Reconciling Dualism and Non-Dualism - Three Arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta

Abstract The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijnanabhiks_u is most

well known today for his commentaries on Sam_khya and Yoga texts. How-

ever, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedabheda(Difference and Non-Difference) Vedanta. This article elucidates threeVedantic arguments from Vijnanabhiks

_us voluminous commentary on the

Brahma Sutra, entitled Vijnanamr_tabhas

_ya (Commentary on the Nectar of

Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhe-dabheda, showing that in Vijnanabhiks

_us understanding, difference and

non-difference does not entail a denial of the principle of contradiction. Thesecond shows how the relation between the individual soul ( jva) and Brah-man can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third sectiondiscusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijnanabhiks

_us particular

formulation of Brahman as locus cause (adhis_t_hanakaran

_a). Understanding

these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijnanabhiks_us Difference and

Non-Difference Vedanta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedantaschools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in hislater works Vijnanabhiks

_u built upon this Difference and Non-Difference

metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedanta, Yoga, and Sam_-

khya philosophies.

Keywords Bhedabheda Nyaya Sam_khya Vedanta Vijnanabhiks

_u

A. J. Nicholson (&)Department of Asian and Asian American Studies,Stony Brook University,Stony Brook, NY 11794-5343, USAe-mail: [email protected]

123

J Indian Philos (2007) 35:371403DOI 10.1007/s10781-007-9016-6

Reconciling dualism and non-dualism: three argumentsin Vijnanabhiks:us Bhedabheda Vedanta

Andrew J. Nicholson

Published online: 8 August 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

AbbreviationsBr: h. Up.Br: hadaranyaka Upanis:adBSBrahma SutraChand. Up.Chandogya Upanis:adSPBSam: khyapravacanabhas:ya of Vijnanabhiks:uSvet. Up.Svetasvatara Upanis:adVABVijnanamr: tabhas:ya of Vijnanabhiks:uVis: . Pu.Vis:n: u Puran: a

Introduction

Vijnanabhiks:u, a philosophical commentator who lived in northern India inthe late 16th century, has been considered problematic by many 19th and 20thcentury Indologists for his apparent disregard of doctrinal boundaries.Richard Garbe, a late 19th century editor and translator of Vijnanabhiks:u,writes that Vijnanabhiks:u mixes up many heterogeneous matters, andeven quite effaces the individuality of the several philosophical systems.Indeed, he maintains that all the six orthodox systems contain in theirprincipal dogmas the absolute truth.1 Garbe also characterizes a particularassertion in Vijnanabhiks:us commentary on the Sam: khya Sutras as amonstrous idea, and considers Vijnanabhiks:us interpretation of the Upa-nis:ads in general as utterly baseless.

2 In spite of these negative assessments,Vijnanabhiks:u was primarily known to 19th and early 20th century scholars for histwo Sam: khya works, the Sam: khyapravacanabhas:ya and Sam: khyasarasam: graha.In spite of Vijnanabhiks:us alleged inability to accept well-established doctrinalboundaries, his Sam: khyapravacanabhas:ya was the most comprehensive availableto early scholars of Sam: khya, and it was well-regarded enough that Garbesedition was published as the second volume in the Harvard Oriental Series.

In the latter half of the 20th century, Vijnanabhiks:us stock rose amongscholars interested in Yoga, particularly after the publication of an Englishtranslation of his sub-commentary on the Yoga Sutras, the Yogavarttika.3

However, his works on Sam: khya-Yoga came after his Vedantic works, whichmake up the majority of Vijnanabhiks:us extant corpus.

4 These works includeVijnanabhiks:us commentary on the Brahma Sutras, the Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya(Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge), his commentaries on numerousUpanis:ads, collectively known by the name Vedantaloka (Light on theVedanta), and his commentary on the Isvaragta section of the KurmaPuran: a, entitled Isvaragtabhas:ya. Vijnanabhiks:u considers these three texts

1 Garbe, intro. to Vijnanabhiks:u (1895: xiiixiv).2 Garbe, intro. to Vijnanabhiks:u (1895, xii).3 Vijnanabhiks:u (1981).4 For a complete list and chronology of Vijnanabhiks:us works, see Rukmani in her intro. toVijnanabhiks:u (1981, pp. 57).

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to be his prasthanatray, the trilogy of commentaries obligatory for Vedantins.It is this he has in mind when he remarks at the beginning of the Isvara-gtabhas:ya that his commentary on the Isvaragta makes up for the lack of acommentary on the Bhagavadgta, since there is no difference in meaningbetween the two works.5

Modern scholars have largely neglected these Vedantic writings. Althougheditions of four of Vijnanabhiks:us Sam: khya-Yoga works have been publishedin Sanskrit and in English translations, only one of Vijnanabhiks:us Vedantictexts has been published in a complete Sanskrit edition, and none have beentranslated in full. Yet an understanding of these earlier works is necessary tocomprehend the metaphysical foundations of his later writings on Sam: khya-Yoga. Vijnanabhiks:u himself makes this clear by referring the reader time andagain to his commentary on the Brahma Sutra, the Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya, whendiscussing metaphysical issues in these four later works. This is also evidencethat Vijnanabhiks:u conceives of all of his writings as presenting a single,comprehensive philosophical position. Unlike other thinkers (e.g., VacaspatiMisra) who commented on texts of multiple schools, Vijnanabhiks:u is notcontent to see his comments on a single text as merely applying to that schooland no other. He sees the dualism of Sam: khya-Yogas purus:a and prakr: ti asvalid at a certain level of analysis, and refrains from positing a higher, over-arching unity in his works on Sam: khya-Yoga. However, by his references tothe Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya, he clearly maintains that this higher unity existsinhis later works, he never retracts statements from his earlier Vedantic writ-ings. In most cases, he instead skims over issues on which Vedanta andSam: khya-Yoga disagree.

6

This neglect of Vijnanabhiks:us early works is one symptom of a widerneglect of Bhedabheda Vedanta by modern scholars. Perhaps the greatestsingle cause of this has been the claim in the 20th century by many Indiannationalists (e.g., Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan) and western orientalists(e.g., Deussen and Gough) that Advaita Vedanta is the authentic philosophyof India. This naturally led to the neglect of realist schools of Vedanta, not tomention the Nyaya-Vaises: ika school, whose common-sense realism did notjibe with the nationalist/orientalist picture of India as the land of mysticalotherworldliness.7 More recently, the growing interest in yoga and all thingsassociated with it has led to new interest in Vijnanabhiks:us works on Yoga,the Yogavarttika and Yogasarasam: graha. But still today, Bhedabheda does noteven a elicit a mention in most textbooks of Indian philosophy.

5 etena bhagavadgtavyakhyapeks: a pi yasyati. sabdadibhedamatren: a gtaya arthasamyatah: . (verse 3of ma _ngalacarana). An edition of chapter one of Vijnanabhiks:us Isvaragtabhas:ya appears inNicholson (2005a, pp. 297314).6 An analysis of Vijnanabhiks:us strategies for reconciling Yoga and Vedanta appears inNicholson (2005b). Vijnanabhiks:us Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya contains many Sam: khya-Yoga influences,but does not argue for the unity of Vedanta, Sam: khya, and Yoga. That claim is most explicit in theintroduction to his commentary on the Sam: khya Sutras (Vijnanabhiks:u 1895, pp. 15).7 For one presentation and defense of this Naiyayika common-sense realism, see Matilal (1986).

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This lack of English-language secondary literature on Bhedabheda Vedantafrom historians of Indian philosophy is especially surprising given the sub-stantial evidence that Bhedabheda is the oldest extant tradition of Vedanta,predating Sa _nkara.8 In his commentary on the Br:hadaranyaka Upanis:ad,Sa _nkara himself criticizes a Vedantin named Bhartr:prapanca, whose viewsbear all of the marks of what later came to be known as Bhedabhedavada.These include the theory of the real transformation (parin: ama) of Brahmanand the understanding of relation between the individual soul and Brahman asone of part and whole.9 The earliest complete and extant Bhedabheda workcomes from Bhaskara, who was either a younger contemporary of Sa _nkara ormay have lived shortly after him. In his commentary on the Brahma Sutra,Bhaskara offers trenchant arguments criticizing Sa _nkara, arguments that arerepeated in the works of later critics of Sa _nkara such as Ramanuja andMadhva. Indeed, Bhaskara states in a ma _ngala verse that the primarymotivation for writing his commentary is to refute Sa _nkara and his followers.10

Bhedabheda did not die out with Bhaskara, but had substantial influence insubsequent centuries. For instance, Ramanujas teacher Yadavaprakasa was afollower of Bhedabheda, and for this reason was excoriated by laterVisis:t:advaitins.

11 In the late medieval period, Bhedabheda concepts becamethe foundations for the Vais:n: ava philosophical systems of Nimbarka (13thc.?), Vallabha (14791531), and Caitanya (14861533). While VallabhasPus:timarga lineage and the Gaudya Vais:n: ava school founded by Caitanyahave attracted the interest of historians of religion in the latter half of the 20thcentury, they continue to be severely underrepresented in the secondary lit-erature on Indian philosophy.12

In the central sections of this paper, I will draw upon Vijnanabhiks:usVedantic works, especially the Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya, to present and analyze afew of his arguments. I hope to elucidate some of the argumentative strategiesVijnanabhiks:u deploys in order to resolve three philosophical puzzles thatthat face the entire Bhedabheda tradition: (1) the apparent logical contra-diction suggested by the phrase difference and non-difference; (2) thephilosophical analysis of the relation of soul and Brahman as relation of partand whole; and (3) the prima facie difficulty of identifying Brahman, which isunchanging, as the material cause of the world. While Vijnanabhiks:us argu-ments are not without their difficulties, illustrating his logical rigor and his

8 Surendranath Dasgupta, Paul Hacker, Hajime Nakamura, and Mysore Hiriyanna have observedthat Bhedabhedavada predates Advaita. Nakamura and Dasgupta even claim that the author ofthe Brahma Sutras was himself a Bhedabhedavadin. E.g., Badarayan: as philosophy was somekind of bhedabheda-vada or a theory of the transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman)(Dasgupta 1922, vol. 2, p. 42). Also see Nakamura (1989, p. 500). For a brief survey of the historyof Bhedabheda Vedanta, see Nicholson (2006).9 Vide Hiriyanna (1957, vol. 1, pp. 7994 and vol. 2, pp. 616).10 Bhaskara (1903, p. 1).11 Vide Oberhammer (1997).12 This is gradually beginning to change. For example, see Frederick Smiths excellent work onVallabha (Smith 1998, 2005).

