Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: …Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power Ahmed Hashim MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL VOLUME

Saddam Husayn and Civil-MilitaryRelations in Iraq:

The Quest for Legitimacy and Power

Ahmed Hashim

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ✭ VOLUME 57, NO. 1, WINTER 2003

Ahmed S. Hashim is Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College in Newport,Rhode Island. The views expressed here are those of the author and not those of the US Government.He specializes in Middle Eastern studies focusing primarily on Iran, Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf, andSouth Asian security issues as well. He also addresses functional strategic issues such as the proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction, asymmetric warfare, the Revolution in Military Affairs, and Terrorism.Between 1996-2000 he was a defense analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia,where he focused on operational issues of concern to the US Navy and on asymmetric warfare. His mostrecent publications include, “Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Joseph Kechichian(ed.), Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States, New York: Palgrave, 2001; “The World According to UsamaBin Laden,” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001. Forthcoming publications include “Dynamics ofCivil-Military Relations in the Arab World,” Saddam’s Grand Strategy, and Al Qaeda: Goals, Strategy,and Operational Art.

In July 2002, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn celebrated 34 years in power. This isan impressive record by any regional standard. He had been leader of Iraq longerthan any other person since the creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, and hadmanaged to retain power in spite of numerous calls for his removal and actual effortsundertaken to unseat him. For years, many observers thought that the most likelyinstitution that could remove Saddam Husayn from power was the Iraqi armed forces,

This article addresses civil-military relations in Iraq under Saddam Husayn overthe past thirty years. Historically, the Iraqi armed forces have intervened regularlyin the political process of the country. This has been to the detriment of politicalstability, the ability of Iraq to play a role in regional politics and to emerge as amajor military power. Saddam recognized this early on and implemented aseries of stringent controls to bring the military to heel under civilian rule. Butthe military has continued to threaten his rule. At the present time, Iraq hascome under immense pressure from the United States, which has threatened itwith war to remove the regime. Is there any possibility that the military mightintervene and remove Saddam itself and under what circumstances? How woulda civilian government in a post-Saddam Iraq establish civilian control over themilitary?

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either by means of a successful assassination attempt or by coup d’état.Saddam Husayn has survived numerous assassination and coup attempts, often

encouraged or supported by foreign powers. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini called upon the Iraqi military to rid itself of itsleader. On February 15, 1991, in the midst of Operation Desert Storm, US PresidentGeorge H.W. Bush declared “that there is another way for the bloodshed to stop. Andthat is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own handsand force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”1 No one, it was thought, couldsurvive a disaster of the magnitude that was facing the Iraqi leadership.2 But Bush’sexhortation to the Iraqi army was based on a profound misunderstanding of the natureof civil-military relations in Saddam’s Iraq. The Iraqi military was either unable orunwilling to heed this call.3

Yet for a number of years after the Gulf War the US and other members of thecoalition continued to believe that the Iraqi military was the best hope for overthrow-ing Saddam Husayn. While defeat had failed to unseat him, history provided somereasonable expectation that Saddam would ultimately go: the long tradition of in-volvement of the Iraqi military in the political process and several repeated attemptsby officers to overthrow the regime. All that was needed was one successful coup,Saddam’s foes kept telling themselves and the world.

Given the history of involvement by the Iraqi military in the political process,outside observers have not been able to understand why the Iraqi military did notmove against the regime.4 Our understanding of the nature of civil-military relationsin Saddam’s Iraq has generally been deficient. Indeed, not much analysis has beenundertaken on contemporary Iraqi civil-military relations per se, and particularly onhow Saddam Husayn has managed to control the armed forces over the last 30 years.

1. Quoted in David Isenberg, “Getting Saddam: Part I: A plan is hatched,” Asia Times, July 30, 2002on-line at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html.

2. In October 2002, George H.W. Bush admitted as much in a speech, see “Bush Sr. DefendsRecord on Hussein,” Washington Post, October 22, 2002, p. 22.

3. Although segments of the population did rise up against the discredited regime, a popular revoltwas not really what the US and its coalition partners had in mind.

4. There is a considerable literature on Iraqi civil-military relations from the origins of the state upuntil the Ba‘thists took over in 1968. See Majid Khadduri, “The Role of the Military in Iraqi Society,”in Dankwart Rustow and Sydney Fisher, The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society andGovernment, (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1963), pp. 41-51; Eliezer Be’eri, Army Officers inArab Politics and Society, (London: Pall Mall, 1970), pp. 171-209, 326-332; George Haddad, Revolu-tions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, (New York: Robert Speller and Sons,1971), p. 55-155; Majid Khadduri, “Iraq, 1958 and 1963,” in William Andrews and Uri Ra’anan, ThePolitics of the Coup d’Etat: Five Case Studies, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969),pp. 65-88; Mark Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence,”Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 1977), pp.75-97; Mohammed Tarbush, The Roleof the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982);Alaa Tahir, Irak: Aux Origines du régime militaire, [Iraq: On the Origins of the Military Regime],(Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989). For studies that contain detailed analyses of republican civil-militaryrelations prior to 1968, see Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq, (London: Oxford University Press,1969), pp. 62-147.


CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN IRAQ ✭ 11

The extremely sensitive nature of civil-military relations in a highly secretive regimewas clearly a major obstacle to research. Moreover, while a number of Iraq expertshave had to address contemporary civil-military relations in their studies of Iraqunder Saddam, this was not often a focus of attention. Apart from a joint article byAndrew Parasiliti and Sinan Anton, and one by the former alone, there has been norecent contribution devoted to the subject.5The first goal of this article is to assess thenature of civil-military relations, and to analyze in detail the manner in which SaddamHusayn has controlled this key institution.

Over the course of the 1990s, both foreign powers and domestic opponents ofSaddam Husayn lost hope that the armed forces could bring about “regime change.”Iraqi officers continued to plot and to foment coups, without success. Foreign helpproved to be no panacea; in fact it, was detrimental to their efforts. In 1996, the USCentral Intelligence Agency lent its support to a disastrous and half-baked coup planformulated by the Amman-based opposition organization the Iraqi National Accord,which claimed that a large number of disgruntled officers were ready for a coup. Theconspiracy was riddled with spies and Saddam struck decisively before the coup waslaunched, executing 300 people, including scores of officers.6

Some exiles even proposed and formulated plans for regime change, includingthe insertion of armed rebel groups into the country that would ostensibly be able togo face to face with the Iraqi military.7 The most active proponent of this strategywas the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its chairman, Ahmed Chalabi. When theUS succeeded in ousting the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan as part of the post-9/11 waron terror by using US forces and the units of the local anti-Taliban Northern Alliance,a new variation on the Iraq insurgency plan, dubbed the “Afghan model” was pro-moted. Once again, the INC and Ahmed Chalabi and his Washington allies were inthe forefront, extolling the virtues of the model. It took several months to point outthe potential pitfalls and weaknesses of this strategy.8

But as the administration of George W. Bush prepared to make the case for a

5. See Andrew Parasiliti and Sinan Anton, “Friends in Need, Foes to Heed: the Iraqi Military inPolitics,” Middle East Policy, Vol.VII, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 131-140; Andrew Parasiliti, “LessonsLearned: The Iraqi Military in Politics,” in Joseph Kechichian (ed.), Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States,(New York: Palgrave, 2001). Other Iraq experts have written some solid pieces on aspects of civil-military relations but this issue was not the focus of their analyses. See e.g., May Chartouni-Dubarry,“The Development of Internal Politics in Iraq from 1958 to the Present Day,” in Derek Hopwood, HabibIshow, and Thomas Koszinowski, (eds.), Iraq: Power and Society, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp.19-36.

6. For details see R. Jeffrey Smith and David Ottaway, “Anti-Saddam Operation Cost CIA $100million,” Washington Post, September 15, 1996, p. A1; Patrick Cockburn, “The CIA’s Bungle in Baghdad,”The Independent, April 11, 1997, p. 17; and Evan Thomas, Christopher Dickey, and Gregory Vistica,“Bay of Pigs Redux,” Newsweek, March 23, 1998.

7. For discussions of this approach see,f or example, Malina Brown, “Analysis: Naval Forces MustNot Use Afghan Model for Iraq War,” Inside the Navy, September 9, 2002, p. 1; Scott Peterson, “KurdsReady to be N. Alliance,” Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 2002, p. 1; Julian Borger, “PlanResurfaces to Target Saddam,” The Guardian, December 28, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk.

8. For the definitive account see Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for InvadingIraq, New York: Random House, 2002, pp. 293-335.



preventive war against Iraq in the closing months of 2002, renewed attention waspaid to the potential reaction of the Iraqi armed forces. Might members of the officercorps make a move prior to an American invasion and overthrow the Iraqi leader?What would this mean for the future of the country? Might the officer corps defect toAmerican forces once the invasion has been launched or would they fight in defenseof their country? Once Iraq is defeated — and there is no war scenario that assumesan Iraqi victory — what kind of role might the military see for itself in a post-SaddamIraq? But there are few answers to these questions. The second goal of this article isto seek some tentative answers — tentative because we must rely on speculation — tothese key questions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

FORMATION OF THE IRAQI ARMY

Iraq is a relatively young state in the ancient land once known as Mesopotamia.It was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Britain had fought acampaign there during the war, and the Peace Conference granted it a League ofNations Mandate over Iraq. Unwilling to bear the costs of imposing direct colonialrule, the British cast around for a suitable puppet — much as the US has sought to doin the present situation — to rule the country while they remained the real powerbehind the scenes. They settled on Prince Faysal, their hapless ally in the war and theson of the Sharif of Mecca, the Hashimite ruler of the Hijaz in Arabia. Faysal,blocked by France from assuming power in Damascus, accepted the British offer andwas crowned king on August 23, 1921.

The new Iraqi state was a backwater: it was weak, unstable, poor, and underde-veloped. The inhabitants were divided by tribal, ethnic, sectarian, religious, andregional differences.9 In order to forge a new nation, the state would need the back-ing not only of its British patron, but of a national army at its disposal. Even beforeFaysal was formally crowned king, the first units of the Iraqi army were raised onJanuary 6, 1921. Defense of the new country from external aggression was to remainin the hands of the British for the foreseeable future. But the new Iraqi army hadthree tasks:

· Protect the new monarchy and provide it with a force more powerful thanthe well-armed tribes;

· Deal with the ever-present threat of rebellion from discontented tribes orethnic groups;

· Contribute to nation-building via the implementation of conscription which

9. For an outstanding and detailed analysis of the make-up of the new state, see Hanna Batatu, TheOld Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1979), pp. 5-44.



would bring young men from disparate regions together and inculcate in thema sense of nationalism. Faysal regarded the new army as a “spinal column fornation-forming.”10

Ultimately, the army itself became a source of threat to the monarchy and civil-ian governments. Indeed, unstable civil-military relations have haunted Iraq from thevery founding of the state because of the political nature of the officer corps that cameinto existence and because of the unstable politics of the country.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AND IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS

From the very beginning of the new state the senior officer corps developednational visions for their country that ultimately clashed with those of the civilianrulers. Iraqi civil-military relations are unique in the fact that there was already inexistence an officer corps prior to the founding of either the country or the army. Thenew state had a large officer corps made up of men from Mesopotamia who had onceserved the proud but now defunct Ottoman army. Much of the Ottoman army hadconsisted of Arabs, including many in the senior ranks of the officer corps. Amongthe most formidable of the Arabs within the Ottoman army were those Sunni Arabsand Kurds who came from Mesopotamia. In 1903, 10% of the admissions to theHarbiye, the Military Academy in Istanbul, were reserved for cadets from that prov-ince.

