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DRAFT comments are welcome 1 Reflective Realism: a Sensitive and Critical Methodology for Political Theory 1 Signe Blaabjerg Christoffersen and Ditte Brasso Sørensen Abstract The goal of this paper is to provide nuances to the realist tradition. Many realist contributions have failed to honor their realist aspirations resulting in either a lack of empirical sensitivity, an uncritical appraisal of empirical beliefs or both. With this contribution we strive to move realist research forward by providing an adequate methodology for a reflective realism. Reflective realism recognizes the advantages of existing realist research by taking its point of departure in the work of Andrea Sangiovanni (2008). Yet, it also attempts to cope with its faults by explicating some of its central premises and features. We underscore, first, the need for sensitivity as we seek to develop an approach which includes both cultural and institutional parts of the political domain. Second, we develop on Sangiovanni’s notion of critique aspiring to strengthen the critical potential of realism. And third, we discuss in more detail which elements need to be explored as a means to develop normative principles and how to do this. In this process it becomes clear that we award politics and morality more equal roles in theorizing reflective realist normative principles. By highlighting all of these elements, we hope to move the realism of Sangiovanni in a direction which is even more sensitive and critical a reflective realism. 1. Introduction Political theory has encountered challenges lately. Globalization and increasing interdependence have challenged and changed the political domain. Structures of cooperation and conflict are changing both regionally and internationally, causing new actors to rise and new policy problems, which need to be dealt with. In response, new forms of organizing political life, increased integration, and intensified communication across borders are at once changing both the conditions and the beliefs that constitute the empirical, political realm. Our political theoretical vocabulary, which has been shaped and refined with a national audience in mind - and with the purpose of criticizing and improving national practice, often appears inadequate in the meeting with changing meaning and practices in the regional and international context Maybe partly as a result of this, the purpose of political theory has been challenged by a group of realist thinkers, claiming that political theory need not merely be concerned with abstract moral ideals, but also with the political domain. Realists call for renewed engagement with empirical reality. We side with the realists, but we do not side with them blindly. Indeed, realism’s opposition to ideal theory has disturbed its critical potential and it has caused debate and divisions within realism itself. We propose to proceed from the kind of realism advocated by Andrea Sangiovanni (2008), while we add nuances to his approach, which has so far 1 For helpful comments and criticism we would like to thank Anders Berg-Sørensen and Malte Frøsle Ibsen
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Page 1: Reflective Realism: a Sensitive and Critical Methodology ... Realism... · interpretative realism.5 Interpretative realism is, according to Freeden, devoted to “decoding patterns

DRAFT – comments are welcome

1

Reflective Realism: a Sensitive and Critical Methodology for Political Theory1

Signe Blaabjerg Christoffersen and Ditte Brasso Sørensen

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to provide nuances to the realist tradition. Many realist contributions have failed to

honor their realist aspirations resulting in either a lack of empirical sensitivity, an uncritical appraisal of

empirical beliefs or both. With this contribution we strive to move realist research forward by providing an

adequate methodology for a reflective realism. Reflective realism recognizes the advantages of existing

realist research by taking its point of departure in the work of Andrea Sangiovanni (2008). Yet, it also

attempts to cope with its faults by explicating some of its central premises and features. We underscore, first,

the need for sensitivity as we seek to develop an approach which includes both cultural and institutional parts

of the political domain. Second, we develop on Sangiovanni’s notion of critique aspiring to strengthen the

critical potential of realism. And third, we discuss in more detail which elements need to be explored as a

means to develop normative principles and how to do this. In this process it becomes clear that we award

politics and morality more equal roles in theorizing reflective realist normative principles. By highlighting all

of these elements, we hope to move the realism of Sangiovanni in a direction which is even more sensitive

and critical – a reflective realism.

1. Introduction

Political theory has encountered challenges lately. Globalization and increasing interdependence have

challenged and changed the political domain. Structures of cooperation and conflict are changing both

regionally and internationally, causing new actors to rise and new policy problems, which need to be dealt

with. In response, new forms of organizing political life, increased integration, and intensified

communication across borders are at once changing both the conditions and the beliefs that constitute the

empirical, political realm. Our political theoretical vocabulary, which has been shaped and refined with a

national audience in mind - and with the purpose of criticizing and improving national practice, often appears

inadequate in the meeting with changing meaning and practices in the regional and international context

Maybe partly as a result of this, the purpose of political theory has been challenged by a group of realist

thinkers, claiming that political theory need not merely be concerned with abstract moral ideals, but also with

the political domain. Realists call for renewed engagement with empirical reality. We side with the realists,

but we do not side with them blindly. Indeed, realism’s opposition to ideal theory has disturbed its critical

potential and it has caused debate and divisions within realism itself. We propose to proceed from the kind of

realism advocated by Andrea Sangiovanni (2008), while we add nuances to his approach, which has so far

1 For helpful comments and criticism we would like to thank Anders Berg-Sørensen and Malte Frøsle Ibsen

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suffered from a lack of explication of some of the central premises and features.2 First, we put renewed stress

on the need for sensitivity by questioning Sangiovanni’s distinction between cultural and institutional

practice dependency. Second, we develop on Sangiovanni’s notion of critique in order to make the critical

potential of realist theory more explicit. And third, we show what concrete elements we should be sensitive

to in developing normative principles and how. This involves stressing the importance of existing normative

principlesand pre-theoretical intuitions. By recognizing and developing these elements, we award politics

and morality a more equal role in theorizing reflective realist normative principles. In doing so, we hope to

move the realism of Sangiovanni in a direction which is at the same time more sensitive and more critical – a

reflective realism.

2. Realist Divisions

As already mentioned, debates have raged in political theory recently on the proper character of political

theory and a realist position has arisen in opposition to so-called ideal theory (Valentini, 2012: 704). Ideal

theorists hold that in formulating and justifying normative principles, one should seek a normative point of

view unfettered by the form and structure of existing institutions and practices (Sangiovanni, 2008: 137).

According to ideal theorists, political theory, therefore, operates on an abstract level in order to provide

insights into how the political domain should work. Only after having developed an ideal conception of

justice or democracy, might one start thinking about how such would look under non-ideal circumstances

(Rawls, 1999: 8, 216).

Realists, on the other hand, have advocated for an action-guiding theory that operates less in the abstract. We

here focus on realist theory as it emerged within the field of international affairs in the aftermath of the

nuclear revolution, and as it has later been reformulated within the narrower field of political theory by

amongst others William Galston. This focus allows us to see the contours of a division within realist theory

itself, which has most recently been manifest in the differences between the realism of e.g. Michael Freeden

and Sangiovanni, as we will return to.

All realists share the aspiration that we need to start from the political domain.3 “[P]olitical philosophy”,

Raymond Geuss writes, “must be realist,”(…) meaning that it should “be concerned in the first instance not

with how people ought ideally to act (…) but rather with the way the social, economic, political etc.,

institutions actually operate at some given time, and what really does move human beings to act in given

2 Sangiovanni argues from the point of view of a theory of justice. We do not. Instead, our field of research lies within democratic theory. The

argument we present here is therefore thought of as having broad application value. As will be clear below, however, we hold certain pre-theoretical intuitions, which very much lie within the democratic frame of reference. 3 We here define the political domain as compassing our lives at the societal level, and concerns related to how we ought these lives. It is about

collective action, power and authority. The moral domain, on the other hand, is often taken to be about how we as individuals ought to live our lives. Moral values and principles are those that justify our individual actions and beliefs. Whereas the political is more negotiable and dynamic, the moral

domain is most often characterized as fixed and pre-given. The moral and political domains cannot be completely separated, but should be thought of

as interlinked (cf. Erman E and Möller N. (2013) Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World: The Priority of Morality and the Autonomy of the Political. British Journal of Political Science: 1-19. p. 10.).

