Sardar Sarovar Dam Final Report

A Report On

The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project

Submitted to: Prof. Jayasankar Variyar

By:

Mayur Agrawal (11BCE1101)

Avishek Banerjee (11BEE1010)

Anurag Aryan (11BEE1079)

Abhineet Singh (10BEE1006)

Adarsh Modi (10BME1006)

SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

Narmada means „ever-delightful‟, one of the holiest rivers in the country of India

“They say that even the site of the river will cleanse all of your sins”

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Narmada River is India's fifth longest river, starting in the central Indian state of Madhya

Pradesh and flowing west through the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat to the Gulf of

Khambhat. The Sardar Sarovar Dam is only one of a proposed thirty large dams-ten to be built

on the Narmada itself, and the rest on its tributaries. In addition to these 30 major dams, the

Narmada Valley Project also envisions 135 medium and 3,000 minor dams. Proposals for

damming the Narmada have been around for many decades but were delayed until the mid-

eighties because of political wrangling over the sharing of the costs and benefits among the three

states. The dream of political leaders and planning officials within Gujarat for many years, the

Sardar Sarovar Dam Project finally commenced in 1987.

Dam building is integral to India's development vision, which until recently was modelled on

the Soviet style centralized, state-led economic development with an emphasis on

industrialization.

INTRODUCTION

Sardar Sarovar Project is one of the biggest projects of Indian government which consists of

more than 3000 dams including 30 big dams constructed on the river Narmada, a 1,312 km river

which flows towards west from Amarkantak in Madhya Pradesh, touching Maharashtra and

ending its course in Gujarat. The SSP is a multipurpose dam and canal system; its primary

objectives are power generation, irrigation and drinking water. It is situated in Gujarat. It is the

second biggest of all the dams proposed on the Narmada River and its canal system is projected

to be the largest in the world. Gujarat gets most of the benefits from this dam because the dam is

situated in Gujarat only. The total land which is submerged due to this project is 37,533 hectares

which is primarily affecting the state of Madhya Pradesh (around 55%) and also state of

Maharashtra.

Sardar Sarovar will comprise a 455 feet-high dam ( but it now stands at 340 feet), a 214

kilometer-long reservoir, a riverbed powerhouse, power transmission lines, main canal, canal

head powerhouse, and an extensive irrigation network. The irrigation envisaged shall be carried

out through an 80,000-kilometer long network of canals. All this shall require approximately

85,000 hectares of land, complex engineering, and immense resources.

As initially planned the key feature of SSP was to be a 138 meter high dam across the Narmada

River in eastern Gujarat that is to provide irrigation water for 1.8 million hectares and have

hydropower installed capacity of 1,450 megawatts. How what the Indians refer to as

Resettlement and Rehabilitation 1 was to be carried out was stipulated by the 1979 report of the

Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (the Tribunal). Because the Project authorities have ignored

the Tribunal‘s provisions from the start, opposition began to build up in the early and mid-

1980s. Several NGOs were involved. Initially their main concern was to improve the

resettlement process according to the Tribunal and the guidelines of the World Bank. As it

became increasingly clear that the political will to undertake a credible resettlement program not

only was absent, but that the project authorities were willing to use the police to harass project

affected people, the activities of all but one of the major NGOs shifted to opposition in the

second half of the 1980s. Since then opposition has strengthened.

Firstly, the fact that this project involves four states — Gujarat, MP, Maharashtra and Rajasthan

— with the state of Gujarat receiving most of the benefits of the project have repeatedly led to

disagreements among the concerned states. Secondly, the nature of Indian water law, which

makes control over water largely a prerogative of the States with some oversight of the Central

government in inter-state matters, provided the background for the setting of complex inter-state

institutional machinery to oversee the development of the project. This was also the basis for the

setting up of a special tribunal, the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), to adjudicate

the claims of the concerned states. Thirdly, the involvement of the World Bank in the SSP was

also a landmark. It not only led to the commissioning of an independent enquiry of an on-going

project but also led the bank to take the unprecedented step of withdrawing from a funded

project. This withdrawal had further significant repercussions at the international level. In

particular, it led the World Bank to set up its first internal accountability mechanism, the

Inspection Panel. The SSP fiasco also constituted one of the triggers for the setting up of the

World Commission on Dams. Fourthly, the SSP is also a landmark project from the point of

view of social movements. While it is now very likely that the dam will be completed as

projected by the project promoters, the work undertaken by the Narmada Bachao Andolan

(NBA) and other organisations and individuals in the context of the SSP has had important

impacts in India and abroad. Thus, to take but one example, before the NBA brought the issue of

displacement to the forefront of the policy agenda, oustees had merely been seen as incidental

costs of development, so much so that until the early 1990s there were no figures indicating the

extent of displacement generated by projects.1 Overall, regardless of whether oustees are

actually resettled or not according to the legal framework put in place and regardless of whether

the project eventually fulfils all the environmental and other conditions that have been set over

time, the SSP will remain a milestone that has significantly contributed to transforming and

redefining people's movements and activism in India and abroad.

Throughout agriculture is dominated by food crops for local consumption and sale.

Rain fed agriculture, livestock management, and foraging, complemented by flood recession

agriculture and fishing along the Narmada, are the main village activities in the tribal areas.

Upriver in Madhya Pradesh, wealthier peasants irrigate their fields from wells and by pumping

water from the Narmada. Crops are marketed locally with Badwani (35,000 in the mid-1980s)

being the largest affected town. Within the peasant villages ―class and caste divisions are even

more pronounced in the Narmada valley than they are in the rest of the country‖, perhaps due to

the middle Narmada basin being relatively isolated from the rest of India.

SALIENT FEATURES OF SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT

I. LOCATION

State Gujarat

District Narmada

Taluka Rajpipla (Nandod)

River Narmada

II. HYDROLOGY

Watershed area of the river above dam site. 88000 sq km

(33970 sq.mile)

Mean annual rainfall 1 120mm (44.10 inch.)

Annual run-off at dam site

at 50% dependability 4.10 Mha m (33.20 MAF)

at 75% dependability 3.36 Mha m (27.22 MAF)

at 90% dependability 2.44 Mha m

(19.77 MAF)

Designed flood (1 in 1000 years) 87000 Cumecs

(30.7 lakh cusecs)

III. RESERVOIR

Full Reservoir Level (FRL) 138.68 m (455 ft) Maximum Water Level (MWL) 140.21 m (460 ft)

Minimum Draw Down Level (MDDL) 110.64 m (363 ft)

Nonnal tail Water Level (NTWL) 25.91 m (85 ft)

Gross Storage Capacity 0.95 Million ha m

(7.70 MAF)

Dead Storage Capacity 0.37 Million ha m

2.97 MAF

Live Storage Capacity 0.58 Million ha m

(4.73 MAF)

Annual evaporation 0.06 Million ha m

(0.5 MAF)

Submergence at FRL 138.68m(455 ft) 37533 ha

No. of villages affected Full Partial

Madhya Pradesh 1 192

Maharashtra - 33

Gujarat 3 19

Total 4 244

No. of families affected

Madhya Pradesh 33104

Maharashtra 3698

Gujarat 4728

Total 41440

IV. DAM

Type Concrete Gravity

Length 1210.02m

Maximum height 163.00 m

Top of dam EL 146.50 m

Crest EL 121.92 m

Spillways

Service spillway 23 bays

60 ft (18.30 m) each

Auxiliary spillway 7 bays

60 ft (18.30 m) each

Crest gates

Type Radial

Size 18.30 mx 16.76 m (23 Nos.)

