, as well as from World. The data were arranged chronologically, and analyzed for

themes and patterns that emerged.

The United States vs Victor Bout

There were seven witnesses that testified for the prosecution in the case against Viktor

Bout, including the DEA Agent in charge of the operation, called Operation Relentless, two paid

DEA operatives, a computer forensic examiner also employed by the DEA, a co-conspirator

turned state witness, and two individuals who had previously been employed by Bout’s

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companies in the late 1990s. The prosecution argued that Bout entered into a transaction with the

DEA informants whom he believed to be high ranking members of the FARC, with the goal of

providing them with 700-800 antiaircraft (or surface to air) missiles, 5,000 AK47s, air

transportation for the weaponry (two cargo planes), and the requisite end user certificates (EUCs)

necessary for transportation.

There were no witnesses for the defense, something that surprised the presiding Judge

who said “I did not realize there would be no defense case” (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011:

841). Instead, the defense case focused on providing contradictory explanations to the

prosecution’s assertions to demonstrate reasonable doubt. For example, the defense argued that

Bout did not intend to sell weapons to the FARC, that he repeatedly evaded meeting with them,

and when he finally agreed to meet with them no contract for the sale of weapons was made.

Furthermore, the defense argued that Bout intended to sell the operatives two air cargo planes

instead of weapons, and that it was one of the operatives posing as a FARC Commander who

spoke about killing Americans on the instruction of the DEA, not Viktor Bout.

The case received considerable media coverage with the majority of the news coverage

coming from the three primary countries involved in the case, Russia, Thailand, and the US. As

expected the coverage from the US aligned with the prosecution’s account of the events that

transpired, whereas the coverage from Russia very much supported the defense case and

protested Bout’s innocence, portraying him as a victim of political persecution. The coverage

from Thai news outlets primarily centered on the extradition, specifically the political pressure

exerted over Thailand by both Russia and the US, in their efforts to take custody of Bout. Also,

of particular prominence across the media coverage was the sting itself: Operation Relentless.

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Operation Relentless

Operation Relentless was a complex sting involving many different individuals, police

authorities, states, spanning three continents. Beginning in late 2007, DEA informant Mike Snow

approached Andrew Smulian, a British born former associate of Viktor Bout, asking him to

contact Bout about weapons for his clients – the paid DEA operatives posing as FARC. Smulian

had not seen Bout for ten years, and was targeted by the DEA as he

was financially broke, strapped for cash, he was -- he needed business. Snow offers

Smulian a once-in-a-lifetime deal, an all-cash arms delivery contract. Get paid, deliver

the arms, drop them in the middle of nowhere. Perfect opportunity for Viktor Bout, who

the DEA believed was a rogue arms dealer (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011: 300).

Smulian reported that he had contacted Bout via email and he had turned down the proposal and

Smulian reported to Snow that Bout’s “situation [is] not so good” (United States v. Viktor Bout

2011: 301). Bout had stated to Smulian that all his assets had been frozen by a UN resolution that

had been supported by the European Union, the US and Switzerland, and he was no longer in the

business of selling “gray items” (arms) and instead he was in Russia selling real estate (United

States v. Viktor Bout 2011: 301).

Two weeks following this exchange, Smulian contacted Bout again, this time via email

through a more secure server in Iceland that was set up by Jon Gylfason, a friend/contact of

Smulian. There were several emails back and forth that finally resulted in Bout giving the deal

the “green light.” This prompted Smulian to meet with Snow, which they did on the island of

Curacao where he learned the clients were the FARC (the DEA undercover operatives). Having

had a successful meeting in Curacao, Smulian then flew to Moscow to meet with Bout and

Mikhail Belozerosky where they discussed the deal further. Smulian testified that it was during

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this meeting that Bout contacted Peter Michev, the owner of KAS Engineering, an arms

manufacturer in Bulgaria and inquired about the availability of weapons (United States v. Viktor

Bout 2011: 1280). Smulian then left Moscow and flew to Copenhagen where he again met with

Mike Snow and Carlos Sagastume – one of the DEA operatives pretending to be the FARC. It is

during this meeting that Smulian provided updates on his meeting with Bout and they began to

talk about the possibility of meeting Bout face to face. The three of them decided that Romania

would be a good location for the meeting, so they flew there in anticipation of a face-to-face with

Bout. They spent almost three weeks in Romania corresponding with Bout via email about a

possible meeting either in Romania or Montenegro. Bout did not show for the meeting, but

instead arranged to meet them in Thailand.