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circumstances.” (Geuss, 2008: 9). The early realists within the field of international relations took this

aspiration very serious. They criticized liberal visions for being perfectionist as opposed to rooted in a real,

sociological, practical understanding of politics (Morgenthau, 1973: 21; Morgenthau, 1966). And they

actually conducted detailed studies of the nuclear revolution, which they argued made it impossible for the

nation-state to live up to its purpose of protecting its citizens. This in turn, led to calls for global reform

(Craig, 2003: 94, 105; Scheuerman, 2011). John Herz wrote: ”The nuclear predicament challenges

statesmen to act in a dual capacity: not only in defense of ”national” interest but as agents and caretakers of

what Reinhold Niebuhr calls the developing ”community of the fate of the common threat of nuclear

annihilation””(Herz, 1962: 140). Thus, this early group of realist strived for empirical sensitivity, and at the

same time retained a normative aspiration for global reform.4

More recent, realist theory has to some extent let go of the former and this has led to a slight refocusing of

the tradition. As a part of a larger realist revival within political theory, Galston has argued that coordination

remains the most central political task in reforming our political reality, yet coordination will always be

complicated by the fact that human interaction is unstable and conflict-ridden (Galston, 2010). Moreover,

Galston and others have depicted human nature as inherently self-interested and manipulative (cf. Stears,

2010; Galston, 2010). By so doing, Galston has fell into the trap, which earlier realists to some extent

managed to avoid, of depicting political reality in static terms while at the same time neglecting the actual

study of it. Of course, by claiming to be concerned with the political domain (and thus by claiming to be a

realist) one needs to make certain assumptions about politics. We argued above that the political domain is

defined by its societal character, by a concern with collective action, power, and authority, and by its

negotiable character – as will be clear later we also believe that the moral domain is to some extent

characterized by the latter. The point here is that claiming this need not result in a lack of attention to the

actual contingency of politics. While the political domain is often characterized by conflict, empirically

speaking, conflict is also often replaced by true cooperation. Thus, we can only understand the political

domain by actually engaging it each and every time we wish to address it. By not grounding his claims

explicitly in empirical practice and stating clearly the need for sustained empirical sensitivity, Galston risks

falling prey to the very same critique that he utters against idealism – namely that it is insufficiently rooted in

empirical facts. Politics might change and for this reason, we argue, keeping idealized assumptions out is

central. Indeed, true empirical sensitivity is needed.

4 Both elements have been and are debated within the field of international political theory, but there is a still greater recognition of the call for global

reform and the details in analysis (see among others Scheuerman WE. (2011) The Realist Case for Global Reform, Cambridge: Polity Press, Craig C.

(2003) Glimmer of a New Leviathal: Total War in the thought of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz, New York: Columbia University Press, Cabrera L. (2010) World government: Renewed debate, persistent challenges. European Journal of International Relations 16: 511-530.). However, some keep

arguing that empirical sensitivity led to a dismissal of any normative visions (Guilhot N. (2013) Politics between and beyond nations: Hans J.

Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. . In: Bliddal H, Sylvest C and Wilson P (eds) Classics of International Relations : Essays in Criticism and Appreciation. London: Routledge, 69-79.).

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This latter critique has been explicitly voiced by amongst others Michael Freeden in a recent reformulation

of realism. As an alternative to Galston’s “prescriptive” realism, which he sees as being too caught up in an

ethical project related to disclosing the ”unequal and the marginalized” and hence not sensitive enough to the

many positions in the real world (Freeden, 2013: 57), Michael Freeden has proposed a notion of

interpretative realism.5 Interpretative realism is, according to Freeden, devoted to “decoding patterns of

concrete and actual political thinking independently of their ethical assessments, or of a desire to offer

improvements, or of using them in order to support a particular type of politics or political system.”

(Freeden, 2013: 57). Freeden has hereby re-instituted the sensitivity of realism, but he has done so at the cost

of the normative potential which was very much visible in the realism of Herz, Morgenthau and others (cf.

Scheuerman, 2011; Scheuerman, 2013). By avoiding reflection Freeden’s realism downplays the critical and

normative element in political theorizing unnecessarily. Thus, while Freeden’s realism contains important

analytical, practical insights, as we will return to, is unsatisfactory from a normative point of view. In fact,

Freeden’s project appears to have more affinities with the post-structural project6 rather than the realist in its

dismissal of normative principles.

The idea that we advance in the following is that realist sensitivity to politics need not exclude the search for

normative principles and thus abstraction. Abstraction as such is a common theoretical feature, though the

level of abstraction might differ between ideal and realist contributions (Valentini, 2012). While ideal theory

most often sets out final goals for institutional reform, realist theory is concerned with normative principles

that can be applied to the institutions and practices as of today as a means of improving these. While end-

state ideals, as professed by idealist, might function as “lodestars”, they are often times difficult to maneuver

after because of a lack of sufficient consensus, and proper means of utilization. As a result, we are unable to

act upon them and this decreases their emancipatory potential. A truly emancipatory potential lies in the fact

that the normative principles proposed are shared in our immediate political context and thought of in

relation to a concrete institutional context. This makes it possible to act on them in a way which is respectful

of current practices. It makes it possible to move somewhere as opposed to being caught up in existing

political reality. Each of us will have an intuition about the long-term goal of this movement – about the

direction – but this intuition need not be shared across traditions and contexts. We might agree on a step

without agreeing on the ultimate goal. Thus, we argue that realist theory should strive for empirical

sensitivity, but it should not do so at the cost of its normative aspirations.

5 Freeden has developed separate methodological approaches for political theory when it comes to instances of thinking about politics, where he has developed the “Conceptual Approach to Ideologies” (Freeden M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford:

Clarendon Press.) and instances of thinking politically, where he has developed a methodological framework to analyze political thinking; “A political

theory of Political Thinking” (Freeden M. (2013) The Political Theory of Political Thinking, Oxford: Oxford University Press.). Note that this is not the only approach to furthering sensitivity, but it is one approach (formulated within the realist framework itself) as will be clear in the following. 6 We associate post-structuralism with the position that emerged in the French intellectual life in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It embraces most

prominently Jacques Derrida's deconstructionism and the historical critiques of Michel Foucault. It departs from the claims to objectivity and comprehensiveness made by structuralism and emphasizes instead plurality and deferral of meaning, rejecting the fixed binary oppositions of

structuralism and the validity of authorial authority (Hornby AS. (2005) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. In: Wehmeier S (ed) Oxford

Advanced Learner's Dictionary. 7 ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). As such, post-structuralism has often been associated with the goal of de-construction rather than critical judgments.

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In the following we present the work of Sangiovanni, which we argue have succeeded in creating a realist

framework which explicates the potential for a realist critique. As will be clear, Sangiovanni’s project suffers

from a lack of sensitivity to the political reality, but we subscribe to his general aim, which is to advance an

approach that takes its point of departure in the political reality, while withholding the ambition of

constructing normative, context sensitive principles.

3. The practice dependency thesis

Sangiovanni has proposed a useful framework for conceptualizing the realist position through the thesis of

“practice dependency”. At the core of this thesis lies the belief that the content, scope, and justification of

first order principles should be dependent on the institutions and practices the principles intend to govern

(Sangiovanni 2008). By emphasizing the need for principles to be, in their content, scope, and justification,

dependent on the political reality to which they speak, Sangiovanni promotes the realist project of giving

priority to the political rather than a universal moral domain, when seeking to justify principles of relevance

for political reform practices.

Following from this thesis, it becomes important to understand the meaning inherent in political reality.

Hence gaining an interpretive understanding of the specific political reality we face becomes an inevitable

part of constructing theoretical principles. In the construction of practice-dependent principles several factors

need to be taken into account. Pre-theoretical moral intuitions (P) might guide our view of the world;

examples of such could be to eliminate human suffering, that humans should be treated with equal concern,

and that normative principles should reflect the convictions of the individuals they seek to guide. What

divorces the practice-dependent approach from the practice-independent is that practice-dependent principles

(J) cannot be derived from our pre-theoretical moral intuitions (P) alone, but needs to be based on an

interpretative understanding of the social context (C) it is seeking to guide (Sangiovanni, 2008: 144). The

emphasis on Cs role when constructing Js makes the theoretical distinction between practice-dependent and

practice-independent approaches clear, and we concur with Sangiovanni that the realist ambition should be to

construct Js through conscious interpretation of C without hereby losing sight of P. However, a problem, as

we see it, in the practice-dependent approach promoted by Sangiovanni, is still a lack of sensitivity and

openness to what this C might encompass. In other words, like Galston, though to a lesser extent,

Sangiovanni tends to fall into the trap of depicting reality in too static terms rather than actually investigating

it.