The Harbiye was one of the few remaining honorable institutions of the dyingand dissolute Ottoman Empire, and had been revitalized by energetic German offic-ers. During their sojourn in the Harbiye these young cadets learned from their Ger-man instructors — such as Colmar von der Goltz11 — theories of modern warfare.They also learned from these super-patriotic Germans of the need for states to havestrong national armies, of the fact that armies were the most superior institution insociety, and of the necessity for the army to intervene in the political process when thesituation warranted. By 1912 there were 1,200 “Iraqi” officers in the Ottoman armymany of whom, by that time, had already begun imbibing new and radical ideologiesswirling in the capital, Istanbul. In the case of the Arab officers, Arab nationalistideologies that sought liberation from the empire caught their imagination. The loy-alties of these officers were put to the test when war broke out in 1914. Manydeserted and joined the Arab Revolt headed by Prince Faysal that fought alongsideBritish forces against the Turks.12

10. King Faysal I’s confidential memorandum of March 1933, cited in H. Batatu, The Old SocialClasses, p. 26.

11. Freiherr Colmar von der Goltz (1843-1916) was a famous Prussian soldier and military scholarwhose book Das Volk im Waffen [The Nation in Arms] called for a strong central government andextolled the role of the military in leading and shaping society. The book had considerable influence inthe Ottoman Military Academy.

12. For the education of and ideological influences on the Iraqi officer corps see Reeva Simon, IraqBetween the Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1986.



Of the 640 Iraqi officers who survived the war and returned home, Faysalbrought with him 190 who had joined his rebellion. A large number of these “Sharifian”officers, as they came to be known, moved into senior positions in the political,administrative and military posts of the new state. Having been a backwater of theempire, Mesopotamia, unlike the Levant or Egypt, had little in the way of an edu-cated middle class or intelligentsia that could move into positions of authority in thenew state. As the most educated and most cosmopolitan “class” in the new society,the Iraqi officer corps occupied this position by default. Those who took positions inthe new state may not have been content with British domination, but they accepted itin return for the privileges and benefits of being in power. Pragmatic yet cynical,these officers in power — either as serving officers in the new military or as civilianofficials — became masters of political intrigue and self-serving behavior.

However, the Iraqi army itself became a laboratory for a variety of ideologies.Some of those who stayed in the army gravitated towards pan-Arab nationalist ideas.Many Sunni Arab officers who were influenced by these ideas became fervent adher-ents of this ideological current. They believed that the Arab nation was liberatedfrom the Ottoman yoke in order to regain its status as a modern and developing nationthat would ultimately unite into one big powerful nation. The fact that they camefrom an ethno-sectarian minority in the new country but were politically and sociallydominant further accentuated their sense of ‘uruba or “Arabness” and their desire todraw Iraq closer to the Arab west. However, their nationalistic fervor was not matchedby any theoretical understanding of the need for socioeconomic and modernizationprograms.

A third group of officers (in addition to the Sunnis and the Sharifians) mainlyfrom the Kurdish and Turcoman minorities, fearful of the possibility that an Iraqdominated by pan-Arab nationalists would further enshrine their minority status, tendedto gravitate towards an “Iraq-first,” ideology. These officers did not view the Britishpresence in Iraq with any degree of equanimity. But unlike the pan-Arab officerswho obsessed over this matter, the “Iraq-firsters” while aware that Iraq was primarilyan Arab country and should play an important role in inter-Arab politics, were mainlyinterested in developing the country and implementing sorely needed socioeconomicprograms.13 These officers saw Kemal Atatürk in Turkey or Reza Pahlavi in Iran asmodels.

When the Iraqi Military Academy was opened up to the sons of the lower middleclasses in the 1930s, the new and young cadets were exposed to either the pan-Arabnationalist or the Iraq-first current. But whatever current they gravitated towards,Iraqi political life at that time provided them with ample opportunity to intervene inthe political process. These officers became radicalized and dissatisfied with theBritish domination of the country, which they saw as a national humiliation, with thecorrupt and “unpatriotic” behavior of the ruling elite and senior officers, and with the

13. For more on this latter group see Michael Eppel, “The Hikmat Sulayman-Bakr Sidqi Governmentin Iraq, 1936-37, and the Palestine Question,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No.1 (January 1988), pp.25-41.



inability of the cabinets to maintain domestic stability. Such a situation provided fertilesoil for conspiratorial politics on the part of the military.

In 1936 the army overthrew the existing government. The coup of 1936 wasalso the first coup of the 20th century in the Arab Middle East,14 and the first of manyin modern Iraqi history. Between 1936 and 1941 there were seven cabinet changeseither as a result of overt coups or of pressure brought to bear on the civilians by thearmy. A coup by nationalist officers in 1941 put a well-known civilian pan-Arabnationalist, Rashid Ali al-Gailani as Prime Minister. Rashid Ali and his associates inthe Iraqi army were very anti-British and pro-Nazi Germany and once in power theyexpected moral and material support from the Germans for their stance. It proveddifficult for the Germans to extend support to the new government. However, thenationalist government in Baghdad had so thoroughly alarmed Britain and threatenedBritish control, that Britain went to war with Iraq in May 1941, defeated the disorga-nized Iraqi army, and reoccupied the country. The small Iraqi army was purged ofhundreds of nationalist officers and cut down in size.15

Between 1941 and 1958 there was no successful coup in Iraq, but the national-ists in uniform went underground and formed several disparate anti-regime cells andbided their time. The monarchy developed a suspicion of the populace and resortedto rule by fear, but the country remained in ferment and there were several popularrebellions and a less than sterling showing by the army in a disastrous war in Palestinein 1948. All of this fed the discontent of the officer corps.16 As William Polk,succinctly put it, in 1958: “the marriage of suspicion and fear seldom gets loyalty, andit did not in Iraq.”17

In 1958 a coalition of disgruntled army officers overthrew the monarchy andestablished a republic.18 In 1963 the Iraqi branch of the Arab Ba‘th Party, whoseideology is a hodge-podge of pan-Arab nationalist, state-capitalist, and socialist ideastook over for a brief and bloody nine-month reign. The regime was an unstablecoterie of civilians and military officers. Despite its attempts to purge unreliable

14. In 1879 the Egyptian army under Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi initiated a coup d’état. In the early 20thcentury, there was a coup in Turkey instigated by the Torkiya al-Fatat organization against Sultan ‘Abdal Hamid; after the first World War, the Turkish officer and first president of the Turkish republic,Mustafa Kemal, overthrew the Ottoman Empire, abolishing the Sultanate in 1922 and proclaiming arepublic a year later. Last but not least, in March 1921, Colonel Reza Pahlavi overthrew the Qajardynasty and founded his own dynasty; for more details see Bernard Vernier, Armée et politique enMoyen-Orient, [Army and Politics in the Middle East] (Paris: Payot, 1966).

15. For further details of the coup of 1941 and its impact on the Iraqi polity, see Alaa Tahir, Irak: auxorigines du régime militaire [Iraq: Origins of the Military Regime], (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1989), pp. 25-26; and Ahmad Shikara, Iraqi Politics 1921-1941: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics andForeign Policy, (London: LAAM Publishers, 1987), p. 183.

16. For a perceptive description of the situation in Iraq in the 1950s, see William Polk, “The Lessonof Iraq,” The Atlantic, December 1958, on-line version. Online at http://www.theatlantic-com/issues/58dec/polk.htm.

17. Polk, “The Lessons of Iraq.”18. See Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study, (Cam-

bridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 37-41.



army officers, primarily by sending many to the front to die fighting Kurdish insur-gents, the regime was unable to bring the army to heel. Army officers helped over-throw the Ba‘thist regime in November 1963. Under the two regimes of ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif (1963-66) and his brother ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif (1966-68), the army —dominated by officers from the Jumayla kinsmen of the ‘Arifs controlled politicsuntil 1968.

THE BA‘TH PARTY, SADDAM HUSAYN AND THE MILITARY

THE IDEOLOGY OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The current Iraqi regime’s determination to control the military was shaped bythe unstable history of civil-military relations described above, by the first Ba‘thistregime’s failures, and of course by the party’s ideology.

Between 1963 and 1968 the Iraqi Ba‘th party spent five years in the politicalwilderness. It learned its lessons from its short-lived period of power. It purgedradical and unstable elements, and became more disciplined. The most importantlesson was the need to infiltrate fully the armed forces, use them as a vehicle to power,and then to control them after seizing power. But how to achieve power again andthen maintain it was to remain a thorny problem. While the civilian Ba‘thists sawthemselves as revolutionaries because of their vision of implementing far-reachingpolitical and socioeconomic change, they had never come to power by means of arevolution in the true sense of the word. A revolution has been defined as a masspolitical, social, and economic upheaval undertaken by social classes.19 In neitherIraq nor Syria did the Ba‘th take power by means of a revolution.20

The Ba‘th has had to rely on the military as the only institution that is capable ofseizing power quickly and efficiently.21 However, the civilian leadership of the party— such as Saddam Husayn — clearly recognized the dangers of relying on the armyin the post-coup phase of political consolidation. Firstly, the army could edge thecivilians out of power, thus defeating the purpose of taking over in the first place.Secondly, a situation could arise where a symbiotic relationship was established be-tween the army and the party in power. But this situation contains the possibility offactional strife between the civilian and military wings, as occurred during the firstBa‘thist regime in Iraq in 1963. In 1968 civilian Ba‘th party conspirators from the

19. For details on revolutions as mass upheavals I relied on the book by Michael Kimmel, Revolu-tion: A Sociological Interpretation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

20. In fact, the closest that Iraq has come to a social revolution was in 1958, when the coup/revolutiontotally destroyed the monarchical system and the hegemony of the classes associated with it. See MajidKhadduri, “Iraq, 1958 and 1963,” in William Andrews and Uri Ra’anan (eds.) The Politics of the Coupd’Etat: Five Case Studies, (New York: Van Nostrand Rheinhold Company, 1969), p. 69.