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ingenuity should go a long way to dispel the notion that Bhedabheda is anirrationalist school of Vedanta, or that Vijnanabhiks:u is some type of sloppysyncretist. On the contrary, only by laying down a firm metaphysical foun-dation using Bhedabheda concepts is it possible for Vijnanabhiks:u to argue ina disciplined way in his later works for the ultimate unity of the Sam: khya,Yoga, and Vedanta schools.

The meaning of Bhedabheda in Vijnanabhiks:us thought

Does the term bhedabheda present a logical impossibility? It is a dvandvacompound, consisting of the words bheda (difference) and abheda (non-difference).13 Therefore, Bhedabheda philosophy would be the philosophy ofdifference and non-difference, holding out the promise of bridging theapparently unbridgeable disagreements between philosophers who subscribeto the theory of difference (or dualism, dvaita) and complete, unqualified non-difference (non-dualism, advaita). In the few places in western secondaryliterature on Indian philosophy where Bhedabhedavada is mentioned, it istypically translated as Difference-in-Identity, presumably in an attempt tomake it seem more familiar by linking it with the western tradition of Dif-ference-in-Identity, typified by thinkers such as Bonaventure, Spinoza, andHegel. Although there are meaningful similarities between these westernthinkers and Indian Bhedabhedavadins, purely on the basis of Sanskritgrammar, difference-in-identity cannot be the translation of bhedabheda.14

A preferable translation is the more literal difference and non-difference,since linguistically it leaves open the question of whether difference is ulti-mately subsumed under non-difference, or vice-versa.

Since basing a philosophical system on both difference and non-differ-ence appears to be the equivalent of arguing both p and not-p, one pos-sible explanation of the doctrine of bhedabhedavada might involve a denial orsuspension of the principle of contradiction, p and not-p cannot both betrue. Some critics have understood the meaning of bhedabhedavada in justthis way, and for this reason have also identified it with the Jaina theory ofperspectivism (anekantavada). The Visis:t:advaitin Vedanta Desika, forinstance, labels the 8th c. Bhedabheda philosopher Bhaskara as a Vedantinwho smells like a Jaina (jainagandhivedantin).15 But just as it is a mistake toportray the Jainas as denying the law of contradiction, so too it is clearly a

13 Alternatively, the compound bhedabheda can be analyzed as a madhyamapadalopin compound,meaning non-difference that does not exclude difference. Philosophically, however, it makeslittle difference whether the compound is a dvandva or a madhyamapadalopin.14 Even if we take bhedabheda as a saptam tatpurus:a compound rather than as a dvandva ormadhyamapadalopin, the meaning of the compound would be identity-in-difference rather thandifference-in-identity. I take it that the western tradition is called difference-in-identitybecause difference is ultimately subsumed by identity, as a multiplicity of phenomena are ulti-mately shown to be aspects of a larger whole. Therefore, identity-in-difference would meansomething substantially different.15 Vedanta Desika (1974, p. 11).


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misunderstanding to accuse Bhedabhedavada of holding that p and not-pcan simultaneously be true. In the late medieval period, it was the Navya-Nyaya school that most emphatically upheld the validity of logical principlessuch as the law of contradiction, and for this reason were one of the mostemphatic in condemning the apparent paradox of simultaneous bheda andabheda. Throughout his works, Vijnanabhiks:u takes pains to illustrate hisunderstanding of the Navya-Nyaya technical terminology. Not only doesVijnanabhiks:u try to show his anticipated Navya-Nyaya critics thatbhedabheda does not involve any logical contradiction, he also employsNavya-Nyaya terms while explicating his own philosophical ideas. Thistendency is even more marked in the writings of Vijnanabhiksus discipleBhavagan: esa, author of the Samkhyatattvayatharthyadpana, suggesting thatVijnanabhiks:us students understood the defense of Bhedabheda and Sam: -khya concepts using the language of Navya-Nyaya as an essential part ofVijnanabhiks:us project.

16 In order to illustrate the rigor of his own ideas,Vijnanabhiks:u is careful to note precisely the places where he sees his dif-ference from the Naiyayikas as merely resulting from arbitrary differences interminology. One paradigmatic example is his explanation of the multiplemeanings of the terms bheda and abheda.

To begin to understand the advantages the Bhedabheda Vedanta traditionhas over its competitors, the Dvaita and Advaita schools, one must keep in mindthat Vedanta itself is as much a school of scriptural interpretation as it is a schoolof philosophy per se. Vedantins of almost all affiliations see scripture (sabda-praman: a) as a more important source of knowledge than inference (anumana).

17

Although both arguments from scripture and arguments on the basis of infer-ence are frequently cited, the former is primary. The name Vedanta asreferring to one particular school is itself a relatively uncommon usage in San-skrit texts. More typically, vedanta simply means the end of the Vedas,referring to the Upanis:ads themselves. Often, the Vedanta school is calledBrahma Mmam: sa (Exegesis of Brahman) or Uttara Mmam: sa (LaterExegesis), these epithets obviously alluding to the school of the PurvaMmam: sa (Prior Exegesis). Both schools primary concerns are interpreta-tion of the Veda. What distinguishes the two is that the later is concerned withthe exegesis of the Upanis:ads, those portions of the Veda that describe thenature of Brahman (brahmakan: d: a), while the prior school concentrates on theparts of the Veda that describe the performance of rituals (karmakan: d: a).

18

Although the two schools do have significant differences in the content oftheir interpretations, the Uttara Mmam: sa, or Vedanta, nonetheless acceptsmost of the interpretive principles developed by the earlier school for the

16 Bhavagan: esa (1969).17 A notable exception to this are Neo-Vedantins such as Vivekananda, who rank reason andimmediate experience (anubhava) above scripture.18 Nakamura argues that, contrary to common assumption, the prior Mmam: sa school is notmeant as chronologically earlier than the Uttara-Mmam: sa. Rather, the Purva-Mmam: sa is logi-cally prior to the Uttara-Mmam: sa: all Vedantins agree that mastery of ritual is a prerequisite forstudy of the sections of the Veda concerning Brahman (Nakamura 1989, p. 412).

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interpretation of the Veda. One of these is the principle that the entire Vedaitself is a single extended sentence (ekavakyata), and hence can never be self-contradictory. This principle has many significant consequences, but perhapsthe most important is that it forced schools of Vedic interpretation to interpretthe entire Veda as being a unitary text with a single message. Discarding partsof the text because of their apparent contradiction with other, more cele-brated passages was not an acceptable option. Instead, this principleencouraged creativity on the part of interpreters, to use whatever means theyhad at their disposal to show that apparently anomalous passages did notdisagree with what they took to be the main message of the Vedas.

Vijnanabhiks:u clearly believes that Bhedabheda Vedanta is superiorbecause it is the only Vedantic school capable of making sense of all of thestatements found in the Upanis:ads. Two types of passages are most significantfor him: statements of difference (bhedavakyani) and statements of non-difference (abhedavakyani). For Vijnanabhiks:u, the primary flaw of Advaiticinterpretive strategies is that they subordinate statements of difference tostatements of non-difference. For instance, Sa _nkara dubbed four Upanis:adicsentences the great statements (mahavakyani): You are that (tat tvamasi), I am Brahman (aham: brahmasmi), This self is Brahman (ayam atmabrahma), and Brahman is consciousness (prajnanam: brahma). Each of thesestatements seems to suggest very strongly that the individual soul (jvatman) isidentical to Brahman. Yet there are statements elsewhere in the Vedas thatstate the difference between Brahman and the individual soul. Because of theprinciple that the Vedas are a single complex sentence, these statementscannot simply be ignored, or rejected as fallacious. There are a numberof strategies for making sense of these statements of difference withoutacknowledging that they have the same weight as statements of non-difference.Often these involve resorting to secondary, or figurative interpretation(laks:an: a). Vijnanabhiks:u summarizes one of these interpretive strategies of theAdvaitins, whom he labels dismissively as modern thinkers:

However, modern thinkers claim that due to the complete undividednessof the soul and Brahman, the primary meaning of the word Brahmanis also soul, just as the primary meaning of the word space is alsospace inside of a pot.19 On the other hand, the notion that the soul isnot Brahman is brought about by ignorance. Furthermore, they say,there are hundreds of revealed texts of non-difference, such as You arethat, I am Brahman, Having entered by means of this, the self, thesoul, name and form are differentiated, and There is no perceiverother than he. From these they claim that the soul simply is Brahman,

19 This refers to the Advaita doctrine of limitationism (avacchedavada), typically ascribed to theBhamat school of Advaita. On this model, Brahman is likened to space (akasa) generally, and theindividual soul to a space located inside a pot. The pot is an artificial limiting condition (upadhi)that has no real effect on the space that is located inside of it, since in reality there is no differencewith the space inside or outside of a pot.


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since pure consciousness is uniform, and also since lordliness andbondage are merely a pair of limiting conditions.