In the following we will first touch upon the need for a further elaboration on the sensitivity to the political

reality, that is, what should we take into consideration when conducting the interpretative analysis of the

political reality? We will further seek to explicate the notion of critique we believe to be inherent in both

Sangiovanni’s and our approach, before moving to discuss the concrete elements that should be taking into

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consideration when constructing Js - here we will elaborate on the importance of P and of balancing

interpretative understanding of Cs with a plurality of already existing Js, while acknowledging their

historical contingency. Simultaneously, we sketch some methodological reflections on how this might be

done. We believe that this add important nuances the practice-dependent thesis, while it stays faithful to the

overall ambition promoted by Sangiovanni. That is, to construct Js through conscious interpretation of C,

while explicitly considering P.

3.1 Reconsidering empirical sensitivity

We proceed now with the goal of reinvigorating the potential of realism by explicating what sensitivity and

critique means. In doing so, we start from within the realist tradition. As it was touched upon above the

notion of sensitivity and related concerns of how it is best obtained is still underdeveloped within the realist

school of thought. Advocating that we should take the political reality seriously when constructing normative

principles, inevitable raises question of what part of the political reality is central?

Within practice-dependent approaches Sagiovanni makes a distinction between the cultural conventionalist

approach and the institutionalist approach. The two approaches differ, according to Sangiovanni, both in

what they base their social interpretations on, i.e. object of analysis, as well as the way they construct

principles based on their social interpretation, i.e. their methodology.7

First, let us consider the difference in the object of analysis. Cultural conventionalists propose the idea that

we assess the justice of a given institutional system based in its relations to the culture sustaining it

(Sangiovanni, 2008: 144). Cultural conventionalists gives different arguments for why culture can justify

normative principles, some based in the role culture plays for our identity formation others in our

commitment to the societal culture. Regardless, cultural conventionalists argue, that we have good reasons

for honoring the principles that are intrinsic in our cultural practice. In opposition to this, Sangiovanni

promotes institutionalism which differs in its object of analysis. According to this approach what should be

scrutinized through social interpretation is our social and political institutions, i.e. “the formal and informal

rules, norms, and decision-making procedures regulating a political or social reality” (Sangiovanni, 2008:

142). We should investigate these elements because institutions establish a network of relations that affect

the ways we as individuals relate to one another (Sangiovanni, 2008: 147). While Sangiovanni finds that

culture is neither necessary nor sufficient to ground theoretical principles, he does accentuate that one cannot

sharply demarcate between the two objects of analysis.

There is a need to dwell a little on this distinction made by Sangiovanni on the object of analysis, before

moving on to the related methodological concern. We believe that the distinction made between the two

7 We will get back to the methodological consideration in the following section “Reconsidering the notion of critique”.

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objects of analysis is artificial, and moreover the priority given to institutions severely limits the sensitivity,

and hence the realist potential, of the approach. Sangiovanni acknowledges that it is not possible to

demarcate sharply between culture and institutions, and therefore somewhat acknowledge the artificiality

related to this distinction. Yet, he maintains a position where he leaves out the justifications for principles as

they play out in social culture. Such, he argues, is not of prime relevance to the practice-dependent approach.

If we solely consider the object of analysis, irrespectively of methodological issues, this seems to be a

question begging position. The reason for why we should focus institutions and not something else,

Sangiovanni says, is that institutions are important because they show to us the result of successful

corporation in a political reality, which is often conflictual (Sangiovanni, 2008: 156). As such they teach us

important lessons, as the “The first aim of any social or political institution is to secure conditions of order,

trust, cooperation, and security among humans beings.” (Sangiovanni, 2008: 157). While Sangiovanni

emphasize that we should be sensitive in our analysis to instances where institutions are not of this

benevolent kind, the argument given for focusing on institutions, as the object of analysis, pays tribute to the

success they have already had in creating order (Sangiovanni, 2008: 159). That is, we should focus on

institutions because they help bring about something that we have a moral intuition to promote, namely

overcoming the potential for violent conflict (Sangiovanni, 2008: 159). We agree that understanding the

underlying reasons of practices that speak to our moral intuitions is one productive consideration, but it is

unclear why such are solely found in social and political institutions. It is unclear why culture would not be

able to establish a set of background conditions which alters the way in which participants interact, and

hence our reasons for endorsing or rejecting principles (Sangiovanni, 2008: 147). Why should we in our

analysis disregard instances in our political reality where social groups seek to reinterpret justifications for

principles just because these have not found an institutional form? We therefore propose a position where the

object of analysis is kept open, to potentially include both culture and institutions, and by doing so

strengthening the sensitivity by not ridding away the important insights on our political reality, which can be

found in culture. We will later, when we lay out our take on a methodology for constructing reflective realist

normative principles, propose a distinction between empirical beliefs and conditions (including social and

political institutions) which we believe will allow for a more sensitive approach to practice-dependent

normative principles.

We noted above that seeking interpretative understanding of practices that speak to our moral intuitions is

one important consideration. As a final reflection in relation to the sensitivity of our interpretative

understanding, we believe that it is important not rely solely on interpretations of instances in the political

reality with which we are already morally inclined to agree. By reducing the political reality we seek to

understand to one which we already at least intuitively agree, we run the risk of letting our understanding of

the political confirm already existing moral intuitions. This concern has, as mentioned above, been raised by

the interpretative realist approach (Freeden, 2013). And, while not aligning with the meta-theoretical position

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of the interpretative realist project, for reasons mentioned above, we believe the analytical instructions of

openness and sensitivity offered by interpretative realism, and the strongly held ambition of understanding

politics, also the less nice parts, before seeking to evaluate them, is an important contribution in the effort of

returning sensitivity to realism.

3.2 Reconsidering the notion of critique

In the following we will touch on the second feature that separates the intuitionalist and the cultural

conventionalist approach, namely the methodological distinction, as this is of importance when considering

the notion of critique in the work of Sangiovanni, and building on this, the understanding of critique we wish

to promote through reflective realism.

Sangiovanni argues that where cultural conventionalists construct normative principles directly based on

their understanding of normativity embedded in a given culture, institutionalists on the other hand look

behind the justification in itself by seeking to decipher the underlying structure of justification (Sangiovanni,

2008: 149). Sangiovanni argues that by relying too heavily on the self-understandings inherent in a

community in the construction of normative principles, as does the cultural conventionalists, one risk

promoting overly conservative normative principles. Sangiovanni believes this to be a product of both the

object matter and the methodology, we, however, argue that it is primarily a methodological implication. It

points to the issue of whether we should allow any given instance of empirical beliefs or institutional norms

to automatically translate into normative principles in a one-to-one fashion, or, if not, how we should then

construct normative principles. This in turn leads to the question of how we should understand the critical

potential of realism. According to Sangiovanni, we as political theorists, when entering critical post-

interpretative phase8, ought to work out how the reasons people have for affirming institutions affect the

relations among them. In the specific instance of justice this is done by, inquiring into what role justice play

for the participants, what type of interaction the institutions facilitate, etc. and based on such critical

considerations one construct practice-dependent normative principles. However, this critical phase remains

somewhat opaque in the realism promoted by Sangiovanni. We will in the following seek to explicate the

notion of critique compatible with the realist project, by developing on the notion of immanent critique,

which should not only be considered deconstructive but also constructive.9

Sangiovanni himself suggests that immanent critique should be seen as a potential element within the

practice-dependent framework, however he suggests that we think of it as a deconstructive position in

contrast to his own constructive position and that the relation between the two will offer the progression

needed (Sangiovanni, 2008: 162-163). Accordingly, immanent critique is seen as “negative, nonsystematic

8 Sangiovanni distinguishes three phases of inquiry within the practice-dependent line of thinking, a pre-interpretative, an interpretative and a post-interpretative phase (Sangiovanni 2008, 148). See also below. 9 We will in the following use the notion “reconstruction” when referring to the idea of reconstructive methods which has been developed by scholar

of critical theory and the notion of “construction” when referring to the creation of normative political ideas of the reflective realist kind we are advocating.