Smulian, Snow, and Sagastume then flew to Thailand where they were joined by Ricardo

Jardeno, the second paid operative for the DEA posing as a high ranking official within the

FARC organization. Bout and his body guard met them in a hotel in Thailand where, following a

brief discussion, they were arrested. After securing the EUCs, the proposed deal would have

resulted in the weapons being flown from Bulgaria to Nicaragua in two planes sold by Bout to

the FARC. From there they would have been loaded onto a flight to Brazil and airdropped into

Colombia. The payment of $5 million in cash was to be transported to Spain, where Bout’s body

guard Misha would receive it (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011).

Here we are not debating Bout’s guilt, rather we are reaffirming that this case reaffirms

the focus of neo-liberal crime control policies as being highly individualistic notwithstanding the

large number of actors involved in the proposed arms trafficking deal and the sting itself. Despite

this, the prosecution argued that Bout had “mastery of all facets of an illegal weapons deal”

(United States v. Viktor Bout 2011: 281), and that it is he, and he alone that was going to provide

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the weapons, EUCs (by flying to Nicaragua to obtain them), contracts necessary to transport the

weapons, the transportation (the cargo planes), and he was also able to ensure their delivery. Like

crime control efforts in general, such as the ‘war on drugs’ (Parenti 2008), the torture at Abu

Ghraib (Smeulers and van Niekerk 2009), and the pirates of Somalia (Collins 2014), the focus on

a singular or few “bad apple/s” shifts focus away from the broader political and economic

context in which the crime occurs. This leaves states free of further scrutiny to pursue their own

economic and political interests, which includes the US continued use of illegal arms brokers,

and the maintenance of an arms market that escapes oversight.

As indicated above there were many other actors involved in the proposed deal including

the arms manufacturer in Bulgaria, arms broker Peter Michev, Bout’s bodyguard Misha, Jon

Gylfason in Iceland who set up the secure email server, Paul Popov, another associate of Bout’s

from Moldova where Bout was keeping an Antonov 12 cargo plane who was mentioned in

conjunction with transporting the weapons, Jean-Bernard Lasnaud identified during the trial as

another arms dealer in Paris who had access to airplanes, and even Russian President Putin who

was mentioned by Sagastume. In addressing the court, Sagastume stated that Bout,

Has total protection of the boss….I understood could be referring to the president of

Russia.

Q. Putin, correct, that’s the name?

A. Yes (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011: 968).

It becomes clear that the sting was designed for the sole purpose of arresting and prosecuting

Bout, and not about the larger arms trafficking network. This hyper-individualistic focus acts to

publically appease those focused on controlling arms trafficking, while distracting attention away

from state complicity in the crime.

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This is further supported by the treatment of the other actors swept up in the sting, such

as Bout’s bodyguard, Gylfason, and Michev who were quickly discarded by the authorities. For

example, Bout’s bodyguard having attended the meeting at the Sofitel hotel in Thailand was

arrested by the DEA and the Royal Thai police. He was detained and briefly questioned, but

shortly afterwards he was given approximately 20 US dollars in Thai Baht and told to leave

Thailand immediately (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011). Furthermore, Michev the arms

manufacturer did not testify at the trial and did not face any criminal prosecution. This is

surprising as technically he was the weapons manufacturer and supplier, whereas Bout

involvement centered on the logistics of transporting the arms. By focusing on one individual,

the state is able to maintain legitimacy and appease the larger population by showing they are

active in their efforts to control the crime.