They say that of the hundreds of statements of differenceincludingTwo birds who are friends and companions perch on the selfsame tree;(Svet. Up. 4.6) Changeless among the changing, sentient among theinsentient, the one, who grants the desires among the many, the wiseperceive him residing in themselves. For them, and not for others, there iseternal peace; (Svet. Up. 6.13) He who resides in the self, but is otherthan the self, should know, the self belongs to me; In the three abodes,whatever might be an object of enjoyment, an enjoyer, or enjoyment, I,pure consciousness, witness, and always munificent, am different fromthem.there cannot be claimed a logical incongruity. For the statements[of difference] make sense insofar as they re-iterate difference with regardto artificial conditions.20

While Advaitins accept that the referents of the statements of non-differencelike I am Brahman are the individual soul (jvatman) and Brahman, theyresort to figurative interpretation to deny that the referent of statements ofnon-difference is Brahman in its highest form, even in cases where the wordBrahman is used. So, for instance, He who resides in the self, but is otherthan the self cannot possibly refer to Brahman in itself, since the Advaitinmaintains the view that there is complete undividedness (akhan: d: ata) oridentity (tadatmya) of the individual soul and highest Brahman. Advaitinswould therefore commonly argue that the referent of the pronoun he in thissentence is not Brahman in its absolute form, but only in a lower form, limitedby artificial conditions (upadhi). This is because the Advaitins take it as axi-omatic that the Upanis:adic statements of non-difference express completeidentity of the soul and Brahman. However, Vijnanabhiks:u argues that this isonly one possible interpretation of statements of non-difference, and by nomeans the best one:

With regard to this, we reply: You claim that the statements of differencecontradict statements of non-difference only because they refer to dif-ference regarding artificial conditions. But why not claim that thestatements of non-difference contradict statements of difference only

20 adhunikas tu jvabrahman: or akhand: ataya jve pi brahmasabdo mukhya eva akasasabda ivaghat: akase. jvasyabrahmatvam: tv ajnanakalpitam. tatha hi tat tvam asi aham: brahmasmi anenajvenatmana nupravisya namarupe vyakaravan: i nanyad ato sti dras: t: a ity ady abhedasrutisatebhyojvo pi brahmaiva cinmatratvavises: at. asvaryabandhayos copadhidvayadharmatvat. na ca dvasuparn: a sayuja sakhaya samanam: vr: ks:am: paris:asvajate nityo nityanam: cetanas cetananam ekobahunam: yo vidadhati kaman. tam atmastham: ye nupasyanti dhras tes: am: santih: sasvato netares: amatmani tis: t:han atmano ntarah: sa me atmeti vidyat tris:u dhamasu yad bhogyam: bhokta bhogas cayad bhavet. tebhyo vilaks:an: ah: saks: cinmatro ham sadasivah: . ityadibhedasrutisatanupapattir itivacyam aupadhikabhedanuvadakatvena tadr: savakyopapatteh: (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 20).

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because they refer to non-difference in the form of non-separation, etc.[and not complete identity]? Both are logically consistent.21

Here Vijnanabhiks:u lays out his basic strategy for reconciling the statementsof difference and non-difference that appear in the Vedas, and likewise forlogically accommodating both difference and non-difference in a way that theNaiyayikas will find logically rigorous. According to Vijnanabhiks:u, the termsdifference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda) can each be understood in atleast two ways. In Naiyayika terminology, non-difference is understood asidentity (tadatmya) while difference is the negation of identity, called mutualabsence (anyonyabhava).22 However, this pair of terms, so central to dis-cussions of the relation between the soul and Brahman, can also be under-stood to mean separation (vibhaga) and non-separation (avibhaga). Byadopting this alternate interpretation, it is possible to explain both thestatements of difference and the statements of non-difference that appear inthe Vedas without arbitrarily subordinating one to the other. AlthoughVijnanabhiks:u introduces this suggestion in response to an Advaitapurvapaks: in, the argument could equally well appear in response to a DvaitaVedantin, since the Dvaitin engages in the same reductive project, onlyreversedhe is forced to explain away statements of non-difference aftertaking statements of the difference between Brahman and the individual soulas axiomatic. From the point of view of the Bhedabhedavadin, both Advaitinand Dvaitin share the mistake of always interpreting the words non-differenceand difference in the Upanis:ads as univocal, not understanding theirequivocality.

After introducing these alternate meanings for the two words, Vijnana-bhiks:u has to show that they are logical ways of characterizing the relationbetween Brahman and the individual soul. He does this by appealing to quotesfrom revealed texts (sruti) and traditional texts (smr: ti) that refer to the selfbeing divided or not divided:

Non-difference in the form of non-separation is also heard in revealedtexts such as: In which way pure water poured into the pure [water] islike that, in that way, O Gautama, is the self of the learned seer. But it isnot a second, different from that, divided (vibhakta). And in the tra-ditional texts: And undivided within beings, He stands as if divided./Whether manifestly or unmanifestly, He is truly the supreme purus:a.

We understand this passage to mean that ultimately, there is non-difference [from Brahman] in the form of non-separation, etc. But we

21 tatrocyate abhedavakyanurodhena bhedavakyanam aupadhikabhedaparatvam: yatha kalpyatetatha bhedavakyanurodhenabhedavakyanam avibhagadilaks:an: abhedaparatvam: katham: na kalpy-ate. avirodhasyobhayathaiva sambhavat (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 21).22 Potter (1977, pp. 5153).


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do not understand this passage to mean that there is a difference dueto artificial conditions (upadhi) that is ultimately false (mithya).23

Vijnanabhiks:u remarks that in the opinion of the Advaita Vedantins, halfof the statements of scripture are falsethose statements expressing differ-ence between the individual soul and Brahman. The advantage of being ableto understand difference and non-difference in terms of separation and non-separation is that it allows us to understand all of the statements that refer toBrahman as being true, instead of having to explain them as merely referringto the artificial conditions that appear to limit Brahman in the world.

Following this, Vijnanabhiks:u has to give linguistic justification to arguethat separation (vibhaga) and non-separation (avibhaga) are legitimateways of glossing the words difference and non-difference. He does this byappealing to authority of the grammarian Yaskas Nirukta, which sets downthe meanings of Sanskrit verbal roots:

And it is not the case that when there is the word non-difference(abheda) in the sense of non-separation (avibhaga) there is a figurativeusage, due to the rule of the root bhid: bhid, in the sense of splitting(vidaran: a), meaning also in the sense of separation (vibhaga).

24

Vijnanabhiks:u takes pains to emphasize that separation is a primarymeaning of the word difference, not a figurative meaning. Establishing thisallows him to argue that understanding difference as separation is just aslegitimate as understanding it as mutual absence (anyonyabhava). AnyNaiyayika or Vedantin who insists on the latter meaning instead of the formeris merely arguing from the verbal conventions of his own school, not from anyfundamental principles of the Sanskrit language.

Of course, Vijnanabhiks:u is not arguing that in all scriptural passages,difference should be understood as separation and not as mutual absence.To maintain this would be just as arbitrary as a Naiyayikas insistence that theopposite should be the case. It would also violate the law of contradiction, sinceas we have seen, the relationship between Brahman and the individual soul isalternately described as difference and non-difference in the Upanis:ads.Accepting simultaneous separation and non-separation would be no less inco-herent than accepting simultaneous difference and non-difference. Both wouldentail a statement of the form p and not-p, which Vijnanabhiks:u agrees islogically invalid. Instead, these readings have to be coordinated based on con-text in order to allow for logical continuity. For instance, in passages where theUpanis:ads reject difference, this difference must be understood as separation,and not as mutual absence (anyonyabhava). This is because mutual absence, the

23 sruyate cavibhagadirupabhedo pi yathodakam: suddhe suddham aks: iptam: tadr: g eva bhavati evam:muner vijanata atma bhavati gautama na tu tad dvityam asti tato nyad vibhaktam ityadisrutis:u.smr: tis:u ca avibhaktam: ca bhutes:u vibhaktam iva ca sthitam. vyaktam: sa eva va vyakta sa evapurus:ah: parah: . ityadis:u. pratyutavibhagadilaks:an: abhedasya paramarthikataya tatparatvam evoci-tam. aupadhikabhedasya tu mithyatvena tatparatvam: nocitam iti (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 21).24 na cavibhagaparatve satyabhedasabde laks:an: a sti bhidir vidaran: e iti vibhage pi bhididhatoranusasanat (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 21).

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denial of complete identity, is permanent. Separation, however, is an ephemeralstate, and the fundamental relation between Brahman and the soul is the state ofnon-separation. Vijnanabhiks:u illustrates the logic behind his interpretivemethod in a polemical exchange with an Advaita purvapaks: in:

Objection: In revealed texts (sruti) there are statements such as: Hewho makes a cavity, a fissure in this, he has fear. (Tait Up. 2.7.1.); and intraditional texts (smr: ti): His knowledge with regard to bodies apartfrom the self as in reality being only one, that is the highest truth. Thedualists are those whose views are false. (Vis: Pu 2.14.31.) Since thetraditional texts reject difference, it is not possible for the revealed textsto have difference as their primary meaning.