18.30 mx 18.30 m (7 Nos)

Constructiun siuices at EL. i8.0m 2.10 m x 2.74 m (10 Nos)

Closed in Feb 94

River sluices at EL. 53.00m 2.5m x 3.6 m (4 Nos.)

V. POWER INSTALLATION (CHPH)

General

Location Right bank

No. of units 5

Rated capacity of each unit 50 MW

Installed capacity 250MW

Type of turbines Kaplan (Conventional)

Type of Power House Surface

Turbine

Rated speed 136.4 RPM

Dia. of runner 4.7 m

Max. head race level 138.20 m

Min. head race level 110.18 m

Max. tail water level 95.10 m

Min. tail water level 92.07 m

Output at 46.13 m head (Max.) 56.4 MW

Output at 36 m head (Design) 51.265 MW

Output at 18.12 m head (Min.) 18.575 MW

Discharge at 46.13 m head (Max.) 135.5 Cumecs

Discharge at 36 m head (Design) 157.6 Cumecs

Discharge at 18.12 m head (Min.) 118.5 Cumecs

Generator

Generator rated output 50.556 MVA (50MW)

Max. cant. output 61.111 MVA (55 MW)

Line voltage 11.0 + 5% KY

Power Factor 0.9 (lag)

Frequency 50(+3%) Hz

VI. POWER INSTALLATION (RBPH)

General

Location Right Bank

No. of units 6

Rated capacity of each unit 200 MW

Installed capacity 1200 MW

Type of turbines Francis (Reversible)

Type of Power House Underground

Turbine

Rated speed 136.36 RPM

Dia of runner 5.7 m

Max. head race level 138.68 m (FRL)

Min. head race level 110.64 m (MDDL)

Max. tail water level 25.91 m

Mill. tail water level 20.80 m

Turbine Mode

Output at 116.6.6 m head (Max.) 224.4 MW

Output at 100 head (Design) 204 MW

Output at 75 m head (Min.) 138 MW

Discharge at 116.6 m head (Max.) 212.3 Cumecs

Discharge at 100 m head (Design) 227.5 Cumecs

Discharge at 75 m head (Min.) 219.1 Cumecs

Pumping Mode

Input at 114 m head (Max.) 204.5 MW

Input at 100 m head (Design) 209.2 MW

Input at 81 m head (Min.) 207.5 MW

Discharge at 114 m head (Max.) 168.4 Cumecs

Discharge at 100 m head (Design) 197.5 Cumecs

Discharge at 81 m head (Min.) 233.4 Cumecs

Generator

Generator rated output 222.22 MVA

Line voltage 13.8 + 10% KY

Power Factor (Generating Mode) 0.9 (lag)

Power Factor (Motoring Mode) 0.95 (lead)

Frequency 50 (±3% Hz)

VII. CANAL SYSTEM

FSL at head regilator of main Canal 91.45 m (300ft)

Type of Canal Lined contour canal

Length 458 Km upto Rajasthan border and 74 Km in Rajasthan

Base width in head reach 73.1 m

FSD in head treach 7.6 m

Discharge capacity in head reach 1132.68 cumecs

(40000 cusecs)

Gross Command Area (GCA) 34.286 lakh ha

Cuturable Command Area (CCA) 21.190 lakh ha

Annual Irrigation 17.92 lakh ha

VIII. Cost (Rs. Crore)

Price Level

1986-87* 1996-97** 2000-01***

Unit -1 (Dam & Appurtenant works) 1019.45 4473.75 6036.78^

Unit-II Main Canal 1588.54 4410.00 5216.35

Unit-III Hydro Power Works 979.95 2184.75 2728.07

Group-IV Branches & Dist. System 2818.10 11850.00 14578.17

Total Cost of the Project 6406.04 22918.50 28613.37

BENEFITS OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

WILD LIFE SANCTUARY

Many wild life centuries have been started in these areas like

"Shoolpaneshewar wild life sanctuary" on left Bank, Wild Ass Sanctuary in little Rann of

Kachchh, Black Buck National Park at Velavadar, Great Indian Bustard Sanctuary in Kachchh,

Nal Sarovar Bird Sanctuary and Alia Bet at the mouth of River.

IRRIGATION

Sardar sarovar dam provides irrigation facilities to a large area of land around the states of

Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. It provides irrigation facilities to 18.45 lac hectares

of land, covering 3112 villages of 73 talukas in 15 districts of Gujarat. It will also irrigate 75,000

hectares of land in the strategic desert districts of Barmer and Jallore in Rajasthan and 37,500

hectares in the tribal hilly tract of Maharashtra through lift. About 75% of the command area in

Gujarat is drought prone while entire command (75,000 ha.) in Rajasthan is drought prone.

Assured water supply will soon make this area drought proof.

DRINKING WATER SUPPLY

It provides drinking water to a large number of villages and cities. A particular amount of water

is provided for drinking to around 135 urban centers and 8215 villages (45% of total 18144

villages of Gujarat) for present population of 18 million and prospective population of 40 million

by 2021. All the villages and urban centers of arid region of Saurashtra and Kachchh and all the

villages who have no source of water who are affected by drought, salinity are benefitted. Water

from dam is also supplied to various industries to meet their demands which help in industrial

development also.

POWER

There are two power houses viz. River bed power house and canal head power house with an

installed capacity of 1200 MW and 250 MW respectively. Power developed is shared by three

states Madhya Pradesh - 57%, Maharashtra - 27% and Gujarat 16%. This power is very much

useful for states who have very limited hydel power production at present. Apart from this

several micro hydel power stations are also installed on branch canals where good amount of

power can be produced.

FLOOD PROTECTION

It will also provide flood protection to riverine reaches measuring 30,000 hectares covering 210

villages and Bharuch city and a population of 4.0 lac in Gujarat.

A Typical Flood Control Dam outflow graph

It will also provide flood protection to riverine reaches measuring 30,000 hectares covering 210

villages and Bharuch city and a population of 4.0 lac in Gujarat.

OTHER BENEFITS

Benefits to small and marginal Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe farmers would be as under :

Marginal farmers (< 1 ha.) 28.0 %

Small farmers (1 to 2 ha.) 24.4%

Scheduled Tribe 8.7%

Scheduled Caste 9.1%

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

FLOODING OF NAURAL HABITATS

Frequent flooding of natural habitats leads to extinction of plants and animals. The riverine

forests close to the river are more prone to damage.

LOSS OF TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE

The filling up of the hydroelectric reservoirs cause floods and many species of wildlife drown

due to these floods

INVOLUNTARY DISPLACEMENTS

Construction of huge hydroelectric projects leads to the displacement of the people living nearby.

These displacements cause great difficulty to the people as they have to adapt to new

surroundings.