21. For an excellent description of the mechanics of the coups of July 17 and 30, 1968, see MarionFarouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “From Gang to Elite: The Iraqi Ba‘th Party’s Consolidation ofPower, 1968-1975,” Peuples Méditerranéens, No. 40, July-September 1987, pp. 92-97.



small and insignificant Sunni Arab town of Tikrit launched a coup against the regimeof General ‘Abd el-Rahman ‘Arif with the help of army sympathizers, includingmilitary officers who were fellow Tikritis positioned in key armored and air forceunits. The Tikritis had infiltrated the Ba‘th party and key sectors of the armed forcesfollowing the debacle of the bloody and short-lived Ba‘thist regime of 1963. How-ever, the coup of 1968 did not prove to be similar to previous coups. From 1968onwards Iraq’s Ba‘thist leadership, with the civilian party organizer Saddam Husayninitially working behind the scenes and then as paramount leader from 1979, soughtto bring stability to civil-military relations.22

Since their failure in 1963, the civilian Ba‘thists articulated and disseminated anideological vision that stressed the hegemony of the party over the military and insti-tuted a series of wide-ranging controls. The important Central Report on the NinthRegional Congress of June 1982, which reviewed the policy programs that the regimehad set out for itself when it came to power, concluded the following with respect tothe military related ones:

To consolidate the Party’s leadership of the army, and disseminate in its ranksBa‘thist principles as well as nationalist and socialist culture; to strengthenthe military and the principled criteria and discipline which enable the armyto fulfill its duties satisfactorily; to protect it against deviation and error; toensure its correct and effective contribution to revolutionary constructionand the fulfillment of national tasks.23

Moreover, leading civilian Ba‘thist ideologues such as its founder, Michel ‘Aflaq,believed that military intervention in politics and civilian reliance on the military inArab countries was detrimental to the Ba‘thist vision. As he put it in the 1960s, aheyday for coups in the Arab world:

We hope to change the function of the army by preventing the officers fromforming a bloc inside the leadership of the party. If the party selects a militarymember for its leadership, he should not maintain his military position, butshould become a popular leader. There is no real revolutionary party in theworld whose leaders are military men continuing to command army units.24

Another Ba‘thist ideologue, Shibli al-Aysami, also argued that the military mustbe prohibited from interference in the political process because the military in powercannot rule effectively. Moreover, a military regime is often alienated from the masseswhen it is in power because the former is incapable of establishing legitimacy or of

22. Isam al-Khafaji, “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Demise of a State-Controlled Society: TheCase of Ba‘thist Iraq,” in Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions and Social Change in the MiddleEast, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 267-268.

23. Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress, Baghdad, June 1982, p. 186.24. Al-Hayat (Beirut) February 25, 1996, cited in ‘Adeed Dawisha, “The Politics of War: Presidential

Centrality, Party Power, Political Opposition,” in Frederick Axelgaard (ed.), Iraq in Transition: APolitical, Economic and Strategic Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 25.



undertaking development. Finally, foreign powers can infiltrate the military regime,subvert it by forming links with a cabal of officers who would then lead the regimeastray.25

Some aspects of Saddam’s life can help better understand his complicated rela-tions with the officer corps, his perceptions of Iraqi political history, and his visionfor Iraq. He was born in 1937 in the village of Al -‘Auja to a poor family. His fatherdied shortly before or after he was born. His schooling was abysmal and he wasprobably barely literate or even well schooled when he tried to enter the MilitaryAcademy after it had been opened to the sons of the middle and lower-middle classes.The purging of his highly nationalistic and anti-British uncle Khayrallah Tulfah fromthe Iraqi army for having taken part in the disastrous anti-British coup of 1941 alsohad an impact on Saddam. Frustrated in his attempt at a military career, but influ-enced by the nationalist tendencies of his uncle and of pan-Arab nationalists likeColonel Salahedin al-Sabbagh, Saddam Husayn gravitated towards radical politicalactivism and joined the Ba‘th party in 1957 at a time of considerable political turmoilin Iraq. (Sabbagh was a leading pan-Arab nationalist officer from Mosul. His pri-mary goal in life was to rid Iraq and the Fertile Crescent of Western influence. Heplayed a major role in the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 and was executed for his role inthat coup.)

Long before the second Ba‘thist takeover of 1968, as a civilian operative andconspirator par excellence, Saddam Husayn had ample time to reflect on the disastersthat were occasioned by constant military intervention in the political process. Hebelieved these military interventions had contributed to the instability of domesticpolitics, the inability of the country to modernize, and last but not least, to the peren-nial weakness of the military itself as a war-fighting instrument. Saddam sharedShibli al-Aysami’s belief that the military’s political ambitions can be exploited byforeign powers who can then use some within the officer corps to advance their ownagendas. In this context, following the overthrow of the leftist Allende government inChile in September 1973 by the American-supported Chilean military, not long after-wards Saddam stated that the “anti-Allende experiment” by foreign powers would notbe repeated in Iraq.26

THE MECHANICS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Not too long after the Ba‘th had seized power, Saddam told the noted Britishjournalist, David Hirst: “with party methods, there is no chance for anyone whodisagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government.”27

Over the course of the past thirty years, Saddam has developed a set of controls —

25. For more details of Ba‘thist thinking on the role of the military see Shibli al-‘Aysami, Unity,Freedom,Socialism, (Baghdad: Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party, 1977), pp. 47-90.

26. Saddam Hussein, On Current Events in Iraq, translated by Khalid Kishtainy, London: Longman,1977, p.16.

27. David Hirst, “The Terror from Tikrit,” The Guardian, November 26, 1971, p. 15.



some terrifying, some benign — to establish civilian hegemony over the military.What are Saddam’s means of “coup-proofing” the regime?28

ROTATIONS, RETIREMENTS, MASS PURGE, & EXECUTIONS

In unstable political systems where violent changes of government are a norm,regimes use the rotation of officers from one unit or position to another, mass retire-ments, mass purges and even executions or assassinations of senior members of theofficer corps as a means to stay in power.29 The most benign tool of control isrotation — undertaken to prevent officers from building up a base of support or closerelations with other officers within a unit. After all, conspiracies usually start with aclique of close-knit officers. Execution is the most drastic tool of control, and is oftenapplied against officers after attempts to overthrow the regime in power fail.

With the first July 1968 coup, the civilian Ba‘thists did not help the army cometo power; rather they saw the army as the vehicle for their seizure of power. But oncethe conspirators had seized power, the Ba‘thists were faced with the unwelcome pres-ence of their military allies in the government. Within two weeks of the joint party-army coup, the Ba‘thists undertook a secondary coup against the non-Ba‘thist officerswho had played important roles and who had demanded key roles in the new regime.There was a grim determination among the civilians from the very beginning that thearmy would not be allowed to disrupt the future trajectory that the party had mappedout for the country in line with its ideological guidelines.

Shortly after its secondary coup in late July 1968 the leadership began movingagainst the military with the first in a long series of rotations, mass purges, andretirements of senior officers. By December 1968, the Chief of Staff, Faysal al-‘Ansari, and all commanders of the eight army divisions were removed and replacedby officers trusted by the ruling party. Under the watchful eye of Taha Yasin Ramadan,a ruthless Ba‘th party apparatchik, close to 2,000 officers of other ranks were purged.

Executions also abounded from the early days. In June 1969, two senior offic-ers in command of troops in the north, Major-General Sa‘dun Husayn and BrigadierSa‘id Hammu (both of the 5th Division), were executed after being charged withplotting against the regime. In October 1969 another purge, this time in the EasternCommand, took place. Major-General Muhammad Nuri Khalil died in a “fatal roadaccident;” while Major-General ‘Ali Rajab died of a “heart” attack. Several otherofficers died in mysterious circumstances at around the same time. That all of thishad a deleterious impact on the operational readiness of a military not historically

28. “Coup-proofing” was defined by one observer as the “creation of structures that minimize thepossibilities of small groups leveraging the system” to undertake a coup; see James Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall1999), pp. 133-134.

29. The difference between forced retirement and a purge is quite significant; with the former one ishonorably discharged and pensioned off because one is not trusted; with the latter one is removed by theleadership because one may have displeased them, is suspected of disloyalty, or lost their confidence.



known for its high levels of readiness must have been known by the regime; however,at this stage considerations of combat capability were subordinated to considerationsof regime survival.

The first serious and well coordinated coup attempt came in January 1970 whenactive and retired senior officers headed by Major-General ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Rawiand Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarra’i were apprehended trying to overthrow theregime, ostensibly with the support of Iraq’s neighbor and enemy, Iran, then underMuhammad Reza Shah. Apparently, the security services had known about it for along time and had closely monitored the would-be plotters. Almost 30 officers wereexecuted.30 From that date on, the regime was especially vigilant with respect toforeign attempts at subversion of the armed forces. Indeed, paranoia over this wassuch that over the course of time the regime limited as much as possible contactbetween the officer corps and foreigners. Of the major Arab military powers, Iraqsent the least number outside of the country for training in foreign academies. An-other serious coup attempt, this time by the head of the security service, NadhimKazar, came in 1971. Following this coup attempt, the regime moved to create anumber of overlapping security services that watched each other and the armed forces.

These tools continue to be used by Saddam Husayn to remove officers suspectedof disloyalty, of seeking to oust Saddam Husayn, or those who may have grown toopopular or powerful within the army because of their battlefield performance. Forexample, after the end of the war with Iran, it was reported that there were extensivepurges of popular war heroes, such as Lieutenant-General Maher ‘Abd al-Rashid,who masterminded Iraq’s dramatic reconquest of the Faw Peninsula in early 1988.There were four serious coup attempts between 1988 and 1990. In the 1989 coupattempt upwards of 50 officers were forced into retirement or were executed for theirsuspected role in an alleged coup plot.31

Rotations and purges accelerated in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991.32

Following the disastrous defeat in the “mother of all battles,” Saddam cut down theregular army in size and hundreds of thousands of unreliable officers and enlisteeswere pensioned off or retired. This step came in the wake of the involvement of largeparts of the regular army in the Shi’a south and Kurdish north following the cease-fire in the war.

In 1999, Saddam Husayn apparently ordered the execution of 24 army officers,including a general who commanded the Baghdad air defense system, Major GeneralGhadban ‘Abed al-Ghriri, and also of General Kamel Sachet, a member of the power-ful Al-Janabbi tribe from central Iraq and a hero of the Iran-Iraq War.33 Even though

30. For details see Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968, (Washing-ton, DC: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 53-57.

31. Anton La Guardia, “Officers Executed in Purge to Forestall Rebellion in Iraq,” The DailyTelegraph, February 10, 1989, p.11.

32. For more details see Michael Eisenstadt, “The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years On,” Jane’sIntelligence Review, March 1993, pp.121-126.