Response: No, this is not the case. For the statements of non-differ-ence (abheda) are concerned with non-separation (avibhaga), and thestatements that reject difference (bheda) have as their concern differ-ence (bheda) in the sense of separation (vibhaga). For that which iscontrary to the topic under discussion must be rejected. Otherwise, inrevealed texts such as, By the mind alone this is to be obtainedherethere is no difference whatsoever. He who sees difference here obtainsdeath upon death. (Kat:h. Up. 4.11), due to the rejection of difference,there would be non-difference with the classes of insentient beings.25

Vijnanabhiks:u sees the fundamental relationship between Brahman andthe individual soul to be non-separation (avibhaga). This obtains before Godscreation and after his destruction of the world. However, during the worldsexistence, the individual soul exists in a state of separation (vibhaga) fromBrahman, until it achieves the state of liberation. Liberated souls too exist in astate of non-separation (avibhaga). Since at various times the soul undergoesboth the state of separation and non-separation, this allows Vijnanabhiks:u tomake sense of both statements of both separation and non-separation. Thisappeal to differences of time is yet another strategy that Vijnanabhiks:uemploys to reconcile the apparent contradiction of difference and non-difference.26 If difference and non-difference occur at different times, andnot simultaneously, then there is no problem:

The difference and non-difference of the part and whole, in the form ofseparation and non-separation, is not a contradiction since it refers

25 nanu ya etasminn u daram antaram: kurute tha tasya bhayam: bhavattyadisrutautasyatmaparadehes:u sato py ekamayam: hi yat. Vijnanam: paramartho sau dvaitino tathyadarsinah: .ityadismr: tau ca bhedanindasravan: an na bhedaparatvam: srutnam: sambhavatti cen na abhe-davakyanam avibhagaparataya bhedanindavakyanam api vibhagalaks:an: amedaparatvat pra-tipadyavipartasyaiva nindarhatvat. anyatha manasaivedam aptavyam: neha nanasti kim: cana mr: tyoh:sa mr: tyum apnoti ya iha naneva pasyattyadisrutis:u jad: avarges:v api bhedanindanadabhedah: syat(Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 22).26 Using the strategy of relativizing difference and non-difference to refer to different times islogically independent of Vijnanabhiks:us primary strategy for reconciling the two. In some ways itappears to be an afterthought in his discussion of difference and non-difference, and very likelyborrowed from earlier Bhedabheda thinkers.


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to differences at different times. But the mutual non-existence(anyonyabhava) of the soul and Brahman is permanent, and the non-separation of the power and the power-possessor is permanent.27

The state of identity (tadatmya) never obtains between the soul andBrahmantherefore every passage of scripture that affirms the relation ofnon-difference between the two means non-separation, and never identity.The fundamental error of Advaita Vedanta is a failure to understand this.Therefore, the relation between the soul and Brahman can be understoodcorrectly as a permanent state of mutual absence (anyonyabhava). This issimply another way of saying that there is never complete identity (tadatmya)between the two. Understanding these four terms correctly, it is possible tomake logical sense of any passage expressing difference or non-difference,without appeal to mystical paradox or denial of the law of contradiction.Vijnanabhiks:u never attempts to uphold a proposition in the form there isboth d and not-d. Instead, he understands difference and non-difference tobe a case of d1 and not-d2. D1 might stand for difference in one sense,such as mutual absence, while in not-d2, d2 refers to difference as sepa-ration. By mixing the different definitions of difference and non-difference insuch ways, Vijnanabhiks:u can avoid logical contradiction entirely.

Vijnanabhiks:u understands these two pairs of terms to have precisephilosophical definitions. One stock example for the relation of identity (A isB) in the Indian logical tradition is The pot is the pot. This is a completedenial of differencein the sphere of Navya-Nyaya logic that Vijnanabhiks:upresupposes, to say A is B is to say that these two things are the very sameindividual.28 The negation of the previous statement of identity, A is not Bis given the technical name mutual absence (anyonyabhava) as in theexample The pot is not the cloth. Note that this is merely a denial of therelation of identity between two individual entities; it implies nothing further.The pot in question can share many properties with the cloth (e.g., blueness,handsomeness, being a product, being ephemeral) and still have the relationof mutual absence. For that matter, there can be two pots sitting side-by-side,indistinguishable in shape, size, color, and texture. But as long as they are notthe very same individual pot, they can still be referred to as having the relationof mutual non-existence.

Identity and mutual absence are familiar concepts from the Nyaya tradition.Vijnanabhiks:us definitions of separation and non-separation, however, are hisown innovation. Non-separation refers to a state in which two entities are per-ceptually indistinguishable from one another, while nonetheless not having therelationship of identity (tadatmya). Vijnanabhiks:u sees the relation of non-separation expressed in statements like In which way pure water poured intothe pure [water] is like that, in that way, O Gautama, is the self of the learned

27 Part and whole refer to the soul and Brahman. am: sam: sinos ca bhedabhedau vibhaga-vibhagarupau kalabhedenaviruddhau. anyonyabhavas ca jvabrahman: or atyantika eva tathasaktisaktimadavibhago pi nitya eve ti mantavyam (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 26).28 On identity and mutual absence in Navya-Nyaya, see Potter and Bhattacharyya (1993, p. 18).

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seer. But it is not a second, different from that, divided (vibhakta)29. Otherexamples he cites include the mixing of sugar into milk, and of salt into water. Inboth these examples, the two substances, although mixed, remain differentthings. Another logical example of the relation of non-separation (avibhaga) isthe relation between a power and power-possessor, or between a property and aproperty possessor. In the example of a blue cloth, blueness and the cloth arenot identical; conceptually, they can still be distinguished. Yet they are con-joined in a relationship of non-separation in the blue cloth itself.

But the previous definitions of separation and non-separation only apply toeveryday examples; in a philosophical context, Vijnanabhiks:u establishestechnical definitions: Separation (vibhaga) in its technical sense meansdifference in characteristics, and more specifically difference in characteristicsthat are manifest. Non-separation means absence of difference in charac-teristics.30 Therefore, separation (vibhaga) does not mean total disjunction,as the Nyaya-Vaises: ika school maintains. Rather, it means a manifest differ-ence in properties (abhivyaktadharmabheda). Although Vijnanabhiks:u isquite happy to use metaphors from everyday life to describe separation, thesemetaphors, generally based on spatiality, cannot literally apply to Brahmanand the souls. Since Brahman and souls are both omnipresent, there can be nophysical-spatial detachment of the souls from Brahman. Rather, when asoul separates from Brahman, that means that it manifests differences inproperties from Brahman. So, for instance, bound souls are characterized bylimited knowledge (alpajnatva), while Brahman is characterized by omni-science (sarvajnatva). It is on the basis of such factors that we can describesouls as separate from Brahman.

Vijnanabhiks:u is also careful not to claim that these two pairs ofconceptsidentity and mutual absence, non-separation and separationareexhaustive as the meanings of the terms difference and non-differencefound in the Upanis:ads. Another important meaning of the word non-difference is non-difference of essential attributes (avaidharmya). In theexample of the two indistinguishable pots, they are neither identical (as theyare two distinct individuals) nor are they non-separate in the everyday sense(since they are not connected in space). They are two tokens of the same type.Although there is more than one, they are non-different because they lackdifferences of their essential attributes. This meaning of non-difference isparticularly important in the context of the Sam: khya school, which teachesthat there are multiple purus:as. Although these purus:as are multiple innumber, and therefore not identical in the Naiyayikas sense of the term, theyare non-different in the sense of not having a difference of essential attributes(avaidharmya). This is how Vijnanabhiks:u understands the well-knownpassage, One only, without a second. (Chand. Up. 6.2.1).31

29 Vijnanabhiks:us (1979, p. 21).30 Vijnanabhiks:u (1979, p. 26).31 See Vijnanabhiks:us explanation in the Sam: khyapravacanabhas:ya (Vijnanabhiks:u 1895, p. 1).


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Although this state of non-separation exists, Vijnanabhiks:u recognizes thatthe relationship between salt and water, soul and Brahman, and blueness andcloth are not characterized by permanent inseparability. These things can beseparated over time. As the color blue is bleached out of the cloth, or water isevaporated in order to become separate from the salt, so too the soul becomesseparate from Brahman in certain conditions (i.e., it manifests differentqualities). But Vijnanabhiks:u claims that unlike the first two examples, in theexample of the soul and Brahman, non-separation is fundamental, and caneven be termed to be real in a way that the relation of separation cannot:

Therefore, difference and non-difference in the form of separation andnon-separation is established, by the relation of part and whole betweenthe soul and God. And between those two, only non-separation is true(satya), due to its being available at the beginning and the end of creation,due to its being the natural state (svabhavika), and due to its being eternal.But separation, since it is only for a limited time between the beginning andend of creation, is conditional (naimittika). Like other changes (vikara), itis merely verbal (vacarambhan: amatra). This is its particular characteristic.

In this way the non-dual self is explained in general, and we willexplain the statements of the non-dual Brahman in the commentary onthe third sutra. But by defining difference as mutual non-existence(anyonyabhava), God, the referent of the word Brahman, can be said tobe completely different from the soul.32

Vijnanabhiks:us assertion that the natural state of Brahman is non-separationseems to put him squarely in the camp of Bhaskaras Conditional Differenceand Non-Difference (aupadhikabhedabheda), and separates him from Nim-barka and Yadavaprakasa, who hold that difference and non-difference areboth essential to Brahman.33 But Vijnanabhiks:u goes even furtherin thelanguage of the first paragraph he comes extremely close to adopting theAdvaitins description of the world as unreal. He even uses the same epithetfrom the Chandogya Upanis:ad that Vacaspati Misra uses to apply to theunreal status of the effects of Brahman, merely verbal (vacaram-bhan: amatra). However, we must take this passage from Vijnanabhiks:u in thecontext of his frequent assertions, in the VAB and elsewhere, of the reality ofthe phenomenal world. Instead of a strict binary relationship between the realand unreal, we should understand a theory of different grades of reality. Onthe one hand, non-separation is the most real because it is the natural state ofthe soul and Brahman. It is even described as eternal (nitya), although thistoo seems to contradict Vijnanabhiks:us previous statements. Although

32 tasmad siddhau jvesvarayor am: sam: sibhavena bhedabhedau vibhagavibhagarupau. tatrapy avi-bhaga eva adyantayor anugatatvat svabhavikatvat nityatvac ca satyah: . vibhagas tu madhyesvalpavacchedena naimittiko vikarantaravad vacarambhan: amatram iti vises:ah: . tad evamatmadvaitam: vyakhyatam: samanyato brahmadvaitavakyani ca tr: tyasutre vyakhyasyamah: . tad evamanyonyabhavalaks:an: abhedena jvadatyantabhinna evesvaro brahmasabdartha iti siddham(Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 32).33 On these two varieties of Bhedabheda, vide Nicholson (2006).