DETERIORATION OF WATER QUALITY

The damming of rivers lead to reduced oxygenation and dilution of pollutants in water causing

water decay. The lack of oxygen and underwater decay make the water unfit for drinking.

DOWNRIVER HYDROLOGICAL CHANGES

There can be a vast change in the ecosystem due to periodic flooding, water decay and other

toxins caused by the hydroelectric project. River edge and coastal corrosion are prone to occur

and even the formation of rivers and estuaries are affected by the dam. Induced desiccation of

river below dam affects the flora and fauna as they are highly dependent on the river.

WATER RELATED DISEASES

Diseases such as malaria and typhoid often occur in warm climates and densely populated

regions near the dam. The consumption of contaminated water can also lead to cholera,

dysentery etc.

FISH AND OTHER AQUATIC LIFE

Hydroelectric projects have large effects on fish and other aquatic life. It has some positive

effects such as increasing the area of available aquatic habitat which helps many fishes to breed

and develop. Even though it has some good effects, the net impacts are often negative, some of

the reason for this are:

1. The pathway for upriver and downriver migration is blocked.

2. Many aquatic species addicted to flowing water cannot survive in artificial lakes.

3. Change in the river flow pattern adversely affects many species.

4. Change in the water quality (such as amount of oxygen and other gases) in or below reservoirs

kill‘s fish and damage other aquatic habitats such as mollusks, crustaceans and other benthic

organisms with limited mobility.

FLOATING AQUATIC VEGETATION

Floating aquatic vegetation can rapidly multiply in reservoirs with stagnant water, causing

problem such as

1. Degradation of habitat for aquatic life

2. improved breeding ground for mosquitoes and other parasites

3. restricted swimming and navigation

4. Clogging of electro-mechanical equipment at dams

5. Increased water loss from some reservoirs

LOSS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

Reservoirs basically inundate whole region on which dam is built thus causing destruction and

loss of cultural property, archaeological property, and historical, paleontological and religious

sites such as (OMKARESHWAR). Sometimes it floods whole city causing loss of roads, houses

and other things. It is evident that the river Narmada along with its two banks and the adjoining

regions had seen the early men bustle with activities. Indeed the entire region bears traces of

Lithic, Iron, and Copper and Chalcolithic cultures. The Narmada basins besides providing shelter

to the Pre and Protohistoric man had also been the home of many early Indian dynasties. Thus

flourished the Mauryas, the Shungas, the Guptas, the Pushyabhutis, the Gurjara Pratiharas, the

Rashtrakutas, the Kalachuris and Paramaras etc... The artifacts left by them made the entire

region a treasure house of antiquities, a repository of different cultures, and a fact that always

attracted the attention of the scholars. Surveys, explorations and excavations were carried out.

Much was done by them but more remains to be done yet.

RESERVIOR SEDIMENTATION

Over long period of time, live storage and power generation are reduced by reservoir

sedimentation, such that much of some projects‘ hydroelectric energy might not be renewable

over the long term.

GREENHOUSE GASES

Greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide and methane) are released into the atmosphere from reservoirs

that flood forests and other biomass, either slowly (as flooded organic matter decomposes) or

rapidly (if the forest is cut and burned before reservoir filling). Greenhouse gases are widely

considered to be the main cause of human-induced global climate change. Many hydroelectric

reservoirs flood relatively little forest or other biomass. Moreover, most hydro projects generate

sufficient electricity to more than offset the greenhouse gases which would otherwise have been

produced by burning fossil fuels (natural gas, fuel oil, or coal) in power plants. However, some

projects which flood extensive forest areas, such as the Balbina Dam in Amazonian Brazil,

appear to emit greenhouse gases in greater amounts than would be produced by burning natural

gas for many years of comparable

ACCESS ROADS

As dams are usually built in hilly areas which are sparsely populated, the environmental impacts

of access roads generally exceed that of the reservoir. New access roads involve deforestation

and induce major land use changes which results in loss of biodiversity, accelerated erosion and

other environmental problems. Such an example is of Arun II in Nepal.

POWER TRANSMISSION LINES

Power transmission lines often result in reduction and fragmentation of forests so as to improve

physical access to them for humans. Thus they indirectly facilitate further deforestation. Large

birds are also sometimes killed in collisions with power lines in mountainous regions, or

sometimes by electrocution.

QUARRIES AND BORROW PITS

Hydroelectric projects require quarries and borrow pits to provide materials for construction of

the dam and other complementary works. Thus they decrease the area of natural habitats and

agricultural lands which are lost to the project.

POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT LARGE DAMS MINIMISE THEIR

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

DETERIORATION OF WATER QUALITY

Water pollution control measures (such as sewage treatment plants or enforcement of industrial

regulations) may be needed to improve reservoir water quality. Where poor water quality would

result from the decay of flooded biomass, selective forest clearing within the impoundment area

should be completed before reservoir filling.

LOSS OF TERRESTRIAL WILDLIFE

Instead of drowning, the captured and relocated animals typically starve, are killed by

competitors or predators, or fail to reproduce successfully, due to the limited carrying capacity of

their new habitats. Wildlife rescue is most likely to be justified on conservation grounds if

(a) The species rescued are globally threatened with extinction and

(b) The relocation habitat is ecologically suitable and effectively protected.

The most effective way to minimize wildlife mortality in hydroelectric projects is to choose dam

sites which minimize the wildlife habitat flooded.

DOWNRIVER HYDROLOGICAL CHANGES

These adverse impacts can be minimized through careful management of water releases.

Objectives to consider in optimizing water releases from the turbines and spillways include

adequate downriver water supply for riparian ecosystems, reservoir and downriver fish survival,

reservoir and downriver water quality, aquatic weed and disease vector control, irrigation and

other human uses of water, downriver flood protection, recreation (such as whitewater boating),

and, of course, power generation. Environmental management plans for hydroelectric projects

should specify environmental water releases, including for dams owned or operated by the

private sector.

WATER RELATED DISEASES

Corresponding public health measures should include preventive measures (such as awareness

campaigns and window screens), monitoring of vectors and disease outbreaks, vector control,

and clinical treatment of disease cases, as needed. Control of floating aquatic weeds near

populated areas can reduce mosquito-borne disease risks.

FISH AND OTHER AQUATIC LIFE

Management of water releases may be needed for the survival of certain fish species, in and

below the reservoir. Fish passage facilities (fish ladders, elevators, or trap-and-truck operations)

are intended to help migratory fish move upriver past a dam; they are usually of limited

effectiveness for various reasons (including the difficulty of ensuring safe downriver passage for

many adults and fry). Fish hatcheries can be useful for maintaining populations of native species

which can survive but not successfully reproduce within the reservoir.

They are also often used for stocking the reservoir with economically desired species, although

introducing non-native fish is often devastating to native species and not ecologically desirable.

Fishing regulation is often essential to maintain viable populations of commercially valuable

species, especially in the waters immediately below a dam where migratory fish species

concentrate in high numbers and are unnaturally easy to catch.