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form of institutionalism” that might help disclose the delusory and enslaving parts of our empirical beliefs

(Sangiovanni, 2008: 162).

In line with the realist project, both as it is envisioned by Sangiovanni and as envisioned here in reflective

realist terms, the foundational idea of immanent critique is that “only the principles or ideals which have

already taken some form if the present social order can serve as a valid basis for social critique” (Honneth,

2001: 6). Immanent critique, according to this understanding, strives to reduce the context-dependency of

interpretation in empirically grounded analysis, thereby leaving room for critique (McCarthy, 1982a).

Advocates of the critical position emphasize the possibility of identifying quasi-transcendent presuppositions

that guide actions and beliefs in pre-theoretical know-how10

and coupling this with the reconstructions of

participants actual self-understandings (Hedrick, 2010: 101). However, the aim is not just bringing about

understanding, but further to reconstruct action guiding principles. The normative aim of immanent critique

is therefore possibly dual, one being diagnostic – in the sense of laying out the land, and one being remedial

– in the sense of proposing a way forward. This means that the aspiration of immanent critique is both

theoretical and practical: to understand the social world and to guide social change.

According to the immanent understanding of critique we wish to promote here, normative principles must be

constructed from the embedded beliefs and practices in society; this means that any potential critique needs

to be truly in touch with empirical reality (Pedersen, 2008: 465).11

Habermas’ attempt to reconstruct the

legitimacy basis of the EU through an empirical analysis of the constitutional innovations of the EU presents

a recent example of such critical endeavor (Habermas, 2012). By focusing on the competence structure and

divided constitution-making power Habermas proposes the possibility of constructing a post-national

legitimacy base, which does not impose a supranational layer of sovereignty, but rather, by emphasizing the

‘originally shared popular sovereignty’ in the European institutional set-up, emanates from the existing

constitutional set-ups, thereby leaving the democratic order intact (Habermas, 2012). Such a reconstruction is

neither fully transcendental nor purely empirical, given that it relies on the ”immanent potentials of social

reality” (Stahl, 2013a: 534). The position we wish to promote here is that explicating ideals and norms in our

political realm should be an integrated part of constructing realist normative principles. The quality of such

10 By referring to pre-theoretical know-how one seeks to make explicit the practical knowledge individuals hold of how to accomplish or perform a given thing without addressing it directly. It therefore concerns practically mastered but seldom directly expressed knowledge (McCarthy T. (1982b)

Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's 'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics. In: Giddens A (ed) Habermas - Crtiical Debates. London: The Macmillan

Press LTD.) 11 It should be noted, that while rational reconstruction can be undertaken at different epidemic levels, both at the level of basic practices (e.g.

language) and at the level of social practices and beliefs (e.g. democracy), we are in this paper occupied with the construction of normative principles

in the latter sense. That is, we are focused on explicating the presuppositions necessary to make social practice or belief meaningful to the engaged participants. Basic practices are practices fundamental to human activity, and must therefore be considered inherent to human nature. They are

dependent on neither culture nor historical context. Social practices and beliefs, on the other hand, are either formal or informal practices and beliefs

created by humans. Humans therefore stand in a reflexive relationship to them from the beginning (Frøslee M. (2013) Global Justice and Two Conceptions of Practice Dependence. Raisons Politiques 3: 81-96.).

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normative principles, of course, depends strongly on the analytical building blocks, i.e. the level of

understanding one has of the political domain.12

Thus, the material needed to mold reflective realists normative principles can be found by seeking out

general ideas from particular know-how and self-understandings, but it needs to be combined with an

explicit engagement with already conceived-off normative ideals and intuitions, as we will develop below.

These elements constitute the building blocks for constructing new reflective realist normative principles. In

this sense, the constructive understanding of immanent critique works as a means of helping to clarify the

realist critical ambition. It should be noted, however, that the critique of conventionalism and the related fear

of relativism, which is often uttered against realism, is not fully curbed with through this promotion of

immanent critique. Taking the political reality as our point of departure when seeking to construct normative

principles, as does constructive immanent critique, will still potentially imply that normative principles

becomes perspectival. This approach does therefore not in itself counter the idealist critique that one trading

off normative rightness for empirical fitness.

Sangiovanni also realizes this. Recall the distinction between cultural conventionalism and institutionalism

made by Sangiovanni, in this lies his attempt to curb with the above critique, by seeking to promote an

institutionalist focus for practice-dependent principles. This focus is preferable to the cultural conventionalist

perspective, according to Sangiovanni, in that the focus on institutions will lead to focus on even deeper-

seated practices and relations, and therefore a potentially less conservative position than taking norms

embedded in cultural utterances as the base.13

As argued above, we believe that delimiting our interpretative

understanding a priori severely lessens the realist potential. It is therefore not a strategy that we endorse.

However, we agree that taking all utterances at face value when constructing action-guiding principles is an

undesired route to follow, as it will lead to unstable and unreflected normative principles. Rather than

dividing the political realm in cultural beliefs, which we leave out, and institutional practices, which we

include in our analysis, we promote a position that includes both in seeking a nuanced understanding of the

political realm. In doing so it becomes perhaps even more crucial that thought is given to how to restrict the

conventionalism inherent in our approach. We argue, that in order to construct ideals, which are both truly

internal to the political realm and not by default conservative, additional reflections are needed. Balancing is

12 We see a similar ambition reflected in the work of James Bohman as he takes seriously empirical developments in an attempt to combine critical

theory and pragmatism (Bohman J. (2002) How to make a social science practical: pragmatism, critical social science and multiperspectival theory.

Millennium-Journal of International Studies 31: 499-524, Bohman J. (2007) Democracy across borders: from Dêmos to Dêmoi, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.). 13 In recent debates on immanent critique two positions have been identified, a hermeneutic and a practice based approach (see Stahl T. (2013a)

Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique. Constellations 20: 533-552, Stahl T. (2013b) What is Immanent Critique. SSRN Working Papers.) – a distinction that seem to relate to the distinction between the cultural conventionalist and institutionalism in Sangiovanni’s work. As mentioned

above, we do not support that utterances based in culture should be dismissed in our investigation of the political reality, but we concur with the raised

methodological concern related to implementing cultural utterances directly in our constructed principles. While the analytical tools advocates for below focuses on utterances rather than practices, and hence are focused on explicating self-understanding of different organization, communities,

groups, etc. the argument made here is compatible with both the hermeneutic and the practice-based understanding of immanent critique. In order to

promote an immanent critique based solely on practice the analytical tools used would need to be slightly different than what are proposed in this paper.

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needed of the empirical beliefs both against the empirical conditions (and potentials) they are facing as well

as existing normative principles and intuitions. This emphasis on extrapolating norms from the political

reality and balancing these against existing normative principles should not be taken as a “sneaking in of

practice-independence” - existing normative principles are, as empirical beliefs, historically and culturally

tied, however they do exhibit considerations that might help to unlock and direct realist normative principles.

We will in the following section engage in more detail with the components that we believe should be taken

into considerations when constructing realist normative principles. But before doing so, we should halt to

reflect on whether the notion of critique promoted here will satisfy the ideal of critique as envisioned from an

idealist perspective. Our suspicion is that it will not. There is still a potential critique coming from idealist

political theorist sounding something like “what if a society is composed solely of racist, would this guiding

societal belief justify racism?”14

As we see it, there is no easy way of dodging this critique, if one (is morally

inclined to) believe that people should not be obliged to comply with principles that are not their own,

respecting the diversity in political reality (also, when it is less nice) must be a consequence. Does this, then,

mean that we are arguing that the racists in the above-sketched society are justified in their racism and thus

that their belief should be promoted to be a normative principle? Not necessarily. Firstly, it should be noted

that the pluralism existing in modern societies entail that normative principles are contested, and not one

moral position will be dominating (Sabia, 2010: 694). Such tension and contestation should be articulated in

the realist analysis to challenge both conventions and conventional foundations. Secondly, as briefly

sketched above, the beliefs and practices must portray a coherent position that we as analyst can lay out

though interpretation, that is, the justification for the racism must be coherent with other principles held by

the agent. And thirdly, the empirical beliefs and practices does not stand on their own, but are reflected

against existing normative principles and the empirical conditions it is facing. We will return to this example

again later and specify these elements, as a means of engaging the question of how the concrete practice of

constructing normative ideals should take place.