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non-separation is the fundamental state from which the world originatesand to which everything will return after the worlds dissolution, there is anin-between period when separation exists. Non-separation can therefore onlybe understood as eternal if we understand that at the time of the phe-nomenal worlds existence, non-separation exists in a latent state.

We should also note that this notion of the gradations of reality itselfappears in a slightly different form in the mainstream Advaita tradition.Although Brahman in its unqualified form is the ultimate reality, there are twoother stages of reality below that which is ultimately real. The lowest is thestate of that which is completely unreal (pratibhasika), which includes illu-sions, physical impossibilities like a sky-lotus, and logical impossibilities likethe son of a barren woman.34 Above this is the level of the phenomenal world,intersubjectively understood as real by normal people. This world, althoughultimately unreal (mithya), is phenomenally real, and for that reason impor-tant. The Advaitins use the epithet inexplicable (anirvacanya) to describeits ontological state, which is neither totally real (like Brahman) nor totallyunreal (like illusory objects). Although Vijnanabhiks:u rejects the Advaitinsformulation as nonsensical and elsewhere argues that the phenomenal world isreal (sat), nonetheless at times he uses terminology that edges him close to thestandard Advaita position.

Soul and brahman as part and whole

One fundamental problem that the Bhedabheda Vedantic tradition faces is itsclaim that the individual souls and Brahman exist in a relation of part (am: sa)and whole (am: sin). The stock analogies used by Bhedabhedavadins to illus-trate the part/whole relation between the two include a fire and its sparks, theocean and its waves, and the sun and its rays. This relation is made explicit inBhedabheda commentaries on the Brahma Sutras since Bhaskara, especiallyin reference to one particular sutra: A part, due to being stated as different.And otherwise also, as some people study it as servant, lord, etc. (BS 2.3.43).It is partly on the basis of this sutra that Hajime Nakamura reaches theconclusion that the author of the Brahma Sutra was a Bhedabhedavadin:

According to one sutra, the individual self is clearly defined as being apart (am: sa) of Brahman (2.3.43) [The] sutra states that the individualself is different (nana) from Brahman but at the same time not different.From this we see that the Brahma-sutra took the standpoint of what wascalled Bhedabheda by later thinkers.35

34 Better would be the biological son of a barren woman, since a barren woman might adopt ason.35 Nakamura (1989, p. 500). Nakamura also claims that, based on internal evidence from theBrahma Sutras themselves, Badarayan: a was not the author of the Brahma Sutras (Nakamura1989, pp. 405407).


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However, a serious interpretive problem arises. In Brahma Sutra 2.1.26, theauthor refers to Brahman as partless (niravayava). Furthermore, as mostcommentators point out (including Vijnanabhiks:u and Sa _nkara), there arepassages in the Upanis:ads that also say that Brahman is partless, such asSvet. Up. 6.19: partless (nis:kala), inactive, peaceful, faultless, spotlessReconciling these two passages is a fundamental interpretive problem foranyone who wishes to comment on the Brahma Sutra. Not surprisingly,Bhedabhedavadins and Advaitins take drastically different steps to resolvethis contradiction in the textthis might even be described as the centralinterpretive difference between the two schools. Advaita Vedantins accept theUpanis:adic statements of the complete partlessness of Brahman at face value,and describe Brahman as a single, undifferentiated mass that is totally indi-visible (akhan: d: a). This leads them to interpret Brahma Sutra 2.3.43, whereBrahman is described as a part, in a purely figurative way. Sa _nkara writes,

He [Badarayan: a] says, it is a part (am: sa). The soul (jva) should beunderstood as part of the Lord (svara), just as the spark is [a part] of thefire.

Part means like a part (am: sa iva), since a thing that is free fromparts (niravayava) cannot literally have parts (am: sa).

36

Sa _nkara goes on to remark that when the sutra says and otherwise also, itrefers to the many statements where the so-called parts are described as non-different from their whole. These statements of non-difference, according toSa _nkara, should be taken to refer to the ultimate state of identity between theso-called parts and the whole, while difference is merely due to difference inartificial limiting conditions. Sa _nkara simply cannot make literal sense of BS2.3.43, and hence employs interpretive strategies to make the passage conformto the standard Advaita reading. But he has good reasons for making thisinterpretive move, since the Upanis:ads attest that Brahman is a partlesswhole. Not only do the Advaitins have scriptural authority (sabdapraman: a) ontheir side, but also inference (anumana). It is inconceivable that Brahmancould be made up of parts, for things that are made up of parts are dependenton those parts, and impermanent. When the parts are separated from thatthing, it is diminished. For instance, when a table is separated from one of itslegs, it no longer functions well as a table. Anyone who hopes to argueplausibly for the part/whole relation pertaining to the soul and Brahman mustshow that it is meaningful to speak of a different sort of part/whole relation inwhich the whole is completely independent of its parts.

At the beginning of his defense of the logical coherence of the part/wholerelation, Vijnanabhiks:u asserts that it is the best of all alternatives. Hiscritique of the Advaita includes a critique of the metaphors by which theAdvaitins theorize the relation between Brahman and the individual soul(jva). The most influential analogies for theorizing the complete unity andpartlessness of Brahman are those of the sun and its reflection in pools of

36 Sa _nkara (1996, pp. 728729).

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water, and of space (akasa) and space as limited by a pot. These two meta-phors correspond to two major schools of thought within post-Sa _nkaraAdvaita, reflectionism (pratibimbavada) and limitationism (avacchedavada).37

Vijnanabhiks:u tries to show through a process of elimination that when bothof these metaphors break down, the only adequate way to represent therelation between Brahman and the soul are metaphors expressing the doctrineof part and whole (am: savada), such as the fire and its sparks. So, for instance,the metaphor of space and the space limited by a pot expresses the view thatthe soul is identical with Brahman, but merely limited by artificial conditions(upadhi)just as the pot is an artificial condition that limits space. But,Vijnanabhiks:u argues,

if it [Brahman] were a single, partless whole, then there might again bethe undesirable occurrence of bondage for someone who has been pre-viously liberated. For although the liberated part is disjoined from oneinternal organ (antah: karan: a), there is the possibility of union withanother internal organ. In the same way, the space that is limited by onepot, even when that pot is broken, eventually comes back into relationwith another pot.38

This is a variation on the very familiar criticism of Advaita that it cannotaccount for liberation. The limitationists model can account for the conven-tional appearance of difference between various souls, one soul apparentlybeing liberated while another is bound, since liberation just means that theartificial limiting condition (upadhi) has been destroyed. But it cannot accountfor the permanent liberation of soulson the model of the pots and space,there would be the constant possibility of the souls backsliding, and ceasing tobe liberated. That is because any given section of space might be surroundedby a new pot, even after the previous pot has been broken.

After advancing numerous arguments for the inadequacy of the limitationist andreflectionist models, both on the basis of scripture and inference, Vijnanabhiks:usuggests that his own doctrine of part and whole should be accepted by default:

We have seen the examples of the moon and the moons reflection in thewater, space and the space limited by a pot, fire and its sparks, shade andheat, woman and man. All these correspond to viewpoints like reflectionism,limitationism, the doctrine of part and whole (am: savada), and so forth.

37 These views are traditionally ascribed to the two major divisions of post-Sa _nkara Advaitins, theBhamat school holding limitationism and the Vivaran: a school reflectionism. For further discus-sion, see Potter (1963, p. 172ff).38 kim: cakhan: d: aikatmye sati muktasya punarbandhapattih: ekantah: karan: aviyoge pi muktam: saevantah: karan: antarasambhvat. yathaikaghat: avacchinnakasasya tadghat:abha _nge pi ghat: antaren: apunah: sambandho bhavati tadvat (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 23). Advaitins can counter by arguingthat although both ignorance and the self are omnipresent, the union (sam: yoga) of the liberatedself with ignorance is non-effective, whereas the union of the bound self with ignorance is aneffective union (Narayan Mishra, personal communication). Mishra offers the example of therelationship between a recently retired professor (the jva) and his former vice-chancellor (ajna-na). Although the retired professor may once again come into contact with the vice-chancellor atoccasional social functions, the vice-chancellor will no longer have any power over him.


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Because they conflict, it is impossible for all of these views to be trueonlyone can be accepted. The rest of the examples should be understood as onlypartially expressing that which is intended everywhere. This being the case,it is appropriate to accept just the doctrine of parthood.39

Vijnanabhiks:u does not completely reject the other metaphors for the relationbetween Brahman and the soul. To the extent that these other views have simi-larities with his own, they might be regarded as partially true. To argue that thedoctrine of part and whole is the only one that can be completely accepted herepeatedly cites Brahma Sutra 2.3.43, A part, due to being stated as differentHowever, simply to cite this sutra is not enough. To make his case that this sutrashould be read literally, not figuratively as the Advaitins do, Vijnanabhiks:uunderstands that he has to show that the doctrine of parthood is logicallycoherent. To do this, he makes a subtle distinction between two different Sanskritwords that are both typically translated as part: am: sa and avayava. While thesouls are the am: sas of Brahman, they are not the avayavas of Brahman.Vijnanabhiks:u wishes to make this distinction by saying that an avayava can beunderstood in the everyday sense of the word part. However, an am: sa has aspecific technical meaning in the Brahma Sutra and in his philosophical writings:

To be a part (am: sa), something must be of the same class (sajatya) as thewhole (am: sin) and be the adjunct of non-separation (avibhagapratiyo-gin). The whole is the subjunct of non-separation (tadanuyogin). Whenreferring to the part as being of the same class as the whole, one must beconsistent with regard to the property under discussion. For instance,when discussing the part being a self, one should say it falls under theclass of selfhood (atmatva). When discussing the part as existent, etc.,one should refer to it as falling under the class of existence (sattva), etc.Following this procedure, there will be no confusion.40