33. “More Iraq Army Officers Executed For Conspiracy,” The Scotsman, March 10, 1999, p. 8.



Iraq faced a higher threat environment in the 1990s vis-à-vis both external and internalthreats, in Saddam’s mind it was the most proximate force to him, the Iraqi military,which continued to represent the gravest threat.

THE PATTERN OF LOGISTICS CONTROL

The phrase ‘logistics control’ refers to the oversight of and control over thegarrisoning and movements of military units, access to ammunition and fuel, andsupervision of field training exercises. For example, Arab regimes have often madesure that all military units – except for well-vetted praetorian guards — in the vicinityof capital cities are not armed with live-fire ammunition.34 Operationally, coups onlysucceed if coup-makers are able to provide fuel and ammunition to units and able tomove these units from garrisons into the capital without the incumbent regime find-ing out until it is too late.35 In this context, the key operational issue for the incum-bent regime is to ensure control over units in or near the capital city, which is invari-ably the key target in a coup attempt. Tight control over units near the capital city notonly diminishes the chances that such units could become infected with the virus ofdiscontent, but also ensures that the regime is well-placed to counter rebellious unitsmoving in on the capital. By 1973, the Ba‘thist regime controlled the Ministry ofDefense, the Habbaniya air base outside of Baghdad, the Baghdad garrison, and theRepublican Guards brigade; all of this gave the regime control over institutions withinBaghdad or of key approaches to the city.

In the wake of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, which was the attempt by the USand Britain to punish Saddam for non-compliance with United Nations Security Councilresolutions by striking key elements of his power structure and degrading his controlover it, Saddam Husayn undertook a major reorganization of the military commandstructure, which included a division of the country into four big regional militarycommands, each under the control of a highly trusted member of the inner circle.That person would have oversight over the movement of units in his command.

POLITICAL PENETRATION

The best account of the definition and characteristics of the political penetrationwas by the noted scholar of civil-military relations, Eric Nordlinger, who wrote:

Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by penetrating the armedforces with political ideas (if not fully developed ideologies) and political

34. This applies to current regimes as well as those of the monarchical era. To undertake the coup-cum-revolution of 1958, the pro-coup Iraqi units close to Baghdad had to be supplied with ammunitionby other units that were further afield; see Ismail Al-Arif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July1958 Revolution And After, (New York: Vantage Press, 1982), pp. 58-69.

35. For more extensive details on the mechanics and logistical aspects of coup-making see EdwardLuttwak, The Coup - A Practical Handbook, (London: Penguin, 1968); Bruce Farcau, The Coup:Tactics in the Seizure of Power, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994).



personnel. Throughout their careers officers (and enlisted men) are inten-sively imbued with the civilian governors’ political ideas. In the militaryacademies, training centers, and mass-indoctrination meetings, and in thefrequent discussions that take place within the smallest military units — atthese times and places intensive efforts are made to shape the political beliefsof the military…

Along with the downward dissemination of political ideas, civilian supremacyis maintained by the extensive use of controls, surveillance, and punishment.“Political officers” are attached to each military unit, at every level in themilitary hierarchy.

It is among the Communist regimes that the penetration model has been ap-plied in its most fully developed form. Civilian control is forcefully pro-claimed in the less well known second part of Mao Tse-Tung’s assertion:“Power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the partycontrols the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party…”The army is differentiated from the civilian sphere in terms of professionalexpertise, but congruent with it in terms of a shared ideology.36

The key point to understand about the political penetration model is that thecivilians want to ensure the military’s non-involvement in the political process bycreating a politicized or ideological army. The goal is as complete and as pervasive aspossible civilian involvement in and control of the military through political means.This stands in contrast to the situation where the army is political and gets heavilyinvolved in the political process. There are two distinct ways to implement politicalpenetration, and the regime has extensively used both:

a) Ideological Control: The Ba‘thist regime set about establishing a system ofideological controls in order to prevent the army from involving itself in the politicalprocess, to ensure the ideological indoctrination of the officer corps in the principlesof Ba‘thism, and to prevent other competing political ideologies such as communism,from taking hold within the officer corps.37 This approach was enshrined in theconcept of the “ideological army” (al jaysh al-‘aqidi). By the end of 1970, 3,000

36. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp.15-16.

37. See Arnold Hottinger, “Flexibilitat der irakischen Baathisten,” [“Flexibility of the Iraqi Ba‘thists”],Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 18, 1975; for example, Saddam Husayn carried out ferocious purges ofofficers and enlisted men suspected of belonging to the Communist Party and later of Islamic fundamen-talist parties. With respect to the former, there were purges in the early 1970s and then in 1978 whenofficers suspected of Communist ties were executed. A leading regime official and ideologue, Tariq‘Aziz, referred to this in an interview: “We were willing to let the Communists reorganize their party andhave a newspaper, but they also wanted power inside the Army. They wanted a secret organization whichwould have permitted them to plot another coup d’état. We would not allow this, and when they insistedwe cracked down on them;” see Milton Viorst, “A Reporter At Large: The View from the Mustansiriyah- I,” The New Yorker, October 12, 1987, p. 93.



new commissions were granted to loyal but poorly trained officers who had beenrushed through the Military Academy. The Ba‘th Party Military Bureau also plays arole in ensuring ideological loyalty of the officer corps. In 1973 this office wassupplemented by the Directorate of Political Guidance (Mudiriyyat al-tawjih al-siyassi)whose tasks included the following:

· Spreading the ideology of the July 17th Revolution to all ranks and units.· Supervising the activities of the political officers. In the early 1970s theregime created a system of political commissars with the help of Soviet andEast German experts. The political commissars were attached down to thelevel of the platoon. Their duties encompassed both surveillance and ideo-logical control because they were supposed to watch for subversive activitiesand to engage in ideological indoctrination of the officer corps.· Achieving “maximum degrees of military discipline.”· Expounding the concept of “pan-Arabism” among personnel of the armedforces.38

b) Security and Intelligence Oversight: Surveillance focuses on trying to un-earth and to nip in the bud any signs of discontent or planning for a coup by dis-gruntled officers. This task is entrusted to a vast infrastructure of security and intel-ligence services that totals between 100,000-150,000 personnel.39 While not all ofthem are focused on scrutinizing the armed forces, a considerable number of them dospy on its activities, movements, and look for expressions of discontent by membersof the officer corps. Informers and spies from the security and intelligence servicespermeated the army from the early days of the regime.

PARALLEL MILITARY STRUCTURES

Parallel military structures refers to the creation of “its own military formation”by a new regime. The primary task of such a formation is to defend the regime andto roll back and defeat any coup attempts by the regular army units led by disgruntledofficers. In this context, it is the next, and often the last, line of defense after thefailure of the security services to root out dissidents plotting a coup. The regime ofSaddam Husayn has followed the time-honored strategy of many other regimes informing parallel military forces to keep the regular armed forces “honest.”

The first parallel military structure that was formed was the Ba‘th Popular Army(al jaysh al-sha‘bi). Over the course of the regime’s life, it became quite evident thatthe Popular Army, whose training and motivation left much to be desired, could never

38. Khalid al-Ani, The Encyclopedia of Modern Iraq, vol.III, (Baghdad: The Arab EncyclopediaHouse, n.d.,) pp. 518-519.

39. As there is a large literature on the security and intelligence services elsewhere, it is not necessaryto repeat their activities in detail. See Sean Boyne, “Inside Iraq’s Security Network — Parts One andTwo,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 7-8, July and August 1997; Ibrahim al-Marashi, “Iraq’sSecurity and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis,” MERIA, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2002.



really function as a counterweight to the regular armed forces. Not only did Iraqistake to calling it the “unpopular army” (al- jaysh al-la sha‘bi), it was viewed withconsiderable disdain by the army during the Iran-Iraq War when its tendency to boltfrom the front in the wake of Iranian offensives left many regular army units danger-ously exposed.40 Its status after the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars remained ambiguous.Some reports indicated that it was disbanded and then revived. It is currently inexistence, but notwithstanding the exaggerated claims of the regime that it containshundreds of thousands of members, it probably contains no more than 20,000 reluc-tant members as of 2002, whose primary job seems to be one of harassing and bully-ing ordinary citizens going about their everyday lives. It is not capable of defendingeither the nation against external aggression or the regime against coup-makers.

Given the patently non-martial proclivities of the Popular Army, the regimebegan to enhance the praetorian role of the Republican Guards Force (RGF) in the1980s. It also managed to transform that force into a powerful offensive combatforce consisting of several divisions both to protect the regime and also to conductoffensive operations against the Iranian enemy. The personnel of the RG come largelyfrom Sunni Arab tribes who have constituted a key bulwark of the regime. Recruitsare lured from the regular army by the prospect of better benefits and pay.41 Beforethey are accepted the backgrounds of recruits are thoroughly investigated. Once inthe RG they are subjected to another two months of extensive military training. Theregime has ensured that, on the whole, they are a well trained, thoroughly indoctri-nated, and loyal parallel military force. RG units are “firepower” heavy; they havethe best equipment in the armed forces and are very mobile. The general inability ofthe RG forces to conduct fast and fluid combined arms operations effectively —something that puts them at great risk vis-à-vis US forces — is not really relevant inthe context of moving to block a coup attempt by another Iraqi unit that is hardlylikely to be better equipped or trained.42 Neutralizing the power inherent in any ofthe Republican Guards units is one of the key problems that any dissident militaryunits have to consider as they embark on the risky path of heading towards the centerof gravity, Baghdad.

But even reliable elite units like the Republican Guards were also hit by seriouspurges and executions. In 1992, 135 mid-level officers from the Republican Guards

40. According to one source, the regular army blamed the Popular Army (PA) for the loss of the FawPeninsula to Iran in February 1986, see Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalism and Civil-MilitaryRelations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No.1, (2000), p. 86. This may wellbe correct, but the combat ineffectiveness of the PA was known as early as the disastrous defeats of 1982when Iran went on the offensive.

41. The regime also recruits from among high school and university students.42. On the historical inability of the Iraqi army to conduct combined arms operations, see “Unsichere

Strategie der irakischen Armee” [Uncertain Strategy of the Iraqi Army], Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Septem-ber 2-3, 1990, p. 5; “Saddams Heer — ein Riese mit manifesten Schwachen” [Saddam’s Army — aGiant with Feet of Clay], Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 24, 1990, p. 6; the definitive study, however, isKenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, (Lincoln: University of NebraskaPress, 2002), pp.182-266.



were purged from a brigade whose leadership was implicated in an attempted coup.43

In 1995, Saddam purged ten high-ranking officers, including two generals followingthe defection of Husayn Kamil, Saddam’s son-in-law, to Jordan.44 In 1996, reportsindicated that officers of the RGFC (Republican Guards Forces Command) and of therelatively new Special Republican Guards Force Command — see below — werealso purged or executed along with officers from the security services.45 The reasonsfor dissatisfaction among the officers of the RGFC and other elite units are not hard tofathom. They are the ones most affected by Saddam’s tempestuous relations with theSunni Arab tribes from which they emanate.46 They are physically closer to thecenters of gravity than regular army officers, giving them a better opportunity to trytheir luck at regime change.