FLOATING AQUATIC VEGETATION

Pollution control and pre-impoundment selective forest clearing will make reservoirs less

conducive to aquatic weed growth. Physical removal or containment of floating aquatic weeds is

effective. Where compatible with other objectives (power generation, fish survival, etc.),

occasional drawdown of reservoir water levels may be used to kill aquatic weeds. Chemical

poisoning of weeds or related insect pests requires much environmental caution and is usually

best avoided.

LOSS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

Structures and objects of cultural interest should undergo salvage wherever feasible through

scientific inventory, careful physical relocation, and documentation and storage in museums or

other appropriate facilities. However, it is often not possible to replace the loss of, or damage to,

unique or sacred sites which may have great religious or ceremonial significance to indigenous

or other local people.

RESERVOIR SEDIMENTATION

If effectively implemented, watershed management can minimize sedimentation and extend a

reservoir‘s useful physical life, through the control of road construction, mining, agriculture, and

other land use in the upper catchment area. Protected areas are sometimes established in upper

catchments to reduce sediment flows into reservoirs. Aside from watershed management, other

sediment management techniques for hydroelectric reservoirs may at times be physically and

economically feasible; they include, among others, upstream check structures, protecting dam

outlets, reservoir flushing, mechanical removal, and increasing the dam‘s height.

ACCESS ROADS

The siting of any new access roads should be in the environmentally and socially least damaging

corridors. Forests and other environmentally sensitive areas along the chosen road corridor

should receive legal and on-the-ground protection.

Road engineering should ensure proper drainage, to protect waterways and minimize erosion.

Environmental rules for contractors (including penalties for noncompliance) should cover

construction camp siting, gravel extraction, waste disposal, avoiding water pollution, worker

behavior (such as no hunting), and other construction practices.

POWER TRANSMISSION LINES

Power lines should be sited to minimize these concerns and built using good environmental

practices (as with roads). In areas with concentrations of vulnerable bird species, the top

(grounding) wire should be made more visible with plastic devices. Electrocution (mainly of

large birds of prey) should be avoided through bird-friendly tower design and proper spacing of

conducting wires.

ECONOMIC LIVELIHOODS

The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project affected people's economic security in some very fundamental

ways. Many people who were directly displaced as a result of the project received no economic

compensation whatsoever. People who were displaced as a result of the canal system, for

example, were not considered to be covered under the 1979 Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal

ruling concerning "oustees," and thus were not deemed to be entitled to resettlement. Indeed,

many received little or no compensation for land lost, and no compensation for other resources,

such as fruit trees, destroyed by the Sardar Sarovar project. For those who were supposed to be

covered under the resettlement and rehabilitation program, there were still many forms of

economic victimization.

Many, if not most, of the people to be displaced by the development project were tribal

"encroachers" on state land because they held no legal title to that land. Both the state of

Maharashtra and the state of Madhya Pradesh chose to interpret the Tribunal ruling regarding

"oustees" to mean that only those with formal title to land, and their adult sons, would be given

land for land, despite the fact that this would make tribal people, who hold their land by

customary usage, landless oustees . What must be understood here is that landlessness is an

economic disaster for these people's well-being since land is their source of subsistence and

knowledge of their local environment is their major skill. As the Narmada Control Authority

stated in 1984, "For tribal, there is no rehabilitation more effective than providing land as the

source of livelihood". Even for those who are covered under the resettlement and rehabilitation

segment of the development project, their economic security was in many cases jeopardized,

even to the point of displacing some family members from one mode of production (that of

cultivator) to another, more insecure, mode of production (that of wage earner). In many cases,

land which was given was too little or of poorer quality.

In addition, the resettlement and rehabilitation policy did not recognize other aspects of

economic livelihoods. It did not take into account economic practices such as fishing,

pastoralism, and gathering. Also, the levels of economic productivity which result from local

environmental and cultural knowledge has been, for the most part, ignored. Nor did the policy

properly take into account the forms of economic security that arise as a result of people's social

ties-"[people attribute their economic security to a long established web of human and

geographical links within their community". These links, of course, would be destroyed where

the community was not resettled as a whole. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the fact that

even in the best case scenario for resettlement and rehabilitation, the process of displacement

precedes that of relocation and rehabilitation. In other words, there is that period of time wherein

people are living a transitory, double existence. There are relocation costs which often have to be

paid out before compensation is given. There is also a readjustment period, wherein land must be

made ready to cultivate, and the general quirks of a new and different environment adjusted to.

Baviskar gives an example of one aspect of the transitionary impact that the Sardar Sarovar

Project had on Anjanvara, the village she had lived in just prior to the dam project: A hand-pump

for the village was sanctioned several years ago, but never installed because the village lies in the

submergence zone of the dam. So the last few years and the present have been held captive to an

uncertain future. All of these transitionary problems negatively impact on economic security. In

some cases, they may even prove to cause yet further displacement in the future.

CULTURE

Many of these people are also victimized in terms of their cultural well-being. Perhaps the most

important means of cultural victimization is the policy stance taken by both the state of

Maharashtra and the state of Madhya Pradesh. "Oustees" have the choice of being resettled

within their own state, but for many there is very little in the way of a real choice. Most

"oustees" in these two states would be considered landless oustees (eligible only for a house lot)

because they hold no legal title to land. However, in the state of Gujarat they would be given a

minimum of 2 hectares of land. Also, the state of Gujarat has more land available in larger

sections, allowing for the potential of at least some families or community groups to resettle

together worse and Berger. However in cultural terms, resettling in Gujarat is a loss. For many it

would mean moving away from other important family and other social ties. As well, language

would become even more of a barrier, since few tribal men and no tribal women know languages

other than their own and even then it would be only the official language of the state that they

live in. Resettlement threatens to culturally victimize people in other ways. These displaced

people must adapt their lifestyle in that they are often "moving from relative isolation and

independence to a high degree of dependence on public institutions and services to protect

against disastrous consequences of the move". Also, the caste system and a general lack of social

ties has meant that for those resettled, there is almost always little in the way of social bonding

with other established communities in the area, leading to social isolation. In all cases where

people have resettled, they have expressed a feeling of loss over leaving their home and their

gods. Included in this list of losses are even the basics of privacy-many women who were

interviewed bemoaned the loss of privacy that the forest provides for bathing and performing

their "ablutions".

HEALTH

The physical and psychological wellbeing of all of those who experienced a drop in the standard

of their living would potentially be threatened as a result of the resettlement process. As

discussed earlier, the loss of one's culture, place, and economic security would certainly affect

psychological well-being. And in many cases, even a temporary drop in economic livelihood

could result in a loss of access to an adequate and nutritious diet, which would especially affect

the health of the very young. "In 1988, the Tata Institute reported unusually high mortality rates

among Manibeli oustees, especially children, for the first years of relocation". Stress and anxiety

which would result simply from the anticipation of having to move could quite possibly have

both physical and psychological effects. In addition, many of the resettled areas are lacking in

basic infrastructure, such as working water pumps and proper, comfortable housing

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

The first and the foremost is that Sardar Sarovar claims to but cannot solve the water crisis of

Gujarat. The project is planned; they claim to irrigate 14 % of Gujarat's cultivatable land and to

supply drinking water to 8215 villages and 135 towns and cities in Gujarat. It is pertinent to note

here that the claimed SSP command area includes only 9.24% cultivable land of Saurashtra and

1.5% cultivable land of Kutch.