Also, of particular interest are the operatives who posed as the FARC. Both had extensive

criminal histories including being engaged in the trafficking of cocaine. Prior to being engaged

in the drugs business, one of the operatives was an officer in the Guatemalan army, and the other

was a former Colombian military officer. Both had extensive histories of human rights violations

associated with how they had pursued and treated guerillas in Colombia. It was the operatives

who approached the US offering their services in exchange for immunity from prosecution and

moving their families to the US. The US not only agreed, but they had both been paid upwards of

$8 million for their work for the DEA (Austin 2012). Here, the US used “former cocaine

traffickers in order to bring Viktor Bout to justice” (Austin 2012). The US justified their use of

the agents by asserting that the operation was too dangerous for DEA field agents. This is

especially ironic considering peace researchers and human rights investigations have long been

engaged in collecting evidence of Bout’s illicit arms trade – dating back to the mid-1990s

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(Farrah and Baun 2007) – operating on small budgets, without the aid of cocaine traffickers

(Austin 2012).

The only other person prosecuted by the US was Andrew Smulian. He was arrested on

the same four charges as Bout, but very early on agreed to help the US in their case against Bout

and secured a cooperation agreement. Smulian pled guilty to the charges against him in July

2008, and was sentenced after the completion of the case against Bout. During Smulian’s

sentencing hearing the Judge took his cooperation into account and he was sentenced to only five

years (the minimum sentence for the four charges was 25 years). As Smulian had been held in

custody since his arrest in 2008, he had already served over four years, so essentially he received

a sentence of time served. During the sentencing hearing the Judge (the same Judge that presided

over Bout’s trial) said that Smulian ““was simply a financially vulnerable, out of work” air

transporter who had known Mr. Bout…There was no evidence…that had Mr. Smulian not been

approached in the sting, he would ever “have been involved with terrorism”” (Schiendlin in

Weiser and Moynihan 2012). Ironically, the same could have been said of Bout, as at the

beginning of the sting he repeatedly rejected the proposed weapons deal and said he could not be

involved, so much so, that at one point Smulian suggested to Snow that he buy the weapons

directly from KAS manufacturing himself expressing to the agents that he was comfortable

acting alone, “I feel OK myself about it. I don't have a problem. If you guys are OK with it, then

we'll go” (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011: 1427). The DEA rejected Smulian’s offer as this

would have cut Viktor Bout out of the transaction completely.

As indicated in the court transcripts, from the very beginning Bout is characterized as

being solely responsible for “all facets of an illegal weapons deal” (United States v. Viktor Bout

2011: 281), and how operating “on his own, Bout had worked out a coverup for the deal”

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(United States v. Viktor Bout 2011:290). Bout is effectively separated from the other actors in

the network, who because of the US’s blind focus on Bout are afforded plausible deniability for

their involvement in the crime. This gives the appearance that the US is pursing justice by

prosecuting the crime of international arms trafficking, appeasing the call for greater crime

control, but also allowing for state parties to protect their own legitimacy and self-interests. In

accordance with this individualistic approach was the US use of terrorism charges.

The terrorism charges were used as a tool by the US to claim jurisdiction over Bout, and

simultaneously heightened security and control over access to not only Bout himself, but to the

information in the case. This was demonstrated when Bout was escorted from his Thai prison to

his plane,

Thai police commandos in full combat gear and balaclavas accompanied Bout from

prison to the asphalt at Don Muang airport in Bangkok. At least half a dozen Americans,

some wearing jackets identifying them as members of the US Drug Enforcement Agency,

ushered Bout aboard a chartered jet. Bout wore a bulletproof vest, a helmet and a blue

tracksuit (The Guardian 2008).

The dramatic “perp walk” that was disseminated by media globally, served to heightened the

focus on Bout as a very threatening and dangerous individual and support US action in holding

him accountable for his crimes.

Additionally, the justification used by the US for the charges of terrorism were built

around two factors. The first was the US designation of the FARC as a terrorist organization in

1997 (US Department of State 2014), and the second revolved around statements made by Bout

to the undercover operatives. Designating an individual a terrorist is a means for states to

exercise extra-jurisdictional power over an individual, state or region beyond its own borders

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(Singh and Bedi 2012). This has been done in other notable instances, with regards to non-legal

detentions at Guantanamo Bay (Butler 2003), targeted killings by drones (Rothe and Collins

2014), and even through the conflation of piracy with terrorism as it relates to the international

response to piracy in Somalia (Collins 2014). This is a common tactic of states in a post-9/11

world, where terrorism legislation, coupled with the extension of executive power has provided

the justification for the extension of state power over issues that pose a threat to international

peace and security. In this particular case however, the FARC are not designated a terrorist

organization by Russia (The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 2014), or by Thailand

(Public Prosecutor v. Viktor Bout 2009), yet the US used this charge as leverage for extradition

from Thailand to the US.