Concern over the reliability of the RGFC was behind the decision to establishthe Special Republican Guards Force (SRGF) in 1995. Under the supervision ofQusayy, Saddam’s younger and more efficient son, this is a smaller force of 26,000men that is tasked with the protection of the president and of fighting a coup attempt.It is based in or around Baghdad and its personnel is made up largely of men fromSaddam’s tribe, the Al Bu Nasir, and its various sub-clans residing in the vicinity ofTikrit.

CORPORATE INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY

The military in any country is a professional organization with interests andneeds of its “own.” It seeks to preserve or enhance societal distribution of resources inits favor and to control promotions and jobs. The military’s corporate interests areseen as being threatened when there is dissatisfaction over: a) promotions, appoint-ments, assignments, and retirement policies; b) budget allocations; c) readiness orlack thereof, and arms supplies; and last, but not least, d) pay, benefits, and livingconditions.47 Saddam Husayn has managed to infringe on all areas over the course ofhis thirty years in power without fail. Between 1975 and 1990, he almost invariablymanaged to satisfy the military’s desire for the most modern arms. From the mid-1970s onwards, Iraq implemented a major arms build-up. Indeed, between 1975 and1980, the Iraqi armed forces witnessed the most dramatic and sustained arms build-up of any Arab army. Saddam was able to devote greater resources to the armedforces as a result of growing financial resources. As one observer — focusing on thegrowth of the ground forces — put it:

43. Michael Gordon, “Saddam has Purged 135,” The Gazette (Montreal), July 7, 1992, p. A7.44. “Defections Lead To Iraqi Army Purge,” The Guardian, August 15, 1995, p. 8.45. Martin Sieff, “Saddam purges his top officers,” Washington Times, August 15, 1996, p. 15.46. For more details on Saddam’s relations with the Sunni Arab tribes, see infra.47. For more on the theoretical aspects of corporate interests see William Thompson, “Towards

Explaining Arab Military Coups,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1974),pp. 243-245; Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,1976.



Between 1973 and 1980, the Iraqi ground forces underwent the most dramaticexpansion of any Arab army during that period. The army more than doubledin size, and some 1,600 tanks and an equal number of armored personnelcarriers were added to the armored forces. Logistic and maintenance capabili-ties were strengthened and training improved. As a result, the army was trans-formed from a small counterinsurgency force into a large well-equipped mili-tary establishment.48

This phenomenal build-up would make Iraq, and by extension, Saddam into akey player in the politics of the region. It was still in progress and was not evencompleted when Saddam Husayn decided to pit his developing military against aweakened Iranian military. This build-up continued unabated during the bitter Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. By endowing Iraq with powerful armed forces,Saddam Husayn would ensure that his country emerged as the key Arab power in theMiddle East. The officers and men of the armed forces also received lavish benefits.The regime’s ability to provide lavish pay, benefits, and excellent living conditionswas at its highest between 1975 and 1990 when the Iraqi officer corps was among themost pampered in the Arab world. These conditions continued even during the pro-hibitively expensive Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988.49

STABILITY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?

Notwithstanding the formidable and multi-layered system of controls, membersof the Iraqi officer corps have not stopped trying to overthrow the regime of SaddamHusayn. The failure of every single attempt to date is testimony both to the hawk-likevigilance of the regime’s leadership and efficiency of the security, intelligence, andparallel military services. Sheer bad luck has played a part in the failure of attemptsto overthrow the regime, but we should never underestimate the role played by thevery fact that Saddam and his closest cronies are master conspirators, and so far theyhave outshone those who would conspire against them.

The failure of coup attempts is also a testimony to the fact that on many occa-sions the conspirators have been unable to get enough support among like-mindedofficers to create a critical mass with sufficient units to succeed in their endeavor.The penalty for exposure is terminal in Iraq. A coup that succeeds is one whosesecrecy has been maintained right up to the moment it is executed and results in thedisplacement of the government. Many Iraqi officers are terrified of speaking ill oftheir leader, let alone of deigning to join a conspiracy. Consider the words of an Iraqiartillery battalion major captured in March 1991:

48. John Wagner, “Iraq,” in Richard Gabriel (ed.), Fighting Armies, Westport, CT: Praeger Publish-ers, 1979, p. 63.

49. See Isam al-Khafaji, “War as a Vehicle …,” pp. 268, 286-287.



We are very afraid of this man. Even now that I am talking to you, an American,you will notice that by habit, I will lower my voice when I want to say his name.He has spies everywhere. If he knows that I say bad things about him to youhe will kill my wife, my children, and my parents in Iraq. If my division com-mander every (sic) ordered me to turn my guns against Saddam Hussein, I willdo it. But who will be the officer to give this order? I will never give this order.But I will follow the man who does…50

While it is difficult, at this stage, to know with any great degree of certaintywhy some officers have risked their lives, and often those of their families, to engagein a dangerous endeavor, we can enumerate a number of possible reasons.

First , we must begin with the complex and animus-ridden relationship be-tween Saddam Husayn and the officer corps itself. This became more apparent fol-lowing his accession to undisputed leadership of the country in 1979. While theserious attempt to block his rise to power was formulated and led by senior partymembers, they sought the help of members of the officer corps within the élite para-troop units allegedly after officers from the then still small Republican Guards de-clined to follow the conspirators.51 Among the conspirators who were executed in theaftermath of the exposure of the coup attempt was an army corps commander. Theanimosity between Saddam and the officer corps has only increased over the course ofthe two decades since 1979. Many reasons exist for this state of affairs. Briefly, theyare the following:

· Saddam’s self-elevation to the rank of General and then Field Marshalwithout having previously ever served a day in the armed forces was resentedby the officers, as was his decision to elevate members of his family such asHusayn Kamil to high military rank. If the accounts of exiled Iraqi officers areto be believed, the only individual within the Tikriti clan with military rankfor whom the officers had any respect was Saddam’s cousin and brother-in-law, Defense Minister ‘Adnan Khairallah, who was killed in a helicopter crashin 1989 reportedly after an allegedly serious breach with the Iraqi leader.52

· Saddam forced the officer corps to extol his virtues as a great strategic andmilitary genius. He was viewed as responsible for all the battlefield achieve-

50. Vern Liebl, “The Other Side of the Jebel (Hill),” Command Magazine, Issue 13, November-December 1991, p. 33.

51. “The Full Details of the Attempted Coup Against Saddam Husayn,” Al-Mustaqbal, August 4,1979, pp. 24-26; for a good overview see Laurent and Anne Chabry, “L’Irak et l’émergence de nouveauxrapports politiques interarabes,” [“Iraq and the Emergence of New Inter-Arab Political Relations”],Maghreb-Machrek, No. 88, April-June 1980, pp. 7-9.

52. To wit, General Khazraji’s comments about ‘Adnan Khayrallah, who he said was “the bestelement in the family…a professional soldier, polite, educated, good, and loved by the army…He wasthe white sheep in that black family. His relations with Saddam Husayn were excellent but theydeteriorated when Husayn Kamil’s star rose in 1986 and 1987;” quoted in Salamah Ni’mat, “Interviewwith Staff General Nizar al-Khazraji, Al- Hayat, April 16, 1996, p. 5; see also “Death of Khairallah,”Mideast Markets, May 15, 1989, p. 3.



ments and the achievements in the field of defense modernization, while theofficer corps received the blame for the abject failures.53 Thus, it is rare to seean Iraqi officer write anything of military substance without referring toSaddam’s genius.54 The end result is that nothing of substance is written orlearned by the officer corps concerning the wars their country has fought. Iraqiofficers were allowed to give interviews, but in most of them they felt com-pelled to ascribe successes of or developments within the armed forces to thegenius or far-sighted vision of Saddam.55 The constant panegyrics directed atSaddam’s way at the hands of the serving officers cannot but continue todamage their self-esteem.

· Saddam’s personal treatment of the officer corps has rankled. In meetingswith them he would sarcastically heap scorn on them colloquially in his localdialect, daring them to undertake a coup. He has also stated on several occa-sions that he was not unhappy that many of them had “fallen by the way-side.”56 One of the most sinister displays of humiliation of the officer corpsand of one of the tribes that constitutes one of the backbones of the officercorps came in 1993 following yet another abortive coup. In July of that year,Colonel Sabri Mahmud al-Jiburi, an armored unit officer in one of the Repub-lican Guards units, was shot after a coup attempt. Saddam traveled to theunfortunate Colonel’s birthplace, Shargat, near Mosul. There, he performed atraditional Bedouin sword dance around the colonel’s grave and forced thelatter’s father to join him in the dance.57

· The most common complaints of Iraqi officers who managed to escape theclutches of the regime was that, notwithstanding Saddam Husayn’s tremen-dous efforts in modernizing the army in the 1970s and 1980s, he destroyed itsprofessionalism, subjected it to capricious behavior, interfered with its tradi-tions and damaged its honor. In this context, it is worth quoting the words ofStaff Colonel Amir Mukhif al-Jubbir, who in an interview stated:

Like all other armies, the Iraqi Army is one of the most important nationalpillars and a symbol of the homeland and people’s pride and dignity. Ourarmy has always been like this until three decades ago when it was under-

53. For more details see Amatzia Baram, “Between Impediment and Advantage: Saddam’s Iraq,”United States Institute of Peace Special Report.

54. One operationally successful officer, Maher Abd al-Rashid, gave both flamboyant and measuredinterviews about operations. He often did not go out of his way to praise Saddam for Iraq victories. Forexample, see ‘Abd al-Wahab al-Qaysi, “Mahir ‘Abd al-Rashid: khatana tahqiq al ahdaf bi aqal al-khasa’ir” [“Mahir ‘Abd al-Rashid: Our Strategy is to attain the objectives by the least casualties”], Al-Dustur, Vol.16, No. 419, March 17, 1986, pp.11-13.

55. For example, see ‘Interview with Staff Air Lt. General Hamid Sha’ban: “Our Air Superiority willlast for Years,” Al Tadamun, September 20-26, 1986, pp.39-41.

56. For details of these episodes see Amatzia Baram, Building Towards Crisis: Saddam Hussein’sStrategy for Survival, Policy Paper No. 47, (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near EastPolicy, 1998), pp. 44-45.

