RE-INTERPRETING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY · foreign policy. For many years, really, Turkish foreign policy was, in many ways, subsumed under the national security policy, foreign policy

RE-INTERPRETING TURKISH FOREIGN

POLICY

JANUARY 20, 2011

6:00 P.M.

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

WELCOME/MODERATOR:

Thomas Carothers

Vice President for Studies

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SPEAKERS:

Ambassador Selim Kuneralp

Permanent Representative to the EU

Mission of Turkey to the EU

Ria Oomen-Ruijten

MEP and European Parliament Rapporteur

European Parliament

Transcript by Way With Words

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery

THOMAS CAROTHERS: Good evening, I’m Thomas Carothers. I’m Vice-President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. It’s my pleasure to be the moderator for the event this evening. The subject of Turkey’s foreign policy’s importance and level of interest here in Brussels is reflected by the strong response we had to this invitation and the good group we have here this evening. Obviously, Turkey’s foreign policy connects with a whole range of issues of first order of importance to Europe and to the international order generally, not just the Middle East and Iran and the Caucasus and Europe itself, but a whole wider range of issues. For many years in Europe, there were meetings about whether and how Turkey might join the European Union and now we’re in a different phase where we’re talking about Turkey’s global role. Conversations about Turkey are at the same time double conversations, because they’re also conversations about the role of emerging powers in the world. When we talk about Turkey’s foreign policy, we’re talking about something deeper, which is: how are emerging powers defining their interest, how are they taking up the challenge of deeper international norms, how are Europe and the United States and others adjusting to this change of power balance in the world? A conversation about Turkey is also a conversation about something much deeper that’s going on in the world as well. I think we’re fortunate tonight to have speakers and commentators who understand this subject at all of those levels. I’m going to introduce our speakers; one of our commentators had warned us that she would be a bit late, but she’ll be here. We’re going to hear first from Sinan Ülgen, who, I’m happy to say, is a visiting scholar here at Carnegie Europe; he’s a distinguished writer, thinker and commentator on Turkish affairs. He spends some of his time here and he also, of course, spends some of his time in Istanbul where he’s Chairman of the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies and active with writing in a number of Turkish publications and other activities there as well. We’re marking the publication of his first paper for us here at Carnegie, which is called A Place in the Sun or 15 Minutes of Fame?, about Turkey’s foreign policy. Then I’m very pleased that we welcome Ambassador Selim Kuneralp, who’s Turkey’s Permanent Representative to the European Union. He brings to that position a wealth of diplomatic experience and a rich series of positions over the years, ranging quite widely, from being ambassador to South Korea, to Sweden, to significant posts in multilateral affairs with international organisations and in the Turkish Foreign Ministry itself. We’ve asked him tonight, diplomatic though he is in experience, to take off his diplomatic suit and to be as challenging as possible to Sinan. He’s going to be, I’m sure, diplomatic, but I think challenging as well, and so we’re looking forward to that. I’ll wait until our final commentator joins us before I introduce her as well. Before we get underway, I just wanted to say tonight we’re really pleased tonight to have Fabrice Pothier in the audience, who is the first Director of Carnegie Europe and was fundamental, as you know, to getting Carnegie Europe underway, but also to getting Sinan on board and getting Carnegie’s work in Turkey underway. It’s a real pleasure, Fabrice, to have you back. As you know, he’s now Policy Director in NATO and has left us for those greener pastures.


I’m also pleased to say that we have with us the new Director of Carnegie Europe, who’ll be joining us in March, after a search process that we took care of late this autumn; it’s Jan Techau, who’s currently at NATO Defence College in Rome. Jan, welcome - his first event at Carnegie Europe as a guest, but soon as the director here. You’ll have a chance afterwards – he’ll be around if you’d like to say hello. Without further ado, Sinan, the floor is yours. SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you so much, Tom. It’s a real pleasure to be here to speak on the evolution of Turkish foreign policy and before such an audience, because this is essentially the first time that Carnegie Europe has put out a paper, and some of you may already have a copy – it says Carnegie Europe Paper Number One - so I’m really happy that we could set the stage in such a manner, with all your contributions. Now, when I started to draft this paper, I was asked to look not so much at what was happening, but really to lift the curtain and to look at the mechanics of what was happening. Indeed, when you read the international press, when you look at all the foreign policy-linked events, it’s not too difficult to see that something’s changed, that there is a deep fundamental transformation of Turkish foreign policy. My objective here today is to take you a little bit behind the curtains and to share with you what I think are the main dynamics and the main drivers behind that change. In this paper, I’ve essentially set out three drivers, which I have summarised as, one, the reconceptualization of Turkish identity and Turkish foreign policy; the second one is the desecuritisation of Turkish foreign policy; and the third one is the transformation of the whole economic framework in Turkey. I will take a little bit of time just to explain what those concepts mean; and then in the second part of my speech I will look at what does this mean for Europe essentially, what are the implications of this transformation for Europe and for the West; and, finally, a few words on the sustainability of this transformation - whereby the title of the paper A Place in the Sun or 15 Minutes of Fame? - how sustainable is this whole transformation? Now, going back to the three drivers – the reconceptualization - what is happening in Turkey, especially after 2002, when a new political party came to power, and they’ve been in power for the past eight years, is that there is a new vision, a new, in a way, definition of Turkish identity. Previously, the Western identity of Turkey was elevated above all the other identities, but now what we see, and we can already see the first signs of this in Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s book, which is called Strategic Depth… He basically tells us in that book, the way he defines the country, is a country that has a multitude of identities. Yes, obviously, Turkey has a Western identity, but it’s not only about the Western identity; it’s also about the country’s Islamic identity, it’s also about the country’s Middle Eastern identity, its Asian identity, its Balkan identity. Some analysts have actually encapsulated this by using the term The Ottoman Identity of the country. Davutoğlu’s thesis is that Turkey is a country that has a multitude of identities and there is no reason why one of those identities should be elevated beyond the others and, as a result, the foreign policy of the country should be in tune with this multitude of identities. That means, in practice, that Turkey should have good relations with all its neighbours and not particularly favour the Western link. Now, that is a fundamental change in how Turkey looks at itself and looked at its place globally but also regionally. That doesn’t mean that Turkey’s breaking with the West, and therefore I certainly don’t