Drinking water is an aspect - they have begun publicising much more during the last two to three

years than before since the other benefits have been exposed to be unfounded. And yet, you may

be shocked to know that not one paisa is allocated for water supply (lifting pipeline etc.) in

Sardar Sarovar Project. This clearly indicates the Government‘s priority for drinking water

benefits which are left to the mostly bankrupt Gram-Panchyats and Municipal councils as well as

for corporations to implement. The fact is that drinking water, as was stated in the Gujarat's

proposal to the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) was never a priority or planned

benefit for the rural Gujarat. Only the Municipal areas were to receive some water along with

industries therein (the combined magnitude being about one ninth of Gujarat's share from SSP,

not even clearly divided into two sub-categories). The number of villages said to be receiving

drinking water is swollen merely on political grounds, including all villages, in Kutch and

Saurashtra, without any basis, neither any change in allocation of water nor finances.

The displacement created by the dam has a number of direct and indirect impacts. A large

number of families were displaced but there was no fixed estimate about the exact number of

families who were displaced. The figure kept on rising. The state governments were not having

enough land to resettle displaced people nor were they having enough funds to buy land. Madhya

Pradesh state was severely affected by this problem. So the case of resettlement was failure to

large extent in case of SSP. However the affected families which have been provided

resettlement and rehabilitation were provided with the following:-

Resettlement and Rehabilitation Package for Project Affected Families

2 hectares irrigable Agriculture land.

Residential plot of 500 Sq. Mts.

Assistance of Rs. 45000/- for the construction of house.

Subsistence allowance of Rs. 4500/-.

Assistance of Rs.7000/- for procuring productive assets like bullocks and agricultural

equipment‘s.

Resettlement grant of Rs. 750/-.

Street light and internal electrification of 1.5 point free of cost in Core House.

Personal accident insurance etc.

A school and children's park in each resettlement site.

Dispensary in each site where MP and MH oustees are resettled.

Since there was delay in the starting of the Sardar sarovar project therefore it caused a huge

loss to the Indian government.

Earlier when the project was started the authority officials claimed that siltation is not going

to cause much problem in this project. But when the project started then the amount of

siltation was very much as compared to what predicted before so the government decided to

get rid of this problem as this decreased the energy production which also costed a lot to the

Indian Government.

CONTROVERSIES OF SARDAR SAROVAR DAM

Narmada Struggle – Fact Sheet

30 Big Dams, 135 Medium Dams, 3000 Small Dams

Height of Sardar Sarovar Dam – 455 feet

Benefits – Irrigation, Electricity

Beneficiaries – Industries and rich farmers

Displacement – 400000 tribals and marginal farmers

Submergence Area - 36,000 ha

Current Height - 340 feet

Status of Rehabilitation – 50000 families in need of rehabilitation

Ruke na jo

Ruke na jo, jhuke na jo,

dabe na jo, mite na jo,

Hum who inquilab hein,

julm ka jawab hein. (Lines used during protest)

Controversy over the dam projects on the Narmada, a river running through central India and the

axis of life for countless rural and tribal communities living on its banks, erupted in the nascent

stages of planning and shows little sign of receding. Songs like the one above, sung at

community gatherings protesting the dams, underscore the defiance, resolution, and anger of a

people forced to live in uncertainty for decades.

The Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), which is spearheading the

protest, says the project will displace more than 200,000 people apart from damaging the fragile

ecology of the region. NBA activists say the dams will submerge forest farmland, disrupt

downstream fisheries and possibly inundate and salinate land along the canals, increasing the

prospect of insect-borne diseases.

Some scientists have added to the debate saying the construction of large dams could cause

earthquakes. They say that in a country as disorganised as India, it is likely that the necessary

maintenance of these dams may suffer.

But those in favour of the project say that the project will supply water to 30m people and

irrigate crops to feed another 20m people. In what was seen as a major victory for the anti-dam

activists, the World Bank withdrew from the Narmada project in 1993.

Several other international financial institutions also pulled out citing human and environmental

concerns. The construction of Sardar Sarovar dam itself was stopped soon afterwards.

Go ahead

However, in October 2000, the Indian Supreme Court gave a go-ahead for the construction of the

dam. The court ruled that the height of the dam could be raised to 121.92 metres and no higher,

until cleared by an environmental authority appointed to undertake the task. This is far below the

proposed height of 130 metres, but higher than the 88 metres that the anti-dam activists want.

Opponents of the dam question the basic assumptions of the Narmada Valley Development Plan

and believe that its planning is unjust and iniquitous and the cost-benefit analysis is grossly

inflated in favour of building the dams. They claim that the plans rest on untrue and unfounded

assumptions of hydrology and seismicity of the area and the construction is causing large scale

abuse of human rights and displacement of many poor and underprivileged communities. They

also believe that water and energy can be provided to the people of the Narmada Valley, Gujarat

and other regions through alternative technologies and planning processes which can be socially

just and economically and environmentally sustainable. They claim that large numbers of poor

and underprivileged communities (mostly tribals and dalits) are being dispossessed of their

livelihood and even their ways of living to make way for dams being built

Large dams imply large budgets for related projects leading to large profits for a small group of

people. A mass of research shows that even on purely technical grounds, large dams have been

colossal failures. While they have delivered only a fraction of their purported benefits, they have

had an extremely devastating effect on the riverine ecosystem and have rendered destitute large

numbers of people (whose entire sustenance and modes of living are centred on the river). For no

large dam in India has it been shown that the resettled people have been provided with just

compensation and rehabilitation.

Critics say that Sardar Sarovar takes up over 80% of Gujarat‘s irrigation budget but has only

1.6% of cultivable land in Kutch, 9% of cultivable land in Saurashtra and 20% cultivable land in

North Gujarat in its command area. Moreover, these areas are at the tail-end of the command and

would get water only after all the area along the canal path get their share of the water, and that

too after 2020 AD. In summary, they fear that all available indicators suggest that these needy

areas are never going to benefit from the Sardar Sarovar Project.

So as the anti-dam activists ponder their next move, the government has started again with

construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam.

PROTESTS

The dam is one of India's most controversial dam projects and its environmental impact and net

costs and benefits are widely debated. The World Bank was initially a funder of the SSD, but

withdrew in 1994. The Narmada Dam has been the center of controversy and protest since the

late 1980s.

Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that mobilised

tribal people, adivasis, farmers, environmentalists and human rights activists against the Sardar

Sarovar Dam being built across the Narmada River, Gujarat, India.

Their mode of campaign includes hunger strikes and garnering support from noted film and art

personalities (notably Bollywood film actor Aamir Khan). Narmada Bachao Andolan, together

with its leading spokespersons Medha Patkar and Baba Amte, were the 1991 recipient of the

Right Livelihood Award.

Narmada Bachao Andolan is the voice of hundreds of thousands of indigenous people and

peasants who are losing their land and livelihoods to large dams on the Narmada River. The

nonviolent satyagraha (insistence on truth) of the displaced people for their rehabilitation has

spanned two decades, challenging the centralized development programs and envisioning

alternatives. The movement has won policy changes in World Bank and other multi-lateral

funding agencies.

