Remediallaw Albano

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JURISDICTION

Q A complaint for damages due to malicious prosecution was filed. It sought an award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P420,000.00 suffered by reason of the utterances while they were at a police station. What court has jurisdiction? Explain.

Answer: The RTC has jurisdiction using the totality rule since the main action is for damages, hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g. , exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

Where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639; Sante v. Hon. Claravall, et. al. , G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, Villarama, J).

Q The owner of a real property gave it to another who subdivided it and sold to other persons, forging the signatures of the owners. Demand was made for the return of the property but as there was refusal of the transferee, an action for cancellation of TCT was filed, alleging that the property was sold for only P4,000.00 was filed with the RTC. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter? Explain.

Answer: No. The MTC has jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 3, RA 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the MTC as the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00 where the property is located outside of Metro Manila. As the case was filed with the RTC, the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, hence, it must be dismissed. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed with the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property. (Huguete v. Embudo, 453 Phil. 170 [2003]).

The case is not simply a case for the cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot. (Padlan v. Dinglasan, et al. , G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, Peralta, J).

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

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RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTIONS

Misjoined cause of action; effect.

Q What is the effect if there is a misjoinder of causes of actions? Explain.

Answer: If there is a misjoinder of causes of action, such defect should not result in the dismissal of the complaint. A "misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately. " (Unicapital, Inc. , et al. v. Consing, et al. , G.R. No. 175277 & 175285; Sec. 6, Rule 2).

RULE 3 - PARTIES

Q Manuel and Lolita obtained a loan from Boston Equity Resources Inc. obligating themselves jointly and severally to pay the amount of the obligation. When the obligation became due and demandable, there was demand to pay but there was no payment, hence a complaint for sum of money was filed against them. Answering the complaint Lolita alleged that her husband has already passed away, hence, Lolita contended that the estate of Manuel is an indispensable party and that the claim should be against the estate of Manuel. If you were the judge, how would you rule on the contention of Lolita? Explain.

Answer: I would decide in favor of the plaintiff, because the obligation is solidary. The creditor can collect the entire obligation from Lolita alone. Under the law, the creditor may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully satisfied. (Art. 1216, NCC). The creditor may opt to collect the entire amount from anyone of the solidary debtors. (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA, et al. , G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013, Perez, J).

Q Maraon filed a complaint for sum of money against Cuenca and Tayactac, stockholders of Arc Cuisine. The suit involved an intra-corporate matter. Properties of Arc Cuisine were subjected to levy on attachment where Stronghold Insurance Co. issued a bond. Cuenca and Tayactac sought for damages against the bond contending that the attachment of the properties caused damages to the properties. Is the contention correct? Explain.

Answer: No, because they are not the real parties in interest. The properties attached belonged to Arc Cuisine alone not Cuenca and Tayactac. They are merely stockholders of the Corporation which has a separate distinct personality. The damages occasioned to the properties of the corporation prejudiced only the corporation, hence only Arc Cuisine has the right under the substantive law to claim and recover damages. The right could not be asserted by them unless they did so in the name of the corporation.



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A litigation should be disallowed immediately if it involves a person without any interest at stake, for it would be futile and meaningless to still proceed and render a judgment where there is no actual controversy to be thereby determined. Courts of law are not allowed to delve on academic issues or to render advisory opinions. They only resolve actual controversies, for that is what they are authorized to do by the Fundamental Law itself, which forthrightly ordains that the judicial power is wielded only to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. (Stronghold Ins. Co. , Inc. v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013).

REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

Q If one of the parties in a compromise fails or refuses to comply with the terms of the same, what is the remedy of the aggrieved party? Explain.

Answer: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. (Art. 2041, NCC).

In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party. (Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013 citing Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005).

RULE 8 MANNER OF ALLEGATIONS

Q An action was filed seeking the nullity of a foreclosure sale of a mortgage alleging that there was payment of the obligation. The defendant did not deny having issued a receipt for payment, instead, it alleged that such payment was false and self-serving, but at the same time argued that, without necessarily admitting that payment was made, the same cannot be considered as a redemption price. State the effect of such allegation? Explain.

Answer: It is a negative pregnant such that by making such an ambiguous allegation in its Answer with Counterclaims, the defendant is deemed to have admitted payment. If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted. (Banares v. Atty. Barican, 157 Phil. 134). Where a fact is alleged with some qualifying or modifying language, and the denial is conjunctive, a negative pregnant exists, and only the qualification or modification is denied, while the fact itself is admitted. Denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is intended to be denied. Profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge, or means of knowing as ineffectual, is no denial at all. In fine, respondent failed to refute the claim of payment. (Venzon v. Rural Bank of Buenavista (Agusan Del Norte) Inc. , G.R. No. 178031, August 28, 2013).