concur with the analysis that Turkey’s shifting away from the West as a policy. What is happening is that there is a rebalancing of all these issues, and therefore the almost sacrosanct place that the West had in the formulation of Turkish identity and the Turkish foreign policy has changed. The West has lost its eminence in the formulation of identity and foreign policy. The second thing that’s been happening is, again, this vision that has best been articulated by the Foreign Minister, is the transformation of Turkey into a central power. Here the vision is that whereas before Turkey was seen by many as a frontier state, as almost a peripheral country, at the periphery of Europe, now all the geopolitical shifts have transformed this field and Turkey now is a central power. Therefore it has to follow policies that are in compliance with this vision. Turkey is a pivotal state. The combination of these two is what is shaping the transformation of Turkish foreign policy: the desire to refashion a national identity, but also the desire to transform Turkey into a very clear and very important player in the region, as a pivotal country. What that means for Turkey’s relation with the West is that even though the relationship remains important, it also means that in cases where Turkey starts to determine and define its national interest, and where it sees that its national interest may on occasion be incompatible with that of the West, then it will be ready to stand up to its national interests. The belief today in Ankara is that Turkey can now afford to remain at odds with the Western consensus if it believes that its national interest warrants that. That, again, is a quite different picture from five or ten years ago where the definition of national interest was already taking place, but with the vision and with the objective of remaining in compliance with whatever the Western consensus is. That’s how Turkey used to define its Western interests: if it’s good for the West, it’s also good for us. Now there’s a very different definition of national interest, more pragmatic, less identity-oriented, but it also means that – and we have seen them on many occasions, in particular with regard to Iran – there’s a belief that if Turkey’s national interest warrants that, then the relationship with the West is not paramount, that Turkey can remains at odds with the Western consensus. The second element that’s driving this transformation is what I’ve called the desecuritisation of Turkish foreign policy. For many years, really, Turkish foreign policy was, in many ways, subsumed under the national security policy, foreign policy was subservient to national security policy. Foreign policy was a tool for national security policy. Therefore, many of the foreign policy actions that we have seen were essentially steered and directed towards that goal: achieving the country’s territorial integrity, enhancing its national security. Over the past decade, of course, with the end of the Cold War, all the geopolitical shifts that have happened in the region, but also as a matter of policy, there has been a re-evaluation of this fundamental concept that foreign policy should not serve only to improve national security. There are other objectives that today are, if not more important, almost as important as this national security objective. This transformation has been underpinned by the third element that I shall talk about, the economic transformation of the country. The economic transformation of the country, where in the past ten years, if we forget the year of 2009, which was a crisis year, but not of Turkey’s doing – it was an imported crisis – where the average growth rates over the past ten years is about 7%. That means that per capita income tripled in the past decade; that means that the country has been a much more attractive spot for international investment.


In 2007, just before the crisis, Turkey was able to get about $20 billion of FDI a year, which put it in number three position among all emerging countries, just after China and Brazil, at that time. The trade volume reached about $350 billion. What this all means is that there has been in the past decade the emergence of a new political constituency which has pushed the government towards a heavier reliance on foreign policy to achieve economic goals, to achieve economic goals in the sense of opening new markets, opening new channels of investment, in particular in a region with whom for the past years Turkey’s relationship has been quite superficial, viz. the Middle East. We have seen this rapprochement, the political rapprochement of Turkey with the Middle East, driven by two different factors; one, the vision that I’ve tried to refer to as the desecuritisation of foreign policy, so establishing good relations with a number of those countries. We’re seeing this very deep transformation when we look at Turkey’s relation with Syria, Turkey’s relation with Iraq, and so on, so this involvement with the Middle East. Also, it has an economic rationale. When we look at the figures - for instance, back in 2004 Turkey’s exports to its southern neighbours was about 12% of the total exports; today, in 2010 – although we’re in 2011 – that figure reached up to 20% of total exports. You see the same in terms of investment, both outgoing and incoming investment; so there’s also an economic rationale behind Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East. Having said this, the question that I ask in this paper, in particular now that we have friends from NATO joining us, is the question of whether this trend of desecuritisation has been taken too far, whether what we have seen transpire in the days leading to the NATO summit, where Turkey argued- and it was the only one to argue among the members of NATO - that we cannot name countries like Syria and Iran as threats to the alliance, is an indication that this vision of desecuritising foreign policy has been taken a bit too far. When we look at the threat perceptions in Turkey about those countries, I think this is a legitimate question to ask. It’s also a legitimate question to ask, because if this is actually going to be the trend, then the former security alliance and the strength of the security alliance that we have seen among NATO members may be put at risk because of deferring threat perceptions. Now, is this transformation which has been actually very popular domestically…? It has been very popular domestically because the Turkish people like to hear about success, obviously. When they see their Prime Minister going to Lebanon and being treated as a rock star – well, that’s much better than the Prime Minister coming to Brussels and hearing about recriminations, about the lack of democratic progress, or the non-willingness to solve a number of political problems. It’s a very popular choice politically. The question is… Of course, here another element is the popularity of this alternative narrative of Turkish foreign policy has also a lot to do with the frustrations over Europe. The country that started negotiations in 2005, five years after that, we have come to a stage where very few people in Turkey believe that these negotiations will lead to a positive outcome. Many Turks believe that, basically, no matter what we do Europe will always find an excuse to say no to Turkey. With this widespread popular feeling, it is very difficult to argue and to champion an alternative political narrative for Turkish foreign policy. What should be that alternative political narrative? Well,