In this passage, Vijnanabhiks:u employs two relational terms from the Navya-Nyaya, subjunct (anuyogin) and adjunct (pratiyogin).41 In the Naiyayikas stockexample, there is absence of the pot in the ground, the pot is the adjunct(pratiyogin) in the relation, while the ground is the subjunct (anuyogin). Note thatthe relation of absence only goes one wayto say that there is absence of the pot inthe ground is not the same thing to say that there is absence of the ground in the pot.Likewise, although it is possible to say that the souls are parts of Brahman, it is quitesomething else to say that Brahman is the part of the souls. Therefore, to avoid the

39 api ca candrajalacandrakasaghat: akasagnivisphuli _ngacchayatapastrpurus: adidr: s: t: antaih: pratibimbavacchedam: sadivadah: parasparavirodhena sarve na sambhavantty eka eva vada asrayan: yah: . itarastu viviks: itatattadam: samatre dr: s: t: anta ity abhyupeyam. tatha ca sati am: savada evasrayitum: yuktah: (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 26).40 am: satvam: ca sajatyatve sati avibhagapratiyogitvam tadanuyogitvam: cam: sitvam. yena carupen: am: sata yatra vivaks:yate tenaiva rupen: a sajatyam: tatra grahyam: yatha atmam: salaks:an: e atmat-venaiva sajatyam: sadam: sadilaks:an: es:u ca sattvadirupen: aivety ato natiprasa _ngah: (Vijnanabhiks:u1979, p. 26).41 I borrow the translations adjunct (pratiyogin) and subjunct (anuyogin) from Matilal (1968,p. 32).

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possibility that Brahman could also be called a part and the souls called thewhole, Vijnanabhiks:u must argue that separation is a one-way relation, not atwo-way relation as it might appear at first glance. In the relation of separation ornon-separation, the anuyogin is the locus, while the pratiyogin is that which sepa-rates from the locus. In the example of leaves falling from a tree, the leaf would bethe pratiyogin of separation, while the tree is the anuyogin. In the case of the soulsand Brahman, it is the souls that separate from Brahman at the time of creation, andre-attach to Brahman at the time of the worlds dissolution. Throughout this entireprocess, however, Brahman, the whole, remains unchanged.42 One way ofexpressing such a one-way relation of separation is by paradoxical statements ofdifference and non-difference, such as one of Vijnanabhiks:us favorite passagesfrom the Vis:n: u Puran: a: There is nothing different from it, yet it is different fromeverything. (Vis: . Pu. 1.16.78). Less enigmatically, one might gloss this to mean thatalthough all of the souls are its parts, Brahman is not dependent on, or affected by,the states of bondage and liberation of those very same souls.

The other half of Vijnanabhiks:us technical definition of a part (am: sa)stipulates that a part must be of the same class (sajatya) as the whole.Vijnanabhiks:u offers examples of two such properties that Brahman and thesouls share: selfhood (atmatva) and existence (sattva). Another propertyBrahman and souls have in common is consciousness (cittva).43 Note, however,that for Vijnanabhiks:u being bliss (anandatva) does not qualify as a sharedproperty. This is because, he argues, the term bliss or happiness whenapplied to the liberated soul or Brahman can only refer to a complete absence ofsuffering. It therefore does not refer to a positive state, as the word does ineveryday statements such as Devadatta is happy. Vijnanabhiks:u borrows thisargument from the Sam: khyas, and in arguing the position cites the Sam: khyaSutra in support of his view.44 Vijnanabhiks:u also emphasizes here that prop-erties like selfhood and existence must not be conflated. This is a rejection ofSa _nkaras view that the consciousness, existence, and bliss of Brahman are infact one and the same. Furthermore, according to Sa _nkara they are not prop-erties of Brahmanthey are identical with Brahman. Vijnanabhiks:u also differsfrom Ramanuja on this issue, since Ramanuja holds that bliss is a property ofBrahman. Vijnanabhiks:u believes that Brahman possesses multiple properties,

42 Explanation provided by Narayan Mishra (personal communication). See also Potter andBhattacharyya (1993, p. 18), Matilal (1968, pp. 3134).43 In a following statement, however, Vijnanabhiks:u seems to suggest that that only atmatvashould, strictly speaking, be considered the common property of Brahman and the souls: Or,more precisely, it should be understood as having the same class by means of a class that is directlypervaded by the property of being a substance (dravyatvasaks: advyapyajati). (Vijnanabhiks:u1979, p. 16). This refers to the nine substances (dravyas) of the Nyaya-Vaises: ika school. Beingpervaded directly by the property of being a substance, in this case, would mean that both the souland Brahman are pervaded by atmatva, since atman is one of the nine substances.44 Vijnanabhiks:u (1979, p. 34). Vijnanabhiks:u frequently cites the Sam: khya Sutra in his com-mentary on the Brahma Sutra, an indication that even in his earliest works he sees the doctrines ofthese schools as frequently compatible. Nonetheless, he writes that Sam: khya is inferior to Vedanta,since the object of knowledge in Sam: khya is the conventional (vyavaharika) self while the object ofknowledge in Vedanta is the ultimate (paramarthika) self (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 36).


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but bliss is not among them. Strictly speaking, bliss exists only in the realm ofprakr: ti, and therefore cannot be a property of Brahman.

45

In the Vijnanamr: tabhas:ya, Vijnanabhiks:u seeks to justify all of the tradi-tional metaphors he has inherited from other Bhedabhedavadins, in spite oftheir apparent dissimilarities and inconsistencies. An ocean and its waves, fireand its sparks, the sun and its rays, and a father and his son are all different intheir specific details. The father is clearly the cause of his son (along with themother, of course), but it seems rather implausible to modern sensibilities that ason can be described as a part of his father. Likewise, in the case of a fire and itssparks, the sparks cease to be parts of the fire as soon as they are distinguishableas sparks. Furthermore, with all of these metaphors except for the first, thereappears to be no eventual re-absorption of the parts back into their wholeonly the ocean creates waves which manifest as distinct parts of the oceanas a whole, and then re-absorbs those same waves. Recognition of theinadequacy of these metaphors is implicit when the Advaita objector in theVijnanamr: tabhas:ya asks, how do we know that the relation of part and wholeas in the examples of the fire and sparks, father and son, etc., is intended?46

On the other hand, the characteristic that all of these metaphors have incommon is to show that it is possible for a whole to exist that is completelyindependent of its parts for its continued existence. In an exampleVijnanabhiks:u does not use, the parts of a human body, loss of a limb greatlydiminishes the proper functioning of the body as a whole; loss of certain partsof the body will result in the wholes complete termination. But the fire cancontinue to be separated from its sparks without thereby being diminished; thesame holds for the father, who is in no way lessened by the production of ason. This difference gets to the heart of Vijnanabhiks:us distinction betweenthe two different Sanskrit words for part. While a part in its everyday sense(avayava) describes are relationship where the whole is dependent on, andconstituted by, its parts, a loss of a part in its specialized sense (am: sa) is notresponsible for the diminishing of the whole:

Objection: Since Brahman is devoid of parts (niravayava), how could itpossess a part (am: sa) in a primary sense?

Reply: We have seen that it possesses a part (am: sa) as according tothe technical definition given previously, although it does not possess anypart in the popular sense of the word (avayava). Likewise, the hair isreferred to as a part (am: sa) of the body. A single unit is called a part ofthe group. The son is called a part of the father. Like the possessions ofthe son that upon his death go to the father, at the time of the dissolution ofthe universe, the souls give up their own characteristic of illumination ofonly the sense-object and take on unity (ananyatva) with the characteristic

45 Vide Ram (1995, p. 33).46 Vijnanabhiks:u (1979, p. 27).

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of Brahman, the pure consciousness, which constantly illuminates every-thing.47 And at the time of the creation of the universe, just due to theLords own desire, the souls, after attaining effective consciousness,become manifest just as the sons of the father become manifest.48 There-fore, souls can be called the parts (am: sa) of Brahman. By the sruti, hehimself is manifested as the son, there is non-difference characterized bynon-separation of the father with the son. In the same way, by the sruti,Let me be manifest as many, (Ch. Up. 6.2.3) the non-difference char-acterized by non-separation of Brahman with the soul is established.Hence, the souls have as their primary meaning parts of Brahman.49

The specifics of Vijnanabhiks:us analogy of the son and the father is unclear inits details, in part possibly due to textual corruption. Either Vijnanabhiks:umeans that the father inherits his sons possessions (vetanah: ) when the sondies, or his consciousness (cetanah: ) is absorbed into his fathers at death. Thefirst seems irrelevant, while the second is simply false. The basic problemwith this metaphor is that although the father can certainly be said to beresponsible for the manifestation of his son, it is hard to see how he mightre-absorb his sons at the time of his sons death. Nonetheless, the basiccosmological picture that Vijnanabhiks:u presents is clear. The world has threeperiods: origin, existence, and dissolution. Before the origin of the world, theindividual consciousnesses of the souls are latent, not in use. Only after theworlds creation do the consciousnesses of the souls become manifest, oreffective. Once again after the souls are re-absorbed into Brahman, theyreturn to their original latent state. This 3-fold chronological division appearsin most commentaries on Brahma Sutra 1.1.2.50 The same basic cosmologicalpicture of an undifferentiated stuff being differentiated and then re-absorbedat the end of the world is depicted in the Puran: as. It also has obvious parallelsto the activity of prakr: ti in the Sam: khya-Yoga system. However, it seemsslightly more problematic in the Vedantic context, since Brahman, unlikeprakr: ti, is changeless. It is this problem, how a changeless entity can none-theless be material cause of the world, that I turn to in the next section.