57. For details of this appalling incident see David Hirst, The Guardian, February 13, 1993.



mined and suffered organized and deliberate destruction by the ruling re-gime. The Army’s armament and equipment were modernized and its forma-tions enlarged but it sank at the same time to lower dangerous levels, mostnoticeably the levels where its hierarchy and rules deteriorated, its exem-plary discipline turned into indiscipline (sic) and the rules of assessment forpromotions were corrupted. Cronyism and parochial, sectarian, ethnic andtribal discrimination became rampant.58

Second, defeat in war has often discredited incumbent regimes in authoritariancountries. The upshot is that members of the armed forces may decide to remove theleadership – whether civilian or military – that was responsible for the national hu-miliation, which is most keenly felt by the armed forces. History abounds withexamples. In 1952 middle-ranking Egyptian army officers overthrew the monarchybecause it was responsible for sending an unprepared army into defeat in the firstArab-Israeli War of 1948. In 1970 Syrian Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad overthrewthe discredited leftist Ba‘thist regime of Salah Jadid because it had been responsiblefor leading Syria into disaster in the Six Day War of 1967. In 1983 the Argentinemilitary acceded to the demands of the populace and the civilian politicians to removeGeneral Galtieri and his coterie of officers from power following Argentina’s defeatin the Falklands/Malvinas War against Britain.

It is debatable whether Iraq emerged defeated from the war with Iran in1988. On the one hand, it had inflicted a series of stinging defeats on the Iranians,beginning in April 1988 and ending in July 1988 with the wholesale flight of Iranianforces from the battlefront. The military emerged with considerable prestige fromthese victories. Moreover, Iraq had the largest and most powerful army in the Arabworld in 1988-1990. Saddam’s plans for the future development of the military andthe defense industrial base were music to the officer corps’ ears. In fact, it is not far-fetched to suggest, as Amatzia Baram has, that many officers began to believe thatSaddam Husayn was some kind of strategic genius. By 1989-1990 Iraqi militarypower was a major fixture on the Middle East strategic landscape.59

On the other hand, many within the officer corps could be forgiven for thinkingthat the war had been a disaster for the country in military, social, and economicterms. The country had achieved nothing concrete in the war in terms of territorialgains or Iranian accession to Iraqi demands. The government was unable to demobi-lize sufficient numbers of officers and enlisted men to re-enter society, establish “nor-mal” careers, and get married. A pervasive sense of malaise within the officer corpsmay have been the reason why there were reported coup attempts in 1989 and 1990.

There is no doubt, however, that the Iraqi officer corps views the invasion ofKuwait and the subsequent war, Operation Desert Storm, as an unmitigated disasterfor Iraq and the army itself. Of course, had Saddam succeeded in getting away with

58. Muhammad Fakhri Razzuqi, “Two Iraqi Officers to Al-Zaman: Army is a main tool for change,”Al-Zaman, January 8, 2001, p. 2.

59. Building Toward Crisis, p. 46.



the absorption of Kuwait there would not have been a single word out of the officercorps, except perhaps to praise the “leader-necessity’s” — as Saddam came to becalled — great brilliance and strategic genius.

But while the planning for the invasion of Kuwait was undertaken without theknowledge of most of the officer corps,60 they were expected to play a role in theplanning for the subsequent defense of the “19th province” (Kuwait) and of Iraq it-self.61 They balked. Members of the officer corps, including Chief of Staff, Nizar al-Khazraji – the nephew of the first chief of staff removed by the Ba‘thists in 1968,Ibrahim Faysal al-‘Ansari — allegedly began pointing out in late August 1990 that theIraqi army was no match for the awesome coalition arrayed against it. In the formerChief of Staff’s own words in 1996 shortly after he defected to Jordan:

…I wrote a strategic report and an operational report. The first report ex-plained the dangers surrounding Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait, saying thatthe world as a whole would oppose this action, which would put us on acollision course with an important section of the world, and the outcomewould be the loss of Iraq and the regime.

I submitted my second report on 28 August 1990. It explained that war wasinevitable…there were clear indications. I explained the potential dangersfor Iraq. I also explained the status of the balance of powers, saying that Iraqwould lose the war. A meeting was held at the General Command on 18September to discuss my two reports in Saddam Husayn’s presence. I began byreviewing the strategic and field situation and explaining the balance of pow-ers and the huge technological gap between the coalition forces and the Iraqiforces, which were exhausted after the eight-year war with Iran. The com-mander in chief expressed his anger and ended the meeting before I finishedmy report.62

Chief of Staff Khazraji allegedly received a letter from retired or pensioned offsenior army officers urging him to do something to avert the headlong rush intocatastrophe. 63 Khazraji did not report the letter, but the regime apparently got windof it, and for his pains, al-Khazraji was removed from his position in November.64

Khazraji was probably lucky to have escaped with his life; he was posted to a “non-

60. For a discussion and sources on Saddam’s move into Kuwait, see Gregory Gause, “Iraq’sDecision to Go to War, 1980 and 1990,” The Middle East Journal, Volume 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002).

61. It was the Republican Guards, which were controlled directly by the commander-in-chief,Saddam Husayn, bypassing the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister, that carried out the swiftinvasion of Kuwait.

62. Salamah Ni‘mat, “Interview with Staff General Nizar al-Khazraji,” Al-Hayat, April 16, 1996, p. 5.63. Victor Mallet, “Sacking of Iraqi military chief is latest sign of dissent,” Financial Times, Novem-

ber 9, 1990, p.1; see also Nora Boustany, “Top Iraqi General Reportedly Replaced,” Washington Post,November 9, 1990, p. A29. Khazraji was replaced by another war hero, General Husayn Rashid, thedeputy chief of staff for operations.

64. Faleh Abd al-Jabbar, “Why the Uprisings Failed,” Middle East Report, May-June 1992, p. 6.



job” as adviser, but was watched very carefully around the clock with his movementsand contacts monitored. In mid-December, General ‘Abd al-Jabbar Khalil Shanshalwas replaced as Defense Minister by a war hero and ostensible hard-liner, GeneralSa‘adi Tu‘ma ‘Abbas.

Third, between 1991 and 2002 Saddam has failed miserably to maintain thecorporate interests of the military. The Iraqi army consists of an enormous number ofrapidly aging weapons systems. He has threatened the military’s corporate interests inthe matter of pay, promotions, and professional assignments. Today, because of thesanctions regime and the decline of oil revenues, members of the armed forces areamong the most destitute in the country. Enlisted men and non-commissioned offic-ers have been seen to beg for bus fare from civilians as they go on authorized leave totheir homes. An expatriate Iraqi observer puts the state of affairs within the armedforces well in an analysis he wrote in March 1998:

Once feared and respected for their power — which in turn breeds wealth —they (the officer corps) have now sunk into dire need, along with large sec-tions of the salaried middle class which has seen its income eroded by hyper-inflation. Even colonels are now using over-crowded buses rather than theirkhaki-painted limousines. In the market place, officers bargain to get third-rate tomatoes. As one of them remarked, they look more like Soviet officers intheir shabby uniforms.65

Even the RGFC has seen a marked decline in its corporate interests, which maybe a reason why some of its officers engaged in coup attempts. While it still gets thebest benefits and best equipment, there has been a marked decline in the provision ofthese corporate interests. The lack of discipline that was rampant among regular unitsprior to the Gulf War and after it seems to have hit the RGFC.

Fourth, Saddam Husayn’s complex relations with the Iraqi tribes, particu-larly the Sunni Arab tribes whose support has been critical to the stability of theregime, has had major implications for civil-military relations. When the Ba‘thistscame to power in 1968 they looked down upon the tribes, regarding them as a retro-gressive and reactionary force.66 But they could not escape the fact that the SunniArab tribes provided the bulk of the officer corps; and indeed, as the army expandedmore and more young men from the tribes — particularly from the large and influen-tial Dulaymi, al-Ubaydi, and Jiburi tribes — entered the armed forces.

In return for sending off their young men into the armed forces, a processthat expanded enormously with the transformation of the Iran-Iraq War in 1982 intoa sanguinary war of attrition, Saddam bought the loyalty of the tribal elders andsheiks by providing services, money, and consumer goods. One of these was SheikhMisha‘an al-Jiburi, who ran a small and poor Jiburi village near Tikrit. His life and

65. Faleh Jabber, “Quelle strategie pour renverser Saddam Hussein?” [What strategy to toppleSaddam Hussein], Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1998, on-line at http://mondediplo.com/1998/03/03iraqfj.

66. Faleh Jabber, “Quelle stratégie pour renverser Saddam Hussein?”



that of his village changed irrevocably in 1975 when he first met Saddam. The Iraqileader asked Misha’an what he could do for him and his village. Misha‘an wanted acar and money for himself, and he wanted to be a journalist. But he also wantedmore. As he tells it:

Saddam bought my loyalty. I truly admired him. He talked of freedom andsocialism. This meant that thousands of my tribe could eat, our schools wereno longer of mud brick. We had roads.

Our lives changed, especially after electricity which until then only the citieshad. We believed that electricity and everything came directly from Saddam,not understanding the quadrupling of the oil price. We were ready to die forhim.67

And die they did by the thousands, particularly after 1982-83, when greaternumbers of Dulaymis, ‘Ubaydis, and Jiburis filled the ranks of the expanding Repub-lican Guards Forces. The tribes continued to put up with this; particularly so long asmaterial benefits continued for the survivors of soldiers killed in action, and as longas the tribes adhered to Saddam’s exhortations that the war was a defense of Arabism(‘uruba) against “Persian greed” (atma’ al-farisiya). The scales began to be removedfrom their eyes in the late 1980s. In January 1990, Saddam managed to put down atribally-organized coup attempt by officers of the influential Juburi tribe.68 After theGulf War, the state of relations between Saddam and the tribes worsened. The regimecould no longer bestow lavish benefits on the tribes; many of their sons did not comeback from the Gulf War; and those that did, came back with horror stories about theinjustice of the Kuwait invasion and the devastation incurred during Desert Storm.The growing incidence of coup attempts by Dulaymi, Ubyadi, and Jiburi officers,was not a surprise, since they were in the units best able to undertake such attempts,contributed to the unraveling of Saddam’s ties to the tribes. Moreover, Saddam’sruthlessness and viciousness — the mutilation of the bodies of coup plotters — merelyinflamed the tribes’ thirst for vengeance. The return of the mutilated body of aDulaymi officer, General Mahammad Madhloum Al-Dulaymi, who had participatedin a coup attempt in May 1995, led to serious disturbances among members of theDulaymi tribe outside the city of Ramadi. The more Saddam exhibited streaks ofviciousness, the more, it seems, that officers from these tribes would risk their lives ina quest for vengeance.

WHITHER CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN IRAQ?

The above analysis explains why during much of the 1990s, the enemies ofSaddam Husayn began to question the likelihood of the military moving againstSaddam. However, the situation changed from 2001 on.