one that still puts the West as the preeminent element of Turkish foreign policy. That has become a very difficult sell today in Turkey. It has become a very difficult sell because of the frustrations over Europe, the belief that Turkey’s being discriminated against and is not being treated fairly, combined with the loss of US legitimacy and the rise in anti-Americanism, especially after the Iraq war. The Turkish people are, basically, asked to decide about a course of action that the government pursues today, which on the surface looks very nice. You see all these press analyses about the role that Turkey has to play in Lebanon, in the Middle East overall, versus an alternative vision which still wants to keep that almost exclusive, sacrosanct relationship with the West. The outcome of this is also influenced by the fact that the cost of the current policy framework, of the policy choices, is not apparent. Now, you may say that is true in general for any foreign policy, that the choices that you make today, the cost benefit analysis of those choices are difficult and they require a long-term vision. That is also true for the Turkish case. The choices that are made by the Turkish government in this foreign policy vision and framework seemingly come cost-free. The foreign policy paradigm is, in fact, changing; it is changing rapidly. It is leading to an actor which sees itself as having the right to be much more assertive, underpinned by economic growth, which really creates an aura of confidence. The belief is that, yes, actually, we can do it. If necessary, we can do it alone; we don’t need the US, we don’t need the EU. We have the capacity, we have the ability, and actually, look what we’re doing. This is the type of background feeling that now emanates from policy circles in Ankara. Two weeks ago, along with Ambassador Kuneralp, I was at a yearly meeting organised by the Foreign Ministry, where they convened all the Turkish ambassadors. We heard the Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and his foreign policy statements and vision, which exactly said this: it is this ambition that permeated the talk of the foreign ministers, so now Turkey sees itself essentially as a regional power, if not to say a medium-sized power. What that means for Turkey’s relationship with the West, I believe, are twofold; one, the power relationship that used to hold between, on the one hand, Turkey and the US, and on the other, between Turkey and the EU, is changing. Turkey sees itself now as an equal partner in many ways, at least as far as regional issues are concerned, with both Brussels and Washington. With Brussels, this is changing because of a lack of progress in the negotiations. The negotiations had painted a framework where Turkey as a candidate country should comply with the rules of the EU. Now that that process has by and large stalled, that the EU has lost its leverage over Turkey, Turkey is responding by saying, if the negotiation process has stalled, then we have to create a new framework where we treat each other like equal partners; you cannot treat us solely as a candidate country. The thinking has not reached a level where Turks and the Turkish government will say, okay, we’ve come to the end of this process of negotiations and we don’t want to continue with this process that has proven to be so frustrating. What Turks and the Turkish government are saying is that, yes, this process, we’re still interested in, but don’t look at Turkey solely as a country within the framework of negotiations, we are more than that; we can do more than that, and we shall do more than that. That’s the first change.


With regard to the US as well, there is a shift in the relationship. The people in Ankara believe that as things stand, the US needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the US. That is so because of Iraq; that is so because of, to some extent, Afghanistan, what Turkey provides there; but also because of what Turkey seemingly is on track of accomplishing as a regional power in the Middle East. I refer you to an article that appeared just two days ago in the New York Times which, basically, depicts Turkey’s activity in Lebanon, where US has lost almost all the influence on what’s happening there, and the power that steps in is Turkey. This, in essence, just to tell you a few anecdotes about why this mentality is changing and what will be its implications on Turkey’s relations with the West, so you will see a Turkey that is going to be more assertive, less flexible on some of the core issues that pits Turkey to Europe, for instance, that can be Cyprus, that can be the NATO-EU relationship. That is the future evolution of the relationship. Now, how sustainable is that? In many ways, it is sustainable, because this is underpinned by a growing confidence about the future of the country, and that, of course, relates to the economic performance of the country. As long as the economics will evolve in the right direction, as long as we shall continue to see these rates of growth, as long as Turkey will enrich its institutional capacity… and by the way, for instance, Turkey has become a significant player as a donor country; last year Turkey’s international aid performance was about $1.5 billion, $500 million going to Afghanistan. The difficulty of championing an alternative narrative in an environment where it’s very difficult to also show the cost element of the policy choices… now, these policy choices have a cost, they have a cost with regard to the relations to Israel, for instance; they have a cost with regard to the relations with the US. Tom is better placed than I am to perhaps say a few things about how the views in Congress have evolved about Turkey and the US. The US is still a very important partner of Turkey. There are costs associated with current policy choices, but it’s difficult to translate those costs in practice and to basically show that these different paradigms for the future evolution of foreign policy in Turkey is actually a much more complex picture. Finally, what I’ve tried to set out in this paper is basically a deal between Turkey and the West. That deal is, with all these dynamics that I’ve tried to outline here, this transformation has become a structural phenomenon, it will continue. We will continue to see an assertive Turkey in this region, an assertive Turkey that has a certain soft power in addition to its hard power. Turkey will continue to ask for a wider space to implement its foreign policy, to project its power. Whether that means Turkey’s shifting away from the West – no, but what I claim is that this transition - which is not only actually a challenge between Turkey and the West, but as Tom rightly mentioned in his introductory speech, it can actually provide the blueprint on how the global powers can start to deal with these emerging middle powers - is for the West to push Turkey to adopt a more normative stance in its foreign policy. Here, the way that I define normative is by essentially referring to three different interpretations, from the less to the more ambitious. The first interpretation is a state that uses its power to project stability across its borders. Now, this is already a role that Turkey plays successfully; Turkey does it in the Middle East, does it in Afghanistan, it is involved in many of the state-building operations in its region, and so. The second level is where a middle-sized power like Turkey, or regional power like Turkey, has so far had better influence, whereas it has the ability, and that is to become a constructive actor, a responsible actor, sharing the burden and the responsibility of providing solutions to global challenges and not only