4. Reconsidering the role of pre-theoretical moral intuitions and existing normative principles

As such, the realism of Sangiovanni and our reflective realism inscribe itself actively and explicitly into the

social and political context in which it emerges. Critique arises from here; the social and political context

poses boundaries on our theorizing and it, we add in the following, might point to unforeseen opportunities.

Normative principles should be proposed which are explicitly (and primarily) relevant for the context within

which they emerge. In some sense, this constitutes a break with the classical conception of philosophy. It

draws attention to the social, political, historical context within which ideals and normative principles

14 A range of other critiques following the same structure could be envisioned. Critics might not even have to build thought experiments. Critical

voices could raise examples of cruelties in real life political regimes, and ask to what degree our approach will allow for critique of such regimes.

Joseph Raz has for instance asked whether, if normative rightness is thought to be relative to empirical fit, such position would be unable to criticize real life political institutions, such as the Final Solution (Sabia D. (2010) Defending Immanent Critique. Political Theory 38: 684-711.).

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emerge – and should emerge – and in so doing also makes visible the links between realism and the early

pragmatic tradition as explicated by John Dewey and Willard Quine among others.15

It is relevant to engage

this pragmatic thread in a bit more detail to draw out the true implications of this context-dependency for the

kind of realism Sangiovanni advocates and for the reflective realism that we wish to advocate on this basis.

The philosophical background of Sangiovanni’s project seems to square enough with that of the pragmatic

tradition – at least on an aspirational level – that it allows for such investigation.

The pragmatic tradition as we use it here might be characterized by three distinct elements. First, pragmatism

is committed to anti-skepticism. Complete doubt is impossible and belief as well as doubt stands in need of

justification. This leads to, second, an ideal of fallibilism; even those commitments that are held most

confidently may turn out to be false. Yet, pragmatists do, third, commit to an idea of tempered

consequentialism and thus a problem-solving approach to institutions and ideas. Institutions and ideas are

tools to navigate a social and political indeterminate world. The latter aspiration is shared by the realism of

Sangiovanni, as he stresses the need for normative principles to be able to guide political reform. This means

that normative principles will always and inevitable “await further confirmation”. Normative principles

might work in one context, but not in another. Yet, the very belief in the value of normative principles, and

as will be clear the recognition of pre-theoretical moral intuitions, leads to the avoidance of any kind of

skepticism. Finally, both traditions share the more fundamental idea that the normative and empirical

domains are inherently interlinked. As Dewey writes: “When the belief that knowledge is active and

operative takes hold of men, the ideal realm is no longer something aloof and separate; it is rather that

collective of imagined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations… [T]he picture of the

better is shared so that it may become an instrumentality of action, while in the classic view this Idea

belongs readymade in a noumenal world.” (Gaus, 2013: 555). Dewey was concerned with experience,

understood as practical know-how or wisdom, as it arise from historical engagement. For Dewey philosophy

was to a large extent reconstructive and – it was concerned with the articulation and revelation of the

meanings of the current course of events (Bernstein, 2010: 155; Koopman, 2011: 550).

This pragmatic thread, as it appears in Sangiovanni’s call for historical engagement, induces certain demands

on our philosophical practice, to the extent that we take it seriously – demands, which we do not believe

Sangiovanni award sufficient attention. It underscores once again the need for sensitivity, but also forces us

to be explicit about the elements which we are to be sensitive to and how such sensitivity is accomplished. It

require us to spell out our methodology and as a part of this, it require us to award greater attention to the

history we are ourselves a part of as theorists. The pragmatic tradition directs our attention to the need for

15Note that some have argued that Quine cannot properly be considered a part of the pragmatist tradition, because he did not act as a public intellectual. We will not consider this critique here, but merely note that the philosophy of Quine was pragmatist at least in the respects we highlight

here (Koopman C. (2011) Genealogical Pragmatism: How History Matters for Foucault and Dewey. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5: 533-561.

P. 134).

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awarding attention not only to current empirical practices, but also to existing moral intuitions and

theoretical ideals as a means of improving both the quality and validity of new normative principles. We

should award the latter elements more explicit attention, because we always approach the world with

preconceptions or, in other words, a web of beliefs. Indeed these preconceptions constitute a necessary

background for evaluating new beliefs.16

Some standpoints and beliefs must always be considered

provisionally true for others to be questioned (Quine, 1960).17

Luckily we often share some general

preconceptions, which we therefore feel we can exempt from discussion – what we might, with Sangiovanni,

call pre-theoretical moral intuitions (Quine and Ullian, 1970: 31). They are nevertheless important in the

process of developing normative principles and, in addition, we cannot take their validity for granted. We

cannot be sure that these beliefs will never be questioned. Indeed, all and any beliefs can and should be

corrected continuously to secure general coherence in our web of beliefs (Quine and Ullian, 1970; Quine,

1951). Note that here we introduce an additional, pragmatic idea, inherent in the idea of a web of belief,

namely the notion of coherence. We will return to this notion below, as it becomes important in relation to

actually developing better normative principles (new Js). It functions as a standard of evaluation and as such

help us avoid relativism(cf. Quine, 1960: 25) .

To sum up, the recognition that history and practice matters forces us to take on board the pragmatic insight

that pre-theoretical moral intuitions and existing normative principles, which constitute another part of our

web of belief, will inevitable come into play when we develop new normative principles with attentiveness

to their coherence. This increases the demand for reflection. It requires of us that we make our moral

intuitions as well as existing normative principles an explicit part of the analysis. It requires that we are

sensitive to these elements as well as empirical practices, as they play an important part in shaping new

normative principles.

Sangiovanni recognizes this implicitly, but he does not award it the attention it calls for. Thus in the

following we proceed, first, to reflect explicitly on the character of pre-theoretical moral intuitions and

existing normative principles as well as the character of empirical beliefs and circumstances. And second, to

reflect on how these interact and should be weighted in a process of reflection. This two-step rhythm reflects

a corresponding distinction between two phases in the process of developing reflective realist normative

principles; namely a phase of understanding and a phase of reflection. Whereas Sangiovanni advocate three

phases, we limit ourselves to these two. In other words, we leave the pre-interpretative phase out. As

16 Other pragmatists has expressed like ideas. See e.g. James W. (1997 (1896)) The Will to Believe. In: Menand L (ed) Pragmatism: a reader. 5 ed.

New York: Vintage Books, 69-93. and James W. (1997 (1907)) What Pragmatism Means. In: Menand L (ed) Pragmatism: a reader. New York:

Vintage Books, 93-111. 17 In similar vein, Pierce stated that we cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices we have upon entering the study and

indeed this is a good thing. It is these very prejudgments – inherited from traditions that have shaped us – that enable us to engage in inquiry and

understanding (Bernstein RJ. (2010) Pragmatism and Hermeneutics. In: Fairfield P (ed) John Dewey and Continental Philosophy. Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 148-160. P. 150).

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Sangiovanni rightly notes, this phase is relatively uncontroversial as the goal is merely to identify the object

of interpretation (Sangiovanni, 2008: 148).18

As we go through these two phases, it will become clearer how our proposal differs from Sangiovanni’s in

awarding a more prominent role to pre-theoretical moral intuitions, existing normative principles, and the

idea of coherence, thereby taking onboard some of the pragmatic insights; But also, how this in turn leads us

to award slightly more priority to the moral domain. In fact, we propose to consider the political and moral

domain on more equal terms in the process of constructing new normative principles. While political theory

should still start from the political domain and be concerned with guiding the reform of existing practices, it

should also award attention to pre-theoretical moral intuitions and existing normative principles as a means

of fulfilling its normative aspirations.