Interestingly, for the Thai government to agree to extradition to the US, they first had to

be established that the evidence was sufficient to justify a detention order, and that the offense

committed was extraditable. This was problematic for the US, as the Thai court had to find that

the offense that Bout was accused of would result in a sentence punishable by one year or more

in both jurisdictions. Although the Thai court acknowledged that the charges would be

punishable under US law for a year or more, they also found there was no evidence to support

the assertion that the FARC would use the weapons that they bought from Bout to attack US

interests in Colombia. This meant that the Thai court found charges against Bout to be political

and as a result they did not meet the criteria for extradition. Furthermore, they found that the US

charges against Bout were not punishable under Thai law as they were committed against an

interest outside of Thailand (Public Prosecutor v. Viktor Bout 2009). Accordingly, Bout should

not have been extradited to the US.

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The second factor influencing the terrorism charges against Bout, was based on testimony

from the operatives posing as FARC, asserting that Bout not only knew the FARC planned to kill

US soldiers and personnel with the weapons he was supplying, but he allied himself with their

cause. The prosecution asserted that Bout,

was presented with an opportunity to put a multi-million dollar arsenal of weapons and

explosives into the hands of men who told him that they needed it to kill American pilots.

And he jumped at the opportunity. He had the experience to do it, he had the means to do

it, he had the will to do it. And he agreed to do it (United States v. Viktor Bout 2011:

280).

In speaking to the press, US Attorney Preet Bharara said “No one should ever think he can plot

to kill Americans with impunity” (Bharara in The Nation 2010). However, when the context of

the exchange between the undercover operatives and Bout is revealed, it is paid operative

Ricardo Jardenero who initiates the conversations about killing Americans. During the last

meeting in Thailand Sagasume testifies to the exchange between Jardenero and Bout,

Ricardo said we want to knock down those American sons of bitches, because we're tired

-- unintelligible -- kill them and kick them out of my country. The problem now is in

Colombia --unintelligible -- Colombia, they don't care where they go anymore. They go

here, they go there, they go wherever they want. Why. And in response, Mr. Bout said

yes, yes, yes. They act as if -- as if it was their home.

Q. Who did you understand him to be referring to there?

A. He was referring to the Americans.

Q. Going to page 80, line 6. Ricardo said: The FARC has -- the FARC has been fighting

for 46 years. I wasn't born with the war began. I was a baby when this started. Now

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Raul Reyes was a great man, he was my teacher. But, man, the important thing for us is,

what did Ricardo do after saying that?

A. Ricardo was referring to the loss of Commander Reyes, and afterwards he was doing

something like -- like he felt the loss of the Commander.

Q. Did he do anything at that time?

A. He was grabbing his chest.

Q. At the beginning of line 1, Ricardo said for the better, we make the decision, we could

die and it doesn't matter because it is for -- for our people. But we don't want anymore

gringos in our mother country. Now we're going to fight. He then continues. In

response in line 2, Mr. Bout said: We are going to do it (United States v. Viktor Bout

2011: 878-879).

Bout agrees with Ricardo’s assessment of his own cause and situation, but Bout never directly

says he wants to kill Americans, and it is only after several outbursts from Jardenero that Bout

begins to convey agreement. Bout is reacting to a conversation initiated by someone he views to

be a potential client. Furthermore, the operative is acting under the specific instructions from the

DEA to speak to the killing of Americans with Bout, as indicated by the Operation Specialist in

charge of the investigation, Agent Brown,

Q. And in your pursuit of Viktor Bout, the DEA operatives and yourself devised a plan

to inject the element -- inject the element of killing Americans into this arms deal,

correct?