regional challenges, so talk about climate change, financial stability, nuclear proliferation, anti-smuggling – many of these global issues, where, when you look at the official talking-points… Turks every time like to remind the international community that they are now proud members of the G20, and we have the former Turkish G20 sherpa, by the way, sitting next to me. What has Turkey actually contributed to the debate on the G20, let alone the debate on climate change, is a very legitimate question. That is essentially the deal that I have proposed in this paper, that, yes, these power aspirations of Turkey can and should be accommodated by the international system. Also, the West and international system should push Turkey to scale up its ambitions in being a more responsible normative power, by becoming a constructive player on the debate regarding global public goods. Third layer of this normative power is the agenda of democracy promotion. Could Turkey become a responsible player on this debate? There, my answer is, for the time being, no. There is no interest in Ankara whatsoever in becoming a much more active player on the democracy promotion agenda, as we have seen in very recent history, when the Turkish government was the first to congratulate Ahmadinejad last year after the elections. They have been very reticent to criticise the regime in Sudan about the human rights, if not to say all the genocide that’s been taking place in this country. The approach has been very much more pragmatic. On that third layer of democracy promotion, I don’t see any time soon any real progress, to the extent that, also, one of the premises of Turkish foreign policy has been non-interference in foreign affairs. On the second level, on the global public goods debate, I think there’s a lot of ground that can be covered. This, to me, is one of those places where we should have more of this debate about how to push Turkey, how to engage Turkey. This can actually provide us a blueprint in this emerging world of multi-polarity, of how to deal with these types of middle emerging powers. Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thanks very much, Sinan. Without further ado, let’s turn directly to Ambassador Kuneralp, and then I’ll introduce our second commentator, once he’s had a chance. AMBASSADOR SELIM KUNERALP: Thank you very much, and I’m very happy to have the opportunity to speak this evening. I’d like to thank Carnegie Europe for having invited me. It’s also a pleasure to be sitting at the same table with Sinan Ülgen. The first time I met Sinan was at his parents’ place - he must have been about seven years old - and when he saw me he hid under the table. Since then, as you can see, our relationship has evolved and I am very glad to be here today. I’m also very happy to see Ria Oomen-Ruijten here this evening. I have not known her for as long as I have known Sinan, but since taking up my present duties in Brussels last year, I have appreciated her commitment to her task as rapporteur of the European Parliament on Turkey. Of course, while we do not always see eye to eye on everything, I’m very grateful for the very open-minded way in which she carries out her duties. Now, it’s with great interest that I have read Sinan’s paper and accepted the invitation to comment on it this evening. What I can say at the outset is that there are many things that I agree with in the paper, but also some that I don’t agree with, and that also goes, I think, for his introductory remarks.


However, I should also add that even though I do not agree with everything that he has said, in writing and orally, I still think that his analysis is well worth reading by anyone who is interested in the course that Turkish foreign policy has been taking in the last few years. These days you encounter quite a few observers of Turkish foreign policy who say that it is changing direction, moving away from the West and becoming more focused on its immediate neighbourhood. Sinan, also, in his paper and his remarks has spoken of a reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy. My thesis would be that it is not so much Turkey’s foreign policy that is changing, but that the world around us, and particularly our region, is changing. For a long period, until about 20 years ago, Europe was stuck in the Cold War, with rigid alliances that reduced everybody’s freedom of manoeuvre. The Middle East was not involved in the game of alliances, except for the brief period of the Baghdad Pact, which nobody remembers, but that linked Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in a military alliance to the UK and the USA. Other than that enterprise that failed fairly quickly, for much of the post-World War Two period, the countries of the Middle East were aligned with one bloc or another, despite their claim of non-alignment. As a result, except for the Arab-Israeli dispute and the ensuing armed conflicts, relative stability prevailed in the region. As a country firmly anchored with the West, Turkey could take a relatively aloof position with respect to the few potential sources of dispute in its neighbourhood. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey did not feel any particular obligation or pressure to intervene or to take sides. All this changed with the end of the Cold War. A completely new situation has arisen not just in the Middle East but also in the other regions surrounding Turkey, particularly the Caucasus and the Balkans. All sorts of ethnic conflicts have broken out and divisions that had been papered over for decades became much more visible. Turkey could no longer remain indifferent to its surroundings. Stability in the region had always been a primary objective of foreign policy. In addition, the remarkable evolution of the Turkish economy that Sinan rightly has pointed out too made this objective of stability even more crucial. Having become much more open to the outside world, the Turkish economy needed to develop markets, particularly in its neighbourhood. Growing trade links require stability; Turkey has therefore felt the need to play a role in helping to ensure stability in its region, perhaps also as a matter of self-interest, if I may put it crudely there. As a result, Turkey has tried to play a role in helping to resolve conflicts and preserve peace in its neighbourhood. We have played a constructive role in the Balkans, where we still work together with the European Union in several countries. We have tried to develop dialogue between Syria and Israel, with some success at first. The situation in Iraq, whose internal stability remains of paramount importance to Turkey, has required active involvement and dialogue with all the disparate forces present in that country. Turkey has also attempted, as we all know, to play a role in helping to solve the issue arising out of the Iranian nuclear programme. In all of these efforts, Turkey’s objectives have coincided with those of its partners in the international community and, more particularly, in the West. If we look at the Iranian problem, we have always made it clear that we are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our region. In that sense, we have adopted a more logical and perhaps internally consistent position than some of our partners and allies who have tacitly accepted that some countries in the region be allowed to develop such weapons.