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RULE 9 - DEFAUT

Q State the effect and remedies of a party in default. Explain.

Answer: When defendant is declared in default, the proper remedy is to file a motion to set aside the order of default upon a proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(b).

A party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. He may not seek the reversal of the decision on the basis of evidence submitted in the appellate court. Otherwise, his right to adduce evidence would have been returned to him. He can also file a motion for new trial or petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of judgment or special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. (Nabua, et al. v. Lu Ym, G.R. No. 176141, December 16, 2008).

RULE 14 - SUMMONS

Q In an action, summons was served upon the defendant through a security guard. It was not shown that he was authorized to receive summons. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant? Explain.

Answer: No. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. (Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, G.R. No.182729, September 29, 2010, 631 SCRA 596, 612, citing Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc. , G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 617, 622; Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp. , G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013, Peralta, J).

Q What is required of the sheriff if there is a substituted service of summons? Explain.

Answer: In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void. (Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp. , G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013, Peralta, J).



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RULE 16 - MOTION TO DISMISS

Q State the rule in ruling a MTD on the ground of failure to state a cause of actions. Explain.

Answer: Settled is the rule that in a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. The test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. (St. Mary of the Woods School Inc. , et al. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, et al. , G.R. Nos. 174290, 176116, January 20, 2009).

RULE 26

Q Petitioners filed a Request for Admission with the RTC and served it upon respondents requesting that the fact that they filed a written claim for refund with the City Treasurer of Manila be admitted. In the respondents MTD and answer to the complaint, they have already stated that petitioners failed to file any claim for tax refund or credit. Is there a need to answer the request for admission? Explain.

Answer: No considering that respondents have already stated in their MTD and answer that petitioners failed to file any written claim for tax refund or credit. Their failure to file a reply to the same is not an admission of the veracity and truth of the requested fact.

Under Rule 26, Secs. 1 & 2, of the Rules of Court, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. (See Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 385, 399; Manzano v. Despabiladeras, G.R. No. 148786, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 123, 134; Motor Service Co. , Inc. v. Yellow Taxicab Co. , Inc. , 96 Phil. 688, 691-692 [1955]).

The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. (Limos v. Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 288). The rationale behind this exception had been discussed in the case of



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CIR v. Manila Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 153204, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 571, citing Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. CA, 334 Phil. 77 [1997]; Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. , et al. v. Ms. Liberty Toledo, et al. , G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013).

RULE 33 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Effect of demurrer to evidence.

Q State the effect if demurrer to evidence is granted in a criminal case. Explain.

Answer: If demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668; Dayap v. Sendiong, et al. , G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009).

RULE 36 - JUDGMENT

When there may be a several judgment.

Q There was an action for partition. There were properties under the names of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The court rendered judgment on the properties in the name of defendants but deferred judgment on the properties under the names of the plaintiffs considering that the properties are separable. The CA affirmed the partial judgment. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?

Answer: Yes. The judgment is in the nature of a several judgment.

A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. (Fernando v. Santamaria, 487 Phil. 351 [2004]).

Although sued they were collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the properties, hence, the pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some did not affect the determination of the obligations of the others. (Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. v. Rolando Sy, et al. , G.R. Nos. 114217 and 150797, October 13, 2009).



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RULE 39 JUDGMENTS AND EXECUTION

Q After the final and executory judgment declaring the donation void, the donee filed an action for quieting of title against the donor. Will the action prosper? Why?

Answer: No. The action for quieting of title will not prosper anymore because of the principle of res judicata.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been juridically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, judgment of the court as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with him. Thus, petitioners can no longer question donors ownership over the land in the suit for quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. (Tan v. CA, 415 Phil. 675 [2001]; Sps. Noceda v. Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010).

APPEALS

Modes of appeal from RTC to CA, etc.

Q State the modes of appeal from a decision of the RTC to the CA.

Answer: In a case decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the public respondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action.

Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a notice of appeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42.

However, in numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice. Dismissal of the appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. It is better to excuse a technical lapse rather than dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. In the present case, a dismissal on technicality would only mean a new round of litigation between the same parties for the same cause of action, over the same subject matter. Thus, notwithstanding



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petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition. (BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010).

Q What is the effect of dismissal of a petition thru a minute resolution? Explain.

Answer: Although contained in a minute resolution, the dismissal of the petition is a disposition of the merits of the case. When the court dismissed the petition, it effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, the ruling in that case has already become final.