4.1. The Phase of Understanding

Let us start first, with the phase of understanding. As opposed to Sangiovanni, we want to treat the analytical

input into this phase in more explicit terms as a means of taking the idea of sensitivity seriously. Thus, in this

phase we distinguish between three types of analytical input; (a) empirical beliefs, (b) physical, biological,

technical, political, cultural, and social conditions (including social and political institutions) and (c)

normative theory including pre-theoretical moral intuitions, all three of which should be included in the

reflective process of constructing new normative principles. The goal of attaining an analytical

understanding of these elements springs from the idea that we can approach empirical reality “objectively”,

or to be more correct, that we can approach empirical reality with sensitivity to any configurations or beliefs,

which might be interesting or relevant. While we acknowledge that we always approach empirical reality

with theoretical preconceptions and expectations, it is important that the analysis in this phase remains open

to alternative conceptions potentially inherent in empirical beliefs and conditions. Let us develop the three

clusters in more detail, as they are represented in figure 1.

18 Note that Ricoeur among others within the pragmatist tradition has operated in accordance with a parallel three-step rhythm. Ricoeur notes that an

order of what he calls describing, narrating, and prescribing serves a didactic function, but also that it serves to provide an explicit link from the more descriptive and analytical to the normative (Ricoeur P and Blamey K. (1992) Oneself as Another: University of Chicago Press.).

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Figure 1: The Phase of Understanding

(a) The category of empirical conditions is to be understood broadly as any physical, biological, technical,

political, cultural, or social conditions (including social and political institutions), which might affect the

likelihood of a given event/action/institution to come above. The danger of invoking empirical conditions in

this phase and thus in a sense classical feasibility considerations is that it will restrain any position that seeks

to alter the present, whether articulated by actors in the political realm or constructed through political

philosophical practice, thereby limiting all ideas on how to change the world. Indeed, Sangiovanni

acknowledges the status-quo bias of his approach and so do we. In some sense, it is this bias which allow for

normative principles to guide political reform. Yet, the bias is not as strong as sometimes advocated. This

becomes apparent as we introduce the distinction between synchronic, direct diachronic, and indirect

diachronic feasibility. This distinction allows us to stress that feasibility might be thought of as referring to

what a given agent can bring about now, what a given agent can bring about at a later point in time, or what

can be brought about by an agent if she gets herself into a position where she is able to bring it about

(Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012). We believe, that this distinction, while increasing the complexity of

what is meant by feasibility, points to the possibility of thinking of feasibility constraints as a component that

comprises both realistic and utopian elements. In reflecting about empirical conditions lays also a potential

for exploring current boundaries, some of which might be fixed, but many of which are probably malleable.

It is true that a range of conditions is given, but many empirical conditions belong to the group of soft

constraints. The notion of soft constraints covers the idea that some feasibility constraints, rather than ruling

a given event/action/institution feasible or non-feasible in the binary sense, allows for thinking

systematically about how feasible a given event/action/institution is (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012:

813). By awarding due attention to soft constraints, forcing political theoretical endeavor to contemplate on

the boundaries of current feasibility constraints, political theory will be forced to engage in an exploration of

possible different ways of understanding these, including changes in conditions. Indeed, sometimes

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conditions change radically, one prominent example being the invention of the Internet, which radically

changed our ways of communicating and interacting – also in real life. This, in turn, has spurred new

thinking about e.g. democratic ideals and civil society interaction.

(b) Another element in the phase of understanding involves actual engagement with the empirical beliefs.

Our explicit focus on empirical beliefs underscores our commitment to not leaving the hermeneutical or

cultural part of political realm out. Empirical beliefs can be of both political and moral character and are

embedded in all corners of our everyday practice and communication, spanning from parliamentary debates

to visual and aural displays (e.g. parades and anthems) (Freeden, 2010: 206). The diverse character of the

beliefs points to their diverse potential. Again critics of the realist stand have emphasized the potential status-

quo gravitation when taken “the world as it is” as input for analysis. As already mentioned there is some

truth to this, but again it is unclear that the bias need be as strong as anticipated by critics. First, our

empirical reality contains various elements, including beliefs, which might challenge existing normative

principles in ways hitherto inconceivable. Thus, it is important that we do not overestimate the power of

imagination of behalf of political theorists, and likewise that we do not underestimate the power of

imagination in political practice. Second, taking empirical beliefs seriously does not mean accepting them

uncritically. As mentioned above, it is important that we honor the potential for critique, which is immanent

in empirical practices. In addition hereto, it is important that we are attentive to the coherence of empirical

beliefs. Finally, and relatedly, we should be attentive to whether empirical beliefs cohere with our pre-

theoretical moral intuitions and existing normative principles to any sufficient extent. We will return to this

shortly (see (c)). Being explicit about this element, we believe, allows for a greater critical potential. To

engage empirical beliefs reflectively, they need to be explicated from our everyday practice. While this

might be done in many ways, we want to highlight two possible ways of accessing empirical beliefs, namely

ideological analysis and re-description. Note that while the two “tools” presented here are maybe most

suitable for the assessment of empirical beliefs, this does not mean that neither Freeden nor Quentin Skinner,

as presented in the following, are incapable of understanding the empirical conditions mentioned above as

they facilitate and shape beliefs uttered in the political domain.

Starting with the former, the interpretive realism of Freeden contains an approach to thinking about politics

through the lens of ideologies that can enable the political theorist to gain the needed sensitive insight into

concrete thinking about politics. Freeden works from a notion of ideology. Ideologies should be understood

as structural arrangements, which ascribe meaning to mutually defining concepts. Political thought is always

communicated through language, and always structured through concepts. Ideologies, as a form of political

thought, must therefore be understood as a union of form and meaning (Freeden, 1996: 5). Consequently,

semantic properties such as the essential contestability of political concepts and structural (or morphological)

constrains such as cultural and logical adjacency, compose the two basic conditions of ideologies (Freeden,

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2008: 199). In turn, the study of ideologies aims at analyzing the substance and functioning of political

thought-patterns by approaching it as articulated (written or oral) ideological formations.

Ideologies are linked to political decision-making through the justification and encouragement of political

action (Freeden, 1996: 23). Ideologies thereby bridge political thought and action, by narrowing the scope of

what can be thought of as politically practicable. Political decision-making implicitly refers to choice among

conflicting understandings of fundamental norms and therefore also to a notion of pluralism (Freeden, 2005:

117). By emphasizing different interpretations of central political concepts such as neutrality, inclusion and

rights, conflicting parts seek to decontest their meaning, i.e. freeze certain interpretations of the concepts and

of their structural relations. The substance and functioning of these ideological decontestations are what the

conceptual approach aims to understand by examining different interpretations of central political concepts,

their internal relations, and the ideological act of assertive selection when choosing a distinctive way to

decontest the meaning of these. Ideologies should hence be understood as ever-present attempts to create

order in the social world and it is through the analysis of the political concepts and their internal relations

that political researchers can obtain insights in prevailing political thought, and hence, regain access to

thinking about politics.

Freeden’s approach, however, need not be the only means of fulfilling the aspiration for sensitivity. As an

alternative, one might attempt to explicate empirical beliefs by reference to the Skinnerian notion of re-

description. In a Skinnerian optic, meaning is inter-subjective occupying a public space external to the

individual minds of the participants, but not therefore independent of all minds in general (Jackson, 2010:

127-129; Agersnap et al., 2001: 8). Consequently, meaning is also never contained in one text or action

alone. If we wish to understand the meaning of a given text, we need to understand the underlying and inter-

subjective intensions, as they can be read off from the context of an action including the linguistic universe

that made it possible (Agersnap et al., 2001: 27). This leads Skinner to argue that change consists in

historical re-descriptions. It consists in rhetorical acts that appeal to inheritance while at the same time

changing it. Rhetorical re-description happens when normative vocabulary is manipulated to actually impose

an alternative vision that the one traditionally ascribed. This has methodological consequences, namely that

we should not only look at the words which persons and politicians utter, but also at the context (broadly

understood) and the generation of meaning. A word or utterance is ascribed different meaning over time and

thus ”understanding of concepts is always, in part, a matter of understanding what can be done with them in

argument” (Skinner, 2002: 176). This means that any reading of a text (broadly defined) should be linked to

the context. As such, the approach is valuable in studying normativity and meaning in a political practice. It

contains resources for studying, how normative ideals formulated in philosophical practices are appealed to

in political practice and how they are performed, nuanced, and refined in various ways thereby enabling

certain acts and disabling others (Palonen, 2005: 352). In other words, Skinner’s perspective makes it

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possible to bridge individual speech and its illocutionary force with general ideas and the broader

philosophical, historical, and political context. It allows for teasing out normative ideals as they are used and

referred to in practice.