The demands of NBA include land-for-land rehabilitation of the displaced people and equitable

distribution of natural resources and benefits of such projects.

There were a lot of protests regarding the dam, the protest by Medha Patkar, the leader of the

"Narmada Bachao Andolan" the "Save Narmada Movement. The movement was cemented in

1989, and was awarded the Right Livelihood Award in 1991. Protests also came from Indian

author Arundhati Roy, who wrote the extended essay "The Greater Common Good" in protest of

the Narmada Dam Project.

While its resettlement requirements, such as resettlement and rehabilitation six months before

inundation, continued to be ignored by the project authorities, the main response of the Supreme

Court during 2001 was to issue contempt notices to the most prominent opposition leaders when

they questioned the Court‘s decision. Again outrage was expressed by different levels of Indian

society as well as by such prominent outsiders as author Salman Rushdie who asked in an

August 7, 2001 New York Times article ―Can it be that the Supreme Court of the world‘s largest

democracy will reveal itself to be biased against free speech and be prepared to act the bidding of

a powerful interest group – a coalition of political and financial interests behind the Narmada

Dam?‖

Construction work on the Sardar Sarovar Dam site, which had continued sporadically since

1961, began in earnest in 1988. At the time, nobody, not the Government, nor the World Bank

were aware that a woman called Medha Patkar had been wandering through the villages slated to

be submerged, asking people whether they had any idea of the plans the Government had in store

for them. When she arrived in the valley all those years ago, opposing the construction of the

dam was the furthest thing from her mind. Her chief concern was that displaced villagers should

be resettled in an equitable, humane way. It gradually became clear to her that the Government's

intentions towards them were far from honourable. By 1986 word had spread and each state had

a peoples' organisation that questioned the promises about resettlement and rehabilitation that

were being bandied about by Government officials. It was only some years later that the full

extent of the horror - the impact that the dams would have, both on the people who were to be

displaced and the people who were supposed to benefit - began to surface. The Narmada Valley

Development Project came to be known as India's Greatest Planned Environmental Disaster. The

various peoples' organisations massed into a single organisation and the Narmada Bachao

Andolan - the extraordinary NBA - was born.

In September 2001 the Government of Maharashtra agreed under pressure to set up a Joint Task

Force on resettlement with NBA and other non-governmental members. The Task Force‘s 2002

report concluded that resettlement was incomplete with 3,100 families yet to be physically

relocated as required, while rehabilitation was incomplete for the 500 families that had moved.

Yet in May 2002 the dam was further heightened to 95 meters. Rising waters during the July-

September monsoon devastated crops and houses in still to be resettled villages. Further ignoring

noncompliance with its requirements, in September 2002 the Supreme Court closed the door to

further legal challenges by dismissing, without reviewing the issues, a NBA case challenging the

legality of raising the height of the dam beyond 90 meters. The following May 2003, further

heightening to 100 meters was approved. The 2003 monsoon began with heavy rains in July with

flooding worsened when water was released from the upriver Tawa Dam. By the end of August,

over 12,000 yet to be resettled families had been adversely affected by flooding. 3,000 of those

families lived in Maharashtra‘s 33 affected villages; 10,000 families lived in over 80 villages in

Madhya Pradesh. Throughout the 2000-2003 periods, the project authorities made promises to

carry out their legally required R & R responsibilities only after fasting threatened the lives of

protestors, including Medha Patkar in both 2002 and 2003, or after visits by prominent persons.

Once fasts ended and visitors left promises were either ignored or dealt with in a token fashion.

In the meanwhile, police in both Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh continued to abuse village

and NGO protestors while the three governments continued to deny benefits to categories of

people covered by the Tribunal. The situation reported from Chimalkhedi Village in Maharastra

illustrates the unacceptable behaviour of government personnel including the police. During the

2003 monsoon, the village became an island surrounded by floodwater. Since houses and some

fields had not been inundated, the villagers were denied resettlement benefits. Fearing bad

publicity if some drowned, the police arrested and removed 74 people and had some of their

houses destroyed while they were absent. 3 Across the Narmada in Madhya Pradesh, the

Government, claiming no land was available, continued to pressure villagers to accept cash

compensation in violation of both the terms of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court. By the end

of the 20th century, the Narmada River has become a symbol for two cultures in conflict that

advocate very different futures for the Indian sub-continent. The first supports a free flowing

river without dams, with living standards to be raised by a wide range of community-based

initiatives with central and state government and NGO assistance. The second, believing the flow

of monsoon rains into the Arabian Sea to be a waste, takes the large project approach. It

advocates the most ambitious program of river basin development in Indian history and perhaps

in the world. Arising relatively recently, the conflict between these two visions has become a

major national issue, with international implications, that has involved the Supreme Court of

India as well as the current President and various Prime Ministers.

These conflicting visions for the Narmada‘s future arose only recently because of the earlier

inability of the three states to agree on how the Narmada‘s water resources should be divided

between them. As in other river basins throughout India, ambitious development plans had been

drawn up in the 1950s and 1960s. Having failed in previous attempts to adjudicate an agreement

between the states, the Government of India appointed a ―Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal‖

(the Tribunal) in the late 1960s. Illustrating the complexities involved, it took the Tribunal over

ten years to produce a final report in 1979 that was acceptable to the three states, plus Rajasthan

which was to benefit from receipt of irrigation water. Not only did the Tribunal‘s Report allocate

benefits and financial costs for SSP between the four states, but it also detailed the conditions

under which resettlement from the reservoir basin was to be carried out. Gujarat as the main

beneficiary would be responsible for all resettlement costs as was the case with Egypt in

connection with the Aswan High Dam. The report‘s provisions were to be legally binding on the

four states for a forty-five year period.

HEIGHT ISSUES

In February 1999, the Supreme Court of India gave the go ahead for the dam's height to

be raised to 88 m from the initial 80 m.

In October 2000 again, in a 2 to 1 majority judgment in the Supreme Court, the

government was allowed to construct the dam up to 90 m.

In May 2002, the Narmada Control Authority approved increasing the height of the dam

to 95 m.

In March 2004, the Authority allowed a 15 m height increase to 110 m.

In March 2006, the Narmada Control Authority gave clearance for the height of the dam

to increase from 110.64 m to 121.92 m. This proposal was declined by the Supreme

Court.

There was a hunger strike conducted by Narendra Modi due to the government allowing

the increase of the height of the dam. The increasing height only led to the increase in

displacement of people.

Why Modify Sardar Sarovar Project by choosing other alternatives to the

project?