47 Accepting the manuscripts reading of vetanah: (possessions) instead of Tripathis substitutioncetanah: (consciousnesses) (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 27).48 During the period of dissolution, the jvas consciousness is latent, i.e. not in use. At the time ofcreation, its consciousness becomes effective (Narayan Mishra, personal communication).49 nanu niravayavasya brahman: ah: katham: mukhyo m: sah: syad iti cen na yathoktalaks:an: am: satv-asyavayavatvabhave pi darsanat. yatha sarrasya kesadir am: so rases caikadeso m: sah: pitus ca putraiti. sarve ca jvah: pitari putravetana (putracetana) iva cinmatre brahman: i nityasarvavabhasakevis:ayabhasanarupam: svalaks:an: am: vihaya pralaye laks:an: ananyatvam: gacchanti. sargakale ca tad-icchaya tata eva labdhacaitanyaphalopadhana avirbhavanti pitur iva putrah: . ato jva brahmam: sabhavanti. atma vai jayate putrah: iti srutya putre pitur avibhagalaks:an: abhedavaj jve pi brahman: ovibhagalaks:an: abhedasya bahu syam: prajayeyetyadisrutya siddher iti. ato jva brahmam: sa mukhyaeva bhavanti (Vijnanabhiks:u 1979, p. 27).50 Most commentators use the threefold division, although Vijnanabhiks:u actually writes in hiscommentary on the sutra that origin, etc. refers to a sixfold set of world-stages: arising, exis-tence, growth, development, decline, and passing away.


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Causality in advaita and bhedabheda vedanta

One of the primary differences between Bhedabheda Vedanta and its better-known rival Advaita is its doctrine of real transformation (parin: amavada), asopposed to the doctrine of unreal or apparent manifestation (vivartavada)maintained by the Advaita. According to the Bhedabhedavadins, the worldof multiplicity that most normal people believe to be real is in fact justthatalthough there may be an underlying, unitary cause from which theuniverse evolves, the results of this evolution (tables, chairs, books, individualhuman beings, etc.) are also real. This is denied by Advaita Vedantins.51 Al-though Advaitins will admit that the world can be said to be conventionally, orconditionally, real (vyavaharasat), they insist that the only absolutely real entityis Brahman, which is unitary, free from qualities, and the cause of this apparentphenomenal world.52

Providing these two different answers to the question of the reality of thephenomenal world takes the Advaitins and the Bhedabhedavadins in quite dif-ferent directions, and will lead to two different sets of problems for each toresolve.53 To illustrate some of Vijnanabhiks:us philosophical tendencies, I wishto discuss just one such problem that confronts the Bhedabhedavadins. How canBrahman, which is universally accepted to be eternally unchanging, be thematerial cause (upadanakaran: a) of the universe? This is a problem that manyAdvaitins claim they do not have to confront, since in their theory the world ismerely an unreal manifestation (vivarta) of Brahman. Furthermore, Sa _nkara doesnot address this, implying that he simply did not consider this to be a problem.Although neither Sa _nkara nor Bhaskara mention this issue, late medievalAdvaitins and Bhedabhedavadins recognize it as a central problem, as I will show.

Indian logicians name things like clay and copper as real-world examples ofmaterial causes. The potter (or instrumental cause, nimittakaran: a) transformsthe clay (the material cause) into its various forms: a pot, a plate, etc.Although the forms (rupas) of the clay have changed, the essence (svarupa) ofthe clay, its clay-ness, remains the same throughout all of these transforma-tions. Perhaps the most well-known description of what it means to be amaterial cause comes from the dialogue between Svetaketu and his fatherArun: i in Chand. Up. 6.1.45. This is the locus classicus of the doctrine that theeffect pre-exists in the cause (satkaryavada):

It is like this, son. By means of just one lump of clay one would perceiveeverything made of claythe transformation is a verbal handle, anamewhile the reality is just this: Its clay.

51 Srinivasa Rao provocatively claims that Sa _nkara did not subscribe to vivartavada (Rao 1996).He does not dispute that this position of the unreality of the phenomenal world was taken byvirtually all subsequent Advaitins.52 This is the standard position of the Bhamat and Vivaran: a schools.53 In the case of the Advaitins, one central aporia is the ontological status of ignorance itself. Is itreal? Is it unreal? Where did it originate? What is its locus? The Advaitins attempt to resolve thisproblem by positing a third category of entities that are anirvacanya, neither totally real nortotally unreal. Vide Ingalls (1953) and Potter (1963, pp. 163167).

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It is like this, son. By means of just one copper trinket one wouldperceive everything made of copperthe transformation is a verbalhandle, a namewhile the reality is just this: Its copper.54

Of course, the unstated subject of this metaphor is Brahman. Brahman is thematerial cause of the world, just as clay is the material cause of pots, plates,and other sorts of things. Although frequently cited, this passage itself is asource of controversy between two different types of satkaryavadins.Sam: khyas and realist Vedantins such as Bhedabhedavadins belong to theschool of Parin: amavada, which maintains that the world is a real transfor-mation (parin: ama) of Brahman. Just as a lump of clay changes, undergoing areal transformation when it assumes the form of a pot, so too Brahmanundergoes some real change in form when it becomes the phenomenalworld. However, because the clays essence does not change, the lump ofclay can also be described as being the same as the pot. For parin: amavadins,the material cause and its effects are both different and non-different: dif-ferent with regard to form, but non-different with regard to essence.55 Ad-vaita Vedantins are usually described as subscribing to the other school ofsatkaryavada, called vivartavada.56 On the interpretation of the AdvaitinVacaspati Misra, for instance, Brahman undergoes no real transformation.Its apparent manifestation (vivarta) in the world has a merely verbal exis-tence (vacarambhan: a). Therefore, Brahman itself does not change in anyway.

It is clear, therefore, that if the Bhedabhedavadins understand Brahman tobe the material cause of the universe in the same way that clay is the materialcause of a pot, this will involve some real change in form of Brahman itself.Bhaskara even uses the metaphor of milk changing into curds to describeBrahmans transformation into the world. On this model, Brahmans causalitywould be very similar to the causality of the original, undifferentiated prakr: tiof the Sam: khya school. The Sam: khyas cosmological dualism maintains thatthere are two eternal, fundamental principles, one the purus:a, the otherprakr: ti. The difference between the two is that the purus:a is eternal andunchanging (kut:asthanitya), while prakr: ti is changing, albeit nonethelesseternal in its changing form (parin: aminitya). On the Sam: khya model, prakr: tibegins in an undifferentiated, quiescent form, transforms into 23 other prin-ciples (tattvas) during the period of creation of the world, then returns to its

54 Translation in Olivelle (1996, p. 148).55 The depiction of difference and non-difference as difference of effect, non-difference of cause,is especially characteristic of Bhaskaras thought. Vide Dasgupta (1922, vol 4, p. 329).56 Although the two different groups share the epithet satkaryavada, their views lead them toconstrue the Sanskrit compound satkarya in two different ways. While Sam: khyas and realistVedantins understand it to be a karmadharaya compound expressing an effect that is real,Advaitins take it to be a s:as: t:h tatpurus:a compound, the effect of that which is real. That whichis real, of course, refers to Brahman (Narayan Mishra, personal communication).


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original quiescent state after the worlds dissolution.57 One option for theBhedabhedavadin would be to accept that Brahman is eternal yet changing,just like the Sam: khya prakr: ti. However, this was generally not an option. Inspite of the many differences among Vedantins in their interpretations of theUpanis:ads, there seems to have been agreement that the Upanis:adic state-ments asserting Brahmans eternality also assert its unchangeability. Since therejection of Brahman as unchanging was not a possibility, the other availableoption was to re-interpret the precise nature of the causality of Brahman.

If Vedantins were hesitant to reject the unchanging nature of Brahman, thenrejection of Brahman as cause of the universe was even more of a problem.After all, the second verse of the Brahma Sutra, From which there is theorigin, etc., of this,(BS 1.1.2) is interpreted by the entire tradition to mean thatBrahman is that from which there is the origin of this world (jagat), i.e.,Brahman is the cause of the world. In his commentary on the second verse ofthe Brahma Sutra, Vijnanabhiks:u attempts to resolve the problem ofexplaining an unchanging cause of the world by re-interpreting material cau-sality to include what he calls locus causality (adhis: t:hanakaran: atva).

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Vijnanabhiks:u makes his case by arguing that the term material cause(upadanakaran: a), frequently used to describe Brahman, can be of two sorts.One sort is a changing cause (vikarikaran: a), such as the example of the clay,which undergoes changes when it is transformed into various effects. However,Vijnanabhiks:u asserts that the term upadanakaran: a can also refer to anunchanging cause (avikarikaran: a), also known as a root cause (mulakaran: a) ora locus cause (adhis: t:hanakaran: a). By this he is not saying that the locus can besaid to be a cause in a figurative, or secondary, sense. Rather, he insists that oneof the primary meanings of material cause (upadanakaran: a) is locuscause. In order to make this claim, he offers a definition of material causalitythat can apply equally to a changing cause or a locus cause: The generaldefinition of material cause is that which is a substratum, non-separate from itseffect.59 This allows Vijnanabhiks:u to claim that an unchanging locus such asBrahman is no less deserving of the appellation cause than a changing causelike the potters clay. But what precisely does it mean to call something alocus cause?

Vijnanabhiks:us technical definition of a locus cause is that from which the[changeable] material cause is not separated, and by which the [changeable]material cause is fully supported.60 To make this more tangible, Vijnana-bhiks:u offers an example of one such locus cause from Sam: khya cosmology.According to the Sam: khyas, each of the five gross elements has its origin in a

57 I use the word prakr: ti to refer the original prakr: ti (i.e., mulaprakr: ti, pradhana), althoughtechnically it can refer to any of the eight tattvas which themselves cause another tattva. (In thissense mulaprakr: ti, buddhi, aham: kara, and the five tanmatras are the prakr: tis. The remaining 16evolutes of mulaprakr: ti are termed vikaras.)58 Vijnanabhiks:u (1979, p. 17).59 Ibid.60 Ibid.