A. That was part of the scenario, yes, very clear.

Q. And you did that so that the United States would gain jurisdiction over Viktor Bout

and extradite him to this country to stand prosecution, correct?

19

A. That we said to kill Americans. We made it perfectly clear throughout the

investigation what the intention of these individuals were.

Q. But my question is very simple, I believe, you did that so that United States would get

jurisdiction over Viktor Bout so he could be extradited and prosecuted in this country?

A. We created an investigation -- …

A. It was a scenario, it was a sting operation, yes, it's common.

Q. So that he could be extradited and prosecuted in the United States?

A. If there was evidence enough for a U.S. court do that, yes (United States v. Viktor

Bout 2011: 543-544).

It therefore appears that the DEA operatives were paid to express anti-American sentiment and to

speak to Bout about their intent to kill Americans as a strategy, to not only to facilitate his

extradition to the US for prosecution, but as a strategy to emphasize the threat that Bout poses to

the US and the rest of the world.

The characterization of Bout as being threatening, not only to the US, but to international

peace and security, is evident in the US media coverage of Bout’s arrest and prosecution.

Characterized as “one of the world’s most notorious arms dealers” and “Africa’s chief merchant

of death” (Mydans and Bonner 2008: 1), he is described as the “FedEx of arms dealers” (Eggen

2008: A01), “munitions monster” (Zambito 2008: 6), and as being aligned with “Afghan

warlords and then the Taliban and Al Qaeda” (The Moscow News 2008: 6), and as heading a

network described as “The McDonald’s of arms trafficking” (Freeze 2008: A3). Repeatedly

referred to as the “Lord of War” by numerous media outlets, Western news coverage of the story

focuses on Bout being caught supplying weapons to a terrorist organization (Johnston and

Mydans 2008; Eggen 2008; Freeze 2008) as well as his history of fueling deadly conflicts in

20

Africa (Campbell and MacKinnon 2008). He is also repeatedly described as “former KGB,”

(Yaniv and Siemaszko 2010: 20), “former Soviet Air Force officer” (Fuller 2010: 4) with

connections to “leftist guerilla groups” (Hutchinson 2010: 19), and “Marxist-inspired guerilla

arm[ies]” (The Irish Times 2011:11). Bout is clearly portrayed as the worst of all criminals, and

is even likened in several newspapers to some of the US’s most high profile criminal defendants,

“Bernie Madoff and the head of Gambino mafia clan John Gotti” (The Moscow News 2010a).

In contrast, Russian coverage of the arrest and prosecution paint a very different picture.

Bout is described as being a “suspected” (The Moscow News 2010b), or an “alleged” (The

Moscow News, 2008) arms trafficker. He is portrayed as a “Russian army officer” (Kozin 2010),

a “businessman” (ITAR-TASS 2010), an “ordinary citizen who found himself in difficult

conditions abroad” (Interfax 2010). Bout also garnered considerable support from the Russian

government who were described as having “raced like bears to honey” to defend him against the

charges (Sidorov 2010). Russian officials described the sting operation as “prejudice,”

“suspicious,” “akin to characterizing it as “sheer murkiness” (Editorial 2010a), and the

extradition as “illegal” (The Moscow News 2010c). Furthermore, non-Western media coverage

provided more quotations from Bout himself who protested his innocence and likened his arrest

to “a plot for a Hollywood action movie” (Bout in Abdullaev 2008). Bout also repeatedly asserts

that he is a victim of “a political chase that has lasted many years” (Bout in Kozin 2010), and is

subject to a justice system that is “akin to medieval witch-hunt trials of inquisition” (ITAR-

TASS 2012). As noted in an Editorial (2010b) in The Moscow News “For the Western press,

Bout is seen as a bogeyman echo of Ronald Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’, while in the Russian media

Bout is widely seen as a victim of a vindictive CIA.”

21

What is really driving the trial?