Gujarat has experienced very catastrophic earthquakes of very high magnitude on the Richter

scale and the damaging consequences of Bhuj earthquake are similar to those caused by

catastrophic Himalayan Earthquakes. The Sardar Sarovar project being located over a major

fault zone surrounded by several lineaments, major earthquakes are bound to occur in the dam

area during its life time when the dam may experience fissures similar to the ones experienced by

the Koyna dam and result in its failure. The seismic co-efficient of 0.125g used for the design of

the dam is unsafe because of the location of the dam in the rift zone on a seismic highway. The

old concept of a seismic design used by civil and structural engineers for major structures has

been shattered by the failures of major structures under Kobe earthquake of Japan. Since there

are major dams upstream of Sardar Sarovar, the failure of one or more of these dams during

torrential cyclonic rains may cause extreme floods at Sardar Sarovar when the dam may collapse,

thereby unleashing extensive peak floods that will cause a major disaster for millions of people

and industries in the extensive region covered by Baroda and Bharuch districts. Several dams

were unscientifically designed by the engineers of Gujarat and the Central Government and some

of them including Machchu-II dam failed because the engineers failed to visualize that the

highest observed floods could be more than the spillway design flood used by them.

There is no guarantee that the Sardar Sarovar dam has been scientifically designed by using peak

maximum flood likely to be experienced under the worst meteorological conditions influenced

by the increasing global warming effects and hence Sardar Sarovar dam may fail due to extreme

flood events also. Hence further increase in the height of the dam should be immediately stopped

and fresh Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report must be prepared as envisaged by the

Supreme Court by taking into consideration the latest seismological changes caused by the Bhuj

earthquake and the Mumbai flood havoc of July 2005 caused by the crucial weather events due

to the global warming effects. In the alternative the hydro-power sought to be generated by this

project must be produced by using alternate energy sources like coal, oil and natural gas. The

irrigation water supply for Kheda district must be provided by the Sardar Sarovar canal and the

Mahi river water from Kadana dam thus saved must be supplied to Rajasthan by taking up a link

canal so that extensive upland areas of North Eastern Gujarat districts may get the benefit of

substantial drinking and irrigation water supplies.

In the downstream of the dam there are a number of towns and cities and several villages which

might be affected in case the proposed dam bursts due to a maximum credible accident caused by

floods, earth quakes and other causes. Hence a preliminary dam, break analysis has been carried

out to create public awareness on the project and its environmental impacts. so that the social

workers and intellectuals along with the industrialists in the Bharuch and Vadodara districts can

come forward to grasp the basic fact that while the existing peak floods are already causing

untold public misery and industrial damage at an enormous cost the additional incremental

increase of the peak floods will be several times higher with the result that millions of people in

the downstream districts of Sardar Sarovar dam will be washed away into the Arabian sea if the

dam were to burst during the night hours in the peak rainy season when there could be torrential

rains due to cyclonic weather conditions that persist for a considerable length of time as had

happened in Mumbai flood havoc of July 2005.

SELECTED OUTPUT DATA ON INUNDATION DOWNSTREAM OF SARDAR

SAROVAR DUE TO A HYPOTHETICAL DAM BREAK CAUSED BY A

MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT

Distance of

stations from dam

(Km)

Max. Elevation of

flood (m)

Max. flood flow

(cusecs)

Hours for Max

flood to reach

station

Max velocity (m/s)

000 58.54 350838 2.275 10.40

10.586 52.84 325657 2.950 7.46

20.290 48.13 315550 3.750 5.84

30.771 43.19 305421 5.075 5.34

40.102 39.07 288175 6.400 4.69

50.211 34.33 270148 8.100 4.24

60.087 30.04 255076 10.500 3.13

70.585 27.04 237416 13.200 2.40

80.514 24.99 220748 15.475 2.10

90.356 23.19 205438 17.500 1.90

100.114 21.46 190640 19.10 1.75

110.220 19.66 173935 20.70 1.59

120.530 17.92 149777 22.30 1.51

130.528 15.94 125027 23.90 1.63

Resettlement

Introduction

To document the duplicity of SSP authorities at both the state and central levels it is necessary to

analyse in detail the resettlement planning and implementation process over a forty year period.

One issue is pulled out for separate analysis. That describes the lengths to which the Government

of Gujarat went to discourage resettlers from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh from resettling

within the SSP command area – an option that was required by the Tribunal to spread irrigation

benefits beyond Gujarat.

Overview:

The 1960s

In April 1961 Prime Minister Nehru laid the foundation stone for the Sardar Sarovar Dam.

Resettlement began that year with the eviction of villagers from what became the Kevardia

construction community adjacent to the dam site even though the three states had yet to agree on

how to share the Narmada‘s water resources. Kevardia was carefully designed for the benefit of

those overseeing project implementation with little attention paid to how current residents might

benefit or to the contribution that the construction colony might make to the future regional

development of the surrounding area. As with others resettled before the May 1985 World Bank

SSP agreement with the governments of India and the three states, all those involved were to

receive, retroactively, the same benefits as those relocated after May 1985. In 1993, when the

remainder of the World Bank SSP loan was cancelled, such benefits had yet to be received.

Depending on definitions, six to eight villages were displaced. Number of families involved is

unknown. Based on the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, policies for acquiring land not only were

restricted to cash compensation, but provided such compensation only to those with legal title to

official revenue lands. That excluded those cultivating fields in government declared forests or

wastelands regardless of how long such land had been under cultivation and regardless of

whether or not it had been previously cultivated under customary tenure. Also excluded were all

families and their heirs that had joint use under customary tenure arrangements of ―legal‖ land

that the government had listed under only one name. According to the two NGOs working in the

area in the 1980s – ARCH-Vahini and the Rajpipla Social Services Society – such joint tenancies

often involved three or more families whose welfare depended on continued use. Resettlement

placed most at risk since government-recognized owners could now terminate the rights of the

other families that had been recognized under customary law. Since some individuals did just

that, this aspect of official resettlement policy not only increased resettler poverty, but also

created enmity between father and sons, brothers, and other kin who formerly had worked

together as joint users. Informed by Gujarat officials those 165 revenue landholders and 120

landless families were displaced, the Independent Review estimated that 950 individuals would

have undergone compulsory resettlement in the early 1960s. Landless families would have

received no compensation even though their welfare might have depended on the sharecropping

or loan of the more than 50 per cent of village lands that were acquired by the project. As for

those who received at least some compensation, what evidence is available – and there is no

reliable counter evidence from government sources – is that it was insufficient to acquire

equivalent lands. Though I did not have time to look into the situation in detail in the 1980s,

what I did learn caused me to write in a notebook in 1984 that in general ―those who received

compensation were miserable and those who did not were even more miserable.‖ Nine years

later the Independent Review noted that the government of Gujarat continued to ignore the plight

of those involved.

The 1970s

As far as resettlement is concerned the main event of the 1970s was the release of the Tribunal‘s

Report in 1979. Though its provisions advanced India‘s resettlement policy, they also had major

limitations. The advances related primarily to families from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra

who lost to the project 25 per cent or more of the land to which they had legal title. So as to

spread the irrigation benefits of the SSP more widely, each such family, as well as their major

sons who were 18 years of age or older, had the option to resettle in Gujarat on two hectares of

irrigable land within the SSP command area.

That land-for-land requirement was a major advance on previous policies based primarily on

cash compensation. Landless families had the same option of resettling within the SSP command

area, although the only land they would be entitled to would be a house plot. Similar conditions

were to apply if resettlers opted to remain in their home state. As with those going to Gujarat, the

Tribunal also stipulated as a guiding principle that all resettlers should be moved in social units

of their own choice, with new communities to be provided with potable water, roads, schools and

other social infrastructure.