67. Helga Graham, “Saddam’s Circle of Hatred,” The Independent, August 20, 1995, p. 11.68. Amatzia Baram, Building Towards Crisis: Saddam Husayn’s Strategy of Survival, p. 27.



Following the coming to office of the Bush Administration in January 2001,senior officials made it quite clear that the United States was bent on regime change inthat country. After the terror attacks of 9/11 Iraq became a possible target of attack bythe United States even though there was no evidence tying Baghdad to the horrificattacks planned and executed by members of the Al-Qa‘ida terror network. However,Iraq’s past transgressions — flouting United Nations resolutions, continuing to ac-quire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), general “aggressiveness,” and supportfor terrorism — were taken as evidence of continued bad faith on the part of a regimewhich cannot be rehabilitated in the eyes of Washington.

In this context, observers and analysts began to focus once more on the potentialrole of the Iraqi armed forces in the coming dénouement between Washington andBaghdad. If war comes, Iraq will ultimately be defeated, and what happens in theaftermath, the post-Saddam period? The following analysis speculates on the pos-sible behavior of the Iraqi military in the period before the initiation of hostilities,during the war itself, and after the war.

THE IRAQI OFFICER CORPS AND PRE-HOSTILITIES PERIOD

It is difficult to ascertain what the Iraqi senior officer corps is thinking as theircountry and the US slowly but surely move towards war. The officer corps’ estima-tion of the balance of power between the two opposing sides cannot be an optimisticone. The officer corps is well aware that Iraq may be heading into catastrophe, yetonce again under its leader. Whether some of them may choose to do somethingabout it is unclear. On the surface it would be logical to assume then that some of theofficers may choose to take matters into their own hands and move decisively againstSaddam Husayn. Some observers have speculated that members of the officer corpsmay make a move before hostilities begin.69 Indeed, doing it before the US initiatesaction might help deflect any perception that these self-professed patriots might bepuppets of the Americans, a tag which could hurt them if they were to do it during thecourse of the war. These officers would bring about regime change themselves by“decapitating” — i.e. arresting or killing — the top echelons of the regime.

How would the US react? There may be some within the Administration whostill believe that a post-Saddam general who has just put a bullet into Saddam and hiscronies is the most cost-effective scenario for a post-Saddam Iraq. But others wouldsee this as the opportunity to work with and also put pressure on this new regime. Inthis context, the next step following the seizure of power by the coup plotters wouldbe for the US to enter into talks with this regime concerning its future trajectory. TheUS would insist that this new military regime provide an accounting of the Iraqiweapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal and accept stringent procedures for thetotal elimination of this arsenal. It is not necessarily true that the coup-makers are

69. Such speculation is just that, since evidence is lacking.



bound to extend an invitation to the exiles to return, as the officers in power areunlikely to view many of the exiled opposition groups or leaders with any degree ofequanimity.70 The US may force the regime to accede to the return of the oppositionand of the exiled officers. Notwithstanding the Washington-based proponents ofdemocratic reform for Iraq, it is not clear that the US would press the regime to widenits base of rule so long as it can maintain stability and not pose a threat. However, itwould be misguided to allow a military regime consisting of a Sunni general or acabal to remain in power with little accounting. Firstly, it is not certain that such aregime would in actual fact succeed in consolidating itself. Indeed, it might be open-ing the floodgates of greater turmoil in the country. Secondly, this will be a regime offearful generals — they will fear both internal and external threats — and there is noguarantee that they will agree to get rid of the WMD arsenal. Thirdly, the US shouldnot be contributing to the legitimization of a military regime, one with possibly unac-ceptable and narrowly-based ethno-sectarian values.

In any case, a closer look at this scenario shows that it would be difficult toexecute. The control mechanisms detailed above are still in existence as the Saddamregime shows no signs of disintegration on the eve of an attack designed to destroy it.Moreover, at this time of increased outside pressure on the regime, it is especiallyvigilant: units are on the move and are under close scrutiny by other units and thesecurity and intelligence services. And last, but not least, the most loyal units — theRepublican Guards and the Special Republican Guards — are moving into positionaround Baghdad, which is the center of gravity in any coup attempt.

THE IRAQI OFFICER CORPS AND THE COMING WAR

It is probably more difficult to gauge the possible behavior patterns of the Iraqiofficer corps during the course of a war. Most might consider an attempt to undertakea coup while the country is under attack to be an “unpatriotic” act. On the other hand,some might consider taking action against Saddam during the course of the war to bethe ultimate patriotic act. It is possible to explore a number of hypothetical circum-stances under which the officer corps, or parts of it, might move against the regimewhile hostilities are raging.

Coup by “silver” bullet or explosive device: With the onset of hostilities, Saddammight have the need to meet with his officers more regularly in order to implementdefensive strategies against the invading American forces. Some officer or group ofofficers might choose to emulate Count Claus von Stauffenberg, the German officertasked with the 1944 assassination attempt against Adolph Hitler. These officers mightchoose to risk their lives and attempt to “take out” Saddam and his coterie of closestadvisers either by engaging in a suicidal fire fight or by means of conveying a bombor other explosive devices to within close proximity of the Iraqi leader. This is highlyunlikely to succeed. Professional officers do not know when or where they would

70. See Ahmed S. Hashim, “A Post-Saddam Mandate,” paper presented at The Future of Iraq and USPolicy Options Conference, July 17-18, 2002, US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.



meet with Saddam. Moreover, they cannot see Saddam Husayn without a thoroughbody search and then they can only meet him in the presence of heavily armed secu-rity guards — known as the murafiqin — from his tribal clan. Saddam does not needto meet with his officers on a regular basis. If Iraqi communications systems aredisrupted, he might rely on his couriers to convey instructions to the officers. Lastbut not least, after the onset of hostilities, Saddam will move around a great deal. Itis possible that only a select group will know where he is or where he is going. Thiswould include his personal secretary and his younger son, Qusayy. Army officers areunlikely to know where he is or to be able to reach him.

Coup under the “fog” of war: War is the realm of uncertainty, chaos and confu-sion: all kinds of units are on the move, and communications, command, and control —even under a regime which centralizes C3 — come under stress. This “fog” of war maypresent some officers with the opportunity to move against the regime since the latter’sefforts would be focused on combating the invaders. Commanders may be able to betterdisguise their unit movements and instead of moving them towards the fight, they mightchoose to move them in the direction of the centers of gravity of the regime. But thedifficulties of finding Saddam or getting access to him to commit bodily harm are thesame as were mentioned in the previous scenario.

Coup under conditions of regime disintegration: Regime disintegration occurswhen a political system comes under extreme stress or pressure or is on the verge ofsuccumbing to defeat in war.71 Regime disintegration and coups are not the samething; but the former could bring about the latter. Iraqi regime disintegration —characterized by the collapse or surrender of units, the fleeing of government offi-cials, the emergence of active and armed civilian opposition to the regime — in themidst of armed conflict could possibly be the ‘window of opportunity’ for key offic-ers to deliver the coup de grace.

In 1991 in the wake of the war and the eruption of large-scale uprisings, partici-pants in that event thought that the regime was disintegrating, as did many observers.The insurgency itself was seen as contributing to the acceleration of the process ofdisintegration. But the regime did not disintegrate. Large segments of the armyrallied around the regime; the uprising was not national in scope but was perceived tobe ethnic or sectarian, and last but not least, there was no clearly articulated quest forregime change on the part of the coalition forces. Could the situation be so differentin the coming months? It is possible because in the final analysis the strains andstresses on the regime in a coming war will be significantly higher than they wereduring the 1991 war. Last, but not least, we must be careful to distinguish between abreakdown in army cohesion and discipline during an uprising, as happened in 1991,and a focused army officer corps uprising under conditions of perceived regime dis-integration that might occur in the coming months.

71. For a well-written article on regime disintegration under conditions of war see Stephen PeterRosen, “Defeating Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2002, p.16.



Coup to preempt Weapons of Mass Destruction Use: Saddam has very fewworkable military options with which to deter or fight the United States.72 His con-ventional military capabilities have most assuredly deteriorated substantially over thecourse of the past decade due to the continued imposition of sanctions, while those ofthe US have advanced significantly even if these forces continue to be thinly stretched.73

Iraq will not make the disastrous mistake of meeting US conventional forces in theopen desert as it did in 1991. So what can Iraq do?

Observers began to talk ominously about “asymmetric warfare,” and much hasbeen made of the Iraqi strategy for meeting US forces in a protracted urban battle.Iraqi officials dared the US to come and fight in Iraq’s urban areas, adding that thecost would be prohibitive enough to make the US pause.74 Nonetheless, it is not clearat all that Iraqi units whose level of initiative, training, and cohesion is low would beable to fight effectively in an urban environment. William Arkin, a well-knowndefense analyst, who follows the Iraqi military put it cogently when he said:

Recent news media stories and Iraqi statements suggest that the upcomingwar with Baghdad is going to be a bloody battle in which Saddam places hismilitary forces inside cities in hope of coaxing the Untied States into urbanwarfare.

Iraq, however, is as incapable of doing this as the United States is incapableof not being the world’s number one military power.

Iraqi threats are intended to scare fence sitters and opponents of a war inAmerica and Europe with visions of Hell…

Why does anyone buy this nonsense?…Saddam’s legions are not formedaround Western military notions of leadership or decentralized decision-mak-ing. Such initiative and self-confidence is required for urban combat or gue-rilla warfare…75

It is possible that the lack of conventional options leaves Saddam Husayn withno choice but to consider WMD deployment and use, despite his claims that Iraq doesnot possess such weaponry. Furthermore, the call for regime change may mean thathe has little to lose by using Weapons of Mass Destruction. A directive by the leader-ship to use Weapons of Mass Destruction may be the occasion for professional offic-ers to balk and turn on the regime in order to save themselves and their countryfurther destruction or post-war problems.

72. For extensive analyses of Saddam’s military options or lack thereof, see William Arkin, “Returnof the Chapstick Syndrome,” Washington Post, September 30, 2002; Tom Bowman, “Iraqi ForcesDown, Not Out,” Baltimore Sun, October 6, 2002, p.1.

73. For an example of what could be in the US arsenal against Iraq see Dave Montgomery, “WarCould Feature New US Arsenal,” Fort Worth Star Telegram, September 29, 2002, p.1.

74. See Vivienne Walt, “Iraqi Official Warns Of Bloody Baghdad Fight for US,” USA Today, October02, 2002, p. 2.

75. William Arkin, “Return of the Chapstick Syndrome,” Washington Post, September 30, 2002; foran opposing view that explores what could go wrong from the perspective of US forces, see BarryPosen, “Foreseeing A Bloody Siege In Baghdad,” New York Times, October 13, 2002.