(c) Lastly, the phase of understanding needs to involve an explicit engagement with pre-theoretical moral

intuitions and existing normative principles. Sangiovanni touches upon the pre-theoretical moral intuitions

(P) in his workand their importance is clear from his evaluation of e.g. the way certain normative principles

can be dismissed in a reflective exercise, though they constitute an important element in practice. In

discussing the potential for critique, Sangiovanni writes: “the interpretive step might reveal that the only

thing propping up an institutional system is the exercise of unmediated coercion by one group over another.

In such cases, there is no foothold upon which a conception of justice can be constructed for the institution

in question. For a conception of justice to get off the ground, there must be some sense in which the terms of

the institution are at least capable of being justified to all participants” (Sangiovanni, 2008: 163).

Concerned as we are with normative principles for democracy, this means that there might be some

conceptions of democracy or democratic agency which cannot get off the ground because it violates

fundamental pre-theoretical moral intuitions. For Sangiovanni these intuitions appear implicitly as he argues

that principles must be justifiable to all so as to avoid coercion (2008: 159). We wish to be explicit here in

stating that two important pre-theoretical moral intuitions, at least, guides our work within democratic

theory. First, we operate from a fundamental democratic intuition about the need for eliminating coercion or

dominance. This intuition might not be translated directly to international practice, but it will inevitably set a

boundary for what reflective realist normative principles we can promote – just as the empirical beliefs and

conditions will set a boundary for what we can promote. While we probably cannot come up with principles

that reflect both our intuitions, empirical beliefs, and conditions one-to-one, we also cannot come up with

principles that are in complete opposition to either. In this sense both our pre-theoretical moral intuitions and

empirical elements constitute flexible boundaries or frames of reference. Yet, they are not necessarily

directly translatable into political theoretical and normative principles. We will develop more on this shortly.

A second and related pre-theoretical moral intuition provides the ground for the whole methodological

framework, namely that normative principles should resonate in practice; that they should be possible to

accept by the people actually engaged in the relevant political practices. At times Sangiovanni seems to

operate with the same intuition (cf. Sangiovanni, 2008: 163), yet at other times he distances himself from it

in the attempt to cope with the culturalists (cf. Sangiovanni, 2008: 149-150)

Apart from these strong pre-theoretical moral intuitions, another element is also important to understand and

explicate in this phase of the research process. As opposed to Sangivanni, we believe that the construction of

reflective realist normative principles requires engagement with existing normative principles (what

Sangiovanni calls Js). Normative theory, including moral ideals, constitutes part of the intellectual and

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philosophical background for any given question and therefore provides us with a relevant vocabulary.

Moreover, it allows for understanding how relevant notions have historically been defined and refined, and it

points to areas of consensus as well as areas of tension. In other words, it gives us an idea of what the

outstanding questions and concerns are and in turn provokes new thinking. It might also, however, spur

conventionalism and status quo bias to the extent that it allows for clinging on to outdated or contested moral

values. The relevance of normative and moral ideals is not only philosophical or intellectual, normative

ideals as formulated in philosophical and theoretical practice are often also inherent in actual empirical

discourse to a greater or lesser extent, as is evident from the way they seem to have influenced our intuitions.

Philosophical, moral, theoretical ideals are themselves part of our historical context, shaping who we are and

how we interact, though they are often characterized by a greater level of abstraction and reflection than

empirical beliefs.

As such, the engagement with existing normative principles does not transform our reflective realism into a

“disguised” version of non-ideal theory. We do not argue that existing beliefs and conditions play a crucial

role in understanding how normative principles can be implemented. We maintain that they play a role in (1)

actually justifying or defending normative principles (2) with the goal of promoting political, democratic

reform of existing practice. Both (1) and (2) are fundamentally realist in the sense advocated here. As

Sangiovanni writes, the idealist will deny the relevance of any principles (J) derived in part from empirical

beliefs and conditions (C) and in part from moral principles (P) – instead they will argue that only P,

principles that can be directly derived from P, other higher-level moral values (P*), and different contextual

applications of P* to C are warranted (2008: 147). Moreover, within this perspective we defend the

inclusion of existing normative principles and intuitions with reference to the historical character, we

ascribed to them above. Normative ideals, including moral ideals, are historical contingent, dynamic

features. They change and they are themselves products of history and tradition. They are a part of our

experience (and of political practice) and they contribute to the reflective exercise that follows as such.

Considering ideals as historical contingent in this sense does not amount to pure relativism as already

indicated. We will develop on this below with reference to the pragmatic notion of coherence.

To sum up, all these three elements constitute important elements to engage in the reflective process of

constructing normative principles. While they might be prioritized differently in any research project, they

are often all relevant to some extent, because in all of these lies a potential for ideas that will guide social

change – not only within each element but also in the discrepancies between them. Thomas McCarthy writes:

“the tension between the real and the ideal it builds into the construction of social facts represents an

immanent potential for criticism that actors can draw upon in seeking to transcend and transform the limits

of their situations” (McCarthy, 1993: 5). Thus, by being sensitive to empirics and the different

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configurations of beliefs and various conditions we can understand their potentials and their shortcomings,

we can see tensions but also possibly synergistic relationships.

4.2. The Phase of Reflective Balancing

Having described the relevant elements to be included in the reflective exercise succeeding the phase of

understanding, let us provide a few more comments on the standards according to which reflection should

occur. We have already touched upon this above in describing the role of our pre-theoretical moral intuitions.

Indeed, the process of reflection takes place with reference to a standard of coherence between all the

elements noted above. Coherence here does not mean convergence. Rather we use the notion to indicate that

a balancing exercise need take place, where different elements of understanding are weighted against each

other thereby contributing to a new normative principle, which is not in complete opposition to any of the

original elements of understanding. Some might argue that this amounts to stretching the notion of coherence

as it has traditionally been advocated within philosophy and political theory – not least because we strive for

coherence between the political and moral domain. Yet, from the point of view advocated here, with

reference to the work of Sangiovanni and the pragmatic conception of philosophy presented above, there is

nothing that precludes such notion of coherence. Indeed, and as already argued, we believe that this form of

coherence contains a larger emancipatory potential because it might actually facilitate some political reform.

Let us develop on this as we consider the notion of coherence, which awards more equal attention to both

moral and political elements in a reflective process.

Figure 2: Phase of Reflective Balancing

The criterion of coherence refers to the character of the argument and the fact that some ideals and

principles, by way of their coherence, can be recognized as more appropriate than others. Most importantly,

in traditional philosophical or theoretical practice, is coherence between premises and conclusions and thus

some kind of logical coherence in reasoning; e.g. we cannot ground a given normative principles on

premises, which in fact support another principle (cf. van Thiel and van Delden, 2010; Thacher, 2006). This

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idea of coherence remains important for us. We cannot accept a normative principle which is incoherent in

its very structure. Note also that this type of coherence need not only refer to the coherence of each principle

in isolation, but also to the whole system or web of principles, which sustain our practices. Thus, if we accept

the normative value of equal democratic participation on national levels we cannot at the same time deny this

value internationally, unless the international arena is characterized by very different empirical conditions

that inhabit such participation e.g. greater heterogeneity, a lack of equal stakes, a lack of resources etc.

As implicit in this latter example, we wish to broaden out the notion of coherence somewhat. We claim that

we should not only be concerned with coherence between premises and conclusions, but also about the

overall reflective balance and thus the coherence between normative ideals, empirical beliefs, and conditions.