The difference in approach with some of our partners has been in relation to tactics rather than strategy. We have favoured the use of dialogue and engagement rather than confrontation and sanctions, simply because sanctions very rarely, if ever, manage to make the targeted countries change their positions. On the other hand, the sanctions have all sorts of unintended but nevertheless harmful effects on innocent bystanders, such as Turkey, as we have seen on several occasions in the past. The fact that the parties to the Iranian problem have chosen to meet in Istanbul for the very first substantive discussion in more than a year vindicates the positions that we have taken. If we have voted against sanctions at the Security Council last year, it is therefore not because we supported the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons programme, but simply because we wanted to give diplomacy a chance. In fact, as a responsible member of the international community, Turkey has implemented those sanctions. I therefore do not agree with Sinan that Turkey’s Iran diplomacy has opened a rift between Ankara and its Western partners. It is true that our Security Council vote took some by surprise, but we have been able to explain our reasons to the satisfaction of our partners. Another point on which I do not agree with him is his assessment that a dream of EU membership has dissolved so thoroughly that it no longer anchors Turkish foreign and domestic policy. It is, of course, true that Turkey’s relationship with the European Union is going through a very difficult period. As Sinan has said, more than five years after the negotiations started, only 13 chapters had been opened and only one has been provisionally closed. Some 18 chapters are blocked for political reasons that are directly relevant to the individual chapters concerned. As a result, there is a growing feeling of frustration and despondency in Turkey; and as Sinan rightly points out, public support in Turkey for membership is shrinking rapidly. However, one should not jump to conclusions. The government has certainly not given up the goal of membership and indeed Sinan does not claim that it has. Work continues to be done, though far from the limelight, on aligning Turkish legislation and practice with those of the European Union. EU standards play an increasing role in everyday life in all sorts of areas, ranging from advertising for medical services, to food security, just to mention two. What is more, past experience has shown that situations such as the one that we find ourselves in can be reversed very quickly. Unfortunately, there is clearly a difference of opinion within the European Union as to the finality of Turkey’s relationship with Europe, and in particular, whether it should lead to accession. This is, of course, very disappointing, because accession has been the eventual objective of Turkey’s relationship with the EU ever since this relationship was first established with our association agreement of 1963. Commitments to that effect have repeatedly been made in the intervening period, most recently when the decision to start accession negotiations was taken by the EU in 2004. It is therefore sad to see these commitments set aside by some member states with a dismissive gesture, if I may put it this way. However, when Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently, as Sinan puts it in his paper, called on the EU to clearly determine its stance on Turkey, there was no authorised or unanimous response from the EU. Instead, you had the foreign ministers of four EU countries – Sweden, UK, Finland and Italy – who published an article in the International Herald Tribune supporting Turkey’s accession in heart-warming terms, while other countries have continued to express scepticism at all levels. This shows that on this subject, too, and there are many others, there is no definitive position in the EU from which to draw conclusions. Consequently, I do not think that the final word has been said about this subject, and it is certainly too soon to draw the type of conclusion that Sinan does.


In any, case, and as I’ve tried to explain, there is still a very important convergence of interest and objectives between Turkey and the EU in relation to the problems that beset our region. In many ways, indeed, our approaches to the Middle East problem, for instance, to the invasion of Iraq and its sequels, and other such issues, are closer to those of the European Union than to those of the US. I will stop here so that there can be a more interactive discussion and so that we can listen to Ria Oomen. Once again, I would urge you all to read the paper very carefully. Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you very much for the comments. We’ll turn now to Ria Oomen-Ruijten, who is a member of the European Parliament and the European Parliament rapporteur on Turkey, and a member on the Committee of Foreign Affairs. She just returned from Strasbourg, made it just in time. We’re delighted to have you here. We look forward to your comments. RIA OOMEN-RUIJTEN: Once again, I have to apologise. I managed to drive from Strasbourg to Brussels in almost four hours - I have been driving too fast – but Brussels took me at least one hour; so that’s the reason that I’m late. Let me thank you for your invitation. The topic is also high on the agenda in the European Parliament, and if you have had a look at the amendments, you see that also on foreign policy I will have to take decisions on some of the amendments. What I also want to do is to congratulate Mr Sinan Ülgen for your absolutely very interesting paper, not only because of the fact that it gives you a deep analysis of the Turkish foreign policy, but it also shows that you are really experienced, because you were in diplomacy in Turkey. Therefore, the paper is so interesting. I think that I would like to share here some observations with you. Let me start, because that’s one of the discussion points we also had at the Parliament: with the new foreign policy, has the West now lost Turkey? I totally agree with Sinan when he said, nobody has lost Turkey, and I also personally do not believe that a resurrection of the Ottoman Empire or even a post-Ottoman commonwealth is about to take place – I don’t believe that. Despite the increase of trade with the bordering states, we must know that the Turkish economy remains firmly linked to the European Union; 80% of the foreign direct investment comes from European countries. If I look at the foreign trades in 2009, then I see that foreign trade with Europe is more or less 102 billion, the foreign trade in total 102 billion, with Europe is almost 50 billion – almost half – and then with the rest of the region it’s only 10%. That means that, in my view, the link to Europe always will stay. Then, observers in Europe also tend to forget that the new Turkish foreign policy – and also you say that – also labels itself as a soft power, a soft power with an emphasis on trade and also people-to-people contacts. This shift from what was before – security, military foreign policy objectives – goes now to civilian and soft policies in itself. I see it as a positive development. Third remark: at the same time that Prime Minister Erdoğan and also the Minister of Foreign Affairs give mixed signals which caused – you see that also in my reports – concern in Europe and the United States, I think that it’s perhaps a matter of style; a matter of style, but that doesn’t mean that the concerns shouldn’t be addressed. We have our contacts to Turkish politicians and also diplomats.


If I look, then I see three challenges for the new orientation of Turkish foreign policy. First of all, and in all my visits which I have to Turkey and when Turkish businessmen and politicians come here, I see that they are really proud about economic development, and they can be proud. At the same time, I think that they should also be careful not to overestimate themselves, like Armenia, Azerbaijan; Turkey Triangle is an example of the limits of a zero problems policy with your neighbours. Second, there is the danger of a very independent approach, that a country is never, ever absolutely independent. It’s not independent, nor domestic nor external influences, in the policy-making they do. Turkey shouldn’t think that it can solve all the problems in the region or in the world on its own. The Iran example, or the policy towards Israel, is the proof of the need for close coordination with partners and also allies to address the problems, to address the concerns. The third challenge: if Turkey really wants to be, and that is what they say, a central power, it has to look to both East and West. If Turkey doesn’t have any more a bridge or a pillar of the bridge in Europe, then Turkey is not a central power any more. Then, to other observations, as you mentioned also in your speech now and also the Ambassador did so: the foreign policy and its impact on the accession negotiations. I do, and I always have, support an active foreign policy of Turkey, and also an increasing role of Turkey in the region, as a regional player, but Turkey and the EU should step up their foreign policy coordination. That is also reflected in the Council conclusions of December, and you saw it also in the visit of Catherine Ashton last week. I think that close coordination in addressing the challenges is absolutely necessary, and Turkey can fulfil a role in Lebanon, but also there Turkey needs the European Union to fulfil this role, because there are also European influences still in that country. Then, the external action service is, in my view, an excellent instrument to shape the strategic dialogue which has to take place on foreign policy issues between EU and also Turkey. At the same time, it also should be clear that closer cooperation in foreign policy is no alternative or substitute for accession negotiations and it also will never, ever resolve the concerns which some member states have towards Turkish accession in the EU. The enlargement process has its own logic, and the logic, the Turkish logic, is not always fulfilled in the way they are treating chapters. I see Diego, and he knows better than I do how the accession process also is stuck at the side of Turkey; we have to realise that. If you look at the accession process, accession is more than negotiating chapters. The most important is that the conditions of the club are fulfilled, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria, and there are many things, but I come on it, many things are to do in their own country. Then, there is an observation, zero problems with the neighbours: the ambition of the new Turkish foreign policy, and there I do agree, is that reality of zero problems with the neighbours doesn’t catch up with the ambition. Zero problems is a very good concept, and I like it and I have also it as a separate spot in my report, but if I look to the relations with Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, then if I can tell it very straight-up [Inaudible], many challenges remain for Turkish foreign policy. I think that, also, they are now involved in the Lebanon crisis, that, also, in the Lebanon crisis, if Lebanon is not solved, it will destabilise the region. Also, there, there is a big role to play.