As part of the pre-war psychological strategy, the US plans a campaign to warnIraqi officers of the dire consequences of using WMD. But while the decision to useWMD may lie in the hands of one decision-maker, the actual execution of such opera-tions lies in the hands of officers in the field. Of course, there is considerable confu-sion as to whether the authority to execute such operations lies in the hands of profes-sional officers or of specially selected, thoroughly indoctrinated and loyal officers.Nonetheless, even if execution authority does not lie in the hands of professionalofficers, undoubtedly they will hear about it and may choose to preempt it by movingagainst the regime.

If the senior officer corps undertakes a successful coup in the midst of hostilitiestheir room for maneuver is rather limited. Since US forces would be in theater, andpresumably would be winning the war, the Bush administration would have greaterleverage over this new military regime than would be the case if the coup plotters hadoverthrown the regime prior to the onset of the war, another option discussed above.It is not clear that such a military regime would be allowed to continue once the warcould be ended, law and order restored, and the future disposition of the politicalfuture of the country be addressed.

But if there is no coup, and the regime proceeds to disintegrate under the blowsof US forces: What happens next? The United States will be saddled with restoringand maintaining order in the aftermath of hostilities in a country whose governmentwould presumably cease to exist. But governance needs to be re-established. Anumber of scenarios present themselves. Two of them are bad and one is a palatablebut costly option.

First, following the end of hostilities the US might succumb to the temptation tofoist upon the country a respectable general — a serving or exiled one — to do thebidding of victorious American forces. A leading Iraqi general in exile has quiteshamelessly promoted himself as the savior of the country following the demise ofSaddam. General Nizar al-Khazraji does not seem to realize – or care – that were heto come to power his legitimacy would rely on the presence of US forces. The USmight allow such a regime to remain in power or might make it clear that the general’sterm of office will be short and the exiled opposition must participate in a transitionto a provisional civilian government. This scenario, whether permanent or tempo-rary, is not a recipe for stability as it merely enshrines the perpetuation of power by afearful Sunni Arab minority, this time at the hands of the military — as in the pre-1968 era — rather than at the hands of civilian Sunni Arabs. Even if a militaryregime gave way to a transitional government that included members of the exiledopposition and of the excluded Shi‘i and Kurdish minorities, the military will con-tinue to remain in the hands of the Sunni Arabs.

Second, the United States could bypass the military and hand power directly toa provisional government of civilians made up of returning exiles and oppositiongroups, and then exit the Iraqi scene. Under this scenario, the US makes little effortto contribute to nation-building in Iraq. This scenario of a direct take-over of powerby a provisional government of the opposition forces must be avoided at all costs.The number of opposition groups is huge, they are famously divided, with vastly



different visions of Iraq. Many have been out of the country for decades and havelittle understanding of the potential morass they are getting into with their return toIraq. Last but not least, they will be at the mercy of the Iraqi army. How would theypropose to control it? Pious declarations made by exiled officers in a mass meeting inLondon in July 2002 that the Iraqi armed forces will honor civilian control are merelyjust that.76 They are not a substitute for the need for hard work to transform thearmed forces culture and mentality. The specter of a revanchist military — whichwould still be the most powerful social institution in the country — hovering in theshadows would also continue to threaten the stability of such a regime. Might notsome US forces then have to remain in order to protect the new provisional govern-ment while it strives to find the means to control the military, to deal with the de-mands of various ethno-sectarian groups, and prevent Iraq’s neighbors from castingcovetous glances on the country?

As I explored elsewhere in the summer of 2002, it became increasingly clearthat a long-term post-war US presence in Iraq would be unavoidable. As the USinexorably began moving towards war in fall 2002, others began to address thenettlesome issue of the ‘day after’ in greater detail. Even some within the BushAdministration have begun to realize that its post regime change project for the re-making of Iraq cannot be done on the “cheap.” Notwithstanding the growing chorusof administration statements about a commitment to a democratic Iraq, it is not clearthat senior officials have thought this through. It is possible that some may havethought — or still think — that opposition groups like the Iraqi National Congressconstitute the “democratic alternative,” and that if it is installed in power, Iraq wouldmagically be transmogrified into a democratic state. Many are realizing that theirproject for a stable post-Saddam state requires a long-term commitment on the part ofthe US and that this commitment may entail the direct control of the country in amandate system as the country slowly develops democratic institutions.77

One of the key tasks of a mandate system would be the need to restructure theIraqi armed forces completely and to ensure that they remain under civilian control.This is being explored in a more detailed manner in my “Post-Saddam Restructuringand Rebuilding of the Iraqi Armed Forces.”78 It suffices to mention two key pointshere. First, both Kurds and Shi‘a must develop a stake in the new armed forces.Currently, almost 80% of the officer corps comes from the Sunni Arab minority, andthe rest from the other minorities, of which the Shi‘i Arabs provide the bulk.79 Byway of contrast, almost 80% of the enlisted men are Shi‘i. This must change to

76. See Richard Beeston, “Military Council Formed to Oust Saddam,” Times (London), July 15,2002, on-line.

77. This is discussed in detail in my forthcoming “A Mandate System for Post-Saddam Iraq.”78. See Ahmed S. Hashim, “A Post-Saddam Mandate,” paper presented at The Future of Iraq and US

Policy Options Conference, July 17-18, 2002, US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.79. There was a significant minority of Kurdish officers whom Saddam purged or killed over the

years because of his increasing suspicion of the Kurdish minority.



reflect a better balance in the future. Of course, Saddam sought to maintain civiliancontrol of the armed forces, but neither his infrastructure of control nor modus oper-andi will be the way to proceed in the post-Saddam era. In his classic book, TheSoldier and the State, Samuel Huntington established the dichotomy between Subjec-tive Control and Objective Control over the armed forces.80 The former type aims atthe maximization of the political control of the governing élite or party and the incul-cation of its ideology within the military. Officers are often appointed to their posi-tions on the basis of loyalty and not on the basis of their professional capabilities assoldiers. And lastly, a myriad number of security and intelligence services spy on thearmed forces. This is the kind of civilian control that is to be found in Saddam’s Iraq.It must be replaced by objective control which would aim at maximizing the profes-sionalism of the military and getting the officers to focus on their area of expertise,which is warfare, rather than on politics; and by separating political from militarydecision-making.

CONCLUSIONS

Between 1968 when they came to power, and late 2002 when their tenure inpower came under stress from American pressure, Saddam Husayn and the Ba‘thParty have expended considerable efforts in trying to establish stable civil-militaryrelations. Implementing civilian control over the military is a laudable endeavor,which all civilian governments seek as an end. But in the case of Iraq, the costs havebeen high and the results have been meager. Officers have not stopped trying tooverthrow the political system. In short, Saddam Husayn has not succeeded in trans-forming ideological indoctrination of, and tight controls over, the armed forces intolegitimacy, where the latter accepts the concept of civilian supremacy. Why? Muchof this has to do with the pathology of the regime, the military’s perception of itself asthe undeniable savior of the Iraqi nation, a view it has held since the founding of thestate, and structural pressures.

By pathology of the regime, I do not necessarily mean the totalitarian nature ofthe regime. It can be convincingly argued that the totalitarian and hence anti-liberalcharacter of the Saddam regime has not been a primary reason for the rising trend ofdisgruntled officers. Nobody can deny that this is the only truly totalitarian system inexistence in the Middle East. There have been totalitarian regimes — e.g. the SovietUnion — that have adopted measures of control that are not very different from thoseof the Iraqi totalitarian system. For much of its history, Soviet control of the armedforces was not challenged by coup attempts. It is not the totalitarian nature of theregime per se that the Iraqi army has often risen against. The tendency of the officercorps to engage in conspiracies against the regime has often been shaped by the pa-thology of Saddam. The Iraqi leader’s quest for absolute control went far beyond the

80. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civilian-MilitaryRelations, (New York: Vintage, 1964).



parameters of even the most totalitarian of states and directly impinged on the securityand safety of the officer corps. This has been coupled with his politics of bloodyvengeance if such control is challenged. Instead of being cowed, members of theofficer corps have chosen to act, often with the knowledge that the chances of successare minimal.

Second, the Iraqi officer corps — a largely Sunni Arab body — has a nationalvision for Iraq that has not been any less authoritarian or any less characterized by axenophobic nationalism. It is a national vision — where the national element iscircumscribed by its being a narrowly-based ethno-sectarian one — which sees thearmed forces at center stage, as the savior of the nation and as the most competentinstitution in the country, to lead the country. This was bound to clash with thecivilian vision of the Ba‘thists, who believe that civilians should lead, although bothgroups are ideological fellow-travelers. The continued existence of this authoritarianand narrow national vision within the armed forces does not bode well for the stabil-ity of any post-Saddam civilian system that seeks to transcend the narrow foundationsof Iraqi political life.

Thirdly, structural pressures from the outside have often shaped the nature ofcivil-military relations in many countries. By structural pressures I mean defeat inwar or the exertion of political, economic, and military pressures by outside, gener-ally more powerful, powers to shape the nature of politics within a target state, in-cluding the nature of civil-military relations. But in the case of Iraq outside pressureshave not led to the overthrow of the regime. The costly wars of the 1980s and 1990s,the sanctions regime, and the growing American pressure on Iraq from early 2002,would most likely have felled most regimes. But there is no doubt that these pressureshave contributed enormously to perpetuating the unstable nature of civil-militaryrelations within the country and to increasing the paranoia with which Saddam viewsthe officer corps. Given the increased pressures on Iraq as of 2002-03, we cannotdiscount the impact of this factor on the regime’s sense of security and on the officercorps. As the situation between Iraq and the US moves towards a dénouement in theopening months of 2003, it is possible that the conjunction of the factors mentionedabove — pathology of the regime, the officers’ vision for Iraq, and the structuralpressures — may force the officers’ hands.

Even if the senior officer corps does not move against the regime, a US decisionto go to war to bring about regime change would ultimately bring to the fore the issueof civil-military relations in a defeated post-Saddam Iraq. By way of conclusion, wecan restate some simple and stark points. Firstly, civil-military relations will not bestable were the US to impose an officer who is no more than a puppet. Secondly,civil-military relations will not be stable if the US creates a provisional governmentmade up of civilian exiles who would return to claim a country most of whom leftdecades ago. Such a regime will not be able to establish the principle of civiliansupremacy over the armed forces, notwithstanding the pious declarations of exiledofficers. Thirdly, civil-military relations will certainly not be stable if, after thevictory, the US leaves the country to its own devices. In this case, who or what groupwould put Iraqi civil-military relations on a stable foundation requires a long-term



commitment to rebuild the country, its institutions, and education of its civilians andofficers in new norms of civil-military interactions. Whether the US has the will andability to do this in the face of potential obstacles and opposition remains to be seen.


Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: …Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power Ahmed Hashim MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL VOLUME

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