As for major weaknesses, resettlers from Gujarat were ignored as were those in Madhya

Pradesh and Maharashtra who were landless or cultivators on government lands called

‗encroachers,‘ the latter were considered as landless people even though they may have been

cultivating the land involved for many years and though it may have been land over which they

formerly had had customary tenure. Furthermore, even the best features of the Tribunal‘s

provisions might be relatively meaningless, since the global experience with resettlement

suggested that the large majority of MP and Maharashtra resettlers would wish to remain within

their home states. That proved to be the case in both states so long as people had an option. In

Madhya Pradesh ―86 percent of potential oustees [the Indian term for resettlers] stated a

preference to relocate within 50 km of their current homes‖, with 54 percent preferring

―resettlement within 20 kilometers of their village‖. In Maharashtra 26 of the 36 villages

preferred local resettlement.

A year later the Government of Gujarat passed a resolution that provided similar benefits to legal

owners of land in their own 19 villages with the exception that it was not stipulated that the two

hectares of irrigable land would be within the SSP command area. That omission provided

project authorities with a loop hole that they subsequently used to avoid the two hectare

requirement and the need to provide community infrastructure. Knowing that the villagers had a

strong preference to relocate no further than 25 kilometres from their current homes so as to

remain within village clusters that were linked together by marriage networks, the authorities

offered land at a greater distance – 100 km in one case and 220 km in another. As stated in my

1983 report, ―That such land was offered at all suggests, at best, insensitivity to the preferences

of oustees and, at worst, a conscious attempt on the part of officials to intentionally reduce the

number of oustees seeking rehabilitation in government provided centres (such centres not only

require government to provide blocks of land, but they also require more time and finance to

implement)‖.

When resettlers refused to move to such distant lands among unfamiliar people, they were given

cash compensation instead. Though some help was provided in finding land, with a few

exceptions, insufficient land was acquired to allow people in resettle in social units of their

choice. Moreover, cash compensation was based on the assessed value of the land rather than on

its replacement value. In an inflationary land market, monies received were seldom sufficient for

purchasing equivalent land. As for the landless and ‗encroachers,‘ they were ignored under the

1979 resolution.

The number of villages that would receive drinking water was zero in 1979, 4,719 in the early

eighties, 7,234 in 1990 and 8,215 in 1991. When challenged, the Government admitted that these

figures for 1991 included 236 uninhabited villages!

Every aspect of the project is approached in this almost cavalier manner, as if it's a family board

game. Even when it concerns the lives and futures of vast numbers of people.

In 1979 the number of families that would be displaced by the Sardar Sarovar reservoir was

estimated to be a little over 6,000. In 1987 it grew to 12,000. In 1991 it surged to 27,000. In 1992

the Government declared that 40,000 families would be affected. Today, it hovers between

40,000 and 41,500. (Of course, even this is an absurd figure, because the reservoir isn't the only

thing that displaces people. According to the NBA the actual figure is 85,000 families - about

half a million people.)

The estimated cost of the project bounced up from Rs.6,000 crores to Rs.20,000 crores

(officially). The NBA says that it will cost Rs.40,000 crores. (Half the entire irrigation budget of

the whole country over the last fifty years.)

The Government claims the Sardar Sarovar Projects will produce 1450 Mega Watts of power.

The thing about multi-purpose dams like the Sardar Sarovar is that their 'purposes' (irrigation,

power production and flood-control) conflict with each other. Irrigation uses up the water you

need to produce power. Flood control requires you to keep the reservoir empty during the

monsoon months to deal with an anticipated surfeit of water. And if there's no surfeit, you're left

with an empty dam. And this defeats the purpose of irrigation, which is to store the monsoon

water. It's like the riddle of trying to ford a river with a fox, a chicken and a bag of grain. The

result of these mutually conflicting aims, studies say, is that when the Sardar Sarovar Projects are

completed, and the scheme is fully functional, it will end up producing only 3 per cent of the

power that its planners say it will. 50 Mega Watts.

The Sardar Sarovar Dam as Unethical Development

Development is supposed to be beneficial. It is supposed to be the creation of a better life.

Within the context of a nation, the state is supposed to be committed to the development of the

people as a whole. It has a responsibility to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs and

benefits of development projects, especially when they are state projects. Yet the potential

benefits of the creation of the Sardar Sarovar Dam are to accrue to a better-off segment of Indian

society-those who can afford electricity and those who hold land in Gujarat or Rajasthan which

would become properly irrigated as a result of the development project. In turn, the costs are

largely being born by an already disadvantaged segment of society- Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes. Many members of these groups do not have formal title to their lands and

therefore little recourse to mainstream legal channels when it comes to compensation. This

leaves the vast majority of displaced people with practically no bargaining power over their fate.

Although there are provisions to resettle and rehabilitate at least some of the people who will be

displaced as a result of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, resettlement still generally means a drop in the

quality of living.(An exception are those resettled in the "model" sites which proponents of the

dam project have topping the tour list.) The resettlement and rehabilitation project, which is

supposed to be a "development opportunity," is, in actual fact, undermining the economic

livelihoods and quality of life of these people.

Over the long term, this might even mean further displacement as essential needs are not met. As

such, resettlement is not improving the standard of living as defined by the displaced people

themselves. In addition, there are all those who, though harmed in various ways by the dam

project, are not receiving even the inadequate compensation of rehabilitation, because they hold

no formal title to the land or waters that they use for economic livelihood purposes.

The Sardar Sarovar Dam is a case of a development project which is both directly and indirectly

causing a massive amount of environmental displacement. This displacement is not limited

to the present. Rather, the effects of both the dam project and its accompanying resettlement and

rehabilitation project are setting the stage for further displacement by increasing people's

economic vulnerability. Those who must bear the majority of the development costs in this

project were neither properly consulted, nor compensated in ways acceptable to them. Moreover,

the Sardar Sarovar Dam is development on the backs of the poor, as the people being displaced

are amongst India's most vulnerable and disadvantaged social groups. For these reasons, the

Sardar Sarovar Dam project cannot be considered to be ethical development.

REFERENCES

The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project website- www.sardarsarovardam.org

SSCAC's website- www.sscac.gov.in

www.wikipedia.org

URL- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sardar_Sarovar_Dam

www.narmada.org

URL- www.narmada.org/sardarsarovar.htm

www.narmada.org/ENV/index.html

www.supportnarmadadam.org

URL- www.supportnarmadadam.org/sardar-sarovar-benefits.htm

Google Images- http://www.google.co.in/imghp?hl=en&tab=wi

‗Harvard Human Rights Journal‘ / Vol. 19 (SARDAR SAROVAR: AN EXPERIENCE

RETAINED)

‗The Sardar Sarovar Dam Project: An Overview‘ by Philippe Cullet

‗The Greater Common Good‘, an article by Arundhati Roy

‗A Narmada Diary‘, a film by Anand Patwardhan

‗A Damaging Report‘, an article in The Hindu (Chennai edition; dated 31-04-2010)