I also should mention that there are positive developments in relations with Greece, but difficulties, for instance, with the readmission agreement, show that there are still fundamental issues to be solved. Also, what we all applauded – the signing of the protocols with Armenia – that was an extremely positive development, but nothing has happened since. If Turkey is serious about its role in the wider Caucasus, in the region, then all these kinds of things should be an absolute priority. In that sense, and also for the accession negotiations, the whole of Cyprus is crucial not only for relations with accession in the EU, but a successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations. Also, a comprehensive settlement of Cyprus issue would really help Turkey to be a real, important player. Then, my last observation, and that is – and that worries me, really – peace at home, peace in the world; that was a quote of Atatürk. One issue, and I think that it should have been perhaps a bit more addressed in your paper, is my view of [the domestic and social-economical development and the impact on the foreign policy. I think that we could write even more about it. There are a number of domestic issues which need to be solved, but everybody knows in the confrontational political climate, for instance, that there is a general polarisation in society, there is still the issue of the minorities, still the role of women, the development of the southeast – all those issues have to be solved when you want to be effective in foreign policy. Then there is the reform process and the democratic opening fundamental in the re-organisation [Inaudible] and democratisation of the country; it’s stuck. Turkish economy is booming now, but during the global crisis the decline of Turkish GDP was nearly 14%, and that was the deepest in the OCD [Inaudible]. Afterwards they recovered, better than anyone else, but it was deeper, so we should rethink that. That’s one of the reasons that I would like to emphasise that it’s nice to be in emerging markets with 10% - we are jealous about it, 10% growth a year - but as you know, I’m also a Christian Democrat and I think that a social-oriented market economy based on social inclusion and on a genuine social dialogue is absolutely more important in the long-run. Thank you very much. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you. Those are two very interesting perspectives. We’ve been talking quite a bit, so I want to go right to the audience. Sinan, you’ll have a chance to come back, because there may be issues raised, but I’d like to hear your points of view. You can just make a comment or you can state a question, and I’ll collect a few of those before I turn back to the panel. Sir – and if you could just introduce yourself, it would be good [Inaudible]. Yes? ALEXANDROS YANNIS: Thank you, the Carnegie for the [inaudible]; thank you, Carnegie for the event; and thank you also for the very good [Inaudible] paper. There’s a lot of ink being spent… THOMAS CAROTHERS: If you could just introduce yourself to the group…? ALEXANDROS YANNIS: Alexandros Yannis; I work for the European Union. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you. ALEXANDROS YANNIS: There’s a lot of ink being spent on Turkey lately and the ink used in your paper, I think, is one of the best uses of the ink used on Turkey lately.


There are two main comments I want to make and questions to pursue this debate; the first one is that you ask, I think, the most pertinent question right now, which is: is all this sustainable? There’s no doubt that Turkey has become the major player in international politics in its region and perhaps beyond. The question is whether it is sustainable. The answer you give, I think, is sound. For as long the geopolitical environment remains the same, an environment which provides the opportunity to many actors around the world to pursue an independent foreign policy, Turkey will be one of the countries best placed in a way to pursue such an independent and more assertive foreign policy. Actually, I was thinking today that Qatar is becoming a major international actor; it’s mediating Lebanon as well as Darfur, and is active in other projects as well. This is, I think, a telling another example of the new geopolitical environment. Then, of course, you have two other factors which are critical for the sustainability of the foreign policy of Turkey, of its more assertive foreign policy; the one is the economy - again, nobody knows, but certainly there is no indication that things will not continue the way they are at this moment; then, the internal political stability and institutional development, where the picture’s a bit more blurred, as far as institutional development is concerned. Certainly, in terms of the political stability, at the moment nobody doubts that that remains reasonably robust. If all these remain as they are, Turkish foreign policy, indeed, has all the elements to remain assertive. Then you ask a question at the end, your good [Inaudible] remark, which is the second, let’s say, point you put on the table, which I think is very relevant; beyond being sustainable, the question is: in what direction does it go? The question I think many people are asking today, beyond the question of sustainability, is assertiveness in itself is not a policy, assertiveness is a style, is a way of being an actor in international politics. The question is: what is the direction of this assertiveness, what kind of role is Turkey playing or planning to play? There, you raise this issue about the normative role of Turkish foreign policy and you posed an additional ambitious challenge to the West, which is: how can the West – Europe or other actors, because the word West perhaps is a bit outdated – help Turkey to help itself in a way to become this kind of fully-fledged, responsible actor in international politics? The question I’m really wondering, because I think this is the issue that’s going to take the debate an extra year, is how is Turkey going to play this normative role, in what direction? Can you give me examples in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in Africa, where Turkey’s becoming very active beyond its borders, where the issue of zero problems has been already challenged or is being discussed as not having produced so much yet even though it’s very legitimate still as a policy? Where can you see the direction of foreign policy? Ultimately, this is the question that Europeans are asking; it’s not whether Turkish foreign policy is assertive or will remain assertive, but in what direction is it going to go? Is it going to be a partner to Europe or not? In that sense, not only to Europe in terms of interest, but in terms of our values, in terms of our ambition to have a more orderly world, a more stable world. What can be the role of Turkey in this direction? Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you very much. We’ll come back to that. How about over on this side, a question or a comment? Yes, sir. CHRIS MORRIS: Thank you. Good evening, I’m Chris Morris from BBC News. I’ve recently arrived back in Brussels, and ten years ago or so I was based in Turkey for a few years. For the last few years I’ve been