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corresponding subtle element, too small for the human sense organ to per-ceive. But Vijnanabhiks:u suggests that for the subtle element of earth tosuccessfully evolve into the gross element earth, water is necessary as a locuscause: For example, at the time of world creation, there are minute parts ofthe earth, known as subtle elements and not separate from the water. Thesesubtle elements change into the form of earth due to the support of water, sowater is the locus cause of the gross element earth.61

In other words, Vijnanabhiks:u portrays this causal relation as having threeterms: unchangeable locus cause, changeable cause, and effect. The change-able cause is both non-separate with the effect and also inheres in the effect(i.e., the stuff that the effect is made up of is the same as the stuff of thematerial cause). The locus cause, although non-separate (avibhakta) fromboth the changeable cause and the effect, does not inhere in either thechangeable cause or the effect. Without the locus cause, no change can takeplace in the changeable cause, and in that sense the locus can itself bedescribed as a cause. Nonetheless, the locus cause itself undergoes no changein form. The effect simply arises due to the presence of the locus cause, andnot due to any action taken by the locus cause. As we saw, this relationshipbetween locus cause and changeable cause is verbally complicated by the factthat both can equally be called material cause (upadanakaran: a). This hasthe potential for great confusion, especially since Vijnanabhiks:u commonlyrefers to a material cause without elaborating which type. But it also allowsa great deal of interpretive flexibility. It allows Vijnanabhiks:u to make senseof apparently nonsensical passages that refer to something unchanging as acause, while still accepting that stock examples like clay and copper are alsocorrectly described as material causes.

I suggested before that Vijnanabhiks:us positing of a type of causality calledlocus causality was in order to solve a problem specific to BhedabhedaVedanta and its theory of real transformation (parin: amavada). However, thelines between the doctrines of parin: amavada and vivartavada are considerablyblurrier than usually depicted in histories of Indian philosophy. First of all,evidence suggests that the development of the theory of unreal manifestation ofBrahman was actually a gradual development out of the earlier theory of thereal transformation of Brahman. Paul Hacker, for instance, believes that theearly Sa _nkara held a position on this question somewhere between the realistparin: amavada of the author of the Brahma Sutra and the vivartavada of thelater Advaitic tradition.62 Srinivasa Rao has argued even more radically thatthe Sa _nkara of the Brahmasutrabhas:ya does not regard the empirical world as

61 Ibid.62 Addressing the process of world-creation depicted in the Upadesasahasr, one of Sa _nkaras earlyworks, Hacker writes, Dieses Bild veranschaulicht das Ubergangstadium, in dem sich Sa _nkarazwischen der realistischen Auffassung der B.S. (nach der Brahman materielle Ursache der Weltist) und dem ausgepragten Illusionismus des spateren Advaita (welches das Brahman als das realeSubstrat einer Scheinmanifestation, vivarta, lehrt) befindet (Hacker 1949, p. 19).


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mithya, by implication placing Sa _nkara squarely in the camp of the pari-n: amavadins.

63 Further complicating matters, Vijnanabhiks:u claims that hehimself is neither a parin: amavadin nor a vivartavadin.

64 This is because heunderstands parin: amavadin to mean one who believes that Brahman is achangeable material cause, precisely what he tries to avoid with his 2-folddistinction of material causes. Nonetheless, it is clear that Vijnanabhiks:usposition comes out of the tradition of parin: amavada, more widely construed, inwhich the world is a real effect of Brahman. And there is no ambiguity aboutVijnanabhiks:us vitriol towards the vivartavada position of the later Advaitins.

In spite of his emphatic rejection of Advaitic views, however, Vijnana-bhiks:us concept of locus cause shares some remarkable affinities with atleast one of the conceptions of causality prevalent among Advaitins in the latemedieval period. In this regard he is much closer to his 16th century Advaitacontemporaries than to early Bhedabhedavadins such as Bhaskara, since theseearlier Vedantins did not appear to see any inherent contradiction indescribing Brahman as material cause, and therefore did not formulate anyconcept similar to locus causality.65 By the late medieval period, it seems,consensus held that Brahman could not possibly be a material cause in thefamiliar sense without undergoing some change. Therefore, Advaitins tooadopted a host of theories to sidestep this apparent aporia.

Appaya Dks: itas 16th century catalog of the many different Advaita views,the Siddhantalesasam: graha (Brief Compendium of Doctrines), lists numerousopinions on the question of Brahmans causality. Typically, these laterAdvaitins saw ignorance (avidya) or illusion (maya) themselves as havingsome part in creating the world.66 By reifying such terms and giving theseentities some sort of autonomous causal power, they were likely quite far fromthe original position of their schools putative founder, Sa _nkara, with regard tothe origin of the world. This was in part because Sa _nkara himself was silent orambiguous on certain puzzling issues regarding Brahmans causality.67

Therefore, these thinkers divvy up the causal duties in various ways. AppayaDks: ita lists a few of these alternatives:

1. According to the author of the Padarthatattvanirn: aya, both Brahman andillusion (maya) are material causes. Brahmans being material cause is notjust a technical term, in the sense of locus of apparent manifestation(vivarta). Brahman itself undergoes apparent manifestation, while illusionundergoes real transformation.

63 Rao (1996, p. 272ff).64 Vijnanabhiks:u (1979, p. 18).65 In this regard, Bhaskara was closer to Sa _nkara, who also maintained that Brahman could bematerial cause of the world without undergoing any essential change. It is possible that earlyVedantins only understood unchanging to mean unchanging in essence. Vide Rao (1996, p.275).66 In later Advaita the terms maya and avidya are closely connected, though not interchangeable.Typically avidya is the cause of concealment, while maya is the cause of projection.67 Karl Potter opines that Sa _nkara made a deliberate decision to avoid the causal conundrumswith which his successors occupied themselves (Potter 1963, p. 165).

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2. Some (unidentified) others say that both Brahman and illusion are materialcause. But they say that being material cause simply means having effectsthat are non-different from that cause. With respect to the worlds exis-tence, it is non-different from Brahman with regard to existence, and non-different from illusion with regard to insentience.

3. According to the author of the Sam: ks:epasarraka (Sarvajnatman), Brahman isthe material cause. However, because it is unchanging, it cannot be a cause byitself. Therefore illusion (maya) is a subordinate cause (dvarakaran: a).

4. According to Vacaspati Misra, Brahman alone is the material cause, and isapparently manifested into the form of the world because it is made anobject by the illusion (maya) situated in the soul (jva). Illusion is merely anassistant (sahakarin), not a subordinate cause (dvarakaran: a).

5. According to the author of the Siddhantamuktaval (Prakasananda), thepower of illusion (mayasakti) is the material cause, not Brahman. Brahmancan only be described as material cause in a secondary sense, due to itsbeing the locus of illusion.68

This last suggestion is the view of Prakasananda, a late 16th-century Vedantinwho authored the Vedantasiddhantamuktaval (Pearl-String of VedantaDoctrines).69 He may or may not be the same person as the scholar of Advaitanamed Srpada Prakasananda Sarasvat who is immortalized in a section ofCaitanyas biography. There, Caitanya takes on a sannyasin who is a leader of theAdvaitin community in Varanasi, and shows him the error of his ways forrejecting bhakti. Although the actual encounter is likely a later fabrication(Caitanya died in 1533, while Prakasananda probably lived in the second half ofthe century), it may offer evidence that Prakasananda was based in Varanasi, andthat he was well-known both among Advaitins and non-Advaitins.

Since Prakasananda was quite influential in late medieval northern Indiaand had numerous disciples, it is quite likely that Vijnanabhiks:u was aware ofhis views. So it is not surprising that Prakasanandas view that Brahman is thelocus of the material cause, and not directly the cause of the world, shows realsimilarities with Vijnanabhiks:us concept of locus cause (adhis: t:hanakaran: a).Prakasananda regards maya as the direct material cause of world creation. Heutilizes the same term for locus (adhis: t:hana) as Vijnanabhiks:u uses to refer toBrahman. However, he takes a slightly different tack than Vijnanabhiks:u.Vijnanabhiks:u habitually avoids appealing to figurative or metaphoricalmeanings of words unless there is absolutely no other way to make inter-pretive sense of the passage in question. We saw this previously in his rejec-tion of the Advaitins figurative interpretations of Upanis:adic passagesexpressing non-difference, and also in his rejection of Sa _nkaras figurative

68 This is summarized from Appaya Dks: ita (1989, pp. 7279).69 See Arthur Veniss discussion of Prakasanandas dates in Prakasananda (1975, pp. viixii).


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interpretation of the word part in Br. Su. 2.3.43. Unlike Prakasananda,Vijnanabhiks:u argues that the true definition of material cause, that which isa substratum, non-separate from its effect, is broad enough to include alocus. Hence there is no need to appeal to figurative usage, and referring to alocus cause itself presents no contradictions. Prakasananda, however, freelyadmits to using figurative interpretation. He believes that strictly speaking,Brahman is not a cause at all. But we can make sense of Badarayan: as clearstatement in BS 1.1.2 that Brahman is cause of the world by understandingthat a locus can be understood as a material cause (upadana) in a figurativesense. Prakasananda sees this as the best way to reconcile scriptural passagesthat seem to disagree about the worlds causality:

It is not true that there is a contradiction between the two sets ofscriptural passages, one that declares ignorance to be the cause of theworld and the other that declares Brahman to be cause of the world:

38. Due to ignorance, Brahman is said to be the cause of the world,since Brahman has nothing to do with causality. Brahman is only de-clared to be cause because it is the locus.

Ignorance, which is indescribable and beginningless, is cause of theworld, which is indescribable and established

Reconciling Dualism and Non-Dualism - Three Arguments in Vijñānabhikṣu’s Bhedābheda Vedānta

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