By examining the weapons deals that Bout had previously been involved with in

conjunction with the US prosecution, it becomes apparent that the US interest in Bout coincides

with their larger geopolitical and economic interests. The sting and subsequent prosecution of

Bout serves to appease the need for crime control, but also ensures the generation and

maintenance of the existing open arms market that serves the very states engaged as controllers

of the crime of arms trafficking. States are able to use covert military planning, to access and

execute arms trafficking deals that serve their own political and economic interests, while

simultaneously keeping it hidden from citizens and other global leaders. By controlling the

prosecution of Bout, the US can continue to perpetuate, and even celebrate its role as being at the

forefront of tackling international crime by bringing a notorious international criminal to

“justice.” In doing so, they can control the flow of information made public, specifically as it

relates to their own complicity in the crime. By propagating understandings of Bout as being

associated with terrorists and being solely responsible for numerous conflicts across the world,

the US has effectively separated their behavior from the crime. This again serves state interests

as this characterization of Bout legitimizes the heavy-handed approach from the US in exerting

pressure on Thailand to extradite him to the US, charge him with serious charges irrespective of

the strength of their evidence, and then sentence him to prison for twenty five years.

It was not until Bout lost all utility to the US, and perhaps became a threat to their global

political and economic interests, that they chose to pursue a case against him. Although his arrest

was framed as the product of an elaborate sting investigation, its timing was not accidental.

Rather, and as indicated by Christopher Walker in an interview with Farrah and Braun (2007) “If

the government really wanted him bad they could have come up with a pretext and seized his

22

planes” at an earlier date. In framing the case against Bout as a cooperative product of varying

law enforcement agencies situated across the globe, the gravity of the charges against Bout are

constructed as credible, and little political and media attention is paid to the logistics of the sting

itself - such as the US use of paid undercover operatives with extensive criminal histories for

drug offenses and human rights violations.

Furthermore, considering the vast array of Bout’s clients, it is unlikely he had particular

allegiances to one group, client, or customer. It is also somewhat of a stretch to suggest he is

aligned with a particular client’s causes or ideologies – the key motivating factor for an act of

terrorism. This argument gathers strength considering that just over a year prior to Bout’s arrest

he was providing transportation and arms for the US military, the very target of the FARC as

indicated to Bout during the sting. We suggest, that like the states that utilize Bout’s services, it

is economics that provide the motivation for Bout, as he has reaped fortunes from his deals

across the globe with his corporate earnings estimated to be in the hundreds of millions (Farrah

and Braun 2007).

Conclusion

Here, we have highlighted some of the hypocrisies in the case against Viktor Bout. We

are not debating the serious harm that has been caused by arms deals that Bout has been involved

with, however, the US case against Bout serves as a reminder of the hyper-individualistic nature

of neo-liberal crime control policies. Playing up Bout’s notoriety, the US focus was on the threat

Bout posed to international security, his active involvement with terrorism, and his supposed

complicity in wanting to kill Americans. This distracts both public and political attention away

from Bout’s connection to the US, allowing them to deny their involvement, and maintain their

agenda of fighting for international peace and security in the “global war on terrorism”

23

(Chossudovsky 2013). It also supports the ongoing emphasis of ‘crime control’ and ‘crime

prevention’ with the focus on a few select-disposable-individuals rather than the broader

structure that facilitates and encourages criminality.

After all, relations with Bout soured when the US found that Bout was not only assisting

in US foreign policy interests, but was simultaneously arming their “enemies.” Bout, albeit a cog

in a larger machine, is assigned blame for the behavior of a network of actors, all of whom

collectively make arms trafficking possible and benefit from the maintenance of an accessible

illegal arms market – both economically and politically. Bout, very publically, has become the

“bad apple,” and his prosecution not only shifts focus away from the reality of the crime, but also

serves US state interests. These interests include their utilization and involvement with an

international arms broker who was also working with other groups whose political interests

counter those of the US, the maintenance of state legitimacy as a controller of crime, and the

preservation of an illegal arms market that allows for covert interactions in a global economic

system that is characterized by free market enterprise and the acquisition of capital. Ironically,

US state involvement as both a facilitator and controller of arms trafficking crime, has

suppressed the real nature of the offense which includes their own culpability. Until states

acknowledge their involvement in arms trafficking networks, targeting specific individuals for

prosecution will not prevent the illicit trafficking of arms.

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank both Dr. Dawn Rothe and Dr. Gary Potter for their valuable feedback on

earlier drafts of this paper.

24

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