living in India, so I’ve been away, unlike many of you, from the day-to-day cut and thrust of relations between Turkey and Europe. I think it’s in some ways quite an interesting perspective to have, because a lot of what I’ve heard this evening doesn’t really surprise me, looking at it from the perspective of where we were ten years ago. Foreign policy, for example – if you look at where we were ten years ago, Turkey’s relations across its eastern borders were almost universally appalling: terrible relations with Syria, partly because of the Ocalan case, terrible relations with the Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq, and regular hot pursuit missions across that border, pretty awful relations with Iran and no relations whatsoever with Armenia, so any rebalancing from such a low base seems, to me, to be natural and universally welcome. I don’t see why it should be seen as a subject of debate, of whether Turkey’s slipping away from the West if it starts to pay some much-needed attention across those eastern borders. Similarly, in the relationship with the European Union, the negotiations – I’ve now been in India, but if I’d come back from Mars after five years and someone had told me that relations between Turkey and the European Union were problematic and negotiations were difficult, I wouldn’t have been particularly surprised. One question I’d like to put to any of you who’d care to deal with it is, obviously, as we all know, one thing which would revolutionise all these relationships would be some kind of deal on Cyprus. Every year, it seems to me, people start the year with wondering: will this be the year when something happens on Cyprus? Obviously, we have electoral politics starting to come into play in Turkey, which may make things difficult, but I wonder where you see any sense of optimism of any kind of progress on Cyprus. Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you. Excellent comments and questions. Yes, right here in the front. JAN TECHAU: Thank you very much. Jan Techau from the NATO Defence College. I have two quick ones to Sinan; you’ve mentioned the multilayered identity that is in the making in Turkey. Of course, one of the core elements of the single-layered identity, the previous one was secularism, so in this multilayered identity that’s in the making there is supposedly or obviously a Muslim layer, a religious layer. How will that play out in the relationship with the EU and with the West, in general, if that term is allowed? The religious element is the one big elephant in the room, I think, because it’s specifically in my country that I come from, Germany, people are obsessed about that element of the emerging identity. The second question: this newly emergent strategic player, Turkey, seems to have a lot of bad press and the debate is more or less negative: have we lost Turkey? We’ve heard all the key words here. Can you imagine a scenario under which the new strategic player, Turkey, that is framing itself as a more strategic key player in the region becomes, because of its new strategic role, more attractive to the West so that there is not alienation but newfound interest? Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: [Inaudible] three people who’ve offered specific questions to parts of that. Would you like to go ahead and address a couple of those, particularly Cyprus, but also the other points?


SINAN ÜLGEN: Yes, let me start with the easy ones. We were hopeful in 2004; a deal was negotiated and at the end of the day, areas where we couldn’t come to an agreement were left to the UN Secretary-General, so eventually the alliance [Inaudible] was born. The rest is history, as has been said. Today, we are revising that, and I think we have another opportunity. The window of opportunity, however, is not going to be with us for a long time. If we don’t have a deal in 2011, after the negotiations, which have now been continuing for almost two years - there is going to be another round at the end of the month – and, certainly, if we don’t have a deal before the Turkish elections, and the talks collapse, I’m afraid that we are going to enter a very different framework of thinking whereby there is going to be enormous pressure on the Turkish government domestically to basically say, this is it. We’ve done our work in a more constructive manner; we said yes in 2004; we haven’t received any benefits from it. We have now negotiated in good faith. Again, the talks have crumbled and collapsed, so from now on, we are changing our policy on Cyprus. If, indeed, Turkey is so influential in its region, has such a huge regional impact, why don’t we use that regional impact to start to collect recognition for the Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus? That, I think, will be the direction where many people will push the Turkish government. Therefore, I think we have entered actually a very risky period - high risk, high reward, in a way. If we have a deal, it’s great. One of the serious obstacles to Turkish accession will be lifted; many chapters will be unblocked and so on. On the other hand, if we fail once more, and I don’t want to go into the game of recrimination about who to blame, but if we happen to fail once more, then I think there is going to be enormous pressure to basically change the modus operandi and then to think along the creation of a Taiwan in the Mediterranean if… Now, Jan, about your question, the elephant in the room - I really like that. Yes, we haven’t really addressed that question. It certainly needs to come out. You are definitely right, that the reshaping of Turkish identity, what we see today, has a very strong conservative and religious element which was suppressed in the previous shaping of Turkish identity. That’s coming out in the open, that’s coming out in the open in a big way, because it’s also an element that pushed by the government. We know that the current party is basically linked to political Islam; it traces its roots to political Islam and they have a conservative agenda; so this is coming out in the open. This is still a very fundamental issue that Turkish society needs to address. Unfortunately, here I agree with the rapporteur: the atmosphere that’s being created in Turkey, the confrontational atmosphere, the polarising atmosphere, is not conducive to really creating the right sort of setup to discuss this issue in a… and to build consensus around what sort of societal vision, what sort of role for religion in the public sphere we should have. Unfortunately, there, the past few years have been more of a: let’s rely on our majority rule and dictate what the society will do, approach. That is where I have a concern, and this is what we’ve seen in the last referendum, where it was a split between 58% and 42%, that 58% voted yes, 42% no. Here, to adopt the constitution with 42% of the population still against that, is, I think, an indication that the fears that a certain segment of Turkish society has about the evolution of this trend have not been addressed properly. They need to be addressed. We have an opportunity which is going to come about with this new debate that we shall have about a new constitution after the elections, and I hope all political parties – the government and the opposition –