That is, coherence should be strived for between normative ideals and circumstances. This notion of

coherence relates to the feasibility conditions of a normative principle in the making. We should not promote

a normative principle, which is empirically impossible to satisfy within any given timeframe – shorter or

longer. In this sense conditions of causal efficacy might contribute to the establishment of the conditions of

normative legitimacy. It is important, in formulating reflective realist normative principles, e.g. whether we

can fulfill a strong ideal of equality or we are likely to worsen the conditions of equality if we strive for such

demanding ideal. Likewise, coherence should be strived for between empirical beliefs and normative ideals.

This idea of coherence thus encompasses the idea of acceptability or resonance, given that shared empirical

beliefs are balanced against normative ideals – while, at the same time, we cannot accept an empirical belief

which stands in complete opposition to our pre-theoretical moral intuitions or existing normative principles.

When investigating the justifications for democracy as they are articulated in political practice, human

equality might not ground democracy. In such cases references to a strong ideal of human equality will not

suffice as justification for a realist normative principle. On the other hand, an empirical belief, which is not

coherent with empirical circumstances, also needs revision; thus, as an alternative to strong human equality

we might advocate a minimal equality to balance all concerns.

One plausible objection to this idea of achieving coherence between different domains of analysis –

empirical and normative – is that we risk having to compromise our moral intuitions to an extent which

seems absurd from where we stand now. Let us return to the example of the racist beliefs. One can imagine

that we encounter racist beliefs empirically and that these are sustained by a host of well-functioning and

well-established institutional practices. In other words, it is possible that we do not encounter the pluralism,

which we anticipated above in discussing this example. How would this influence our normative principles?

In this case, should we dismiss our pre-theoretical moral intuitions and existing normative principles because

the empirical inputs outbalance them? Hopefully it is clearer now, that we should never directly dismiss our

moral intuitions. The whole point of the above is to strive for balance –whether such balance is easy or not.

By now it should be clearer how balance might be achieved. It should also be clear how we can demand

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coherence internally among advocates of racism, if we are to accept their ideals. This means that in the face

of racism, we might be able to confront racists with their own moral intuitions as they may point in other

directions. What would the practical result of this be? It is likely that in this situation, we nevertheless have

to formulate principles, which reflect certain racist elements. Yet, because of our moral intuitions these

principles will still be moving us somewhere in a direction, which is compatible with our intuitions and thus

with the promotion of a more democratic world. In other words, new normative principles would function as

to provide slight improvements from the perspective of our moral intuitions (and potentially exiting

theoretical ideals). This also highlights how we, in line with much early pragmatic and realist thought,

envision an active role for political theorists and philosophers in moving the public by way of engagement

and possibly debate; A role in changing existing structures in what for us seems to be a better direction step

by step and with awareness of people’s wishes and beliefs. We cannot and should not rid ourselves of this

emancipatory aspiration.

4.3. The Status of Reflective Realist Normative Principles

As a concluding remark, it is important to note that the theoretical contributions that will emerge from

reflective realist endeavor as it is sketched above will neither be universal nor neutral. As touched upon

above, the contribution of a reflective realism will not be universal in any strict sense given that normative

principles will be reliant on normative beliefs, empirical beliefs, and conditions, which are embedded in a

historical and cultural context – maybe even in a specific institutional context. This, however, need not mean

that the resulting normative principles are always completely relative to any context. Within a given frame of

reference, potentially broader than the institutional or cultural context, well augmented and coherent

normative principles might have broader application value. As argued above the form of critique we are

advocating can be taken on at different epistemic levels, the application of the derived principles will

therefore depend on whether the reconstruction is undertaken at the level of basic practices, which are

believed to be pre-cultural and pre-political or whether the reconstruction is on the level of societal beliefs

and practices. But even in the case of reconstructions on the level of societal beliefs and practices elements

of such interpretation might be of relevance in other contexts. As a minimum these principles will have more

general relevance qua the role they play as theoretical background for constructing new principles.

Moreover, the standard of coherence indicates that while normative principles are obviously not neutral in

any strict sense, this need not mean that “everything goes”. First of all, the good argument or principle here

is characterized by being coherent and thus well-founded. The notion of coherence constitutes the standard

of "truth" within a reflective realist framework. Thus, while any truth will be the result of a process of

inquiry, it cannot be anything. Second, neutrality need not exclude honesty. “Dispassion” or “objectivity

serves as a valuable methodological beacon in securing sensitivity and openness in the analytical phase of

understanding. As we enter the latter phase of reflection the ideal of “objectivity” seems to demanding. In

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this process we unavoidably touch upon pre-theoretical moral intuitions. But rather than striving for an

impossible ideal of neutrality or “objectivity” in this latter phase, we should strive for explicitly stating the

relevant moral intuitions. We should be explicitly interested rather than neutral. Political theory should be

self-reflexive, and acknowledge that its own analysis is part of the social reality it seeks to understand and

affect. Intellectual honestly, rather than neutrality, then becomes the status that political theory should aim

for as it strives to develop good normative arguments and principles (Carrens, 1996).

5. Conclusion

As stated, we are sympathetic to the realist turn in political theory, but we have argued for taking more

seriously the early aspirations for normative reform and the critique arising from e.g. Freeden . Building on

the work of Sangiovanni, we have proposed an alternative reflective realism, which take seriously the need

for sensitivity and elaborate on the normative and critical potential resulting therefrom.

We have argued in support of the practice-dependency theses, but we have also showed that Sangiovanni’s

aspiration for sensitivity is better served by collapsing the cultural and institutional domain, thereby

operating with categories of empirical beliefs and conditions respectively. On the basis of such enhanced

sensitivity, Sangiovanni’s notion of critique can be reconsidered. We argued that, the notion of immanent

critique understood as a both deconstructive and constructive exercise help to clarify the critical element in

Sangiovanni’s work. Building on a notion of immanent critique understood in this way, we argued that we

should not limit ourselves to only considering institutional practices but instead be open to interpretations of

both beliefs and conditions. We recognize that such an approach run the risk of conventionalism, and

therefore propose to give added attention to pre-theoretical moral intuitions and normative principles.

In the second phase of the paper, we argue that the pragmatist threads inherent in Sangiovanni’s approach

induce certain demands on our theoretical, normative practice, which Sangiovanni does not award sufficient

attention. It is the recognition that history and practice matters that allows us to take on board the pragmatic

insight that pre-theoretical moral intuitions and that existing normative principles will inevitably come into

play when we develop new normative principles with attentiveness to their coherence This at the same time

increases the demand for reflection. It requires of us that we make our moral intuitions as well as existing

normative principles an explicit part of the analysis. It requires that we are sensitive to these elements as well

as empirical practices, as they play an important part in shaping new normative principles. Thus, we need

first proceed through a phase of understanding in which we make these elements explicit as a means of

fostering understanding and, second, engage in a reflective exercise where we strive for coherence between

the different elements. As we enter this phase, it becomes evident that our proposal also differs from

Sangiovanni’s in awarding slightly more priority to the moral domain. In fact, we propose to consider the

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political and moral domain on more equal terms in advancing normative principles that can guide the reform

of existing practices.

What difference will this approach make for the actual normative principles that we are likely to end up

with? We have already indicated above that this approach might from a strict normative point of view result

in less ambitious normative principles. Thus, while these normative principles might not be in direct

opposition to existing normative principles, they will most likely differ slightly. E.g. we might imagine a

change of focus from the promotion of full-fledged democratic procedures to relations of democratic

accountability or a focus on minimal equality of capacity rather than full resource equality as a means to

facilitate participation. Importantly, from this perspective, these normative principles, while more minimal,

will be valuable in and of themselves. The value of these normative principles lies in their ability to facilitate

change. They will constitute the ultimate political normative standard – independently of whatever

underlying purposes we as political theorists might have with promoting these principles. Indeed, it is not

given that any such underlying purpose will be served in the longer run, this will depend on the further

engagement with principles and ideals and on our active engagement in the debate. Moreover, note that even

if this research process results in normative principles, which are in many ways parallel to existing

alternatives, the normative principles resulting from this process has an inherent value – a value which lies in

the fact that we as political theorists have taken people serious in formulating them.

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