With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. x x x. (Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2008, 600 SCRA 413; PNB v. Lim, et al. , G.R. No. 171677, January 30, 2013, Reyes, J; Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama, G.R. No. 186614, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 299).

RULE 58

Preliminary injunction will not issue if damage is quantifiable not irreparable.

Q There was a controversy over the ownership of parcels of land. But during the pendency of the same, there was a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to recover possession alleging irreparable damage due to loss of the fruits, etc. over the same If you were the judge, how would you rule on the motion? Explain.

Answer: I would deny the motion. Granting that there is strong evidence to prove private respondents ownership and possession of the disputed lot, still, they are not entitled to the grant of preliminary mandatory injunction. As the damage alleged by them can be quantified, it cannot be considered as grave and irreparable injury as understood in law.

Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. As previously held in Golding v. Balatbat, the writ of injunction should never issue when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. (Power Sites & Signs, Inc. v. United Neon, G.R. No. 163406, November 24, 2009; PPA v. Cipres Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc. , G.R. No. 145742, July 14, 2005).

Furthermore, they could still be fully compensated for the damages they may suffer by simply requiring petitioners to file a bond to answer for all damages that may be suffered



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by such denial. (See Rules of Court, Rule 58, Sec. 6; Heirs of Uy v. CA, et al. , G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013, Peralta, J).

RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

Q In a case, the spouses obtained a loan secured by mortgage over their properties. After Flaviano died, a petition for settlement of his estate was filed where one of the children was appointed as administrator. Notice to creditors was issued hence, the mortgagee notified the probate court of its claim. In the meantime, the administrator obtained several loans secured by PNs. The probate court terminated the intestate proceeding due to an extrajudicial partition of the properties of the estate; but the loan remained unsatisfied. The creditor extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, became the highest, bidder, but there was a deficiency. A suit to recover the deficiency was filed against the estate where the court rendered a judgment holding it liable. The decision was appealed contending that with the foreclosure of the mortgage, the creditor waived the right to recover the deficiency. The CA ruled that the creditor is entitled to claim the deficiency. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?

Answer: No, because having foreclosed the mortgage, it relied on the security and waived the right to claim the deficiency.

Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 225). Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate when it provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. (Heirs of the Late Spouses Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corp. , G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013).

DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED

Q Mercado was one of the accused in the anomalous situation where officials of the Department of Finance (DOF) formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency



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Tax Credit & Drawback Center (DOF-One-Stop-Shop) issued Tax credit certificates to JAM Liner for domestic capital equipment although it did not qualify. Showing willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate, Homer Mercado applied with the DOJ for immunity as a state witness under its witness protection program which was granted. But inspite of the immunity he was charged before the SB by the Ombudsman where he filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted, hence, there was an Immunity Agreement subject to the condition that he would produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify against the accused. The SB denied the Motion of the Ombudsman to discharge him on the ground that there was no compliance with Rule 119, Sec. 17 of the Rules of Court and held that the testimony of Mercado is not absolutely necessary because the State has other direct evidence that may prove the offense charged.

It was likewise contended by his co-accused who opposed the grant of immunity to him, that the immunity that the Ombudsman gave Mercado did not bind the court, which in the meantime already acquired jurisdiction over the case against him. That immunity merely relieved Mercado from any further proceedings, including preliminary investigation, which the state might still attempt to initiate against him. Is the contention of the co-accused correct? Why?

Answer: No. The filing of the criminal action against an accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman from exercising the power that the Congress has granted him. Section 17 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

The authority enables the Ombudsman to carry out his constitutional mandate to ensure accountability in the public service. (Quarto v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580). It gives the Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused discharged from the information to increase the chances of conviction of the other accused and attain a higher prosecutorial goal. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783). Immunity statutes seek to provide a balance between the states interests and the individuals right against self-incrimination. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution. In such case, both interests and rights are satisfied. (People v. The Hon. SB, et al. , G.R. No. 185729-32, June 26, 2013).

RULE 113 ARREST

Q A judgment was rendered by the MTC-Muntinlupa City which became final and executory. A motion for execution was filed but as there was no action, the Clerk of



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Court, Atty. Fria, was charged under Art. 231, RPC for open disobedience. The accused filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause which was opposed. In the meantime the RTC declared the proceedings in the MTC void for lack of jurisdiction. Finding no probable cause, the MTC dismissed the criminal case which was affirmed by the RTC, hence, this petition with the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Will the petition prosper? Why?

Answer: No. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

The judges power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA, G.R. Nos. 178947 and 179079, June 26, 2013, it was ruled that while a judges determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause x x x.

In order not to transgress the public prosecutors authority, the judges dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. (The Law Firm of Chavez, Miranda & Aseochi v. Atty. Fria, G.R. No. 183014, August 7, 2013).

RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Q Accused were charged before the Ombudsman with violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act. However, it took the Ombudsman almost eight (8) years to resolve and file the same with the SB. The accused filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaints were filed. The SB denied the Motions, hence, they filed the petition for certiorari with the SC. Was there violation of the right of the accused? Why?

Answer: Yes. The right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete, causing prejudice to the accused. Under the Constitution, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. (Sec. 16, Art. III, Constitution).



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This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. (Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723; Coscolluela v. SB, et al. , G.R. No. 191411; Nacionales, et al. v. SB, et al. , G.R. No. 191871, July 15, 2013).

PLEA

Q What are the duties of a court if an accused pleads guilty to a grave offense and why? Explain.

Answer: The duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a grave offense are:

(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,

(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and

(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death (now reclusion perpetua), for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. (People v. Ernas, 455 Phil. 829 [2003]). Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid the Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. (People v. Pastor, 428 Phil. 976 [2002]; People v. Gambao, et al. , G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013).

BAIL

Q - a. ) When is bail a matter of right; when is it a matter of discretion?

b. ) A was charged with the crime of plunder and now under detention. As his counsel, he asked you how he could have provisional liberty. Advice your client and state your reasons.

Answer: a. ) Bail is a matter of right in the following cases:

1. Before and after conviction in inferior courts;



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2. Before conviction of an offense not punishable by death reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment in the RTC; or

3. Before conviction of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment when guilt of evident is not strong.

Bail is a matter of discretion:

1. Upon conviction of an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment; or

2. Upon conviction of an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 years to 20 years when the convictee was not among the following:

a. Recidivist, habitual delinquent, quasi-recidivist or is charged of an offense which is aggravated by resteracion;

b. A fugitive of law before arrest;

c. Has evaded sentence or has violated conditions of parole, or probation;

d. Other similar cases from the foregoing;

e. That accused is a fight risk.

b. ) I will tell A that while plunder may be punishable by reclusion perpetua as the case may be, the Constitutional right to bail is still available to him because there is yet a determination of whether his evidence of guilt is strong. I will advise the filing of an application for bail and in order that the court may determine by evidence to be presented by the prosecution if there is a strong evidence of guilt against A. the right to bail under the Constitution cannot be denied to A unless the Court has determined that there is strong evidence as to As guilt. Bail is intended to relieve those who are entitled thereto from the vigors of imprisonment and premature punishments. In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to present evidence as to As guilt, the Court is still to conduct searching questions. The right to bail is premised on the Constitutional right of the accuseds presumption of innocence.

Q - State the requisites of the admissibility of dying declaration and the bases for the rule as exception to the hearsay rule.

Answer: To be admitted, a dying declaration must:

a. The declarant must be at the danger of imminent death and he is conscious of such;

b. The facts and circumstances declared was within the personal knowledge of the declarant to which he is qualified to testify had he been alive;



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c. The death of the declarant is in issue;

d. The declaration made was relating to the circumstances surrounding the death of the declarant;

e. The declaration was complete; and

f. The declarant died.

This is based on the truthfulness and the necessity to admit such declaration. Usually, the identity of the perpetrator in cases involving dying declaration is unknown and the prosecution of the death of the declarant would be inutile for lack of witness. This is to assure efficient administration of justice and prosecution of offenses despite absence of direct evidence pursuant to public policy.

EVIDENCE

Q At the trial pieces of evidence were identified to prove entitlement to commission, but were never offered. May the court consider the same? Why?

Answer: No. Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. (Landingin v. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 415).

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. None of the above-cited exceptions finds application to the instant case, more particularly, the alleged failure of the contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties nor did Zamora raise any of the issues at the proceedings before the trial court.

With more reason, documentary evidence which was not formally offered cannot be used to modify, explain or add to the terms of an agreement.

Q May a mentally retardate be qualified to testify? Explain.



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Answer: Yes. Human experience teaches that even mentally deficient persons or individuals having low intelligence can still narrate their ordeals in detailed manner and recall painful experiences like any average individual could. Here, the victim notably could not even recall feeling anything after appellant supposedly penetrated her private part. (People v. Calango, G.R. No. 179280, August 27, 2009).

Q During the pendency of an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband, she filed a motion for production of the hospital record as he underwent hospital confinement for detoxication and rehabilitation. He opposed it arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The motion was denied by the RTC. Imputing grave abuse of discretion of the court, she filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA which affirmed the lower courts order holding that if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although the husband can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement. Is the contention of the husband correct? Why?

Answer: Yes. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. (Josielene Lara Chan v. Johnny Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013).



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