will have drawn their own conclusions from the creation of this polarised atmosphere and not repeat their mistakes, and work towards building the type of political climate where we can address these issues and arrive at a consensus about what sort of society we want to have. Obviously, this has linkage to foreign policy. Now, in many ways, yes, to some extent, the rapprochement with the Middle East has this dimension, but I’ve tried to outline in this paper that it’s not only about ideology, it also has an economic rationale, it has a foreign policy rationale; it’s a region where the relationship with Turkey was superficial, so there’s a return to normalcy in it. When you look at other issues, like Israel, you see that ideological component much more vividly. Yes, it will have an incidence on Turkish foreign policy, it has an incidence on foreign policy, but fundamentally, that’s up to the Turkish society to decide what sort of a consensus, what sort of framework we shall have on this very torn and sensitive, crucial question, really. Whether Turkey is becoming more attractive, or can Turkey become more attractive - I think Turkey is already becoming much more attractive for the EU. I see this whenever I go and speak to the policy elites, to the think-tankers; there it’s very easy to argue for Turkey’s attractiveness, Turkey’s contribution to the EU as a soft power. Turkey’s problem is not any more so much with the intellectual elites in Europe; Turkey’s problem is with regard to the popular support towards not only Turkey but also enlargement. It’s Europe’s problem as well, how you are going to deal with this phenomenon of Islam, where have arisen radical feelings among many European societies, which has an incidence on how Turkey’s viewed. The foreign policy angle, the strategic value of Turkey – yes, it’s nice to have, but it’s, unfortunately, not having the transformational effect that we see on the public discourse on Turkey in Europe. THOMAS CAROTHERS: We’re a little past time, but I’d like to give Ambassador Kuneralp and also Ria Oomen a chance to have a further reflection that any of the questions or comments stirred up, and then we’ll finish up and we’ll out in a few more minutes. AMBASSADOR SELIM KUNERALP: Thank you very much. I just wanted to comment on this Cyprus matter… RIA OOMEN-RUIJTEN: Me, too! AMBASSADOR SELIM KUNERALP: I’m not surprised! …because, of course, it has become a very important element in our relationship with the European Union, regrettably, I might say, but I’m not going to go into an analysis of the various mistakes that have been made in the past and which have brought this question to the foreground so much. The fact is that I agree with Sinan that there is a lot of frustration, because, at least since 2004 and, to a certain, since before that, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have been doing the running on trying to find a solution to the Cyprus problem; and the Greek Cypriots have been much less keen and enthusiastic. The fact is that the credibility of the whole exercise is increasingly being questioned. I do not want to speculate about what might happen, Taiwanisation or whatever, but the fact is that the European Union cannot remain indifferent to this situation. We’re talking of a member state; at least the


European Union, in terms of the accession treaty of 2004, considers that the whole island is part of the European Union. If we have, over the next five, ten, 15 years or so, a situation where the island remains divided and the European Union simply watches and does nothing, what sort of image is it going to project of the Union itself and a Union that, with all its new institutions, external action service and whatnot, wants to play a role on the world stage, quite rightly so? Won’t people ask it: before you play a role on the world stage, why don’t you try to help solve this minor problem which is really a domestic one from the point of view of the European Union? Of course, we do not expect the European Union to be an active participant in the efforts to reach a settlement, because the European Union, unfortunately, cannot be an impartial actor in this, and the United Nations is a much more reliable impartial actor. The Union can still play a role by discretely, or less so, encouraging the parties, and, particularly, at this particular moment, the Greek Cypriots to be constructive. Unfortunately, we do not see that happening. Mrs Merkel was in Southern Cyprus only last week and gave quite wrong messages from that perspective. At least she was interpreted as encouraging the leadership in the south in their present and rather intransigent position, so this was regrettable; it was an opportunity that was missed. I hope that in future the spokesmen and members and particular leaders of major European Union countries take a more balanced approach, because it is in the interests of the Union also. Thank you. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Finally, Ria, a final comment. RIA OOMEN-RUIJTEN: Yes, on the Cyprus issue, because that divides us quite often. In my view, Cyprus plays a role not only in the European negotiations, but it’s also, for the role of Turkey in the region, of major importance. Therefore, the problems should be solved. What I’m always speaking about, and I know that there is disagreement, I think that it would be nice if Turkey would give some positive signs, for instance, starting by withdrawing some troops. For instance, when I see that on first Christmas Day - quite important in most European countries - a mass is disturbed in the northern part of the island, and then I’m asking myself: if those kinds of frustrations would be taken away, then the role would already be much more positive than it is now. You know that for me and my party, it was Mr Kassoulides who wanted to say yes to the referendum, and it was Van den Broek who was in favour of a yes, and that was the reason that we took the whole island up, because we did expect that the whole island would come, but it hasn’t come, the population didn’t want. Now we have to give a new impetus. Then, I would like to know, because I thought the opposite could be true, why do you think that a solution has to be made before the elections? With your arguments, because of the citizens, it could also be that they do it only after the election, because they don’t want to frustrate that one-third of the population in Turkey. I would like to know that. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Sinan, can you answer that in one minute or less - not the whole conflict, but the question of the election timing? SINAN ÜLGEN: Yes. Well, the reason is that, first of all, we have now a process and this cannot be a very protracted process, so there is a calendar that was submitted by the Turkish side that actually wants a


solution by March. That’s what I’m basing my… A March deadline, with an international donors’ conference, peace conference, on Cyprus, and the government is ready to uphold that calendar, so the opportunity is there. THOMAS CAROTHERS: Sinan, thank you for writing this paper, for taking on this subject in a big and thoughtful way. I want to thank Ambassador Kuneralp and Ria Oomen for coming to offer your very direct and well-considered comments; we appreciate that. I thank all of you for coming; we look forward to seeing you again. Thanks very much.

RE-INTERPRETING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY · foreign policy. For many years, really, Turkish foreign policy was, in many ways, subsumed under the national security policy, foreign policy

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